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| number = ML17041A387 | | number = ML17041A387 | ||
| issue date = 02/16/2017 | | issue date = 02/16/2017 | ||
| title = Staff Review of Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementing Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 | | title = Staff Review of Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Associated with Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementing Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 | ||
| author name = Vega F | | author name = Vega F | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/JLD | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/JLD | ||
| Line 18: | Line 18: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 Mr. Joseph W. Shea Vice President, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 3R-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 16, 2017 Mr. Joseph W. Shea Vice President, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 3R-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 | ||
==SUBJECT:== | ==SUBJECT:== | ||
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1AND2-STAFF REVIEW OF SPENT FUEL POOL EVALUATION ASSOCIATED WITH REEVALUATED SEISMIC HAZARD IMPLEMENTING NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1 (CAC NOS. MF3767 AND MF3768) | SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1AND2- STAFF REVIEW OF SPENT FUEL POOL EVALUATION ASSOCIATED WITH REEVALUATED SEISMIC HAZARD IMPLEMENTING NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1 (CAC NOS. MF3767 AND MF3768) | ||
==Dear Mr. Shea:== | ==Dear Mr. Shea:== | ||
The purpose of this letter is to inform Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) of the results of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's review of the spent fuel pool (SFP) evaluation for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah), which was submitted in response to Item 9 of Enclosure 1 of the NRC's March 12, 2012, request for information (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340) issued under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the 50.54(f) letter). The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's assessment was performed consistent with the NRG-endorsed SFP Evaluation Guidance Report and that the licensee has provided sufficient information to complete the response to Item 9 of the 50.54(f) letter. BACKGROUND On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter as part of implementing lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 1 to the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees reevaluate seismic hazards at their sites using present-day methodologies and guidance. | |||
Enclosure 1, Item 4, of the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees perform a comparison of the ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) and the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The staff's assessment of the information provided in response to Items 1-3 and 5-7 of the 50.54(f) letter is provided by letter dated April 27, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15098A641 | The purpose of this letter is to inform Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) of the results of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's review of the spent fuel pool (SFP) evaluation for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah), which was submitted in response to Item 9 of Enclosure 1 of the NRC's March 12, 2012, request for information (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340) issued under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the 50.54(f) letter). The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's assessment was performed consistent with the NRG-endorsed SFP Evaluation Guidance Report and that the licensee has provided sufficient information to complete the response to Item 9 of the 50.54(f) letter. | ||
). Enclosure 1, Item 9, of the 50.54(f) letter requested that, when the GMRS exceeds the SSE in the 1 to 10 Hertz frequency range, a seismic evaluation be made of the SFP. More specifically, plants were asked to consider" ... all seismically induced failures that can lead to draining of the SFP." | BACKGROUND On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter as part of implementing lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 1 to the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees reevaluate seismic hazards at their sites using present-day methodologies and guidance. Enclosure 1, Item 4, of the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees perform a comparison of the ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) and the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The staff's assessment of the information provided in response to Items 1-3 and 5-7 of the 50.54(f) letter is provided by letter dated April 27, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15098A641 ). Enclosure 1, Item 9, of the 50.54(f) letter requested that, when the GMRS exceeds the SSE in the 1 to 10 Hertz frequency range, a seismic evaluation be made of the SFP. More specifically, plants were asked to consider" ... all seismically induced failures that can lead to draining of the SFP." | ||
J. Shea By letter dated February 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16055A021 | |||
), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) staff submitted Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report No. 3002007148 entitled, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: | J. Shea By letter dated February 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16055A021 ), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) staff submitted Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report No. 3002007148 entitled, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Spent Fuel Pool Integrity Evaluation" (SFP Evaluation Guidance Report). The SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides criteria for evaluating the seismic adequacy of an SFP to the reevaluated GMRS hazard levels. This report supplements the guidance in EPRI Report 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID)" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12333A170), for plants where the GMRS peak spectral acceleration is less than or equal to 0.8g (low GMRS sites). The NRC endorsed the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report by letter dated March 17, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15350A158), as an acceptable method for licensees to use when responding to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter. | ||
Spent Fuel Pool Integrity Evaluation" (SFP Evaluation Guidance Report). The SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides criteria for evaluating the seismic adequacy of an SFP to the reevaluated GMRS hazard levels. This report supplements the guidance in EPRI Report 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: | By letter dated October 27, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15194A015), the NRC staff stated that SFP evaluation submittals for low GMRS sites are expected by December 31, 2016. | ||
Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID)" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12333A170), for plants where the GMRS peak spectral acceleration is less than or equal to 0.8g (low GMRS sites). The NRC endorsed the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report by letter dated March 17, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15350A158), as an acceptable method for licensees to use when responding to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter. By letter dated October 27, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15194A015), the NRC staff stated that SFP evaluation submittals for low GMRS sites are expected by December 31, 2016. REVIEW OF LICENSEE SPENT FUEL POOL EVALUATION By letter dated December 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16362A204), the licensee submitted its SFP evaluation for Sequoyah for NRC review. The NRC staff assessed the licensee's implementation of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report through the completion of a reviewer checklist, which is included as an enclosure to this letter. TECHNICAL EVALUATION Section 3.0 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report develops SFP evaluation criteria for plants with GMRS peak spectral acceleration less than or equal to 0.8g. These criteria address SFP structural elements (e.g., floors, walls, and supports); | REVIEW OF LICENSEE SPENT FUEL POOL EVALUATION By letter dated December 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16362A204), the licensee submitted its SFP evaluation for Sequoyah for NRC review. The NRC staff assessed the licensee's implementation of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report through the completion of a reviewer checklist, which is included as an enclosure to this letter. | ||
non-structural elements (e.g., penetrations); | TECHNICAL EVALUATION Section 3.0 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report develops SFP evaluation criteria for plants with GMRS peak spectral acceleration less than or equal to 0.8g. These criteria address SFP structural elements (e.g., floors, walls, and supports); non-structural elements (e.g., | ||
seismically-induced SFP sloshing; and water losses due to heat-up and boil-off. | penetrations); seismically-induced SFP sloshing; and water losses due to heat-up and boil-off. | ||
Section 3.0 also provides applicability criteria, which enables licensees to determine if their specific conditions are within the bounds considered in developing the evaluation criteria for this report. The staff's review consists of confirming that these SFP site-specific conditions are within the bounds considered for the evaluation criteria specified in the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report. 1.1 Spent Fuel Pool Structural Evaluation Section 3.1 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides a SFP structural evaluation approach used to demonstrate that the SFP structure is sufficiently robust against the reevaluated seismic hazard. This approach supplements the guidance in Section 7 of the SPID and follows acceptable methods used to assess the seismic capacity of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) for nuclear power plants as documented in EPRI NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Plant Seismic Margin, Revision 1." Table 3-2 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report (reproduced from Table 2.3 of EPRI NP-6041) provides the structural screening criteria to assess the SFPs and their supporting structures. | Section 3.0 also provides applicability criteria, which enables licensees to determine if their site-specific conditions are within the bounds considered in developing the evaluation criteria for this report. The staff's review consists of confirming that these SFP site-specific conditions are within the bounds considered for the evaluation criteria specified in the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report. | ||
1.1 Spent Fuel Pool Structural Evaluation Section 3.1 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides a SFP structural evaluation approach used to demonstrate that the SFP structure is sufficiently robust against the reevaluated seismic hazard. This approach supplements the guidance in Section 7 of the SPID and follows acceptable methods used to assess the seismic capacity of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) for nuclear power plants as documented in EPRI NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Plant Seismic Margin, Revision 1." Table 3-2 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report (reproduced from Table 2.3 of EPRI NP-6041) provides the structural screening criteria to assess the SFPs and their supporting structures. | |||
The licensee stated that it followed the SFP structural evaluation approach presented in the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report and provided site-specific data to confirm its applicability. | The licensee stated that it followed the SFP structural evaluation approach presented in the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report and provided site-specific data to confirm its applicability. | ||
J.Shea The NRC staff reviewed the structural information provided, which included the requested specific data in Section 3.3 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report, and confirmed that the evaluation criteria are applicable to the Sequoyah site. The staff concludes that SFP SSCs were appropriately evaluated and screened based on the seismic capacity criteria in EPRI NP-6041 and that the licensee has demonstrated that the SFP structure is sufficiently robust and can withstand ground motions with peak spectral acceleration less than or equal to O.Bg. 1.2 Spent Fuel Pool Non-Structural Evaluation Section 3.2 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides criteria for evaluating the structural aspects of the SFP, such as piping connections, fuel gates, and anti-siphoning devices, as well as SFP sloshing and heat up and boil-off of SFP water inventory. | |||
Specifically, Table 3-4 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides a summary of the SFP structural evaluation criteria derived in Section 3.2, along with applicability criteria to demonstrate that site-specific conditions are suitable for applying the evaluation criteria. | J.Shea The NRC staff reviewed the structural information provided, which included the requested site-specific data in Section 3.3 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report, and confirmed that the evaluation criteria are applicable to the Sequoyah site. The staff concludes that SFP SSCs were appropriately evaluated and screened based on the seismic capacity criteria in EPRI NP-6041 and that the licensee has demonstrated that the SFP structure is sufficiently robust and can withstand ground motions with peak spectral acceleration less than or equal to O.Bg. | ||
The licensee stated that it followed the SFP non-structural evaluation approach presented in the guidance report and provided site-specific data to confirm its applicability. | 1.2 Spent Fuel Pool Non-Structural Evaluation Section 3.2 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides criteria for evaluating the non-structural aspects of the SFP, such as piping connections, fuel gates, and anti-siphoning devices, as well as SFP sloshing and heat up and boil-off of SFP water inventory. Specifically, Table 3-4 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides a summary of the SFP non-structural evaluation criteria derived in Section 3.2, along with applicability criteria to demonstrate that site-specific conditions are suitable for applying the evaluation criteria. | ||
