ML12073A188: Difference between revisions
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| number = ML12073A188 | | number = ML12073A188 | ||
| issue date = 03/12/2012 | | issue date = 03/12/2012 | ||
| title = Letter to All Operating Boiling-Water Reactor Licensees with Mark I and Mark | | title = Letter to All Operating Boiling-Water Reactor Licensees with Mark I and Mark II Containments - Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents | ||
| author name = Leeds E | | author name = Leeds E | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR | ||
| addressee name = Annacone M | | addressee name = Annacone M, Colomb M, Davis J, Joyce T, Langdon K, Madison D, O'Connor T, O'Grady B, Pacilio M, Reddeman M, Smith R, Swafford P, Wamser C, Wells P | ||
| addressee affiliation = Carolina Power & Light Co, Energy Northwest, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc, Exelon Generation Co, LLC, Exelon Nuclear, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD), Nextera Energy, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, PPL Susquehanna, LLC, PSEG Nuclear, LLC, Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc, Tennessee Valley Authority | | addressee affiliation = Carolina Power & Light Co, Energy Northwest, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc, Exelon Generation Co, LLC, Exelon Nuclear, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD), Nextera Energy, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, PPL Susquehanna, LLC, PSEG Nuclear, LLC, Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc, Tennessee Valley Authority | ||
| docket = 05000219, 05000220, 05000237, 05000249, 05000254, 05000259, 05000260, 05000263, 05000265, 05000271, 05000277, 05000278, 05000293, 05000296, 05000298, 05000321, 05000324, 05000325, 05000341, 05000352, 05000353, 05000354, 05000366, 05000373, 05000374, 05000387, 05000388, 05000397, 05000410 | | docket = 05000219, 05000220, 05000237, 05000249, 05000254, 05000259, 05000260, 05000263, 05000265, 05000271, 05000277, 05000278, 05000293, 05000296, 05000298, 05000321, 05000324, 05000325, 05000341, 05000352, 05000353, 05000354, 05000366, 05000373, 05000374, 05000387, 05000388, 05000397, 05000410 | ||
| license number = DPR-016, DPR-019, DPR-022, DPR-025, DPR-028, DPR-029, DPR-030, DPR-033, DPR-035, DPR-044, DPR-046, DPR-052, DPR-056, DPR-057, DPR-062, DPR-063, DPR-068, DPR-071, NPF-005, NPF-011, NPF-014, NPF-018, NPF-021, NPF-022, NPF-039, NPF-043, NPF-057, NPF-069, NPF-085 | | license number = DPR-016, DPR-019, DPR-022, DPR-025, DPR-028, DPR-029, DPR-030, DPR-033, DPR-035, DPR-044, DPR-046, DPR-052, DPR-056, DPR-057, DPR-062, DPR-063, DPR-068, DPR-071, NPF-005, NPF-011, NPF-014, NPF-018, NPF-021, NPF-022, NPF-039, NPF-043, NPF-057, NPF-069, NPF-085 | ||
| contact person = Fretz R | | contact person = Fretz R | ||
| case reference number = EA-12-050 | | case reference number = EA-12-050 | ||
| package number = ML12054A696 | | package number = ML12054A696 | ||
Line 19: | Line 19: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:March 12, 2012 EA-12-050 | {{#Wiki_filter:March 12, 2012 EA-12-050 All Operating Boiling-Water Reactor Licensees with Mark I and Mark II Containments | ||
All Operating Boiling-Water Reactor | |||
==SUBJECT:== | ==SUBJECT:== | ||
ISSUANCE OF ORDER TO MODIFY LICENSES WITH REGARD TO RELIABLE HARDENED CONTAINMENT VENTS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Order modifying the current license for your facility. The Order requires that all licensees listed in Attachment 1 to the Order implement requirements for reliable hardened containment vents at their facilities. | ISSUANCE OF ORDER TO MODIFY LICENSES WITH REGARD TO RELIABLE HARDENED CONTAINMENT VENTS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Order modifying the current license for your facility. The Order requires that all licensees listed in Attachment 1 to the Order implement requirements for reliable hardened containment vents at their facilities. | ||
