The inspectors identified a finding associated with a failure to implement a station procedure which resulted in not providing sufficient work instructions. Specifically, contrary to station procedure
EN-WM-105, Planning, Revision 10, the work instructions generated to replace the Unit 1 makeup tank level recorder did not provide sufficient detailed work instructions to prevent damage to adjacent equipment. This resulted in a technician causing a short across the makeup hand switch, blowing fuses, and losing power to several relays with the associated loss of relay functions. The licensee has placed the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2012-0716. The failure of station personnel to implement the requirements of station procedure
EN-WM-105, Planning, Revision 10, to generate a compliance work package with sufficient detail work instructions and/or documents was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and is therefore a finding. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4 Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A The
Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power the finding was screened against the
mitigating systems cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding; 1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system that did maintain its operability or functionality, 2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function, 3) did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, 4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant for greater than
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and 5) did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with work control component, in that the licensee failed to plan and coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify the hand switch during walk downs and adequately consider the job site conditions such that adjacent equipment would be protected from damage