The staff reviewed the non-structural information provided, which included the requested site-specific data in Table 3-4 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report, and confirmed that the evaluation criteria are applicable to the Sequoyah site. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee adequately evaluated the non-structural considerations for SSCs whose failure could lead to potential down of the SFP due to a seismic event. CONCLUSION The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's SFP evaluation report. Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the SFP integrity evaluation met the criteria of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report for Sequoyah and therefore, the licensee responded appropriately to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the NRC's 50.54(f) letter. | The licensee stated that it followed the SFP non-structural evaluation approach presented in the guidance report and provided site-specific data to confirm its applicability. The staff reviewed the non-structural information provided, which included the requested site-specific data in Table 3-4 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report, and confirmed that the evaluation criteria are applicable to the Sequoyah site. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee adequately evaluated the non-structural considerations for SSCs whose failure could lead to potential drain-down of the SFP due to a seismic event. | ||
J.Shea If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1617 or via e-mail at Frankie.Vega@nrc.gov. | CONCLUSION The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's SFP evaluation report. Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the SFP integrity evaluation met the criteria of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report for Sequoyah and therefore, the licensee responded appropriately to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the NRC's 50.54(f) letter. | ||
Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 | |||
J.Shea If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1617 or via e-mail at Frankie.Vega@nrc.gov. | |||
Sincerely, Frat~anager Hazards Management Branch Japan Lessons-Learned Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 | |||
==Enclosure:== | ==Enclosure:== | ||
Technical Review Checklist cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv | Technical Review Checklist cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv | ||
Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter requests addressees to reevaluate the seismic hazard at their site using present-day methods and guidance for licensing new nuclear power plants, and identify actions to address or modify, as necessary, plant components affected by the reevaluated seismic hazards. Enclosure 1, Item 4, of the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees perform a comparison of the ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) with the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). Enclosure 1, Item 9, requests that, when the GMRS exceeds the SSE in the 1 to 10 Hertz (Hz) frequency range, a seismic evaluation be made of the spent fuel pool (SFP). More specifically, plants were asked to consider" ... all seismically induced failures that can lead to draining of the SFP." Additionally, by letter dated February 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16055A021 | |||
), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report No. 3002007148 entitled, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: | TECHNICAL REVIEW CHECKLIST BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO SPENT FUEL POOL EVALUATIONS FOR LOW GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM SITES IMPLEMENTING NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1 SEISMIC SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 BACKGROUND By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) issued a request for information to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deterred status, pursuant to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 O CFR), Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the "50.54(f) letter"). Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter requests addressees to reevaluate the seismic hazard at their site using present-day methods and guidance for licensing new nuclear power plants, and identify actions to address or modify, as necessary, plant components affected by the reevaluated seismic hazards. | ||
Spent Fuel Pool Integrity Evaluation" (SFP Evaluation Guidance Report). The SFP Evaluation Guidance Report supports the completion of SFP evaluations for sites with reevaluated seismic hazard exceedance in the 1 to | Enclosure 1, Item 4, of the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees perform a comparison of the ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) with the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). | ||
By letter dated December 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16362A204), Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee), provided a SFP report in a response to Enclosure 1, Item 9, of the 50.54(f) letter for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah). | Enclosure 1, Item 9, requests that, when the GMRS exceeds the SSE in the 1 to 10 Hertz (Hz) frequency range, a seismic evaluation be made of the spent fuel pool (SFP). More specifically, plants were asked to consider" ... all seismically induced failures that can lead to draining of the SFP." | ||
The NRG staff performed its review of the licensee's submittal to assess whether the licensee responded appropriately to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter. The NRG staff checked whether the site-specific parameters are within the bounds of the criteria considered in the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report, verified the SFP's seismic adequacy to withstand the reevaluated GMRS hazard levels, and confirmed that the requested information in response to Item 9 of the 50.54(f) letter was provided. | Additionally, by letter dated February 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16055A021 ), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report No. | ||
Enclosure | 3002007148 entitled, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Spent Fuel Pool Integrity Evaluation" (SFP Evaluation Guidance Report). The SFP Evaluation Guidance Report supports the completion of SFP evaluations for sites with reevaluated seismic hazard exceedance in the 1 to 1O Hz frequency range. Specifically, the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report addressed those sites where the GMRS peak spectral acceleration (Sa) is less than or equal to 0.89 (low GMRS sites). The NRG endorsed the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report by letter dated March 17, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15350A158), as an acceptable method for licensees to use when responding to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter. Licensee deviations from the SFP Evaluation Guidance should be discussed in their SFP evaluation submittal. | ||
