ML20204E990

Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Encl Secondary Containment Integrity

ML20204E990
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	03/23/1987
From:	PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Shared Package
ML20204E972	List: ML20204E966 ML20204E982 ML20204E990
References
NUDOCS 8703260119
Download: ML20204E990 (5)

Text

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS' 3/4.6.5-SECONDARY CONTAINMENT REACTOR ENCLOSURE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.5.1.1 REACTOR ENCLOSURE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION Without REACTOR ENCLOSURE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore REACTOR ENCLOSURE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.5.1.1 REACTOR ENCLOSURE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated by:

a. Verifying at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> that the pressure within the reactor enclosure secondary containment is greater than or equal to 0.25. inch of vacuum water gauge.

b. Verifying at least once per 31 days that:

1. All reactor enclosure secondary containment equipment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed.

2. At least one door in each access to the reactor enclosure secondary containment is closed.

3. All reactor enclosure secondary containment penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE secondary containment automatic isolation dampers / valves and i required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic dampers / valves secured in position.

c. At least once per 18 months:

1. Verifying that one standby gas treatment subsystem will draw down the reactor enclosure secondary containment to greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to 121 seconds with the reactor enclosure recirc system in operation, and

2. Operating one standby gas treatment subsystem for one hour and maintaining greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in the reactor enclosure secondary containment at a flow rate not exceeding 1250 cfm with wind speeds of < 7.0 mph as measured on the wind instrument on Tower 1 elevation 30' or, if that instrument is unavailable, Tower 2, elevation 159'.

8703260119 B70323 LIN PDR ADOCK 05000352 /4 6-46 p PDR

CbNTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASUS 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accident. The Reactor Enclosure and associated structures provide secondary containment during normal operation when the drywell is sealed and in service. At other times the drywell may be open and, when required, secondary containment integrity is specified.

Establishing and maintaining a vacuum in the reactor enclosure secondary containment with the standby gas treatment system once per 18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches, dampers and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment.

The OPERABILITY of the reactor enclosure recirculation system and the standby gas treatment systems ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or refueling accident (SGTS only). The reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses associated with containment leakage. The operation of this system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions used in the LOCA and refueling accident analyses. Provisions have been made to continuously purge the filter plenums with instrument air when the filters are not in use to prevent buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and the HEPA filters.

Although the safety analysis assumes that the reactor enclosure secondary containment draw down time will take 135 seconds, these surveillance requirements specify a draw down time of 121 seconds. This 14 second difference is due to the diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays which is not part of this surveillance requirement.

The reactor enclosure secondary containment draw down time analyses assumes a starting point of 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge and worst case SGTS dirty filter flow rate of 2800 cfm. The surveillance requirements satisfy this assumption by starting the draw down from ambient conditions and at the SGTS rated flow rate of 3000 cfm.

4 The post-LOCA offsite dose analysis assumes a reactor enclosure secondary containment post-draw down leakage rate of 1250 cfm and certain post-accident X/Q values. While the post-accident X/Q values represent a statistical interpretation of historical meteorological data, the highest ground level wind speed which can be associated with these values is 7 mph (Pasquill-Gifford stability Class G for a ground level release). Therefore, the surveillance requirement assures that the reactor enclosure secondary containment is verified under meteorological conditions consistent with the assumptions utilized in the design basis analysis. Reactor Enclosure LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-5

, CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASE'S Secondary Containment leakage tests that are successfully performed at wind speeds in excess of 7 mph would also satisfy the leak rate curveillance requirements, since it shows compliance with more conservative test conditions.

3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen combustible mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen ensures that these systems will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within the primary containment below the lower flammability limit during post-LOCA conditions. The primary containment hydrogen recombiner is provided to maintain the oxygen concentration below the lower flammability limit. The combustible gas analyzer is provided to continuously monitor, both during normal operations and post-LOCA, the hydrogen and oxygen concentrations in the primary containment. The primary containment atmospheric mixing system is provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere to prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen and oxygen l from exceeding the lower flammability limit. The hydrogen control l system is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7,

" Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971.

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LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-6

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULA'IDRY C0bHISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

In the Matter of  : Docket No. 50-352 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY  :

(Limerick Generating Station,  :

Unit No. 1)  :

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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I hereby certify that copies of Philadelphia Electric Company's Application for Amendment of Facility Operating License NPF-39 in the above-captioned matter were served on the following by_ deposit in the United States mail, first-class postage prepaid on this 23rd day of March, 1987.

Kathryn S. Lewis, Esquire Atomic Safety 6 Licensing Municipal Services Building Appeal Board Panel 15th 6 JFK Blvd. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Philadelphia, PA 19107 Washington, D.C. 20555 Benjamin H. Vogler, Esquire Robert J. Sugarman, Esquire Counsel for NRC Staff Sugarman 6 Hellegers Office of the Executive Legal Director 16th Floor, City Place U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 North Broad Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Philadelphia, PA 19107 Angus R. Love, Esquire Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esquire Montgomery County Legal Aid Conner 6 Wetterhahn, P.C.

107 E. Main Street 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Norristown, PA 19401 Washington, D.C. 20006 Docket 6 Service Section Mr. Robert L. Anthony U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 103 Vernon Lane, Box 186 Washington, D.C. 20555 - (3 copies) Moylan, PA 19065 Atomic Safety 6 Licensing Board Panel Mr. Frank R. Romano U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forest Avenue Washington, D.C. -20555 Ambler, PA 19002 Barry M. Hartman, Esquire Timothy R. S. Campbell, Director Office of General Counsel Department of Emergency Services P.O. Box 11775 14 East Biddle Street Harrisburg, PA 17108 West Chester, PA 19380 f

David Wersan, Esquire Ms. Maureen Mulligan Assistant Consumer Advocate Limerick Ecology Action Office of Consumer Advocate P.O. Box 761 1425 Strawberry Square 762 Oteen Street Harrisburg, PA 17120 Pottstown, PA 19464 Mr. Thomas Gerusky, Director Charles W. Elliott, Esquire Bureau of Radiation Protection Counsel for Limerick Ecology Action Department of Environmental Resources 325 N. 10th Street i

Fulton Bank Building, 5th Floor Easton, PA 18042 i Third 4 Locust Streets l

Harrisburg, PA 17120 E. M. Kelly Senior Resident Inspector Spence W. Perry, Esquire U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission General Counsel P.O. Box 47 FBIA, Room 840 Sanatoga, PA 19464 500 C Street, SW Washington, D.C. 20472 Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Director Region I Pennsylvania Emergency 631 Park Avenue Management Agency King of Prussia, PA 19406 Basement, Transportation 6 Safety Building liarrisburg, PA 17120 N

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Eugene J,. Bradley '/

Attorney for Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19101

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