05000482/FIN-2013002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for the failure to promptly identify and correct the source of a reactor coolant system pressure boundary leak from about August, 2012, through February 5, 2013. On February 4, 2013, Wolf Creek was performing a routine boric acid walkdown of containment as part of Refueling Outage 19. A cracked weld spraying reactor coolant pump seal water was observed on the upstream side of valve BBV130, reactor coolant pump A seal water supply line drain valve. The licensee had attributed increased leakage to reactor coolant system leakage identified in early June 2012, past emergency core cooling system check valves, without conducting inspections to rule out pressure boundary leakage. This issue was entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 62946. Wolf Creek\'s failure to promptly identify and correct the cause of reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage is a performance deficiency. The issue is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that leakage could increase over time. The inspectors assessed the significance of the issue using IMC 609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, Section A , Loss of Coolant Accident Initiators. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because after a reasonable assessment of degradation, the finding could not result in exceeding the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small loss of coolant accident and the finding would not have affected other systems used to mitigate a loss of coolant accident resulting in a total loss of their function (e.g., Interfacing System LOCA). The inspectors determined that this issue had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance cross-cutting area because Wolf Creek did not maintain long term plant safety by minimization of long-standing equipment issues to support safety. Specifically, the pressure boundary leakage was more difficult to identify because of concurrent check valve leakage into emergency core cooling systems, an intermittent but longstanding issue |
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2013002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Peabody D You J Laughlin L Carson M Bloodgood M Williams N Greene N O'Keefe R Kopriva T Hartman |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Wolf Creek - IR 05000482/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Wolf Creek) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Wolf Creek)
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