By letter dated December 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16362A204), Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee), provided a SFP report in a response to Enclosure 1, Item 9, of the 50.54(f) letter for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah). The NRG staff performed its review of the licensee's submittal to assess whether the licensee responded appropriately to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter. The NRG staff checked whether the site-specific parameters are within the bounds of the criteria considered in the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report, verified the SFP's seismic adequacy to withstand the reevaluated GMRS hazard levels, and confirmed that the requested information in response to Item 9 of the 50.54(f) letter was provided. | |||
Enclosure | |||
A review checklist was used for consistency and scope. The application of this staff review is limited to the SFP evaluation as part of the seismic review of low GMRS sites as part of the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1. | |||
NTTF Recommendation 2.1 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluations Technical Review Checklist for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Site Parameters: | NTTF Recommendation 2.1 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluations Technical Review Checklist for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Site Parameters: | ||
I. Site-Specific GMRS The licensee: | I. Site-Specific GMRS The licensee: | ||
* Provided the site-specific GMRS consistent with the information Yes provided in the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (SHSR), or its update and evaluated by the staff in its staff assessment. | * Provided the site-specific GMRS consistent with the information Yes provided in the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (SHSR), or its update and evaluated by the staff in its staff assessment. | ||
* Stated that the GMRS peak Sa is less than or equal to 0.8g for any Yes frequency. | * Stated that the GMRS peak Sa is less than or equal to 0.8g for any Yes frequency. | ||
Notes from the reviewer: | Notes from the reviewer: | ||
: 1. The NRG staff confirmed that the site-specific peak Sa= 0.759g (SHSR -ADAMS Accession No. ML14098A478). | : 1. The NRG staff confirmed that the site-specific peak Sa= 0.759g (SHSR - ADAMS Accession No. ML14098A478). | ||
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | ||
No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | ||
The NRC staff concludes: | The NRC staff concludes: | ||
* The site-specific GMRS peak Sa at any frequency is less than 0.8g . | * The site-specific GMRS peak Sa at any frequency is less than 0.8g . Yes | ||
* The licensee's GMRS used in this evaluation is consistent with the information provided in the SHSR. Structural Parameters: | * The licensee's GMRS used in this evaluation is consistent with the Yes information provided in the SHSR. | ||
II. Seismic Design of the SFP Structure The licensee: | Structural Parameters: | ||
* Specified the building housing the SFP. | II. Seismic Design of the SFP Structure The licensee: | ||
* Specified the plant's peak ground acceleration (PGA). | * Specified the building housing the SFP. Yes | ||
* Stated that the building housing the SFP was designed using an SSE with a PGA of at least 0.1 Q. | * Specified the plant's peak ground acceleration (PGA). Yes | ||
: 1. The NRC staff confirmed that the SFP is housed in the auxiliary building which is seismically designed to the site SSE with a PGA of 0.18g (SHSR Section 3.1 and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 3.8) Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | * Stated that the building housing the SFP was designed using an Yes SSE with a PGA of at least 0.1 Q. | ||
Notes from the reviewer: | |||
: 1. The NRC staff confirmed that the SFP is housed in the auxiliary building which is seismically designed to the site SSE with a PGA of 0.18g (SHSR Section 3.1 and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 3.8) | |||
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | |||
No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | ||
The NRC staff concludes that: | The NRC staff concludes that: | ||
* The structure housing the SFP was designed using an SSE with a Yes PGA of at least 0.1 g. Ill. Structural Load Path to the SFP The licensee: | * The structure housing the SFP was designed using an SSE with a Yes PGA of at least 0.1 g. | ||
* Provided a description of the structural load path from the Yes foundation to the SFP. | Ill. Structural Load Path to the SFP The licensee: | ||
* Performed screening based on EPRI NP-6041 Table 2-3 screening Yes criteria. | * Provided a description of the structural load path from the Yes foundation to the SFP. | ||
* Performed screening based on EPRI NP-6041 Table 2-3 screening Yes criteria. | |||
Notes from the reviewer: | Notes from the reviewer: | ||
: 1. The staff verified the structural load path to the SFP. The staff confirmed that the structural load path from the auxiliary building foundation to the SFP consists of reinforced concrete shear walls and a reinforced concrete pool bottom that is built integrally with the auxiliary building foundation. (FSAR Section 3.8.4). Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | : 1. The staff verified the structural load path to the SFP. The staff confirmed that the structural load path from the auxiliary building foundation to the SFP consists of reinforced concrete shear walls and a reinforced concrete pool bottom that is built integrally with the auxiliary building foundation. (FSAR Section 3.8.4). | ||
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | |||
No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | ||
The NRC staff concludes that: | The NRC staff concludes that: | ||
* Licensee appropriately described the structural load path to the SFP. | * Licensee appropriately described the structural load path to the Yes SFP. | ||
* Structures were appropriately screened based on the screening criteria in EPRI NP-6041. | * Structures were appropriately screened based on the screening Yes criteria in EPRI NP-6041. | ||
* Stated that the SFP structure is included in the Civil Inspection Yes Program performed in accordance with Maintenance Rule (1 O CFR 50.65). Notes from the reviewer: | IV. SFP Structure Included in the Civil Inspection Program Performed in Accordance with Maintenance Rule The licensee: | ||
* Stated that the SFP structure is included in the Civil Inspection Yes Program performed in accordance with Maintenance Rule (1 O CFR 50.65). | |||
Notes from the reviewer: | |||
None Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | None Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | ||
No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | ||
The NRC staff concludes that: | The NRC staff concludes that: | ||
* The SFP structure is included in the Civil Inspection Program Yes performed in accordance with Maintenance Rule (1 O CFR 50.65). Non-Structural Parameters: | * The SFP structure is included in the Civil Inspection Program Yes performed in accordance with Maintenance Rule (1 O CFR 50.65). | ||
Non-Structural Parameters: | |||
V. Applicability of Piping Evaluation The licensee: | V. Applicability of Piping Evaluation The licensee: | ||
* Stated that piping attached to the SFP is evaluated to the SSE . Yes Notes from the reviewer: | * Stated that piping attached to the SFP is evaluated to the SSE . Yes Notes from the reviewer: | ||