Following the earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in March 2011, the NRC established a senior-level task force referred to as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF conducted a systematic and methodical review of the NRC regulations and processes to determine if the agency should make safety improvements in light of the events in Japan. As a result of this review, the NTTF issued SECY-11-0093, Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11186A950). SECY-11-0124, Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report, (ADAMS Accession No. ML112911571) and SECY-11-0137, Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned, (ADAMS Accession No. ML11272A111), were issued to establish the NRC staffs prioritization of the recommendations. | |||
Following the earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in March 2011, the NRC established a senior-level task force referred to as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF conducted a systematic and methodical review of the NRC regulations and processes to determine if the agency should make safety improvements in light of the events in Japan. As a result of this review, the NTTF issued SECY-11-0093, | Recommendation 5.1 concerning reliable hardened vents was determined to be a high-priority action. This Order is based upon the NTTF recommendation. | ||
ML11272A111), were issued to establish the NRC | |||
The events at Fukushima Dai-ichi highlight the possibility that extreme natural phenomena could challenge the prevention, mitigation and emergency preparedness defense-in-depth layers. At Fukushima, a variety of challenges, some of which are not yet clearly known, significantly challenged attempts by the responders to preclude core damage and containment failure. One item that is known is that, under that particular set of circumstances, the operators were unable to successfully operate the containment venting system early in the event. The inability to reduce containment pressure inhibited efforts to cool the reactor core. If additional backup or alternate sources of power had been available to operate the containment venting system remotely, or if certain valves had been more accessible for manual operation, the operators at Fukushima may have been able to depressurize the containment earlier. This, in turn, could have allowed operators to implement strategies using low-pressure water sources that may have limited or prevented damage to the reactor core. Thus, the events at Fukushima demonstrate that reliable hardened vents at boiling-water reactors facilities with Mark I and Mark II containment designs are important to maintain core and containment cooling. | The events at Fukushima Dai-ichi highlight the possibility that extreme natural phenomena could challenge the prevention, mitigation and emergency preparedness defense-in-depth layers. At Fukushima, a variety of challenges, some of which are not yet clearly known, significantly challenged attempts by the responders to preclude core damage and containment failure. One item that is known is that, under that particular set of circumstances, the operators were unable to successfully operate the containment venting system early in the event. The inability to reduce containment pressure inhibited efforts to cool the reactor core. If additional backup or alternate sources of power had been available to operate the containment venting system remotely, or if certain valves had been more accessible for manual operation, the operators at Fukushima may have been able to depressurize the containment earlier. This, in turn, could have allowed operators to implement strategies using low-pressure water sources that may have limited or prevented damage to the reactor core. Thus, the events at Fukushima demonstrate that reliable hardened vents at boiling-water reactors facilities with Mark I and Mark II containment designs are important to maintain core and containment cooling. | ||
The NRC staff has determined that continued operation does not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety; however, the additional requirements outlined in this Order are necessary in light of insights gained from the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. The requirements of this Order are immediately effective and are expected to remain in place until superseded by Order or rule. | The NRC staff has determined that continued operation does not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety; however, the additional requirements outlined in this Order are necessary in light of insights gained from the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. The requirements of this Order are immediately effective and are expected to remain in place until superseded by Order or rule. | ||
