05000266/FIN-2011003-04: Difference between revisions

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| identified by = NRC
| identified by = NRC
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.22
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.22
| Inspector = D Jones, K Carrington, M Thorpe,_Kavanaugh N, Feliz_Adomo P, Cardona_Morales S, Burton T, Bili
| Inspector = D Jones, K Carrington, M Thorpe Kavanaugh, N Feliz Adomo, P Cardona Morales, S Burton, T Bilik
| CCA = H.14
| CCA = H.14
| INPO aspect = DM.2
| INPO aspect = DM.2
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to perform an operability evaluation of leakage inside containment when it was identified in September 2010. Specifically, on September 26, 2010, condition report AR01397092 identified increased leakage and a related work order was initiated to inspect Unit 1 containment for the leakage source; however, an evaluation of the leak and leak location/source was not performed as required by licensee procedures. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of structure, system, and component and barrier performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers, specifically the containment, would be able to protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors answered No to all of the questions in the Containment Barrier column of Table 4a of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings; therefore, the finding screened as very low safety significance. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision-making, because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions during the decision-making and review process associated with the degraded condition (H.1(b)).
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to perform an operability evaluation of leakage inside containment when it was identified in September 2010. Specifically, on September 26, 2010, condition report AR01397092 identified increased leakage and a related work order was initiated to inspect Unit 1 containment for the leakage source; however, an evaluation of the leak and leak location/source was not performed as required by licensee procedures. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of structure, system, and component and barrier performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers, specifically the containment, would be able to protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors answered No to all of the questions in the Containment Barrier column of Table 4a of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings; therefore, the finding screened as very low safety significance. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision-making, because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions during the decision-making and review process associated with the degraded condition (H.1(b)).
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Latest revision as of 19:42, 20 February 2018

04
Site: Point Beach NextEra Energy icon.png
Report IR 05000266/2011003 Section 1R22
Date counted Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2)
Type: NCV: Green
cornerstone Barrier Integrity
Identified by: NRC identified
Inspection Procedure: IP 71111.22
Inspectors (proximate) D Jones
K Carrington
M Thorpe Kavanaugh
N Feliz Adomo
P Cardona Morales
S Burton
T Bilik
CCA H.14, Conservative Bias
INPO aspect DM.2
'