: 1. The licensee stated that piping attached to the SFP is evaluated to the SSE (FSAR Section 3.2.2). Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | : 1. The licensee stated that piping attached to the SFP is evaluated to the SSE (FSAR Section 3.2.2). | ||
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | |||
No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | ||
The NRC staff concludes that: | The NRC staff concludes that: | ||
* The piping attached to the SFP is evaluated to the SSE . Yes | * The piping attached to the SFP is evaluated to the SSE . Yes | ||
* Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation Yes guidance have been met. | * Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation Yes guidance have been met. | ||
VI. Siphoning Evaluation The licensee: | VI. Siphoning Evaluation The licensee: | ||
* Stated that anti-siphoning devices are installed on piping systems Yes that could lead to siphoning inventory from the SFP. | * Stated that anti-siphoning devices are installed on piping systems Yes that could lead to siphoning inventory from the SFP. | ||
* In cases where anti-siphoning devices were not included on the N/A applicable piping, a description documenting the evaluation performed to determine the seismic adequacy of the piping is provided. | * In cases where anti-siphoning devices were not included on the N/A applicable piping, a description documenting the evaluation performed to determine the seismic adequacy of the piping is provided. | ||
* Stated that the piping of the SFP cooling system cannot lead to rapid No drain down due to siphoning. | * Stated that the piping of the SFP cooling system cannot lead to rapid No drain down due to siphoning. | ||
* Stated that no anti-siphoning devices are attached to 2" or smaller piping with extremely large extended operators. | * Stated that no anti-siphoning devices are attached to 2" or smaller Yes piping with extremely large extended operators. | ||
* Provided a seismic adequacy evaluation, in accordance with NP-N/A 6041, for cases where active siphoning devices are attached to 2" or smaller piping with extremely large extended operators. | |||
* Provided a seismic adequacy evaluation, in accordance with NP-6041, for cases where active siphoning devices are attached to 2" or | |||
Notes from the reviewer: | Notes from the reviewer: | ||
: 1. The licensee stated that anti-siphoning devices are installed on all SFP piping that could lead to siphoning (FSAR Section 9.1.3). 2. Piping of the SFP cooling system is not likely to lead to rapid draindown due to siphoning. | : 1. The licensee stated that anti-siphoning devices are installed on all SFP piping that could lead to siphoning (FSAR Section 9.1.3). | ||
: 2. Piping of the SFP cooling system is not likely to lead to rapid draindown due to siphoning. | |||
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | ||
No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | ||
The NRC staff concludes: | The NRC staff concludes: | ||
* Anti-siphoning devices exist in applicable piping systems that could Yes lead to siphoning water from the SFP. | * Anti-siphoning devices exist in applicable piping systems that could Yes lead to siphoning water from the SFP. | ||
* Piping of the SFP cooling system is not likely to lead to rapid Yes draindown due to siphoning. | * Piping of the SFP cooling system is not likely to lead to rapid Yes draindown due to siphoning. | ||
* No active anti-siphoning devices are attached to 2" or smaller piping Yes with extremely large extended operators. | * No active anti-siphoning devices are attached to 2" or smaller piping Yes with extremely large extended operators. | ||
* Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation | Yes | ||
* Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation guidance have been met. | |||
VII. Sloshing Evaluation The licensee: | VII. Sloshing Evaluation The licensee: | ||
* Specified the SFP dimensions (length, width, and depth). Yes | * Specified the SFP dimensions (length, width, and depth). Yes | ||
* Specified that the SFP dimensions are bounded by the dimensions Yes specified in the report (i.e., SFP length and width <125ft.; SFP depth >36ft.). | * Specified that the SFP dimensions are bounded by the dimensions Yes specified in the report (i.e., SFP length and width <125ft.; SFP depth >36ft.). | ||
* Stated that the peak Sa in the frequency range less than 0.3 Hz is Yes less than 0.1 g. Notes from the reviewer: | * Stated that the peak Sa in the frequency range less than 0.3 Hz is Yes less than 0.1 g. | ||
: 1. Unit 1 -SFP dimensions (FSAR Figure 9.1.2.2) -SFP Length -39.5 ft. -SFP Width -31.7 ft. -SFP Depth -47.8 ft. 2. The staff confirmed in the SHSR that the peak Sa in the frequency range less than 0.3 Hz is less than 0.1 g (SHSR). Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | Notes from the reviewer: | ||
: 1. Unit 1 - SFP dimensions (FSAR Figure 9.1.2.2) | |||
- SFP Length - 39.5 ft. | |||
- SFP Width - 31.7 ft. | |||
- SFP Depth - 47.8 ft. | |||
: 2. The staff confirmed in the SHSR that the peak Sa in the frequency range less than 0.3 Hz is less than 0.1 g (SHSR). | |||
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | |||
No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | ||
The NRC staff concludes: | The NRC staff concludes: | ||
* SFP dimensions are bounded by the dimensions specified in the report (i.e., SFP length and width <125ft.; SFP depth >36ft.). | * SFP dimensions are bounded by the dimensions specified in the Yes report (i.e., SFP length and width <125ft.; SFP depth >36ft.). | ||
* The peak Sa in the frequency range less than 0.3 Hz is less than 0.1g. | * The peak Sa in the frequency range less than 0.3 Hz is less than Yes 0.1g. | ||
* Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation guidance have been met. VIII. Evaporation Evaluation The licensee: | * Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation Yes guidance have been met. | ||
* Provided the surface area of the plant's SFP. | VIII. Evaporation Evaluation The licensee: | ||
* Stated that the surface area of the plant's SFP is greater than 500 ft 2. | * Provided the surface area of the plant's SFP. Yes | ||
* Provided the licensed reactor core thermal power. | * Stated that the surface area of the plant's SFP is greater than Yes 500 ft 2 . | ||
* Stated that the reactor core thermal power is less than 4,000 megawatt thermal (MW1) per unit. | * Provided the licensed reactor core thermal power. Yes | ||
: 1. Surface area of pool = 1,250 ft 2 2. Reactor thermal power = 3,455 MW, (FSAR Section 1.1) Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | * Stated that the reactor core thermal power is less than 4,000 Yes megawatt thermal (MW1) per unit. | ||
Notes from the reviewer: | |||
: 1. Surface area of pool = 1,250 ft 2 | |||
: 2. Reactor thermal power = 3,455 MW, (FSAR Section 1.1) | |||
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution: | |||
No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | No deviations or deficiencies were identified. | ||
The NRC staff concludes: | The NRC staff concludes: | ||
* The surface area of the plant's SFP is greater than 500 ft 2. Yes | * The surface area of the plant's SFP is greater than 500 ft 2. Yes | ||
* The reactor core thermal power is less than 4,000 MW, per unit. Yes | * The reactor core thermal power is less than 4,000 MW, per unit. Yes | ||
* Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation Yes guidance have been met. | * Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation Yes guidance have been met. | ||
== Conclusions:== | == | ||
Conclusions:== | |||
The NRG staff reviewed the licensee's SFP evaluation report. Based on its review, the NRG staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the SFP integrity evaluation met the criteria of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report for Sequoyah and therefore the licensee responded appropriately to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter. | The NRG staff reviewed the licensee's SFP evaluation report. Based on its review, the NRG staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the SFP integrity evaluation met the criteria of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report for Sequoyah and therefore the licensee responded appropriately to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter. | ||
ML17041A387 *via e-mail OFFICE NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NRR/JLD/LA NRR/JLD/JHMB/BC(A) | |||
*via e-mail OFFICE NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NRR/JLD/LA NRR/JLD/JHMB/BC(A) | NAME FVega SLent LGibson DATE 02/14/2017 02/13/2017 02/15/2017 OFFICE NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NAME FVega DATE 02/16/2017}} | ||
NAME FVega SLent LGibson DATE 02/14/2017 02/13/2017 02/15/2017 OFFICE NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NAME FVega DATE 02/16/2017 | |||
Latest revision as of 19:55, 18 March 2020
| ML17041A387 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/2017 |
| From: | Frankie Vega Japan Lessons-Learned Division |
| To: | James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Vega F, NRR/JLD, 415-1617 | |
| References | |
| CAC MF3767, CAC MF3768 | |
| Download: ML17041A387 (13) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 16, 2017 Mr. Joseph W. Shea Vice President, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 3R-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1AND2- STAFF REVIEW OF SPENT FUEL POOL EVALUATION ASSOCIATED WITH REEVALUATED SEISMIC HAZARD IMPLEMENTING NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1 (CAC NOS. MF3767 AND MF3768)
Dear Mr. Shea:
The purpose of this letter is to inform Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) of the results of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's review of the spent fuel pool (SFP) evaluation for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah), which was submitted in response to Item 9 of Enclosure 1 of the NRC's March 12, 2012, request for information (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340) issued under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the 50.54(f) letter). The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's assessment was performed consistent with the NRG-endorsed SFP Evaluation Guidance Report and that the licensee has provided sufficient information to complete the response to Item 9 of the 50.54(f) letter.
BACKGROUND On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter as part of implementing lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 1 to the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees reevaluate seismic hazards at their sites using present-day methodologies and guidance. Enclosure 1, Item 4, of the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees perform a comparison of the ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) and the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The staff's assessment of the information provided in response to Items 1-3 and 5-7 of the 50.54(f) letter is provided by letter dated April 27, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15098A641 ). Enclosure 1, Item 9, of the 50.54(f) letter requested that, when the GMRS exceeds the SSE in the 1 to 10 Hertz frequency range, a seismic evaluation be made of the SFP. More specifically, plants were asked to consider" ... all seismically induced failures that can lead to draining of the SFP."
J. Shea By letter dated February 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16055A021 ), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) staff submitted Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report No. 3002007148 entitled, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Spent Fuel Pool Integrity Evaluation" (SFP Evaluation Guidance Report). The SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides criteria for evaluating the seismic adequacy of an SFP to the reevaluated GMRS hazard levels. This report supplements the guidance in EPRI Report 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID)" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12333A170), for plants where the GMRS peak spectral acceleration is less than or equal to 0.8g (low GMRS sites). The NRC endorsed the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report by letter dated March 17, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15350A158), as an acceptable method for licensees to use when responding to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter.
By letter dated October 27, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15194A015), the NRC staff stated that SFP evaluation submittals for low GMRS sites are expected by December 31, 2016.
REVIEW OF LICENSEE SPENT FUEL POOL EVALUATION By letter dated December 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16362A204), the licensee submitted its SFP evaluation for Sequoyah for NRC review. The NRC staff assessed the licensee's implementation of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report through the completion of a reviewer checklist, which is included as an enclosure to this letter.
TECHNICAL EVALUATION Section 3.0 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report develops SFP evaluation criteria for plants with GMRS peak spectral acceleration less than or equal to 0.8g. These criteria address SFP structural elements (e.g., floors, walls, and supports); non-structural elements (e.g.,
penetrations); seismically-induced SFP sloshing; and water losses due to heat-up and boil-off.
Section 3.0 also provides applicability criteria, which enables licensees to determine if their site-specific conditions are within the bounds considered in developing the evaluation criteria for this report. The staff's review consists of confirming that these SFP site-specific conditions are within the bounds considered for the evaluation criteria specified in the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report.
1.1 Spent Fuel Pool Structural Evaluation Section 3.1 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides a SFP structural evaluation approach used to demonstrate that the SFP structure is sufficiently robust against the reevaluated seismic hazard. This approach supplements the guidance in Section 7 of the SPID and follows acceptable methods used to assess the seismic capacity of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) for nuclear power plants as documented in EPRI NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Plant Seismic Margin, Revision 1." Table 3-2 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report (reproduced from Table 2.3 of EPRI NP-6041) provides the structural screening criteria to assess the SFPs and their supporting structures.
