05000266/FIN-2011002-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.08 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.08 | ||
| Inspector = M Kunowski, M Phalen, M Thorpe | | Inspector = M Kunowski, M Phalen, M Thorpe-Kavanaugh, P Cardona-Morales, R Ruiz, R Winter, S Burton, T Bilik, A Dahbur, J Bozga, J Jandovitz, K Carrington | ||
| CCA = H.8 | | CCA = H.8 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.4 | | INPO aspect = WP.4 | ||
| description = On March 3, 2010, the inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a vendor examiners failure to follow procedure instructions and perform required circumferential ultrasonic scans of two elbow-to-pipe containment spray line welds. The licensee subsequently performed the scans with no relevant indications detected and documented the failure to perform the scans in the corrective action system. The finding was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to perform the weld examinations could become a more significant safety concern. Absent NRC identification, the licensee would not have performed the full required exam of the weld for an indefinite period of service which would have placed the reactor coolant pressure boundary at increased risk for undetected cracking, leakage, or component failure. This finding was of very low safety significance based on the inspectors answering No to the Phase 1 screening question identified in the Containment Barrier column of Table 4a in Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated January 10, 2008, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance. Specifically, the failure to perform required circumferential examinations occurred because the licensees management staff did not adequately stress or enforce procedure adherence for this activity. In particular, procedure NDE-173 was issued as an Informational Use type procedure that allowed licensee staff to rely on memory to perform the procedural steps, H.4(b). | | description = On March 3, 2010, the inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for a vendor examiners failure to follow procedure instructions and perform required circumferential ultrasonic scans of two elbow-to-pipe containment spray line welds. The licensee subsequently performed the scans with no relevant indications detected and documented the failure to perform the scans in the corrective action system. The finding was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to perform the weld examinations could become a more significant safety concern. Absent NRC identification, the licensee would not have performed the full required exam of the weld for an indefinite period of service which would have placed the reactor coolant pressure boundary at increased risk for undetected cracking, leakage, or component failure. This finding was of very low safety significance based on the inspectors answering No to the Phase 1 screening question identified in the Containment Barrier column of Table 4a in Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated January 10, 2008, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance. Specifically, the failure to perform required circumferential examinations occurred because the licensees management staff did not adequately stress or enforce procedure adherence for this activity. In particular, procedure NDE-173 was issued as an Informational Use type procedure that allowed licensee staff to rely on memory to perform the procedural steps, H.4(b). | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:42, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2011002 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Kunowski M Phalen M Thorpe-Kavanaugh P Cardona-Morales R Ruiz R Winter S Burton T Bilik A Dahbur J Bozga J Jandovitz K Carrington |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
| ' | |