05000395/FIN-2011006-08: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.21 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.21 | ||
| Inspector = D Jones, D Mas | | Inspector = D Jones, D Mas-Penaranda, M Yeminy, S Sandal, B Desai, J Eargle | ||
| CCA = H.6 | | CCA = H.6 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.2 | | INPO aspect = WP.2 | ||
| description = The team identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to implement prompt corrective actions to ensure that SG primary to secondary break flow could be terminated within the accident analysis assumptions used for a design basis SGTR event. The licensee entered this concern into the corrective action program as CR-11-01031. The licensees failure to implement prompt and effective corrective actions to ensure that primary to secondary steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) break flow could be terminated within the timeframes established by the FSAR accident analysis of record was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was greater than minor because it adversely affected the SSC/barrier performance, procedure quality, and human performance attributes of the barrier integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to complete timely corrective actions to ensure the adequacy of system design, emergency operating procedures, and/or licensing basis SGTR accident analyses challenged the assurance that those attributes would demonstrate sufficient protection for the consequences associated with a design basis SGTR event. The significance of the finding was screened using the barrier integrity column of IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent (1) the degradation of only the radiological barrier function provided for the control room/auxiliary building/spent fuel pool, (2) the degradation of the barrier function of the control room against toxic atmosphere or smoke, (3) an actual open pathway in the integrity of reactor containment or heat removal components, or (4) an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The finding directly involved a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area [H.2(a)]. | | description = The team identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to implement prompt corrective actions to ensure that SG primary to secondary break flow could be terminated within the accident analysis assumptions used for a design basis SGTR event. The licensee entered this concern into the corrective action program as CR-11-01031. The licensees failure to implement prompt and effective corrective actions to ensure that primary to secondary steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) break flow could be terminated within the timeframes established by the FSAR accident analysis of record was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was greater than minor because it adversely affected the SSC/barrier performance, procedure quality, and human performance attributes of the barrier integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to complete timely corrective actions to ensure the adequacy of system design, emergency operating procedures, and/or licensing basis SGTR accident analyses challenged the assurance that those attributes would demonstrate sufficient protection for the consequences associated with a design basis SGTR event. The significance of the finding was screened using the barrier integrity column of IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent (1) the degradation of only the radiological barrier function provided for the control room/auxiliary building/spent fuel pool, (2) the degradation of the barrier function of the control room against toxic atmosphere or smoke, (3) an actual open pathway in the integrity of reactor containment or heat removal components, or (4) an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The finding directly involved a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area [H.2(a)]. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:44, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Summer  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000395/2011006 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Jones D Mas-Penaranda M Yeminy S Sandal B Desai J Eargle |
| CCA | H.6, Design Margins |
| INPO aspect | WP.2 |
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