All Boiling-Water Reactor | |||
All Boiling-Water Reactor Licensees with Mark I and Mark II Containments Pursuant to Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, any person who willfully violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to violate, any provision of this Order shall be subject to criminal prosecution as set forth in that section. Violation of this order may also subject the person to civil monetary penalty. | |||
The enclosed Order requires responses and actions within specified timeframes. Please contact your Licensing Project Manager or Mr. Robert Fretz, Reliable Hardened Vents Order Project Manager (301-415-1980), regarding any issues related to compliance with the requirements in the enclosed Order, or if you have other questions. | The enclosed Order requires responses and actions within specified timeframes. Please contact your Licensing Project Manager or Mr. Robert Fretz, Reliable Hardened Vents Order Project Manager (301-415-1980), regarding any issues related to compliance with the requirements in the enclosed Order, or if you have other questions. | ||
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the | In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/. The enclosed Order has been forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. | ||
. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/. The enclosed Order has been forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. | Sincerely, | ||
Sincerely, | /ra/ | ||
Eric J. Leeds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
/ra/ | |||
Eric J. Leeds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
==Enclosure:== | ==Enclosure:== | ||
Order (EA-12-050) cc: Listserv | |||
ML12054A694 *e-mail concurrence OFFICE PM: NRR/JLD LA: NRR/JLD QTE* BC: NRR/JLD NAME RFretz SRohrer JDoughtery RPascarelli DATE 03/09/2012 03/09/2012 02/05/2012 03/11/2012 OFFICE OGC* D: JLD* OD: OE* OD: NRR NAME CSafford DSkeen RZimmerman ELeeds (NHilton for) | |||
DATE 03/10/2012 03/11/2012 03/09/2012 03/ 12 /2012 Distribution: | |||
Public RidsNrrLASRohrer RidsNrrOd LRegner RidsNrrDorl RidsNrrPMBrownsFerry RidsNrrDorlLpl1-1 RidsNrrPMBrunswick RidsNrrDorlLpl1-2 RidsNrrPMColumbia RidsNrrDorlLpl2-1 RidsNrrPMCooper RidsNrrDorlLpl2-2 RidsNrrPMDresden RidsNrrDorlLpl3-1 RidsNrrPMDuaneArnold RidsNrrDorlLpl3-2 RidsNrrPMFermi2 RidsNrrDorlLpl4 RidsNrrPMFitzPatrick RidsOgcMailCenter RidsNrrPMHatch RidsOeMailCenter RidsNrrPMHopeCreek RidsNroOd RidsNrrPMLaSalle RidsNsirOd RidsNrrPMLimerick RLewis RidsNrrPMMonticello DSkeen RidsNrrPMNineMilePoint RTaylor RidsNrrPMOysterCreek RPascarelli RidsNrrPMPeachBottom CGratton RidsNrrPMPilgrim JKratchman RidsNrrPMQuadCities GEMiller RidsNrrPMSusquehanna SBloom RidsNrrPMVermontYankee RFretz OEWEB - (Orders only) | |||
JShea RLaura | |||
Enclosure}} | ORDER TO MODIFY LICENSES WITH REGARD TO RELIABLE HARDENED CONTAINMENT VENTS EA-12-050 Enclosure}} |
Latest revision as of 18:20, 6 February 2020
Text
March 12, 2012 EA-12-050 All Operating Boiling-Water Reactor Licensees with Mark I and Mark II Containments
SUBJECT:
ISSUANCE OF ORDER TO MODIFY LICENSES WITH REGARD TO RELIABLE HARDENED CONTAINMENT VENTS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Order modifying the current license for your facility. The Order requires that all licensees listed in Attachment 1 to the Order implement requirements for reliable hardened containment vents at their facilities.
Following the earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in March 2011, the NRC established a senior-level task force referred to as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF conducted a systematic and methodical review of the NRC regulations and processes to determine if the agency should make safety improvements in light of the events in Japan. As a result of this review, the NTTF issued SECY-11-0093, Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11186A950). SECY-11-0124, Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report, (ADAMS Accession No. ML112911571) and SECY-11-0137, Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned, (ADAMS Accession No. ML11272A111), were issued to establish the NRC staffs prioritization of the recommendations.
Recommendation 5.1 concerning reliable hardened vents was determined to be a high-priority action. This Order is based upon the NTTF recommendation.
The events at Fukushima Dai-ichi highlight the possibility that extreme natural phenomena could challenge the prevention, mitigation and emergency preparedness defense-in-depth layers. At Fukushima, a variety of challenges, some of which are not yet clearly known, significantly challenged attempts by the responders to preclude core damage and containment failure. One item that is known is that, under that particular set of circumstances, the operators were unable to successfully operate the containment venting system early in the event. The inability to reduce containment pressure inhibited efforts to cool the reactor core. If additional backup or alternate sources of power had been available to operate the containment venting system remotely, or if certain valves had been more accessible for manual operation, the operators at Fukushima may have been able to depressurize the containment earlier. This, in turn, could have allowed operators to implement strategies using low-pressure water sources that may have limited or prevented damage to the reactor core. Thus, the events at Fukushima demonstrate that reliable hardened vents at boiling-water reactors facilities with Mark I and Mark II containment designs are important to maintain core and containment cooling.
The NRC staff has determined that continued operation does not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety; however, the additional requirements outlined in this Order are necessary in light of insights gained from the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. The requirements of this Order are immediately effective and are expected to remain in place until superseded by Order or rule.
All Boiling-Water Reactor Licensees with Mark I and Mark II Containments Pursuant to Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, any person who willfully violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to violate, any provision of this Order shall be subject to criminal prosecution as set forth in that section. Violation of this order may also subject the person to civil monetary penalty.
The enclosed Order requires responses and actions within specified timeframes. Please contact your Licensing Project Manager or Mr. Robert Fretz, Reliable Hardened Vents Order Project Manager (301-415-1980), regarding any issues related to compliance with the requirements in the enclosed Order, or if you have other questions.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/. The enclosed Order has been forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.
Sincerely,
/ra/
Eric J. Leeds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
Order (EA-12-050) cc: Listserv
ML12054A694 *e-mail concurrence OFFICE PM: NRR/JLD LA: NRR/JLD QTE* BC: NRR/JLD NAME RFretz SRohrer JDoughtery RPascarelli DATE 03/09/2012 03/09/2012 02/05/2012 03/11/2012 OFFICE OGC* D: JLD* OD: OE* OD: NRR NAME CSafford DSkeen RZimmerman ELeeds (NHilton for)
DATE 03/10/2012 03/11/2012 03/09/2012 03/ 12 /2012 Distribution:
Public RidsNrrLASRohrer RidsNrrOd LRegner RidsNrrDorl RidsNrrPMBrownsFerry RidsNrrDorlLpl1-1 RidsNrrPMBrunswick RidsNrrDorlLpl1-2 RidsNrrPMColumbia RidsNrrDorlLpl2-1 RidsNrrPMCooper RidsNrrDorlLpl2-2 RidsNrrPMDresden RidsNrrDorlLpl3-1 RidsNrrPMDuaneArnold RidsNrrDorlLpl3-2 RidsNrrPMFermi2 RidsNrrDorlLpl4 RidsNrrPMFitzPatrick RidsOgcMailCenter RidsNrrPMHatch RidsOeMailCenter RidsNrrPMHopeCreek RidsNroOd RidsNrrPMLaSalle RidsNsirOd RidsNrrPMLimerick RLewis RidsNrrPMMonticello DSkeen RidsNrrPMNineMilePoint RTaylor RidsNrrPMOysterCreek RPascarelli RidsNrrPMPeachBottom CGratton RidsNrrPMPilgrim JKratchman RidsNrrPMQuadCities GEMiller RidsNrrPMSusquehanna SBloom RidsNrrPMVermontYankee RFretz OEWEB - (Orders only)
JShea RLaura
ORDER TO MODIFY LICENSES WITH REGARD TO RELIABLE HARDENED CONTAINMENT VENTS EA-12-050 Enclosure