05000390/FIN-2012009-03: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Failure | | title = Failure to Maintain an Adequate Abnormal Condition Procedure to Implement the Flood Mitigation Strategy | ||
| docket = 05000390 | | docket = 05000390 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000390/2012009 | | inspection report = IR 05000390/2012009 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.01 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.01 | ||
| Inspector = J Bartley, J Heath, J Heisserer, L Pressley, R Monk, S Sandal, W Deschainek, | | Inspector = J Bartley, J Heath, J Heisserer, L Pressley, R Monk, S Sandal, W Deschainek, Millerr Monk, S Shaeffer | ||
| CCA = H.1 | | CCA = H.1 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.1 | | INPO aspect = LA.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified an AV of Technical Specification 5.7.1, Procedures, for the licensees inability to demonstrate that the required Stage I and Stage II activities could be performed within 27 hours as required by AOI-7.1, Maximum Probable Flood. The licensees failure to adequately demonstrate the ability to realign plant systems into their flood mode configuration using AOI-7.1, Maximum Probable Flood, within the time frame required by TRM 3.7.2 and Watts Bar UFSAR Section 2.4, which could directly lead to the inability to remove decay heat from the reactor core resulting in core damage, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was considered more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Reactor Safety/ Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the inability to realign plant systems into their flood mode configuration within the required time frame could directly lead to the inability to remove decay heat. The combination of the seismic and rainfall event frequencies and types of rainfall events which would lead to flooding above site grade and the inability to realign plant systems into their flood mode configuration within the 27-hour required time frame could directly lead to the inability to remove decay heat from the reactor core resulting in core damage which has an impact of substantial safety significance. The NRC concluded that the significance of the finding is preliminarily substantial safety significance (Yellow). The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting component of Resources in the area of Human Performance with an aspect of ensuring that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, inadequacies in those procedures, equipment, and personnel training necessary to realign plant systems within the required time frame to cope with all anticipated external flooding events. | | description = The inspectors identified an AV of Technical Specification 5.7.1, Procedures, for the licensees inability to demonstrate that the required Stage I and Stage II activities could be performed within 27 hours as required by AOI-7.1, Maximum Probable Flood. The licensees failure to adequately demonstrate the ability to realign plant systems into their flood mode configuration using AOI-7.1, Maximum Probable Flood, within the time frame required by TRM 3.7.2 and Watts Bar UFSAR Section 2.4, which could directly lead to the inability to remove decay heat from the reactor core resulting in core damage, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was considered more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Reactor Safety/ Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the inability to realign plant systems into their flood mode configuration within the required time frame could directly lead to the inability to remove decay heat. The combination of the seismic and rainfall event frequencies and types of rainfall events which would lead to flooding above site grade and the inability to realign plant systems into their flood mode configuration within the 27-hour required time frame could directly lead to the inability to remove decay heat from the reactor core resulting in core damage which has an impact of substantial safety significance. The NRC concluded that the significance of the finding is preliminarily substantial safety significance (Yellow). The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting component of Resources in the area of Human Performance with an aspect of ensuring that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, inadequacies in those procedures, equipment, and personnel training necessary to realign plant systems within the required time frame to cope with all anticipated external flooding events. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:47, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000390/2012009 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | Violation: Yellow |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Bartley J Heath J Heisserer L Pressley R Monk S Sandal W Deschainek Millerr Monk S Shaeffer |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
| ' | |