The licensee stated that it followed the SFP structural evaluation approach presented in the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report and provided site-specific data to confirm its applicability.
J.Shea The NRC staff reviewed the structural information provided, which included the requested site-specific data in Section 3.3 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report, and confirmed that the evaluation criteria are applicable to the Sequoyah site. The staff concludes that SFP SSCs were appropriately evaluated and screened based on the seismic capacity criteria in EPRI NP-6041 and that the licensee has demonstrated that the SFP structure is sufficiently robust and can withstand ground motions with peak spectral acceleration less than or equal to O.Bg.
1.2 Spent Fuel Pool Non-Structural Evaluation Section 3.2 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides criteria for evaluating the non-structural aspects of the SFP, such as piping connections, fuel gates, and anti-siphoning devices, as well as SFP sloshing and heat up and boil-off of SFP water inventory. Specifically, Table 3-4 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report provides a summary of the SFP non-structural evaluation criteria derived in Section 3.2, along with applicability criteria to demonstrate that site-specific conditions are suitable for applying the evaluation criteria.
The licensee stated that it followed the SFP non-structural evaluation approach presented in the guidance report and provided site-specific data to confirm its applicability. The staff reviewed the non-structural information provided, which included the requested site-specific data in Table 3-4 of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report, and confirmed that the evaluation criteria are applicable to the Sequoyah site. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee adequately evaluated the non-structural considerations for SSCs whose failure could lead to potential drain-down of the SFP due to a seismic event.
CONCLUSION The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's SFP evaluation report. Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the SFP integrity evaluation met the criteria of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report for Sequoyah and therefore, the licensee responded appropriately to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the NRC's 50.54(f) letter.
J.Shea If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1617 or via e-mail at Frankie.Vega@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, Frat~anager Hazards Management Branch Japan Lessons-Learned Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328
Enclosure:
Technical Review Checklist cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
TECHNICAL REVIEW CHECKLIST BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO SPENT FUEL POOL EVALUATIONS FOR LOW GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM SITES IMPLEMENTING NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1 SEISMIC SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 BACKGROUND By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) issued a request for information to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deterred status, pursuant to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 O CFR), Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the "50.54(f) letter"). Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter requests addressees to reevaluate the seismic hazard at their site using present-day methods and guidance for licensing new nuclear power plants, and identify actions to address or modify, as necessary, plant components affected by the reevaluated seismic hazards.
Enclosure 1, Item 4, of the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees perform a comparison of the ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) with the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
Enclosure 1, Item 9, requests that, when the GMRS exceeds the SSE in the 1 to 10 Hertz (Hz) frequency range, a seismic evaluation be made of the spent fuel pool (SFP). More specifically, plants were asked to consider" ... all seismically induced failures that can lead to draining of the SFP."
Additionally, by letter dated February 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16055A021 ), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report No.
3002007148 entitled, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Spent Fuel Pool Integrity Evaluation" (SFP Evaluation Guidance Report). The SFP Evaluation Guidance Report supports the completion of SFP evaluations for sites with reevaluated seismic hazard exceedance in the 1 to 1O Hz frequency range. Specifically, the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report addressed those sites where the GMRS peak spectral acceleration (Sa) is less than or equal to 0.89 (low GMRS sites). The NRG endorsed the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report by letter dated March 17, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15350A158), as an acceptable method for licensees to use when responding to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter. Licensee deviations from the SFP Evaluation Guidance should be discussed in their SFP evaluation submittal.
By letter dated December 23, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16362A204), Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee), provided a SFP report in a response to Enclosure 1, Item 9, of the 50.54(f) letter for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah). The NRG staff performed its review of the licensee's submittal to assess whether the licensee responded appropriately to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter. The NRG staff checked whether the site-specific parameters are within the bounds of the criteria considered in the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report, verified the SFP's seismic adequacy to withstand the reevaluated GMRS hazard levels, and confirmed that the requested information in response to Item 9 of the 50.54(f) letter was provided.
Enclosure
A review checklist was used for consistency and scope. The application of this staff review is limited to the SFP evaluation as part of the seismic review of low GMRS sites as part of the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1.
NTTF Recommendation 2.1 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluations Technical Review Checklist for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Site Parameters:
I. Site-Specific GMRS The licensee:
- Provided the site-specific GMRS consistent with the information Yes provided in the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (SHSR), or its update and evaluated by the staff in its staff assessment.
- Stated that the GMRS peak Sa is less than or equal to 0.8g for any Yes frequency.
Notes from the reviewer:
- 1. The NRG staff confirmed that the site-specific peak Sa= 0.759g (SHSR - ADAMS Accession No. ML14098A478).
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution:
No deviations or deficiencies were identified.
The NRC staff concludes:
- The site-specific GMRS peak Sa at any frequency is less than 0.8g . Yes
- The licensee's GMRS used in this evaluation is consistent with the Yes information provided in the SHSR.
Structural Parameters:
II. Seismic Design of the SFP Structure The licensee:
- Specified the building housing the SFP. Yes
- Specified the plant's peak ground acceleration (PGA). Yes
- Stated that the building housing the SFP was designed using an Yes SSE with a PGA of at least 0.1 Q.
Notes from the reviewer:
- 1. The NRC staff confirmed that the SFP is housed in the auxiliary building which is seismically designed to the site SSE with a PGA of 0.18g (SHSR Section 3.1 and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 3.8)
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution:
No deviations or deficiencies were identified.
The NRC staff concludes that:
Ill. Structural Load Path to the SFP The licensee:
- Provided a description of the structural load path from the Yes foundation to the SFP.
- Performed screening based on EPRI NP-6041 Table 2-3 screening Yes criteria.
Notes from the reviewer:
- 1. The staff verified the structural load path to the SFP. The staff confirmed that the structural load path from the auxiliary building foundation to the SFP consists of reinforced concrete shear walls and a reinforced concrete pool bottom that is built integrally with the auxiliary building foundation. (FSAR Section 3.8.4).
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution:
No deviations or deficiencies were identified.
The NRC staff concludes that:
- Licensee appropriately described the structural load path to the Yes SFP.
- Structures were appropriately screened based on the screening Yes criteria in EPRI NP-6041.
IV. SFP Structure Included in the Civil Inspection Program Performed in Accordance with Maintenance Rule The licensee:
- Stated that the SFP structure is included in the Civil Inspection Yes Program performed in accordance with Maintenance Rule (1 O CFR 50.65).
Notes from the reviewer:
None Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution:
No deviations or deficiencies were identified.
The NRC staff concludes that:
- The SFP structure is included in the Civil Inspection Program Yes performed in accordance with Maintenance Rule (1 O CFR 50.65).
Non-Structural Parameters:
V. Applicability of Piping Evaluation The licensee:
- 1. The licensee stated that piping attached to the SFP is evaluated to the SSE (FSAR Section 3.2.2).
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution:
No deviations or deficiencies were identified.
The NRC staff concludes that:
- Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation Yes guidance have been met.
VI. Siphoning Evaluation The licensee:
- Stated that anti-siphoning devices are installed on piping systems Yes that could lead to siphoning inventory from the SFP.
- In cases where anti-siphoning devices were not included on the N/A applicable piping, a description documenting the evaluation performed to determine the seismic adequacy of the piping is provided.
- Stated that the piping of the SFP cooling system cannot lead to rapid No drain down due to siphoning.
- Stated that no anti-siphoning devices are attached to 2" or smaller Yes piping with extremely large extended operators.
- Provided a seismic adequacy evaluation, in accordance with NP-N/A 6041, for cases where active siphoning devices are attached to 2" or smaller piping with extremely large extended operators.
Notes from the reviewer:
- 1. The licensee stated that anti-siphoning devices are installed on all SFP piping that could lead to siphoning (FSAR Section 9.1.3).
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution:
No deviations or deficiencies were identified.
The NRC staff concludes:
- Anti-siphoning devices exist in applicable piping systems that could Yes lead to siphoning water from the SFP.
- No active anti-siphoning devices are attached to 2" or smaller piping Yes with extremely large extended operators.
Yes
- Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation guidance have been met.
VII. Sloshing Evaluation The licensee:
- Specified the SFP dimensions (length, width, and depth). Yes
- Specified that the SFP dimensions are bounded by the dimensions Yes specified in the report (i.e., SFP length and width <125ft.; SFP depth >36ft.).
- Stated that the peak Sa in the frequency range less than 0.3 Hz is Yes less than 0.1 g.
Notes from the reviewer:
- SFP Length - 39.5 ft.
- SFP Width - 31.7 ft.
- SFP Depth - 47.8 ft.
- 2. The staff confirmed in the SHSR that the peak Sa in the frequency range less than 0.3 Hz is less than 0.1 g (SHSR).
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution:
No deviations or deficiencies were identified.
The NRC staff concludes:
- SFP dimensions are bounded by the dimensions specified in the Yes report (i.e., SFP length and width <125ft.; SFP depth >36ft.).
- The peak Sa in the frequency range less than 0.3 Hz is less than Yes 0.1g.
- Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation Yes guidance have been met.
VIII. Evaporation Evaluation The licensee:
- Provided the surface area of the plant's SFP. Yes
- Stated that the surface area of the plant's SFP is greater than Yes 500 ft 2 .
- Provided the licensed reactor core thermal power. Yes
- Stated that the reactor core thermal power is less than 4,000 Yes megawatt thermal (MW1) per unit.
Notes from the reviewer:
- 1. Surface area of pool = 1,250 ft 2
Deviation(s) or Deficiency(ies), and Resolution:
No deviations or deficiencies were identified.
The NRC staff concludes:
- The surface area of the plant's SFP is greater than 500 ft 2. Yes
- The reactor core thermal power is less than 4,000 MW, per unit. Yes
- Applicability criteria specified in Table 3-4 of SFP evaluation Yes guidance have been met.
==
Conclusions:==
The NRG staff reviewed the licensee's SFP evaluation report. Based on its review, the NRG staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the SFP integrity evaluation met the criteria of the SFP Evaluation Guidance Report for Sequoyah and therefore the licensee responded appropriately to Item 9 in Enclosure 1 of the 50.54(f) letter.
ML17041A387 *via e-mail OFFICE NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NRR/JLD/LA NRR/JLD/JHMB/BC(A)
NAME FVega SLent LGibson DATE 02/14/2017 02/13/2017 02/15/2017 OFFICE NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NAME FVega DATE 02/16/2017