05000440/FIN-2008003-03: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 15: | Line 15: | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Technical Specification 3.7.10, Emergency Closed Cooling Water (ECCW) System, Condition A.1, required, when one or two ECCW subsystem(s) are inoperable, that the licensee immediately declare associated system(s) or component(s) inoperable. Condition B.1, of TS 3.7.10, required that, if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A was not met, the licensee put the plant in Mode 3 within 12 hours. Contrary to this requirement, on February 8, 2008, the plant remained in Mode 1 at 4:30 p.m. when TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.10 requirements were not met. Specifically, on February 10, 2008, the licensee discovered that minimum flow requirements for operability were not met for the ECC 'B' subsystem since February 8, 2008, at 4:40 a.m., which required that ECC 'B' to be declared inoperable. Not knowing that TS LCO 3.7.10 was not met, licensee personnel did not make the required mode changes. Upon discovery, the licensee took immediate actions to restore ECC 'B' operability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was determined to not have resulted in an actual loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than its TS-allowed outage time. The issue was entered into the CAP as CR 08-35163 | | description = Technical Specification 3.7.10, Emergency Closed Cooling Water (ECCW) System, Condition A.1, required, when one or two ECCW subsystem(s) are inoperable, that the licensee immediately declare associated system(s) or component(s) inoperable. Condition B.1, of TS 3.7.10, required that, if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A was not met, the licensee put the plant in Mode 3 within 12 hours. Contrary to this requirement, on February 8, 2008, the plant remained in Mode 1 at 4:30 p.m. when TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.10 requirements were not met. Specifically, on February 10, 2008, the licensee discovered that minimum flow requirements for operability were not met for the ECC \'B\' subsystem since February 8, 2008, at 4:40 a.m., which required that ECC \'B\' to be declared inoperable. Not knowing that TS LCO 3.7.10 was not met, licensee personnel did not make the required mode changes. Upon discovery, the licensee took immediate actions to restore ECC \'B\' operability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was determined to not have resulted in an actual loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than its TS-allowed outage time. The issue was entered into the CAP as CR 08-35163 | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:35, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2008003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2008 (2008Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Wilk M Phalen G Wright M Franke R Leidy T Taylor J Cameron R Murray |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |