ML18012A666

Revision 23 to Fire Protection Report, Vol. 1 Redacted

ML18012A666
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/19/2017
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
Download: ML18012A666 (643)

Text

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Fire Protection Report (FPR)

Amend 23 - October 2017 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 (Unit 1) and DPR-30 (Unit 2)

NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-254 (Unit 1) and 50-265 (Unit 2)

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Effective Pages Revision History Revision Number And Date Revision Description Revision 12, As a result of an extensive review of the Fire Protection Program, November 2000 an optimized Fire Protection Report - Volume 1 (Fire Hazards Analysis) has been developed and approved.

This revision includes the incorporation of the following FPR Change Requests:

CRN 98-10 CRN 99-01 CRN 99-02 CRN 99-08 CRN 99-09 CRN 99-10 CRN 00-01 CRN 00-03 CRN 00-05 CRN 00-08 Revision 13, August 2001 CRN 00-10 CRN 01-01 CRN 01-12 Revision 16, September 2003 CRN 01-03 CRN 01-04 CRN 02-06 CRN 02-07 CRN 02-08 CRN 03-02 Revision 17, October 2005 FPR-R17-001 FPR-R17-002 FPR-R17-003 FPR-R17-006 FPR-R17-008 FPR-R17-011 Revision 18, October 2007 FPR-R18-001 FPR-R18-002 FPR-R18-004 FPR-R18-008 i

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Effective Pages Revision 19, July 2009 FPR-R19-001 FPR-R19-005 FPR-R19-006 FPR-R19-007 FPR-R19-008 FPR-R19-009 FPR-R19-010 FPR-R19-011 FPR-R19-012 FPR-R19-013 FPR-R19-014 FPR-R19-017 FPR-R19-018 Revision 20, October 2011 FPR-R20-001: Table 2.1-2, pages 2.1-3; 2.1-11; 2.1-15; Table 3.8-1, pages 3.8-20, 3.8-21, 3.8-22, 3.8-23; 3.8-24, 3.8-25; pages 4.3-217, 4.3-218, 4.3-219, 4.3-220, 4.3-296, 4.3-332, 4.3-333, 4.3-341, 4.3-346, 4.3-348, 4.3-350, 4.3-353, 4.3-354, 4.3-355, 4.3-357, 4.3-359, 4.3-360, 4.3-362, 4.3-363, 4.3-364 FPR-R20-002: Page 2.1-14 FPR-R20-004: Table 2.1-2, Pages 2.1-4 through 2-1.24 FPR-R20-005: Table 2.1-2, Page 2.1-12 FPR-R20-007: Page 4.3-269 FPR-R20-008: Pages 4.3-330, 4.3-334, 4.3-336 and 4.3-434 FPR-R20-009: Page 2.1-3 FPR-R20-010: Page 4.2-13 FPR-R20-012: Page 3.4-1 Revision 21, October 2013 FPR-R21-002: Table 2.1-2, Pages 2.1-24 and 2.1-4 FPR-R21-003: Pages 4.3-324, 4.3-328, and 4.3-378 FPR-R21-004: Table 3.3-1 FPR-R21-005: Page 4.3-330 Revision 22, October 2015 FPR-R22-002: Page 4.2-4 FPR-R22-003: Page 4.3-327 FPR-R22-005: Page 4.2-13 FPR-R22-006: Page 5.4-3 FPR-R22-008:Table 3.6-1, Page 3.6-5 ii

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Effective Pages Revision 23, October 2017 FPR-R23-001: Table 2.1-2, Pages 2.1-4, and 2.1-5 FPR-R23-003: Page 4.3-219 FPR-R23-004: Table 2.1-2, Page 2.1-20 FPR-R23-008: Pages 4.3-313, 4.3-329, 4.3-335, 4.3-344, 4.3-353 and 4.3-362 FPR-R23-011: Table 3.3-1, Page 3.3-4; Table 3.3-2, Page 3.3-5; Pages 4.2-1, 4.2-15, and 4.2-16 FPR-R23-012: Page 4.3-275 FPR-R23-014: Table 2.1-1, Page 2.1-1 FPR-R23-016: Page 2.3-1; Table 3.8-1, Pages 3.8-30, and 3.8-31; Pages 5.4-8, and 5.4-11 FPR-R23-017: Pages 4.3-250, 4.3-252, 4.3-254, 4.3-264, 4.3-267, and 4.3-269 FPR-R23-018: Pages 4.3-178, 4.3-179, 4.3-180, 4.3-193, 4.3-195, 4.3-218, 4.3-219, 4.3-220, 4.3-258, 4.3-259, 4.3-260, 4.3-282, and 4.3-284 iii

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011 CONTENTS Section Page

1.0 INTRODUCTION

............................................................................................................ 1.1-1 1.1 Purpose........................................................................................................................... 1.1-1 1.2 Background .................................................................................................................... 1.2-1 1.3 Use of Fire Hazards Analysis ........................................................................................ 1.3-1 1.3.1 Procedures for Fire Protection Safety Analysis in Regard to Future Modifications.. 1.3-1 1.3.2 Procedures for Future Updates of the FHA................................................................ 1.3-1 1.4 Definitions...................................................................................................................... 1.4-1 2.0 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ................................................................................ 2.1-1 2.1 General Concepts for the Fire Protection Program........................................................ 2.1-1 2.1.1 Defense-In-Depth ....................................................................................................... 2.1-1 2.1.2 Use of Water on Electrical Fires ................................................................................ 2.1-1 2.1.3 Applicability of NFPA Codes .................................................................................... 2.1-1 2.2 Fire Protection Organization and Responsibilities ........................................................ 2.2-1 2.3 General Guidelines for Plant Fire Protection................................................................. 2.3-1 2.3.1 Building Design.......................................................................................................... 2.3-1 2.3.2 Administrative Controls ............................................................................................. 2.3-3 2.4 Fire Protection Systems and Equipment ........................................................................ 2.4-1 2.4.1 Water Supply and Distribution System ...................................................................... 2.4-1 2.4.2 Fire Detection and Alarm Systems............................................................................. 2.4-2 2.4.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Systems................................................................................. 2.4-2 2.4.4 Manual Fire Suppression Equipment ......................................................................... 2.4-4 2.5 Fire Brigade ................................................................................................................... 2.5-1 2.5.1 Organization ............................................................................................................... 2.5-1 2.5.2 Training ...................................................................................................................... 2.5-1 2.5.3 Equipment .................................................................................................................. 2.5-1 2.5.4 Fire Fighting Strategies .............................................................................................. 2.5-1 TOC-1

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011 3.0 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS............... 3.1-1 3.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 3.1-1 3.2 Assumptions and Approach ........................................................................................... 3.2-1 3.3 Fire Area Identification.................................................................................................. 3.3-1 3.4 Combustible Loading Calculation ................................................................................. 3.4-1 3.4.1 Fire Severity ............................................................................................................... 3.4-1 3.4.2 Heat Release Potential of Combustible ...................................................................... 3.4-2 3.4.3 Category of Combustibles .......................................................................................... 3.4-2 3.4.3.1 Fixed Combustibles 3.4-2 3.4.3.2 Transient Combustibles 3.4-3 3.4.4 Assumptions/Engineering Judgement 3.4-4 3.5 Suppression Effects Analysis......................................................................................... 3.5-1 3.6 Structural Steel Analysis................................................................................................ 3.6-1 3.6.1 Methodology .............................................................................................................. 3.6-1 3.6.2 Results ........................................................................................................................ 3.6-2 3.6.3 References .................................................................................................................. 3.6-3 3.7 Penetrations.................................................................................................................... 3.7-1 3.7.1 Electrical Penetration Seal Evaluation ....................................................................... 3.7-1 3.7.2 Mechanical Penetration Seal Evaluation.................................................................... 3.7-1 3.7.3 Fire Damper Review (NFPA 90A)............................................................................. 3.7-1 3.8 Design-Basis Fire Protection Commitments.................................................................. 3.8-1 4.0 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 4.1-1 4.1 Fire Zones Without Safe Shutdown or Radioactive Release Issues .............................. 4.1-1 4.2 Fire Zones With Abbreviated Fire Hazards Analysis .................................................... 4.2-1 4.3 Safety Related Fire Zones.............................................................................................. 4.3-1 TOC-2

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011 5.0 GUIDELINES OF APPENDIX A TO APCSB 9.5-1...................................................5.1-1 5.1 Overall Requirements Of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program................................. 5.1-1 5.2 Administrative Procedures, Controls, And Fire Brigade ............................................... 5.2-1 5.3 Quality Assurance Program ........................................................................................... 5.3-1 5.4 General Guidelines For Plant Protection ....................................................................... 5.4-1 5.5 Fire Detection And Suppression .................................................................................... 5.5-1 5.6 Guidelines For Specific Plant Areas .............................................................................. 5.6-1 5.6.1 Primary And Secondary Containment ........................................................................ 5.6-1 5.6.2 Control Room ............................................................................................................. 5.6-5 5.6.3 Cable Room................................................................................................................ 5.6-7 5.6.4 Plant Computer Room .............................................................................................. 5.6-10 5.6.5 Switchgear Rooms.................................................................................................... 5.6-11 5.6.6 Remote Safety-Related Panels ................................................................................. 5.6-12 5.6.7 Station Battery Room ............................................................................................... 5.6-13 5.6.8 Turbine Lubrication And Control Oil Storage And Use Areas................................ 5.6-14 5.6.9 Diesel Generator Area .............................................................................................. 5.6-15 5.6.10 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area.................................................................................. 5.6-17 5.6.11 Safety-Related Pumps ............................................................................................ 5.6-18 5.6.12 New Fuel Area........................................................................................................ 5.6-19 5.6.13 Spent Fuel Pool Area.............................................................................................. 5.6-20 5.6.14 Radwaste Building ................................................................................................. 5.6-21 5.6.15 Decontamination Areas .......................................................................................... 5.6-22 5.6.16 Safety-Related Water Tanks................................................................................... 5.6-23 5.6.17 Cooling Towers ...................................................................................................... 5.6-24 5.6.18 Miscellaneous Areas............................................................................................... 5.6-25 5.7 Special Protection Guidelines ........................................................................................ 5.7-1 TOC-3

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011 LIST OF TABLES Number Title 2.1-1 NFPA Codes of Record 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations 3.3-1 Index of Fire Areas and Zones 3.3-2 Index To Fire Zones By Area 3.6-1 Beams Requiring Fire Protection Following Study of Beam Stress Interactions with Dead Load at Elevated Temperature 3.8-1 Quad Cities Design-Basis Related Fire Protection Commitments TOC-4

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011 LIST OF FIGURES Number Title 3.3-1 Elevation 554-0 3.3-2 Elevation 572-0 3.3-3 Elevation 595-0 3.3-4 Elevation 623-0 3.3-5 Elevation 647-6 3.3-6 Elevation 666-6 TOC-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011

1.0 INTRODUCTION

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose The purpose of the updated Fire Hazards Analysis is to provide a description of the approved station fire protection program that can be used to support the station in NRC audits and procedures to ensure that fire protection issues are addressed in safety reviews of future modifications.

The Updated Fire Hazards Analysis Report contains:

1. A summary description of the station fire protection program. This portion of the updated fire hazards analysis contains a summary of various aspects of the station fire protection program. The appropriate documents which contain the evaluation of station compliance with its commitments are referenced. The referenced documents are part of the Fire Protection Program Document Package (F.P.P.D.P.) and the Fire Protection Reports (F.P.R.).

2. A zone-by-zone description of the fire hazards and fire protection measures currently in place. The fire barriers required under both BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R are identified in this section. References to the appropriate licensing documents are provided.

3. The comparison of the stations fire protection provisions with the guidelines of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, is provided in Section 5.0. Appendix A guidelines are provided for administrative procedures, quality assurance and fire protection features for general and specific plant areas.

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QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011

1.2 Background

As part of the continuing NRC evaluation following the fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Station in March 1975, Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd) has outlined its fire protection program and features at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS) in a number of documents submitted to the NRC between 1976 and the present.

The document entitled, Information Relevant to Fire Protection Systems and Programs - Parts 1-3, April 1977, provided ComEds response to the NRC initial request for a comparison of the fire protection provisions of Quad Cities Station with the guidelines of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. This was ComEds first Fire Hazards Analysis of Quad Cities Station and resulted in a number of fire protection modifications.

ComEd also responded to NRC guidelines regarding nuclear power plant fire protection programs issued in the following documents.

1. Supplementary Guidance on Information Needed for Fire Protection Evaluation, September 30, 1976,

2. Sample Technical Specifications, June 24, 1977, and

3. Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls, and Quality Assurance, August 12, 1977.

Following the review of these ComEd submittals and a plant inspection, the NRC staff docketed a Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (FPSER) for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 in July 1979.

A staff letter of February 12, 1981, confirmed that all FPSER items were considered closed with the exception of Safe Shutdown Capabilities.

Implementation of these guidelines resulted in additional fire protection measures being incorporated to enhance the existing fire protection program and satisfy the NRC defense-in-depth philosophy. Many studies and much discussion were also associated with the subsequent NRC fire protection guidelines and requirements.

The fire protection rule, 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R of 10 CFR 50, was issued on February 17, 1981. 10 CFR 50.48(b) states: Except for the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J, and III.O, the provisions of Appendix R to this part shall not be applicable to nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, to the extent that fire protection features proposed or implemented by the licensee have been accepted by the NRC staff as satisfying the provision of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 reflected in staff fire protection safety evaluation reports issued prior to the effective date of this rule, or to the extent that fire protection features were accepted by the staff in comprehensive fire protection safety evaluation reports issued before Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 was published in August, 1976.

1.2-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011 At that time, the shutdown analyses and subsequent related correspondence for Quad Cities Station was well underway and being reviewed by the NRC staff. ComEd continued to provide the NRC staff with all of the necessary information for their review of the stations safe shutdown capability.

On July 1, 1982, ComEd submitted the final response and position on Generic Letter 81-12 questions, Safe Shutdown Capability, Associated Circuits, and a listing of the exact shutdown methods and necessary safe shutdown modifications for Quad Cities Station. Submitted with this response was Quad Cities Stations Fire Protection Associated Circuits Analysis and Modifications Report. The cable discrepancy report was revised and resubmitted August 13, 1982, as a supplement to the Modifications Report.

Enclosure D of the July 1, 1982, submittal included the first formal exemption requests from the requirements of Appendix R Section III.G.3.b for fixed fire suppression and Section III.G.2 for three-hour fire barriers separating redundant divisions of safe shutdown equipment. The request for exemption from Section III.G.3.b was made for nine fire zones having electrical equipment critical to the power distribution necessary for normal and emergency operation of safety-related equipment for Unit 1 and 2 at Quad Cities. The request for exemption from Section III.G.2 was made for essential and associated cable in the reactor building basements of Units 1 and 2 of Quad Cities Station. A formal exemption was granted on July 23, 1983, from the requirements of Appendix R Sections III.G.3 and III.G.2 for the zones under consideration.

By cover letter dated December 30, 1982, the NRC staff stated that they had completed the review of Quad Cities Station Unit 1 and 2 alternate shutdown capability which is used to achieve safe shutdown in the event of a fire. This capability was evaluated against the requirements of Sections III.G and III.L of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. Based on this review, the NRC staff concluded that Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 was in compliance with Appendix R Sections III.G and III.L regarding safe shutdown in the event of a fire. A Safety Evaluation Report (SER) was written on this Appendix R review. The conclusion of this evaluation states:

We (the NRC staff) have reviewed the licensees proposed alternate shutdown capability for Quad Cities in accordance with Appendix R criteria. Based on that review, we conclude that the performance goals for accomplishing safe shutdown in the event of a fire, i.e., reactivity control, inventory control, decay heat removal, pressure control, process monitoring and support functions are met by the proposed alternate. Therefore, we conclude that the requirements of Appendix R, Sections III.G.3 and III.L are satisfied. However, once the alternate system is implemented, the licensee will propose technical specifications for the new safe shutdown makeup pump comparable to these existing for the RCIC pump.

On the basis of these conclusions, ComEd management was confident that the intent of Appendix R had been satisfied and continued working to implement the identified modifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48 (c) (4).

On October 19, 1983, Generic Letter 83-33, which reemphasized NRC positions on certain requirements of Appendix R, was transmitted to Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2. As a result, ComEd management decided to perform a reevaluation of the previous analysis to verify that misinterpretations did not exist.

1.2-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011 1.3 Use of Fire Hazards Analysis 1.3.1 Procedures for Fire Protection Safety Analysis in Regard to Future Modifications To insure that future modifications to plant systems do not adversely impact the fire protection program presently in place, station procedure CC-AA-103 requires a review of all modifications for impact on fire protection.

1.3.2 Procedures for Future Updates of the FHA The Fire Hazards Analysis report will be updated on a periodic basis per approved station procedures.

1.3-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011 1.4 Definitions

1. ANSI - American National Standards Institute

2. Automatic - self-acting, operating by its own mechanism, e.g., a change in current strength, pressure, temperature, or mechanical configuration.

3. Combustible Liquid - a liquid having a flash point at or above 100F (37.8C).Combustible liquids are subdivided as follows:

Class II liquids include those having flash points at or above 100F (37.8C) and below 140F (60C)

Class IIIA liquids include those having flash points at or above 140F (60C) and below 200F (93.4C)

Class IIIB liquids include those having flash points at or above 200F (93.4C)

4. Combustible Material - any material which burns or sustains the combustion process.

5. Design Basis Fire - that fire that is considered to cause the worst reasonable case damage assuming passive protective features function as designed, and manual, automatic, or other fire fighting actions have been initiated. The design-basis fire is the most severe fire that can credibly occur within a fire area or zone. Failure of all cables and equipment within a fire area or zone group is postulated except for cable or equipment with passive fire protection and components such as pipes, heat exchangers and CRD hydraulic units which are filled with water. Where equipment or cabling necessary for safe shutdown is located within the postulated fire area, analyses were performed to demonstrate their availability .

6. Electrical Conduit - rigid or flexible tubing usually either steel or aluminum in which electrical cables are run.

7. Equivalent Fire Area - this is a zone or zone group where the fire protection features including passive and active systems are sufficient to ensure that the design basis fire outside of the equivalent fire area will not result in damage to safe shutdown equipment within the equivalent fire area.

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QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011

8. Equivalent Fire Barriers - these are barriers of substantial construction which, although they have features preventing them from being classified as rated, provide the required separation between fire zones or areas. Descriptions and justifications have been provided for each of these equivalent barriers detailing the equivalency of the protection provided in the approved Exemption Requests, Safe Shutdown Report, SERs, and other station documents.

9. Fire Area - that portion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by 3-hour rated fire barriers (walls, floors, or roofs) with any openings or penetrations protected with seals or closures having a fire resistive rating equal to that of the barrier. Exceptions are justified with engineering evaluations.

10. Fire Barrier - those components of construction (walls, floors, and roofs) that are rated in hours by approving laboratories for resistance to a standard time/temperature curve to prevent the spread of fire.

11. Fire Break - a feature of construction which retards fire propagation along the length of cable(s) or prevents spreading of fire to nearby combustibles within a given fire area or fire zone.

12. Fire Brigade - the team of plant personnel assigned to fire fighting and trained in the manual fighting of fires by an established training program.

13. Fire Detectors - a device designed to automatically detect one or more aspects of the presence of fire and initiate an alarm system. Typical fire detectors are classified as follows:

Heat or thermal detector - a device which detects abnormally high temperature or rate-of-temperature rise.

Photoelectric detector - a device which detects the visible particles of combustion.

Ionization detector - a products-of-combustion detector whose actuation mechanism depends upon invisible pyrolysis or combustion products.

For further definitions, see National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 72, National Fire Alarm Code.

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QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011

14. Fire Door - a tested door and door assembly constructed and installed for the purpose of preventing the spread of fire through openings in walls, partitions, or other horizontal or vertical construction. (See NFPA 80 for classification and types of fire doors.)

15. Fire Hose Station - a standpipe and hose system consisting of 1-1/2 inch piping, 100% Dacron single jacket with Neoprene tube, 300-psi test UL-labeled fire hose; nozzle; and hose valve.

16. Fire Load - the amount of combustibles present in a given fire zone expressed in terms of potential heat release (Btu) per square foot of the fire zone 1.4-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011

17. Fire Rating - refers to the endurance period of a fire barrier or structure and defines the period of resistance to a standard fire exposure elapsing before the first critical point in behavior is observed (refer to NFPA 251).

18. Fire Resistive - properties or designs to resist the effects of any fire to which a material or structure may be expected to be subjected. Fire resistive materials or assemblies of materials are noncombustible, but noncombustible materials are not necessarily fire resistive.

19. Fire Retardant - materials or structures which are combustible in whole or part but have been subjected to treatments or have surface coverings to prevent or retard ignition or the spread of fire under the conditions for which they are designed.

20. Fire Suppression - refers to capability for control and/or extinguishment of fires (fire fighting). Manual fire suppression activities refer to the use of manually initiated fixed pipe suppression systems, standpipe and hose, or portable extinguishers. Automatic fire suppression refers to fixed systems such as water sprinklers, halon, or carbon dioxide.

21. Fire Zones - subdivisions of fire areas defining natural divisions in fire areas for the purpose of discussion.

22. Flammable Liquids - a liquid having a flash point below 100F and having a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 lb/in.2 absolute at 100F shall be known as a Class I liquid. Flammable liquids (Class I) are subdivided as follows:

Class IA includes those having flash points below 73F (22.8C) and having a boiling point below 100F (37.8C).

Class IB includes those having flash points below 73F (22.8C) and having a boiling point at or above 100F (37.8C).

Class IC includes those having flash points at or above 73F (22.8C) and below 100F (37.8C).

23. Flashover - phenomena of a slowly developing fire producing radiant energy at wall or ceiling surfaces. The radiant feedback from those surfaces gradually heats the contents of the fire area, and when all the combustibles in the space have become heated to their ignition temperature, simultaneous ignition occurs as from a pilot ignition source.

24. FM - Factory Mutual Engineering Corporation and Factory Mutual Research Corporation.

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QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011

25. Hydraulically designed sprinkler system - a fixed water suppression system in which sprinkler spacing and pipe sizing is, within established limits, determined by hydraulic calculation rather than a standard schedule of allowable pipe sizes.

26. Heat Load (Combustible Load) - the total amount of potential total heat release (Btu) present in a fire zone.

27. Ignition Temperature - minimum temperature to which a substance in air must be heated in order to initiate, or cause, self-sustained combustion independently of the heating or heat element.

28. MOV - motor-operated valve.

29. NFPA - National Fire Protection Association

30. Noncombustible - materials which will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapors when subjected to fire or heat.

31. Raceway - any channel for holding wires, cables, or busbars which is designed expressly for and used solely for this purpose.

32. RPS - reactor protection system.

33. Safe shutdown related systems and components - minimum systems and components required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition as identified in the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report.

34. Safety-related systems and components - systems and components required to shut down the reactor, mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents, or maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition.

35. Sprinkler system - a fixed system of piping and components from the supply valve to the point at which water discharges from the system to the fire area. The system is normally activated by heat from a fire.

Sprinkler system classifications:

Wet pipe - a system employing automatic closed-head (fusible link operated) sprinklers and/or nozzles attached to a fixed piping system containing water and connected to a water supply so that water discharges immediately from sprinklers individually opened by a fire.

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QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 20 OCTOBER 2011

36. Preaction system - a system employing automatic closed-head sprinklers and/or nozzles attached to a fixed piping system containing air that may or may not be under pressure, with a fire detection system installed in the same areas as the sprinklers. Actuation of the fire detection system opens a valve which permits water to flow into the sprinkler piping system and then to be discharged from any sprinkler or nozzle which may have been opened by the heat from the fire.

Water spray system - a system employing directional open-head sprinklers and/or nozzles attached to a piping system connected to a water supply through an automatic valve which is opened by the operation of a separate fire detection system installed in the same areas as the sprinklers and/or nozzles. When this valve opens, water flows into the distribution piping system and discharges from all open sprinklers and/or nozzles simultaneously.

37. Standpipe or Manual Hose Stations - a fixed piping system connected to a water supply to provide effective fire hose streams for manual use by the fire brigade within the building.

38. TIP - Traversing in-core probe.

39. UL - Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

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QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 2.0 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 2.0 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM 2.1 General Concepts for the Fire Protection Program This section covers basic topics which must be addressed in the overall fire protection program.

The references to specific documents are those contained in the Quad Cities Station's Fire Protection Program Documentation Package (F.P.P.D.P.).

2.1.1 Defense-In-Depth Quad Cities Station utilizes the defense-in-depth concept in order to ensure that safe shutdown capability is not impaired by a fire. The defense-in-depth concept achieves the high degree of safety required through the use of the following echelons of safety systems:

1. Prevent fire initiation.

2. Quickly detect and suppress fires once they have occurred.

3. Contain any unmitigated fires that might occur so that safe shutdown is not affected.

2.1.2 Use of Water on Electrical Fires Water spray is an effective extinguishing agent on electrical fires, particularly in grouped electrical cables since cable insulation and jacketing are ordinary combustibles and water spray is nonconductive. In plant areas where a water type suppression system is employed, measures have been taken to reduce the probability of equipment being damaged by water discharge.

These measures include providing adequate area drainage, shielding the equipment from the spray, and curbing and or placing the equipment on pads or pedestals where needed.

Hose stations, where necessary, are equipped with fog nozzles designed for use on electrical type fires (as well as other types of fires). The fire brigade is trained in the classroom on the use of water for the extinguishment of electrical fires.

2.1.3 Applicability of NFPA Codes National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes were used as guidelines in the design of passive fire protection features (e.g., fire doors, dampers and walls) and active fire protection systems (i.e., fire suppression and detection systems) and in the development of administrative controls of fire hazards. A list of the NFPA Codes that have been reviewed are listed in Table 2.1-1. As the fire protection features have been modified, newer versions of the NFPA Codes have been used to design and install components. The newer version of the NFPA Code is identified and comments added to describe the applicability of the newer NFPA Code.

2.1-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Unique situations and configurations arise in power plants that are not explicitly dealt with in the NFPA Codes. Detailed NFPA Code compliance reviews were conducted in 1985 using the NFPA Code revision of record. Details of these reviews are contained in Vol. 8 of the FPPDP.

Follow up reviews were conducted in 1994 and 1998 to document activity on the deviations identified by the original report. (NTSC Report 93-125 and 98-041). In some cases, departure from NFPA Code requirements was determined to be acceptable based on technical justification.

Table 2.1-2 provides a list of the deviations from NFPA Codes with the technical justification.

2.1-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 2.1 NFPA Codes of Record NFPA Year Comments Code 4 1971 4A 1969 6 1974 7 1974 8 1974 10 1975 12 1973 12A 1973 13 1976/1991/2000 FWRV water spray system designed and installed per 1991 code. 2000 code used for U1 & 2 MPT system demands.

13A 1976 14 1974 15 1973/1985/1990/ MG set water spray systems were designed and installed per 1985 code. (MG sets 2001 abandoned in placed with oil removed) FWRV water spray system designed and installed per 1990 code. Water spray changes to accommodate 660 gal. FP Day Tanks 0-5205A/B were designed and installed per 2001 code.

16 1974 20 1976/2003 660 gal. FP Day Tanks 0-5205A/B were designed and installed per 2003 code.

24 1973 26 1976 27 1975 30 1973/2003 660 gal. FP Day Tanks 0-5205A/B were designed and installed per 2003 code.

49 1975 50A 1973 51 1974 51B 1971 69 1973 70 1975 72 1999 Installation of the MXL FAS reviewed against 1999 code.

72D 1975 72E 1974/1984 Detectors installed as part of the upgrades in 1984 were evaluated against the 1984 code.

78 1975 80 1975/1983 1983 code referenced for supplementary guidance in evaluating code compliance.

90A 1976 92M 1972 194 1974 196 1974 197 1966 232 1980 601 1975 2.1-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section In the event of a fire at Quad Cities, depending on the extent, the Emergency There is no Industrial Emergency Association which Preparedness procedures may be entered which in turn will provide the appropriate

1. 7 07-01 Section 700 provides for mutual aid between Quad Cities and other notification to surrounding plants, communities and authorities as needed. The industrial plants. (Ref. 2, pg 4, para 3).

Cordova Fire Department is trained to respond to fire emergencies at Quad Cities.

Most hazards at Quad Cities involve electrical equipment and combustible liquids.

For this reason, Quad Cities has more CO2 and dry chemical extinguishers than Extinguishers for class A hazards are not distributed in Class A extinguishers. CO2 extinguishers can be used to control a class A fire

1. 10 10-01 Section 3-2 accordance with NFPA 10 (Ref. 3, pg 3, para 5; and pg 4, until the site fire brigade arrives. In addition, Quad Cities has properly distributed para 1). manual hose stations to also address the existing hazards. The combination of extinguishing agents available in the plant provides appropriate protection. (Ref EC 370562, rev 0)

The increased travel distances for Class B extinguishers are acceptable due to the fact that there are no large quantities of flammable liquids and the major Class B Extinguishers for class B hazards are not distributed in

1. 10 10-02 Section 3-3 fire hazards are protected by automatic detection/suppression systems. In addition, accordance with NFPA 10. (Ref. 3, pg 4, para 3).

typical sources of fires, such as welding operations, are procedurally controlled.

(Ref. 3, pg 4, para 3).

CO2 extinguishers are located in close proximity to where major energized Extinguishers for class C hazards are not distributed in equipment exists. In addition, hose reels equipped with electrically safe nozzles

1. 10 10-03 Section 3-6 accordance with NFPA 10. (Ref. 3, pg 5, para 3). are also distributed throughout the plant and in close proximity to electrical equipment. Given that, the code deviation is justified. (Ref 3, pg 5, para 3).

Fire brigade members are trained and periodically retrained on using fire Extinguisher instructions do not face outward in accordance extinguishers. Therefore, the fire brigade can effectively use extinguishers even if

1. 10 10-04 Sections 1-4 and 4-3 with NFPA 10. the extinguisher instructions do not face outward. Personnel can turn the extinguishers to read the instructions if necessary. (Ref AT 3971637-02) .

Transmittal 92-060 dated 5-26-92 concludes that for the expected type of fire, the concentrations achieved were sufficient to determine the system would be operable.

Unit 1 DG and Day Tank Rooms Do not meet the 34% However, the results of the test were marginal. To enhance overall system

1. 12 12-01 2321 concentration within 60 seconds. performance, the discharge time is increased to 96 seconds. Implementation of this recommendation substantially increases the margin of safety by achieving the CO2 design concentration of 34%. (Ref. 19)

Transmittal 92-060 dated 5-26-92 concludes that for the expected type of fire, the concentrations achieved were sufficient to determine the system would be operable.

Unit 1 DG and Day Tank Rooms Do not meet their design However, the results of the test were marginal. To enhance overall system

1. 12 12-02 2521 concentration within 60 seconds. performance, the discharge time is increased to 96 seconds. Implementation of this recommendation substantially increases the margin of safety by achieving the CO2 design concentration of 34%. (Ref. 19)

Transmittal 92-060 dated 5-26-92 concludes that for the expected type of fire, the concentrations achieved were sufficient to determine the system would be operable.

Unit 2 DG and Day Tank Rooms Do not meet the 34%

1. 12 12-03 2321 This evaluation was originally applied to Unit 1, but because Unit 2 performed concentration within 60 seconds.

better than Unit 1 on the Cardox tests, the analysis can be applied to Unit 2. (ECR 430257, Ref. 19) 2.1-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section Transmittal 92-060 dated 5-26-92 concludes that for the expected type of fire, the concentrations achieved were sufficient to determine the system would be operable.

Unit 2 DG and Day Tank Rooms Do not meet their design

1. 12 12-04 2521 This evaluation was originally applied to Unit 1, but because Unit 2 performed concentration within 60 seconds.

better than Unit 1 on the Cardox tests, the analysis can be applied to Unit 2. (ECR 430257, Ref. 19)

All identified systems were installed by Grinnell or Automatic Sprinkler whose standard practice, based on experience, is to hydrostatically test all such systems.

Lack of documentation verifying hydrostatic tests (200 psig This is supported by the fact that 40% of the listed sprinkler systems in Table One for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) have been conducted for several sprinkler

1. 13 13-02 1-11.3.1 did have hydrostatic test documentation available. The integrity of the existing systems included in Table One on pgs 9-11. (Ref. 4, pg 4, sprinkler systems is further supported by the fact that there have been no known Sect 2.2).

leaks or breaks at normal system pressures as a result of inadequate installation or construction. (Ref. 4, pg 21, Sect 6.4).

U1 RHR SW & CB pumps: The sprinkler at location M as Adequate coverage is provided by sprinklers under the stairs above. Therefore,

1. 13 13-03 4.1.1(3) shown on Sketch QC-FP-SK1 (Ref. 4, pg 80) is partially justification exists for not relocating this sprinkler (Ref. 4, pg 27, Sect 7.1.3).

blocked by a minor obstruction (Ref. 4, pg 27, Sect 7.1.3).

U1 RHR SW & CB pumps: Sprinkler J as shown on Sketch Relocation is not considered necessary due to adequate coverage from sprinkle rs

1. 13 13-04 4-3 QC-FP-SK1 (Ref. 4, pg 80) is located 2 ft. below the ceiling located below stairs south of this sprinkler. (Ref. 4, pg 27, Sect 7.1.4).

(Ref. 4, pg 27, Sect 7.1.4).

No combustibles are typically stored in the rooms so the most likely fire would be U2 RHR SW & CB pumps: Sprinklers in the RHR service an oil fire which result in rapidly developing high temperatures. Because of this, water pump cubicles are approximately 24 inches below the

1. 13 13-05 4-3 the minor deviation from the code (2 ft vs. 1 ft from ceiling) can be justified since ceiling, and this does not meet NFPA spacing requirements response time is expected to be similar. On that basis, the response time of the (Ref. 4, pg 29, Sect 7.2.2).

sprinklers will not need to be modified. (Ref. 4, pg 29, Sect 7.2.2).

Additional protection is not recommended at this time since 1) this area is separated from other areas by 3-hour fire doors, walls, and ceiling, 2) disabling a U1 & U2 HPCI pump Rooms: The systems in the HPCI single HPCI system does not prevent safe plant shutdown capability, 3) the

1. 13 13-06 4-1 pump areas provide only partial protection (Ref. 4, pg 30, automatic depressurization system provides functional redundancy to the HPCI Sect 7.3.1).

systems, and 4) a redundant safe shutdown path exists which does not require the HPCI pumps (Ref. 4, pg 30, Sect 7.3.1).

U1 CRD Feed pumps: The stairs in the northeast corner do Combustibles are not allowed to be stored under the stairs so no fires are expected

1. 13 13-07 4-4.8.2 not have any sprinkler protection underneath (Ref. 4, pg 31, to originate or propagate from this area. Because of this, the absence of sprinkler Sect 7.4.1). protection in the area can be justified. (Ref. 4, pg 31, Sect 7.4.1).

U2 CRD Feed pumps: The stairs in the southeast corner do Combustibles are not allowed to be stored under the stairs so no fires are expected

1. 13 13-08 4-4.8.2 not have any sprinkler protection underneath. (Ref 4, pg 32, to originate or propagate from this area. Because of this, the absence of sprinkler Sect 7.5.1) protection in this area can be justified. (Ref. 4, pg 32, Sect 7.5.1).

No combustibles are typically stored in the rooms so the most likely fire would be U2 CRD Feed pumps: Four sprinklers in the NE area are an oil fire which result in rapidly developing high temperatures. Because of this,

1. 13 13-09 4-3 24 below the ceiling which exceeds the NFPA spacing the minor deviation from the code (2 ft vs. 1 ft from ceiling) can be justified since limits. (Ref. 4, pg 32, Sect 7.5.3) response time is expected to be similar. On that basis, this configuration is justified (Ref. 4, pg 32, Sect 7.5.3).

2.1-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section Due to the narrowness of the enclosure, concrete construction, and the design objective which is merely to limit fire damage in this area, the location of these sprinklers is considered acceptable up to a maximum of 25 below the ceiling.

This distance may introduce a small delay in the actuation of several nozzles (due to extended time required for heat collection at the nozzle), however, their U1 Cable Tunnel: NFPA requires sprinklers to be located relocation would not result in a significant improvement in protection within the within 12 inches of the ceiling in areas with smooth limits of the stated design objective. The existing nozzles which can be justified in

1. 13 13-10 4-3 noncombustible ceilings. Several of the top nozzles are their present position are the top nozzles on the following riser numbers: 7, 8, 11, located 16 to 39 inches below the ceiling. (Ref. 4, pg 33, 17 through 24, and 29. (Ref. 4, pg 33, Sect 7.6.1).

Sect 7.6.1 and pg 35, Sect. 7.6.5)

There are only 2 risers where the top nozzle is located greater than 25 inches below the ceiling, risers #2 and #26. Neither is located near hatches and the remaining riser top nozzles in the area are located within 25 inches from ceiling so water spray from adjacent heads/risers will adequately control any fire in the area until #2 and #26 activate or until the fire brigade arrives. (Ref. 3, calc QC09 and QC10).

The most likely fire associated with the floor area beneath the cable trays is limited to combustible materials that may be stored there. Due to administrative controls U1 Cable Tunnel: Cable trays obstruct the distribution of that limit combustibles in the tunnels and the fact that the cable tray widths are

1. 13 13-11 4-1.1.1(3) water from nozzles to the floor area below. (Ref. 4, pg 34, small (under 4) allowing some coverage of the floor by the sprinkler system, no Sect 7.6.2) significant improvement in protection would be afforded by providing nozzles under the lowest tray. (Ref. 4, pg 34, Sect 7.6.2).

This may limit heat buildup at the head to fuse the nozzle, but a significant improvement would not result from moving the nozzle to be beneath the tray U1 Cable Tunnel: In several areas, nozzles between trays above. This is because cable tray fires burn slowly, allowing heat to dissipate. In are located 12 inches or less above the tray being protected,

1. 13 13-12 4-3 these cases, nozzles may be more desirable located immediately above the tray. In but are over 12 inches below the tray above. (Ref. 4, pg 34, addition, the entire area is provided with smoke detectors to provide prompt Sect 7.6.3) notification of fire conditions. See Section 7.6.3 for specific location of these conditions. (Ref. 4, pg 34, Sect 7.6.3)

The most likely fire associated with the floor area beneath the cable trays is limited to combustible materials that may be stored there. Due to administrative controls U2 Cable Tunnel: Cable trays obstruct the distribution of that limit combustibles and traffic in the tunnels and the fact that the cable tray

1. 13 13-13 4-1.1.1(3) water from the nozzles to the floor area below. (Ref. 4, pg widths are small (under 4) allowing some coverage of the floor by the sprinkler 38, Sect 7.7.2) system, no significant improvement in protection would be afforded by providing nozzles under the lowest tray. (Ref. 4, pg 38, Sect 7.7.2).

This may limit heat build-up at the head to fuse the nozzle, but a significant U2 Cable Tunnel: In several areas nozzles between trays are improvement may not result from moving the nozzle to be beneath the tray or located 12 inches or less above the tray being protected, but ceiling above. This is because cable tray fires burn slowly, allowing heat to

1. 13 13-14 4-3 are over 12 inches below the tray or ceiling above. (Ref. 4, dissipate. In these cases, nozzles may be more desirable immediately above the pg 38, Sect 7.7.3). tray. See Section 7.7.3 for specific location of these conditions. (Ref. 4, pg 38, Sect 7.7.3).

2.1-6

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section The design objective of the wetpipe system in the cable tray area is to prevent the spread of fire to other areas while limiting damage to the cabling. Given this and U2 Cable Tunnel: At riser 2C, the west 4 of trays are

1. 13 13-15 4-3 the small size of the area that is unprotected, no significant improvement in unprotected by sprinkler nozzles (Ref. 4, pg 42, Sect 7.7.8) protection would result from providing additional nozzles. (Ref. 4, pg 42, Sect 7.7.8).

The design objective of the wetpipe system in the cable tray area is to prevent the U2 Cable Tunnel: South of riser 1 E, on the first and second spread of fire to other areas while limiting damage to the cabling. Given this and

1. 13 13-16 4-1.1.1(3) levels, about 2 of cable tray is not covered by nozzles on the small size of the area that is obstructed, no significant improvement in riser 1D due to an obstruction. (Ref. 4, pg 42, Sect 7.7.10). protection would result from providing south-facing nozzles. (Ref. 4, pg 42, Sect 7.7.10).

The design objective of the wetpipe system in the cable tray area is to prevent the U2 Cable Tunnel: The top nozzle on the following riser spread of fire to other areas while limiting damage to the cabling. Given this and numbers has a minor obstruction by a trapeze hanger. These

1. 13 13-17 4-1.1.1(3) the small size of the area that is obstructed, no significant improvement in riser numbers are: 3L, 3O, 4F, 4G, 4J, 4K, and 4M. (Ref. 4, protection would result from reorienting or adding nozzles. (Ref. 4, pg 42, Sect pg 42, Sect 7.7.11).

7.7.11).

The design objective of the wetpipe system in the cable tray area is to prevent the U2 Cable Tunnel: On the east side of the tunnel spread of fire to other areas while limiting damage to the cabling. Given this and approximately 4 feet north of column line 13, there is a

1. 13 13-18 4-1.1.1(3) the small size of the area that is obstructed, no significant improvement in minor unprotected portion of 3 cable trays due to protection would result from reorienting or adding nozzles. (Ref. 4, pg 43, Sect obstructions by cables. (Ref. 4, pg 43, Sect 7.7.14).

7.7.14).

The design objecting of the wetpipe system in the cable tray area is to prevent the U2 Cable Tunnel: Under a beam located between nozzle spread of fire to other areas while limiting damage to the cabling. Given this and risers 4P and 4Q, there is a 2 foot long dry spot caused by

1. 13 13-19 4-1.1.1(3) the small size of the area that is obstructed, no significant improvement in the beam obstructing existing nozzles. (Ref. 4, pg 43, Sect protection would result from reorienting or adding nozzles. (Ref. 4, pg 43, Sect 7.7.15).

7.7.15).

The design objective of the wetpipe system in the cable tray area is to prevent the U2 Cable Tunnel: On risers 6B, 6C, 6D, 6H, and 6I, the spread of fire to other areas while limiting damage to the cabling. The existing

1. 13 13-20 4-1 second nozzle from the top is not centered beneath the top nozzle placement, while not ideal, provides sufficient coverage to ensure that the tray. (Ref. 4, pg 43, Sect 7.7.18).

design objective will be met. (Ref. 4, pg 43, Sect. 7.7.18).

The design objective of the wetpipe system in the cable tray area is to prevent the U2 Cable Tunnel: West-facing nozzles would normally be spread of fire to other areas while limiting damage to the cabling. Given that the required at riser 6CC on all levels to cover an elevation

1. 13 13-21 4-1.1.1(3) affected cable trays contain minor amounts of cable and there is adequate coverage change in the tray which obstructs existing heads. (Ref. 4, in adjacent areas of the cable trays, no significant improvement in protection would pg 44, Sect 7.7.26).

result from providing additional nozzles. (Ref. 4, pg 44, Sect 7.7.26).

U1 Reactor Feed Pumps and Speed Increaser Gears Very few combustibles are typically stored in the room so the most likely fire Sprinklers in these rooms are generally located 24 inches would be an oil fire which result in rapidly developing high temperatures. Because

1. 13 13-22 Section 4-3 below the ceiling, which is not in accordance with NFPA 13 of this, the minor deviation from the code (2 ft vs. 1 ft from ceiling) can be justified spacing rules requiring heads within 12 inches of the ceiling. since response time is expected to be similar. On that basis, the response time of (Ref. 4, pg 46, Sect. 7.8.1). the sprinklers will not need to be modified. (Ref. 4, pg 46, Sect 7.8.1).

The area directly under the cable trays and 18 inch pipe is a walkway where no Cable trays 1788 and 1781 (3-10 wide each) as well as an combustibles are stored on the floor and no source of fire exists. The areas

1. 13 13-23 4-1.1.1(3) 18 pipe form minor obstructions to sprinklers in the immediately adjacent to this corner have sprinkler protection and the areas over northwest corner. (Ref. 4, pg 46, Sect 7.8.2). each Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) where any fire is likely to originate are also adequately protected with sprinklers. (Ref. 4, pg 46, Sect 7.8.2).

2.1-7

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section 2 Reactor Feed Pumps and Speed increaser Gears: Sprinklers Very few combustibles are typically stored in the room so the most likely fire in these rooms are generally located 24 inches below the would be an oil fire which result in rapidly developing high temperatures. Because

1. 13 13-24 Section 4-3 ceiling, which is not in accordance with NFPA 13 spacing of this, the minor deviation from the code (2 ft vs. 1 ft from ceiling) can be justified rules requiring heads within 12 inches of the ceiling. (Ref. since response time is expected to be similar. On that basis, the response time of 4, pg 48, Sect 7.9.1). the sprinklers will not need to be modified. (Ref. 4, pg 48, Sect 7.9.1).

U2 Reactor Feed Pumps and Speed Increaser Gears: The Within 4 of these sprinklers, hangers are installed. The piping stress associated original plans for this system showed hangers located with the 4 of unsupported water filled piping is well within the limits of carbon

1. 13 13-25 3-14.6.3 approximately 6 from the end sprinkler on each of the east steel piping from B31.1. Therefore, adequate support currently exists for these branch lines. These hangers were not installed. (Ref. 4, pg small sections of 1-inch pipe. (Ref. EC 376115, rev 0).

38, Sect 7.9.2).

The obstruction is minor and overlapping protection will be available from adjacent U2 Drum Storage Area: One nozzle in the center of the sprinklers 8 away. Relocation of this head is not justifiable in view of the

1. 13 13-26 4-1.1.1(3) room is obstructed by unit heaters. (Ref. 4, pg 50, Sect marginal increase in protection that would be afforded. (Ref. 4, pg 50, Sect 7.11.2).

7.11.2).

U1 Trackway: A pendant sprinkler east of the caustic tank A tray located near the sprinkler head would cause any rising heat to accumulate room is positioned over 16 inches below the ceiling, which is

1. 13 13-27 Section 4-3 near the head allowing the fusible link to melt. Therefore, relocation of the head is not in accordance with NFPA 13 spacing requirements.

not justified. (Ref. 4, pg 51, Sect 7.12.1).

(Ref. 4, pg 51, Sect 7.12.1).

EHC Fluid Reservoirs: The existing sprinklers at locations These sprinklers are located in an area where there are no combustibles above them 11, 14, 15 and 18 as shown on Sketch QC-FP-SK5 (Ref. 4,

1. 13 13-28 Section 4-3 and the other sprinklers in the area provide adequate coverage of the EHC skids pg 86) are located a considerable distance below the ceiling, located below. (Ref. 4, pg 55, Sect 7.14.3).

in some cases exceeding 4 ft. (Ref. 4, pg 55, Sect 7.14.3)

U2 L.P.: Heater Bay - West Side: Three sprinklers located just north of column line 60 on the upper level of the low This is justifiable since a second sprinkler branch line is located approximately 5 -

1. 13 13-29 4-1.1.1(3) pressure heater bay are partially obstructed by a nearby crane 5 north of the crane rail and, therefore, adequately covers the affected area. (Ref.

rail running parallel to the branch line. (Ref. 4, pg 57, Sect 4, pg 57, Sect 7.17.1).

7.17.1).

The design objective of the wetpipe system in the U2 LP Heater Bay is to provide general area protection and to prevent the spread of fire beyond the source.

U2 L.P.: Heater Bay - West Side: One sprinkler head Generally the most likely fire will be an oil fire originating in oil that has pooled located just north of column 9 at the far east portion of the following a turbine bearing lube oil pipe break. Generally, other combustibles are

1. 13 13-30 4-1.1.1(3) upper level of the lower pressure heater bay (adjacent to the limited to short-term storage during outages and fire watches are provided where condenser unit) is partially obstructed by a 2-inch wide appropriate. Given this and the small size of the area that is obstructed, no vertical support. (Ref. 4, pg 57, Sect 7.17.2).

significant improvement in protection would result from relocating a single nozzle.

(Ref. 4, pg 58, Sect 7.17.2).

U2 H.P.: Heater Bay - East Side: A single sprinkler head location north of col. Line 11 and immediately west of col. The obstruction is minor and overlapping protection will be available from adjacent

1. 13 13-31 4-1.1.1(3) Line G along the east wall of the high pressure heater bay is sprinklers. Relocation of this head is not justifiable in view of the marginal partially obstructed by a nearby HVAC duct. (Ref. 4, pg 59, increase in protection that would be afforded. (Ref. 4, pg 59, Sect 7.19.1).

Sect 7.19.1).

U2 H.P.: Heater Bay - East Side: A single sprinkler head The obstruction is minor and overlapping protection will be available from adjacent approximately 6-0 south of column line 9 and 8-0 west

1. 13 13-32 4-1.1.1(3) sprinklers. Relocation of this head is not justifiable in view of the marginal of column line G is partially obstructed by a large valve increase in protection that would be afforded. (Ref. 4, pg 60, Sect 7.19.2).

operator. (Ref. 4, pg 60, Sect 7.19.2).

2.1-8

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section U2 H.P.: Heater Bay - East Side: The first sprinkler south of column line 9 and immediately east of column line G is The obstruction is minor and overlapping protection will be available from adjacent

1. 13 13-33 4-1.1.1(3) partially obstructed due to close proximity of an electrical sprinklers. Relocation of this head is not justifiable in view of the marginal conduct adjacent to the sprinkler head. (Ref. 4, pg 60, Sect increase in protection that would be afforded. (Ref. 4, pg 60, Sect 7.19.3).

7.19.3).

No combustibles are typically stored in the rooms so the most likely fire would be Unit 1, 2, and 1/2 DG cells and Fuel Day Tank Rooms: an oil fire which result in rapidly developing high temperatures. Because of this,

1. 13 13-34 Section 4-3 Sprinklers are generally located more than 16 inches below the minor deviation from the code (16 in vs. 12 in from ceiling) can be justified the ceiling. (Ref. 4, pg 61, Sect 7.20.1). since response time is expected to be similar. On that basis, the sprinklers will not need to be relocated. (Ref. 4, pg 61, Sect 7.20.1).

Units 1, 2, and 1/2 DG Cells and Fuel Day Tank Rooms: In the Unit 1/2 day tank room, the sprinkler below the oil tank is The sprinklers are a back-up to the CO2 system. Since the room is small and there

1. 13 13-35 4-1.1.1(3) located approximately 4 inches below the level of the diked are two ceiling sprinklers, justification exists for not relocating this head. (Ref. 4, spill area, with the possibility it could be submerged in the pg 61, Sect 7.20.2).

event of a spill. (Ref. 4, pg 61, Sect 7.20.2).

The design objective is to prevent the spread of fire to other areas while limiting damage to the cabling. The most likely fire associated with the floor area beneath Cable Spreading Room: No sprinkler protection is provided the cable trays is limited to combustible materials that may be stored there. Due to

1. 13 13-36 4-4.13 below the cable trays, even where these trays exceed 4 ft. in administrative controls that limit combustibles in these room and the fact that the width. (Ref. 4, pg 63, Sect 7.23.1). nozzles in adjacent areas do provide adequate floor coverage to limit the spread of fire, no significant improvement in protection would be afforded by providing nozzles under the trays. (Ref. 4, pg 63, Sect 7.23.1).

Cable tray fires burn slowly, allowing heat from the fire to more likely dissipate Cable Spreading Room: The second nozzle from the bottom rather than accumulate effectively under the cable tray above. Given that, locating on riser #7 is located 12 inches or less above the tray the nozzles immediately above the cable tray, as in this case, would be just as

1. 13 13-37 Section 4-3 protected, but is over 12 inches below the tray above. (Ref. effective. Also, the design objective of the wetpipe system in this area is to prevent 4, pg 64, Sect 7.23.2). the spread of fire. The sprinklers in the adjacent areas will provide adequate protection to satisfy this objective. (Ref. 4, page 64, Sect 7.23.2).

The design objective of the wetpipe system in the cable tray area is to prevent the Cable Spreading Room: Between sprinkler Nos. 20 and 26 spread of fire to other areas while limiting damage to the cabling. Given that the

1. 13 13-38 Section 4-1 there is a 4 section of cable tray 489T that is not covered by affected cable trays contain minor amounts of cable and there is adequate coverage nozzles. (Ref. 4, pg 64, Sect 7.23.3). in adjacent areas of the cable trays, no significant improvement in protection would result from providing additional nozzles. (Ref. 4, pg 64, Sect 7.23.3).

Cable Spreading Room: There is a minor obstruction found The obstruction is minor and overlapping protection will be available from adjacent

1. 13 13-39 4-1.1.1(3) by junction box 2SB-9/2SB-8 at ceiling. (Ref. 4, pg 64, Sect sprinklers. Relocation of this head is not justifiable in view of the marginal 7.23.4). increase in protection that would be afforded. (Ref. 4, pg 64, Sect 7.23.4).

The design objective of the wetpipe system in the cable spreading room is to Cable Spreading Room: North of nozzle risers N33 and prevent the spread of fire to other areas while limiting damage to the cabling.

N34, and northwest of sprinkler 58 there are five sections of

1. 13 13-40 Section 4-1 Given this and the small size of the area that is unprotected, no significant cable trays where approximately 2 of the tray is not covered improvement in protection would result from providing additional nozzles. (Ref. 4, by existing nozzles. (Ref. 4, pg 64, Sect 7.23.5).

pg 64, Sect 7.23.5).

2.1-9

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section The unprotected area is small and the obstruction allows some coverage from the sprinkler above as well as from adjacent sprinklers. Given that the design objective Unit 1 ASD Cooler Area: There is a small unprotected area of the system is to limit the spread of fire from this area, additional nozzles are not

1. 13 13-42 4-1.1.1(3) in the southwest corner beneath a cable tray. (Ref. 4, pg 71, necessary. (Ref. 4, pg 71, Sect 7.26.1).

Sect 7.26.1).

The MG Set Oil Coolers and Pumps were removed from this area per EC 366310, eliminating a major combustible source.

No combustibles are typically stored in the area so the most likely fire would be an oil fire which result in rapidly developing high temperatures. Because of this, the minor deviation from the code (sprinklers greater than 1 ft from ceiling) can be Unit 1 ASD Cooler Area: Sprinkler nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 justified since response time is expected to be similar. On that basis, the location

1. 13 13-43 Section 4-3 are located over 12 inches below cable trays or ceilings of the sprinklers will not need to be modified. (ref. 4, pg 72, Sect 7.27.1).

above. (Ref. 4, pg 72, Sect 7.27.1).

Following removal of the oil from this area, the suppression system design objective is to limit fire damage in this area. Relocation of discrepant sprinkler heads would not result in significant protection improvement and is not required.

Units 1 and 2 Turbine Bearing Life Pumps: These systems The existing valves located on the sprinkler system protecting the Turbine Bearing have non-indicating control valves on each riser, which do lift pumps are maintained in a locked open position and are additionally monitored

1. 13 13-44 3-13.2.1 not meet the requirements for control valves in NFPA 13. with a Potter GVS supervisory switch. The existing controls provide assurance that (Ref. 4, pg 73, Sect 7.28.1). the sprinkler system is maintained in a ready condition.

NFPA 13 does not require the use of heat collectors around closed nozzles.

Units 1 and 2 Turbine Bearing Lift Pumps: The closed However, in response to the documented concern, the most likely fire associated

1. 13 13-45 Section 4-3 nozzles are not provided with heat collectors. (Ref. 4, pg 73, with the lift pumps would be from the oil igniting. An oil fire will result in rapid Sect 7.28.2). heat generation and with the nozzles located 5 feet above the skid, it is expected the spray system will actuate.

Units 1 and 2 Turbine Bearing Protection: The sprinkler systems provide deluge protection for the turbine bearings The valves are administratively controlled in their required position which ensures

1. 13 13-46 3-13.2.1 have non-indicating control valves. (Ref. 4, pg 74, Sect a flow path to the deluge system.

7.29.1).

2.1-10

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section The most likely fire in this area is a postulated oil fire which would generate intense heat, more than enough to ensure sprinkler actuation would operate effectively. In addition, the hazard is also protected by a water spray system which supplements the ceiling sprinklers. (Ref. 4, pg 75, Sect 7.30.1).

With the oil removed from the MG Sets per EC 366310 and EC 366314, there are Unit 1 ASD Cooler Area, Unit 2 Motor Generator Set: minor combustible materials located in the area of the MG Sets, the combustible

1. 13 13-47 Section 4-3 Ceiling sprinklers are located 16 to 20 inches below the load of the Turbine operating floor if negligible and transient combustible materials ceiling. (Ref. 4, pg 75, Sect 7.30.1). are controlled by station procedures. Thus, it is very unlikely for a fire to start near the MG Sets or on the Turbine operating floor. In the unlikely event of an Appendix R type fire, the suppression systems in the area of the MG Sets would be actuated and prevent the spread of a fire into the equivalent fire areas. Thus with the oil removed from the MG Sets, the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not affected.

Units 1 and 2 Bus Duct Penetrations: On each of two These ducts contain bare wires with ceramic insulators. Due to the lack of cable systems, two sprinklers were installed in accordance with the insulation or other combustibles within these ducts, the proposed sprinklers are not

1. 13 13-48 Section 4-1 original sprinkler contractors plans. These heads were considered necessary to provide the required protection. (Ref. 4, p g 79, Sect aimed at a set of three ducts on each unit penetrating the east 7.32.1).

wall. (Ref. 4, pg 79, Sect 7.32.1).

NFPA history indicates the most common cause of sprinkler system failure has been the control valve found closed. In a nuclear power plant, controls and training are in place to assure that valves and equipment are in the correct position. Valves arent repositioned without procedural direction and are only manipulated by the operating dept. The chance of inadvertent closure of a sprinkler control valves is minimal. Therefore a reduction in the frequency of this surveillance is acceptable.

NFPA 13A required weekly checks of control valve position.

(Ref. ECR 52828).

Quad Cities procedures indicate the valve position checks NFPA requires valve position to be supervised in the open position using an

1. 13 13S-49 13 and 13A are performed quarterly, but the remaining surveillances are accepted method which may include seals, locks, etc. Administrative controls not conducted. (Ref. 5, pg 9, Sect 3.3, para 2, subpart 7; and other than seals are used at Quad Cities so the seal integrity check requirement of pg 7, Table 3.3.1, Item 2 and 3).

13A does not apply.

Valve operation is verified annually under QCOS 4100-02. At the same time the valve stem is lubricated to ensure valve remains free to move when needed.

History has shown that the annual stroke and stem lubrication has been successful at maintaining the operability of the valves. Therefore the reduction in the frequency of this surveillance is justified.

2.1-11

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section NFPA 13A requires weekly check of riser gage readings, as well as a 2-inch drain test at each riser. These requirements are not being implemented. However, NFPA 13A requires Since the water supply at Quad Cities is totally under plant control, these tests are

1. 13 13S-50 13 and 13A these tests at sprinklered properties normally served by city unnecessary. (Ref. 5, pg 9, Sect 3.3, para 2, subpart 8).

water connections. The test verifies that the city supply is in service. (Ref. 5, pg 9, Sect 3.3, para 2, subpart 8; and pg 7, Table 3.3.1, Item 5).

Cable Spreading Room: The piping plans specified on F- The piping stress associated with the worst-case cantilever identified in the Cable 269 specify a few locations where piping cantilevers are in Spreading Room, 5 ft. unsupported length, is within the limits of carbon steel

1. 13 13-51 3-14.6.3 excess of the maximum 3ft. dimension specified for 1-inch piping from B31.1. Therefore, adequate support currently exists for these small piping in NFPA 13. sections of 1-inch pipe (Ref. EC 376446).

Hydraulic calculation QDC-4100-M-1534 has been performed which demonstrates Several hose reels supplied with 2 pipe are located some that the available fire pump discharge pressure is adequate to ensure that the

1. 14 14-01 NFPA 14 Para. 219 distance from the primary risers (as much as 80 equivalent required pressure is available to the limiting hose reel which is up to 80 ft from the feet) (Ref. 6, pg 8, para 4).

riser.

This area consists of a long enclosed tunnel with concrete walls, floor and ceiling.

A portion of the cable tunnel is not within reach of a hose The area is adequately protected by a wetpipe system which is fully capable of

1. 14 14-02 NFPA 14 Para. 322 stream. (Ref. 6, pg 8, para 6). containing any expected fire. Adding an additional hose reel for this area is not necessary to meet the design objective of the fire protection system in that area.

The hose reels in use at Quad Cities meet the construction requirements of UL47, At Quad Cities, UL listed or FM approve hose reels have not

1. 14 14-03 Section 43 Semiautomatic Fire Hose Storage Devices, section 11 (Rack and Reel-Type been specified. (Ref. 6, pg 10, para 1)

Storage Devices) and therefore are adequate as installed. (Ref. 6, pg 10, para 1).

The intent of the standard is to protect the employee from run-away hoses if it becomes necessary to drop a pressurized hose line and retreat from the fire. At Pressure at hose outlets exceeds 100 psi with no pressure

1. 14 14-04 NFPA 14, Para 442 Quad Cities, only fire brigade personnel are authorized to use the fire hoses in the reducing devices installed. (Ref. 6, pg 10, para 4).

plant and brigade members are trained to handle the higher pressures. Warning signs are posted on all hose stations to warn brigade members of the high pressure.

A primary function of a flow switch is to provide notification of unauthorized use.

Flow switches are not provided on all standpipe risers. (Ref. Since access to a nuclear power plant is controlled, unauthorized operation is not

1. 14 14-05 NFPA 14, Para 671 6, pg 12, paras 3,4,5) normally a concern. In addition, operation of any of the hose stations should activate the fire pump running alarm. (Ref. 9, pg 12, paras 3,4,5).

2.1-12

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section a) No hose stations in the cable tunnels or containment a) Even though manual hose stations are not provided for the cable tunnels and drywells (Ref. 6, pg 2) drywells, adequate hose is provided for access to these areas. In addition, the areas are adequately protected by sprinkler systems which are fully capable of containing any expected fire. (Ref. xx, Sect E.3(d), pg 5.5-8). NOTE: this reference is not included on the reference page but should be. The reference is QDC FPR Vol 1, NFPA 14, Para 219 and

1. 14 14-06 Sect 5 - Guidelines of Appendix A to APCSB 9.5-1.

322 b) A few standpipes serving multiple hose connections are b) Hydraulic calculation QDC-4100-M-1534 has been performed which less than 4 inches in diameter. Several connections to single demonstrates that the available fire pump discharge pressure is adequate to ensure hose stations are less than 2-1/2 diameter (i.e. several that the required pressure is available to the limiting hose reel which is up to 80 ft standpipes feeding single hose connections are less than 2 1/2 from the riser.

inches in diameter). (Ref. 6, pg 2).

One pump has failed to meet pressure and flow requirements (stated in NFPA 20-4-1.4) during periodic testing since its The fire pump is monitored per surveillance and the surveillance acceptance

1. 20 20-01 12-3.1 and 4-1.4 acceptance test, based on available information. (Ref. 4, pg criteria ensures the hydraulic study (Ref. 17) remains valid.

3, Sect 2.2; and pg 17, Sect 6.1).

There shall be a separate fuel line and separate fuel supply A separate tank is provided for fire mitigation, therefore, meeting NFPA-20 tank for each engine. A cross-tie line is provided between requirements. Two (2) locked closed isolation valves are provided on the day tank

1. 20 20-02 11-4.4,2003 the FP diesel pump day tanks to allow for increased fuel cross-tie line. These valves will only be opened for Appendix R support. (EC volume for Appendix R support. 341220)

This deviation is justified in EC 346408 and EC 346409. Per the EC Design Summary discussion the acceptance of the engine and code deviation will be based The Cummins NT855-F3 engines are being used to provide

1. 20 20-03 11.2.1(2003) on the acceptable results of a full flow test using procedures QCMMS 4100-32, power outside their listed value.

1/2A-4101 Diesel Driven Fire Pump Annual Capacity Test and QCMMS 4100-33, 1/2B-4101 Diesel Driven Fire Pump Annual Capacity Test.

The pressure relief valves for the fire protection system This deviation is justified in EC 346408 and EC 346409. The basis for the (170-psi to 180-psi) exceed the working pressure limits of

1. 20 20-04 5.18.1.1 (2003) justification is that the normal pressure is maintained at 120-psi and magnitude and the system components. This is primarily a deviation from duration of pressure transients are within the capability of the piping systems.

NFPA 20, but also deviates from NFPA 13, 14, 15, AND 24.

2.1-13

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section Staggering the setpoints by 5 psi satisfies the intent of NFPA 20 to prevent In Lieu of a sequential timing device to prevent one engine simultaneous start of both pumps. This approach is used at the other Exelon sites, from starting at the same time as the other, the initiation

1. 20 20-05 9-5.2.3 and based on operating experience at Quad Cities and the other sites this approach setpoints are staggered by 5 psi, with PS 0-4141-5A set at 70 is sufficient to minimize dynamic loads on the piping system as a result of fire psig and PS 0-4141-5B set at 65 psig (both values nominal) pump starts.

The intent of the NFPA requirement is satisfied. The fire pump rooms/assemblies are routinely observed shiftly during operator rounds ensuring that the pump assembly appears to be in operating condition and is free from physical damage.

The automatic or manual operation upon demand and continuous delivery of the required system output is ensured. The fire pump performance and reliability is The diesel driven fire pumps are test run monthly instead of tracked and trended in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program, and any

1. 20 20-06 8-6.1 weekly as required by NFPA. deficiencies encountered are documented and corrected in accordance with corrective action program. As a result, the impact of performing the routine fire pump surveillance monthly (rather than once per 7 days) is monitored and acted upon to maintain reliability, if necessary. Therefore, fire pump reliability, including any necessary adjustments to the surveillance frequency based on future performance is ensured.

The unlined steel distribution piping is not acceptable as it is QDC-4100-M-0537 verifies that all system demands can be met with a C-Factor of likely to adversely restrict the water supply to sprinkler 60. The C-Factor of 60 is a bounding value against the projected end of life C-

1. 24 24-01 FHA 3.5, Section E.2(a) systems through the effects of tuberculation and corrosion factor of 65 for the underground fire main system (Ref EC 346408 and EC (FHA 3.5, Section E.2(a) requires lined pipe). (Ref. 4, pg 3, 346409). In addition, the station periodically monitors the C-Factor during Sect 2.1; Ref. 4, pg 12, Sect 5.1) surveillance testing.

Due to the remote location, lack of a nearby public water supply, redundancy of A fire department connection through which the public fire fire pumps, and intake canal supplies from the Mississippi River through which

1. 24 24-02 Paragraph 2600 department can pump water into the system has not been water may be pumped from draft by back feeding through existing hydrants, provided. (Ref. 7, pg 7, Sect 3.1) omission of such a connection is justified. (Ref. 7, pg 7, Sect 3.1).

Yard and Distribution Piping: This valve has been designed for buried application and provides positive The Roto Hammer control valves stem located east of the indication of valve position. The station has had no problem with the operation of

1. 24 24-03 Paragraph 3101 Unit 1 Reactor Building is not UL - listed for fire protection the valve during routine surveillance and functional cycling. Should the valve service, particularly in areas where valves are buried below require replacement for any reason in the future, it should be replaced with a listed asphalt or earth. (Ref. 4, pg 79, Sect 7.33.1, Ref. 7, pg 7) or approved valve.

2.1-14

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section Loss of a single PIV due to its potential close proximity to a fire will not cut off PIVs are located closer than 40 feet from buildings. (Ref. 7, water supplies to the sprinkler systems. In addition, the walls of the buildings are

1. 24 24-04 Paragraph 3302 pg 7-8, section 3.3) constructed of reinforced concrete and collapse is not anticipated during a fire and most exposed openings have metal doors without windows.

The most likely failure mode for this piping would be a small leak or partial piping break that would not adversely effect the operation of the system until it could be isolated and repaired. In the highly unlikely event of complete failure of this section of underground piping, the piping could be isolated by closing 1-4199-26 in the Crib House and 1-4199-29 in the Unit 1 Turbine Building. This isolation Paragraphs 9301 and Piping is located below the Radwaste Building without would take out several hose stations in the Radwaste Building, but would restore

1. 24 24-05 3502 sectional valves. (Ref. 7, pg 8, Sect 3.5) the vast majority of the Fire Protection system and thus satisfies the main intent of the requirement for sectional valves. Since the FP system is modeled with this section of piping isolated (worst-case), the system would be restored to an analyzed condition, and as such, additional isolation valves for this section of piping would afford little additional protection, especially since the Radwaste hose drops come off the described underground section of piping. (Ref. EC 376115, rev 0).

Many of the exterior walls are reinforced concrete construction, and the collapse Hydrants are located closer than 50 feet from buildings. during a postulated fire is not likely. In addition, several of the exposed walls are

1. 24 24-06 Paragraph 4202 (Ref. 7, pg 9, Sect 3.8). blank. Finally, the on site fire brigade and adequate inside hose stations reduce the dependence on outside hydrants. (Ref. 7, pg 9, Sect 3.8)

The lack of prominent markings does not cause any significant issue because the Hose houses have not been marked as required by NFPA 24

1. 24 24-08 Paragraph 5501 only personnel who can operate the hose houses are trained to recognize the hose (Ref. 7, pg 10, Sect 3.12) houses and their function.

NFPA history indicates the most common cause of sprinkler system failure has been the control valve found closed. In a nuclear power plant, controls and training are in place to assure that valves and equipment are in the correct position. Valves NFPA 24 recommends weekly verification of valve position,

1. 24 24S-11 NFPA 24, Para 3601 arent repositioned without procedural direction and are only manipulated by the whereas valves are inspected QUARTERLY. (Ref. 5, pg 18) operating dept. The chance of inadvertent closure of a sprinkler control valve is minimal. Therefore a reduction in the frequency of this surveillance is acceptable.

(Ref. ECR 52828)

The room is equipped with a high point forced air vent on one end of the stored oil.

The Clean and Dirty Lube Oil Tank Room exhaust and air The other end contains a closed door with an air gap between the bottom of the

1. 30 30-02 Paragraph 4313 intakes are not located within 12 inches of the floor. (Ref.

door and the floor. This configuration provides continuous air flow across the oil 8, pg 12, para 4) storage area that will prevent vapors from accumulating at floor level.

2.1-15

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section Each EHC Fluid Reservoir tank is equipped with a breather device that filters EHC Fluid Reservoir Tank area vents are not installed. (Ref. incoming air to minimize humidity intrusion and outgoing air to prevent EHC mist

1. 30 30-03 NFPA 30, Para 2140 8, pg 13, para 3) from escaping. The breather is mounted above the EHC skids so it communicates directly with the air space along the 13 line.

NFPA 30 is unclear with respect to fire resistance Each unit of equipment is located in an open area that is protected by a sprinkler requirements for enclosures serving as fire barriers for tanks system. The fluid tanks are adequately diked and the high flash point of the oil in similar to these (EHC Fluid Reservoirs, MG Set Oil Coolers, each application renders it difficult to ignite. Based on that, no concerns exist with

1. 30 30-04 Section 52 Turbine Oil Reservoirs, Hydrogen Seal Oil Units, MG Sets, respect to the storage of combustible liquids in the identified enclosures. (Ref. 8, Crib Hse FP). (Ref. 8, pg 13, para 6; pg 18, paras 2 & 5; pg pg 13, para 6; pg 18, paras 2 & 5; pg 20, para 1; pg 21, para 5).

20, para 1; pg 21, para 5) (MG Set Oil Coolers removed)

The non-standard fire door is acceptable due to the presence of the installed suppression system, the ramped access and the limited exposure to safety related equipment. All exposed liquids are Class III combustibles, and Class I liquids that may be present in the room are stored inside approved fire resistance storage Deficiencies in the Unit 2 Oil Drum Storage Room include cabinets. This makes the existing electrical equipment acceptable as is. The the following (Ref. 8, pg 16):

ventilation system actively pulls air from penetrations above the fire door and Non standard fire door.

1. 30 30-05 Section 43 exhausts it through vent ducts located on the opposite end of the stored oil drums.

Ordinary electrical equipment.

While the vent ducts are four feet from the ground, given that the Class III liquids No low level ventilation.

have flash points in excess of 400 deg F and given that each time the door is Room exceeds 500 sq ft.

opened the lower levels are purged of vapors, no concerns exist. While the room size does exceed 500 sq ft, the amount of actual storage area being used is less than 500 sq ft and given its fire resistant construction, the available suppression system and the presence of only Class III liquids, the room is acceptable. (Ref. 8, pg 17)

This requirement is over-ridden by the more significant concern for the possible NFPA 30, Paragraph 2343 requires a heat-actuated shutoff spurious operation of such a valve, as fuel for the down going unit could be cut off

1. 30 30-06 Paragraph 2343 valve to prevent flow from the DG day tank in the event of a by such operation. It is desired that the down going units be able to operate even if fire. (Ref. 8, pg 20, para 3) a fire occurs due to the overriding concern for safe shutdown. (Ref. 8, pg 20, para 3)

The code states that where a secondary tank is used to provide spill control, all piping connections shall be made Relative to the fire pump fuel supply and cross-tie connections, this position is above the normal maximum liquid level. Contrary to this the over-ridden by the NFPA-20 requirement (Section 11.4.5.3, 2003) to have the fuel following connections on the FP diesel day tanks will be supply located on the side of the tank at the 5% sump level (to facilitate gravity below the normal liquid level:

1. 30 30-07 4.3.2.3.3, 2003 feed supply to the fire pump engine). The drain and instrumentation connections Fire pump fuel supply are needed at the bottom of the tank to ensure functionality. A sight glass is Level Instrumentation lower leg provided to monitor for secondary leakage detection. Daily system inspections are Main Tank drain connections performed, including observation for fuel leakage. (EC 341220)

Secondary Tank drain connection Day Tank cross-tie connection 2.1-16

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section The code states that manifolding of vent piping shall be The code is concerned with manifolding of vent piping from alternate tank sources.

avoided except for special purposes such as vapor recovery, The QC design will only manifold primary/secondary vents from the same tank. In

1. 30 30-08 5.7.1.2, 2003 vapor conservation, or air pollution control. The primary addition, the vent piping has been sized to ensure pressure limitations of the system and secondary emergency vent piping will be manifolded on have been met. (EC 341220) the FP diesel day tanks.

No procedures exist to address periodic air sampling to verify the ventilation system associated with the Battery The time required to build up a hydrogen concentration above 1% is ~11 months.

1. 69 69-01 Paragraph 3723 Rooms are effective at reducing H2 gas concentrations to at Alarms on the ventilation system will alert Operations to the potential problem.

least 25% of the lower explosive limit for hydrogen (4% in Sampling does not provide any added value.

air). (Ref. 9, pg 9)

Fire alarms are received in the control room. The alarms indicate the location of The fire alarm system requires alarms on each floor of the the concern to the control room operators. The operators notify station personnel building to ensure all occupants are able to hear. The alarm

1. 72 72-01 Para. 2541, NFPA 72D of the condition via the P.A. system which includes a fire alarm that is audible to system at Quad Cities does not fully meet this requirement.

all plant personnel. The operators address the alarm condition accordingly with the (Ref. 10, pg 17) assistance of written emergency response procedures.

All personnel are trained to notify the control room in the event of a fire at which Pull stations are not distributed throughout the protected time appropriate plant notifications are made via the P.A. system. The existing

1. 72 72-02 Para. 3113, NFPA 72D areas. (Ref. 10, pg 18) communication system is judged to be equivalent to the use of pull ns since phones are available and distributed throughout the protected area.

The most likely fire originating in these areas would involve lube oil from the compressors. This type of fire will have a high heat release and with the area Thermal detectors for the Drywell/Torus DP Compressors curbed to contain the oil, the heat would be localized within the curbing. The 2

1. 72 72-03 NFPA 72E, Sect 3-4.1 and ACAD Air Compressors are not located at the ceiling. thermal detectors, one on each side, have heat canopies or deflector immediately (Ref. 10, pg 24, para 6) above the detectors (w/in 6 inches) and given the high localized heat, should allow sufficient heat build-up to effectively actuate the preaction system. (Ref. 10, pg 24, para 6).

The objective of the detectors is to provide early warning of a fire in the cable trays in these areas. The detectors are installed directly above the cable penetration to The location of the smoke detectors in the Unit 1 northwest the Turbine Building and would be adequate for any fire that is propagating area (Unit 2 southwest) of the RB on the 595 floor elev. Are through the cable tray. The spacing, however, is beyond NPFA guidance for

1. 72 72-04 NFPA 72E, Sect 4-3.1 greater than 15 ft from the edge of the beam pocket in which coverage of a transient exposure fire from the floor. Given that transient they are installed (Ref. 10, pg 26, para 3) combustibles are procedurally controlled at Quad Cities and are rarely left unattended in the area, the risk of any exposure originating from the floor is mitigated. (Ref. 10, pg 26, para 3).

2.1-17

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section The detection system also includes detectors that are located in the pockets Detectors 080, 085 (Unit 1) and 076 (Unit 2) are installed on between the beams. While the detectors on the bottom of the concrete beams are the bottom of concrete beams about 24 in. deep rather than

1. 72 72-05 NFPA 72E, Sect 4-4.6 not in compliance with NFPA guidance, given that the other detectors are present, in the pocket between the beams where smoke will the non-compliant detectors could be removed without any reduction in the level of accumulate. (Ref. 10, pg 28, para 1) protection. (Ref. 10, pg 28, para 1).

Since there are typically no combustibles stored on the floor around the MCCs the most likely fire would be an electrical fire associated with the MCCs. Since the A number of detectors in the beam pockets above MCCs smoke detectors are located directly above the MCCs a smoke plume originating at

1. 72 72-06 NFPA 72E, Sect 4-3.1 (623) are not spaced properly (Ref. 10, pg 28, para 2) the MCCs would likely be directed towards the detectors. Because of this, the deviation from the code (>15 ft from a beam) can be justified since response time is expected to be similar. (Ref. 10, pg 28, para 3)

The objective of the detectors is to provide early warning of a fire in the cable trays in these areas. The detectors are installed directly above the cable penetration to the Turbine Building and would be adequate for any fire that is propagating Detectors exceed spacing limitations in the U1 northwest through the cable tray. The spacing, however, is beyond NFPA guidance for

1. 72 72-07 NFPA 72E, Sect 4-3.1 and U2 southwest Major Cable Penetration Area (623).

coverage of a transient exposure fire from the floor. Given that transient (Ref. 10, pg 30, para 3) combustibles are procedurally controlled at Quad Cities and are rarely left unattended in the area, the risk of any exposure originating from the floor is mitigated. (Ref. 10, pg 30)

The most likely fire in this area is a one associated with the cables. The smoke detectors are located directly above the cable trays, which is appropriate for cable tray fires. Given the configuration, two smoke detectors mounted directly on the Section 4-3.1, NFPA Detectors in the HPHB are not spaced in accordance with

1. 72 72-08 ceiling would provide adequate protection. The smoke detectors in this area are 3 72E NFPA 72E. (Ref. 10, pg 45, para 3) inches below the ceiling, which is in conflict with the NFPA guidance. However, given that the detectors are immediately above the expected source of the fire, the existing locations are acceptable.

The most likely fire would be a diesel fuel fire which result in rapidly developing high temperatures. Since the diesel generator rooms are relatively small and given Detectors in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 DG Rooms are not the high rate of heat released and also considering that the average heat detector

1. 72 72-09 NFPA 72E, Sect 3-5 mounted on the ceiling and are improperly spaced. (Ref. 10, coverage (380 sq ft) is less than 625 sq ft maximum coverage that the code pg 50, para 1) requires, the minor deviation from the code (i.e. detectors 12 inches from ceiling) can be justified since response time is expected to be similar. (Ref. 10, pg 50 &

51).

The most likely fire would be an oil fire which result in rapidly developing high temperatures. Since the oil storage room is relatively small with 12 ft ceilings and Detectors in Oil Storage Rooms exceed U.L. spacing limits. given the high rate of heat released and also considering that the average heat

1. 72 72-10 NFPA 72E, Sect 3-5 (Ref. 10, pg 55, para 2) detector coverage (380 sq ft) is less than the 625 sq ft maximum coverage that the code requires, the minor deviation from the spacing requirements of the code can be justified since response time is expected to be similar. (Ref. 10, pg 50 & 51).

2.1-18

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section The distance to any corner in the beam pocket is not greater than 70% of the listed Detection in the U2 Trackway exceeds NFPA spacing

1. 72 72-11 NFPA 72E, Sect 4-3.1 spacing of 30 ft. The detector placement is adequate to effectively operate the requirements. (Ref. 10, pg 58, para 1) reaction system. (Ref. 10, pg 58, para 1)

The most likely fire would be a lube oil fire which would result in rapidly developing high temperatures. Given the high rate of heat released during an oil Detectors above the Turbine Oil tanks are not properly

1. 72 72-12 NFPA 72E, Sect 3-5 fire and the fact that the activation of any of the six installed detectors in the area spaced. (Ref. 10, pg 61, para 1) will actuate the water spray system, the existing detector locations are adequate.

(Ref. 10, pg 61).

The most likely fire would be an oil fire which would result in rapidly developing high temperatures. Given the high rate of heat released during an oil fire and the Detectors above the Hydrogen Seal Oil Units are not spaced

1. 72 72-13 NFPA 72E, Sect 3-5 fact that the activation of any of the two installed detectors in the area will actuate adequately. (Ref. 10, pg 63, para 1) the water spray system, the existing detector locations are adequate. (Ref. 10, pg 63).

The fire pump day tanks are double-lined and are elevated over 6 feet in the air.

These designs features protect the tanks from rupturing by minimizing the potential

1. 72 72-14 NFPA 15, Para. 4050 Fire pump day tanks are not curbed. (Ref. 10, pg 73, para 5) for incidental contact and by preventing any unlikely contact from penetrating both liners. Given the design, curbing is no longer warranted.

The lack of early detection on the refuel floor has been justified in GL 86-10 Early warning detection is not provided for the Refueling evaluation S040-QH-0614, rev 1 dated 7/30/00. The evaluation concluded that due

1. 72 72-15 SER Sect. 5.5.6 floor. (Ref. 10, pg 31, para 3) to the low combustible loading the potential for fire ignition and spread is too low to justify automatic suppression systems.

The spacing of the detectors in the trackways meets the requirements of NFPA 72E Heat detectors which actuate the Pre-action Systems in the except in the hatch area. This area would only have a risk of fire during use of the

1. 72 72-16 3-5 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Trackway do not cover the entire area trackway to bring equipment into the turbine building. Administrative controls protected by Pre-action System.

reduce the risk of fires at the time. (EC 348102).

The installation of the MXL fire alarm system under EC 330819, rev 1 resulted in the following deviation: Based on the combination of the UPS with four hour batteries, 0-2212-113-BAT

- Using rated current values for components, the MXL batteries, and field measured currents, the MXL secondary power supply provides

1. 72-1999 72-17 1-5.2.3 & 1-5.2.6 secondary power supply does not have sufficient capacity to equivalency to the code requirements of NFPA 72, Section 1-5.2.3 (QDC 4100-E-operate the system for 24 hrs under maximum quiescent load 1239).

(system functioning in a non-alarm condition).

The installation of the MXL fire alarm system under EC Based on the redundant visual displays, electronic signal records, an available 330819, rev 1 resulted in the following deviation:

1. 72-1999 72-18 5-3.4.6 printer, and fully staffed and trained control room operators, the MXL system

- The MXL system does not provide an automatic permanent design provides equivalency to the code requirements. (QDC 4100-E-1239).

visual record of required signals using an on-line printer.

2.1-19

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section Evaluation of switch function and pressure setting found that switches installed as Square D pressure switches installed in station wetpipe original design have been performing and will continue to perform design function

1. 72A 72-19 1.2.2 systems are not UL listed under VOXZ category. as installed. The deviation only affects UL listing requirement and is considered administrative in nature not affecting wetpipe design function (EC 355931).

The heat detectors and manual initiation stations that initiate The heat detectors and manual initiation stations that initiate the CO2 systems for

1. 72D 72-20 2.4.3.1 the CO2 systems for the EDGs and Main Generator Exciters the EDGs and Main Generator Exciters are functionally tested with a surveillance do not have electrical supervision in their circuits. every 6 months (Nexus Technical Services Corporation Report 98-041).

The access doors to the MSIV rooms are not labeled but have been justified in an exemption request to the NRC as being 1-1/2 hour rated fire doors as allowed by 10-2.1. (Ref. 11, pg 6, Dash 1)

The access doors from the Auxiliary Electric Room to the Cable Tunnels (1 and 2) consist of 33 square steel manhole covers, 1/4 inch thick. The plate is coated with a minimum 1 inch thick layer of Pyrocrete and has at least 3-1/2 of Thermafiber Paragraph 1-6.1 and 10- At Quad Cities, several openings contain doors that are insulation on the bottom side. The Pyrocrete provides at least 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of protection

1. 80 80-01 2.30 unlabeled or unlisted. (Ref. 11, pg 5 & 6) during a fire. Therefore, the protection provided by the access doors is sufficient.

The door between the U2 DG Cell and its associated fuel oil day tank room appears to be a missing label. The door schedule shows the door as being purchased as a 3 hr door. (Ref. 11, pg 5, para 3, Dash 4).

The door between the Service Bldg and the Control Rm, at the west CR wall is a security door and therefore presumable rated for fire as well. The listing information is believed to be obscured by the door hinge. (Ref. 11, pg 6, Dash 2).

Of thirty-five single and double swinging doors observed at Based on a comparison of the unlisted door frames to UL-63 construction

1. 80 80-02 Paragraph 2-5.1 Quad Cities, only four have listed door frames. (Ref. 11, pg requirements (as documented in Ref. 11, pg 8 table 3-3.1), the unlisted frames, 6, para 1). closer and hinges are adequate. (Ref. 11, pg 6, para 2).

The purpose of a self latching door is to prevent inadvertent opening. Due to the The access doors to the Cable Tunnels from the Auxiliary substantial weight of the hatch covers on the access door to the cable tunnels,

1. 80 80-03 Section 10-1.2 Electric Room are not provided with latches as required by inadvertent opening is prevented. The code deviation is acceptable. (Ref. 11, pg 9, Paragraph 10-1.2 (Ref. 11, pg 9, Sect 3.6)

Sect 3.6, para 3).

While not specifically labeled as the code requires, the closers are made by Paragraph 2-8.2.4, 2- Use of unlabeled door closing devices. (Ref. 11, pg 10, Sect

1. 80 80-04 Russwin, LCN, Yale and Norton, who based on the manufacturers model 8.4.2, 2-8.7.1 and 10-2.2 3.7, para 1) numbers, are all UL listed for fire doors use. (Ref. 11, pg 10, Sect 3.7, para 2) .

The steam chase doors are held open and do not have a self- These doors are not kept shut as required by Paragraph 10-1.3, but were justified in

1. 80 80-05 Paragraph 10-2.2 closer as required by Paragraph 10-2.2. (Ref. 11, pg 10, Sect exemption request Section 3.3 and 4.3 which was submitted to the NRC, December 3.7, para 3). 18, 1984. (Ref. 11, pg 9, Sect 3.6, para 3).

There are no fusible links to allow the hatches between the Paragraph 2-8.2.4, 2- This door is kept in the normally closed position and maintained in that position by

1. 80 80-06 cable tunnels and the Aux. Electric Room to close in the 8.4.2, 2-8.7.1 and 10-2.2 administrative controls. (Ref. 11, pg 10, Sect 3.7, para 4).

event of a fire. (Ref. 11, pg 10, Sect 3.7, para 4)

These are not sufficient to affect fire door performance under fire conditions, as 1)

Minor dents in the surface of several fire doors listed in the the surface is intact, and 2) the damage has not been sufficient to alter the internal

1. 80 80-07 Paragraph 2-9.91 Appendix to PLC report. (Ref. 11, pg 11, Dash 1). framework of the door, or warp it to the extent it will not fit the door frame. (Ref.

11, pg 11, Dash 1).

2.1-20

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section Because of the light weight and noncombustible construction, the installed contact Security hardware is attached to several fire doors listed in

1. 80 80-08 Paragraph 2-8.9.1 switches will not degrade the fire resistance of the fire door/frame assemble. (Ref.

Appendix to PLC report. (Ref. 11, pg 11, para 2) 11, pg 11, dash 2, para 1).

UL does not list electric strikes on paired door assemblies such as these. The The electric strike on the doors located at the Control Room.

function of the electric strike is to provide secure entry, requiring a key card to Aux. Electric Room and the Turbine and Radwaste

1. 80 80-09 Paragraph 2-8.9.1 open the door. The electric strike does not prevent the door from performing its Buildings are not listed for fire door use. (Ref. 11, pg 11, fire barrier function. The door will still latch and remain latched on loss of power.

dash 2, para 2)

(Ref. 11, pg 11, dash 2, para 2).

At Quad Cities, the four double-swinging doors with non UL The hole that has been drilled into the door does not penetrate both sides and is listed electric strikes have been modified to accept an relatively small. As such, the modification to the door will have no effect on fire

1. 80 80-10 Paragraph 2-8.9.1 electric cable through a hole drilled in the door to energize endurance. Guidance to support this position is being documented in Exelons the strike. (Ref. 11, pg 11, dash 2, para 3) Penetration Seals Best Practices Inspection Guideline.

NFPA 80-1975 does not allow signs on doors, however, Appendix G to the 1983 addendum to NFPA 80 was written to allow the use of small signs installed on the doors that indicate function, use of location of the doors. The signs installed at

1. 80 80-11 Paragraph 2-8.9.1 Signs attached to fire doors. (Ref. 11, pg 11, dash 3) Quad Cities provide various warning such as hearing protection required and are attached with either screws or adhesives, similar to the methods now allows by NFPA 80-1983. In addition, the signs do not adversely affect the fire barrier function of the doors. (Ref. 11, pg 11, dash 3).

The Control Room (south wall) door has been altered such The plate is securely attached with machine screws and does not result in any that its UL listing is no longer valid. A 5-1/2 by 7 plate

1. 80 80-12 Paragraph 2-8.9.1 openings in the door face. The plate does not degrade the fire rating of the door has been attached to one side of the door. (Ref. 11, pg 12, and is therefore considered acceptable. (Ref. 11, pg 12, dash 2, item 2).

dash 2, item 2)

These devices would aid in keeping a fire door within its frame during a fire Additional manual latches attached to paired door

1. 80 80-13 Paragraph 2-8.9.1 condition and as such artery considered to enhance rather than detract from the fire installations. (Ref. 11, pg 13, dash 1, item 2) door integrity. (Ref. 11, pg 13, dash 1, item 2).

The metal plates and handles are attached to the outside of the doors. The attachment method does not create a hole through the fire barrier since any holes Small metal plates and handles attaches to doors. (Ref. 11,

1. 80 80-14 Paragraph 2-8.9.1 are on one side only have been filled with machine screws. These plates and pg 13, dash 1, item 3) handles are similar to the signage that is now allowed by NFPA 80-1983 and do not degrade the overall fire performance of the doors. (Ref. 11, pg 13, dash 1, item 3).

2.1-21

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section While not specifically labeled as the code requires, the hardware is made by Stanley which does have UL listings for sliding door hardware similar to this. In Three sliding doors (#150, 175, 178A) have tracks and addition, the doors themselves are UL labeled indicating that the assembly was

1. 80 80-15 Paragraph 4-5.1 associated hardware without a U.L. label. (Ref. 11, pg 14, manufactured as a fire resistant assembly. Based on the availability of UL listed /

Sect 3.9.3) labeled equipment from the manufacturer and the fact that the other components of the assembly are labeled, it is expected the hardware meets the design requirements of the code. (Ref. 11, pg 14, Sect 3.10).

There is an unused opening in the fire barrier. At the northwest corner of the Auxiliary Electric Room, there is a The door has been welded shut and the opening is covered by 8 solid concrete fire door that has been removed from service but the door

1. 80 80-16 Paragraph 14-1.1 block. This provides a three hour barrier at this unused doorway. (Ref. 11, pg 14, has not been removed and the opening filled with Sect 3.10).

construction equivalent to that of the wall. (Ref. 11, pg 14, Sect 3.10)

The rooms that do not have smoke control systems installed in the associated ducts are not normally inhabited and are not normal escape routes during a fire. The Not all plant HVAC systems are provided with automatic fan

1. 90A 90A-01 Paragraph 4-3, App B rooms are equipped with smoke detection systems that will, as a minimum, actuate shutdown. (Ref. 12, pg 4, para 4) alarms in the control room so that the smoke/fire can be controlled as necessary.

(Ref. 12, pgs 4 thru 9).

Appendix A is included for information only and is not considered to be part of NFPA 90A specifies annual inspections of installed fire NFPA 90A-1976. The periodic maintenance activities are recommendations to

1. 90A 90A-03 Sect A-7 dampers. Quad Cities performs inspections every 18 ensure NFPA requirements are maintained. The existing inspection frequency has months. (Ref. 12, pg 10, para 3) demonstrated that it is acceptable to extend the recommended annual inspection to at least 18 months.

If a large accumulation of radioactive water were to occur, it would be held in the Drains in the Hotwell area are plugged. (Ref. 13, pg 7, note

1. 92M 92M-01 Chapter 4 pit until disposal arrangements could be made. Containment of radioactive 2) material takes priority over fire protection water drainage. (Ref. 13, pg 7, note 2).

Drains in the H2 Seal Oil Unit area have been plugged. This can be justified due to sufficient curbing around the reservoir to contain an oil

1. 92M 92M-02 Chapter 3 (Ref. 13, pg 7, note 5) spill and nearby stairway to drain ceiling sprinkler runoff. (Ref. 13, pg 7, note 5).

Lack of drains in this area is justified as 1) the area is enclosed by concrete shield There are no drains for the sprinkler system protecting the

1. 92M 92M-03 Chapter 3 walls, and 2) each system protecting the bearings has no more than four nozzles, main turbine bearings. (Ref. 13, pg 9, para 3) which would result in minimal water release. (Ref. 13, pg 9, para 3).

No curbs around Crib House diesel day tanks. (Ref. 13, pg

1. 92M 92M-04 Chapter 5 See deviation 72-14.

9, para 4).

2.1-22

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section Use of open-shelf racks instead of enclosed file cabinets for Correction of the noted deficiencies is not warranted due to duplication of records

1. 232 232-01 Chap. 3 & 4 records (Paragraph 3-1.2, 3-12.1, and Chapter 4). (Ref. 14, in the outside vault. Due to the detached location, the probability of a single fire pg 3, Sect 3.1, para 4, subpart 1) destroying both sets of records is extremely remote. (Ref. 14, pg 5, Sect 3.1).

The file room HCB walls do not extend floor-to-ceiling

1. 232 232-02 Chap. 3 & 4 (Paragraph 3-4.3). (Ref. 14, pg 3, Sect 3.1, para 4, subpart See justification for deviation 232-01.

2)

The file room walls do not have approved file room doors (Paragraph 3-6.3.2 and Section 3-8) and are pierced from

1. 232 232-03 Chap. 3 & 4 See justification for deviation 232-01.

ventilation ducts (Paragraphs 3-6.3.3 and 3-11.2). ((Ref. 14, pg 4, Sect 3.1, para 4, subpart 3)

Interior ceiling supports (columns supporting the third floor of the building) are unprotected steel and do not have fire-

1. 232 232-04 Chap. 3 & 4 See justification for deviation 232-01.

resistance equivalent to the walls (Paragraph 3-7.2(c)). (Ref.

14, pg 4, Sect 3.1, para 4, subpart 4)

Electric lighting units are not vapor-proof or explosion

1. 232 232-05 Chap. 3 & 4 resistant (Paragraph 3-10.3). (Ref. 14, pg 4, Sect 3.1, para 4, See justification for deviation 232-01.

subpart 5)

The file room contains limited work stations and access is

1. 232 232-06 Chap. 3 & 4 not closely controlled (Paragraph 3-12.4). (Ref. 14, pg 4, See justification for deviation 232-01.

Sect. 3.1, para 4, subpart 6)

The vault is a stand alone unit that is located outside and away from the main The roof of the vault is pierced for ventilation equipment service building. There are no overhead structures that would expose the roof to

1. 232 232-07 Chap. 2 (Paragraph 2-9.2(d) prohibits such penetrations). (Ref. 14, fire. The existing ventilation penetration is justified. (Ref. 1, pg 6, Sect. 3.2, para pg 6, Sect 3.2, para 5, subpart 1) 5, subpart 1).

The vault is not provided with a listed vault door in The vault does not communicate with any other building and is provided with two

1. 232 232-08 Chap. 2 accordance with Paragraph 2-10.1. (Ref. 14, pg 6, Sect 3.2, 3-hour fire doors installed in series. The existing installation is justified. (Ref. 14, para 5, subpart 2) pg 6, Sect 3.2, para 5, subpart 2).

Vapor-proof or explosion-proof lighting is not installed in There are no explosive vapors present and the installed air conditioning system

1. 232 232-09 Chap. 2 accordance with Paragraph 2-11.3. (Ref. 14, pg 6, Sect 3.2, should exhaust any liquid vapors. The installation of ordinary fluorescent light para 5, subpart 3) fixtures is justified. (Ref. 14, pg 6, Sect 3.2, para 5, subpart 3).

The vault includes a smoke detector actuated Halon 1301 fire suppression system Records are not stored in fully enclosed non combustible that will protect the records at the onset of a fire and prevent it from spreading.

1. 232 232-10 Chap. 2 containers as required by Paragraph 2-12.1. (Ref. 14, pg 6, This provides sufficient protection to allow the existing records storage method to Sect 3.2, para 5, subpart 4) be acceptable. (Ref. 14, pg 6, Sect 3.2, para 5, subpart 4).

2.1-23

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 2.1-2 NFPA Code Deviations NFPA Deviation Code Deviation Justification Code No. Section Due to the large size of the guard forced (with guards stationed in various areas),

electronic and television monitoring of the property perimeter, card key entry Supervised tours of the premises are not conducted. (Ref. systems, and 24-hour operation of the plant, there is no need for supervised tours.

1. 601 601-01 Section 23 15, pg 3, para 4) Also, card key entry doors are checked by a guard every two hours, resulting in a tour of the premises with a form of supervision (the key entry record). (Ref. 15, pg 3, para 4).

Section 58 of NFPA 601-1975 requires guards to be familiar with the fire hazards in the various plant areas. At Quad Operating personnel perform rounds throughout the plant. They are trained in

1. 601 601-02 Section 58 Cities, this has not been made a required part of the guard recognizing hazards. This is not a security force job. (Ref. 15, pg 4, last para).

training procedure. (Ref. 15, pg 4, last para)

References:

1. An Evaluation of Organization of Industrial Fire Loss Prevention (NFPA #6) at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, May 24, 1985, Rev. 0.

2. An Evaluation of Management Control of Fire Emergencies (NFPA #7) at Quad Cities Power Stations, Units 1 and 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, Rev. 0, 5/24/1985.

3. An Evaluation of Standard Portable Fire Extinguishers (NFPA #10 and #10A) at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, May 24, 1985, Rev. 0.

4. Fire Suppression Survey in Nuclear Safety Related Areas at Quad Cities Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, Rev. 5, 9/30/86.

5. A Review of Fire Suppression System Surveillance procedures for Compliance with NFPA 12, 12A, 13, 15, 16, 20 and 24 in Nuclear Safety Related Areas at Quad Cities Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, Rev. 0, 5/24/85.

6. An Evaluation of Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems (NFPA# 14) at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, 6/19/85, Rev. 1.

7. Outside Protection Survey for Nuclear Safety Related Areas at Quad Cities Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, Rev. 0, 5/24/85.

8. An Evaluation of Flammable, Combustible, and Highly reactive Chemical Storage and Handling (NFPA #30 and 49) at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, Rev. 0 (May 24, 1985).

9. A Survey of the Fire Hazards of Hydrogen Storage and Handling (NFPA #50A and 69) at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, Rev. 0, May 24, 1985.

10. Fire Detection and Alarm System Survey (#NFPA 72E) in Nuclear Safety Related Areas at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, Rev. 1, January 24, 1986.

11. An Evaluation of Fire Doors in Nuclear Safety Related Areas at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, Rev. 2, April 9, 1987.

12. Fire Protection Survey of HVAC Systems installed in Computer and Nuclear Safety related areas at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, Rev. 1, Nov. 19, 1985.

13. Floor Drainage Survey in Nuclear Safety Related Areas at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, 5/24/85, Rev. 0.

14. An Evaluation of Records Storage at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, 5/24/85, Rev. 0.

15. An Evaluation of the Security Force Response to Fire Emergencies (NFPA #601) at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 for Commonwealth Edison Company, Rev. 0, May 24, 1986.

16. NFPA Code Conformance, Fire Protection Program Documentation Package, Volume 7 (Professional Loss Control, Inc code conformance evaluations for Quad Cities).

17. NFPA Code Conformance, Fire Protection Program Documentation Package, Volume 8 (Fire Suppression System Hydraulic Verification Study).

18. Evaluation of Deviation 72-19 performed under Engineering Change (EC) #355931

19. Transmittal 92-060, dated 5-26-92. .

2.1-24

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 2.2 Fire Protection Organization and Responsibilities The following sections describe the compliance of Quad Cities Station with the intent of the positions of Section A.1 of Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 regarding fire protection organization and responsibilities.

Exelon Generation Company (Exelon) is responsible for the establishment and execution of the Quad Cities Station fire protection and loss prevention program. The Exelon Fire Protection Organization is described in an approved station procedure, Fire Protection Program.

The fire protection and loss prevention program for Quad Cities Station was formulated using the guidance of NRC supplemental guides, NFPA codes, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards, consultant recommendations, insurance guidelines, and Exelon corporate policies and procedures. Using these as a basis, along with other standards judged applicable, a program tailored to the unique application of fire protection at a nuclear facility was formulated.

The program is assessed by the Exelon Nuclear Oversight Department and through independent biennial and triennial fire protection audits. Results of these assessments are reported to the Station Manager.

2.2-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 2.3 General Guidelines for Plant Fire Protection This section examines the implementation of the guidelines of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 as they apply to the building design and administrative controls. These guidelines are addressed again in Section 4.0 of this document on a plant zone-by-zone basis.

2.3.1 Building Design 2.3.1.1 Plant Layout-Separation Quad Cities Station has been divided into fire areas and equivalent fire areas for evaluation against 10 CFR 50, Appendix R criteria. Safe shutdown related equipment components and systems are provided with adequate separation as described in Section 4 of this document.

2.3.1.2 Barriers The majority of the interior finish in Quad Cities Station consists of noncombustible surfaces.

All walls, structural components, and soundproofing are fire retardant or noncombustible. Roof construction is fire resistive or noncombustible and all suspended ceilings and their supports are of noncombustible construction. Class II metal roof deck construction was used at Quad Cities Station. Floor coverings in areas containing systems or equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant are generally Class I material as defined in NFPA 101, or generally a flame spread of 25 or less as defined by ASTM E-84. For fire hazard analysis purposes, floor coatings are considered non-combustible if the material has a structural base of non-combustible material, with a nominal depth not over 1/8-inch thick, and has a flame spread rating not higher than 50 as defined by ASTM E-84. Exceptions to these guidelines are evaluated for acceptability by Fire Protection Engineering on a case-by-case basis.

2.3.1.3 Penetration Seals Fire penetration seals provided in fire barriers are documented on the F-drawings (Drawing F-41 through F-198) and penetration details for the mechanical penetration seals and in the report entitled Preliminary Review of Electrical Penetration Seal Fire Testing and Installation Programs, and test reports for the electrical penetrations. These penetrations are inspected periodically. Open flames or combustion generated smoke are not permitted for this inspection.

2.3.1.4 Grouped Electrical Cables The cabling initially installed at Quad Cities was not qualified per IEEE Standard 383-1794.

New safety related cables and all cables installed in cable tray or in free-air applications are qualified to IEEE-383, IEEE-1202, NFPA 262 or equivalent. Cables installed in rigid metal conduit or in metal enclosures (ventilated or non-ventilated) cannot support sustained combustion and are not required to be qualified to IEEE-383, IEEE-1202, or NFPA 262.

2.3-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Cable trays are of noncombustible construction and cable trays, raceways, and conduits are used for cabling only. Miscellaneous storage in areas housing grouped electrical cables is administratively controlled. Fire breaks are provided in horizontal cable trays as required to meet Appendix A criteria for separation of redundant divisions.

2.3.1.5 Ventilation The plant does not have a fixed smoke removal system except for the control room. Portable smoke ejectors have been provided for fire brigade use in moving smoke in areas that do not have fixed smoke removal systems. All smoke produced in potentially contaminated areas is monitored before it is released to the environment. The fresh air supply intakes to areas containing safety-related equipment are located away from the exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other areas.

Fire dampers are used in most fire walls and barriers where ventilation ducts penetrate or equivalent protection is provided. If fire dampers are not provided, justification for not providing them is found in the approved Exemption Requests. In areas where total flooding gaseous suppression systems are used, dampers in the ventilation system are closed before agent discharge occurs.

2.3.1.6 Emergency Lighting Emergency lighting is provided to illuminate the areas housing equipment needed for safe shutdown as well as the pathways which must be taken to reach the necessary equipment.

Emergency lighting consists of sealed beam units with 8-hr emergency backup power supplies.

(See the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report).

2.3.1.7 Communications The communication system consists of fixed telephones and paging system. All the components of the system can be supplied with emergency power, but this could be disabled by fire. Portable radios are also available for plant communications.

The paging system and plant siren are normally used for initial notification of the fire brigade.

The fire alarm tone is distinctive and can be heard in all plant areas. Portable radio communication units are also provided on site and are available for use by the fire brigade during fire emergencies. Emergency communications are monitored in the control room and at the security central and secondary alarm stations. (See the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report for a discussion of communications to achieve safe shutdown).

2.3.1.8 Drainage Drains are available to handle expected run-off from fixed water suppression operations and hose streams in many plant areas. In areas where large, fixed water suppression systems are provided, their operation may temporarily exceed the capacity of the drain system.

2.3-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Most major equipment is pad or pedestal mounted to protect it from localized flooding.

Suppression effects are described in detail in Section 4.0 for each fire zone. All water drains in potentially radioactive areas are routed to the radwaste system.

2.3.2 Administrative Controls NFPA codes and recommendations, NRC supplemental guides deemed applicable, Exelon corporate guidance and procedures, and insurance standards were used as guidance for the development of the Quad Cities Station fire protection administrative controls. These administrative controls are used to control ignition sources and limit transient fire hazards in order to reduce the probability of a fire exposure to safe shutdown systems and equipment as well as to reduce the likelihood of a fire being initiated in any plant area. Likewise, the impact of plant modifications are assessed in order to ensure that fire protection will not be compromised by those modifications.

Quality Assurance policies and procedures are covered in the Exelon Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR).

2.3-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 2.4 Fire Protection Systems and Equipment 2.4.1 Water Supply and Distribution System 2.4.1.1 Water Supply and Pumps Two automatically controlled diesel engine driven fire pumps are provided to maintain the required flow during system operation. The pumps take suction from the service water intake structure. The largest demand can be supplied for more than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> since the water source is the Mississippi River. The diesel engine driven fire pumps are rated to produce 2500 gpm at 139 psi. Guidelines established in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 20 were generally followed for fire pump installation. Both pumps are protected by automatic water suppression systems. The pumps are arranged to actuate upon a decrease in system pressure. In addition, a normally closed 10 inch tie-in to the plant service water system is available as a non-credited back-up water supply to the fire header.

A 2-1/2" bypass line is installed around the normally-closed 10" service water cross-tie valve to provide a constant source of pressure on the fire header when the diesel fire pumps are idle.

Within the 2-1/2" bypass line is a restricting orifice which serves as a leak detection device by creating a pressure drop upon excess flow, triggering an auto start of a fire diesel.

The operating status of each pump in monitored in the main plant control room. Periodic tests and inspections of each pump are conducted in accordance with established procedures to assure that the pumps remain operable.

2.4.1.2 Piping, Valves, and Hydrants An underground yard main system with multiple loops is capable of delivering the anticipated largest single fire flow including allowances for hose streams, the SSMP room cooler and service water backflow. (see calc. QDC- 4100-M-0537). The system is common to both Units 1 and 2 and is provided with valves to facilitate the isolation of portions of the system for maintenance or repairs without interrupting the supply to the remaining system. All control valves are sealed, locked, or electrically supervised in their proper position. The main yard loop is separate and independent from the service water system and is dedicated for purpose of fire protection with the exception of the SSMP during some design basis fires. Guidelines established in NFPA 24 were generally followed for the design and installation of the piping. However, most piping in the yard main loop is unlined steel. Fire protection system piping is not designed as a Seismic Category 1 system.

An inside main loop is provided in each turbine and reactor building. The inside loop supplies all automatic sprinkler systems, water spray systems, standpipe risers, and hose stations. The inside main loop is supplied directly by the underground yard main loop and is independent of other plant water systems.

2.4-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire hydrants are installed on the yard main loop to provide a means for applying effective fire hose lines throughout the plant for use by the fire brigade. Each hydrant outlet is provided with hose threads compatible with those used by the local fire department in the event of the need for outside assistance. The flow from hydrants will cause a pressure drop in the system sufficient to start the fire pumps, which will cause an alarm in the control room. A 2-1/2 gate valve is available for each hydrant.

Established procedures are provided for the periodic flushing of the piping system as well as systematic operation of all valves and hydrants.

2.4.2 Fire Detection and Alarm Systems The fire alarm and detection systems are designed and installed under the general guidance of NFPA 72D. However, certain specific items encountered in nuclear power plants are not always addressed in NFPA codes. Where such situations occurred, deviations from code provisions were justified and documented in NFPA Code Review. The number, type, and location of detectors was determined in general in accordance with the recommendations of the manufacturer and the guidelines established in NFPA No. 72E. All fire alarms and fire detectors in safety related areas provide an audible and visual alarm in the plant control room. A printer for the fire alarm system is available in the Old Computer Room for use with surveillances and for printing alarms and troubles, if needed.

Periodic tests and inspections of each alarm system are conducted according to established procedures to assure system operability. All alarm circuits are either electrically supervised or are tested to assure operability.

2.4.3 Fixed Fire Suppression Systems 2.4.3.1 Water Suppression Systems Automatic sprinkler and water spray protection is provided in many areas of the plant with emphasis on protecting equipment and operations involving combustible and flammable liquids as well as specific areas containing safety-related systems, equipment, and components. The design and installation of these systems is generally based on guidelines established in NFPA 13 and 15 giving due consideration to maintaining the ability to perform safe plant shutdown functions. However, in specific instances, it is not always possible or practical to comply with the literal provisions of the code. Where code deviations are required or are desirable, they are made under the intent of the code based on engineering judgment.(See "Fire Suppression System Hydraulic Verification Study").

Water suppression systems consist of wet pipe sprinkler, water spray, and preaction type sprinkler systems. Actuation of sprinkler systems is effected by operation of the thermal element within each head/nozzle. Operation of the preaction sprinkler systems is effected by actuation of an associated heat or smoke detection system in addition to the operation of the individual thermal element in each head/nozzle. Actuation of the open head water spray systems is effected by operation of the associated heat detection system installed in the protected area.

2.4-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Steps have been taken to ensure that inadvertent water discharge from a suppression system will not affect the ability to safely shut down the plant (see Section 4.0). Piping for water suppression systems is seismically supported in areas where its failure could affect safety-related systems and components.

Each water suppression system in the turbine, reactor, and service buildings and the crib house is supplied by the inside main loops for the turbine and reactor buildings. Each system is provided with an OS&Y gate valve where the system connects to the main loop. Periodic tests and inspections of appropriate seals and alarm systems are conducted according to established procedures to assure the operability of the water suppression, control valves, and alarms.

2.4.3.2 Halon Suppression Systems Halon fire suppression system are provided in the new computer room, the simulator room, the telephone room and the records storage vault where other forms of suppression could damage valuable equipment or records. The ability of the plant to safely shut down is not affected by inadvertent operation of the system (see Section 4.0). Guidelines established in NFPA 12A were used as general guidance in system design and installation. Periodic tests and inspections are conducted in accordance with established procedures.

2.4.3.3 CO2 Suppression Systems Total flooding carbon dioxide (CO2) suppression systems are provided in the emergency diesel generator rooms, associated diesel day tank rooms, and the main Turbine-Generator exciter housings for both units. Guidelines established in NFPA 12 were used as general guidance in system design and installation with consideration given to sufficient design concentration and soak time.

All systems are arranged for automatic actuation with manual capability provided as a backup.

Automatic actuation is effected by operation of thermal detectors located in the protected area.

Each CO2 system is designed with appropriate electrical interlocks arranged to close dampers and/or shutdown ventilation systems prior to CO2 discharge. In addition, each system is provided with a predischarge local alarm and a winter green odorant to ensure that personnel are alerted of a system discharge. Periodic tests and inspections are conducted in accordance with established procedures to assure operability of each CO2 system.

2.4-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 2.4.4 Manual Fire Suppression Equipment 2.4.4.1 Manual Hose Stations Manually operable, water-supplied hose stations are strategically located throughout the interior of the plant and are located so as to reach any location containing safety-related equipment or systems with an effective hose stream. Each hose station is equipped with 1-1/2 inch fire hose with a 1-1/2 inch nozzle. Electrically safe-type nozzles are provided where electrical equipment and cable warrant. The guidelines established in NFPA 14 were followed in the design and installation of the standpipe system. Hose outlets are provided with hose threads compatible with those used by the local fire department in the event of the need for outside assistance.

Flows from the standpipe system beyond the capacity of the service water connection will result in a system pressure drop which will cause the fire pumps to start, activating an alarm in the control room.

Periodic tests and inspections of the standpipe systems are conducted according to established procedures to assure system operability.

2.4.4.2 CO2 Hose Reels Abandoned in place EC 354100.

2.4.4.3 Portable Extinguishers Portable fire extinguishers are located throughout all safety-related plant areas. The majority of extinguishers provided are of the CO2 type with other type extinguishers installed only where appropriate with due consideration given to possible adverse effects on equipment located in the area. Periodic inspections and tests of portable extinguishers are conducted in accordance with established procedures to assure operability.

2.4-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 2.5 Fire Brigade 2.5.1 Organization A fire brigade of at least five trained members is maintained on site at all times. Their responsibilities and duties are reviewed and discussed during training sessions and coordination with local fire departments is emphasized during leadership training. Local fire departments are afforded the opportunity for training in the operational precautions during fire emergencies (e.g., radiation protection and special hazards at a nuclear power plant).

Local fire departments have agreed to provide support and their response is considered in the overall fire protection program. Plant training is offered to the local fire departments.

2.5.2 Training Each member of the fire brigade is required to complete an established amount of classroom instruction and additional hands-on practical training. The Station Training Department is responsible for all fire training which covers all basic topics. In addition to the initial training program, all brigade personnel attend retraining classes on a regular basis. Training is established such that brigade members understand their duties and learn to operate as a team. Fire drills are conducted quarterly providing opportunity for fire fighting personnel to become familiar with fire fighting equipment and major areas of the plant. Drills are pre-planned and post critiqued to establish training objectives and determine how well those objectives have been met.

2.5.3 Equipment The fire brigade is provided with sufficient equipment to perform manual fire suppression operations, as required. Full personal protective gear, including self-contained breathing apparatus with reserve breathing air, is provided. Fire fighting equipment is located throughout the plant to facilitate brigade use and response. Portable smoke removal equipment is available for use by the fire brigade, if necessary.

Portable radios are used for primary communications in fire emergencies. Fire emergencies are broadcast over the plant-wide loud speaker system.

2.5.4 Fire Fighting Strategies Pre-fire plans are provided for all safety-related areas of the plant. The plans provide necessary information, including a diagram showing fire equipment located to aid the fire brigade in executing manual fire fighting operations.

2.5-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 3.0 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 3.0 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 3.1 Introduction A systematic approach was established for the review of the fire hazards and their proximity to safety-related equipment and components necessary for safe shutdown within the area. The combustible materials, the type of fire hazard, the quantity, the combustible loading the material imposes on the area, and the fire detection and suppression capability for the area were reviewed.

The effects of postulated fires on the performance of safe shutdown functions and the minimization of radioactive releases to the environment were evaluated.

Actual arrangement of the equipment and combustible materials in the areas, location of doors, provisions of the ventilation system and the penetrations in the walls were considered. Smoke removal requirements resulting from a fire in any plant area are discussed in fire pre-plans for each specific plant area.

The station was divided into separate fire areas based on the results of the zone interaction analysis (see Section 2.1 of the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report) to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. To aid station personnel in assessing fire hazards in each zone, the fire hazards analysis was performed on a zone-by-zone basis.

3.1-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 3.2 Assumptions and Approach This fire hazards analysis, as updated to include the concerns in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, is based on the following assumptions:

1. Fire areas are designated, based on as-built conditions, as those portions of a building which are separated from other areas by physical boundaries whose construction is equivalent to that of a rated fire barrier. This is necessary since the plant did not incorporate the "fire-area" concept in its original design. The intent of a physical impedance to fire spread is satisfied based on the relatively low fire loading which exists throughout the plant and the adequacy of the barriers due to other design considerations (e.g., radiation shielding, pipe whip, tornado, seismic). Fire area boundaries are either 1) 3-hour rated, 2) have an exemption request justifying the boundary, or 3) have an engineering evaluation to justify unrated components of the boundary.

2. For the purpose of facilitating the fire hazards analysis, fire areas are further subdivided into fire zones based on logical fire break points and/or substantial barriers. This approach is based on the relatively low fire loading that generally exists throughout the plant, no continuity of combustibles between fire zones (except along the access corridor on the ground floor of the turbine building) or otherwise specifically addressed in Section 4.0, and the existence of noncombustible penetration seals in electrical penetrations between zones (though other unsealed penetrations may exist).

3. The calculation of fire loads in a given fire zone is accomplished by calculating the average combustible loading in a fire zone. Although this may be unrealistic in a few instances, it does provide a quantitative measure of a fire hazard. For the evaluation of structural steel in fire barriers, localized combustible concentrations are taken into account. Also, it should be noted that on the turbine operating floor the fire loads for Fire Zones 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.D are not averaged over the entire turbine floor thus providing a more conservative view of the effects of a fire in these zones.

4. This analysis is performed based on the occurrence of the design-basis fire in any zone.

The design basis fire postulated for each zone is specific to the hazards and protective features therein, using the definition found in Section 1.

5. Electrical cable tray fire propagation is limited by the provision of existing noncombustible horizontal and vertical fire breaks. However, no credit is taken for them in preventing fire spread between redundant safe shutdown equipment within a fire area or zone group.

6. Radioactive waste handling systems will not be considered in the evaluation unless a hazard can result in a major release and concurrently prevent building containment features from accomplishing their intended function.

3.2-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017

7. External fires exposing buildings containing safe shutdown equipment were also considered. Most exterior walls have no significant fire exposure. The only exterior fire exposures significant enough to warrant analysis are the outside transformers and the SBO Building.

8. Credit is taken for the primary containment boundary as a 3-hour fire-rated barrier.

3.2-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 3.3 Fire Area Identification Appendix R states that an alternate or dedicated shutdown procedure shall exist for all areas of the plant. To conform with this requirement, Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 were subdivided into fire areas or equivalent fire areas. The justification for treating equivalent fire areas and zone groups as fire areas is contained in this analysis and specifically in the report, "Appendix R Reevaluation Interim Compensatory Measures and Exemption Requests." These fire areas (or equivalent fire areas) were selected because of the substantial natural separation and/or structural barriers present. Also of concern in the selection of the fire areas was the alternate shutdown path which may ultimately be used throughout a particular fire area or equivalent fire area. Each fire area is generally a composite of more than one fire zone or elevation. Table 3.3-1 lists the various fire zones located throughout Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 with cross references to the fire area of which they are a part. Also listed is a brief description of the zone and a reference to the appropriate F-drawing. Table 3.3-2 provides the same information, sorted by fire area. The location of the various fire zones in the plant is shown on Figures 3.3-1 through 3.3-6.

The following penetration seal requirements should be considered when a modification involves penetration of a fire area boundary or rated barrier.

1. All penetrations in fire rated walls should be sealed to the same rating as the wall.

2. All penetrations in unrated fire area boundaries should be sealed with noncombustible material.

By making a careful evaluation of penetration seal requirements, the fire area boundaries identified in the analysis and any other fire barrier commitments will not be violated.

3.3-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 3.3-1 INDEX TO FIRE AREAS AND ZONES Fire Zone Description Fire Area 1.1.1.1.N U-1 RB Basement (North Half) RB-1N 1.1.1.1.S U-1 RB Basement (South Half) RB-1S 1.1.1.2 U-1 RB Ground Floor RB-1N 1.1.1.3 U-1 RB Mezzanine Level RB-1N 1.1.1.4 U-1 RB Main Floor RB-1N 1.1.1.5 U-1 RB Reactor Floor RB-1N 1.1.1.5.A TB Vent Fan Room (658') TB-IV 1.1.1.6 RB Refueling Floor RB-1N 1.1.1.6.A TB Vent Fan Room (678') TB-IV 1.1.2.1.N U-2 RB Basement (North Half) RB-2N 1.1.2.1.S U-2 RB Basement (South Half) RB-2S 1.1.2.2 U-2 RB Ground Floor RB-2N 1.1.2.3 U-2 RB Mezzanine Level RB-2N 1.1.2.4 U-2 RB Main Floor RB-2N 1.1.2.5 U-2 RB Reactor Floor RB-2N 1.2.1 U-1 Primary Containment (Drywell) DW-1 1.2.2 U-2 Primary Containment (Drywell) DW-2 2.0 Main Control Room SB-I 3.0 Cable Spreading Room SB-I 4.0 Old Computer Room SB-I 5.0 Safe Shutdown Make-Up Pump (SSMP) Room TB-II 6.1.A U-1 DC Panel Room (Small) TB-III 6.1.B U-1 DC Panel Room (Large) TB-III 6.2.A U-2 DC Panel Room (Small) TB-I 6.2.B U-2 DC Panel Room (Large) TB-I 6.3 Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room SB-I 7.1 U-1 Battery Room TB-III 7.2 U-2 Battery Room TB-I 8.1 Clean and Dirty Oil Tank Room TB-II 8.2.1.A U-1 Condensate Pump Room TB-III 8.2.1.B U-2 Condensate Pump Room TB-I 8.2.1.C U-1 Turbine Foundation (Under Hotwell) TB-III 8.2.1.D U-2 Turbine Foundation (Under Hotwell) TB-I 8.2.2.A U-2 TB Upper Basement (CRD Pump Level) TB-I 8.2.2.B U-2 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel TB-I 8.2.3.A U-1 TB Upper Basement (CRD Pump Level) TB-III 8.2.3.B U-1 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel TB-III 8.2.4 U-1 Cable Tunnel CT-1 8.2.5 U-2 Cable Tunnel CT-2 3.3-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 8.2.6.A U-1 TB Ground Floor TB-III 8.2.6.B U-1 TB Ground Floor (LP Heater Bay) TB-III 8.2.6.C U-1/2 TB Ground Floor TB-II 8.2.6.D U-2 TB Ground Floor (LP Heater Bay) TB-I 8.2.6.E U-2 TB Ground Floor TB-I 8.2.7.A U-1 TB Mezzanine Floor TB-III 8.2.7.B U-1 TB Mezzanine Floor (LP and D Heater Bay) TB-III 8.2.7.C U-1/2 TB Mezzanine Floor TB-II 8.2.7.D U-2 TB Mezzanine Floor (LP and D Heater Bay) TB-I 8.2.7.E U-2 TB Mezzanine Floor TB-I 8.2.8.A 4-kV Bus 14-1 Switchgear Area 14-1*

8.2.8.B 4-kV Bus 13-1 Switchgear Area 13-1*

8.2.8.C 4-kV Bus 24-1 Switchgear Area 24-1*

8.2.8.D 4-kV Bus 23-1 Switchgear Area 23-1*

8.2.8.E Turbine Operating Floor TB-IV 8.2.10 Off Gas Recombiner Level TB-II 9.1 U-1 Emergency Diesel Generator Room TB-III 9.2 U-2 Emergency Diesel Generator Room EDG-2 9.3 Swing Emergency Diesel Generator Room RB-1/2 11.1.1.A U-1 D RHR Service Water Pump Room TB-III 11.1.1.B U-1 B/C RHR Service Water Pump Room TB-V 11.1.1.C U-1 A RHR Service Water Pump Room TB-III 11.1.2.A U-2 A RHR Service Water Pump Room TB-I 11.1.2.B U-2 B/C RHR Service Water Pump Room TB-I 11.1.2.C U-2 D RHR Service Water Pump Room TB-I 11.1.3 U-1 HPCI Room RB-1N 11.1.4 U-2 HPCI Room RB-2S 11.2.1 U-1 RB Southwest Corner Room (1B Core Spray) RB-1S 11.2.2 U-1 RB Southeast Corner Room (1B RHR) RB-1S 11.2.3 U-1 RB Northwest Corner Room (1A Core Spray) RB-1N 11.2.4 U-1 RB Northeast Corner Room (1A RHR) RB-1N 11.3.1 U-2 RB Southwest Corner Room (2B Core Spray) RB-2S 11.3.2 U-2 RB Southeast Corner Room (2B RHR) RB-2S 11.3.3 U-2 RB Northwest Corner Room (2A Core Spray) RB-2N 11.3.4 U-2 RB Northeast Corner Room (2A RHR) RB-2N 11.4.A Cribhouse Basement CH 11.4.B Cribhouse Ground Floor CH 13.1 Guardhouse Outside Equivalent Fire Area 3.3-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 14.1 Radwaste Collection and Handling Area RW 14.1.1 U-1 Off Gas Recombiner Rooms TB-III 14.1.2 U-2 Off Gas Recombiner Rooms TB-I 14.3.1 Maximum Recycle Radwaste Building RW 15.1 Security Diesel Generator Building Outside 16.1 U-2 HRSS Building Outside 16.2 U-1 HRSS Building Outside 17.1.1 Main Power Transformer No. 1 Outside 17.1.2 Auxiliary Transformer 11 Outside 17.1.3 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 12 Outside 17.2.1 Main Power Transformer No. 2 Outside 17.2.2 Auxiliary Transformer 21 Outside 17.2.3 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 22 Outside 17.3 Spare Main Power Transformer Outside 18.1 Technical Support Center Outside 19.1 Service Building Offices (First Floor) SB-II 19.2 Service Building Offices (Second and Third Floors) SB-II 19.3 Control Room Air Handling Unit Room SB-II 20.1 Spray Canal Lift Station Outside 21.1 Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) Outside 22.1 Off Gas Filter Building OG 23.1 Central Alarm Station (CAS) SB-II 24.1 Heating Boiler Building Outside 25.1 Laundry, Tool and DAW Building (LTD) Outside 26.1 Interim Radwaste Storage Facility Outside 27.1 Robust Flex Storage Building Outside SBO-1 SBO Work Area SBO SBO-2 U-1 SBO Day Tank Room SBO SBO-3 U-1 SBO Diesel Generator Room SBO SBO-4 U-2 SBO Diesel Generator Room SBO SBO-5A U-1 SBO Switchgear Room SBO SBO-5B U-1 SBO Battery Room SBO SBO-6A U-2 SBO Switchgear Room SBO SBO-6B U-2 SBO Battery Room SBO SBO-7 SBO Building Stairwell SBO SBO-8 U-2 SBO Day Tank Room SBO 3.3-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 3.3-2 INDEX TO FIRE ZONES BY AREA Fire Area Fire Zone Description 13-1* 8.2.8.B 4-kV Bus 13-1 Switchgear Area 14-1* 8.2.8.A 4-kV Bus 14-1 Switchgear Area 23-1* 8.2.8.D 4-kV Bus 23-1 Switchgear Area 24-1* 8.2.8.C 4-kV Bus 24-1 Switchgear Area CH 11.4.A Cribhouse Basement CH 11.4.B Cribhouse Ground Floor DW-1 1.2.1 U-1 Primary Containment (Drywell)

DW-2 1.2.2 U-2 Primary Containment (Drywell)

OG 22.1 Off Gas Filter Building Outside 13.1 Guardhouse 15.1 Security Diesel Generator Building 16.1 U-2 HRSS Building 16.2 U-1 HRSS Building 17.1.1 Main Power Transformer No. 1 17.1.2 Auxiliary Transformer 11 17.1.3 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 12 17.2.1 Main Power Transformer No. 2 17.2.2 Auxiliary Transformer 21 17.2.3 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 22 17.3 Spare Main Power Transformer 20.1 Spray Canal Lift Station 21.1 Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) 24.1 Heating Boiler Building 25.1 LTD Building 26.1 Interim Radwaste Storage Facility 27.1 Robust Flex Storage Building SBO SBO-1 SBO Work Area SBO-2 U-1 SBO Day Tank Room SBO-3 U-1 SBO Diesel Generator Room SBO-4 U-2 SBO Diesel Generator Room SBO-5A U-1 SBO Switchgear Room SBO-5B U-1 SBO Battery Room SBO-6A U-2 SBO Switchgear Room SBO-6B U-2 SBO Battery Room SBO-7 SBO Building Stairwell SBO-8 U-2 SBO Day Tank Room RB-1/2 9.3 Swing Emergency Diesel Generator Room RB-1N 1.1.1.1.N U-1 RB Basement (North Half) 1.1.1.2 U-1 RB Ground Floor Equivalent Fire Area 3.3-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 RB-1N (Cont'd) 1.1.1.3 U-1 RB Mezzanine Level 1.1.1.4 U-1 RB Main Floor 1.1.1.5 U-1 RB Reactor Floor 1.1.1.6 RB Refueling Floor 11.1.3 U-1 HPCI Room 11.2.3 U-1 RB Northwest Corner Room (1A Core Spray) 11.2.4 U-1 RB Northeast Corner Room (1A RHR)

RB-1S 1.1.1.1.S U-1 RB Basement (South Half) 11.2.1 U-1 RB Southwest Corner Room (1B Core Spray) 11.2.2 U-1 RB Southeast Corner Room (1B RHR)

RB-2N 1.1.2.1.N U-2 RB Basement (North Half) 1.1.2.2 U-2 RB Ground Floor 1.1.2.3 U-2 RB Mezzanine Level 1.1.2.4 U-2 RB Main Floor 1.1.2.5 U-2 RB Reactor Floor 11.3.3 U-2 RB Northwest Corner Room (2A Core Spray) 11.3.4 U-2 RB Northeast Corner Room (2A RHR)

RB-2S 1.1.2.1.S U-2 RB Basement (South Half) 11.1.4 U-2 HPCI Room 11.3.1 U-2 RB Southwest Corner Room (2B Core Spray) 11.3.2 U-2 RB Southeast Corner Room (2B RHR)

RW 14.1 Radwaste Collection and Handling Area 14.3.1 Maximum Recycle Radwaste Building SB-I 2.0 Main Control Room 3.0 Cable Spreading Room 4.0 Old Computer Room 6.3 Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room SB-II 19.1 Service Building Offices (First Floor) 19.2 Service Building Offices (Second and Third Floors) 19.3 Control Room Air Handling Unit Room 23.1 Central Alarm Station (CAS)

TB-I 8.2.1.B U-2 Condensate Pump Room 8.2.1.D U-2 Turbine Foundation (Under Hotwell) 8.2.2.A U-2 TB Upper Basement (CRD Pump Level) 8.2.2.B U-2 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel 3.3-6

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TB-I (Cont'd) 8.2.6.D U-2 TB Ground Floor (LP Heater Bay) 8.2.6.E U-2 TB Ground Floor 8.2.7.D U-2 TB Mezzanine Floor (LP and D Heater Bay) 8.2.7.E U-2 TB Mezzanine Floor 11.1.2.A U-2 A RHR Service Water Pump Room 11.1.2.B U-2 B/C RHR Service Water Pump Room 11.1.2.C U-2 D RHR Service Water Pump Room 14.1.2 U-2 Off Gas Recombiner Rooms 6.2.A U-2 DC Panel Room (Small) 6.2.B U-2 DC Panel Room (Large) 7.2 U-2 Battery Room TB-II 5.0 Safe Shutdown Make-Up Pump (SSMP) Room 8.1 Clean and Dirty Oil Tank Room 8.2.10 Off Gas Recombiner Level 8.2.6.C U-1/2 TB Ground Floor 8.2.7.C U-1/2 TB Mezzanine Floor TB-III 8.2.1.A U-1 Condensate Pump Room 8.2.1.C U-1 Turbine Foundation (Under Hotwell) 8.2.3.A U-1 TB Upper Basement (CRD Pump Level) 8.2.3.B U-1 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel 8.2.6.A U-1 TB Ground Floor 8.2.6.B U-1 TB Ground Floor (LP Heater Bay) 8.2.7.A U-1 TB Mezzanine Floor 8.2.7.B U-1 TB Mezzanine Floor (LP and D Heater Bay) 9.1 U-1 Emergency Diesel Generator Room 11.1.1.A U-1 D RHR Service Water Pump Room 11.1.1.C U-1 A RHR Service Water Pump Room 14.1.1 U-1 Off Gas Recombiner Rooms 6.1.A U-1 DC Panel Room (Small) 6.1.B U-1 DC Panel Room (Large) 7.1 U-1 Battery Room TB-IV 1.1.1.5.A TB Vent Fan Room (658')

1.1.1.6.A TB Vent Fan Room (678')

8.2.8.E Turbine Operating Floor TB-V 11.1.1.B U-1 B/C RHR Service Water Pump Room CT-1 8.2.4 U-1 Cable Tunnel CT-2 8.2.5 U-2 Cable Tunnel EDG-2 9.2 U-2 Emergency Diesel Generator Room 3.3-7

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 3.4 Combustible Loading Calculation Combustible loading refers to the quantity of heat which may be released within a defined space if all exposed combustible material located in the space were to burn. As an analysis tool, combustible loading is primarily used to assess the ability of the barriers surrounding a space and any fire resistive construction contained within the space to withstand a worst case fire. The ability of such barriers and constructions to withstand fire is referred to as their fire resistivity and is measured in units of time (e.g., hours). Calculation QDC-4100-M-0691 contains the combustible loading for fire zones in the plant.

3.4.1 Fire Severity The combustible loading of an area can be converted to a fire severity figure, expressed in units of time (e.g., hours). This allows a comparison between the combustible loading and the fire resistive capabilities of the barriers or other rated construction. The relationship between combustible loading, expressed in BTUs per square foot, and fire severity, expressed in units of time, is provided by the relationship:

80,000 BTU/ft2 combustible load = 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> severity This relationship is linear up to a loading of 240,000 BTU/ ft2.

The relationship between combustible loading, fire severity, and fire resistivity is illustrated by the following: If a barrier surrounding a room is of three hour fire resistive construction, it would be expected to survive a fire of2 three hours severity. Such a severity is represented by a combustible load of 240,000 BTU/ ft .

It should be noted that fire severity is an analytical concept and does not necessarily relate to the duration, intensity or extent of any real fire. However it is not the only information that should be used in determining fire risk. For example, the addition of a large oil storage tank would be a considerable increase in the fire hazard, but may not cause a significant change to the combustible loading if the fire zone was large. Therefore using the specific values determined in the combustible load calculation to determine fire risk is inappropriate.

NES-MS-05.1 rev. 0, Combustible Loading Standard provides standards for dividing combustible loading into three categories. The categories are:

Low Less than 100,000 BTU/ ft2 Medium Between 100,000 BTU/ ft2 and 200,000 BTU/ ft2 High Greater than 200,000 BTU/ ft2 These values are the correct order of magnitude for performing fire hazard evaluations. Changes that do not change the combustible loading categories are not of significance to fire safety.

The fire severity listed in Section 4 of this document is relative to the combustible loading category of the Fire Zone. Calculation QDC-4100-M-0691 calculates the actual fire severity based on the combustible loading of the Fire Zone.

3.4-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 3.4.2 Heat Release Potential of Combustibles The heat release potential (HRP) of any combustible is determined by multiplying its heating value per unit quantity by the quantity of the material present. The units used for quantity are selected depending on the nature of the combustibles and their usage. In general, solids are quantified in terms of weight in pounds, liquids in terms of volume in gallons, and gases in terms of volume in cubic feet. However, some deviations from this practice occur where other units are more appropriate. The HRP values used are presented in Attachment B of Calculation QDC-4100-M-0691.

3.4.3 Categories of Combustibles The combustible loading in an area is usually considered to have two components; fixed (in-situ) and transient. The definition of these terms and the methodology used in determining each is discussed in subsequent sections.

3.4.3.1 Fixed Combustibles GENERAL: Fixed combustibles come in any of three states; solid, liquid, or gaseous. The determination of combustible loading contributed by solid materials is a straightforward process of inventorying the quantity of combustible solids in the area, and multiplying the result by the heat release potential of the material. In cases where the solid is fully or partially enclosed by non-combustible materials, a derating factor may be applied to provide a more realistic assessment of the actual heat release which may be expected. The treatment of liquids and gases, however, is complicated by their ability to flow in a gravitational field.

DATA DEVELOPMENT: The determination of the fixed combustible loading has been made utilizing information gathered during walkdowns of the plant and taken from design documents, vendor manuals, and other sources. The data obtained established both the nature and quantity of combustibles present in each area. Multiplying the information for each type of combustible present by the heating value for that combustible provided the heat release potential of that material. Once this information was obtained, the results were summed and the result divided by the floor area of the space being analyzed to arrive at the spaces combustible loading.

COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS: Combustible liquids are generally not a concern when properly contained. When they escape their container, however, they can present a significant hazard. In consideration of this, the quantities of liquids contained in sumps, reservoirs, tanks, transformers, bearing housings, and gear boxes are included in the area combustible loading calculation.

Combustible liquids can also be released into an area from pressurized piping systems which pass through it. The pressurized piping will cause oil to be sprayed into the area creating a significant fire hazard. Thus, the potential combustible loading from the failure of pressurized piping system components is added to the area combustible loading. This methodology for including the entire same quantity of oil in multiple fire zones due to the piping which passes through the area represents a more conservative approach than the previous bases for the Fire Hazard Analysis. It should also be noted that complete failure of these piping systems goes beyond the failure scenarios described in the Quad Cities UFSAR, but they are included in this calculation as an added conservatism.

3.4-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 COMBUSTIBLE GASES: Systems containing combustible gases are treated in a similar manner to liquids, as discussed above.

ELECTRICAL CABLES: A significant contributor to the combustible loading in many areas is the insulation and jacketing material associated with electrical cables. The determination of the amount of cable in a given fire zone is made using information from the SLICE database. The routing points used in SLICE are assigned to the appropriate fire zone along with the length of cables associated with the routing point. The length of cable are then summed for a given fire zone. This method is conservative since SLICE will credit cable lengths into the adjacent fire zones, thus assigning cable to a fire zone that may not be physically in that fire zone.

3.4.3.2 Transient Combustibles GENERAL: Transient combustibles are those combustibles which are moved into an area for some period of time to support a given activity and are either consumed during the activity or are removed from the area at the end of the activity. At any given time, a number of activities may be going on in a particular area. Since the start time and duration of a given activity is different from any other, the number of activities going on at any one time is quite variable. Thus, the transient combustible loading is also quite time variant. To provide a realistic and conservative projection of the transient combustible loading which might be found in each area, a task analysis process has been used.

TASK ANALYSIS: This process consisted of defining the activities which may be expected to occur in each area, then identifying the specific tasks associated with that activity. Using a tabulation of the combustibles associated with each of these tasks, the transient loading for the area could be projected. Since not all possible tasks could occur at any given time due to the restraints of space, manpower, operating mode and other factors, a projected worst case combination of activities formed the basis of the loading calculation for each zone. The selection of the worst case combination was based on a number of considerations including: 1) the limitation imposed on the conduct of multiple activities by the space available, 2) the selection of the worst case of any activities which are mutually exclusive, 3) and that some activities are precluded while others are in progress (e.g., spray painting is not allowed while welding is in progress). These judgements were tempered utilizing knowledge of plant operations, maintenance, and other activities.

The activities which may occur in the plant were divided into the following categories:

Lubrication Maintenance Modification Contamination Control Services (e.g., janitorial, preservation)

Fuel Handling 3.4-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 A breakdown of these activities into their associated tasks and combustibles is presented in Attachment C of QDC-4100-M-0691. Obviously, the specific amount of material introduced for any specific task can vary depending on the circumstances. The figures used are selected to be representative for a given task.

For ease in calculating the transient loading, each combustible introduced by a given task was placed in one of six categories. These categories and the associated heats of combustion are as follows:

Cellulosics 9,100 BTU/lb Combustible liquids 20,000 BTU/lb or 155,000 BTU/gal Combustible gases 1,500 BTU/ft3 Plastics 20,000 BTU/lb Charcoal 15,000 BTU/lb Filter media 3,000 BTU/lb These heats of combustion are considered to be representative bounding values. For cellulosics, the value used is that associated with wood. For combustible liquids and plastics, the value used is a bounding value for hydrocarbons which is widely accepted for fire protection purposes. For combustible gases, the value associated with acetylene is used.

3.4.4 Assumptions / Engineering Judgments The following assumptions are made in the development of the combustible loading calculation.

For further explanation refer to QDC-4100-M-0691

1. To account for small, distributed quantities of combustible materials in the form of instrument parts, switch plates, flex conduit jackets, combustible parts of emergency lights, name plates, signs, snubber oil and similar items, a miscellaneous combustible loading of 400 BTU/ft2 is incorporated into zone area.

2. Where ordinary combustible material is enclosed completely by noncombustible construction (e.g., paperwork in steel file cabinets or desks), the heat release potential of the combustibles will be based on a factor of 0.4 times the maximum expected heat release.

3. Where ordinary combustibles are enclosed on five sides by non-combustible construction (e.g., steel bookcases), the quantity of combustibles will be multiplied by a factor of 0.75.

4. No reductions based on degree of enclosure will be given for combustible and flammable liquids and gases.

5. Electrical power and control cables are considered to have an average heat release potential of 1750 BTU/ft of length. Instrument cables are considered to have an average heat release potential of 1122 BTU/ft of length.

3.4-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017

6. The combustible components of electrical cables (e.g., jackets and insulation) contained in a non-combustible, enclosed raceway system (e.g., conduit, pull boxes, junction boxes) do not contribute to the combustible loading in the area.

7. The combustible loading represented by combustibles contained in ventilated electrical cabinets (e.g., switchgear, power electronic cabinets) is reduced by a factor of 0.5.

8. The combustible loading contribution of combustibles contained in closed, non-combustible, non-ventilated electrical panels and cabinets (e.g., MCCs, panel boxes, control panels, lighting panels, and similar enclosures), is encompassed in the miscellaneous combustible loading of 400 BTU/ft2 (Assumption 1).

9. Where non-liquid Class-B combustibles (e.g., grease) are totally enclosed in metal gear boxes, bearing housings, valves, or sealed bearings, they do not contribute to the combustible loading in the area.

10. Offgas is considered to be non-combustible until it exits the steam jet air ejector condensers.

11. In determining the combustible loading of a given area, discrete quantities of combustibles are considered only if they exceed the following limits:

Combustible and flammable liquids 1/2 gallon Cellulosics (wood, paper, cotton cloth) 2-1/2 pounds Plastics 1 pound Charcoal 1-1/2 pounds Fuel gas 1 cubic foot

12. The combustible insulation in electric motors and dry transformers is considered to have negligible contribution to area combustible loading and are accounted for in the miscellaneous loading discussed in Assumption 1, above.

13. The existence of fire retardant properties by a material does not exclude it from the combustible loading determination, since such materials do burn once ignited.

14. Where trash drums are fitted with lids designed to smother fire, the heating potential of the contained material is derated by a factor of 0.25. In the absence of test data, this assumption is that these cans are only 25% efficient in preventing combustion. This assumption is considered to be reasonable given the effect of partial enclosure as cited in the bases for assumptions 2, 3, and 7.

15. The combustible content of ventilated electrical panels (e.g., switchgear) is assumed to be the combustible contribution per foot for each of the cables serving the panel multiplied by six.

16. For calculational purposes, the linear relationship between combustible load and fire severity will be assumed to exist throughout the combustible loading domain.

3.4-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 3.5 Suppression Effects Analysis Appendix R of 10 CFR 50 requires that alternative or dedicated shutdown capability shall be provided "where redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located in the same fire area may be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems" (Section III.G.3.b). The NRC went on to establish four lines of inquiry that should be considered when performing a suppression effects analysis in the Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Temporary Instruction 2515/62, Rev. 1. These lines of inquiry are as follows:

1. Whether a fire in a single location (or inadvertent actuation of a fire suppression system) could cause activation of potentially damaging automatic fire suppression systems for all redundant trains, or;

2. Whether a fire in a single location could, through the production of smoke, heat, or hot gases, cause activation of potentially damaging fire suppression for all redundant trains, or;

3. Whether a fire in a single location (or inadvertent actuation or rupture of a fire suppression system) could, through local fire suppression activity, indirectly cause damage, or;

4. Whether, in response to a fire in a single location the utilization of manually controlled fire suppression systems could cause damage to all redundant trains."

The safe shutdown approach used at Quad Cities Station is based primarily upon an alternative shutdown method rather than redundant trains of equipment. For this reason, the suppression effects analysis was conducted to ensure that the alternative safe shutdown path would remain unaffected although redundant equipment might be subject to the effects of suppression discharge under conservative assumptions. The analysis included the effects of piping breaks or leakage and the use of manual hose streams. Effects of portable extinguisher use, however, were not analyzed since it is unrealistic to assume that the use of an extinguisher will affect alternative shutdown paths due to the wide physical separation between the paths.

Insulated, undamaged electrical cable will not be affected by, water spray, water accumulations, smoke, or CO2 discharge. Cables which could have been damaged by an actual fire have been postulated to be unusable and the application of water to these circuits will not degrade the situation beyond that assumed in the safe shutdown analysis (see the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report).

The results of the suppression effects analysis are summarized for each fire zone in Section 4.0.

3.5-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 3.6 Structural Steel Analysis Based on the guidance contained in Generic Letter 83-33 and Information Notice 84-09, the survivability of the structural steel beams at Quad Cities Station was evaluated to ensure fire-related structural damage would not have an adverse effect on the plant's ability to shut down.

The reactor buildings, turbine building, control room, cable spread room, and AEER were reviewed in detail since they contain mechanical and electrical equipment needed to support either hot or cold shutdown. The Cribhouse and SBO Building were not reviewed since failure of steel in these buildings would not effect hot or cold shutdown. This evaluation was conducted in three steps as follows:

1. Areas with protected steel (either fire resistive cover and/or automatic sprinkler protection) were eliminated from the review.

2. The fire exposure was quantified to determine the thermal environment for the steel beams.

3. Calculations were conducted to determine heat transfer to the steel beams.

3.6.1 Methodology The first step in the evaluation was to identify those areas required for safe shutdown which contained unprotected exposed steel beams necessary to support the structure (ceiling above area). This resulted in a list of areas only in the turbine building which required evaluation.

Areas which contained steel with approved fire resistive coverage and/or automatic sprinkler protection were considered adequately protected without further analysis. (The NRC accepted automatic water suppression systems in lieu of passive steel protection at Limerick Generating Station as discussed in Reference 1.) The fire detection and automatic suppression drawings in the Exemption Requests, (Figures B-1 through B-24) were used as the basis of determining where sprinkler protection was or would be provided.

The next step was to quantify the severity of the fire exposure in terms of a thermal environment seen by the structural steel element. The methodology applied in this step was that developed and applied by PLC and approved by the NRC for use at Limerick Generating Station as discussed in Reference 1. A detailed discussion of this methodology is provided in Appendix A to the Structural Steel Beam Fire Exposure Evaluation.

The generalized methodology then incorporated the specific condition (cable materials) at Quad Cities Station. The conservative assumption was made that the bulk of the cables installed in the plant was non-IEEE-383-qualified, PE/PVC jacket and insulation. Test data obtained from fire research conducted by both Factory Mutual Research Corporation (see Reference 2) and Sandia National Laboratories (see Reference 3) was used to develop heat release rates, plume temperatures and separation criteria for cable tray arrays.

3.6-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 With the exception of the Unit 1 and 2 battery rooms and Unit 1 and 2 125-Vdc panel rooms, all of the areas evaluated were large open areas. Therefore, only the effects of fire plumes needed to be evaluated. The structural steel supporting the ceilings and walls of the Unit 1 and 2 battery rooms, and the structural steel supporting the exterior walls of the 125 Vdc panel rooms and battery charging rooms have been fire protected with Pyrocrete 241.

Since transient combustibles were assumed to be only at floor level, the most severe fire exposure to ceiling level structural steel would be from direct plume or flame impingement from localized cable tray fires. Heat release data and temperature profile data from FMRC tests and Sandia Laboratories tests were used to develop separation criteria and plume temperatures. This yielded the separation/exposure criteria given in Appendix B to the Structural Steel Beam Fire Exposure Evaluation. The separation/exposure criteria was then used to determine which structural elements need heat transfer evaluation.

In order to determine the duration of localized exposure fires, it was necessary to evaluate the number of cables and their characteristic burning rates (mass combustion rates, and heat release rates). Cable raceway drawings indicated the number of cables in each tray, identified from reference point to reference point. (No documentation was available on subsequent cable additions to those shown on the base documents which could influence the fire exposure to the structural steel.) To translate this cable information into the mass of combustible material available to burn and subsequently into exposure duration, cable specification data supplied by Sargent & Lundy and the cable manufacturers (General Electric and Simplex) were used to quantify an average cable. This portion of the evaluation is attached in Appendix C to the Structural Steel Fire Exposure Evaluation (See the F.P.P.D.P.).

A Reanalysis of the Structural Steel Fire Exposure Evaluation was performed in 1998 (Calc. 9801910 ) using the original methodology and criteria to verify that the effects of changes in cable loading had been properly evaluated. In addition, new cable trays that had been installed since the 1986 evaluation were analyzed to verify that localized area temperatures would not jeopardize structural steel members. SLICE or field walkdowns were used to identify the number of cables in the cable trays.

3.6.2 Results Based on the results of these evaluations, the majority of structural steel supporting the unrated walls in the general area of the turbine building would not fail due to fire exposure. When calculated structural steel temperatures exceeded 1100F, the result was considered a failure because the load carrying ability of the steel has degraded the typical safety factor to a point where the steel can only carry its design load.

For the beams which would be exposed to temperatures higher than 1100F, a review was performed of stresses which these beams experience due to the permanent dead load which they support. These stresses were then compared to the yield stresses at elevated temperatures of ASTM-A36 steel published in "U.S.S. Steel Design Manual" to determine if the beams can 3.6-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 accept higher temperatures than 1100F without failure. Table 3.6-1 lists the beams that cannot accept the higher temperatures and the type of fire protection that was recommended and installed. Also the beams located in the battery charger rooms cannot accept the high temperature identified by the 1998 evaluation. The failure of the battery and battery charger rooms was deemed to not affect the ability of the station to safely shutdown in the event of a fire in their respective fire areas.

As part of the structural steel evaluation cable loading limits were established for selected cable trays. Cable loadings must be maintained below these limits to avoid additional potential beam failures in the event of a cable tray fire. Cables in plant trays are controlled by Calculations QDC-4100-S-0455 and 980190.

3.6.3 References

1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of the Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Supplement 2," NUREG0991, October 1984.

2. FMRC, "Categorization of Cable Flammability, Intermediate Scale Fire Tests of Cable Tray Installations," Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-1881, August 1982.

3. W.H. Schmidt and F.R. Krause, "Burn Mode Analysis of Horizontal Cable Tray Fires,"

SAND 81-0079, NUREG/CR-2431, Sandia National Laboratories, February 1982.

3.6-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 3.6-1 BEAMS REQUIRING FIRE PROTECTION FOLLOWING STUDY OF BEAM STRESS INTERACTIONS WITH DEAD LOAD AT ELEVATED TEMPERATURES Beam Fire Zone Fire Protection No.

5 8.2.6.A Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

7 8.2.6.A Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

8 8.2.6.A Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

9 8.2.6.A Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

11 8.2.6.C Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

12 8.2.6.C Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

13 8.2.6.C Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

14 8.2.6.C Extend the existing water suppression system.

22 8.2.7.C Fireproof the beam.

23 8.2.7.A Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

24 8.2.7.C Fireproof the beam.

26 8.2.7.C Fireproof the entire length of the beam.

27 8.2.7.C Fireproof the part of the beam above the cable tray.

28 8.2.7.C Fireproof the part of the beam above the cable tray.

29 8.2.7.C Fireproof the part of the beam above the cable tray.

30 8.2.7.C Fireproof the beam for 14 feet on the north end.

45 8.2.7.A Fireproof the west end of the beam outside the battery room.

3.6-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 3.6-1 BEAMS REQUIRING FIRE PROTECTION FOLLOWING STUDY OF BEAM STRESS INTERACTIONS WITH DEAD LOAD AT ELEVATED TEMPERATURES Beam Fire Zone Fire Protection No.

48 8.2.7.A Fireproof the entire length of the beam.

51 8.2.7.A Fireproof the entire length of the beam.

52 8.2.7.A Fireproof the part of the beam above the cable tray.

54 8.2.7.A Fireproof the entire length of the beam.

55 8.2.7.A Fireproof the part of the beam above the cable tray.

57 8.2.6.C Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

58 8.2.6.C Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

59 8.2.6.C Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

62 8.2.6.C Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

68 8.2.6.E Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

69 8.2.6.E Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

74 8.2.7.C Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

75 8.2.7.C Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

76 8.2.7.C Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

81 8.2.7.E Fireproof the entire length of the beam.

82 8.2.7.E Fireproof the part of the beam above the cable tray.

87 8.2.6.E Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

88 8.2.6.E Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

3.6-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 TABLE 3.6-1 BEAMS REQUIRING FIRE PROTECTION FOLLOWING STUDY OF BEAM STRESS INTERACTIONS WITH DEAD LOAD AT ELEVATED TEMPERATURES Beam Fire Zone Fire Protection No.

103 8.2.6.A Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

124 8.2.6.A Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

131 8.2.6.A Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

249 8.2.6.E Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

277 8.2.6.E Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

278 8.2.6.E Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

309 8.2.6.E Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

465 8.2.7.C Fireproof beam as indicated in the structural steel analysis.

See the March 28, 1986 Sargent & Lundy letter Recommendation for Fire Protection for Structural Steel Beams Appendix R Fire Protection located in the F.P.P.D.P for additional information.

3.6-6

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 3.7 Penetrations 3.7.1 Electrical Penetration Seal Evaluation Wherever cables pass through barriers for which credit is taken in the Appendix R analysis or a previous commitment was made, it was demonstrated that the penetrations are sealed in a manner that preserves the integrity of the fire barriers in accordance with the requirements of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. Walkdowns were conducted to gather data on the penetrations. The data recorded for each penetration included the location, seal detail, and degree of cable fill. These data were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the seals. This evaluation is summarized in the report entitled, "Review of Electrical Penetrations Seal Fire Testing and Installation Program.." As a result the evaluation tests were conducted to ensure that the existing seals met the specifications of Exelon commitments. The reports on these tests are found in the F.P.P.D.P.

3.7.2 Mechanical Penetration Seal Evaluation In accordance with the Appendix R safe shutdown analysis, certain walls and floors in the reactor building, turbine building, and service building are required to have a 3-hour fire resistance rating. To justify the 3-hour rating of a wall all mechanical penetrations must be sealed and those seals must be 3-hour fire rated.

A walkdown of all mechanical penetration seals was conducted. The data from the walkdown was compared against current seal details to confirm that they apply and the adequacy of the existing seal was verified. (The data sheets verifying the adequacy of existing seals are found in F.P.P.D.P.) Barrier drawings were then developed (see drawings F-41 through F-198) based on the walkdown to show the size and location of every penetration in the fire barriers.

3.7.3 Fire Damper Review (NFPA 90A)

Fire barriers carrying a 3-hour fire rating must also have 3-hour rated fire dampers in any HVAC ducts that penetrate the barrier. All barriers that were designated as being 3-hour barriers were reviewed to determine if HVAC ducts penetrated them and then a check was made to determine if fire dampers had been installed. If no damper had been installed either a fire damper was installed or an exemption request from the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R was submitted to justify not installing a damper (see Sections 3.3 and 4.3 of the Exemption Requests).

Fire dampers that have been installed in HVAC ducts that penetrate fire barriers have been designed and installed according to guidance in NFPA 90A (1976). All of these fire dampers were reviewed for compliance with criteria in NFPA 90 and justification for significant deviations was provided.

A fire damper surveillance program was established for all 3-hour rated fire dampers. This program is controlled by a fire damper surveillance procedure.

3.7-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 3.8 Design-Basis Fire Protection Commitments Design-Basis fire protection commitments associated with Appendix R Exemption Request justifications, the stations response to Appendix A requirements, and Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) are listed in Table 3.8-1. As noted, Table 3.8-1 lists design-basis related fire protection commitments. Procedural and administrative related fire protection commitments have not necessarily been listed. Where appropriate, these commitments have been entered into the fire protection commitments section of the FHA for each fire zone (see section 4). These commitments were reviewed against existing plant configurations.

The commitments listed in Table 3.8-1 are grouped (sorted) by fire zone. Commitments which are general in nature or apply to several fire zones are not assigned to a specific fire zone. Instead, they are listed as General in the fire zone column of Table 3.8-1.

Commitments associated with outside areas are listed as Outside in the fire zone column.

Many of the commitments have multiple references (e.g. Exemption Request section 3.2 and SER (July 21, 1988) section 2.2.1); additional references are indicated in the comment column of the table.

Additional fire protection commitments are listed in the Fire Protection Commitment Matrix (Rev. 3). Table 3.8-1 was used in conjunction with the matrix to complete the Commitments section of the new Fire Hazards Analysis.

The following documents were used in the development of Table 3.8-1.

The Quad Cities NRC approved Appendix R Exemption Requests located in Volume 4 of the FPR.

The following SERs for Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

July 27, 1979 Fire Protection SER.

November 5, 1980 Supplement to SER on Fire Protection February 12, 1981 Supplement 2 to SER on Fire Protection The following SERs for 10CFR50, Appendix R Sections III.G and III.L and 10CFR50.48.

December 30, 1982, SER for Appendix R to 10CFR50, Sections III.G and III.L June 23, 1983, SER for Request for Exemption from Requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50, Section III.G.

3.8-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 December 1, 1987, SER for Interim Compensatory Measures and Request for Exemption from 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1 Regarding Hot Shutdown Repairs.

April 20, 1988, Revised SER for Exemption from 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1 December 11, 1987, SER for Exemptions from the Fire Protection Requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G. (This SER was replaced in its entirety by the July 21, 1988 SER).

July 21, 1988, Revised SER for Exemptions from 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.

August 18, 1989, Exemption from Technical Requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50 Appendix R.

May 10, 1990, Appendix R Section III.G Exemption SER Comments.

May 22, 1990, Hot Shutdown Repairs in the Event of a Fire.

February 25, 1991, Safety Evaluation of Licensee Requests for Exemptions from Certain Technical Requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50.

May 21, 1991, Exemption from Technical Requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50.

March 2, 1994, Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to a Request for Revisions to Exemptions from Fire Protection Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R.

September 27, 2001, Safety Evaluation for Revocation of Exemptions form the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R.

Quad Cities response to the requirements of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 (located in Section 5 of the FHA).

3.8-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Cable Riser has fire resistive 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.2 Combustibles pass between 1.1.1.1 & 1.1.1.2 at K/19. 1.1.1.1 seal.

Cable penetrations (1.1.1.1 & 8.2.4) fire resistive 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 seals. 1.1.1.1 Fixed linear thermal detection in/near torus cable Also 4.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.4.3, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.2 trays. 1.1.1.1 11.2.2 of (ER)

Below 595' slab, at cable 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.2 July 21, 1988/2.2.2, 2.3 Auto. water suppression sys. provided for cable riser. 1.1.1.1 riser. Also 11.2.2(ER)

Also 3.2.2, 3.2.4.2, & 11.2.2 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.3 July 21,1988 / 2.2.1 & 2 Manual fire fighting equipment is credited 1.1.1.1 of ER, 8.2 of 88 SER 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.3 RHR divisional path (cables) separation >125' 1.1.1.1 Concrete walls(watertight) door between redundant 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.3 RHR 1.1.1.1 Between 1.1.1.1 & 11.2.4.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.2 Feb. 25, 1991 /2.1.2 Transient combustibles administratively controlled. 1.1.1.1 Also see 11.2.3.1 of the ER 6/86 (Rev.2)/11.1.1.3.1 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1 Elect. pens. sealed in floor of 1.1.1.2. 1.1.1.1 Also see 11.2.3.2 of ER.

Fire brigade able to control fire/smoke on the torus To allow use of supp. pool Feb. 25, 1991 / 3.0 level 1.1.1.1 level indicators.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Fire detection provided with some exceptions. 1.1.1.1 In SAIC's evaluation.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Manual hose stations & port. extinguishers provided. 1.1.1.1 At entrance to torus level.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Control room alerted of fire condition via detection sys. 1.1.1.1 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Fire brigade to control fires using manual equipment. 1.1.1.1 Provided for cable trays per Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.2.2 Linear detectors are provided. 1.1.1.1 2.2.3.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.2.2 Auto. sprinkler sys. where cable trays breach ceiling. 1.1.1.1 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.2.3 Transient combustibles administratively controlled. 1.1.1.1 Also see 2.2.2 For 20' minimum. Also 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.3 1-hour fire resistive material on intervening cable trays. 1.1.1.1 11.2.2 of ER.

1.1.1.2 and zones 6/86(Rev.2)/3.2.4.1&2 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 No combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations 1.1.1.2 below(1.1.1.1, 11.2.2, etc) 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 Transient comb. & ignition sources admin. controlled. 1.1.1.2 Except stm tun, airlock, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.1 July 21,1988 / 2.2.1 & 2 Fire Detection system provided throughout. 1.1.1.2 1/2trackway Cable Riser has fire resistive 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.2 Combustibles pass between 1.1.1.1 & 1.1.1.2 at K/19. 1.1.1.2 seal.

Local auto. water suppression over the DW/Torus DP 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.3 Compressor. 1.1.1.2 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 No combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations. 1.1.1.2 3.8-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment 6/86 (Rev. 2)/11.1.1.4 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1 Emerg. lighting is available for reactor water level inst. 1.1.1.2 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 8.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 8.2 Fire detectors are provided near elect. & mech. pens. 1.1.1.2 Also see 11.1.1.2 & 11.2.2 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Fire detection is provided for the zone. 1.1.1.2 of ER.

Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 zone. 1.1.1.2 Also see 11.2.3.2 of ER.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Transient combustibles administratively controlled. 1.1.1.2 6/86 (Rev.2)/11.1.1.3.1 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1 & All elect. pens. sealed in floor & ceiling w/nc matl. 1.1.1.2 Also see 11.2.3.2 of ER.

2.2 July 27,1979/3.1.1,5.9.6 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 1.1.1.2 In area of MCCs & Cable penetrations to TB.

Also see 4.3.1.4 & 5.9.6 of July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Auto. sprinklers for supp. chamber drywell air packs. 1.1.1.2 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Class "A" doors to be provided between U1 & U2 RBs. 1.1.1.2 Also see 5.8.6 of 79 SER.

To prevent spread of oil July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Provide curbs around drywell air pack units. 1.1.1.2 spills(5.9.6 of 79 SER)

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Oil dispensing stations: approved cabinets. 1.1.1.2 Limit quantity to 5-gallon.

Hose stations & portable extinguishers provided for July 27, 1979 / 5.9.4 area. 1.1.1.2 Waste oil removed from area, approved cabinets July 27, 1979 / 5.9.6 provided 1.1.1.2 Lube oil limited to 5 gallons.

In SAIC's evaluation. Also Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Fire detection provided with some exceptions. 1.1.1.2 see 2.2.2 & 2.2.3.

Also see sections 2.2.2 &

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Manual hose stations & port. extinguishers provided. 1.1.1.2 2.2.3.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Control room alerted of fire condition via detection sys. 1.1.1.2 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Fire brigade to control fires using manual equipment. 1.1.1.2 6/86 (Rev.2)/11.1.1.3.1 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1 Elect. pens. sealed in ceiling of 1.1.1.2. 1.1.1.3 6/86 (Rev. 2)/11.1.1.4 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1 Emerg. lighting is available for reactor water level inst. 1.1.1.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 8.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 8.2 Fire detectors are provided near elect. & mech. pens. 1.1.1.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 11.1.1.3.2 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Fire detection is provided for the zone. 1.1.1.3 Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this Also see section 3.2.2 &

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 11.1.1.3.2 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 zone. 1.1.1.3 11.1.1.2 of ER.

Above MCCs & Cable pens July 27, 1979/3.1.1,5.8.6 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 1.1.1.3 to TB.

July 27, 1979/3.1.8 Class "A" doors to be provided between U1 & U2 RBs. 1.1.1.3 Also see 5.8.6 of 79 SER.

3.8-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Hose stations & portable extinguishers provided for July 27, 1979/5.8.4 area. 1.1.1.3 Feb 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Fire detection provided with some exceptions. 1.1.1.3 In SAIC's evaluation.

Feb 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Manual hose stations & port. extinguishers provided. 1.1.1.3 Feb 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Control room alerted of fire condition via detection sys. 1.1.1.3 Feb 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Fire brigade to control fires using manual equipment. 1.1.1.3 July 27, 1979/3.1.8 Class "A" doors to be provided between U1 & U2 RBs. 1.1.1.4 Also see 5.8.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979/3.1.11 Remove wood boxes from control rod storage room. 1.1.1.4 Also see 5.7 of 79 SER.

Hose stations & portable extinguishers provided for July 27, 1979/5.7.4 area. 1.1.1.4 This was reportedly taken July 27, 1979/5.7.6 Wood storage boxes to be removed. 1.1.1.4 care of in 1979.

July 27, 1979/3.1.8 Class "A" doors to be provided between U1 & U2 RBs. 1.1.1.5 Also see 5.8.6 of 79 SER.

Hose stations & portable extinguishers provided for July 27, 1979/5.6.4 area. 1.1.1.5 Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this Also 11.2.2 of ER, & 8.2 of 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 zone. 1.1.1.6 88 SER July 27, 1979/3.1.8 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 1.1.1.6 Also see 5.5.6 of 79 SER.

Hose stations & portable extinguishers provided for July 27, 1979/5.5.4 area. 1.1.1.6 Below 595' floor elev. Also 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.5 Automatic suppression at single vertical cable riser. 1.1.2.1 11.2.2 of ER 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.2&3 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.5 Linear thermal detection in & adjacent to cable trays. 1.1.2.1 Also 4.2.7, & 11.2.2 of ER.

Cables & cable trays have 1-hr. fire wrap where w/in Rev. to 88 SER: cond. seals 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.6 20' 1.1.2.1 vs. wrap Hose reels in torus area per 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.5 Manual fire fighting equipment is available. 1.1.2.1 4.4.2 ER 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.5 Manual hose reels & port. ext. on each elev. in RB. 1.1.2.1 8.2 of 88 SER Cables at K/13 are only 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 No combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations. 1.1.2.1 comb. to pass.

Cable penetrations to U2 Cable Tunnel & 1.1.2.2 Sealed with fire resistive 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 sealed. 1.1.2.1 material.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 Transient combustibles & ignition sources controlled 1.1.2.1 Also see 11.2.3.3 of ER.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.6 Redundant RHR cables routed more than 125' apart. 1.1.2.1 Between No. & So. for > 20',

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.6 Intervening cables prot. w/1-hr. fire wrap or conduit. 1.1.2.1 Also 11.2.2 of ER Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Fire detection is provided for the zone. 1.1.2.1 3.8-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this Available at entrance to Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 zone. 1.1.2.1 torus level.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Transient combustibles administratively controlled. 1.1.2.1 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 11.2.3.3 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.2 Elect. pens. in ceiling of 1.1.2.1 sealed w/ nc matl. 1.1.2.1 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1 & Elect. pens. sealed in floor of 1.1.2.2.(ceiling of 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 11.1.2.3.1 2.2 1.1.2.1.) 1.1.2.1 Also see 11.2.3.4 of ER.

Fire brigade able to control fire/smoke on the torus To allow use of supp. pool Feb. 25, 1991 / 3.0 level 1.1.2.1 level indicators.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Fire detection provided with some exceptions. 1.1.2.1 In SAIC's evaluation.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Control room alerted of fire condition via detection sys. 1.1.2.1 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Fire brigade to control fires using manual equipment. 1.1.2.1 Provided for cable trays per Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.2.2 Linear detectors are provided. 1.1.2.1 2.2.3.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.2.2 Auto. sprinkler sys. where cable trays breach ceiling. 1.1.2.1 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.2.3 Transient combustibles administratively controlled. 1.1.2.1 Also see 2.2.2 Ceiling of 1.1.2.1 is the floor 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 11.2.3.3 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.2 Elect. pens. in ceiling of 1.1.2.1 sealed w/nc matl. 1.1.2.2 of 1.1.2.2.

July 21, 1988 / 2.2.5 Single riser sealed with fire resistive material. 1.1.2.2 From 1.1.2.1 below.

W/exceptions(stm chase, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.4&5 Fire detection provided throughout. 1.1.2.2 airlock)&4.3.2,4.4.2 July 21, 1988 /

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.2 2.3&3.2.2 Local auto. fire supp. DW/Torus DP compressor units 1.1.2.2 (4.2.8 & 4.4.2 /ER)

Also see 4.3.2 & 4.4.4.2 of 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.4 Manual hose reels & port. ext. on each elev. in RB. 1.1.2.2 ER., 3.2.2 / 88 SER 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.4.1 July 21, 1998 / 2.0 No combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations. 1.1.2.2 Also see 4.4.4.2, 11.1.2.3.1, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.4.1 July 21, 1998 / 2.0 Transient combustibles & ignition sources controlled 1.1.2.2 & 11.2.3.4 of ER.

Cables at K/13 are only 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.4.2 July 21, 1998 / 2.0 No combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations. 1.1.2.2 comb. to pass.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 11.1.2.4 Feb 25, 1991 / 2.1 Emerg. lighting is available for reactor water level inst. 1.1.2.2 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 8.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 8.2 Fire detectors are provided near elect. & mech. pens. 1.1.2.2 Also see 11.1.2.2 & 11.2.2 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Fire detection is provided for the zone. 1.1.2.2 of ER.

Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this Also 4.4.2, 11.1.2.2, &

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 zone. 1.1.2.2 11.2.2 of ER & 8.2 / 88 SER Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Transient combustibles administratively controlled. 1.1.2.2 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 11.1.2.3.1 Feb 25, 1991 / 2.1 Elect. pens. sealed in floor and ceiling of 1.1.2.2. 1.1.2.2 Also see 11.2.3.4 of ER.

3.8-6

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment In area of MCCs & Cable July 27, 1979/3.1.1,5.9.6 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 1.1.2.2 penetrations to TB.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Auto. sprinklers for supp. chamber drywell air packs. 1.1.2.2 Also see 5.9.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Class "A" doors to be provided between U1 & U2 RBs. 1.1.2.2 Also see 5.8.6 of 79 SER.

To prevent spread of oil July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Provide curbs around drywell air pack units. 1.1.2.2 spills(5.9.6 of 79 SER)

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Oil dispensing stations: approved cabinets. 1.1.2.2 Limit quantity to 5-gallon.

Hose stations & portable extinguishers provided for July 27, 1979 / 5.9.4 area. 1.1.2.2 Waste oil removed from area, approved cabinets July 27, 1979 / 5.9.6 provided 1.1.2.2 Lube oil limited to 5 gallons.

In SAIC's evaluation. Also Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Fire detection provided with some exceptions. 1.1.2.2 see 2.2.2 & 2.2.3.

Also see sections 2.2.2 &

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Manual hose stations & port. extinguishers provided. 1.1.2.2 2.2.3.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Control room alerted of fire condition via detection sys. 1.1.2.2 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Fire brigade to control fires using manual equipment. 1.1.2.2 Elect. pens sealed in floor of 1.1.2.3 (ceiling of 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 11.1.2.3.1 Feb 25, 1991 / 2.1 1.1.2.2). 1.1.2.3 Also see 11.2.3.4 of ER.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 11.1.2.4 Feb 25, 1991 / 2.1 Emerg. lighting is available for reactor water level inst. 1.1.2.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 8.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 8.2 Fire detectors are provided near elect. & mech. pens. 1.1.2.3 Also 11.1.2.2 & 7.2 ER, 7.2, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.4.2 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Fire detection is provided for the zone. 1.1.2.3 supp. or det 88 SER Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 zone. 1.1.2.3 Also see 11.1.2.2 of ER.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.4.4.3 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Transient combustibles administratively controlled. 1.1.2.3 Also see 11.1.2.3.2 of ER.

All electrical penetrations sealed w/ noncomb.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.4.1.3 Feb 25, 1991 / 2.1 materials. 1.1.2.3 Between levels in RB.

July 27, 1979 / Above MCCs & Cable 3.1.1,5.8.6 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 1.1.2.3 penetrations to TB.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Class "A" doors to be provided between U1 & U2 RBs. 1.1.2.3 Also see 5.8.6 of 79 SER.

Hose stations & portable extinguishers provided for July 27, 1979 / 5.8.4 area. 1.1.2.3 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.2 Fire detection provided with some exceptions. 1.1.2.3 In SAIC's evaluation.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Control room alerted of fire condition via detection sys. 1.1.2.3 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1.3 Fire brigade to control fires using manual equipment. 1.1.2.3 3.8-7

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Hose stations & portable extinguishers provided for July 21, 1988 / 5.7.4 area. 1.1.2.4 This was reportedly taken July 21, 1988 / 5.7.6 Wood storage boxes to be removed. 1.1.2.4 care of in 1979.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Class "A" doors to be provided between U1 & U2 RBs. 1.1.2.5 Also see 5.8.6 of 79 SER.

Hose stations & portable extinguishers provided for July 27, 1979 / 5.6.4 area. 1.1.2.5 July 27, 1979 / 5.12.4 Hose stations & port. ext. near containment entrance. 1.2.1 Drains provided to mitigate consequences of oil spill July 27, 1979 / 5.12.4 fires 1.2.1 The primary cont. is inerted w/ nitrogen during APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.1.a operation 1.2.1 To control additional APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.1.a Admin. controls enforced during refuel/maint. ops. 1.2.1 hazards.

July 27, 1979 / 5.12.4 Hose stations & port. ext. near containment entrance. 1.2.2 Drains provided to mitigate consequences of oil spill July 27, 1979 / 5.12.4 fires 1.2.2 The primary cont. is inerted w/ nitrogen during APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.1.a operation 1.2.2 To control additional APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.1.a Admin. controls enforced during refuel/maint. ops. 1.2.2 hazards.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 TB sprinkler system extended to protect zone. 11.1.1.A Also see 5.13.6 of 79 SER.

1-hour fire wrap provided for swing diesel 1/2 reserve July 21, 1988 / 13.2 feed. 11.1.1.A July 21, 1988 / 13.2 Fire hose stations & fire extinguishers are available. 11.1.1.A 3-hour walls, floor, ceiling, except closed door, east Door is substantial metal, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.9.1 July 21, 1988 / 9.2&13.2 wall 11.1.1.B watertight door.

11.1.1.A & 11.1.1.B. Rate 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.9.2 July 21, 1988 / 13.2 Complete fire detection & auto. water supp. systems. 11.1.1.B comp thermal July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 TB sprinkler system extended to protect zone. 11.1.1.B Also see 5.13.6 of 79 SER.

July 21, 1988 / 13.2 Fire hose stations & fire extinguishers are available. 11.1.1.B July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 TB sprinkler system extended to protect zone. 11.1.1.C Also see 5.13.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 TB sprinkler system extended to protect zone. 11.1.2.A Also see 5.13.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 TB sprinkler system extended to protect zone. 11.1.2.B Also see 5.13.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 TB sprinkler system extended to protect zone. 11.1.2.C Also see 5.13.6 of 79 SER.

Also see 5.8.6 & 5.11.6 of July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Class "A" door to be provided between U1 & U2 HPCIs11.1.3 79 SER.

3.8-8

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment July 27, 1979 / 5.11.4 Auto. water deluge sys. over the HPCI turbine & pump. 11.1.3 Hose stations in torus area July 27, 1979 / 5.11.4 Portable extinguisher provided in each HPCI room. 11.1.3 for backup supp.

Fire detection & suppression over HPCI pump &

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.4.4.8 July 21, 1988 / 4.2.7 turbine. 11.1.4 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.4.4.8 July 21, 1988 / 4.2.7 Manual fire fighting equipment is available. 11.1.4 Also see 5.8.6 & 5.11.6 of July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Class "A" door to be provided between U1 & U2 HPCIs11.1.4 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 5.11.4 Auto. water deluge sys. over the HPCI turbine & pump. 11.1.4 Hose stations in torus area July 27, 1979 / 5.11.4 Portable extinguisher provided in each HPCI room. 11.1.4 for backup supp.

Watertight door between 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 Reinforced concrete walls w/ watertight door provided. 11.2.1 torus & corner room 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 Cable penetrations are sealed between elevations. 11.2.1 Fire Det. Sys. provided except above RB Eq. drain Linear heat per the 88 SER, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.1 tank. 11.2.1 also 4.2.1 With access to the non-RHR July 27, 1979 / 5.10.4 A hose station & port. ext. are located in torus area. 11.2.1 corner rooms.

Watertight door between 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 Reinforced concrete walls w/ watertight door provided. 11.2.2 torus & corner room 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 No combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations 11.2.2 Between 11.2.2 & 1.1.1.2.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 Transient comb. & ignition sources admin. controlled. 11.2.2 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.1 Fire Detection System provided throughout. 11.2.2 Linear heat per the 88 SER.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.1 Fire Suppression System provided throughout. 11.2.2 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 11.2.2 construction will confine a fire from torus area. 11.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.1 Manual fire fighting equipment is credited 11.2.2 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 Cable penetrations are sealed between elevations. 11.2.2 Linear heat per the 88 SER, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.1 Fire Detection System provided throughout. 11.2.2 also 4.2.1 A hose station & port. ext. provided in each RHR July 27, 1979 / 5.10.4 room. 11.2.2 Watertight door between 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 Reinforced concrete walls w/ watertight door provided. 11.2.3 torus & corner room 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 Cable penetrations are sealed between elevations. 11.2.3 Linear heat (88 SER),also 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.1 Fire Detection System provided throughout. 11.2.3 4.2.1,11.1.1.2 July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Class "A" doors to be provided between U1 & U2 RBs. 11.2.3 Also see 5.8.6 of 79 SER.

3.8-9

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment With access to the non-RHR July 27, 1979 / 5.10.4 A hose station & port. ext. are located in torus area. 11.2.3 corner rooms.

Watertight door between 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 Reinforced concrete walls w/ watertight door provided. 11.2.4 torus & corner room Concrete walls(watertight) door between redundant Steel watertight door 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.3 RHR 11.2.4 maintained closed.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 Cable penetrations are sealed between elevations. 11.2.4 Linear heat per the 88 SER, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 3.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.1 Fire Detection System provided throughout. 11.2.4 4.2.1 July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Class "A" doors to be provided between U1 & U2 RBs. 11.2.4 Also see 5.8.6 of 79 SER.

A hose station & port. ext. provided in each RHR July 27, 1979 / 5.10.4 room. 11.2.4 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 11.1.2.2 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.1 Fire detection provided. 11.3.1 July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Class "A" doors to be provided between U1 & U2 RBs. 11.3.1 Also see 5.8.6 of 79 SER.

With access to the non-RHR July 27, 1979 / 5.10.4 A hose station & port. ext. are located in torus area. 11.3.1 corner rooms.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 2.3 Area wide automatic suppression is provided. 11.3.2 Appears to be a typo in E.R.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.4 Automatic sprinkler system provided in zone. 11.3.2 section.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.6 Enclosed w/reinforced concrete walls & watertight door 11.3.2 Door maintained closed.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.4 Fire detection provided throughout corner rooms. 11.3.2 Linear thermal.

Manual fire hose stations & port. extinguishers July 21, 1988 / 2.2.4 available 11.3.2 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.4.1 July 21, 1998 / 2.0 No combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations. 11.3.2 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.4.1 July 21, 1998 / 2.0 Transient combustibles & ignition sources controlled 11.3.2 July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Class "A" doors to be provided between U1 & U2 RBs. 11.3.2 Also see 5.8.6 of 79 SER.

A hose station & port. ext. provided in each RHR July 27, 1979 / 5.10.4 room. 11.3.2 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.6 Enclosed w/reinforced concrete walls & watertight door 11.3.3 Door maintained closed.

Linear therm (not above RB 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.2&3 July 21, 1988 / 4.2.7 Fire det. provided for zone. (Also see 4.3.3 & 4.4.4.6). 11.3.3 eq. drn tank) 4.4.2 With access to the non-RHR July 27, 1979 / 5.10.4 A hose station & port. ext. are located in torus area. 11.3.3 corner rooms.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 4.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.2.6 Enclosed w/reinforced concrete walls & watertight door 11.3.4 Door maintained closed.

A hose station & port. ext. provided in each RHR July 27, 1979 / 5.10.4 room. 11.3.4 3.8-10

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Limit quantity to 55-gallon.&

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Oil dispensing stations: approved cabinets. 11.4.A 5.21.6 of 79 SER Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided for July 27, 1979 / 5.21.4 area 11.4.A Storage limited, safety cans, Nov. 5, 1980 / 3.1.5(k) Admin. procedures in place to eliminate oil storage. 11.4.A & safety cabinets.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Sprinkler sys. to protect diesel driven fire pumps. 11.4.B Also see 5.21.6 of 79 SER.

Limit quantity to 55-gallon.&

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Oil dispensing stations: approved cabinets. 11.4.B 5.21.6 of 79 SER July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Curbs & drains for liquid storage areas in crib house. 11.4.B Also see 5.21.6 of 79 SER.

Each pump: 2500 gpm at July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.2 Two approved fire pumps and controllers, provided. 11.4.B 139 psig.

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.2 An 8-hour fuel supply (diesel) provided for each pump 11.4.B Water from service water July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.2 Provide a system to detect excessive make up water. 11.4.B sys. to fire water sys.

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.3 Each pump has separate 10" discharge line. 11.4.B Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided for July 27, 1979 / 5.21.4 area 11.4.B Storage limited, safety cans, Nov. 5, 1980 / 3.1.5(k) Admin. procedures in place to eliminate oil storage. 11.4.B & safety cabinets.

25' and 80' from diesel fire Feb. 12, 1981 / 3.1.5(k) Flamm. liquids cabinet provided for oil storage. 11.4.B pumps.

Amount of comb. liquid Feb. 12, 1981 / 3.1.5(k) Flam. liquid cab. contents; <25 gal. oil, <10 gal. grease 11.4.B limited per NFPA 30.

Each rated at 2500 gpm at APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.2.c 2 diesel driven fire pumps provided. 11.4.B 139 psig.

Fire pumps suction from APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.2.c Separate valved connections to loop from each pump. 11.4.B Mississippi River.

Alarms; trouble, pump APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.2.c Fire pumps generally installed per NFPA 20. 11.4.B running, fuel level, etc APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.2.d Fire pumps take suction from Mississippi River. 11.4.B Storage tanks not used.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 No safe shutdown cables or equipment in zone. 14.1.1 Substantial shield walls w/ metal doors between 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 zones. 14.1.1 Between 8.2.10 & 14.1.1 Includes doors, dampers, July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Fire barriers around Electrical Eq. Room to be 3-hr. 19.1. etc (5.3.6 / 79 SER).

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.f Noncombustible suspended ceilings provided. 19.1.

3.8-11

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Halon 1301 protects records storage & new comp. NFPA 12A reviewed &

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.4 room 19.1. deviations justified.

Includes doors, dampers, July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Fire barriers around Electrical Eq. Room to be 3-hr. 19.2. etc (5.3.6 / 79 SER).

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.f Noncombustible suspended ceilings provided. 19.2.

3-hour separation between zone & U1 Turbine 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 Building. 2.0.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 Complete early warning fire detection system. 2.0. Alarms locally (6.3.4) 3-hr. separation from other areas of the service 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 building. 2.0.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.3.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 All boundary walls are 3-hr except boundary w/ 3.0. 2.0.

Available hose stations 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.3.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 Portable fire extinguishers are provided in zone. 2.0. outside entrances 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.3.4 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 Control room continuously manned. 2.0.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.3.4 July 21, 1988 / 5.0 Transient combustibles & ignition sources controlled. 2.0.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.3.5 July 21, 1988 / 5.0 Local monitoring of instrumentation, from outside SB-I. 2.0.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Smoke detection provided in the make-up air supply. 2.0. Also see 5.1.6 of 79 SER.

W/ shut-off valves. ( 5.1.6 of July 27, 1979 / 3.1.4 One-inch booster reels w/ low flow nozzles 2.0. 79 SER)

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.7 Two Halon 1211 port. extinguishers for Control Room. 2.0. Also see 5.1.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Provide UL listed floor covering in Control Room. 2.0. Also see 5.1.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 5.1.4 Smoke detectors in return air path from control room. 2.0.

A hose station & additional port. extinguishers July 27, 1979 / 5.1.4 provided. 2.0. Provided in adjacent areas.

July 27, 1979 / 5.1.4 Class "A" doors provided. 2.0.

July 27, 1979 / 5.1.4 3-hour dampers provided in ventilation penetrations. 2.0.

Visual & audible alarms in control rm. for det. & supp. Also for supervisory July 27, 1979 / 4.2 sys. 2.0. systems.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.f Noncombustible suspended ceilings provided. 2.0.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.f Fire detection provided throughout above drop ceiling. 2.0.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.j Cabling kept to a minimum, no cables in trenches, etc. 2.0. Cables terminate in room APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.j No cables routed under raised central console area. 2.0.

Manual water spray systems provided for charcoal And in TSC and HRSS APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.d filter. 2.0. buildings.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.h Adequate SCBAs & spare bottles available for use. 2.0. For control room personnel.

3.8-12

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Local alarms also provided APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.2 Det. alarms & annunciation provided in control room. 2.0. for det. systems.

Floor is 3-hr. except unrated APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.2 3-hour separation for control room except floor. 2.0. nonc. pen. seals See Drawing F-8-1 for APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.2 Hose stations & port. exts. provided for control room. 2.0. location in & around rm.

Appropriate hose station nozzles provided for control APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.2 rm. 2.0.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.2 Ionization det. provided above open-grid ceiling. 2.0.

Fire alarms throughout the plant alarm in the control APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.2 rm. 2.0.

Control rm. vent sys. designed as a recirculation With smoke detectors in the APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.2 system. 2.0. return air ducts.

Operates as a once-through APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.2 Dampers interlocked with detection system. 2.0. sys.

To provided a purging APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.2 Control room vent. sys. may be manually operated. 2.0. capability if necessary.

No trenches or eulverts in APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A/ F.2 Cabling in control room kept to a minimum. 2.0. control room floor.

Cables are not routed under raised floor in control APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A/ F.2 room 2.0.

3-hour separation between zone & U1 Turbine 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 Building. 3.0.

Complete fire detection and water suppression 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 systems 3.0.

3-hr. separation from other areas of the service 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 building. 3.0.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Automatic water supp. sys. in cable spreading room. 3.0. Also see 5.2.6 of 79 SER.

Includes doors, dampers, July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Fire barriers around Electrical Eq. Room to be 3-hr. 3.0. etc (5.3.6 / 79 SER).

July 27, 1979 / 5.2.4 Smoke detection in the return air ventilation duct. 3.0. From cable spreading room.

July 27, 1979 / 5.2.4 Hose stations & port extinguishers at each entrance 3.0.

July 27, 1979 / 5.2.6 Provide smoke detectors in the cable spreading room. 3.0.

July 27, 1979 / 5.2.6 Installation of a drainage system. 3.0.

Upgrade fire resistance of structural steel to 3-hr.

July 27, 1979 / 5.2.6 rating. 3.0.

July 27, 1979 / 5.2.6 Install 3-hr. rated dampers in vent. penetrations. 3.0.

3.8-13

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment July 27, 1979 / 5.2.6 Access doors to be 3-hour rated fire doors. 3.0.

Except some unrated APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.c Cable spread room has 3-hr. barriers. 3.0. noncomb. pen. seals.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.c Water supp. provided over major cable concentrations. 3.0.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.3.a.1 Wet pipe supp. is provided in the cable spread room. 3.0.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.3.a.2 Manual hoses & port. exts. provided as backup supp. 3.0.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.3.a.4 Two separate entrances provided to the c.s. room. 3.0.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.3.a.5 All cable trays accessible for manual suppression. 3.0.

Except ceiling which has APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.3.b 3-hr. separation provided for cable spreading room. 3.0. unrated nonc. seals 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 Complete early warning fire detection system. 4.0.

3-hr. separation from other areas of the service 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 building. 4.0.

Includes doors, dampers, July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Fire barriers around Electrical Eq. Room to be 3-hr. 4.0. etc (5.3.6 / 79 SER).

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.5 Detection Provided. 5.0.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 6.1.A Also see 5.4.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Doors to the DC equip. room to be Class "A" doors. 6.1.A Also see 5.4.6 of 79 SER.

Port. Ext. provided near July 27, 1979 / 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water & CO2 supp. capability. 6.1.A each room.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 6.1.B Also see 5.4.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Doors to the DC equip. room to be Class "A" doors. 6.1.B Also see 5.4.6 of 79 SER.

Port. Ext. provided near July 27, 1979 / 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water & CO2 supp. capability. 6.1.B each room.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 6.2.A Also see 5.4.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Doors to the DC equip. room to be Class "A" doors. 6.2.A Also see 5.4.6 of 79 SER.

Port. Ext. provided near July 27, 1979 / 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water & CO2 supp. capability. 6.2.A each room.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 6.2.B Also see 5.4.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Doors to the DC equip. room to be Class "A" doors. 6.2.B Also see 5.4.6 of 79 SER.

Port. Ext. provided near July 27, 1979 / 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water & CO2 supp. capability. 6.2.B each room.

3-hour separation between zone & U1 Turbine 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 Building. 6.3.

Alarms locally & in control 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 Complete early warning fire detection system. 6.3. room (6.2.2 & 6.2.4).

3.8-14

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment 3-hr. separation from other areas of the service 6.2.1 (ER), 3-hr sep. from 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 building. 6.3. TB & other SB areas 3-hr. except fire resistive 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 3-hr. separation between 6.3 & cable tunnels. 6.3. access covers.

Available hose stations 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 Portable fire extinguishers are provided in zone. 6.3. outside entrances 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 5.0 Fire Brigade to respond quickly due to proximity to 2.0. 6.3.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 5.0 Transient combustibles & ignition sources controlled. 6.3.

W/ shut-off valves.(5.3.6 of July 27, 1979 / 3.1.4 One-inch booster reels w/ low flow nozzles 6.3. 79 SER)

Includes doors, dampers, July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Fire barriers around Electrical Eq. Room to be 3-hr. 6.3. etc(5.3.6 / 79 SER)

July 27, 1979 / 5.3.4 Smoke detectors are provided in return air path. 6.3. From computer room.

July 27, 1979 / 5.3.4 Fire hose stations are located near both entrances. 6.3.

Portable extinguishers provide in area & adjacent July 27, 1979 / 5.3.4 areas. 6.3.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 7.1. Also see 5.4.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11, With an alarm in the control 5.4.6 Provide air flow supervision for battery room exhaust. 7.1. room.

Alarms on air flow July 27, 1979 / 4.4.1 Elect. supervision for battery room ventilation systems. 7.1. loss(precludes excess H2)

Port. Ext. provided near July 27, 1979 / 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water & CO2 supp. capability. 7.1. each room.

NFPA 69 reviewed for battery rm. explosion Air flow alarms notify C.R. if APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.7 prevention. 7.1. loss of vent.

See F-drawings for APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.7 Standpipe / hose / port. ext. provided for battery rms. 7.1. locations.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 7.2. Also see 5.4.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11, With an alarm in the control 5.4.6 Provide air flow supervision for battery room exhaust. 7.2. room.

Alarms on air flow July 27, 1979 / 4.4.1 Elect. supervision for battery room ventilation systems. 7.2. loss(precludes excess H2)

Port. Ext. provided near July 27, 1979 / 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water & CO2 supp. capability. 7.2. each room.

NFPA 69 reviewed for battery rm. explosion Air flow alarms notify C.R. if APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.7 prevention. 7.2. loss of vent.

See F-drawings for APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.7 Standpipe / hose / port. ext. provided for battery rms. 7.2. locations.

3.8-15

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Adjacent to steam pipe July 27, 1979 / 5.17.6 Fixed automatic water suppression is provided. 8.1. chase.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8, 5.17.6 Provide fire dampers in HVAC penetrations. 8.1. Also see 5.17.6 of 79 SER.

Unrated (substantial) hinged APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.8 3-hour separation provided except 2 access hatches. 8.1. covers for hatches.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.8 Wet pipe supp. system provided. 8.1.

Also see 5.13.4 of the 79 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.9.2 July 21, 1988 / 13.2 Complete automatic wet pipe sprinkler system. 8.2.1.A SER. Alarms in C.R.

Also see section 13.3 of the 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.9.3 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Reserve feed to swing diesel gen. has 1-hr. fire wrap. 8.2.1.A 88 SER.

Limit lube oil to 30-gallon.&

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Oil dispensing stations: approved cabinets. 8.2.1.A 5.13.6 of 79 SER July 27, 1979 / 5.13.4 Hose stations & port. extinguishers provided for area. 8.2.1.A Water flow annunciation in July 27, 1979 / 5.13.4 Complete automatic wet pipe sprinkler system. 8.2.1.B Control Room.

Limit lube oil to 30-gallon.&

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Oil dispensing stations: approved cabinets. 8.2.1.B 5.13.6 of 79 SER July 27, 1979 / 5.13.4 Hose stations & port. extinguishers provided for area. 8.2.1.B July 27, 1979 / 5.13.4 Hose stations & port. extinguishers provided for area. 8.2.1.C July 27, 1979 / 5.13.4 Hose stations & port. extinguishers provided for area. 8.2.1.D 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 No safe shutdown cables or equipment in zone. 8.2.10 Substantial shield walls w/ metal doors between 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 zones. 8.2.10 Between 8.2.10 & 14.1.1 July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 TB sprinklers extended to the control rod drive pumps 8.2.2.A Also see 5.14.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 5.14.4 Hose stations & port. extinguishers provided for area. 8.2.2.A Exemption request 5.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 10.2 No safe shutdown cables or equipment in zone. 8.2.2.B withdrawn.

Exemption request 5.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 10.2 Negligible amounts of combustible loading. 8.2.2.B withdrawn.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Automatic sprinkler protection provided. 8.2.3.A 8.2.3.A is in the Southern 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 No continuity of comb. between 8.2.3.A & 8.2.6.C 8.2.3.A Group July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 TB sprinklers extended to the control rod drive pumps 8.2.3.A Also see 5.14.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 5.14.4 Hose stations & port. extinguishers provided for area. 8.2.3.A No significant quantity of 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2, 10.2 No safe shutdown cables or equipment in zone. 8.2.3.B combustibles.

3.8-16

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment 3-hr. except fire resistive 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 6.2.1 July 21, 1988 / 5.2 3-hr. separation between 6.3 & cable tunnels. 8.2.5 access covers.

Exemption request 5.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.3.4 July 21, 1988 / 10.2 Unit 2 cable tunnel elect. seals are 3-hr. rated. 8.2.5 withdrawn.

Complete detection and suppression in the cable Exemption request 5.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.3.4 July 21, 1988 / 10.2 trays. 8.2.5 withdrawn.

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Tunnels separated by 3-hr Exemption request 5.3 July 21, 1988 / 10.2 walls 8.2.5 withdrawn.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.4, For adequate coverage.

5.15.6 Additional hose at hose stations adj. to cable tunnels 8.2.5 (4.3.1.4, 79 SER).

Also see 5.16.6 & 4.10 of 79 July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Cable tunnel sprinklers modified to prevent fire prop. 8.2.5 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 4.11 Portable smoke ejectors provided. 8.2.5 July 27, 1979 / 5.15.4 Automatic sprinkler system provided for cable tunnel. 8.2.5 To prevent propagation Nov 5, 1980 / 3.1.5 (d) U1 cable tunnel sprinkler system is adequate. 8.2.5 between trays.

Single line break would take sprinkler sys. out of Should provide adequate Nov 5, 1980 / 3.1.5 (d) service. 8.2.5 separation of feeds.

Hose stations provided w/

Feb 12, 1981 / 3.1.5(d) Separate sprinkler system for each div. of cables. 8.2.5 alternate supply.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.c Water supp. provided over major cable concentrations. 8.2.5 Available from ground floor APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.c Manual fire fighting eq. available from adjacent zones. 8.2.5 of TB.

Hose stations have adequate hose to cover cable APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.d tunnels 8.2.5 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.1 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Automatic detection and water suppression in corridor. 8.2.6.A Fire detection & suppression above cable tunnel July 21, 1988 / 10.2 access 8.2.6.A 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Auto. water supp. & smoke detection sys. in corridor. 8.2.6.A Exemption request 5.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.3.4 July 21, 1988 / 10.2 Unit 2 cable tunnel elect. seals are 3-hr. rated. 8.2.6.A withdrawn.

Exemption request 5.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.3.4 July 21, 1988 / 10.2 Curbed access at F/17 & F/25 8.2.6.A withdrawn.

Above 4-kV SWGR by DG July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.6.A rooms (& 5.17.6)

High pressure heater bay, July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.6.A cable pens. to RB 3.8-17

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Also see 5.17.6+E777 of 79 July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Water supp. sys. provided for Unit 1 trackway. 8.2.6.A SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3-hr. barriers installed. (See 3.1.8,5.22 Rx. fd pump exhaust vents sealed (adj. to transformer) 8.2.6.A 5.17 of 79 SER)

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Oil dispensing stations: approved cabinets. 8.2.6.A Limit quantity to 55-gallon.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Curbs & drains for liquid storage on TB ground floor. 8.2.6.A Also see 5.17 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 5.17.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.6.A July 27, 1979 / 5.17.4 Extra-hazard wet pipe spk. sys. for feed water pumps. 8.2.6.A Pipe schedule system.

Automatic water supp. provided for Unit 1 trackway July 27, 1979 / 5.17.6 area. 8.2.6.A Exhaust vents in reactor feed pump area sealed w/3- Relocated not to expose July 27, 1979 / 5.17.6 hr. 8.2.6.A transformers. 5.22.6 Nov 5, 1980 / 3.1.5 (f) Provide pre-action sprinkler sys. in trackways. 8.2.6.A Sized for extra hazard duty.

Heat shields will be Nov 5, 1980 / 3.1.5 (f) Detection sys. will comply w/ NFPA codes. 8.2.6.A provided.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.c Water supp. provided over major cable concentrations. 8.2.6.A Cable pens. sealed 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Substantial shield walls around zone. 8.2.6.B w/noncomb. material Exemption request 5.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.3.4 July 21, 1988 / 10.2 Unit 2 cable tunnel elect. seals are 3-hr. rated. 8.2.6.B withdrawn.

Exemption request 5.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.3.4 July 21, 1988 / 10.2 Supp. systems in zones adjacent to radwaste tunnel 8.2.6.B withdrawn.

July 27, 1979 / 5.17.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.6.B 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.1 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Automatic detection and water suppression in corridor. 8.2.6.C 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Auto. water supp. & smoke detection sys. in corridor. 8.2.6.C 8.2.6.C is in the Central 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 No continuity of comb. between 8.2.3.A & 8.2.6.C 8.2.6.C Group.

& for adj. cable risers. (Also July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Water supp. sys. for turbine EHC oil reservoirs. 8.2.6.C 5.17.6 of 79 SER).

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Oil dispensing stations: approved cabinets. 8.2.6.C Limit quantity to 55-gallon.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Curbs & drains for liquid storage on TB ground floor. 8.2.6.C Also see 5.17 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 5.17.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.6.C The feedwater heater bays protected by auto.

July 27, 1979 / 5.17.4 sprinklers. 8.2.6.C Design density: 0.3 gpm/sq.

Nov 5, 1980 / 3.1.5 (k) Areas P & T in TB protected by auto. deluge systems. 8.2.6.C ft. for entire area.

3.8-18

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Maybe 8.2.7.C as well (not APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.c Water supp. provided over major cable concentrations. 8.2.6.C specified).

Closed head sprinkler prot.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.8 EHC systems have fire retardant fluid & sprinkler prot. 8.2.6.C above EHC units.

Cable pens. sealed 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Substantial shield walls around zone. 8.2.6.D w/noncomb. material Exemption request 5.3 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.3.4 July 21, 1988 / 10.2 Supp. systems in zones adjacent to radwaste tunnel 8.2.6.D withdrawn.

July 21, 1988 / 5.17.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.6.D The feedwater heater bays protected by auto.

July 21, 1988 / 5.17.4 sprinklers. 8.2.6.D Design density: 0.3 gpm/sq.

Nov 5, 1980 / 3.1.5 (k) Areas P & T in TB protected by auto. deluge systems. 8.2.6.D ft. for entire area.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.1 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Automatic detection and water suppression in corridor. 8.2.6.E 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Auto. water supp. & smoke detection sys. in corridor. 8.2.6.E Above 4-kV SWGR by DG July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.6.E rooms (& 5.17.6)

High pressure heater bay, July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.6.E cable pens. to RB July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Water supp. sys. provided for Unit 2 trackway. 8.2.6.E Also see 5.17 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8, 3-hr. barriers installed. (See 5.22 Rx. fd pump exhaust vents sealed (adj. to transformer) 8.2.6.E 5.17 of 79 SER)

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Oil dispensing stations: approved cabinets. 8.2.6.E Limit quantity to 55-gallon.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Curbs & drains for liquid storage on TB ground floor. 8.2.6.E Also see 5.17 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 5.17.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.6.E July 27, 1979 / 5.17.4 Extra-hazard wet pipe spk. sys. for feed water pumps. 8.2.6.E Pipe schedule system.

Automatic water supp. provided for Unit 1 trackway July 27, 1979 / 5.17.6 area. 8.2.6.E Exhaust vents in reactor feed pump area sealed w/3- Relocated not to expose July 27, 1979 / 5.17.6 hr. 8.2.6.E transformers.5.22.6 Nov 5, 1980 / 3.1.5 (f) Provide pre-action sprinkler sys. in trackways. 8.2.6.E Sized for extra hazard duty.

Heat shields will be Nov 5, 1980 / 3.1.5 (f) Detection sys. will comply w/ NFPA codes. 8.2.6.E provided.

Water suppression provided over major cable APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.c concentrations. 8.2.6.E Substantial, locked, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 All penetrations in shield walls sealed w/nc. materials. 8.2.7.A unlabeled, metal doors 3.8-19

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.0 Smoke detection provided for most of 8.2.7.A. 8.2.7.A 4-kV SWGR area on TB July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.7.A mezz. floor.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Curbs around Hydrogen seal oil units. 8.2.7.A Also see 5.18.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.7.A July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 Auto. deluge sys. provided for H2 seal oil units. 8.2.7.A July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 Auto. sprinkler protection provided for H2 seal oil area. 8.2.7.A Hydrogen seal oil reservoirs have auto. water spray APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.8 sys. 8.2.7.A Substantial, locked, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 All penetrations in shield walls sealed w/nc. materials. 8.2.7.B unlabeled, metal doors Extensive auto. sprinkler protection provided 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 throughout. 8.2.7.B Except west of row D.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1, HP htr bay, ceiling pens. &

5.18 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.7.B cable pens. to RB July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.7.B July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 Sprinklers provided for the heater bays. 8.2.7.B Substantial, locked, 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 All penetrations in shield walls sealed w/nc. materials. 8.2.7.C unlabeled, metal doors 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.2.4 Spot detection provided in western portion of 8.2.7.C. 8.2.7.C July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1, Cable pens. to RB adj to 5.18 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.7.C ASD Coolers Also see 5.18.6 of 79 SER (MG Set oil coolers and July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Curbs around MG set oil cooler / pump. 8.2.7.C pumps removed).

July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.7.C Auto. deluge sys. provided for turbine lube oil July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 reservoirs. 8.2.7.C (MG Set oil coolers and Auto. sprinkler protection provided for MG set oil pumps removed, but July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 coolers. 8.2.7.C sprinkler system retained).

Supplemented by a ceiling-APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.8 Turbine oil reservoir tanks prot. by auto. water spray. 8.2.7.C level wet pipe sys.

Thermal det. provided for the turbine oil reservoir APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.8 tanks. 8.2.7.C July 27, 1979 / HP htr bay, ceiling pens. &

3.1.1,5.1.8 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.7.D cable pens. to RB 3.8-20

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.7.D July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 Sprinklers provided for the heater bays. 8.2.7.D 4-kV SWGR area on TB July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.7.E mezz. floor.

Relocate to outside the area July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Relocate manual pull station for H2 seal oil unit deluge 8.2.7.E & 5.18.6/79 SER July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Curbs around Hydrogen seal oil units. 8.2.7.E Also see 5.18.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.7.E July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 Auto. deluge sys. provided for H2 seal oil units. 8.2.7.E July 27, 1979 / 5.18.4 Auto. sprinkler protection provided for H2 seal oil area. 8.2.7.E Hydrogen seal oil reservoirs have auto. water spray APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.8 sys. 8.2.7.E 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 4-kV SWGRs for each unit sep. by partial 3-hr barrier. 8.2.8.A 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Partial fire barrier separates div. SWGR. 8.2.8.A 2-hr. & 3-hr. barrier between RB & 480-V SWGR 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 areas 8.2.8.A 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.0 3-hr. seals into bottom of SWGR. 8.2.8.A 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.0 No unsealed penetrations are located near SWGR. 8.2.8.A No continuity of comb. between 8.2.8.E & eq. fire 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.0 areas 8.2.8.A Oil removed from units MG 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 MG sets are curbed to confine any liquid spill. 8.2.8.A Sets.

July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Thermally actuated water spray system for local supp. 8.2.8.A Separate auto. wet pipe spk. sys. at ceiling for MG With spray shields for water 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 sets 8.2.8.A damage.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Smoke detection at ceiling. 8.2.8.A Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 zone. 8.2.8.A 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Smoke detection provided above 4-kV SWGR. 8.2.8.A 4-kV & 480-Volt SWGR July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.8.A areas. Also 5.19.6.

To contain oil spills. Also 5.19.6 of 79 SER. Oil removed from Units MG July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Curbs around MG sets on turbine main operating floor 8.2.8.A Sets.

3.8-21

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment With water-flow annunciation in the control rm. Oil removed from MG Set, July 27, 1979 / 5.19.4 MG Set area protected by an auto. sprinkler sys. 8.2.8.A sprinkler system retained.

July 27, 1979 / 5.19.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.8.A July 27, 1979 / 5.19.6 Drains to be provided for enclosed (curbed) area. 8.2.8.A See exemption requests for APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.j Partial fire barriers used on op. floor. 8.2.8.A details.

Separates U1 & U2 480-V 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 3-hr. rated barrier at col. line 13 east of col. line G. 8.2.8.B SWGR 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Partial fire barrier separates div. SWGR. 8.2.8.B 2-hr. & 3-hr. barrier between RB & 480-V SWGR 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 areas 8.2.8.B 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 3-hr. seals into bottom of SWGR. 8.2.8.B 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 No unsealed penetrations are located near SWGR. 8.2.8.B No continuity of comb. between 8.2.8.E & eq. fire 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 2.0 areas 8.2.8.B 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 MG sets are curbed to confine any liquid spill. 8.2.8.B Oil removed from MG Sets July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Thermally actuated water spray system for local supp. 8.2.8.B With spray shields for water damage. Oil removed from Separate auto. wet pipe spk. sys. at ceiling for MG MG Sets, sprinklers 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 sets 8.2.8.B retained.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Smoke detection at ceiling. 8.2.8.B Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 zone. 8.2.8.B 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Smoke detection provided above 4-kV SWGR. 8.2.8.B 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 No intervening comb. between each units SWGR. 8.2.8.B 4-kV & 480-Volt SWGR July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.8.B areas. Also 5.19.6.

To contain oil spills. Also 5.19.6 of 79 SER. (Oil removed from MG Set.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Curbs around MG sets on turbine main operating floor 8.2.8.B Curbs remain).

3.8-22

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment With water-flow annunciation in the control rm. (Oil removed from MG Set, July 27, 1979 / 5.19.4 MG Set area protected by an auto. sprinkler sys. 8.2.8.B sprinkler system retained).

July 27, 1979 / 5.19.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.8.B July 27, 1979 / 5.19.6 Drains to be provided for enclosed (curbed) area. 8.2.8.B See exemption requests for APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.j Partial fire barriers used on op. floor. 8.2.8.B details.

Separates U1 & U2 4kv &

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 3-hr. rated barrier at col. line 13 east of col. Line G. 8.2.8.C 480-V SWGR 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Partial fire barrier separates div. SWGR. 8.2.8.C 2-hr. & 3-hr. barrier between RB & 480-V SWGR 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 areas 8.2.8.C With Class A fire door.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.0 3-hr. seals into bottom of SWGR. 8.2.8.C 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.0 No unsealed penetrations are located near SWGR. 8.2.8.C No continuity of comb. between 8.2.8.E & eq. fire 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 12.0 areas 8.2.8.C Oil removed from MG.Sets.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 MG sets are curbed to confine any liquid spill. 8.2.8.C Curbs remain.

W/baffles to prevent 4-kV SWGR damage (oil removed Separate auto. wet pipe spk. sys. at ceiling for MG from MG Sets, sprinkler 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 sets 8.2.8.C system retained).

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Smoke detection at ceiling. 8.2.8.C 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.2 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Smoke detection provided above 4-kV SWGR. 8.2.8.C Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 zone. 8.2.8.C 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 No intervening comb. between SWGR divisions. 8.2.8.C 3-hr. barrier separates fire areas along col. G to H at Full height partial fire barrier 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 11. 8.2.8.C for div. 4-kV 4-kV & 480-Volt SWGR July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.8.C areas. Also 5.19.6.

To contain oil spills. Also 5.19.6 of 79 SER. Oil removed from MG.Sets.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Curbs around MG sets on turbine main operating floor 8.2.8.C Curbs remain.

3.8-23

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment With water-flow annunciation in the control rm. Oil removed from MG Sets.

July 27, 1979 / 5.19.4 MG Set area protected by an auto. sprinkler sys. 8.2.8.C Sprinkler system retained.

July 27, 1979 / 5.19.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.8.C July 27, 1979 / 5.19.6 Drains to be provided for enclosed (curbed) area. 8.2.8.C See exemption requests for APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.j Partial fire barriers used on op. floor. 8.2.8.C details.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Partial fire barrier separates div. SWGR. 8.2.8.D 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 3-hr. barrier between RB & 480-V SWGR areas 8.2.8.D Except 2-hour portion.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 3-hr. seals into bottom of SWGR. 8.2.8.D SER indicates 3-hr. rated 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 No unsealed penetrations are located near SWGR. 8.2.8.D floor.

No continuity of comb. between 8.2.8.E & eq. fire Equivalent areas (8.2.8.A -

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 areas 8.2.8.D D)

July 21, 1988 / 12.2 No continuity of combustibles through the floor slab. 8.2.8.D Oil removed from MG Sets.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 MG sets are curbed to confine any liquid spill. 8.2.8.D Sprinkler system retained.

5.10.4.1 , water supp. &

July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Thermally actuated water spray sys for local supp. 8.2.8.D foam-water prot.

W/baffles to prevent 4-kV SWGR damage. Oil Separate auto. wet pipe spk. sys. at ceiling for MG removed from MG Sets.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 sets 8.2.8.D Sprinkler system retained.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Smoke detection at ceiling. 8.2.8.D 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 Smoke detection provided above 4-kV SWGR. 8.2.8.D Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 zone. 8.2.8.D 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 No intervening comb. between SWGR divisions. 8.2.8.D 3-hr. barrier separates fire areas along col. G to H at Full height partial fire barrier 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.4.3 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 11. 8.2.8.D for div. 4-kV 4-kV & 480-Volt SWGR areas. Also 5.19.6. Oil removed from MG Sets.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. 8.2.8.D Sprinkler system retained.

3.8-24

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment To contain oil spills. Also 5.19.6 of 79 SER. Oil removed from MG Sets.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.11 Curbs around MG sets on turbine main operating floor 8.2.8.D Sprinkler system retained.

With water-flow annunciation July 27, 1979 / 5.19.4 MG Set area protected by an auto. sprinkler sys. 8.2.8.D in the control rm.

July 27, 1979 / 5.19.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.8.D July 27, 1979 / 5.19.6 Drains to be provided for enclosed (curbed) area. 8.2.8.D See exemption requests for APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.j Partial fire barriers used on op. floor. 8.2.8.D details.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 No safe shutdown cables or equipment in zone. 8.2.8.E These features located in 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.2 curbs & wet pipe sys. separates areas. 8.2.8.E 8.2.8.A - D.

Electrical penetration sealed with noncombustible 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.8.1 July 21, 1988 / 12.0 matl. 8.2.8.E Floor penetrations.

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.2 Exciters for both generators protected by CO2 sys. 8.2.8.E On the turbine deck.

July 27, 1979 / 5.19.4 Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided. 8.2.8.E See exemption requests for APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.j Partial fire barriers used on op. floor. 8.2.8.E details.

Auto. closed head water supp. sys. for bearing lift APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.8 pumps 8.2.8.E Turbine bearings protected w/heat det. & auto deluge APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.8 sys. 8.2.8.E July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Upgrade penetrations in DG Rooms to 3-hr. rating. 9.1. Also see 5.20.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Provide electrical supervision for door. 9.1. Also see 5.20.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Provide 3-hr. rating for structural steel in DG Rooms. 9.1. Also see 5.20.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.2 Auto. total flooding CO2 system protects DG room. 9.1. Manual & auto. actuation .

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.2 Local & control rm. alarms for DG CO2 systems. 9.1.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.2 A 3-hr. enclosure is provided for the diesel day tank. 9.1.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 Thermostats actuate local and control alarms. 9.1.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 Thermostats also actuate a total flooding CO2 system. 9.1.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 Day tank rooms also protected by auto. sprinklers. 9.1.

Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided for July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 area 9.1.

Interlocked to close on APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.i Dampers interlocked w/ CO2 systems. 9.1. activation of gas sys.

3.8-25

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.5.a CO2 systems designed per NFPA 12. 9.1.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.5.b All CO2 systems have predischarge alarms. 9.1.

CO2 system nozzles do not discharge directly on APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.5.c equip. 9.1.

Except around DG exhaust APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9 3-hr. separation for U1 DG. 9.1. & air supply pipes Manual smoke venting by APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9 Auto total flooding CO2 system for each DG. 9.1. port. smoke ejectors The DG day tank rooms prot. by auto. sprinkler APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9.b system. 9.1.

CO2 is discharged into DG APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9.b CO2 is discharged into DG & day tank rooms 9.1. & day tank rooms July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Upgrade penetrations in DG Rooms to 3-hr. rating. 9.2. Also see 5.20.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Provide electrical supervision for door. 9.2. Also see 5.20.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Provide 3-hr. rating for structural steel in DG Rooms. 9.2. Also see 5.20.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.2 Auto. total flooding CO2 system protects DG room. 9.2. Manual & auto. actuation .

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.2 Local & control rm. alarms for DG CO2 systems. 9.2.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.2 A 3-hr. enclosure is provided for the diesel day tank. 9.2.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 Thermostats actuate local and control alarms. 9.2.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 Thermostats also actuate a total flooding CO2 system. 9.2.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 Day tank rooms also protected by auto. sprinklers. 9.2.

Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided for July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 area 9.2.

Interlocked to close on APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.i Dampers interlocked w/ CO2 systems. 9.2. activation of gas sys.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.5.a CO2 systems designed per NFPA 12. 9.2.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.5.b All CO2 systems have predischarge alarms. 9.2.

CO2 system nozzles do not discharge directly on APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.5.c equip. 9.2.

Except around DG exhaust APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9 3-hr. separation for U2 DG. 9.2. & air supply pipes Manual smoke venting by APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9 Auto total flooding CO2 system for each DG. 9.2. port. smoke ejectors The DG day tank rooms prot. by auto. sprinkler APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9.b system. 9.2.

CO2 is discharged into DG APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9.b CO2 is discharged into DG & day tank rooms 9.2. & day tank rooms 3.8-26

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Upgrade penetrations in DG Rooms to 3-hr. rating. 9.3. Also see 5.20.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Provide electrical supervision for door. 9.3. Also see 5.20.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.8 Provide 3-hr. rating for structural steel in DG Rooms. 9.3. Also see 5.20.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.2 Auto. total flooding CO2 system protects DG room. 9.3. Manual & auto. actuation .

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.2 Local & control rm. alarms for DG CO2 systems. 9.3.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.2 A 3-hr. enclosure is provided for the diesel day tank. 9.3.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 Thermostats actuate local and control alarms. 9.3.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 Thermostats also actuate a total flooding CO2 system. 9.3.

July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 Day tank rooms also protected by auto. sprinklers. 9.3.

Portable extinguishers & hose stations provided for July 27, 1979 / 5.20.4 area 9.3.

Interlocked to close on APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.i Dampers interlocked w/ CO2 systems. 9.3. activation of gas sys.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.5.a CO2 systems designed per NFPA 12. 9.3.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.5.b All CO2 systems have predischarge alarms. 9.3.

CO2 system nozzles do not discharge directly on APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.5.c equip. 9.3.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9 3-hr. separation between RBs & DG 1/2. 9.3.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9 Auto total flooding CO2 system for each DG. 9.3.

The DG day tank rooms prot. by auto. sprinkler APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9.b system. 9.3.

CO2 is discharged into DG APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.9.b CO2 is discharged into DG & day tank rooms 9.3. & day tank rooms Adjacent to expansion gap 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 8.2.2 July 21, 1988 / 8.2 Det. located adjacent to mech. & elect. penetrations. Expansion Gap penetrations.

Near mech. & elect.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 8.2.5 July 21, 1988 / 8.2 Manual suppression is readily available near pens. Expansion Gap penetrations.

To fire water sys. from July 27, 1979 / 3.1.2 Sys. to detect excessive make up water. Fire Pumps service water sys.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.6 Provide foam concentrate & pickup tubes. General Also see 4.3.1.6 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.12 Turn-out coats will be provided for fire brigade. General Also see 4.12 of 79 SER.

6/86 (Rev. 2) / 12.1.1 Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.4.2 Operators trained at pulling fuses. General Reel type, w/ hose & 180 July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.4 Interior hose stations located throughout the plant. General degree movement.

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.5 Auto. sprinklers protect areas in TB & cable tunnel. General Zones 8.2.4, 8.2.5, & in TB.

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.3 Portable extinguishers throughout the plant. General Dry chem. & CO2.

3.8-27

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Combined capacity: 15,000 July 27, 1979 / 4.4.1 Provide 3 fire service smoke ejectors & port. ducting General to 20,000 CFM 2 air packs in Radwaste, 4 in July 27, 1979 / 4.4.2 Self-contained breathing equip. & cascade provided. General RB, plus extras.

Powered from 125-Volt DC July 27, 1979 / 4.5 Emerg. lighting is provided. General station batteries.

July 27, 1979 / 4.8 Electrical penetration seals are adequate. General Such as zones 9.1, 9.2, .9.3, July 27, 1979 / 4.8 Fire doors for safety related areas, elect. supervised. General etc.

To ensure they will be July 27, 1979 / 4.8 Other fire doors locked or admin. controlled. General effective.

July 27, 1979 / 4.10 In general, fire areas have 3-hr. barriers. General Some exceptions exist.

July 27, 1979 / 4.11 Turn out coats provided for fire brigade use. General July 27, 1979 / 4.12 Fire brigade provided w/ & trained for breathing equip. General Air breathing facilities for 10 men for 6 hrs., 3 bottles/ 3 bottles/hour/person. See July 27, 1979 / 3.1.13 hr. General 4.1.2, 4.4.2, 3.1.12

& cascade system w/six 300 July 27, 1979 / 4.4.2 Breathing air: 30 air packs plus 60 extra bottles. General cubic ft. bottles.

July 27, 1979 / 3.2.1 In situ tests conducted for existing smoke detectors. General Also see 4.2 of 79 SER.

Lighting backup power source provided by station July 27, 1979 / 4.5 DGs. General July 27, 1979 / 4.5 Seal beam emergency lighting & hand held lanterns. General Provided for emergency use.

Communications provided: telephones, page & Voice-powered headset July 27, 1979 / 4.6 answer. General stations & port. radios July 27, 1979 / 6.2 Fire brigade training meets App. A to BTP 9.5-1. General July 27, 1979 / 6.3 Admin. controls minimize amount of combustibles. General In safety-related areas.

Control of ignition sources are administratively July 27, 1979 / 6.4 controlled. General Adequate fire fighting procedures have been July 27, 1979 / 6.5 developed. General Annual audits & QA in place for fire protection July 27, 1979 / 6.6 program. General Nov. 5, 1980 / 3.2.1 Conduct bench tests for smoke detectors. General Feb. 12, 1981 / 3.2.1 Have detectors bench tested. General Or have an approved Dec. 30, 1982 / 2.3 All other plant areas (24) will meet III.G.2 of App. R. or General exemption request.

3.8-28

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment The SSD makeup pump equivalent in capacity to And serves as a substitute Dec. 30, 1982 / 2.4 RCIC. General to the RCIC.

To provide alternated SSD Dec. 30, 1982 / 3.1.6 The DGs, DG cooling water sys., etc. are available. General functions.

W/O off-site power if Dec. 30, 1982 / 3.2 Achieve cold shutdown w/in 72 hrs. General alternate SSD Dec. 30, 1982 / 3.4 Plant meets associated circuits criteria w/ mods. General Dec. 30, 1982 / 3.5 Safe shutdown procedures & manpower adequate. General Dec. 1, 1987 / 2.1 Operators trained & available in fuse pulling for SSD. General Emerg. lighting & manpower Dec. 1, 1987 / 2.2 Maintain replacement fuses and fuse pullers by DGs. General (& 2.2, 5/88SER)

Instead of from service Dec. 1, 1987 / 2.3.1 SSD makeup pump backup water from Fire Water Sys.General water system.

Dec. 1, 1987 / 2.3.1 Fire water sys. supply meets fire & SSD demands. General Simultaneously Previously listed as not Dec. 1, 1987 / 2.3.2 RHR flow indication inst. available during a fire event. General available (12/82 3.1.5)

Shedding power source Dec. 1, 1987 / 2.3.4 SSD procedures include operator instruction for fuses. General loads & fuse pulling.

Vessel level can be monitored from multiple RB Feb. 25, 1991 / 3.0 locations General For safe shutdown related Feb. 25, 1991 / 3.0 Operators have time to obtain portable lights. General actions.

Feb. 25, 1991 / 2.4.2 Operators trained at pulling fuses. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / A.1 Admin. Prog. compared w/ detailed recommendations. General Manual hose stations & port.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / A.3 Backup fire suppression capability & equip. provided. General extinguishers.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / A.4 Fire water supply provided by redundant fire pumps. General Diesel driven pumps.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / A.4 Lightning protection comparable to req. in NFPA-78. General Pipe break would not APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / A.5 Supp. effects analysis conducted. General adversely affect SSD.

Separation between shared eq. addressed in SSD And addressed in Exemption APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / A.9 Rep. General Requests.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / B.1 Admin. procedure guidance in NFPA Codes reviewed. General See NFPA Code Review.

See Supplementary APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / B.2 Bulk storage of comb. materials per NRC guidance. General Guidance Review.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / B.3.a Procedure in place to control ignition sources. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / B.3.b Open flame not permitted for leak testing. General 3.8-29

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Procedure specifies APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / B.3.c Admin. controls for combustibles such as wood. General acceptable materials.

Some training w/ other APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / B.4 Station fire brigade self-sufficient. General agencies.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / B.5.a Fire prot. sys. surveillance's performed per procedure. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / B.5.a Periodic testing of fire prot. sys. & eq. per procedure. General One drill per shift per APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / B.5.b Fire drills conducted per QEP 340-5. General quarter.

Fire brigade & fire dept. training compared to NRC APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / B.5.c guide General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / B.5.d NFPA Codes reviewed for fire brigade activity. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1 Major fire hazards protected w/ fixed supp. systems. General HVAC materials meet NFPA APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.d HVAC work since late1970's have low comb. finishes. General 90A-1976.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.e The roofs at Quad Cities are Class 2 construction. General App. A required Class I See suppression effects APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.i Fire fighting water will not adversely affect SSD. General analysis.

Including pen. seals, doors, APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.j In general, fire areas separated by 3-hr. barriers. General dampers, etc.

Alarmed if kept in closed APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.j Most fire doors are locked and/or alarmed. General position.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.2.a Major fire hazards have fixed fire protection. General New safety related cables and all cables installed in cable tray or in free-air applications are qualified to IEEE-383, IEEE-1202, NFPA 262 or equivalent.

Cables installed in rigid Plastic (including PVC & neoprene)materials APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.2.c General metal conduit or in metal minimized enclosures (ventailated or non-ventilated) cannot support sustained combustion and are not required to be qualified to IEEE-383, IEEE-1202, or NFPA 262.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.2.d NFPA 30 used as a guide for storage of flamm. liquids. General 3.8-30

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.a All cable trays constructed of noncomb. materials. General Galvanized sheet metal.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.c Fire detection in areas containing major elect. equip. General Cables are waterproof type, not subject to elect.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.c faulting General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.c Manual hose stations & port. ext. in all cable areas. General Except cable tunnels.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.c Alt. SSD capability avail. independent of all fire areas. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.d Cable & cable tray pens. sealed equivalent to barrier. General Fire stops from SER 4.9 not as significant(since App. Existing fire stops will be APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.e R) General maintained.

New safety related cables and all cables installed in cable tray or in free-air applications are qualified to IEEE-383, IEEE-1202, NFPA 262 or equivalent.

Cables installed in rigid APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.f & g New cables to meet IEEE-383 requirements. General metal conduit or in metal enclosures (ventailated or non-ventilated) cannot support sustained combustion and are not required to be qualified to IEEE-383, IEEE-1202, or NFPA 262.

Cable trays, raceways, conduit, etc used only for APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.h cables General Port. vent. eq. (smoke ejectors) available for fire APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.3.i brigade. General Vent. sys. shuts down in a fire area, manually Manual restart of vent. sys.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.a & b restarted General to purge smoke.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.d Charcoal in filter systems contained in metal cabinets. General Separation between fresh air intakes & exhaust APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.e outlets. General Physical separation.

Escape & access routes are APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.f Elevators enclosed with 2-hr. construction. General established.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.g Existing vent. systems will be utilized to purge smoke. General For post fire operations.

For fire brigade and damage APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.h Adequate SCBAs & spare bottles available for use. General control.

3.8-31

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Interlocked to close on APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.4.i Dampers interlocked w/ CO2 systems. General activation of gas sys.

At selected locations APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.5.a Fixed emerg. lighting installed in plant per App. R. General throughout the plant.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.5.b Sealed beam port. hand lights provided for emerg. use. General Battery powered.

And some voice powered APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.5.c 2-way phones & a paging sys. exists throughout plant. General head set stations.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.1.a Fire detection systems compared to NFPA 72D. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.1.c Station fire alarm is distinct from other station alarms. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.1.d Present fire alarm sys. connected to plant UPS. General To allow for underground pipe APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.2.a Supp. systems were conservatively designed. General deterioration.

W/hyd. shortest leg out & 500 APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.2.e Hyd. calcs. show either fire pump can handle demands. General gpm hose.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.a Auto. sprinklers, hose stations fed by interior loops. General And from interior mains.

No single failure will impair APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.a Loops & int. mains w/ min.2 connections to undergrd. loop General primary & backup.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.a Sprinkler/standpipe systems eq. w/OS & Y gate valves. General Or other approved valves.

Not provided for standpipe APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.a Water flow alarms provided for auto. spk.. systems. General systems.

Supp. effects analysis APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.a Water shields or baffles for some safety-related eq. General performed.

Sectional valves are not elect.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.b Elect. supervision gen. provided for fixed supp. valves. General supervised.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.b Valves are sealed or locked in proper position. General With monthly inspections.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.c Fixed water ext. systems installed per NFPA 13 & 15. General Hose lengths do not exceed APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.d Hose stations/standpipes use rubber lined hose. General 100'.

Calcs. performed to verify APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.d Some standpipe / hose systems comply w/NFPA 14 General adequacy of supply APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.d Hose stations gen. located outside unoccupied areas. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.d Shutoff valves for standpipes, sections of interior piping. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.d Standpipe systems installed & inspected per NFPA 14 General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.d Signs installed warning of hose station high pressure. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.e Elect. safety nozzles for elect. eq. / cabling areas. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.3.f Portable foam extinguishers provided w/ manual equip. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.5.b All CO2 systems have predischarge alarms. General 3.8-32

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Standpipes gen. used in lieu of APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.6 CO2 & dry chem. port. exts. avail. for Class B & C fires. General Class A exts.

See exemption requests for APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.1.a Local supp. system provided over specific & gen. hazards. General specifics.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.1.b Comb. & ignition sources admin. controlled. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.1.b Hose stations & port. CO2 exts. throughout sec. cont. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.4. Plant computers are not safety related. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.5. Auto. fire det. provided in vicinity of SWGR & MCCs. General Alarms in the control room.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.5. Hose stations & port. exts. provided for SWGR & MCCs General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.6 In gen., SSD local panels provided w/ det. and/or supp. General Meeting the 3-hr. fire separation APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.10 Diesel fuel oil storage tanks are buried underground. General criteria.

For safety-related pump areas &

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.11 Auto. sprinkler prot. &/or det. provided where appropriate General per FHA APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.11 Hose stations & port. ext. for safety-related pump areas General To protect safety-related APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.11 Equipment pedestals, curbs & drains provided. General equipment.

Exhaust from these areas APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.11 Vent. to safety-related pump areas manually controlled. General through RB stack.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.15 No flammable liquids stored in decontaminated areas. General Prot. w/ port. exts. & hose APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.18 Misc. areas located & prot. to minimize effects of a fire. General stations.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / G.1 A cutting & welding permit system in place. General APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / G.1 Hose stations & port. exts. provided throughout the plant General A dry resin fire will not prevent APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / G.2 Detection provided in most dry resin storage areas. General SSD.

With fire prot.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / G.3 Hazardous chemicals kept in proper containers. General recommendations.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / G.3 Vent. & flood prot. are provided for haz. chem. areas. General See NFPA 49 & 30 reviews.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / G.4 Resins & filters stored in controlled areas. General And kept in closed containers.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.1.a Auto. det. provided for most of reactor building. General (RB) Sec. cont.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / G.2 Resins temporarily stored in various locations in TB. General-TB Away from vital equipment.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / G.2 Wet pipe sprinkler prot. provided for major resin storage General-TB July 27, 1979 / 3.1.2 Provide sep. feed to undergrd. loop, from fire pumps. Loop With isolation valves.

Safety Eval. Reports Fire Brigade being credited for fire incidents in the plant. NA All zones.

Located immediately outside APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.12 Port. ext. & hose stations near new fuel storage area. New fuel area area.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.12 Combustibles limited by admin. controls. New fuel area 3.8-33

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Rack configuration precludes criticality of total Fog nozzles not used near APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.12 flooding. New fuel area fuel storage area APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.12 The storage area provided w/ a drain. New fuel area.

W/substantial locked metal 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.1 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Substantial shield walls, cable pens. sealed w/ nc matl Northern Zone Gp. access doors.

Also see 4.3.1.3 of the 79 July 27, 1979 / 3.1.3 No interference's w/ the operation of hydrants & PIVs. Outside SER.

2-1/2" gate valve. & 4.3.1.3 July 27, 1979 / 3.1.3 Gate valve to be provided for the unused hydrant port Outside of the 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Water spray sys. for bus duct, w/in 15' of transformers. Outside Also see 5.22.6 of 79 SER.

Independent from July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Independent water for bus duct deluge system. Outside transformer water spray July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.3 Cross connections provided for fire prot. Loop. Outside To prevent a line break form July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.3 Provide a separate feed to the underground F.P. loop. Outside isolating systems.

July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.3 Fire hydrants feed by exterior loop. Outside July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.3 Fire hydrants to have post-indicator valves. Outside July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.3 Fire hydrants to be at intervals not in excess of 400'. Outside Auto. deluge systems protect yard transformers & oil July 27, 1979 / 4.3.1.5 sys. Outside Also see 5.22.4 of 79 SER.

July 27, 1979 / 5.22.4 The yard area is protected by manual fire protection. Outside Outside transformers protected by auto. deluge July 27, 1979 / 5.22.4 systems. Outside APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.h Water spray sys. above transformers. Outside APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.h Reinforced concrete wall between TB & transformers. Outside Plus a 6" curb.

Not provided at east wall APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.h Water spray prot. of bus duct pens. at west wall of TB. Outside (19' separation).

NFPA 50A & 6 addressed in APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.2.b Outside bulk hydrogen storage properly arranged. Outside the reviewed.

Unlined pipe was used in the APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.2.a Looped 10" water main surrounds the plant. Outside buried loop.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.2.a Cross connections & sectional valves provided in loop. Outside C-factor testing conducted every 3 years (for yard APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.2.a main). Outside Common yard main fire loops & water supplies APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.2.b provided. Outside 3.8-34

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Table 3.8-1 DESIGN BASIS FIRE PROTECTION COMMITMENTS REFERENCE E.R. Date/Section SER Date/Section Fire Protection Commitment Description Affected Fire Zone Comment Fire hydrant spacing gen. per NFPA 24(<400 feet Except crib house area APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / E.2.g apart) Outside (carts w/500' of hose).

Protected by hose houses APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.16 Safety-related storage tanks located outside. Outside located in vicinity Supp for major hazards (transformers) located w/in APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.16 50'. Outside Within 50' of outdoor tanks.

In designated areas w/

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / G.1 Acetylene, Oxygen fuel gas systems stored outside. Outside admin. procedures.

Capable of being shutdown APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.14 Radwaste vent. sys. independent of plant vent. sys. Radwaste & restarted.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.14 A fire in the radwaste bldg. will not prevent SSD. Radwaste Per the SSD analysis.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.1.j Fire doors held open have fusible links in event of fire. RB Adequate SCBAs provided near primary cont.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.1.b entrances Sec. cont./Pri. cont W/substantial locked metal 6/86 (Rev. 2) / 5.1 July 21, 1988 / 9.2 Substantial shield walls, cable pens. sealed w/ nc matl Southern Zone Gp. access doors.

Port. fire ext. & hose stations throughout spent fuel APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / F.13 area Spent fuel area Also 5.17.6 of 79 SER(<5 July 27, 1979 / 3.1.5 Sprinklers, curbs, & cabinets for oil storage in TB. TB gal.)W/drains & spk.

APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A / D.2.b Area hydrogen monitors provided to protect TB. TB Check valves in place.

Note 1:Exemption requests and Safety Evaluation Reports are located in the Fire Protection Report.

Note 2:Fire protection commitments which are not related to the design basis for the plant are shown in the Fire Protection Commitment Matrix (Revision 3).

Note 3:Commitments in this table were taken from the following documents.

1. Safety Evaluation Reports related to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A.

2. Safety Evaluation Reports related to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

3. Appendix R exemption requests submitted by Com Ed and approved by the NRC.

4. ComEd's response to the requirements of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A (Section 5.0 of this FHA).

3.8-35

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QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 4.0 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 4.0 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 4.1 Fire Zones Without Safe Shutdown or Radioactive Release Issues The fire zones listed below do not contain cables or equipment required by any of the safe shutdown paths and do not share a boundary with any fire area that contains cables or equipment required by any of the shutdown paths. A fire in these fire zones will not prevent achieving or maintaining safe shutdown nor will it create the potential for a significant release of radioactive material. Therefore, fire hazards analyses have not been developed for the following seven fire zones.

Fire Zone Description Fire Area 13.1 Guardhouse Outside 15.1 Technical Support Center Outside 18.1 Security Diesel Generator Building Outside 17.3 Spare Main Power Transformer Outside 20.1 Spray Canal Lift Station Outside 21.1 Secondary Alarm Station Outside 23.1 Central Alarm Station SB-II 24.1 Heating Boiler Building Outside 4.1-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 4.2 Fire Zones With Abbreviated Fire Hazards Analysis The following sixteen zones either do not contain safe shutdown equipment, or are inerted during power operation. They have minimal impact on safe shutdown capabilities of adjacent fire areas.

Therefore, an abbreviated analysis is provided.

Fire Zone Description Fire Area 1.2.1 Drywell U-1 Primary Containment 1.2.2 Drywell U-2 Primary Containment 14.1 Radwaste Collection & Handling Area Radwaste Building 14.3.1 Max. Recycle Radwaste Building Radwaste Building 16.1 HRSS Building U-2 Outside 16.2 HRSS Building U-1 Outside 17.1.1 U-1 Main Power Transformer Outside 17.1.2 Auxiliary Transformer 11 Outside 17.1.3 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 12 Outside 17.2.1 U-2 Main Power Transformer Outside 17.2.2 Auxiliary Transformer 21 Outside 17.2.3 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 22 Outside 19.1 Service Building Offices SB-II 19.2 Service Building Offices SB-II 19.3 Control Room Air Handling Unit Room SB-II 22.1 Off Gas Filter Building Off Gas Filter Bldg.

25.1 LTD Building Outside 26.1 Interim Radwaste Storage Facility Outside 27.1 Robust Flex Storage Building Outside Fire Zone 1.2.1 - Unit 1 Drywell (Primary Containment)

This fire zone is shown on drawings F-2 and F-6.

Fire Barrier Description The drywell wall is metal surrounded by minimum 5-foot 0-inch thick concrete extending from elevation 554 feet 0 inches to the floor elevation 690 feet 6 inches. All penetrations in this wall are sealed to give the wall a 3-hour fire rating. The drywell floor is 23-foot 6-inch thick concrete. The ceiling is a metal drywell head covered by shield plugs. The shield plugs consist of a reinforced concrete annular ring with a central core of three removable stacked shield plugs with a total thickness of 6-feet and 0-inches. The top of this shield plug is at elevation 690 feet 6 inches and the plug has a 3-hour fire rating.

In addition to this general structure, there is one removable concrete shield plug and metal equipment door and one man opening (personnel airlock). The walls of the personnel airlock room are 1-foot 6-inch thick structural concrete. The floor is 2-foot 0-inch thick concrete.

4.2-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Protection Criteria and Measures Fire protection requirements for the Unit 1 primary containment were recognized in the plant design. Reactor Protection System (RPS) cables are enclosed in metal conduit throughout the plant. In the primary containment, Essential Safety System (ESS) cables are completely enclosed in solid steel cable trays.

For the Unit 1 primary containment, penetrations constitute the fire stops with all walls being 3-hour fire walls. No specific water damage protection is afforded to equipment within the primary containment.

Design-Basis Fire There is no design-basis fire for the drywell since the drywell atmosphere is inerted during normal reactor operation. Justification for the standby gas treatment system lines penetrating the drywell wall is provided in Section 7.2 of the Exemption Requests. Hot and cold shutdown can be achieved as discussed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (FPR, Volume 2).

Administrative procedures and controls are enforced during refueling and maintenance operations to control any additional hazards that would be introduced to the primary containment area.

Fire Suppression Effects There are no fire suppression systems or piping in this area. Therefore, damaging effects of water release are not contemplated.

Fire Zone 1.2.2 - Unit 2 Drywell (Primary Containment)

This fire zone is shown on drawings F-2 and F-6.

Fire Barrier Description The drywell wall is metal surrounded by minimum 5-foot 0-inch thick concrete extending from elevation 554 feet 0 inches to the floor elevation 690 feet 6 inches. All penetrations in this wall are sealed to give the wall a 3-hour fire rating. The drywell floor is 23-foot 6-inch thick concrete. The ceiling is a metal drywell head covered by shield plugs. The shield plugs consist of a reinforced concrete annular ring with a central core of three removable stacked shield plugs with a total thickness of 6-feet and 0-inches. The top of this shield plug is at elevation 690 feet 6 inches and the plug has a 3-hour fire rating.

In addition to this general structure, there is one removable concrete shield plug and metal equipment door and one man opening (personnel airlock). The walls of the personnel airlock room are 1-foot 6-inch thick structural concrete. The floor is 2-foot 0-inch thick concrete.

4.2-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Protection Criteria and Measures Fire protection requirements for the Unit 2 primary containment were recognized in the plant design. RPS cables are enclosed in metal conduit throughout the plant. In the primary containment, ESS cables are completely enclosed in solid steel cable trays.

For the Unit 2 primary containment, penetrations constitute the fire stops with all walls being 3-hour fire walls. No specific water damage protection is afforded to equipment within the primary containment.

Design-Basis Fire There is no design-basis fire for the drywell since the drywell atmosphere is inerted during normal reactor operation. Justification for the standby gas treatment system lines penetrating the drywell wall is provided in Section 7.2 of the Exemption Requests. Hot and cold shutdown can be achieved as discussed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (FPR, Volume 2).

Administrative procedures and controls are enforced during refueling and maintenance operations to control any additional hazards that would be introduced to the primary containment area.

Fire Suppression Effects There are no fire suppression systems or piping in this area. Therefore, damaging effects of water release are not contemplated.

Fire Zone 14.1 - Radwaste Collection & Handling Area This fire zone is shown on drawings F-20 and F-21.

Fire Barrier Description This fire zone shares a boundary with Fire Zones 14.3.1, 8.2.2.B, 8.2.3.B, 8.2.6.C, and 8.2.7.C.

The wall separating Fire Zone 14.1 from Fire Zones 8.2.2.B and 8.2.3.B is constructed of a minimum 3-foot 0-inch thick concrete. Separation of Fire Zones 14.1 and 8.2.6.C is by minimum 3-foot 0-inch thick concrete wall that contains an unlabeled door and the wall separating Fire Zone 8.2.7.C is constructed of minimum 3-foot 0-inch thick concrete up to elevation 611-feet 6-inches and insulated metal siding above this elevation. The walls separating Fire Zone 14.1 from 14.3 are constructed of concrete or metal siding. All other walls enclosing the radwaste building are exterior walls constructed of concrete or metal siding. None of the walls enclosing Fire Zone 14.1 are fire rated.

The roofs over Fire Zone 14.1 are constructed of built-up roofing over 1-foot 0-inch to 3-foot 0-inch thick concrete or over 1-inch rigid insulation on precast channel slabs supported by structural steel. None of the roofs are fire rated.

4.2-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Safe Shutdown Equipment There are no cables or equipment associated with any of the safe shutdown methods located in this fire zone.

Fire Protection Criteria and Measures There are no fire detection or automatic suppression systems installed in this fire zone. Manual fire suppression equipment, however, is installed in this fire zone. This equipment consists of hose stations, each equipped with 100 feet of hose, and portable fire extinguishers. The equipment is discussed in greater detail in Subsection 2.4.4.

Design-Basis Fire This fire zone is part of the Radwaste Building Fire Area. In the event of a fire in this fire zone, both hot and cold shutdown can be achieved as discussed in Section 4.12 of the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (FPR Volume 2).

Fire Zone 14.1 shares a boundary with Fire Areas TB-I, TB-II, and TB-III. A fire is prevented from spreading into these fire areas by equivalent 3-hour fire barriers. The adequacy of these barriers in preventing fire spread is discussed in Section 5.2 of the Exemption Requests.

Combustible loading in the Radwaste Building is minimal overall, with the largest concentration being in the Control Room in the form of cable insulation and clean anti-contamination clothing (approximately 70 ft3). Other combustibles consist of small amounts of lube oil contained in equipment or stored in flammable liquids cabinets, small amounts of HDPE pipe, and limited amounts of dry active waste stored in sealed steel drums (typically 8 to 10 drums). The vast majority of radwaste handled in this building is water based and is contained in steel tanks.

Due to the substantial construction and compartmentation of this building, and the low combustible loading, a fire would not be expected to spread from the immediate area of origin.

In addition, since the limited amount of dry active waste handled here is stored in sealed steel drums, and an exposure fire to these drums is improbable, a fire would not result in a significant release of contamination.

Fire Suppression Effects No safe shutdown paths would be affected by water damage in this area. Water runoff would be handled by the floor drains in the general area which are connected to a sump. This water is processed and stored in one of two 350,000 gallon contaminated condensate storage tanks.

4.2-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone 14.3.1 - Maximum Recycle Radwaste Building This fire zone is shown on drawings F-20 and F-21.

Fire Barrier Description The only other fire zone that shares a boundary with Fire Zone 14.3.1 is Fire Zone 14.1. The walls separating these two fire zones are constructed of concrete or metal siding. On the ground floor level an unlabeled door provides access to Fire Zone 14.1. All other walls enclosing this fire zone are exterior walls constructed of concrete or metal siding. None of the walls are fire rated.

The roof over the maximum recycle building is also not fire rated.

Fire Protection Criteria and Measures There are no fire detection or automatic suppression systems installed in this fire zone. Manual suppression equipment, however, is installed in this fire zone. This equipment consists of two hose stations, each equipped with 100 feet of hose, and three portable fire extinguishers.

Design-Basis Fire This fire zone is part of the Radwaste Building Fire Area. In the event of a fire in this fire zone, both hot and cold shutdown can be achieved as discussed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (FPR Volume 2).

Fire Zone 14.3.1 does not share a boundary with any other fire area, therefore, a fire in this zone cannot impact other fire areas.

Fire Suppression Effects No safe shutdown paths would be affected by water discharge in this area. Water runoff would be handled by the drains in the general area which are connected to a sump. This water is processed and stored in one of two 350,000 gallon contaminated condensate storage tanks.

Fire Zone 16.1 - Unit 2 High Rad Sampling Station (HRSS)

This fire zone is a separate 2,150 ft2 building, located near the northeast corner of the Unit 2 Reactor Building. It would be manned in the event of a serious reactor accident for the purpose of obtaining process samples.

4.2-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Barrier Description This fire zone shares no boundaries with other fire zones. The building is constructed of three foot thick concrete walls and a two-foot thick concrete roof to provide post accident radiation shielding. Although the walls and roof are not qualified as fire rated, they will provide a substantial barrier to spread of fire outside this zone.

Fire Protection Criteria and Measures There are no fire detection or automatic fire suppression systems in this fire zone. There are temperature sensors in the exhaust ventilation system which provide indication at the local control panel if the charcoal filters overheat. There is a manually controlled water spray system covering the two charcoal filters. There is a nitrogen blanketing system for the waste sample tank which would be utilized if post accident sampling were performed. There are portable fire extinguishers in the zone, and there is a fire hydrant located within 100 feet of the building.

Design-Basis Fire This fire zone does not contain cables or equipment required for safe shutdown as defined in the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (FPR, Volume 2) nor does it share a boundary with any other fire zone. A fire in this zone will not impact safe shutdown.

Combustible loading in this fire zone is negligible. During post accident sampling, hydrogen buildup in the waste sample tank is contemplated, and a nitrogen blanketing system is provided.

Fire Suppression Effects No safe shutdown paths would be affected by water discharge in the area. Water from manual hose streams would collect in the building sump pit.

Fire Zone 16.2 - Unit 1 High Rad Sampling Station (HRSS)

This fire zone is a separate 2,150 ft2 building, located near the southeast corner of the Unit 1 Reactor Building. It would be manned in the event of a serious reactor accident for the purpose of obtaining process samples.

Fire Barrier Description This fire zone shares no boundaries with other fire zones. The building is constructed of three-foot thick concrete walls and a two-foot thick concrete roof to provide post accident radiation shielding. Although the walls and roof are not qualified as fire rated, they will provide a substantial barrier to spread of fire outside this zone.

4.2-6

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Protection Criteria and Measures There are no fire detection or automatic fire suppression systems in this fire zone. There are temperature sensors in the exhaust ventilation system which provide indication at the local control panel if the charcoal filters overheat. There is a manually controlled water spray system covering the two charcoal filters. There is a nitrogen blanketing system for the waste sample tank which would be utilized if post accident sampling were performed. There are portable fire extinguishers in the zone, and there is a fire hydrant located within 100 feet of the building.

Design-Basis Fire This fire zone does not contain cables or equipment required for safe shutdown as defined in the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (FPR, Volume 2) nor does it share a boundary with any other fire zone. A fire in this zone will not impact safe shutdown.

Combustible loading in this fire zone is negligible. During post accident sampling, hydrogen buildup in the waste sample tank is contemplated, and a nitrogen blanketing system is provided.

Fire Suppression Effects No safe shutdown paths would be affected by water discharge in this area. Water from manual hose streams would collect in the building sump pit.

Station Transformer Fire Zones (Outside)

The station transformers outside the main Unit 1 and 2 structures could possibly pose a severe fire hazard. Therefore, each transformer area has been designated as a fire zone. These transformer fire zones are denoted as follows:

Description Fire Zone Unit 1 Main Power Transformer 17.1.1 Unit 1 Auxiliary Transformer 11 17.1.2 Unit 1 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer 12 17.1.3 Unit 2 Main Power Transformer 17.2.1 Unit 2 Auxiliary Transformer 21 17.2.2 Unit 2 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer 22 17.2.3 These fire zones are shown on drawings F-12, F-13, and F-24.

4.2-7

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Barrier Description The transformers are located on individual reinforced concrete pads. Concrete block fire barriers are provided between the Auxiliary and Reserve Auxiliary units, and crushed rock sumps are provided around each transformer to contain any oil release.

Fire Protection Measures Each transformer is protected by an automatic water spray system which is activated through a linear thermal detection system (Protectowire brand detection). Alarms are provided which alarm locally and in the control room to indicate operation of the system. The locations of the automatic suppression systems are shown on Figures B-11, B-12, and B-23 of the Exemption Requests. A water spray system is provided for bus duct protection for transformers in zones 17.1.2 and 17.2.2.

Fire Suppression Effects No safe shutdown paths would be affected by water discharge in this area. Initial suppression discharge would be handled by the crushed rock sumps surrounding the transformers. Overflow from the crushed rock areas would not affect safe shutdown because no shutdown actions are required in these areas given a transformer fire.

Design-Basis Fire If a fire started in any of the transformers, it would be mitigated by the water spray system.

These suppression systems would prevent the spread of the fire to the turbine building. A fire involving a transformer could cause the respective unit to trip resulting in a loss of off-site power for the affected unit. An uncontrolled fire involving a Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer 12 (Zone 17.1.3 or 17.2.3) could potentially damage SBO Diesel Generator power and control cables. However, in this scenario shutdown can be achieved regardless of the loss of the SBO power because the unit diesel generators would be available.

Fire Zone 19.1 - Service Building Offices - Elevation 595 feet 0 inches This fire zone is shown on drawing F-8.

4.2-8

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Barrier Description Fire Zone 19.1 shares a boundary with Fire Zones 4.0, 6.3, 8.2.6.A, and 19.2. The walls separating Fire Zone 19.1 from Fire Zones 4.0 and 6.3 are 3-hour fire barriers constructed of 1-foot 6-inch thick concrete. Two Class A fire doors in these walls allow access to Fire Zone 6.3. Fire Zone 19.1 is separated from Fire Zone 8.2.6.A by a minimum 2-foot 0-inch thick concrete wall. This wall is not fire rated. Access to the service building from the turbine building is gained through two unlabeled doors located in this wall. All other walls enclosing this fire zone are non-rated exterior walls. They are constructed of 11-5/8-inch thick concrete block supported by unprotected structural steel.

The ceiling separates Fire Zones 19.1 and 19.2. It is constructed of 6-inch thick concrete supported by exposed structural steel. The ceiling is not fire rated.

Fire Protection Criteria and Measures Partial detection is provided in Fire Zone 19.1. Automatic wet pipe sprinkler protection has been installed in the store room, store room office, and the paint and oil room, and a halon suppression system protects the new computer room. Manual suppression equipment has been installed throughout the fire zone. This equipment consists of hose stations, each equipped with 100 feet of hose and portable extinguishers.

Fire Suppression Effects No safe shutdown paths would be affected by water discharge in this area. Most water runoff would be handled by the floor drains located in the washrooms. Minor amounts of water runoff which may enter adjacent zones such as the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (AEER) will not impact the operation of the safe shutdown equipment there.

Actuation of the Halon extinguishing system in the new computer room presents the remote possibility of over pressurization conditions, but it is unlikely this would cause damage to nearby zones 4.0 and 6.3. The Halon 1301 suppression agent would not damage safe shutdown equipment located in these adjacent zones.

Fire Zone 19.2 - Service Building Offices - Elevation 609 feet 0 inch This fire zone is shown on drawing F-8.

4.2-9

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Barrier Description Fire Zone 19.2 shares a boundary with Fire Zones 3.0, 8.2.7.A, 19.1, 19.3, and 23.1. The walls separating Fire Zone 19.2 from Fire Zone 3.0 are 3-hour rated fire barriers constructed of 1-foot 6-inch thick concrete. Two Class A fire doors in the south wall of the cable spread room allow access to Fire Zone 3.0. Fire Zone 19.2 is separated from Fire Zone 8.2.7.A by a minimum 1-foot 6-inch concrete wall. The wall is not fire rated. All other walls enclosing this fire zone are exterior walls. They are constructed of 11-5/8-inch thick concrete block supported by unprotected structural steel and they are not fire rated. Openings exist in the walls for louvers and windows.

The floor separates Fire Zones 19.2 and 19.1. It is constructed of 6-inch thick concrete supported by exposed structural steel and is not fire rated.

Part of the ceiling of Fire Zone 19.2 is the floor of Fire Zone 19.3. It is constructed of 6-inch concrete supported on exposed structural steel. The rest of the ceiling is part of the service building roof which is constructed of built-up roofing over 1-inch rigid insulation on 3-1/2-inch precast concrete slabs supported by exposed structural steel. The roof is not fire rated.

Fire Protection Criteria and Measures Partial detection is provided in Fire Zone 19.2, and an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system protects the records storage room. Manual suppression equipment has been installed throughout the fire zone. This equipment consists of hose stations, each equipped with 100 feet of hose, and portable extinguishers.

Fire Suppression Effects No safe shutdown paths would be affected by water discharge in this area. Most water runoff would be handled by floor drains located in the washrooms. Minor amounts of water runoff which may enter adjacent zones will not impact safe shutdown equipment.

Fire Zone 19.3 - Control Room A Air Handling Unit Room This fire zone is shown on drawing F-8.

Fire Barrier Description Fire Zone 19.3 shares a boundary with Fire Zones 2.0 and 19.2. The wall separating Fire Zone 19.3 from Fire Zone 2.0 are 3-hour rated Control Room fire barriers constructed of 1-foot 6-inch thick concrete. The doors in this wall are Class A fire doors. All other walls enclosing this fire zone are exterior walls. They are constructed of 11-5/8-inch thick concrete block supported by exposed structural steel and they are not fire rated. Openings exist in the walls for louvers and an unlabeled door.

4.2-10

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The floor of Fire Zone 19.3 is part of the ceiling of Fire Zone 19.2. It is constructed of 6-inch thick concrete supported on exposed structural steel. The floor is not fire rated.

The ceiling is part of the service building roof. It is constructed of built-up roofing over 1-inch rigid insulation on 3-1/2-inch precast concrete slabs supported by exposed structural steel. The roof is not fire rated.

Fire Protection Criteria and Measures There is partial fire detection in this fire zone. Manual fire suppression equipment is installed in this fire zone. This equipment consists of one hose station, equipped with 100 feet of hose, and portable fire extinguishers.

Fire Suppression Effects No safe shutdown paths would be affected by water discharge in this area. Water runoff would be handled by the floor drains located on lower levels. Minor amounts of water runoff which may enter adjacent zones such as the Control Room will not impact the operation of safe shutdown equipment there.

Fire Zone 22.1 - Off Gas Filter Building Fire Area This area is shown on General Arrangement Drawing M-11A.

Fire Barrier Description The Off Gas Filter Building does not share a boundary with any other plant structure. The walls of this building are constructed of 3-foot 6-inch thick concrete below grade and insulated metal siding supported by exposed structural steel above grade. None of the walls are fire rated. The south and east walls, above grade, contain non-labeled doors and the north walls have louvers.

The roof below grade floor is 2-feet 6-inches to 4-feet 6-inches concrete with removable concrete slabs. Above the grade floor, the roof is built-up roofing over 2-inch rigid insulation on 3-1/2-inch precast concrete channel slabs. The roof is not fire rated.

Fire Protection Criteria and Measures This area is protected by a manual suppression system. This system consists of fire hose stations, equipped with 100 feet of hose, and portable fire extinguishers.

4.2-11

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Design-Basis Fire In the event of a fire in this area both hot and cold shutdown can be achieved as discussed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (FPR, Volume 2).

This building does not share a boundary with any other fire area, therefore, a fire in this area cannot impact any other fire areas.

The existing fire hazards are not significant enough to present a problem due to the breaching of the radioactive systems and building constraints allowing a release to the environment in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits.

The potential radiological consequences of the Quad Cities Units 1 & 2 off gas system component failure have been submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission (now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) in Table 4 of the Quad Cities Units 1 & 2 Special Report No. 1 and Supplementary Information for Dresden Units 2 & 3 Special Report No. 4A, Modified Off Gas System, Commonwealth Edison Company, June 11, 1974. No credible hypothetical fires in the off-gas system could produce doses to the public above those calculated, using very conservative assumptions, in this report.

Should a fire occur in a charcoal vessel, the temperature elements on the charcoal vessels would initiate a high temperature alarm in the control room and provide warning of a fire. In addition radiation instrumentation in the stack would provide high radiation warnings, providing further assurance that the abnormal condition would be recognized and that timely action would be taken by the operating staff.

However, in the event a fire should occur, a very conservative analysis would assume a release of 100% of the iodine from a fire in the first charcoal bed (This also conservatively assumes the loss of function of all subsequent charcoal beds) and 100% of the Noble Gas Source term, described in Table 3 of the earlier referenced report, through the station chimney. The off gas system charcoal beds are in steel vessels. However, in the unlikely event that the system integrity is not maintained, the results of this analysis would not be changed since the off gas charcoal beds are located in the off gas filter building and the off gas filter building HVAC would exhaust through the station chimney.

Assuming a fumigation accident meterology consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.3, the resultant calculated radiological consequences at the exclusion area boundary are 447 mrem thyroid and 4.55 mrem whole body. These postulated doses are well within 10 CFR 20 limits.

Fire Suppression Effects There are no fixed suppression systems in this area. The use of manual hose lines or portable extinguishers will not affect safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone.

4.2-12

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone 25.1Laundry, Tool and Dry Active Waste Building (LTD)

This fire zone is a separate 19,300 ft2, two-story building with a corridor connecting it to the Unit 1 Turbine Building (fire zone 8.2.6.A). It houses the low level dry active waste handling facility, the clean and dirty rad protection clothing facility, and the hot tool/equipment storage and hot machine shops.

Fire Barrier Description There is an enclosed corridor connecting the northeast corner of the LTD building to the Unit 1 Turbine Building at the rear of the Unit 1 trackway. The Turbine Building wall in this area is concrete block, and the double doors between the areas are of metal construction without openings. These UL labeled 3hr fire doors provide a substantial barrier to fire spread between the zones. The LTD building is of noncombustible construction with concrete block exterior walls at the first level, and insulated metal panel siding on the exterior of the second level.

Interior walls are of concrete block, and the second floor and roof are supported on exposed structural steel.

Fire Protection Criteria and Measures The LTD building is protected throughout with a wet pipe sprinkler system, of appropriate design density for the hazards. There is also a manually activated water curtain system to provide exposure protection from an exterior fire involving the Unit 1 Main Transformer. The north-south corridors on both floors are maintained as combustible free areas. There are portable multi-purpose fire extinguishers located throughout the building, and hose stations located in the stairwells.

Design-Basis Fire This fire zone does not contain cables or equipment required for safe shutdown as defined in the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (FPR, Volume 2). The communicating boundary between it and Fire Area TB-III is a concrete block wall, which although not rated, will provide a substantial barrier to fire spread. A fire in this zone will not impact safe shutdown.

Combustible loading in this fire zone is moderate, primarily consisting of rad protection clothing, respirator equipment, low level dry active waste being processed and stored, and oil/oily waste (40 gallons) stored in multiple drums. The building is well compartmentalized via full height concrete block walls, although most interior walls are not designated fire walls. A fire originating in this building will be effectively controlled by the sprinkler system, preventing the release of contaminated materials to the environment. A Unit 1 Main Transformer fire may breach the metal panel construction at the northeast corner of the LTD building before the manual water curtain system can be activated. This would result in fire exposure to the respirator storage room; however, the LTD building wet-pipe system would limit the involvement of the combustibles there and prevent a significant release of radioactive material.

Fire Suppression Effects No safe shutdown paths would be affected by water discharge in this area. Water from the sprinkler system or manual hose streams would be controlled by the floor drains and collect in the building sump pit.

4.2-13

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone 26.1 - Interim Radwaste Storage Facility (IRSF)

This fire zone is a separate building of 10,000 square feet that provides interim storage for radioactive waste in the event of the closure of the burial site. It provides storage for Dry Active Waste (DAW) and solid radwaste. Radioactive waste not in the final burial form is staged in the IRSF prior to shipment to radioactive waste processors.

Fire Barrier Description The IRSF is a separate building that does not adjoin any power block buildings.

The storage and truck bay exterior walls and roof are reinforced concrete. The exterior walls of the control room and mechanical equipment space cement masonry units. The Floor is slab on grade. The storage area is surrounded by wall so minimum 30 thick reinforced concrete up to a height of 34 feet and is then 15 thick to the roof. The storage area is separated from the truckbay by a 30 reinforced concrete wall up to a height of 34/ There is no separating wall above the 34 elevation. There is an opening 7 by 7 at the top of this wall. The truck bay is surrounded by minimum 15 thick concrete exterior walls. Truck entrance and personnel doors are located at each end of the truckbay.

Fire Protection Criteria and Measures The truckbay is protected by smoke detectors that alarm to a local alarm panel. The mechanical equipment room is protected by ionization type smoke detectors that alarm on the local panel.

Supply air ducts are equipped with duct mounted smoke detectors that cause interruption of fan operation in addition to a local alarm. The IRSF control room is protected by ionization type detectors that alarm on a local panel. The local panel is connected to alarm annunciators in the main control room. There are no fire detectors in the storage ara; the likelihood of a fire in this area is acceptably low.

Portable fire extinguishers are provided in the IRSF.

Design-Basis Fire This fire zone does not contain cable or equipment required for safe shutdown as defined in the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (FPR, Volume 2). The IRSF does not communicate with any power block fire areas. A fire in this zone will not impact safe shutdown.

Combustible loading in this fire zone is moderate. The materials are DAW, which consists of the following: paper, plastics and cloth, metal, wood, concrete chippings, dirt, filter elements and other miscellaneous trash, and solid radwaste which consists of resins, sludges and higher activity filters and other higher activity material. The solid radwaste is stored in high integrity containers (HICs) or stainless steel liners. The HICs are made of high-density polyethylene.

4.2-14

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The control room contains electrical panels and furniture. The mechanical equipment room contains electrical panels, ventilation duct insulation, and ventilation equipment. The electrical wiring is predominantly contained in conduit rather than cable trays, thus reducing the substantially the effect of the cabling on the combustible loading.

The design basis fire starts with a truck fire with the tractor in the truck bay which includes the rupture of the tractor fuel tanks and flashover into the storage area occurs which consumes all the HICs and combustibles in the truck bay and storage areas. Potential structural damage from the heat results in collapse of the roof. This is a highly unlikely scenario since the tractor is in the truck bay for less than 10 minutes to drop off or pickup a trailer containing radioactive material for shipment or storage. During the time the tractor is in the truckbay procedures require that a fire watch be set as a compensatory measure.

Fire Suppression Effects Water from the sprinkler system or manual hose streams would be controlled by the floor drains or out through rollup doors in the IRSF truckbay.

Fire Zone 27.1 - Robust Flex Storage Building This fire zone is a separate building of approximately 5400 square feet that contains equipment for diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX).

Fire Barrier Description The Robust Flex Storage Building is a separate building that does not adjoin any power block buildings.

The Robust Flex Storage Building is a 60 ft by 90 ft cast-in-place reinforced concrete structure with a structural steel roof framing that supports the weight of the reinforced concrete roof. The building has small doors for personnel and large doors for Flex vehicles and equipment. The building is designed to NEI 12-06 Rev 0 and is therefore made to withstand beyond-design-basis external events.

Fire Protection Criteria and Measures The Robust Flex Storage Building contains a fire detection system, which utilizes Protectowire cable run along the ceiling of the building. The Protectowire produces an alarm input into a fire alarm panel, which in turn activates a fire communicator panel (dialer). The fire communicator panel notifies an off-site monitoring company via the stations phone lines of either a fire alarm or trouble signal. The monitoring company then notifies the control room of the condition.

Dry chemical fire extinguishers are provided in the Robust Flex Storage Building.

4.3-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Design-Basis Fire This fire zone does not contain cable or equipment required for safe shutdown as defined in the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (FPR, Volume 2). The Robust Flex Storage Building does not directly communicate with any power block fire areas. A fire in this zone will not impact safe shutdown.

Combustible loading in this fire zone is moderate, consisting of several vehicles, including many diesel generators, and other Flex equipment, such as communications equipment. Combustible materials in the zone include diesel fuel,, power cables, and plastic. A fire would be contained by the buildings exceptionally thick walls and could be effectively fought by the fire brigade.

4.3 Safety Related Fire Zones The fire zones in this section contain cables or equipment required for safe shutdown or equipment important to safety. Therefore, a fire hazards analysis is provided for each zone.

The guidance of NRC Generic Letter 86-10, Enclosure 1, provides the NRC Staffs interpretation of certain provisions of Appendix R to 10CFR50. These interpretations indicate that evaluations of this type may reflect compliance with Appendix R, eliminating the need for exemptions.

Further, the NRC Staff guidance stated that these evaluations that reflect compliance (in accordance with the new NRC Staff interpretation) need not be submitted to the Staff for review.

In accordance with this guidance, Quad Cities has incorporated the previous exemption requests into this Fire Hazards Analysis as engineering evaluations. The following evaluations describe the capability of fire protection features, including fire detection, fire suppression, fire barriers, and fire area boundaries to limit the potential for a postulated fire to adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

To provide an evaluation of Quad Cities compliance with applicable fire protection regulations and practices, the following evaluations assume the bounding transient plus insitu combustible loading values from the new combustible load.

4.3-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.1 Unit 1 Reactor Building Basement Floor Fire Area: RB-1N/RB-1S F Drawing: F-2-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 13,314 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area heat detectors (linear thermal) have been installed in each cable tray and below the bottom of the cable trays.

Suppression: Local area sprinkler protection is provided in the immediate vicinity of the only cable riser that passes through the ceiling in this zone. See reference [1].

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: Portions of the Division I and II cable trays, where they are routed within 20 feet of each other, are wrapped with a 1-hour fire resistive material.

Suppression Effects: The safe shutdown equipment located in this zone consists of valves which will not be adversely affected by application of water or leakage of water from floor levels above since they can be operated manually. Water will collect in the basement floor where it will be removed by sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description DW-1 3 Hour [5]

TB-III Equivalent 3 Hour [6]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [6]

4.3-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.1 Unit 1 Reactor Building Basement Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.4* CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-144] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.6.A* TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> noncombustible No doors 3'-0" thick concrete ceiling 11.2.2 RB-1S Non-rated noncombustible, open One watertight door. 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.2.1 RB-1S Non-rated noncombustible, open One watertight door. 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.1* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-195] No doors 3'-0" thick concrete ceiling 1.1.1.2 RB-1N Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical ceiling 11.1.3 RB-1N Non-rated noncombustible, open One watertight door. 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.2.4 RB-1N Non-rated noncombustible, open One watertight door. 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.2.3 RB-1N Non-rated none One watertight door. 3'-0" thick concrete 1.2.1 DW-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [5] All penetrations No doors 5'-0" thick concrete sealed.[5]

1.1.2.1 RB-2N/RB-2S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-41, 42, & No doors 3'-0" thick concrete 43], [6]

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.1 Unit 1 Reactor Building Basement Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 7, 2.2.3 Concrete walls and a substantial watertight door provided between 1.1.1.1 and 11.2.4.

Also reference [4](3.2.4.3).

6, 9.2 Generally 3-hour separation provided between the reactor building and the turbine building. See references for exceptions. Also reference [6](4.2.1) for unrated seals and concrete plugs in the ceiling.

4, 3.2.1 Electrical (cable) penetrations are sealed with noncombustible material between elevations in the reactor building. Also reference [6](4.2.2), [4](3.4.1.2, 11.1.1.3.1, 11.2.3.2 & 11.3.3.1).

3, 2.3.2 Hand held light sources provided for operators. Also reference [4](11.3.1).

3, 2.1.3 Detection system to alarm Control Room of a fire condition.

6, 2.2.3 RHR divisional path cables separated by more than 125 feet. Also reference [4](3.2.4.3).

3, 2.1.2 Transient combustibles administratively controlled. Also reference [3](2.2.2, 2.2.3),

[4](3.2.4.2, 3.4.4.1, & 11.2.3.1).

6, 2.2.1, 2.2.2 Manual fire fighting equipment is credited for this zone. Also reference [3](2.1.2),

[4](3.2.4.3, 3.2.2, 3.4.2, 3.2.4.2, 11.2.2), & [6](8.2). Located at entrance to torus level.

Fire brigade to control fires and smoke using manual eq. [3](2.1.3 & 3.0).

4, 3.2.4.2 Cable penetrations between 1.1.1.1 & 8.2.4 have fire resistive seals.

6, 2.2.2 Combustibles pass between 1.1.1.1 & 1.1.1.2 at K/19 with cable riser having fire resistive seal. Also reference [4](3.2.4.2) 6, 2.2.2, 2.3 Automatic sprinklers near cable tray at south wall of Units 1 & 2. Where cable trays breach ceiling, below 595' slab at cable riser. Also reference [2], [3](2.2.2), and

[4](3.2.4.2, 11.2.2).

6, 2.2.3 Install 1-hour fire barrier between div. cable trays in Reactor Building basement. 1-hour fire resistive material on intervening cable trays for 20' minimum. Also reference [2] and

[4](3.2.4.3, 3.4.2, & 11.2.2).

6, 2.2.2 Fixed linear detection in / near torus cable trays and below bottom cable tray. Also reference [2], [3](2.1.2 & 2.2.2), [4](3.2.2, 3.2.4.2, 3.2.4.3, 3.4.2, 4.2.1, & 11.2.2).

12 U1 & U2 Reactor Building separated by 3-hour barrier. Seal penetrations to adjacent Reactor Building.

4.3-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.1 Unit 1 Reactor Building Basement Floor Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 August 18, 1989 Letter, T. Ross (NRC) to T. Kovach (CECO). Exemption from the technical requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 - Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2.

2 December 18, 1984 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. De 3 Appendix R exemption request (section 11.0) applies to this fire zone and addresses separation of redundant instrumentation. Exemption issued on 5-21-91.

4 Appendix R Exemption Requests: Exemption Requests 3.2 (Exemption for equivalent separation of redundant RHR trains. 12-11-87, Exemption granted 3.0).

5 The torus comprises a portion of the Unit 1 Primary Containment. Since it is a partially water-filled vessel, and is inert during operation, the barrier rating is not applicable.

6 SER, July 21, 1988.

7 May 10, 1990 Letter 8 SER, June 23, 1983.

10 SER, March 2, 1994.

11 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611, Rev. 1evaluates the Unit 1 Reactor Building/Turbine Building Boundary.

12 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0614, Rev. 1.

4.3-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.1.1 AREA: RB-1 LOCATION: RB1, Elev 554-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Torus Area, North and South FIRE SEVERITY: The updated fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. The combustible loading is considered low.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that impacts safe shutdown equipment, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL WITHIN ZONE 1.1.1.1:

This zone is unusual in that it is divided into a north and a south section. Fire spreading from one section to the other would adversely affect safe shutdown. Fire spread between the two sections is prevented by the low combustible loading, and by a space clear of intervening combustibles. This configuration is not in literal compliance with Appendix R requirements, but is specifically allowed by Exemption 2.4, as stated in the 07/21/88 SER. The clear space remains free of intervening combustibles, and the combustible load limit remains low.

4.3-6

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 1.1.1.1 which are in separate fire areas or which contain safe shutdown equipment that is redundant or alternate to the equipment in this zone. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 1.2.1 U1 Pr Cont. 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.2.1 RB-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.1.2 RB-1 Non-rated 8.1 TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.4 CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6.A TB-III Non-rated EVALUATION - ZONE 1.2.1:

The primary containment is inerted during plant operation, so fire spread into containment is not a concern. No further evaluation is required.

EVALUATION - ZONES 1.1.2.1, 8.1, and 8.2.4:

Since these three fire zones are separated from Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barriers, and the maximum predicted fire severity in zone 1.1.1.1 is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, no further evaluation is required.

EVALUATION - ZONE 1.1.1.2:

This zone is separated from Zone 1.1.1.1 by a 1-foot thick concrete floor. The cable risers that penetrate this floor are fire stopped. There are open mechanical penetrations in the floor; however, the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings and vertical vent paths limit the potential for fire spread to Zone 1.1.1.2. The low combustible loading is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier.

EVALUATION - ZONE 8.2.6.A:

This zone is separated from Zone 1.1.1.1 by a 3-foot thick concrete floor. All penetrations through the floor are sealed with non-combustible material. Equipment access hatches are closed with concrete floor plugs. The concrete floor plugs are not a tested configuration, but they are heavily built and fit tightly. The low combustible loading is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier.

CONCLUSION:

A fire originating in this zone will not spread to adjacent fire zones that contain redundant equipment. Therefore, the ability to safely shutdown the plant is assured.

4.3-7

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.2 Unit 1 Reactor Building Ground Floor Fire Area: RB-1N F Drawing: F-3-1,12-1 General Elevation: 595"-0" Zone Area: 11,612 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection coverage, with the exception of the MSIV room. Local area heat (thermal) detectors are installed above the drywell to torus DP air compressor.

Suppression: A local area preaction suppression systems is provided above the drywell to torus DP air compressor. The preaction system protecting the ACAD unit is electrically disarmed.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers. Manual hose stations are located in each corner of the ground floor. Each hose station is equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: Curbs are provided around drywell air pack unit. Tops of electrical cabinets and MCCs are sealed to prevent water damage. Drywell penetrations (X-100B and X-104F) are protected by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated enclosures. An automatic closure actuated by a smoke detector is located on the door between the MSIV room and the ground floor of the Reactor Building.

Suppression Effects: Water or carbon dioxide release from piping breaks, manual hose streams, or suppression systems onto equipment in this zone can be tolerated as any adverse effects would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire. Water runoff will be handled by the floor drainage system in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-1S Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

DW-1 3 Hour RB-1/2 3 Hour TB-III Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

TB-II 3 Hour RB-2N 3 Hour 4.3-8

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.2 Unit 1 Reactor Building Ground Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.7.B* TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-45] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete (wall) 8.2.7.C* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-46] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.B* TB-III Non-rated noncombustible [7] No doors 2'-0" thick concrete (ceiling) ceiling 1.1.1.3 RB-1N Non-rated noncombustible, open One Fire Damper 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical [7] ceiling 1.1.2.2 RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-49 & 50] One 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> class "A" 3'-0" thick concrete 9.3* RB-1/2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-51 & 52] One Class A door, 1'-0 and 1'-6" thick concrete wall 8.1* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-46 & 158] No doors, one 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 5'-0" thick concrete rated damper 8.2.6.C* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-46] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.6.A* TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-44 & 45] One 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> class "A" 1'-6" thick concrete door wall (south), 4'-0" (west) 1.1.1.1 RB-1N/RB-1S Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical [7]

11.2.4 RB-1N Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical [7]

11.2.2 RB-1S Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical [7]

1.2.1 DW-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4] No doors 5'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-9

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.2 Unit 1 Reactor Building Ground Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 7, 3.2.1 Sprinkler protection will be provided over drywell to torus DP unit. Also reference [2],

[4](3.2.2, & 4.2.2), [7](2.3) [8].

1, 3.1.8 Provide Class A fire doors between Unit 1 and 2 ground floor. Also reference [1](5.8.6).

1, 3.1.11 Provide curb around drywell air pack unit. Also reference [1](5.9.6).

1, 3.1.1(7) Provide detection in area of MCC's and cable penetration to Turbine Building. Also reference [1](5.9.6).

1, 3.1.5a Install automatic sprinkler system to protect suppression chamber drywell air packs.

Also reference [1](4.3.1.4 & 5.9.6).

1, 3.1.11 Provide listed flammable liquids cabinet. Also reference [1](5.9.6). Waste oil removed from area, lube oil limited to 5 gallons. No flammable liquids cabinet provided.

7, 4.2.2 3-hour separation provided between Reactor Buildings. Seal penetration to adjacent Reactor Building except at refuel floor [3].

7, 2.2.1 Smoke detection on ground and mezz. floors in Reactor Building with exceptions(steam tunnel, etc.). Also reference [3], [7](2.2.2, 3.2.1), [4](3.2.4.1, 11.1.1.2, 11.2.2), [6](2.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.2.3).

1, 5.9.6 Install fire detectors in area of 480V MCC 18/19-5.

4, 3.2.4.1 & 2 No combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations between 1.1.1.2 and zones below.

6, 2.1.3 Control room alerted of fire condition via detection system.

4, 3.2.4.1 Transient combustibles and ignition sources are administratively controlled. Controlled to a minimum [4] (11.1.1.3.1 and 11.2.3.2), [6](2.1.2).

7, 3.2.1 Manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are provided for the zone. Also reference [1](5.9.4), [7](8.2), [4](3.2.2, 11.2.2, 11.2.3.2), [6](2.1.2, 2.2.2 & 2.2.3). Fire brigade to control fires using manual equipment [6](2.1.3).

4, 11.1.1.4 Emergency lighting is available for reactor water level instruments.

4.3-10

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.2 Unit 1 Reactor Building Ground Floor 7, 8.2 Fire detectors are provided near electrical and mechanical penetrations. Also reference

[4](8.2.2).

4, 3.2.1 Electrical (cable) penetrations are sealed w/ noncombustible material between elevations in the reactor building. Riser to 1.1.1.1 (at K/19) sealed w/ fire resistive material. Also ref. [4](3.2.4.2, 11.1.1.3.1, 11.2.3.2) & [7](2.2.2, 4.2.2).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July, 27, 1979.

2 Based on the Fire Protection Commitment Matrix dated Feb. 28, 1992, This document indicates that sprinkler protection will be provided in the area of differential pressure system compressors. 4-10-78 (13) 1.C.

3 12-18-84 Letter from B.Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

4 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 3.2.

5 Equivalency of fire seal justified in PLC Report "Evaluation of Penetration Seal Systems at the Dresden and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plants" Section 2.12, Dated April 21, 1987. Reference FPPDP Volume 5, Section E.

6 Appendix R exemption request 11.0 applies to this fire zone and addresses separation of redundant instrumentation. Exemption issued on 5-21-91.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611, Rev. 1.

9 Left intentionally blank.

10 SER, March 2, 1994.

11 Justification to perform manual actions in this zone prior to fire extinguishment can be found in NDIT QDC-98-137.1 4.3-11

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.1.2 AREA: RB-1 LOCATION: RX 1, Elev. 595 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 consists of two areas on elevation 595 of the Unit 1 Reactor Building.

• One area, the ground floor of the building, extends from the 595 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 623 and is bounded by the exterior wall on the east and south sides of the building and by column line H to the west and 13 to the north, with the drywell in the center.

• The other area, the MSIV room, is bounded on the east by the drywell and extends from elevation 595 to elevation 623 east of column line H. West of column line H, the area extends from elevation 595 to the bottom of the floor of the 611 foot, 6 inch elevation.

The west wall of this area lies along column line G. The portions of this area west of column line H are bounded by walls separating it from various zones in the Turbine Building.

The two areas of zone 1.1.1.2 are separated by reinforced concrete shield walls, however there is an unrated access through the south shield wall. This access is fitted with a non-rated door which is normally open during operations.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.1.1.S, 1.1.1.1.N, below RB-1 11.2.2, 11.2.4, below RB-1 1.1.1.3, above RB-1 9.3, east RB-1/2 1.1.2.2, north RB-2 8.2.6.C, west TB-II 8.2.7.C, west TB-II 8.2.6.A, west TB-III 8.2.7.B, west TB-III 8.1, west TB-III DETECTION:

Ionization detection is provided throughout the zone with the exception of the MSIV room.

4.3-12

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

Local sprinkler protection for:

• The area of the Drywell/Torus D/P Compressors (southwest corner of the zone); and

• The area of the ACAD Air Compressor, which is located over the drywell personnel entry way.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of discrete materials distributed throughout the zone. This means that the only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a propagating fire from the ignition point to other portions of the zone are the electrical cables. Full involvement of the cables is precluded by fire stops and, in the area near the equipment hatch, by trays covered for a length of approximately twenty five feet. With the exception of tray risers from the zones below, the cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor.

Transients account for a large portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. A look at the individual tasks for each activity, shows that the combustibles involved would be in discrete "fuel packets" and would not have the spatial continuity to produce a fire capable of propagating throughout the zone. Rather, the real hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of propagating the fire away from the area of origin. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are the electrical cables.

Of the combustibles in this zone, virtually none are located in the MSIV room.

The installed detection system should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out. The lack of such a system in the MSIV room is of little concern due to the sparse combustibles located there.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

4.3-13

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 1.1.1.2:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles. Fire spread between the two areas of the zone is precluded by the reinforced concrete shield walls which separate them and the extremely light combustible loading in the MSIV room. In the main portion of the zone, the combustibles are limited, with the exception of the electrical cables in the tray system. Thus, fire spread in this area is dependent on tray involvement. Should the trays become involved, the discontinuity of the exposed cables due to fire stopping or covering, the high ceiling in the area, and the vertical vent paths provided would limit the involvement to only a portion of the zone.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-1:

Fire spread to the zones below 1.1.1.2 is unlikely due to the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor. The cable risers penetrating the floor are fire stopped at the floor, preventing downward fire spread along the cables. Of the transients which can be expected in the zone, the volume of flammable and combustible liquids are quite limited, minimizing the likelihood of a spill which could become involved and flow to the zones below via the floor openings (e.g., stairway openings).

The potential for fire spread to the zone above is limited by the reinforced concrete floor which separates the two zones and the discontinuity of combustibles. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g., stairways, equipment hatch, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate area of the openings and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone would make fire spread unlikely. Cable riser penetrations are sealed at the floor and, thus, do not provide a path for vertical fire spread.

4.3-14

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-1/2:

Fire spread to fire area RB-1/2 is unlikely due to separation by three-hour rated construction.

Such construction should not be challenged by any fire which can credibly occur in zone 1.1.1.2.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Fire area TB-II is separated from zone 1.1.1.2 by reinforced concrete barriers. The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.2 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier separating it from the Turbine Building; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-III:

Fire area TB-III is separated from zone 1.1.1.2 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete, barrier and by the concrete shield walls of the MSIV room. The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.2 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour barrier. Thus, fire spread via this path is not credible.

The MSIV room is separated from the remainder of the zone by floor-to-ceiling, reinforced concrete, shield walls of substantial construction. These barriers have sufficient thickness to sustain a fire of significantly more than three-hour severity. However, as mentioned elsewhere, there is an unprotected access penetration through the south shield wall between column line H and the drywell shield wall. The combustible loading in the MSIV room is quite low, with no exposed electrical cables or other significant combustibles. Although the MSIV room is of substantial construction, there are unrated penetrations in the barriers separating it from the Turbine Building. These consist primarily of an air lock with non-rated doors, a non-rated steel ceiling assembly, and the steam line penetrations into Fire Area TB-III. Thus, the MSIV room is, in effect, a space of significantly reduced combustibles between the remainder of zone 1.1.1.2 and the Turbine Building; serving effectively as a zone free of intervening combustibles. In consideration of this, the propagation of a fire from the main portion of zone 1.1.1.2 into the Turbine Building is not considered credible. Should a fire originate in the MSIV room, propagation into the Turbine Building is equally unlikely due to the small and discontinuous quantities of combustible materials available. Access to the MSIV room is highly restricted during plant operations due to the high radiation field encountered there. This eliminates the potential for buildup of transients and the possible introduction of ignition sources during plant operation.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-2:

Fire area RB-2 is separated from zone 1.1.1.2 by a three-hour rated barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.2 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

4.3-15

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issues identified in the SER relative to zone 1.1.1.2 are addressed below. Each issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

2.0 Separation of Redundant RHR Trains: Zones 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, and 11.2.2 Issue: The barrier shared by 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, and 11.2.2 deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant RHR-related cables. The principle concern is the potential for fire extension between elevations.

Evaluation: As discussed under Factors Influencing Fire Impact, above, the primary fixed combustibles in zone 1.1.1.2 are electrical cables located in the overhead trays. Due to their location, these trays do not constitute a direct exposure to the barrier separating zone 1.1.1.2 from zones 1.1.1.1 and 11.2.2, both located below. This topic has been explored in the discussion of Fire Spread Potential, above. Based on that exploration, the possibility of fire spread to the zones below 1.1.1.2 is highly unlikely and, therefore, the separation provided is acceptable for the hazard. This finding is consistent with that of the existing SER.

4.3-16

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 14.0 Separation of Redundant Reactor Vessel Level Indicating Instrumentation: Zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3 Issue: These zones contain redundant reactor vessel level indicating instrumentation which, with respect to the separation of the instruments and their sensing lines, deviates from the separation requirements of § III.G.2 of App. R to 10 CFR 50. The principle concern is that a fire in one of these zones could spread to the adjacent fire zone and damage redundant reactor level instrumentation.

4.3-17

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Evaluation: The reactor level can be read from instruments mounted on racks, two of which are in each of these zones. Separation can be considered adequate if a given fire will not result in the loss of the instruments in both zones. As discussed under Fire Spread Potential, fire spread between the two zones is not considered realistic and redundant instrumentation would not be lost. Thus, the existing separation is adequate for the hazard.

For a severe fire in zone 1.1.1.2, the safe shutdown procedures call for local reading of level instruments by operations personnel. These instruments are located on instrument racks in zone 1.1.1.2. The instruments on rack 2201-8 are to be used for fires in the northern portion of the zone and those on rack 2201-7 for fires in the southern portion. Accessibility of the instruments during a fire must be considered. Due to the openings in the floor separating this zone from zone 1.1.1.3, above, venting of the smoke and heat to zone 1.1.1.3 should occur. This venting, in concert with the high ceilings of zone 1.1.1.2 and its relatively large area compared to the quantity of involved combustibles should preclude smoke banking down to a level that personnel at the floor level would be adversely affected. Thus, the effects of smoke on entry at the 595 foot elevation is not considered sufficiently severe to prevent access to at least one set of instruments.

15.0 Separation of Redundant Suppression Pool Level Indicators: Zones 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2 1.1.2.1 and 1.1.2.2 Issue: These zones do not provide 20 feet of space free of intervening combustibles between redundant components (e.g., suppression pool level instrumentation).

Evaluation: The safe shutdown procedure for fire in fire zone 1.1.1.2 calls for the sightglass in fire zone 1.1.1.1 for monitoring suppression chamber level. Based on the assessment of Fire Spread Potential, above, fire spread to zone 1.1.1.1 is not considered credible. Thus, this instrumentation should be available for performing safe shutdown operations and, therefore, adequate separation is deemed to exist.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluations presented above for fire zone 1.1.1.2 demonstrate that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

The barrier shared by 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, and 11.2.2 deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant RHR-related cables. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 1.1.1.2 will not result in the loss of redundant RHR trains. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-18

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017

• The separation between zone 1.1.1.2 and the Turbine Building deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant RHR-related components. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 1.1.1.2 will not result in the loss of redundant RHR-related components in the Turbine Building. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

• Zone 1.1.1.2, a zone for which alternative SS/D is provided, does not comply with Appendix R since fixed suppression and detection are not provided throughout. However, the suppression and detection provided are sufficient to assure a fire in 1.1.1.2 would not cause a loss of normal SS/D capability. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

• The separation between zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3 deviates from § III.G.2 of Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant reactor level instrumentation. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 1.1.1.2 will not result in the loss of redundant reactor level instrumentation. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

• The separation between zones 1.1.1.1 and 1.1.1.2 does not provide 20 feet of space free of intervening combustibles between redundant components (e.g., suppression pool level instrumentation). However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 1.1.1.2 will not result in the loss of redundant suppression pool level instrumentation. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-19

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.3 Unit 1 Reactor Building Mezzanine Level Fire Area: RB-1N F Drawing: F-4-1 General Elevation: 623'0" Zone Area: 12,401 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: A general area smoke detection system is provided throughout the zone with the exception of the regenerative and nonregenerative heat exchanger rooms, the cleanup recirculation pump rooms, and the cleanup decant pump phase separator room.

Suppression: None.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and 4 hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: Tops of MCCs are sealed to prevent water damage.

Suppression Effects: Water release from piping breaks and manual hose streams onto equipment in this zone can be tolerated as any adverse effects would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water release will travel to area floor drains.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description 13-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [2]

DW-1 3 Hour 14-1 3 Hour TB-III 3 Hour TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [2]

RB-2N 3 Hour 4.3-20

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.3 Unit 1 Reactor Building Mezzanine Level Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.8.A* 14-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-58 & 59] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.8.B* 13-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-60] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete wall (2'-0" thick at floor) 8.2.7.C* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hr except SBGT pen No doors 4'-0" thick concrete

[F-59 & 60][2]

8.2.7.B* TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-58 & 59] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 1.1.1.4 RB-1N Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical [2][8] floor 1.1.1.2 RB-1N Non-rated noncombustible, open One Fire Damper 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical [2][8] floor 1.2.1 DW-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [6] No doors 5'-0" thick concrete wall 1.1.2.3 RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except 4kV bus One Class "A" Fire 2'-0" thick concrete duct [2][8] [F-61 & Door. wall F-62]

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-21

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.3 Unit 1 Reactor Building Mezzanine Level Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2, 6.2 No combustibles in 4-kV bus duct near fire barrier, a nonrated seal at bus duct penetration.

1,3.18 & 5.8.6 U1 and U2 Reactor Buildings separated by 3-hour barriers. Exception includes 4kV bus duct penetration. A Class A fire door will be provided in the wall separating Unit 1 and Unit 2.

5 Seal penetration to adjacent Reactor Building except at refuel floor.

5 Smoke detection provided for ground and mezz. floors in Reactor Bldg. (with exceptions). Per letter dated 12-18-84. Also ref. [4](3.2.2, 8.2.2, 11.1.1.2).

10 Electrical penetrations sealed (with noncombustible material) between elevation in the reactor building. Also reference [4](11.1.1.3.1, 11.2.3.2).

1, 5.8.6, & 3.1.1 Provide fire detectors over MCC 18-3 and near safety related MCC's and at cable penetrations (H/14 & H/18-19) to the Turbine Building.

4, 11.1.1.4 Emergency lighting is available for reactor water level instrumentation.

7, 2.1.2 Manual fire fighting equipment (hose stations and portable fire extinguishers) is available for this zone. Also reference [1](5.8.4), [4](3.2.2 & 11.1.1.2). Fire brigade to control fires using manual equipment [7](2.1.3).

7, 2.1.2 Transient combustibles and ignition sources are administratively controlled.

7, 2.1.3 Control Room alerted of fire condition via detection system.

10 U1 RB (mezz. level) separated from Turbine Bldg. by 3-hour barrier with exceptions, such as 2-hr. rated portion an 4kV bus duct penetration. Also reference [2](9.2).

4.3-22

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.3 Unit 1 Reactor Building Mezzanine Level Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979 2 SER, July 21, 1988.

3 Equivalency of fire seal justified in PLC Report "Evaluation of Penetration Seal Systems at the Dresden and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plants", Dated April 21, 1987. Reference FPPDP Volume 5, Section E.

4 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Sections 3.2, & 11.1.

5 Letter dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

6 The following apply to this Fire Zone: Exemption Requests 3.2 (Exemption for equivalent separation of redundant RHR trains. 12-11-87 exemption granted 2.0).

7 SER, February 25, 1991.

8 GL 86-10 S040-QH-0614, Rev. 1.

9 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0610, Rev. 1.

10 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611, Rev 1.

11 SER, March 2, 1994.

4.3-23

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.1.3 AREA: RB-1 LOCATION: RX 1, Elev. 623 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 1.1.1.3 consists of elevation 623 of the Unit 1 Reactor Building. The zone extends from the 623 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 647 and is bounded -by the exterior wall of the building on the east and south sides and by column lines H to the west and 13 to the north, with the drywell in the center.

BARRIERS: This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.1.2, below RB-1 1.1.1.4, above RB-1 1.2.1, center DW-1 1.1.2.3, north RB-2 8.2.7.C, west TB-II 8.2.7.B, west TB-III 8.2.8.A, west 14-1 8.2.8.B, west 13-1 DETECTION:

With the exception of the Reactor Water Clean Up (RWCU) system areas1, fire detection is provided throughout the zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: Low FIRE SEVERITY: Less than 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed with good spatial separation. Thus, the only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a propagating fire from the ignition point to other portions of the zone are the electrical cables.

1 The RWCU heat exchanger room, the RWCU pump room, and the cleanup phase separator decant pump room.

4.3-24

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 With the exception of tray risers from the zones below, the cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor.

Transients account for a significant portion of the total combustibles which may be in the zone.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. A look at the individual tasks for each activity, shows that the combustibles involved would be in discrete "fuel packets" which would not have the continuity necessary to produce a fire capable of propagating throughout the zone. The primary hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of propagating the fire away from the area of origin. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are the electrical cables.

The installed detection system should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Slow propagation rate of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 1.1.1.3:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles which, with the exception of the electrical cables in the tray system, are quite limited. Thus, significant fire spread in this area is dependent on tray involvement. Since there is limited coverage of trays in this zone, fire propagation along the length of the trays is possible.

However, considering the rate at which such fires propagate, there is ample time for fire brigade intervention. Considering this and the ability to provide timely brigade callout, fire spread throughout the area is not likely.

4.3-25

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-1:

Fire spread to zone 1.1.1.2, located below 1.1.1.3, is unlikely due to separation by a floor of reinforced concrete construction and the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor.

The cable risers penetrating the floor are fire stopped at the floor, preventing downward fire spread along the cables. Of the transients which can be expected in the zone, the volume of flammable and combustible liquids are quite limited, minimizing the likelihood of a spill which could become involved and flow to the zones below via floor openings such as stairways.

The potential for fire spread to the zone above is limited by the reinforced concrete floor separating the two zones and the discontinuity of combustibles. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g., stairways, equipment hatch, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone would make fire spread unlikely. Cable riser penetrations are sealed at the floor and, thus, do not provide a path for vertical fire spread.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Fire area TB-II is separated from zone 1.1.1.3 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier.

The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.3 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-III:

Fire area TB-III is separated from zone 1.1.1.3 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete, barrier.

The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.3 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area 14-1:

Fire area 14-1 (zone 8.2.8.A) is separated from zone 1.1.1.3 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.3 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area 13-1:

Fire area 13-1 (zone 8.2.8.B) is separated from zone 1.1.1.3 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.3 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-2:

Fire area RB-2 is separated from zone 1.1.1.3 by a three-hour rated barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.3 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

4.3-26

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issues identified in the SER relative to zone 1.1.1.3 are addressed below. Each issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

14.0 Separation of Redundant Reactor Vessel Level Indicating Instrumentation: Zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3 Issue: These zones contain redundant reactor vessel level indicating instrumentation which, with respect to the separation of the instruments and their sensing lines, deviates from the separation requirements of § III.G.2 of App. R to 10 CFR 50. The principle concern is that a fire in one of these zones could spread to the adjacent fire zone and damage redundant reactor level instrumentation.

Evaluation: The reactor level can be read from instruments mounted on racks in zone 1.1.1.2, below. Separation can be considered adequate if a given fire will not result in the loss of the instruments on both racks. As discussed under Fire Spread Potential, fire spread between the two zones is not considered realistic and the redundant instrumentation would not be lost. Thus, the existing separation is adequate for the hazard.

For a severe fire in zone 1.1.1.3, the safe shutdown procedures call for local reading of level instruments by operations personnel. These instruments are located on instrument racks in zone 1.1.1.2. Accessibility of the instruments during a fire in zone 1.1.1.3 should not be a problem due to the vent paths provided for that zone. This vertical venting, along with the large building volume and the limited quantity of involved combustibles should preclude smoke banking down to a level that personnel in zone 1.1.1.2, below, would be adversely affected. Thus, the effects of fire in zone 1.1.1.3 on entry to zone 1.1.1.2 at the 595 foot elevation should not prevent access to one or both sets of instruments.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluations presented above for fire zone 1.1.1.3 demonstrate that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

Zone 1.1.1.3, a zone for which alternative SS/D is provided, does not comply with Appendix R since fixed suppression and detection are not provided throughout. However, the detection provided is sufficient to assure a fire in 1.1.1.3 would not cause a loss of SS/D capability. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

The separation between zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3 deviates from § III.G.2 of Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant reactor level instrumentation. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard since a fire in zone 1.1.1.3 will not result in the loss of redundant reactor level instrumentation. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-27

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 This page intentionally left blank 4.3-28

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.4 Unit 1 Reactor Building Main Floor Fire Area: RB-1N F Drawing: F-5-1 General Elevation: 647'-6" Zone Area: 13,034 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Water release from manual hose streams or pipe breaks in this zone can be tolerated since no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone.

Water runoff would be handled by the floor drainage system in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-IV 2 Hour 13-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [2]

DW-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [3]

14-1 3 Hour [2]

RB-2N 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.1.5.A* TB-IV 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> No doors 1'-6" thick concrete block 1.1.1.5 RB-1N Non-rated [2] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical [1]

1.1.1.3 RB-1N Non-rated [2] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical [1]

1.2.1 DW-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except SBGT 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4] No doors 5'-0" thick concrete lines wall 8.2.8.B* 13-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-68 & 69) No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 8.2.8.A* 14-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-66 & 67) No doors 1'-6" thick concrete wall 1.1.2.4 RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-73, F-74) Two - Class "A" fire 2'-0" thick concrete doors wall

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-29

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.4 Unit 1 Reactor Building Main Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 10 3-hour separation between Reactor Building and Turbine Building at this level (with exceptions). Also reference [9](9.2).

5, 5.7.6 Wood storage boxes to be removed from zone. Reportedly removed in 1979.

7 No continuity of combustibles through vent system penetration. Vent system is metal and restrained at penetration. Also reference [3](7.2). No continuity of combustibles through SBGT penetration. No combustibles inside metal SBGT piping. Piping is mechanically restrained at penetrations.

9, 4.2.4 Electrical penetrations sealed with noncombustible materials between elevation in the Reactor Building. Also reference [4](3.4.1.3).

6 Seal penetrations to adjacent Reactor Building except at refuel floor.

5, 3.1.8 & 5.8.6 Provide Class A fire doors between Unit 1 & 2 Reactor Building main floors.

4.3-30

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.4 Unit 1 Reactor Building Main Floor Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 The floor has open hatches and stairwells. The mechanical penetrations are unsealed and electrical penetrations which pass through the floor are sealed with a noncombustible material. See Exemption Request 3.2.

2 This is justified in Section 3.0 of the Exemption Requests.

3 This (Reactor Building penetrations) is justifed in section 7.0 of the Exemption Requests.

4 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0614, Rev. 1.

5 SER, July 27, 1979.

6 Letter dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

7 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0610, Rev. 1.

8 One of the doorways between 1.1.1.4 and 1.1.2.4 is protected by two fire doors.

Door #175A is a normally closed fire door. This door in the open configuration does not qualify as a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated door because the fusible link is locate on only one side of the barrier. Door #175 is a normally open sliding fire door.

9 SER, July 21, 1988.

10 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611, Rev. 1.

4.3-31

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.1.4 AREA: RB-1 LOCATION: RB1, Elev. 647-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Reactor Building, Third Floor FIRE SEVERITY: The previous fire severity was 0.13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> and the updated fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. The combustible loading is still considered low.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones which are adjacent to Fire Zone 1.1.1.4, but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then the spread of fire to the adjoining fire area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 1.1.2.4 RB-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.8.A 14-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.8.B 13-1 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 1.2.1 DW-1 3 hour1 1.1.1.5.A TB-IV 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 1

Barrier has 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating except for SBGTS lines.

EVALUATION - ZONE 1.2.1:

The primary containment is inerted during plant operation, so fire spread into containment is not a concern. No further evaluation is required.

EVALUATION - ZONES 1.1.2.4, 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, and 1.1.1.5:

All four of these Fire Zones interface through rated fire barriers of either 2- or 3-hour construction. Given the low combustible loading and the 2- or 3-hour rated barriers, fire spread to any of the four zones is not credible.

CONCLUSION:

A fire originating in this fire zone will not spread to adjacent fire zones that contain redundant equipment. Therefore, the ability to safely shutdown the plant is assured.

4.3-32

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.5 Unit 1 Reactor Building Reactor Floor Fire Area: RB-1N F Drawing: F-6-1 General Elevation: 666'-6" Zone Area: 12,359 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations equipped with 100 ft of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Piping breaks or the use of manual hose streams would not affect safe shutdown capability since no equipment associated with safe shutdown is located in this zone. Water runoff should be handled by the floor drainage system in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description DW-1 3 Hour RB-2N Equivalent 3 Hour [3]

13-1 3 Hour TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour [3]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.8.B 13-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-0" thick concrete floor 1.2.1 DW-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 5'-0" thick concrete wall 1.1.1.6.A* TB-IV 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-115, F-116] No doors, no dampers 1'-6" thick concrete in HVAC ducts wall 1.1.1.6 RB-1N Non-rated [3][4] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-6" thick concrete mechanical ceiling 1.1.1.5.A* TB-IV 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except HVAC No doors 1'-6" thick concrete duct penetration wall

[F-115, F-116]

1.1.1.4 RB-1N Non-rated [4] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical floor 1.1.2.5 RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> equivalent 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />(except for 3 Two Class "A" fire 2'-0" thick concrete

[3][4] SBGT lines) doors wall

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-33

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.5 Unit 1 Reactor Building Reactor Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 7 3-hour separation between Reactor Bldg. and Turbine Bldg. with exceptions. Also reference [3](9.2).

6 No continuity of combustibles through SBGT penetration(s). No combustibles inside metal SBGT piping, piping is mech. restrained at penetrations.

7 3-hour separation between 1.1.1.5 and TB except for HVAC ducts penetrations. Also reference.

1, 5.6.4 Manual fire fighting equipment (hose stations and portable fire extinguishers) is provided for this zone. Also reference 2 Seal penetrations between adjacent Reactor Buildings except at refuel floor.

6 3-hour separation between 1.1.1.5 & 1.1.2.5, except 3 SBGTS lines.

1, 3.1.8 & 5.8.6 Provide Class A Fire Doors between Unit1 and 2 Reactor Floor.

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Dent 3 SER, July 21, 1988.

4 Left intentionally blank.

5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0614, Rev. 1, Justification For Lack of Complete Fire Detection and Suppression in the Unit 1 Reactor Building.

6 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0610, Rev. 1.

7 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611, Rev. 1.

4.3-34

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.1.5 AREA: RB-1 LOCATION: RX 1, Elev. 666 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 1.1.1.5 consists of elevation 666 of the Unit 1 Reactor Building. The zone extends from the 666 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 690 and is bounded by the exterior walls on the east and south sides of the building and by column line H to the west and 13 to the north. The zone is divided in half along the north/south axis by the dryer/separator pit, the drywell shield wall, and the spent fuel pool. A portion of the wall along column line H is an exterior wall.

BARRIERS: This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.1.4, below RB-1 1.1.1.6, above RB-1 1.2.1, center DW-1 1.1.2.5, north RB-2 1.1.1.5.A, west TB-IV 1.1.1.6.A, west TB-IV 8.2.8.B, below 13-1 DETECTION:

Fire detection is not provided in this zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: Fire Severity:

Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. A minor contributor to the fixed loading is the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) filter media. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed with good spatial separation. This separation means that the only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a propagating fire from the ignition point to other portions of the zone are the electrical cables.

With the exception of tray risers from the zones below, the cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor.

4.3-35

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a large portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. A look at the individual tasks for each activity, shows that the combustibles involved would be in discrete "fuel packets" which would not have the continuity necessary to produce a fire capable of propagating throughout the zone. The primary hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of propagating the fire away from the area of origin. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are the electrical cables. Due to the construction of the zone, the trays are discontinuous from the east side to the west side.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Slow propagation rate of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 1.1.1.5:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles which, with the exception of the electrical cables in the tray system, are quite limited. Thus, significant fire spread in this area is dependent on tray involvement. Additionally, the splitting of the zone into east and west portions by the dryer separator pit, drywell shield wall, and spent fuel pool minimizes the likelihood of fire spread throughout the zone. Since the exposed cables are split between the east and west sides of the zone, any significant fire which may occur would be expected to be limited to only a portion of the zone. Given that no detection is provided to alert operations personnel to a fire in the area, timely fire brigade notification is unlikely and extensive cable damage could occur in the involved part of the zone.

4.3-36

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-1:

Fire zone 1.1.1.5 is separated from zone 1.1.1.4, located below, by a non-rated reinforced concrete floor of substantial construction. A number of open penetrations, many of significant size (e.g., hatchway, stairways) penetrate the floor. Fire spread to zone 1.1.1.4 is unlikely, however, due to the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor. The cable risers penetrating the floor are fire stopped at the floor level, preventing downward fire spread along the cables. Of the transients which can be expected in the zone, the volume of flammable and combustible liquids are quite limited, minimizing the likelihood of a spill which could become involved and flow to the zones below via floor openings such as stairways.

The potential for fire spread to zone 1.1.1.6, above, is limited by the reinforced concrete floor which separates the two zones and the discontinuity of combustibles. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g., stairways, equipment hatch, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone would make fire spread unlikely.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-IV:

Fire area TB-IV is separated from zone 1.1.1.5 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier.

The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.5 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area 13-1:

Fire area 13-1 (zone 8.2.8.B) is separated from zone 1.1.1.5 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.5 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-2:

Fire area RB-2 is separated from zone 1.1.1.5 by a three-hour rated barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.5 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

None. This area does not contain any safe shutdown components and does not represent a hazard to any zones which do contain safe shutdown components.

4.3-37

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.6 Reactor Building Refuel Floor Fire Area: RB-1N F Drawing: F-7-1 General Elevation: 690'-6" Zone Area: 30,512 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose. Hose stations are equipped with smooth bore nozzles due to criticality issues presented in SIL #152, Criticality Margins for Storage of New Fuel (3/31/76).

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Piping breaks or the use of manual hose streams would not affect safe shutdown as no equipment associated with safe shutdown is located in this zone. Water runoff would be handled by the floor drainage system in the general area. Only smooth bore hose station nozzles are provided to ensure their use will not result in a criticality incident.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description DW-2 Equivalent 3 Hour [3]

DW-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [3]

TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour [3][5]

RB-2N Equivalent 3 Hour [4]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.2.2 DW-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> noncombustible No doors Refuel cavity floor plugs 1.2.1 DW-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> noncombustible No doors Refuel cavity floor plugs 1.1.2.5 RB-2N Non-rated [4] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-6" thick concrete mechanical [4 floor]

1.1.1.6.A* TB-IV Non-rated[5] Non-rated[5] No doors 1'-0" thick concrete wall 1.1.1.5 RB-1N Non-rated [3] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-6" thick concrete mechanical [3 floor

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-38

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.6 Reactor Building Refuel Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 8 3-hour separation between RB and TB. Also reference [2](9.2).

1, 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided. Also reference [1](5.5.6). The lack of complete detection has been justified [7].

3, 3.2.2 Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this zone. Also reference [1](5.5.4),

[3](11.2.2) and [2](8.2).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 SER, July 21, 1988.

3 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 3.2.

4 Evaluation for fire area separation between RB-1 and RB-2, ER9801567.

5 Evaluation for fire area separation between RB-1 and TB-IV, ER9801572.

6 GE Service Information Letter (SIL) #152, Criticality Margins for Storage of New Fuel, March 31, 1976.

7 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0614, Rev. 1, Justification For Lack of Complete Fire Detection and Suppression in the Unit 1 Reactor Building.

8 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611, Rev. 1.

4.3-39

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.1.6 AREA: RB-1 LOCATION: RB 1, Elev. 690 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 1.1.1.6 consists of elevation 690 of the Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Buildings. The zone extends from the 690 foot elevation to the roof of the building at elevation 737 and is bounded by the exterior walls on the east and south and north sides of the building and by column line H to the west. A portion of the column line H wall is an exterior wall. The zone is divided along the north/south axis by the dryer/separator pits, the drywell access well, and the spent fuel pools for each unit. The zone contains equipment used for handling of reactor fuel and for performing refueling operations.

BARRIERS: This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.1.5, below RB-1 1.2.1 DW-1 1.2.2 DW-2 1.1.2.5, below RB-2 1.1.1.6.A, west TB-IV DETECTION:

Fire detection is not provided in this zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: Fire Severity:

Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is composed primarily of plastic (PMMA) panels installed around the fuel pools. The minor contributor to the fixed loading are the lubricating oils in the reactor building bridge crane. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of a variety of materials distributed with good spatial separation. Thus, the only fixed combustibles theoretically capable of sustaining a propagating fire from the ignition point to other portions of the zone are the plastic panels and the crane lubricants.

4.3-40

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a large portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The bulk of these combustibles are those associated with refueling or fuel handling and related operations. A look at the individual tasks for each activity, shows that the combustibles involved would consist of various "fuel packets" which would not have the continuity necessary to produce a fire capable of propagating throughout the zone.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas;

• High ceiling which minimizes the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 1.1.1.6:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are the plastic panels around the pools and the crane lubricants. The crane lubricants are contained in various separate bearing and gear housings and, thus, are unlikely to be spilled in sufficient quantities to pose a significant hazard. The configuration of the plastic panels and their response to high temperatures is such that propagation along them could occur. The dryer separator pits and spent fuel pools serve to minimize fire spread throughout the zone by providing spatial separation between areas containing combustibles. Given that no detection is provided to alert operations personnel to a fire in the area, timely fire brigade notification is unlikely, unless work activities, such as refueling, are in progress in the zone. Thus, considerable local damage could result.

4.3-41

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-1:

Fire spread to the zone 1.1.1.5, located below 1.1.1.6, is unlikely due to the reinforced concrete floor which separates the two zones and the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g., stairways, equipment hatch), the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings make fire spread unlikely. The volume of flammable and combustible liquids are quite limited, except for the lube oil in the Reactor Building Bridge Crane. The crane contains approximately 50 gallons of lubricating oil distributed in a number of bearing housings and gear boxes. An event which could result in the spill and ignition of a significant amount of this oil is highly unlikely. Thus, the potential for a spill which could become involved and flow to the zone below via floor openings such as stairways, is minimal.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-2:

Fire spread to the zone 1.1.2.5, located below 1.1.1.6, is unlikely due to the reinforced concrete floor which separates the two zones and the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g., stairways, equipment hatch), the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings make fire spread unlikely. The volume of flammable and combustible liquids are quite limited, except for the lube oil in the Reactor Building Bridge Crane. The crane contains approximately 50 gallons of lubricating oil distributed in a number of bearing housings and gear boxes. An event which could result in the spill and ignition of a significant amount of this oil is highly unlikely. Thus, the potential for a spill which could become involved and flow to the zone below via floor openings such as stairways, is minimal.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-IV:

Fire area TB-IV is separated from zone 1.1.1.6 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier.

The fire loading in zone 1.1.1.6 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

None. This area does not contain any safe shutdown components and does not represent a hazard to any zones which do contain safe shutdown components.

4.3-42

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.3 Unit 1 HPCI Room Fire Area: RB-1N F Drawing: F-9-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 1,439 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area linear heat (thermal) detection above the HPCI pump and turbine.

Suppression: Local area deluge system above the HPCI pump and turbine.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s).

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: No adverse effects on safe shutdown from water release are involved as no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Water would collect in the HPCI room sump pit until removed by pump to the radwaste water collection system.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [6]

RB-2 3 Hour CT-2 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.C* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, except for No doors 3'-0" thick concrete floor plugs [6]

8.2.5* CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> One Class A Door 1'-6" thick concrete wall (1'-0" thick at floor) 11.2.3 RB-1N Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 1.1.1.1 RB-1N/RB1S Non-rated noncombustible, open One nonlabled 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical watertight door.

11.1.4 RB-2S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [3][4] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-141] One Class A (3-hr.) 3'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-43

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.3 Unit 1 HPCI Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 11 U1 and U2 RBs separated by 3-hour barriers.

11 Unrated seals and concrete plugs in ceiling separating RB from TB.

11 Manual fire fighting equipment is available.

1, 5.11.4 A portable extinguisher provided in each HPCI room with hose stations in torus area for backup suppression.

6 3-hour separation between RB and TB.

6 Automatic water suppression over the HPCI pump and turbine (water deluge system provided). Also reference [1] (5.11.4).

11 Fire detection over the HPCI pump and turbine.

7 Original commitment was to install a preaction system. This zone is provided with a deluge system and protectowire detection. LER 89-022, Rev.00 (12 89), MC-4-1(2)-90-57 (1-10-91).

1, 3.1.8, 5.8.6 & 5.11.4 Provide Class A fire door between Unit 1 and 2 HPCI rooms.

4.3-44

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.3 Unit 1 HPCI Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

3 SER, July 21, 1988.

4 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

5 Exemption for equivalent separation of redundant RHR trains. Exemption request 3.2 (12-18-84). Exemption granted (2.0) 12-11-87.

6 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611, Rev. 1.

7 LER 89-022, Rev.00 (12-28-89). Install Protectowire 3-30-90. LER closed 10-5-90.

1-10-91 MC-4-1(2)-90-57. LER closed 5-15-91.

8 Left intentionally blank.

9 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

10 SER, March 2, 1994.

11 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0614, Rev. 1.

4.3-45

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.1.3 AREA: RB-1 LOCATION: RB1, Elev. 554-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 HPCI Room FIRE SEVERITY: The previous fire severity was 1.70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br /> and the updated fire severity for this zone is 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 11.1.3 which are in separate fire areas or which contain safe shutdown equipment that is redundant or alternate to the equipment in this zone. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 11.1.4 RB-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.1.1 RB-1 Non-rated 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6.C TB-II 3 hour1 1

The seals are rated for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except for the floor plugs.

EVALUATION - ZONE 1.1.1.1:

The HPCI room (Fire Zone 11.1.3) is adjacent to the north section of the torus area (Fire Zone 1.1.1.1). A fire which started in the HPCI room could spread through non-rated wall penetrations into the north section of the torus area. However, fixed automatic fire suppression is provided for the hazards in the HPCI room, which reduces the likelihood of this spread occurring. The torus area contains cabling for both trains of RHR equipment, one train in the north section and one in the south section. Fire spread between the north and south sections of the torus area is prevented by the low combustible loading and by a space free of intervening combustibles. A fire which originated in the HPCI room would be no more likely to spread to the south section of the torus area than one which originated in the torus area itself.

EVALUATION - ZONE 8.2.6.C:

Zone 8.2.6.C is separated from Zone 11.1.3 by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier, except for the floor plugs. The concrete floor plugs are not a tested configuration, but they are heavily built and fit tightly.

Given the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier and substantial floor plugs, the potential for fire spread from Zone 11.1.3 to Zone 8.2.6.C is low.

4.3-46

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.2.1 Unit 1 Southwest Corner Room Fire Area: RB-1S F Drawing: F-2-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 596 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area linear heat (thermal) detection except above the reactor building equipment drain tank.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and a hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose, located in adjacent Fire Zone 1.1.1.1.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Piping breaks or use of manual hose streams would not affect safe shutdown as no equipment associated with safe shutdown is located in this zone. Water runoff would be handled by the floor drainage system in the general area or by sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-1S Equivalent 3 Hour TB-III Equivalent 3 Hour at D-Htr Bay [3]

CT-1 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.4* CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-144, 145, No doors 1'-0" thick concrete 146) 8.2.6.A* TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> equivalent 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />,except for No doors 2'-0" thick concrete floor plugs [3] ceiling 1.1.1.1 RB-1N/RB-1S Non-rated noncombustible, open One unlabeled 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical watertight door.

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-47

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.2.1 Unit 1 Southwest Corner Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 4 Unrated seals and concrete plugs in the ceiling which separates the RB from TB.

8 3-hour separation between RB and TB with exceptions. Also reference [3] (9.2).

1, 5.10.4 Manual fire fighting equipment available with a hose station and portable extinguisher located in the torus area.

5, 3.2.1 Cable penetrations are sealed between elevations.

5, 3.2.1 Reinforced concrete walls with water tight door provided between torus and corner room.

2 Thermal line type heat detection in corner rooms. M4-1(2)-84-36 Task 2.23. Also reference [3] (2.2.1, and 4.2.1) and [5] (3.2.2).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Dent 3 SER, July 21, 1988.

4 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611, Rev. 1.

5 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 3.2.

6 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

7 SER, March 2, 1994.

8 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0614, Rev. 1.

4.3-48

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.2.1 AREA: RB-1 LOCATION: RX 1, Elev. 554 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 11.2.1, the southwest corner room, is located on elevation 554 of the Unit 1 Reactor Building and contains the Reactor Building Equipment Drain (RBED) Tank and RBED pump and one of the units core spray pumps.

The zone extends from the 554 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 595 and is bounded by exterior walls on the west side of the building along column line G and south side of the building along column line 17. The third wall of this generally triangular-shaped space consists of a wall along a southeast to northwest line which is shared by the torus area, fire zone 1.1.1.1. One wall to the east, along column line H is shared with the building elevator shaft.

The zone is divided into two areas by reinforced concrete shield walls surrounding the RBED tank.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.1.1, north east RB-1 8.2.4, above CT-1 8.2.6.A, above TB-III DETECTION:

General area linear heat detection is provided except over the RBED tank area.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The largest contributors to the fixed combustible loading in this zone are contamination control materials and lubricating oil. The rest of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials, such as ventilation system insulation.

4.3-49

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a significant portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle.

The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification prompts fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 11.2.1:

The potential for fire spread between the two areas of the zone is inhibited by the reinforced concrete shield wall which separates them. In the core spray portion of the zone, the predominant combustibles are the lube oil in the core spray pump and motor and the control point which provides access to the RBED tank area. There are no significant quantities of combustibles in the RBED tank area.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-1:

Fire spread to zone 1.1.1.1 is unlikely due to the substantial, reinforced concrete, barrier which separates the two zones. A non-rated, water-tight door in the barrier provides for personnel access between the two zones. The door design is such that a combustible liquid spill in zone 11.2.1. would not flow to zone 1.1.1.1; but a severe fire could result in failure of the gasket on the door, allowing smoke and hot combustion gases to enter zone 1.1.1.1. However, given the distribution of combustibles in 1.1.1.1 and its high ceiling height, ignition of combustibles in that zone is unlikely. The same is true of other unsealed penetration in the barrier. The fire potential for zone 11.2.1 is not sufficient to challenge barrier integrity and fire spread is not likely.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Areas TB-III and CT-1:

Fire area TB-III and CT-1 is separated from zone 11.2.1 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete, barrier. The fire loading in the zone is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the separating barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

4.3-50

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 This page intentionally left blank 4.3-51

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.2.2 Unit 1 Southeast Corner Room Fire Area: RB-1S F Drawing: F-2-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 657 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area linear heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge from the sprinkler system, manual hose stream use, or piping breaks would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Damage to valves, room cooler, heat exchanger, and pumps by water discharge would be negligible. Water removal would be accomplished by drainage or sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-1N Equivalent 3 Hour [3]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.1.2 RB-1N Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical 1.1.1.1 RB-1N/RB-1S Non-rated noncombustible, open One unlabeled 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical watertight door

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-52

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.2.2 Unit 1 Southeast Corner Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 4, 3.2.1 Cable penetrations are sealed between elevations.

4, 3.2.4.1 No combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations between 11.2.2 and 1.1.1.2.

4, 3.2.4.1 11.2.2 construction will confine a fire from the torus area.

6, 2.2.1 Fire suppression system provided throughout. Also reference [4] (3.2.4.1).

6, 2.2.1 Manual fire fighting equipment available with a hose station and portable extinguisher provided in each RHR room. Also reference [1] (5.10.4).

4, 3.2.4.1 Transient combustibles and ignition sources controlled.

4, 3.2.1 Reinforced concrete walls with water tight door provided between torus and corner room.

2 Automatic sprinklers in Division II RHR pump rooms.

2 Thermal line type heat detection in corner rooms. M4-1(2)-84-36 Task 2.23. Also reference [4] (3.2.2, and 3.2.4.1) and [6] (2.2.1).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Dent 3 Exemption for equivalent separation of redundant RHR trains. Exemption request 3.2 (12-18-84).

Exemption granted 2.0 (12-11-87).

4 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 3.2.

5 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

6 SER, July 21, 1988.

7 SER, March 2, 1994.

4.3-53

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.2.2 AREA: RB-1 LOCATION: RX 1, Elev. 554 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 11.2.2, the southeast corner room, is located on elevation 554 of the Unit 1 Reactor Building and contains the pumps and heat exchanger for one loop of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System.

The zone extends from the 554 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 595 and is bounded by exterior walls on the east side of the building along column line N and the south side of the building along column line 19. The third wall of this triangular-shaped space lies along a southwest to northeast line and is shared by the torus area, fire zone 1.1.1.1.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.1.1, northwest RB-1 1.1.1.2, above RB-1 DETECTION:

General area linear heat detection is provided throughout the zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

A general area wet-pipe sprinkler system is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. The next most significant fixed combustible is the lubricating oil associated with the RHR pumps. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed throughout the zone. The only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a fire are the electrical cables and the lube oil. The cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor and the tray risers from the zone above are fire stopped where they penetrate the floor. The lube oil is contained in the bearing housings of the two RHR pumps. Thus, any release of this combustible to the zone would be significantly less than the total amount present.

4.3-54

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a significant portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a fire which may expose combustibles capable of producing a severe fire. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such a fire are the electrical cables and the lubricating oil, should it be released from the bearing housings.

The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should initiate fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 11.2.2:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited. The fixed combustibles, with the exception of the electrical cables in the tray system and the lube oil, are small in quantity. Thus, significant fire spread in this area is dependent on tray involvement or a lube oil spill. The likelihood of tray involvement is limited due to their height above the floor and the fact that the lower tray is of solid bottom construction with a tight fitting cover. Thus, ignition of the cables in it is unlikely and its presence shields the trays above from the plume of any fire located below.

The high ceiling in the area, and the vertical vent paths provided would limit the buildup of any significant stratification layer, thereby minimizing thermal layer radiation to combustibles within the zone. The lubricants in the zone are separately housed, making a spill of the entire inventory unlikely. The limited spill potential and the characteristics of oil spills on concrete substrates mean that a spill fire is unlikely and that should one occur it would be of limited severity and duration. In addition, the general area sprinkler protection will limit fire involvement to only a portion of the zone.

4.3-55

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-1:

The potential for fire spread to zone 1.1.1.2, above, is limited by the reinforced concrete floor separating the two zones and the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor. Cable risers penetrating the floor are fire stopped at the floor, preventing upward fire spread along the cables. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g., stairways, equipment hatch, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone would make fire spread unlikely. Regardless, heat and smoke from fires in zone 11.2.2 would vent to zone 1.1.1.2.

Fire spread to zone 1.1.1.1 is unlikely due to the substantial reinforced concrete barrier which separates the two zones. A non-rated, water-tight door in the barrier provides for access between the two zones. The door design is such that a combustible liquid spill in zone 11.2.2. would not flow to zone 1.1.1.1; but a severe fire could result in failure of the gasket on the door, allowing smoke and hot combustion gases to enter zone 1.1.1.1. A similar result can be expected from unsealed penetrations in the barrier. However, given the distribution of combustibles in 1.1.1.1 and its high ceiling height, ignition of combustibles in that zone is unlikely. The fire potential for zone 11.2.2 is not sufficient to challenge the barrier and fire spread is not likely. The presence of the sprinkler system in the corner room provides further assurance that any fire which occurs will be confined to that zone.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 11.2.2 is addressed below. The issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

2.0 Separation of Redundant RHR Trains: Zones 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, and 11.2.2 Issue: The barrier shared by 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, and 11.2.2 deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant RHR-related cables. The principle concern is the potential for fire extension between elevations.

Evaluation: As discussed under Factors Influencing Fire Impact, above, the primary fixed combustibles in zone 11.2.2 are electrical cables located in the overhead trays and the lubricating oil in the RHR pumps. The section entitled Fire Spread Potential, above, explores the potential for fire spread between these zones. Based on that exploration, the possibility of fire spread to the zones adjacent to 11.2.2 is highly unlikely and, therefore, the separation provided is acceptable for the hazard. This finding is consistent with that of the existing SER.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above for fire zone 11.2.2 demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

The barrier shared by 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, and 11.2.2 deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant RHR-related cables. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 11.2.2 will not result in the loss of redundant RHR trains. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-56

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.2.3 Unit 1 Northwest Corner Room Fire Area: RB-1N F Drawing: F-2-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 643 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area linear heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose in Fire Zone 1.1.1.1.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Damage to pumps, valves, and similar equipment by water discharge would be negligible. Water removal would be accomplished by floor drains or sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [5], (3 Hour at Fire Zone 8.1)

RB-2S 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.C* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [5] noncombustible, No doors 2'-0" thick concrete non-rated mechanical 8.1* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 11.1.3 RB-1N Non-rated [7][8] noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.3.1 RB-2S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [7][8] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-41, 42, 43) One Class A door 3'-0" thick concrete 1.1.1.1 RB-1N/RB-1S Non-rated noncombustible, open One nonlabeled 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical watertight door

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-57

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.2.3 Unit 1 Northwest Corner Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 12 Unit 1 and Unit 2 RB separated by 3-hour barrier with 3-hour penetration seals.

5 Unrated seals and concrete plugs in the ceiling which separates the RB from TB.

5 3-hour separation between RB and TB with exceptions. Also reference [7] (9.2).

1, 5.10.4 Manual fire fighting equipment available with a hose station and portable extinguisher located in the torus area.

9, 3.2.1 Reinforced concrete walls with water tight door provided between torus and corner room.

9, 3.2.1 Cable penetrations are sealed between elevations.

2 Seal penetration to adjacent Reactor Building except at refuel floor.

2 Class A door between RCIC pump rooms. Also reference [1] (3.1.8 and 5.8.6).

2 Thermal linear type heat detection in corner rooms. M4-1(2)-84-36 Task 2.23.

Also reference [7] (2.2.1, and 11.1.1.2) and [9] (3.2.2).

4.3-58

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.2.3 Unit 1 Northwest Corner Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Dent 3 SER, Feb. 25, 1991. Appendix R exemption request 11.0 applies to this fire zone and addresses separation of redundant instrumentation. Exemption issued on 5-21-91.

4 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611, Rev. 1.

6 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0614, Rev. 1.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

9 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 3.2.

10 SER, March 2, 1994.

11 Justification to perform manual actions in this zone prior to fire extinguishment can be found in NDIT QDC-98-137.

4.3-59

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.2.3 AREA: RB-1 LOCATION: RX 1, Elev. 554 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 11.2.3, the northwest corner room, is located on elevation 554 of the Unit 1 Reactor Building and contains the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System turbine and pump and one of the core spray pumps.

The zone extends from the 554 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 595 and is bounded by walls on the west side of the building along column line G and on the north side of the building along column line 13. The third wall of this generally triangular-shaped space consists of a wall along a southwest to northeast line which is shared by the torus area, fire zone 1.1.1.1.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.1.1, southeast RB-1 11.1.3, west RB-1 11.3.1, north RB-2 8.1, above TB-II 8.2.6.C, above TB-II DETECTION:

General area linear heat detection is provided throughout the zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The two largest contributors to the fixed combustible loading in this zone are electrical cable insulation and lubricating oil. The rest of the fixed combustibles consists of small quantities of miscellaneous materials distributed throughout the zone.

Transients account for a significant portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle.

4.3-60

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification prompts fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 11.2.3:

The potential for a severe fire within the zone is limited by the quantity and discontinuity of combustibles. The predominant combustibles are lube oil in the RCIC unit and the core spray pump and exposed electrical cables. The RCIC pump is steam turbine driven, which introduces an ignition source. The lube oil is contained in a number of separate bearing housings, with the largest containing four gallons. Thus, the involvement of a more than four gallons of the oil is a remote possibility; requiring the failure of the bearing housings on separate pieces of equipment.

The cable tray in this zone is a single short section located over fifteen feet above the floor.

Thus, it represents a concentrated combustible load which cannot provide for propagation throughout the zone. The high ceiling in the area, and the vertical vent paths provided serve to limit hot combustion product accumulation. Given an oil release and ignition by the steam turbine, fire damage would be expected throughout this zone.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-1:

Fire spread to zone 1.1.1.1 is unlikely due to the presence of a substantial concrete barrier separating the two zones and the relatively low combustible loading in zone 11.2.3. The cable tray penetrating the barrier is not fire stopped, thus spread along the tray cannot be discounted.

A non-rated, water-tight door in the barrier provides for access between the two zones. The door design is such that a combustible liquid spill in zone 11.2.3. would not flow to zone 1.1.1.1; but a severe fire could result in failure of the gasket on the door, allowing smoke and hot combustion gases to enter zone 1.1.1.1. However, given the distribution of combustibles in 1.1.1.1 and its high ceiling height, ignition of combustibles in that zone is unlikely.

Fire zone 11.1.3, the Unit 1 HPCI room, also interfaces with zone 11.2.3. The separation is provided with a substantial reinforced concrete barrier which has a number of unsealed penetrations; none of which carry cable trays. Given the configuration of zone 11.2.3 and the fact that there are no combustibles passing through the penetrations, fire spread to the HPCI room is considered unlikely.

4.3-61

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-2:

Fire area RB-2 is separated from zone 11.2.3 by three-hour rated, reinforced concrete construction. The fire loading in zone 11.2.3 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of this barrier; thus fire spread to area RB-2 is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Fire area TB-II is separated from zone 11.2.3 by reinforced concrete construction. The fire loading in the zone is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of this barrier. However, non-sealed penetrations would allow heat and smoke to enter area TB-II.

4.3-62

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.2.4 Unit 1 Northeast Corner Room Fire Area: RB-1N F Drawing: F-2-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 657 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area linear heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Damage to valves, cooler, heat exchanger, and pumps by water discharge would be negligible. Water removal would be accomplished by drainage or sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-2S 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.1.2 RB-1N Non-rated [7][8] noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.3.2 RB-2S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [7][8] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-41, 42 ,43) Two Class A fire 3'-0" thick concrete doors 1.1.1.1 RB-1N/RB-1S Non-rated noncombustible, open One nonlabeled 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical watertight door

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-63

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.2.4 Unit 1 Northeast Corner Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 3.1.8 & 5.8.6 Class A door provided between 11.3.2 and 11.2.4. Also reference [1] (3.1.8 and 5.8.6).

5, 3.2.1 Cable penetrations are sealed between elevations.

7, 2.2.3 Reinforced concrete walls with water tight door provided between torus and corner room.

Also reference [5] (3.2.1 and 3.2.4.3).

1, 5.10.4 Manual fire fighting equipment available with a hose station and portable extinguisher provided in each RHR room.

2 Seal penetration to adjacent Reactor Building except at refuel floor.3, 3 Install UL Listed fire door between U1 RHR room (1A) and U2 RHR room (2B).

2 3-hour barrier between the two units RHR rooms.

2 Thermal line type heat detection in corner rooms. M4-1(2)-84-36 Task 2.23. Also reference [7] (2.2.1 and 4.2.1) and [5] (3.2.2).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Dent 3 LER 90-024, Rev. 00 (11-12-90).

4 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

5 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 3.2.

6 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0614, Rev. 1.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

9 SER, March 2, 1994.

4.3-64

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.2.4 AREA: RB-1 LOCATION: RX 1, Elev. 554 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 11.2.4, the northeast corner room, is located on elevation 554 of the Unit 1 Reactor Building and contains the pumps and heat exchanger for one loop of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System.

The zone extends from the 554 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 595 and is bounded by an exterior wall on the east side of the building along column line N. The north wall of the area lies on column 13 and is shared by zone 11.3.2 in area RB-2. The third wall of this triangular-shaped space consists of a wall along a southeast to northwest line which is shared by the torus area, fire zone 1.1.1.1.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.1.1, southwest RB-1 1.1.1.2, above RB-1 11.3.2, north RB-2 DETECTION:

General area linear heat detection is provided throughout the zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. The other predominant fixed combustible is the lubricating oil associated with the RHR pumps. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed throughout the zone. The only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a fire are the electrical cables and the lube oil. The cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor and the tray risers from the zone above are fire stopped where they penetrate the floor. The lube oil is contained in the bearing housings of the two RHR pumps. Thus, any release of this combustible to the zone would be significantly less than the total amount present.

4.3-65

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a significant portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a fire which may expose combustibles capable of producing a severe fire. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such a fire are the electrical cables and the lubricating oil, should it be released from the bearing housings.

The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should initiate fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 11.2.4:

The development of a significant fire in this area is dependent on tray involvement or a lube oil spill. The likelihood of tray involvement is limited due to the height of the trays above the floor and the fact that the lower tray is of solid bottom construction with a tight fitting cover. Thus, ignition of the cables in it is unlikely and its presence shields the trays above from the plume of fires located below. The high ceiling in the area, and the vertical vent paths provided would limit the buildup of any significant stratification layer, thereby minimizing thermal layer radiation to combustibles within the zone. The lubricants in the zone are separately housed, making a spill of the entire inventory unlikely. The limited spill potential and the characteristics of oil spills on concrete substrates mean that a spill fire is unlikely and that should one occur it would be of limited severity and duration. Thus, fire involvement is expected in only a portion of the zone.

4.3-66

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-1:

The potential for fire spread to zone 1.1.1.2, above, is limited by the reinforced concrete floor which separates the two zones and the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor.

The cable risers penetrating the floor are fire stopped at the floor, preventing upward fire spread along the cables. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g., stairways, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone would make fire spread unlikely. Regardless, heat and smoke from fires in zone 11.2.4 would vent to zone 1.1.1.2.

Fire spread to zone 1.1.1.1 is unlikely due to the substantial reinforced concrete barrier which separate the two. A non-rated, water-tight door in the barrier provides for personnel access between the two zones. The door design is such that a combustible liquid spill in zone 11.2.4.

would not flow to zone 1.1.1.1; but a severe fire could result in failure of the gasket on the door, allowing smoke and hot combustion gases to enter zone 1.1.1.1. In addition, there are a number of unsealed penetrations in the barrier. However, given the distribution of combustibles in 1.1.1.1 and its high ceiling height, ignition of combustibles in that zone is unlikely. The fire potential for zone 11.2.4 is not sufficient to challenge the barrier and fire spread is not likely.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-2:

Fire spread to fire area RB-2 is unlikely due to separation by three-hour rated construction. Such construction would not be challenged by any fire which can credibly occur in zone 11.2.4.

4.3-67

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 This page intentionally left blank 4.3-68

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.1 Unit 2 Reactor Building Basement Fire Area: RB-2N/RB-2S F Drawing: F-2-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 12,868 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area heat detectors (linear thermal) have been installed in each cable tray and below the bottom cable trays.

Suppression: Local area sprinkler protection is provided in the immediate vicinity of the only cable riser that passes through the ceiling in this zone.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: Portions of the Division I and II trays, where they are routed within 20 feet of each other, are wrapped with a 1-hour fire resistive material.

Suppression Effects: The safe shutdown equipment located in this zone consists of valves which will not be adversely affected by application of water or leakage of water from floor levels above since they can be operated manually. Water will collect in this area where it will be removed by sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description DW-2 3 Hour TB-I Equivalent 3 Hour [4], [5]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [4], [5]

RB-1N 3 Hour 4.3-69

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.1 Unit 2 Reactor Building Basement Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 11.1.4 RB-2S Non-rated noncombustible, open One watertight door. 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 5.0* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 8.2.6.C* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 1.1.2.2 RB-2N Non-rated [4][5] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical ceiling 11.3.2 RB-2S Non-rated noncombustible, open One watertight door. 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.3.1 RB-2S Non-rated noncombustible, open One watertight door. 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical 1.1.1.1 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-41, 42, & No doors 3'-0" thick concrete 1.2.2 DW-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4][7] All penetrations No doors 5'-0" thick concrete 8.2.6.E* TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 4'-0" thick concrete ceiling 11.3.4 RB-2N Non-rated none One watertight door. 3'-0" thick concrete 11.3.3 RB-2N Non-rated noncombustible, open One watertight door. 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-70

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.1 Unit 2 Reactor Building Basement Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 5, 4.2.4.2 Transient combustibles and ignition sources are administratively controlled. Also reference [3](2.1.2, 2.2.2, & 2.2.3) and [5](11.2.3.3).

4, 2.2.5 Automatic sprinklers near cable tray at south wall of Units 1 & 2.[1]. At single vertical cable riser, below and through 595' floor elevation [5](4.2.2, 4.4.2, & 11.2.2) and

[3](2.2.2).

3, 2.1.2 Fire detection is provided with some exceptions. Linear thermal detection in each torus area cable tray and below bottom cable tray [1], [3](2.2.2, 2.2.3), [4](2.2.5), [5](4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.7, 4.4.2, 4.4.4.1, & 11.2.2).

6 U1 and U2 separated by 3-hour rated fire barriers at torus level. Also reference [4]9.2.

4, 8.2, 2.2.5 Manual fire fighting equipment is available for zone. Available at entrance to torus

[3](2.1.2). Fire brigade to control fire & smoke using manual equip.[3](2.1.3 & 3.0).

4, 2.2.6 Cables and cable trays have conduit seals between 1.1.2.1.S and 1.1.2.1.N (instead of 1-hour wrap as in 1.1.1.1) where w/in 20 feet. [5](4.2.2, 4.4.2, 4.2.4.3, 11.2.2) Install 1-hr.

fire barrier between div. cable trays in RB [1]. 1-hr. wrap provided.

5, 4.2.4.2 Cable penetrations to the U2 Cable Tunnel and 1.1.2.2 are sealed with fire resistive materials.

4, 9.2 3-hour separation between RB and TB with exceptions. Also reference [9].

4, 2.2.6 Redundant RHR cables are routed more than 125 feet apart. Also reference [5](4.2.4.3).

5, 11.2.3.3, 11.1.2.3.1 All electrical / cable penetrations are sealed with noncombustible materials between

& 11.2.3.4 elevations (floors and ceilings) in the Reactor Building 3, 2.1.3 Control room alerted of fire condition via detection system.

5, 4.2.4.2 No combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations. Cables at K/13 are the only combustibles to pass between zones.

4.3-71

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.1 Unit 2 Reactor Building Basement Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

2 SER, June 23, 1983.

3 SER, February 25, 1991 4 SER, July 21, 1988.

5 Appendix R Exemption Requests 4.2.

6 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0615, Rev. 1..

7 The torus comprises a portion of the Unit 2 Primary Containment. Since it is a partially water-filled vessel, and is inert during operation, the barrier rating is not applicable.

8 SER, March 2, 1994.

9 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612, Rev. 1.

4.3-72

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.2.1 AREA: RB-2 LOCATION: RB2, Elev 554 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Torus Area, North and South FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. The combustible loading is still considered low.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL WITHIN ZONE 1.1.2.1:

This zone is unusual in that it is divided into a north and a south section. Fire spreading from one section to the other would adversely affect safe shutdown. Fire spread between the two sections is prevented by the low combustible loading, and by a space clear of intervening combustibles.

4.3-73

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 1.1.2.1 which are in separate fire areas or which contain safe shutdown equipment that is redundant or alternate to the equipment in this zone. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 1.2.2 DW-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.1.1 RB-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.2.2 RB-2 Non-rated 5.0 TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.1 TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6.C TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6.E TB-I Non-rated EVALUATION - ZONE 1.2.2:

The primary containment is inerted during plant operation, so fire spread into containment is not a concern. No further evaluation is required.

EVALUATION - ZONE 1.1.2.2:

This zone is separated from Zone 1.1.2.1 by a 1-foot thick concrete floor. The cable risers that penetrate this floor are fire stopped. There are open mechanical penetrations in the floor, however, the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings and vertical vent paths should limit the potential for fire spread to Zone 1.1.2.2. The low combustible loading is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier.

EVALUATION - ZONE 8.2.6.E:

This zone is separated from Zone 1.1.2.1 by a 4-foot thick concrete floor. All penetrations through the floor are sealed with non-combustible material. Equipment access hatches are closed with concrete floor plugs. The concrete floor plugs are not a tested configuration, but they are heavily built and fit tightly. The low combustible loading is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier.

4.3-74

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.2 Unit 2 Reactor Building Ground Floor Fire Area: RB-2N F Drawing: F-3-1,13-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 11,629 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: A general area smoke detection system is provided throughout the zone, with the exception of the MSIV room. Local area heat (thermal) detectors are installed above the drywell to torus DP air compressors.

Suppression: A local area preaction system is provided above the drywell to torus DP air compressors. The ACAD unit has been taken out of service. The preaction system protecting the ACAD unit has been removed.

Reference DCP 9600187.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s). Manual hose stations are located in each corner of the ground floor. Each hose station is equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: Curbs are provided around drywell air pack unit. Drywell penetrations (X-100F and X-104A) are protected by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated enclosures. An automatic closure actuated by a smoke detector is located on the door between the MSIV room and the ground floor of the Reactor Building.

Suppression Effects: Water or carbon dioxide release from piping breaks, manual hose streams, or suppression systems onto equipment in this zone can be tolerated as any adverse effects would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire. Water runoff may be handled by the floor drainage system in the general area. MCC 28/29-5 is mounted on a 3 1/2-inch pedestal, and the cable connections on top of the panel are sealed.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-2S Equivalent 3 Hour [9]

DW-2 3 Hour RB-1/2 3 Hour TB-I Equivalent 3 Hour [9]

TB-II 3 Hour RB-1N 3 Hour 4.3-75

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.2 Unit 2 Reactor Building Ground Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.7.D* TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 2'-0" thick concrete (ceiling) ceiling 8.2.7.D* TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 4'-0" thick concrete (wall) 8.2.7.C* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 5.0* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-53) No doors 5'-0" thick concrete 8.2.6.E* (w/o TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-54 & 57) One Class A door. 4'-0" thick MSIV) concrete(west), 1'-6" (north) 8.2.6.C* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-53) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 1.1.2.3 RB-2N Non-rated [8][9] noncombustible, open One Fire Damper 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical 9.3* RB-1/2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [9] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-52) No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 11.3.4 RB-2N Non-rated [8][9] noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.3.2 RB-2S Non-rated [8][9] noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical 1.1.2.1 RB-2N/RB-2S Non-rated [8][9] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical 1.1.1.2 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [8][9] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-49 & 50) One Class A door 3'-0" thick concrete 1.2.2 DW-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [8][9] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 5'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-76

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.2 Unit 2 Reactor Building Ground Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 5, 4.2.4.1 No combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations. Cables at K/13 are the only combustibles to pass between zones. Also reference [5](4.2.4.2).

1, 5.9.6 The suppression chamber drywell air pack units will be curbed and protected by an automatic sprinkler system. Also reference [1](3.1.5, 3.1.11, & 4.3.1.4).

1, 5.9.6 Waste oil will be removed from the area and NFPA approved flammable liquid storage cabinets will be provided. Cabinet to be provided on Unit 2 Reactor mezzanine floor

[1](3.1.11). No flammable liquids cabinet provided.

1, 5.9.6 Lube oil storage will be limited to a maximum container size of five gallons.

1, 5.9.6 Seal top of electrical cabinets, switchgear, and MCC's[1](3.1.10). The MCC's will be protected from water damage[1](5.9.6).

1, 5.8.6, 3.1.8 3-hour separation provided between Reactor Bldgs. [7] Provide Class A fire doors between Units 1 and 2 in the Reactor Building.

2, PF 15-1 Seal top of MCC's 28/29-5.

3, (13) 2.B. Install automatic sprinkler system to protect the differential pressure system compressors.

Also reference [9](2.3, 3.2.2), [5](4.2.2, 4.2.8, & 4.4.2).

9, 2.2.4 Smoke detection provided for zone [4], [5](4.2.2), With some exceptions (such as the steam chase, airlock, etc.)[9](2.2.5, 4.3.2, 4.4.2). Fire detectors near elect. & mech.

penetrations[9](8.2),[5](8.2.2, 11.1.2.2, 11.2.2), [10](2.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.2.3).

4 Seal penetrations to adjacent Reactor Building except at refuel floor.

5, 11.2.3.3, 11.1.2.3.1 All electrical penetration sealed between elevations in the RB with noncombustible

& 11.2.3.4 materials.

1, 5.9.6 Early warning fire detection system will be provided in the area of the motor control centers (including 480V MCC 28/29-5) and the cable penetrations to the turbine building.

9, 2.2.4 Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this zone. Also reference [1](5.9.4),

[5](11.1.2.2, 11.2.2, 4.2.2), [9]( 8.2) and [10](2.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.2.3). Fire brigade to control fires using manual eq.[10](2.1.3).

10, 2.1.3 Control room alerted of fire condition via detection system.

10, 2.1.2 Transient combustibles and ignition sources are administratively controlled. Also reference [5](4.2.4.1, 4.4.4.2, 11.1.2.3.1 & 11.2.3.4).

6 Generally, 3-hour separation provided between TB and U2 RB. Exceptions include steam pipe chase area. Separated from TB by substantial shield walls, with locked metal doors at steam chase interface w/ 8.2.6.E 4.3-77

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.2 Unit 2 Reactor Building Ground Floor 5, 11.1.2.4 Emergency lighting is available for reactor water level instruments.

9, 2.2.5 Single cable riser sealed with fire resistive material. From 1.1.2.1 below.

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter dated 12-27-78 from CECO to NRC.

3 Document dated 4-10-78. Rev. 3 of the Fire Protec 4 Letter dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

5 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 11.1 & 11.2 6 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612, Rev. 1.

7 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0615, Rev. 1.

8 NRC Exemption dated August 18, 1989.

9 SER, July 21, 1988.

10 SER, February 25, 1991 11 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

12 SER, March 2, 1994.

13 Justification to perform manual actions in this zone prior to fire extinguishment can be found in NDIT QDC-98-136, QDC-98-138.

4.3-78

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.2.2 AREA: RB-2 LOCATION: RX 2, Elev. 595 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 consists of two areas on elevation 595 of the Unit 2 Reactor Building.

• One area, the ground floor of the building, extends from the 595 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 623 and is bounded by the exterior wall on the east and north sides of the building and by column line H to the west and 13 to the south, with the drywell in the center.

• The other area, the MSIV room, is bounded on the east by the drywell and extends from elevation 595 to elevation 623 east of column line H. West of column line H, the area extends from elevation 595 to the bottom of the floor of the 611 foot, 6 inch elevation.

The west wall of this area lies along column line G. The portions of this area west of column line H are bounded by walls separating it from various zones in the Turbine Building.

The two areas of zone 1.1.2.2 are separated by reinforced concrete shield walls, however there is an unrated access through the south shield wall. This access is fitted with a non-rated door which is normally open during operations.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.2.1.S, 1.1.2.1.N, below RB-2 11.3.2, 11.3.4, below RB-2 1.1.2.3, above RB-2 1.2.2 DW-2 9.3 RB-1/2 1.1.1.2 RB-1 8.2.6.E TB-I 8.2.7.D TB-I 8.2.6.C TB-II 8.2.7.C TB-II 5.0 TB-II DETECTION:

Ionization detection is provided throughout the zone with the exception of the MSIV room.

4.3-79

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

Local sprinkler protection for:

• The area of the Drywell/Torus D/P Compressors (northwest corner of the zone); and COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of discrete materials distributed with good spatial separation. This means that the only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a propagating fire from the ignition point to other portions of the zone are the electrical cables. Full involvement of the cables is precluded by fire stops and, in the area near the equipment hatch, by trays covered for a length of approximately twenty five feet. With the exception of tray risers from the zones below, the cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor.

Transients account for a large portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. A look at the individual tasks for each activity, shows that the combustibles involved would be in discrete "fuel packets" and would not have the spatial continuity to produce a fire capable of propagating throughout the zone. Rather, the real hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of propagating the fire away from the area of origin. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are the electrical cables.

Of the combustibles in this zone, virtually none are located in the MSIV room.

The installed detection system should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out. The lack of such a system in the MSIV room is of little concern due to the sparse combustibles located there.

4.3-80

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 1.1.2.2:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles.

Spread between the two areas of the zone is precluded by the reinforced concrete shield walls which separate them and the extremely light combustible loading in the MSIV room. In the main portion of the zone, the combustibles are limited, with the exception of the electrical cables in the tray system. Thus, significant fire spread in this area is dependent on tray involvement.

Should the trays become involved, the discontinuity of the exposed cables due to fire stopping or covering, the high ceiling in the area, and the vertical vent paths provided would limit the involvement to only a portion of the zone.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-2:

Fire spread to the zones below 1.1.2.2 is unlikely due to the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor. The cable risers penetrating the floor are fire stopped at the floor, preventing downward fire spread along the cables. Of the transients which can be expected in the zone, the volume of flammable and combustible liquids are quite limited, minimizing the likelihood of a spill which could become involved and flow to the zones below via the floor openings (e.g., stairway openings).

The potential for fire spread to the zone above is limited by the reinforced concrete floor which separates the two zones and the discontinuity of combustibles. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g., stairways, equipment hatch, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate area of the openings and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone would make fire spread unlikely. Cable riser penetrations are sealed at the floor and, thus, do not provide a path for vertical fire spread.

4.3-81

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-1/2:

Fire spread to fire area RB-1/2 is unlikely due to separation by three-hour rated construction.

Such construction should not be challenged by any fire which can credibly occur in zone 1.1.2.2.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-I:

Fire area TB-I is separated from zone 1.1.2.2 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete, barrier and by the concrete shield walls of the MSIV room. The fire loading in zone 1.1.2.2 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier separating it from the Turbine Building; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

The MSIV room is separated from the remainder of the zone by floor-to-ceiling, reinforced concrete, shield walls of substantial construction. These barriers have sufficient thickness to sustain a fire of significantly more than three-hour severity. However, as mentioned elsewhere, there is an unprotected access penetration through the south shield wall between column line H and the drywell shield wall. The combustible loading in the MSIV room is quite low, with no exposed electrical cables or other significant combustibles. Although the MSIV room is of substantial construction, there are unrated penetrations in the barriers separating it from the Turbine Building. These consist primarily of an air lock with non-rated doors, a non-rated steel ceiling assembly, and the steam line penetrations into Fire Area TB-I. Thus, the MSIV room is, in effect, a space of significantly reduced combustibles between the remainder of zone 1.1.2.2 and the Turbine Building; serving effectively as a zone free of intervening combustibles. In consideration of this, the propagation of a fire from the main portion of zone 1.1.2.2 into the Turbine Building is not considered credible. Should a fire originate in the MSIV room, propagation into the Turbine Building is equally unlikely due to the small and discontinuous quantities of combustible materials available. Access to the MSIV room is highly restricted during plant operations due to the high radiation field encountered there. This eliminates the potential for buildup of transients and the possible introduction of ignition sources during plant operation.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Fire area TB-II is separated from zone 1.1.2.2 by reinforced concrete barriers. The spread of fire into the Turbine Building via this avenue is not considered credible for the reasons stated above for fire area TB-I.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-1:

Fire area RB-1 is separated from zone 1.1.2.2 by a three-hour rated barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.2.2 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

4.3-82

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issues identified in the SER relative to zone 1.1.2.2 are addressed below. Each issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

5.0 Separation of Redundant RHR Trains: Zones 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.2, and 11.3.2 Issue: The barrier shared by 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.2, and 11.3.2 deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant RHR-related cables. The principle concern is the potential for fire extension between elevations.

Evaluation: As discussed under Factors Influencing Fire Impact, above, the primary fixed combustibles in zone 1.1.2.2 are electrical cables located in the overhead trays. Due to their location, these trays do not constitute a direct exposure to the barrier separating zone 1.1.2.2 from zones 1.1.2.1 and 11.3.2, both located below. This topic has been explored in the discussion of Fire Spread Potential, above. Based on that exploration, the possibility of fire spread to the zones below 1.1.2.2 is highly unlikely and, therefore, the separation provided is acceptable for the hazard. This finding is consistent with that of the existing SER.

4.3-83

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 14.0 Separation of Redundant Reactor Vessel Level Indicating Instrumentation: Zones 1.1.2.2 and 1.1.2.3 Issue: These zones contain redundant reactor vessel level indicating instrumentation which, with respect to the separation of the instruments and their sensing lines, deviates from the separation requirements of § III.G.2 of App. R to 10 CFR 50. The principle concern is that a fire in one of these zones could spread to the adjacent fire zone and damage redundant reactor level instrumentation.

Evaluation: The reactor level can be read from instruments mounted on racks, two of which are in each of these zones. Separation can be considered adequate if a given fire will not result in the loss of the instruments in both zones. As discussed under Fire Spread Potential, fire spread between the two zones is not considered realistic and redundant instrumentation would not be lost. Thus, the existing separation is adequate for the hazard.

For a severe fire in zone 1.1.2.2, the safe shutdown procedures call for local reading of level instruments by operations personnel. These instruments are located on instrument racks in zone 1.1.2.2. The instruments on rack 2202-58 are to be used for fires in all portions of the zone, except fires south of the south CRD bank. The instruments on rack 2202-7 are to be used in that circumstance. Accessibility of the instruments during a fire must be considered.

Rack 2202-58 is in zone 11.3.1, the south core spray pump room. These instruments should be accessible during fires in all except the southern portion of zone 1.1.2.2, since they are separated from the fire area by a heavy reinforced concrete floor. Although there are open penetrations in this floor, they would be a significant distance from the location of the fire and, due to the openings in the floor separating zone 1.1.2.2 from the zone above, venting of the smoke and heat to zone 1.1.2.3 should occur. This venting, in concert with the high ceilings of zone 1.1.2.2 and its relatively large area compared to the quantity of involved combustibles should preclude smoke and heat banking down to a level that personnel at the instrument rack would be affected.

Instrument rack 2202-7 is located on the north side of the drywell in zone 1.1.2.2. For a fire in the portion of the zone south of the southern CRD hydraulic units, the physical separation provided by the intervening drywell, the high ceilings of zone 1.1.2.2, and the many paths for vertical venting of heat and smoke, should allow access to rack 2202-7 for determining reactor level.

Thus, a fire in zone 1.1.2.2 should not preclude access to at least one set of reactor level instruments.

4.3-84

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 15.0 Separation of Redundant Suppression Pool Level Indicators: Zones 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2 1.1.2.1 and 1.1.2.2 Issue: These zones do not provide 20 feet of space free of intervening combustibles between redundant components (e.g., suppression pool level instrumentation).

Evaluation: The safe shutdown procedure for fire in fire zone 1.1.2.2 calls for monitoring suppression pool level using the sightglass in fire zone 1.1.2.1, the torus area. Based on the assessment of Fire Spread Potential, above, fire spread to zone 1.1.2.1 is not considered credible. Additionally, access to the instrument should not be precluded due to the physical separation provided by the intervening floor, the high ceilings of zone 1.1.2.2, and the many paths for vertical venting of heat and smoke from the affected zone. Thus, suppression pool level instrumentation should be available for performing safe shutdown operations and, therefore, adequate separation is deemed to exist.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluations presented above for fire zone 1.1.2.2 demonstrate that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

• The barrier shared by 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.2, and 11.3.2 deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant RHR-related cables. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 1.1.2.2 will not result in the loss of redundant RHR trains. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

• The separation between Zone 1.1.2.2 and the Turbine Building deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant RHR-related components. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 1.1.2.2 will not result in the loss of redundant RHR-related components in the Turbine Building. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

• The separation between zones 1.1.2.2 and 1.1.2.3 deviates from § III.G.2 of Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant reactor level instrumentation. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 1.1.2.2 will not result in the loss of redundant reactor level instrumentation. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

• The separation between zones 1.1.2.1 and 1.1.2.2 does not provide 20 feet of space free of intervening combustibles between redundant components (e.g., suppression pool level instrumentation). However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 1.1.2.2 will not result in the loss of redundant suppression pool level instrumentation. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-85

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.3 Unit 2 Reactor Building Mezzanine Floor Fire Area: RB-2N F Drawing: F-4-1 General Elevation: 623'-0" Zone Area: 12,303 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: A general area smoke detection system is provided throughout the zone with the exception of the regenerative and nonregenerative heat exchanger room, the cleanup recirculation pump rooms, and the cleanup decant pump phase separator pump room.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and four hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: Tops of electrical cabinets and MCCs are sealed to prevent water damage.

Suppression Effects: Water release from piping breaks and manual hose streams onto equipment in this zone can be tolerated as adverse effects would be less than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description DW-2 3 Hour 24-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [1]

23-1 3 Hour TB-I Equivalent 3 Hour [1]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [1]

RB-1N 3 Hour 4.3-86

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.3 Unit 2 Reactor Building Mezzanine Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.8.D* 23-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-64 & 65) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.D* TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [1][2] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-64, 65) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete except 4kV bus duct (SWGR 23-1).

8.2.7.C* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [1][2] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-63, 64) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete except SBGT.

1.1.2.2 RB-2N Non-rated. [1][2] noncombustible, open One Fire Damper 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.8.C* 24-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 4'-0" thick concrete wall (2'-0" thick at floor) 1.1.2.4 RB-2N Non-rated [1][2] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical ceiling 1.2.2 DW-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [1][2] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 5'-0" thick concrete 1.1.1.3 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [1][2] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except 4kV bus One Class A door, 2'-0" thick concrete duct [1] (F-61, 62)

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-87

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.3 Unit 2 Reactor Building Mezzanine Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 3, 5.8.6 A Class A fire door will be provided in the wall separating Unit 1 and Unit 2 at this elevation. Also reference [3](3.1.8).

3, 3.1.8 Install fire detection over cable pan areas column / row H/12 & H/7-8. Per the commitment matrix.

6, 11.1.2.2 Complete smoke detection mezz. floors in Reactor Building. Except regen., nonregen.,

recirc., and decant room. Also reference [5].

12 U1 and U2 reactor buildings separated by 3-hr. barrier and Class A door. Seal penetrations to adjacent Reactor Building except at refuel floor [4].

6, 11.1.2.3.1 & 11.2.3.4 All cable and electrical penetrations are sealed between elevations in the reactor building.

1, 8.2 Manual fire fighting equipment (hose reesl & port. extinguishers) is available for this zone. Also reference [3](5.8.4), [6]( 11.1.2.2), and [7](2.1.2).

3, 5.8.6 Provide an early warning fire detection system in the area of the MCC's and at the cable penetrations to the turbine building. Install fire detection near safety related MCC's (MCC 28-3). [3](3.1.1.(b)).

13 Fire zone 1.1.2.3 is generally separated from the Turbine Building by 3-hour barriers. 3-hour separation between the TB and RB with exceptions.

7, 2.1.3 Control room alerted of fire condition via detection system.

7, 2.1.2 Transient combustibles are administratively controlled. Also reference [6](11.1.2.3.2).

8 No combustibles in 4-kV bus duct near fire barrier. Nonrated seal at bus duct penetration. No continuity of combustibles through bus duct penetration (SWGR feed from 1/2 DG).

8 No combustibles inside metal SBGT piping. Piping is mechanically restrained at penetrations. No continuity of combustibles through SBGT penetration.

6, 11.1.2.4 Emergency lighting is available for reactor water level instrumentation.

4.3-88

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.3 Unit 2 Reactor Building Mezzanine Floor 1, 8.2 Fire detectors are provided near electrical and mechanical penetrations. Also reference

[6]8.2.2).

7, 2.1.3 Fire brigade to control fires using manual equipment.

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 21, 1988.

2 NRC Exemption, August 18, 1989.

3 SER, July 27, 1979.

4 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0615, Rev. 1.

6 Appendix R Exemption Requests, 11.1 & 11.2.

7 SER, February 25, 1991 8 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0610, Rev. 1.

9 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

10 SER, March 2, 1994.

11 Justification to perform manual actions in this zone prior to fire extinguishment can be found in NDIT QDC-98-136.

12 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612, Rev. 1.

4.3-89

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.2.3 AREA: RB-2 LOCATION: RX 2, Elev. 623 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 consists of elevation 623 of the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The zone extends from the 623 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 647 and is bounded by the exterior wall on the east and north sides of the building and by column line H to the west and 13 to the south, with the drywell in the center.

BARRIERS: This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.2.2, below RB-2 1.1.2.4, above RB-2 1.2.2, center DW-2 1.1.1.3, south RB-1 8.2.7.C, west TB-II 8.2.7.D, west TB-I 8.2.8.C, west 24-1 8.2.8.D, west 23-1 DETECTION:

With the exception of the Reactor Water Clean Up (RWCU) system areas1, fire detection is provided throughout the zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: Fire Severity:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone consists primarily of electrical cables. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed with good spatial separation.

Thus, the only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a propagating fire from the ignition point to other portions of the zone are the electrical cables.

With the exception of tray risers from the zones below, the cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor.

Transients account for moderate portion of the total combustibles which may be in the zone.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle.

The RWCU heat exchanger room, the RWCU pump room, and the cleanup phase separator decant pump room.

4.3-90

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 A look at the individual tasks for each activity, shows that the combustibles involved would be in discrete "fuel packets" which would not have the continuity necessary to produce a fire capable of propagating throughout the zone. The primary hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of propagating the fire away from the area of origin. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are the electrical cables.

The installed detection system should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Slow propagation rate of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 1.1.2.3:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles which, with the exception of the electrical cables in the tray system, are quite limited. Thus, significant fire spread in this area is dependent on tray involvement. The trays containing exposed cables on this elevation are not fitted with fire stops and do not have any covered sections. Thus, fire propagation along the length of the trays is theoretically possible. When one considers the rate at which such fires propagate, there is ample time for fire brigade intervention.

Considering this and the ability to provide timely brigade callout, fire spread throughout the area is not likely.

4.3-91

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-2:

Fire spread to zone 1.1.2.2, located below 1.1.2.3, is unlikely due to separation by a floor of reinforced concrete construction and the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor.

The cable risers penetrating the floor are fire stopped at the floor, preventing downward fire spread along the cables. Of the transients which can be expected in the zone, the volume of flammable and combustible liquids are quite limited, minimizing the likelihood of a spill which could become involved and flow to the zone below via floor openings such as stairways.

The potential for fire spread to the zone above is limited by the reinforced concrete floor separating the two zones and the discontinuity of combustibles. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g., stairways, equipment hatch, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone would make fire spread unlikely. Cable riser penetrations are sealed at the floor and, thus, do not provide a path for vertical fire spread.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-I:

Fire area TB-I is separated from zone 1.1.2.3 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier.

The fire loading in zone 1.1.2.3 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Fire area TB-II is separated from zone 1.1.2.3 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete, barrier.

The fire loading in zone 1.1.2.3 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area 24-1:

Fire area 24-1 (zone 8.2.8.C) is separated from zone 1.1.2.3 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.2.3 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area 23-1:

Fire area 23-1 (zone 8.2.8.D) is separated from zone 1.1.2.3 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.2.3 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-1:

Fire area RB-1 is separated from zone 1.1.2.3 by a three-hour rated barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.2.3 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the three-hour rated barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

4.3-92

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issues identified in the SER relative to zone 1.1.2.3 are addressed below. Each issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

14.0 Separation of Redundant Reactor Vessel Level Indicating Instrumentation: Zones 1.1.2.2 and 1.1.2.3 Issue: These zones contain redundant reactor vessel level indicating instrumentation which, with respect to the separation of the instruments and their sensing lines, deviates from the separation requirements of § III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. The principle concern is that a fire in one of these zones could spread to the adjacent fire zone and damage redundant reactor level instrumentation.

Evaluation: The reactor level can be read from instruments mounted on racks, two of which are in each of these zones. Separation can be considered adequate if a given fire will not result in the loss of the instruments in both zones. As discussed under Fire Spread Potential, fire spread between the two zones is not considered realistic and the redundant instrumentation would not be lost. Thus, the existing separation is adequate for the hazard.

For a severe fire in zone 1.1.2.3, the safe shutdown procedures call for local reading of level instruments by operations personnel. These instruments are located on instrument rack 2202-58 in zone 11.3.1. Accessibility of the instruments during a fire in zone 1.1.2.3 should not be a problem due to the vertical separation of the two zones by zone 1.1.2.2 and the associated floors.

Vertical venting paths for zone 1.1.2.3, along with the large building volume and the limited quantity of involved combustibles should preclude smoke banking down to a level that personnel in zone 11.3.1 would be adversely affected. Neither is fire spread to zone 11.3.1 a realistic concern due to the separation provided and the quantity and distribution of combustible materials. Thus, the effects of fire in zone 1.1.2.3 on entry to zone 1.1.2.2 at the 595 foot elevation should not prevent access to the reactor level instrumentation.

4.3-93

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 CONCLUSION:

The evaluations presented above for fire zone 1.1.2.3 demonstrate that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

Zone 1.1.2.3, a zone for which alternative SS/D is provided, does not comply with Appendix R since fixed suppression and detection are not provided throughout. However, the suppression and detection provided are sufficient to assure a fire in 1.1.2.3 would not cause a loss of SS/D capability. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

The separation between zones 1.1.2.2 and 1.1.2.3 deviates from § III.G.2 of Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant reactor level instrumentation. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in Zone 1.1.2.3 will not result in the loss of redundant reactor level instrumentation. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-94

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 This page intentionally left blank 4.3-95

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.4 Unit 2 Reactor Building Main Floor Fire Area: RB-2N F Drawing: F-5-1 General Elevation: 647'-6" Zone Area: 12,651 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Water release from manual hose streams or piping breaks in this area can be tolerated as no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone.

Water runoff would be handled by the floor drainage system in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description DW-2 Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

24-1 3 Hour 23-1 3 Hour RB-1N 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.1.5.A* TB-IV 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> [3] 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (F-77) No doors 1'-6" thick concrete, 2-hour rated block 8.2.8.D* 23-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [3] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-75, 76) No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 1.1.2.3 RB-2N Non-rated [5][6] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical 1.1.2.5 RB-2N Non-rated [5][6] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical 1.1.1.4 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [5][6] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-73, 74) Two Class A 2'-0" thick concrete doors 8.2.8.C* 24-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [3][5] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-77 ,78) One Class A door, 1'-6" thick concrete except SBGT line 1.2.2 DW-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except for No doors 5'-0" thick concrete SBGT line [6][7]

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-96

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.4 Unit 2 Reactor Building Main Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 7 No continuity of combustibles through vent system penetration(s). Vent system is metal and restrained at penetrations.

1, 5.7.4 Manual fire fighting equipment (hose reels and portable extinguishers) is available for this zone. Also reference [5](8.2).

7 No continuity of combustibles through SBGT penetrations. No combustibles inside metal SBGT piping. Piping is mechanically restrained at penetrations.

4 3-hour separation between 1.1.2.4 and 1.2.2 except SBGT lines.

3 3-hour separation between Turbine Building and this zone with exceptions.

3 No safe shutdown cables or equipment are located in this zone. Also reference [4].

1, 5.7.6 Wood storage boxes in the area of the control rod storage room will be removed.

9 3-hour separation between Fire Zones 1.1.1.4 & 1.1.2.4 with 2 Class A fire doors and rated seals. Also reference [4]. Seal penetrations to adjacent Reactor Building except at refuel floor [2].

1, 3.1.8 Provide Class A fire doors between Units1 and 2 Reactor Building Main Floors. Also reference [1](5.8.6).

4.3-97

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.4 Unit 2 Reactor Building Main Floor Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

3 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612, Rev. 1.

4 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0615, Rev. 1.

5 SER, July 21, 1988.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0610, Rev. 1.

8 Intentionally left blank 9 Intentionally left blank 10 One of the doorways between 1.1.1.4 and 1.1.2.4 is protected by two fire doors.

Door #175A is a normally closed fire door. This door in the open configuration does not qualify as a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated door because the fusible link is locate on only one side of the barrier. Door #175 is a normally open sliding fire door.

4.3-98

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.2.4 AREA: RB-2 LOCATION: RB2, Elev. 647-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Reactor Building, Third Floor FIRE SEVERITY: The previous fire severity was 0.13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> and the updated fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. The combustible loading is still considered low.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones which are adjacent to Fire Zone 1.1.2.4, but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then the spread of fire to the adjoining fire area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 1.2.2 DW-2. 3 hour1 1.1.1.4 RB-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.1.5.A TB-IV 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 8.2.8.C TB-IV 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.8.D TB-IV 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1

Barrier has 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating except for SBGTS lines.

EVALUATION - ZONE 1.2.2:

The primary containment is inerted during plant operation, so fire spread into containment is not a concern. No further evaluation is required.

EVALUATION - ZONES 1.1.1.4, 1.1.1.5.A, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.B:

All four of these Fire Zones interface through rated fire barriers of either 2- or 3-hour construction. Given the low combustible loading and the 2- or 3-hour rated barriers, fire spread to any of the four zones is not credible.

4.3-99

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.5 Unit 2 Reactor Building Reactor Floor Fire Area: RB-2N F Drawing: F-6-1 General Elevation: 666'-6" Zone Area: 12,359 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Piping breaks or the use of manual hose streams would not affect safe shutdown capability since no equipment associated with safe shutdown is located in this zone. Water runoff should be handled by the floor drainage system in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description 24-1 3 Hour DW-2 3 Hour RB-1N Equivalent 3 Hour [6][9]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.8.C 24-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-0" thick concrete floor 1.1.1.6.A* TB-IV 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-106, 107, No doors, no dampers 1'-6" thick concrete 108) in HVAC ducts [5][6] wall 1.1.1.5.A* TB-IV 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except no No doors 1'-6" thick concrete dampers in HVAC wall ducts [5][6]

1.1.1.6 RB-1N Non-rated [5][6][9] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-6" thick concrete mechanical[9] ceiling 1.1.2.4 RB-2N Non-rated [5][6] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical floor 1.2.2 DW-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [5][6] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 5'-0" thick concrete wall 1.1.1.5 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> equivalent 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except 3 SBGT Two Class A 2'-0" thick concrete lines [3][5] doors

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-100

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.5 Unit 2 Reactor Building Reactor Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 7 No continuity of combustibles through SBGT penetration. No combustibles inside metal SBGT piping. Piping is mechanically restrained at penetrations.

4 3-hour separation between 1.1.2.5 and 1.2.2.

3 3-hour separation between this zone and the turbine building except HVAC ducts (which do not have fire rated dampers). Also reference [5]9.2.

1, 5.6.4 Manual fire fighting equipment (hose reels and portable extinguishers) is provided for this fire zone. Also reference [5](8.2).

3 No safe shutdown cables or equipment are located in this zone. Also reference [4].

9 3-hour separation between fire zones 1.1.1.5 and 1.1.2.5 except SBGT lines. With two Class A fire doors [4].

4 All electrical penetrations between elevations in the reactor building are sealed with noncombustible materials.

2 Seal penetrations to adjacent Reactor Building except at refuel floor.

1, 3.1.8 Provide Class A fire doors between Units 1 and 2 Reactor Building Reactor Floors. Also reference [1](5.8.6).

4.3-101

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.2.5 Unit 2 Reactor Building Reactor Floor Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton 3 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612, Rev. 1.

4 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0615, Rev. 1.

5 SER, July 21, 1988.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0610, Rev. 1.

8 Left intentionally blank 9 Evaluation for fire area separation between RB-1 and RB-2, ER9801567.

4.3-102

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.2.5 AREA: RB-2 LOCATION: RX 2, Elev. 666 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 1.1.2.5 consists of elevation 666 of the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The zone extends from the 666 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 690 and is bounded by the exterior walls on the east and north sides of the building and by column line H to the west and 13 to the south. The zone is divided in half along the north/south axis by the dryer/separator pit, the drywell shield wall, and the spent fuel pool. A portion of the wall along column line H is an exterior wall.

BARRIERS: This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.2.4, below RB-2 1.2.2, center DW-2 1.1.1.5, south RB-1 1.1.1.6, above RB-1 1.1.1.5.A, west TB-IV 1.1.1.6.A, west TB-IV 8.2.8.C, below 24-1 DETECTION:

Fire detection is not provided in this zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: Fire Severity:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. A minor contributor to the fixed loading is the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) filter media. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed with good spatial separation. This separation means that the only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a propagating fire from the ignition point to other portions of the zone are the electrical cables.

With the exception of tray risers from the zones below, the cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor.

4.3-103

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a large portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. A look at the individual tasks for each activity, shows that the combustibles involved would be in discrete fuel packets which would not have the continuity necessary to produce a fire capable of propagating throughout the zone. The primary hazard associated with transients in this zone is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of propagating the fire away from the area of origin. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are the electrical cables. Due to the construction of the zone, the trays are not continuous from the east side to the west side of the zone.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Slow propagation rate of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 1.1.2.5:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles which, with the exception of the electrical cables in the tray system, are quite limited. Thus, significant fire spread in this area is dependent on tray involvement. Additionally, the splitting of the zone into east and west portions by the dryer separator pit, drywell shield wall, and spent fuel pool minimizes the likelihood of fire spread throughout the zone. Since the exposed cables are split between the east and west sides of the zone, any significant fire which may occur would be expected to be limited to only a portion of the zone. Given that no detection is provided to alert operations personnel to a fire in the area, timely fire brigade notification is unlikely and extensive cable damage could occur in the involved part of the zone.

4.3-104

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-2:

Zone 1.1.2.4, located below, is separated from zone 1.1.2.5 by a reinforced concrete floor of substantial construction. There are a number of open penetrations in the floor, some of significant size(e.g., hatchway, stairways). Fire spread to zone 1.1.2.4 is unlikely due to the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor. The cable risers are fire stopped at the floor level, preventing downward fire spread along the cables. Of the transients which can be expected in the zone, the volume of flammable and combustible liquids are quite limited, minimizing the likelihood of a spill which could become involved and flow to the zone below via floor openings.

The potential for fire spread to zone 1.1.1.6, above, is limited by the reinforced concrete floor which separates the two zones and the discontinuity of combustibles. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g., equipment hatch, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone would make fire spread unlikely.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-IV:

Fire area TB-IV is separated from zone 1.1.2.5 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier.

The fire loading in zone 1.1.2.5 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area 24-1:

Fire area 24-1 (zone 8.2.8.C) is separated from zone 1.1.2.5 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.2.5 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-1:

Fire area RB-1 is separated from zone 1.1.2.5 by a three-hour rated barrier. The fire loading in zone 1.1.2.5 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier; thus fire spread via this path is not credible.

4.3-105

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.4 Unit 2 HPCI Room Fire Area: RB-2S F Drawing: F-9-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 1,439 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area heat linear (thermal) detection above the HPCI pump and turbine.

Suppression: Local area deluge system above the HPCI pump and turbine.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s).

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: No adverse effects on safe shutdown from water release are involved as no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Water would collect in the HPCI room sump pit until removed by pump to the radwaste water collection system.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description CT-2 3 Hour TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [5]

RB-1N 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.C* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except floor No doors 3'-0" thick concrete plugs [5]

11.3.1 RB-2S Non-rated [3][4] noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 1.1.2.1 RB-2N Non-rated [3][4] noncombustible, open One unlabeled 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical watertight doors.

8.2.5* CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-6" thick concrete wall (1'-0" thick at floor) 11.1.3 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [3][4] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-141) One class A (3-hr.) 3'-0" thick concrete Door

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-106

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.4 Unit 2 HPCI Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.11.4 Portable extinguisher provided in each HPCI room with hose stations in torus area for backup suppression.

10 Automatic water deluge system provided per [1] (5.11.4).

3, 4.2.7 Fire detection over HPCI pump and turbine.

5 3-hour separation between RB and TB with exceptions. Also reference

[3](9.2).

1, 3.1.8 Provide Class A fire door between Unit 1 and 2 HPCI rooms. Also reference [1] (5.8.6 and 5.11.6).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

3 SER, July 21, 1988.

4 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612, Rev. 1.

6 Left intentionally blank.

7 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

8 SER, March 2, 1994.

9 Justification to perform manual actions in this zone prior to fire extinguishment can be found in NDIT QDC-98-136.

10 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0615, Rev. 1.

4.3-107

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.1.4 AREA: RB-2 LOCATION: RB2, Elev. 554-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 HPCI Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 11.1.4 which are in separate fire areas or which contain safe shutdown equipment that is redundant or alternate to the equipment in this zone. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 11.1.3 RB-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.2.1 RB-2 Non-rated 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6.C TB-II 3 hour1 1 The seals are rated for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except for the floor plugs.

EVALUATION - ZONE 1.1.2.1:

The HPCI room (Fire Zone 11.1.4) is adjacent to the south section of the torus area (Fire Zone 1.1.2.1). A fire which started in the HPCI room could spread through non-rated wall penetrations into the south section of the torus area. However, fixed automatic fire suppression is provided for the hazards in the HPCI room, which reduces the likelihood of this spread occurring. The torus area contains cabling for both trains of RHR equipment, one train in the north section and one in the south section. Fire spread between the north and south sections of the torus area is prevented by the low combustible loading and by a space free of intervening combustibles. A fire which originated in the HPCI room would be no more likely to spread to the north section of the torus area than one which originated in the torus area itself.

4.3-108

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION - ZONE 8.2.6.C:

Zone 8.2.6.C is separated from Zone 11.1.4 by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier, except for the floor plugs. The concrete floor plugs are not a tested configuration, but they are heavily built and fit tightly.

Given the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier and substantial floor plugs, the potential for fire spread from Zone 11.1.4 to Zone 8.2.6.C is low.

EVALUATION - ZONES 11.1.3 and 8.2.5:

Since Fire Zones 11.1.3 and 8.2.5 are separated from Fire Zone 11.1.4 by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barriers, and the maximum predicted fire severity in zone 11.1.4 is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, no further evaluation is required.

4.3-109

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.3.1 Unit 2 Southwest Corner Room Fire Area: RB-2S F Drawing: F-2-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 630 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area linear heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose in the adjacent fire zone.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Damage to pumps, valves, and similar equipment by water discharge would be negligible. Water removal would be accomplished by floor drains or sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity:1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-2N Equivalent 3 Hours TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [4], (3 Hour at Fire Zone 5.0)

CT-2 3 Hour RB-1N 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 5.0* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 8.2.6.C* TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except floor No doors 2'-0" thick concrete plugs 8.2.5* CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-0" thick concrete 11.1.4 RB-2S Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.2.3 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [6][7] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-41, 42, 43) One Class A door 3'-0" thick concrete 1.1.2.1 RB-2N Non-rated noncombustible, open One nonlabeled 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical watertight door wall

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-110

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.3.1 Unit 2 Southwest Corner Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 5 Unit 1 and Unit 2 RB separated by 3-hour barrier with 3-hour penetration seals.

1, 5.10.4 Manual fire fighting equipment available with a hose station and portable extinguisher provided in each RHR room. Also reference [9] (11.1.2.2).

6, 2.2.6 Reinforced concrete walls with water tight door provided between torus and corner room.

Also reference [9] (4.2.1).

2 Seal penetration to adjacent Reactor Building except at refuel floor.3, 2 Class A door between RCIC pump rooms. Also reference [1] (3.1.8 and 5.8.6).

2 Thermal line type heat detection in corner rooms. M4-1(2)-84-36 Task 2.23. Also reference [6] (4.2.7) and [9] (4.2.2 and 11.1.2.2).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton 3 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

4 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612, Rev. 1.

5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0615, Rev. 1.

6 SER, July 21, 1988.

7 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

8 SER, February 25, 1991 9 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 4.2 and 11.1.

10 SER, March 2, 1994.

11 Justification to perform manual actions in this zone prior to fire extinguishment can be found in NDIT QDC-98-138.

4.3-111

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.3.1 AREA: RB-2 LOCATION: RX 2, Elev. 554 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 11.3.1, the southwest corner room, is located on elevation 554 of the Unit 2 Reactor Building and contains the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System turbine and pump and one of the core spray pumps.

The zone extends from the 554 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 595 and is bounded by walls on the west side of the building along column line G and on the south side of the building along column line 13. The third wall of this generally triangular-shaped space consists of a wall along a southeast to northwest line which is shared by the torus area, fire zone 1.1.2.1.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with 4:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.2.1, northeast RB-2 11.1.4, west RB-2 11.2.3, south RB-1 8.2.5, above TB-I 5.0, above TB-II 8.2.6.C, above TB-II DETECTION:

General detection in the form of a linear thermal detection system is provided throughout.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The predominant contributor to the fixed combustible loading in this zone is electrical cable insulation. The second largest contributor, is lubricating oil. The rest of the fixed combustibles consist of small quantities of miscellaneous materials distributed throughout the zone.

4.3-112

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a significant portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle.

The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification prompts fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

Type and distribution of combustibles; Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers; and Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 11.3.1:

The potential for a severe fire within the zone is limited by the quantity and distribution of combustibles. The predominant combustibles are the lube oil in the core spray pump and its associated motor and the exposed electrical cables. The lube oil is contained in a number of separate bearing housings. Thus, the involvement of a significant amount of the oil is a remote possibility; requiring the failure of the bearing housings on separate pieces of equipment. The cable tray in this zone is located over fifteen feet above the floor. Of the transients which can be expected in the zone, the volume of flammable and combustible liquids are quite limited, minimizing the likelihood of a spill which could involve a large portion of the zone.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-2:

The potential for fire spread to zone 1.1.2.1 is limited by the presence of a substantial concrete barrier separating the two zones and the relatively low combustible loading in zone 11.3.1.

However, if the cables in the tray penetrating the separating barrier were to become involved, fire spread to zone 1.1.2.1 is a distinct possibility. The non-rated door in the barrier is designed to preclude combustible liquid flow to zone 1.1.2.1. Due to its substantial construction, the prospect of fire spread to 1.1.2.1 via the door is limited.

The potential for fire spread to zone 11.1.4 is limited by a substantial concrete barrier which separates the two zones and the relatively low combustible loading in zone 11.3.1. However, if the electrical cables in the tray penetrating the separating barrier were to become involved, fire could spread along it to zone 11.1.4.

4.3-113

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-1:

Fire area RB-2 is separated from zone 11.3.1 by three-hour rated, reinforced concrete barrier and its fire loading is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier. Thus fire spread to area RB-2 is not credible.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Fire area TB-II is separated from zone 11.3.1 by monolithic, reinforced concrete construction.

The fire loading in the zone is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of this barrier. However, non-sealed penetrations would allow fire, hot combustion gases and smoke to enter area TB-II.

4.3-114

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 This page intentionally left blank 4.3-115

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.3.2 Unit 2 Southeast Corner Room Fire Area: RB-2S F Drawing: F-2-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 671 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area linear heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge from sprinkler system, manual hose stream use, or piping breaks would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Damage to valves, room cooler, heat exchanger, and pumps by water discharge would be negligible. Water removal would be accomplished by drainage or sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-2N Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

RB-1N 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 11.2.4 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [7][8] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-41, 42, 43) Two Class A fire 3'-0" thick concrete doors 1.1.2.2 RB-2N Non-rated [7][8] noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical 1.1.2.1 RB-2N/RB-2S Non-rated noncombustible, open One nonlabeled 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical watertight door.

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-116

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.3.2 Unit 2 Southeast Corner Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 4, 4.2.4.1 No Combustibles pass through unsealed penetrations.

1, 3.1.8 Class A door provided between 11.3.2 and 11.2.4. Also reference [1] (5.8.6).

4, 4.2.4.1 Transient combustibles and ignition sources controlled.

7, 2.2.7 Manual fire fighting equipment available with a hose station and portable extinguisher provided in each RHR room. Also reference [7] (2.2.4) and [1] (5.10.4).

7, 2.2.6 Reinforced concrete walls with water tight door provided between torus and corner room.

Also reference [4] (4.2.1).

2 Seal penetration to adjacent Reactor Building except at refuel floor.3, 3 Install UL Listed fire door between U1 RHR room (1A) and U2 RHR room (2B).

2 3-hour barrier between the two units RHR rooms.

2 Automatic sprinklers in Division II RHR pump rooms. Also reference [7] (2.2.4 and 2.3) and [4] (4.2.1 and 4.2.2).

2 Thermal line type heat detection in corner rooms. M4-1(2)-84-36 Task 2.23. Also reference [7] (4.2.7) and [4] (4.2.2 and 4.4.2).

4.3-117

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.3.2 Unit 2 Southeast Corner Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton 3 LER 90-024, Rev.00 (11-12-90).

4 Exemption for equivalent separation of redundant RHR trains. Exemption request 4.2 (12-18-84). Exemption granted 2.0 (12-11-87).

5 Left intentionally blank.

6 Left intentionally blank.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

9 SER, March 2, 1994.

4.3-118

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.3.2 AREA: RB-2S LOCATION: RX 2, Elev. 554 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 11.3.2, the southeast corner room, is located on elevation 554 of the Unit 2 Reactor Building and contains the pumps and heat exchanger for one loop of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System.

The zone extends from the 554 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 595 and is bounded by an exterior wall on the east side of the building along column line N. The south wall of the area lies on column 13 and is shared by zone 11.2.4 in area RB-1N. The third wall of this triangular-shaped space consists of a wall along a southwest to northeast line which is shared by the torus area, fire zone 1.1.2.1.S.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.2.1.S, northwest RB-2S 1.1.2.2, above RB-2N 11.2.4, south RB-1N DETECTION:

General area linear heat detection is provided throughout the zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

A general area wet-pipe sprinkler system is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. The next most significant fixed combustible is the lubricating oil associated with the RHR pumps. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed throughout the zone. The only fixed combustibles capable of producing a severe fire in the zone are the electrical cables and the lube oil. The cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor and the lower tray is fully covered. The lube oil is contained in the bearing housings of the two RHR pumps. Any release of this combustible to the zone would be significantly less than the total amount present, unless multiple and simultaneous failures of the bearing housings on separate pumps were to occur.

4.3-119

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a significant portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a fire which may expose combustibles capable of producing a severe fire. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such a fire are the electrical cables and the lubricating oil, should it be released from the bearing housings.

The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should initiate fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke buildup will adversely affect access and visibility; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 11.3.2:

With the exception of the electrical cables in the trays and the lube oil, the combustibles in this zone are quite limited and discontinuous. Thus, severe fire in this area is dependent on the involvement of the cable trays or a lube oil spill. The potential for tray involvement is limited by the height of the trays above the floor and the fact that the lower tray is of solid bottom construction with a tight fitting cover. Thus, ignition of the cables in it is unlikely and its presence shields the trays above from the plume of any fire located below. The high ceiling in the area, and the vertical vent paths provided would limit the buildup of any significant stratification layer, thereby minimizing thermal layer radiation to combustibles within the zone.

The lubricants in the zone are separately housed, making a spill of the entire inventory unlikely.

The limited spill potential and the characteristics of oil spills on concrete substrates mean that a spill fire is unlikely and that should one occur it would be of limited severity and duration. In addition, the general area sprinkler protection will limit fire involvement to only a portion of the zone.

4.3-120

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-2S :

Fire spread to zone 1.1.2.1.S is unlikely due to the substantial reinforced concrete barrier which separates it from zone 11.3.2. The door design is such that a combustible liquid spill in zone 11.3.2 would not flow to zone 1.1.2.1.S; but a severe fire could result in failure of the gasket on the door, allowing smoke and hot combustion gases to enter zone 1.1.2.1.S. However, given the distribution of combustibles in 1.1.2.1.S and its high ceiling height, ignition of combustibles in that zone is unlikely. The fire potential for zone 11.3.2 is not sufficient to challenge the barrier and fire spread is not likely.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-2N :

The potential for fire spread to zone 1.1.2.2, above, is limited by the reinforced concrete floor which separates the two zones and the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor.

The cable risers which pass through the floor are fire stopped at the floor, preventing upward fire spread along the cables. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g.,

stairways, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone would make fire spread unlikely. Regardless, heat and smoke from fires in zone 11.3.2 would vent to zone 1.1.2.2.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-1N:

Fire spread to fire area RB-1N is unlikely due to separation by three-hour rated construction.

Such construction would not be challenged by any fire which can credibly occur in zone 11.3.2.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 11.3.2 is addressed below. The issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

5.0 Separation of Redundant RHR Trains In The Reactor Building Unit 2: Zones 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.2 and 11.3.2 Issue: These zones do not comply with Appendix R to the extent that it requires redundant components to be separated by 3-hour rated barriers. The major concern is that a fire on one elevation could develop, spread to the adjacent elevation and damage the redundant RHR train.

Evaluation: Zone 11.3.2 has full area fixed fire suppression (See Automatic Suppression, above) and is provided with a linear thermal detection system throughout. The combustibles are limited, with the combustible liquids being distributed in machinery bearing housings of substantial construction. The quantity and distribution of the combustibles does not create the potential for a fire which could visit significant damage on adjacent zones (See Fire Spread Potential, above), hazard the redundant train of RHR, and impair the ability to execute and maintain safe shutdown. Thus, the ability to achieve objectives of Appendix R with respect to the maintenance of safe shutdown capability is not compromised.

4.3-121

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above for fire zone 11.3.2 demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

The separation provided for Zone 11.3.2 is sufficient for the hazards present and a fire which could damage both safe shutdown trains is not credible. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.

4.3-122

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.3.3 Unit 2 Northwest Corner Room Fire Area: RB-2N F Drawing: F-2-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 592 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area linear heat (thermal) detection except above the reactor building equipment drain tank.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and a hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose, located in adjacent Zone 1.1.2.1.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Piping breaks or use of manual hose would not affect safe shutdown as no equipment associated with safe shutdown is located in this zone.

Water runoff would be handled by the floor drainage system in the general area or by sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-I Equivalent 3 Hour [4],

CT-2 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.5* CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-142) No doors 1'-0" thick concrete 8.2.6.E* TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except for No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical plugs 1.1.2.1 RB-2N/RB-2S Non-rated noncombustible, open One unlabeled 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical watertight door

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.10.4 Hose station and portable extinguisher are located in the torus area.

6, 2.2.6 Reinforced concrete walls with water tight door provided between torus and corner room.

Also reference [8] (4.2.1).

2 Thermal line type heat detection in corner rooms. M4-1(2)-84-36 Task 2.23. Also reference [5] and [8] (4.22 & 4.2.3).

4.3-123

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.3.3 Unit 2 Northwest Corner Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

3 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

4 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612, Rev. 1.

5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0615, Rev. 1.

6 SER, July 21, 1988.

7 NRC Exemption Aug, 18, 1989.

8 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 4.2.

9 SER, March 2, 1994.

4.3-124

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.3.3 AREA: RB-2N LOCATION: RX 2, Elev. 554 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 11.3.3, the northwest corner room, is located on elevation 554 of the Unit 2 Reactor Building and contains the Reactor Building Equipment Drain (RBED) tank and RBED pump and one of the unit's core spray pumps.

The zone extends from the 554 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 595 and is bounded by exterior walls on the west side of the building along column line G and north side of the building along column line 7. The third wall of this generally triangular-shaped space consists of a wall along a southwest to northeast line which is shared by the torus area, fire zone 1.1.2.1.N. One wall to the east, along column line H is shared with the building elevator shaft.

The zone is divided into two areas by reinforced concrete shield walls surrounding the RBED tank.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.2.1.N, south east RB-2N 8.2.5, above CT-2 8.2.6.E, above TB-I DETECTION:

General area linear heat detection is provided except over the RBED tank area.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The largest contributor to the fixed combustible loading in this zone is electrical cables. The second largest contributor is lubricating oil. The rest of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials, such as ventilation system insulation. These combustibles are distributed throughout the zone.

4.3-125

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a significant portion of the total combustibles which may be in the zone.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle.

The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification prompts fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 11.3.3:

The potential for fire spread between the two areas of the zone is inhibited by the reinforced concrete shield wall which separates them. In the core spray pump portion of the zone, the predominant combustible is the lube oil in the core spray pump and motor. This oil is contained in separate bearing housings of substantial construction. Thus, multiple and simultaneous failures are necessary to release the oil to the zone environment. There are no significant quantities of combustible materials in the RBED tank area.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-2N:

Fire spread to zone 1.1.2.1.N is unlikely due to the substantial reinforced concrete barrier which separates the two zones. A non-rated, water-tight door in the barrier provides for personnel access between the two zones. The door design is such that a combustible liquid spill in zone 11.3.3 would not flow to zone 1.1.2.1.N; but a severe fire could result in failure of the gasket on the door, allowing smoke and hot combustion gases to enter zone 1.1.2.1.N. However, given the distribution of combustibles in 1.1.2.1.N and its high ceiling height, ignition of combustibles via that mechanism is unlikely. Should the cables in zone 11.3.3 become involved, spread along the cable tray and through the unsealed penetration into zone 1.1.2.1.N is possible.

A fire originating in this fire zone will not spread to adjacent fire zones that contain redundant equipment. Therefore, the ability to safely shutdown the plant is assured.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-I:

Fire area TB-I is separated from zone 11.3.3 by a three-hour rated, reinforced concrete, barrier.

The fire loading in the zone is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier; thus fire spread to the Turbine Building via this path is not credible.

4.3-126

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QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.3.4 Unit 2 Northeast Corner Room Fire Area: RB-2N F Drawing: F-2-1 General Elevation: 554'-0" Zone Area: 657 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area linear heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Damage to pumps, valves, and other equipment by water discharge would be negligible. Water removal would be accomplished by drainage or sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None N/A Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.2.2 RB-2N Non-rated [4][6] noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical 1.1.2.1 RB-2N Non-rated noncombustible, open One unlabeled 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical watertight door

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.10.4 Manual fire fighting equipment available with a hose station and portable extinguisher provided in each RHR room.

5, 2.2.6 Reinforced concrete walls with water tight door provided between torus and corner room.

Also reference [6] (4.2.1). Door to be maintained closed.

2 Thermal linear type heat detection in corner rooms. M4-1(2)-84-36 Task 2.23. Also reference [5] and [6] (4.2.2).

4.3-128

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.3.4 Unit 2 Northeast Corner Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

3 Left intentionally blank.

4 Left intentionally blank.

5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0615, Rev. 1.

6 SER, July 21, 1988.

7 NRC Exemption Aug, 18, 1989.

8 SER, March 2, 1994.

4.3-129

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.3.4 AREA: RB-2N LOCATION: RX 2, Elev. 554 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 11.3.4, the northeast corner room, is located on elevation 554 of the Unit 2 Reactor Building and contains the pumps and heat exchanger for one loop of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System.

The zone extends from the 554 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 595 and is bounded by exterior walls on the east side of the building along column line N and the north side of the building along column line 7. The third wall of this triangular-shaped space consists of a wall along a southeast to northwest line which is shared by the torus area, fire zone 1.1.2.1.N.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 1.1.2.1, southwest RB-2N 1.1.2.2, above RB-2N DETECTION:

General area linear heat detection is provided throughout the zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. The other predominant fixed combustible is the lubricating oil associated with the RHR pumps. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed throughout the zone. The only fixed combustibles capable of producing a severe fire in the zone are the electrical cables and the lube oil. The cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor and the lowest tray is fully covered. The lube oil is contained in the bearing housings of the two RHR pumps. Thus, any release of this combustible to the zone would be significantly less than the total amount present.

4.3-130

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a significant portion of the total combustibles which may be in the zone.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a fire which may expose combustibles capable of producing a severe fire. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such a fire are the electrical cables and the lubricating oil, should it be released from the bearing housings.

The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should initiate fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 11.3.4:

The combustibles are limited, with the exception of the electrical cables in the tray system and the lube oil. Thus, significant fire spread in this area is dependent on tray involvement or a lube oil spill. The likelihood of tray involvement is limited due to their height above the floor and the fact that the lower tray is of solid bottom construction with a tight fitting cover. Thus, ignition of the cables in the lower tray is unlikely and its presence shields the trays above from the plume of any fire located below. The high ceiling in the area, and the vertical vent paths provided would limit the buildup of any significant stratification layer, thereby minimizing thermal layer radiation to combustibles within the zone. The lubricants in the zone are separately housed, making a spill of the entire inventory unlikely. The limited spill potential and the characteristics of oil spills on concrete substrates mean that a spill fire is unlikely and that should one occur it would be of limited severity and duration. Thus, fire involvement is expected to encompass only a portion of the zone.

4.3-131

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area RB-2N:

The potential for fire spread to zone 1.1.2.2, above, is limited by the reinforced concrete floor which separates the two zones and the lack of continuity of combustibles penetrating the floor.

The cable risers penetrating the floor are fire stopped at the floor, preventing upward fire spread along the cables. In locations where there are open penetrations in the floor (e.g., stairways, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate vicinity of the openings and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone would make fire spread unlikely. Regardless, heat and smoke from fires in zone 11.3.4 would vent to zone 1.1.2.1.N.

Fire spread to zone 1.1.2.1.N is unlikely due to the substantial reinforced concrete barrier which separate the two. A non-rated, water-tight door in the barrier provides for personnel access between the two zones. The door design is such that a combustible liquid spill in zone 11.3.4 would not flow to zone 1.1.2.1.N; but a severe fire could result in failure of the gasket on the door, allowing smoke and hot combustion gases to enter zone 1.1.2.1.N. In addition there are unsealed penetrations in the barrier, but no cable trays pass through them. Given the distribution of combustibles in 1.1.2.1.N and its high ceiling height, however, ignition of combustibles in that zone is unlikely. The fire potential for zone 11.3.4 is not sufficient to challenge the barrier and, despite some unsealed mechanical penetrations, fire spread is not likely.

4.3-132

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QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 9.3 Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator Room Fire Area: RB-1/2 F Drawing: F-3-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 995 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area heat (thermal) detectors are provided to actuate the Carbon Dioxide suppression system.

Suppression: The swing diesel generator room is protected by a total flooding Carbon Dioxide system. Within the swing diesel generator is an enclosure for the diesel oil day tank. The CO2 protection for this enclosure is supplemented by a wet pipe sprinkler system. Actuation of the thermal detectors either in the day tank room or diesel generator room releases CO2 in both areas.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s). A hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose is located near the DG access interlock in adjacent Fire Zone 1.1.1.2, and there is an exterior fire hydrant within 200 feet.

Other FP features: The Day Tank Room is curbed.

Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown through the discharge of water or Carbon Dioxide in this area would be no more severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be handled by the floor drainage systems. Should actuation of the CO2 system interfere with ventilation for the diesel generator unit and cause it to shut down, the other two diesel generators would be unaffected.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-2N 3 Hour RB-1N 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.1.2* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-51) One 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> class "A" 1'-0" thick concrete (south) door 1.1.2.2* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-52) No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 1.1.1.2* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-52) No doors 1'-6" thick concrete (west)

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-134

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 9.3 Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 4.3.2 Automatic total flooding CO2 system protects DG room. Manual and automatic actuation provided. Also reference [8](F.9). Manual smoke venting by portable smoke ejectors.

6, pg. 2.3-63 Provide Class A fire doors for the Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator Room. Also see the 5-24-85 PLC NFPA 80 Review.

1, 3.1.8 Protect structural steel with 3-hour rating. MOD 4-1/2-78-20 complete (for fire zones 9.1

& 9.2). There is no exposed steel in this fire zone. Also reference [1](5.20.6).

1, 3.1.8 Electrically supervise door to room. Door is electrically supervised. Also reference

[1](5.20.6).

3, pg. 6 Provide fire rated barrier for louvered doors. Doors with louvers have been removed.

3, pg. 6 Install 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire dampers in HVAC ducts. No ducts.

3, pg. 6 Provide portable ventilation equipment. Three portable ventilators provided on fire cart.

2, 4.2.2 Provide 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barriers to separate fire area 9.3 from Reactor Buildings (fire areas 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.2.2). Also reference [8](F.9).

1, 3.1.8 Fire zone 9.3 (swing diesel generator room) is separated from other fire zones by 3-hour rated construction and assemblies. Also reference [1](5.20.6).

8, F.9.b The DG day tank rooms are protected by an automatic sprinkler system.

1, 4.3.2 Local and control room alarms required for DG CO2 systems.

1, 5.20.2 A 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> enclosure is provided for the diesel day tank.

1, 5.20.4 Thermostats actuate local and control room alarms, and the total flooding CO2 system.

1, 5.20.4 DG day tank room protected by automatic sprinkler system.

1, 5.20.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided for area.

8, D.4.i Dampers interlocked to close on activation of CO2 system.

8, E.5.a CO2 systems designed per NFPA 12. Installation acceptance tests were not performed.

8, E.5.b CO2 systems have predischarge alarms. CO2 system nozzles do not discharge directly on equipment. CO2 is discharged into DG and day tank rooms. Also reference [8](E.5.c) and [8](F.9.b).

4.3-135

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 9.3 Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 SER, July 21, 1988.

3 Letter 4-10-78, CECO to NRC. Page 6 addresses the need for fire barriers inplace of doors with louvers.

4 Letter 12-18-84. B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton 5 NTS Item 254(265)/88021-07. Perform CO2 concentration test. Item closed 2-5-92.

6 Fire Hazards Analysis / Updated Fire Hazards Analysis 7 Left intentionally blank.

8 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 4.3-136

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 9.3 AREA: RB-1/2 LOCATION: RB1/2,Elev. 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1/2 (Swing) Diesel Generator Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 30 minutes). The fire severity based on the updated combustible loading is still at a level that would not challenge the rated fire barriers beyond their 3-hour rating.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 9.3 which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 1.1.1.2 (west) RB-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.1.2 (south) RB-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.2.2 RB-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> EVALUATION ZONE 9.3:

The west wall of this fire zone is a 3-hour fire rated 1-6 thick reinforced concrete barrier that separates this zone from the unit 1 and unit 2 reactor buildings (fire zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.2.2).

The south wall is a 3-hour fire rated 1-0 thick reinforced concrete barrier that separates this area from the unit 1 reactor building (fire zone 1.1.1.2). The north and east walls are 16 thick reinforced concrete exterior walls. The ceiling of this zone is constructed of 10 thick reinforced concrete and serves as the roof of the swing diesel generator room. There is no exposed structural steel in this fire zone. The major combustible material within this fire zone is fuel oil, lube oil, and other miscellaneous combustible material associated with diesel generator support equipment. This zone is provided with a CO2 fire suppression system actuated by thermal detectors. The day tank room is also provided a wet-pipe sprinkler system and overflow/tank rupture spill containment. Actuation of the detection system releases CO2 regardless of the location of the fire (day tank room or diesel room). Manual fire suppression equipment is provided by an exterior hydrant within 200 feet.

4.3-137

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 CONCLUSION:

The combustible fire loading limits for this zone are being increased to 2-1/2 hours severity. The barriers separating this zone from adjacent fire zones are rated for 3-hours of fire resistance. In addition, this zone is provided with automatic fire suppression systems, which would actuate in the event of a fire in this zone and control or suppress any fire event. In addition, the systems actuation would summon the plant fire brigade would provide additional assurance that any fire originating in this zone would not grow and spread to an adjacent fire zone and damage redundant safe shutdown equipment and cables. Based on the defense in depth and the fire protection features of this zone, the increase in combustible limits for this fire zone are acceptable and will not degrade the ability to achieve safe shutdown.

4.3-138

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.1.B Unit 2 Condensate Pump Room Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-9-1,10-1 General Elevation: 547'-0" Zone Area: 4,287 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: Flammable liquids cabinet provided.

Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose streams, or piping breaks will not affect safe shutdown as no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-II See note number [1][5]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.E TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors, open pipe 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical chase 8.2.6.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated[5] noncombustible, open No doors Open pipe chase mechanical[5]

8.2.2.A TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 2'-3" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.1.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open One unlabeled door. 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.1.2.C TB-I Non-rated noncombustible One unlabeled 1'-6" thick concrete watertight door.

11.1.2.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible One unlabeled 1'-6" thick concrete watertight door.

11.1.2.A TB-I Non-rated noncombustible One unlabeled 1'-6" thick concrete watertight door.

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-139

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.1.B Unit 2 Condensate Pump Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 5.13.4 Hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are provided for this zone.

2, 5.13.4 Complete automatic wet pipe sprinkler system provided with water flow annunciation in the control room.

2, 5.13.6 Lube oil storage will be limited to a maximum container size of thirty gallons for both fire zones 8.2.1.A and 8.2.1.B. Also reference [2](3.1.11).

2, 5.13.6 Waste oil will be excluded from the area and an NFPA approved flammable liquids storage cabinet will be provided in Turbine Building basement. Also reference

[2](3.1.11).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Fire Zone 8.2.1.B does not border Fire Zone 8.2.6.C, but the north wall contains an opening to a vertical pipe chase to Fire Zone 8.2.6.C above.

2 SER, July 27, 1979.

3 There is a 1 1/2-inch hydrogen line from the Unit 2 Hydrogen Control Station, which manifolds into 4, 1-inch lines to the discharge piping of each condensate pump.

4 Complete detection and suppression has not been provided in this zone. This is justified in GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.003, Rev 3.

5 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-II, QDC-4100-M-1222.

4.3-140

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.1.B AREA: TB-I LOCATION: Unit 2 TB, Elev. 547-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Condensate Pump Room FIRE SEVERITY: The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.. This additional allowance for potential transient combustibles contributes approximately half of the estimated fire loading for the zone.

SER ISSUES:

A review of the Safety Evaluation Reports did not uncover established combustible loading limits for this zone.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists the fire zone which is adjacent to Fire Zone 8.2.1.B but in a different fire area, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barrier. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then the spread of fire to the adjoining fire area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated1 1

Fire Zone 8.2.1.B communicates with Fire Zone 8.2.6.C. The two fire zones do not share a common border, but the south wall of 8.2.1.B opens to a vertical pipe chase which leads to Fire Zone 8.2.6.C located above. The floor levels of these two zones are 48 feet apart (elevations 547 to 595).

EVALUATION:

Fire Zone 8.2.6.C utilizes safe shutdown equipment different from that for Fire Zone 8.2.1.B.

Although not directly adjacent, these zones are connected by a manlift shaft, stairs, and by a vertical pipe chase.

4.3-141

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The potential fire and/or explosion hazard in Fire Zone 8.2.1.B which would be most likely to affect Fire Zone 8.2.6.C is the hydrogen water chemistry system. Should a hydrogen release occur, it is expected that hydrogen would rise through the mechanical openings which would expose the fire zones located above (Fire Zones 8.2.2.A and 8.2.6.C). Hydrogen leak detection is provided in Fire Zone 8.2.2.A and in the area of 8.2.6.C above the manlift, stairs, and open pipe chase. When the detection system senses a release, interlocks stop the flow of hydrogen. Should a significant release of hydrogen occur and a fire or explosion result, the substantial concrete barriers would serve to limit the structural damage to adjacent zones.

Other fire protection measures provided for Fire Zone 8.2.1.B are as follows:

General area wet pipe sprinkler protection is provided throughout Fire Zone 8.2.1.B.

Fire detection is provided in Fire Zone 8.2.6.C. Should products of combustion enter 8.2.6.C from a fire in Fire Zone 8.2.1.B, it would be promptly detected.

The volume of Fire Zone 8.2.1.B is quite large (a ceiling height of approximately 25 and a reported area of 4,287 sq. ft.). Heat and smoke from a fire in Fire Zone 8.2.1.B would rise and begin filling this volume as well as entering the chase. The large volume and the physical separation between these two zones would limit the amount of heat and smoke entering Fire Zone 8.2.6.C.

Manual fire fighting equipment is available for both of these fire zones.

The fire brigade is trained and available to fight a fire in these zones. Pre-fire plans have been developed for these fire zones and are utilized by the fire brigade in training.

4.3-142

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.1.D Unit 2 Turbine Foundation Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-9-1 General Elevation: 558'-6" Zone Area: 3,850 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: One hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose streams, or piping breaks will not affect safe shutdown as no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Water runoff would be handled by sump pumps of the general area drainage system, these drains are normally closed and would have to be unplugged for water removal.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description CT-2 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.E TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open One non labeled door Concrete block at mechanical tube pull pit 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 8.2.2.A TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.6.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors, vertical 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical pipe chase 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open One non labeled door. 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.13.4 Hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are provided for this zone.

4.3-143

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.1.D Unit 2 Turbine Foundation Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Complete detection and suppression has not been provided in this zone. This is justified in GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.003, Rev. 3.

4.3-144

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.1.D AREA: TB-I LOCATION: TB, Elev 558-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Turbine Foundation FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> (75 minutes). The combustible loading is light and is due to electrical cable insulation and transients.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone impacting safe shutdown equipment or cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.1.D which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.6.E TB-I Non-rated 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.2.A TB-I Non-rated 8.2.6.D TB-I Non-rated 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated EVALUATION - ZONE 8.2.1.D:

A non-rated barrier constructed of concrete blocks separate this zone from Fire Zone 8.2.6.E in the condenser tube pull pit. A non-labeled door is installed in this barrier. The wall separating this zone from Fire zone 8.2.2.A is 4-foot thick concrete as is the wall separating this zone from Fire zone 8.2.1.A. Electrical penetrations in these walls are sealed with noncombustible material and open mechanical penetrations exist. A 1-6 thick 3-hour fire rated concrete wall separates this fire zone from Fire Zone 8.2.5. A 4-foot thick concrete wall containing one unlabeled door, electrical penetrations sealed with noncombustible material, and open mechanical penetrations separate this zone from Fire Zone 8.2.1.B. The ceiling of this zone serves as the boundary with Fire Zone 8.2.6.D. The electrical penetrations in the ceiling are sealed with noncombustible material and there are open mechanical penetrations. In addition, an open pipe chase exists between these two zones.

4.3-145

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Even though the fire-loading limit for this zone is relatively light, a wet pipe sprinkler system is provided for this zone. In addition, a hose station, equipped with 100 feet of hose is located in this fire zone.

The barriers separating this fire zone are unrated except for the boundary with the cable tunnel (fire zone 8.2.5); however, significant structural mass and thermal adsorption capability is associated with the boundaries that provides some degree of fire resistance. The existence of a suppression system provides additional assurance that a fire originating in this zone would not spread to an adjacent zone prior to extinguishment, since the suppression system would actuate, controlling or extinguishing the fire and summoning the plant fire brigade.

CONCLUSION:

The light combustible loading in this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge the structural boundaries due to the material of construction and the associated thermal adsorption capability.

In addition, the zone is provided with a wet pipe suppression system, which would control any fire occurring in this area.

4.3-146

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.2.A Unit 2 Upper Basement Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-10-1 General Elevation: 572'-6" Zone Area: 4,711 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection coverage. Hydrogen leak detection.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose lines, or piping breaks will not affect safe shutdown as no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [4]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.1.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 2'-3" thick concrete (Floor) mechanical floor 8.2.6.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated[4] noncombustible, open One unlabeled door 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[4]

11.1.2.C TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 2'-3" thick concrete floor 8.2.2.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete /

(North) mechanical open

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-147

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.2.A Unit 2 Upper Basement Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.14.4 Hose stations and portable extinguishers provided for area.

1, 5.14.6 Automatic sprinklers will be extended to protect the control rod drive feed pumps. Also reference [1](3.1.5).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Left Intentionally Blank 3 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-I, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.003 Rev. 3.

4 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-II, QDC-4100-M-1222.

4.3-148

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.2.A AREA: TB-I LOCATION: Unit 2 TB, Elev. 572-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Upper Basement FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. This fire severity should not challenge the fixed fire protection systems (both general area smoke detection and wet pipe sprinkler protection is provided) in the zone. Manual suppression capabilities are also provided.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists the one fire zone which is adjacent to Fire Zone 8.2.2.A but in a different fire area, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barrier. Since the barrier rating is less than the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated EVALUATION:

Fire Zone 8.2.6.C utilizes different safe shutdown equipment from Fire Zone 8.2.2.A. A concrete floor on unprotected structural steel separates the two zones. There are several large openings between these zones, including a manlift and a vertical pipe chase. Fire protection measures for the hazards in Fire Zone 8.2.2.A are as follows:

General area wet pipe sprinkler protection and smoke detection are provided throughout Fire Zone 8.2.2.A. Hydrogen leak detection is provided in the zone.

Even with the increased combustible limits, the fire severity remains light.

Fire detection is provided in Fire Zone 8.2.6.C. Should products of combustion enter 8.2.6.C from a fire in Fire Zone 8.2.2.A, it would be promptly detected. Hydrogen leak detectors are provided above the vertical openings from 8.2.2.A.

Manual fire fighting equipment is available for both of these fire zones.

The fire brigade is trained and available to fight a fire in these zones. Pre-fire plans have been developed for these fire zones and are utilized by the fire brigade in training.

4.3-149

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.2.B Unit 2 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-10-1 General Elevation: 580'-0" Zone Area: 1,685 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: One hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Use of manual hose streams or piping breaks will not affect safe shutdown as no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RW Nonrated[6]

TB-III Equivalent 3 Hour [1]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [1][7]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 14.1 RW Non-rated[6] noncombustible, open No doors 1'-6" thick concrete mechanical[6]

8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated[7] noncombustible, open No doors 2'-8" thick concrete mechanical[7]

8.2.2.A TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.3.B TB-III None noncombustible, open No doors No wall mechanical

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2, 10.2 There are no safe shutdown cables or equipment in this zone.

4.3-150

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.2.B Unit 2 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 Note: The combustible loading for this zone has been justified.

1 Appendix R Exemption Request 5.2 applies to this fire zone and involves the lack of 3-hour fire barriers between the Southern and Central Zone Groups.

2 SER, July 21, 1988.

3 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

4 SER, March 2, 1994.

5 Complete detection and suppression has not been provided in this zone. This is justified in GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.003 Rev. 1.

6 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and RW, ER9801573.

7 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-II, QDC-4100-M-1222.

4.3-151

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.2.B AREA: TB-I LOCATION: TB I, Elev. 580-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel FIRE SEVERITY:

The previous fire severity was 0.11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> (6.4 minutes) and the updated fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. Based on the existing fire area separation, this fire loading should not challenge cables or equipment in the adjacent fire areas.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.2.B which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.3.B TB-III Non-rated1 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated 8.2.2.A TB-I Non-rated 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated1 14.1 RW Non-rated 1

The separation between these fire zones and Fire Zone 8.2.2.B is considered to be equivalent to 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. A description of the adequacy of these barriers is provided in Exemption Request 5.2.

4.3-152

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION ZONE 8.2.2.B:

This fire zone is the unit 2 turbine building radwaste piping tunnel. The east wall of this zone partially borders the radwaste building. The wall for this portion is constructed of 1-6 thick reinforced concrete and has an open passage to the radwaste building collection and holding area. The remainder of the east wall borders the outside (below grade). The north wall is constructed of 3-6 concrete and borders fire zones 8.2.1.B and 8.2.2.A. The remaining walls border below grade areas underneath the turbine building. The tunnel is open to the unit 1 radwaste piping tunnel on the south end. None of the zones walls are credited as being fire rated. The ceiling of this area is the floor of fire zone 8.2.6.C and is constructed of 2-6 thick concrete with an open hatchway and pipe chase. Due to the light fire loading associated with this fire zone, the tunnel is not provided with either a fire detection system or an automatic fire suppression system. However, manual fire suppression equipment in the form of a hose station, equipped with 100 ft. of hose, is provided in this area. The radwaste-piping tunnels fire loading remains light with the only specifically identified combustible in the area being a half gallon of lube oil associated with the condensate backwash transfer pump.

Plant procedures controlling combustible transients and hot work assure that any new hazards that could be introduced into this area will be properly addressed. In the event of a fire occurring within this zone, the significant thermal mass associated with the boundaries and the lack of significant combustibles is likely to result in a slowly growing fire that will not propagate outside the zone due to the lack of continuity of combustibles. Due to the opening of this tunnel to adjacent fire zones, the buildup of significant amounts of hot gasses and smoke is unlikely. As such, a high degree of assurance exists that a fire originating within this area will not spread to adjacent fire zones and damage safe shutdown equipment or cables.

4.3-153

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.D Unit 2 Ground Floor Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-13-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 14,460 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area heat detectors (thermal) throughout the access corridor along the west wall for suppression actuation.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system except in the access corridor along the west wall of the turbine building. Local area deluge sprinkler system located in that corridor to protect transient combustibles.

Manual Suppression: Hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose and portable fire extinguisher(s).

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose streams, or piping breaks will not adversely affect safe shutdown. The effect on safe shutdown equipment in this area would be no greater than that tolerated from a design basis fire. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system, or would flow to the Turbine Condenser Pit where it could be removed via sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [12]

CT-2 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.5 CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 3'-0" thick concrete floor 8.2.1.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors Vertical pipe chases mechanical 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.2.A TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.7.D TB-I Non-rated open No doors open 8.2.7.E TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 1'-6" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.6.E TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open One nonlabeled door. 3'-0" - 4'-0" thick mechanical concrete and concrete block 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated noncombustible, open Two nonlabeled 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[12] doors[12], One three- and concrete block hour Class A door

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-154

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.D Unit 2 Ground Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 10, 3.1.5.k Areas P & T in the TB protected by automatic deluge systems. Design density: 0.3 gpm/sq.ft. .for entire area.

1, 5.17.4 The feedwater heater bays protected by automatic sprinklers.

1, 5.17.4 Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations provided.

7, 10.2 Suppression systems in zones adjacent to radwaste tunnel.

7, 9.2 Substantial shield walls around zone. Cable penetrations sealed with noncombustible material. Also reference [5](5.2.4).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-84 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 Left Intentionally Blank.

5 The previous FHA indicates that Exemption Request 5.2 applies to this fire zone.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 Left Intentionally Blank.

9 Left Intentionally Blank.

10 SER, November 5, 1980.

11 Complete detection and suppression has not been provided in this zone. This is justified in GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.003 Rev. 3.

12 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-II, QDC-4100-M-1222.

4.3-155

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.6.D AREA: TB-I LOCATION: TB2, Elev. 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Turbine Bldg. Ground Floor FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. This is primarily due to the allowance for a turbine oil system piping break.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.6.D which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.6.C TB-II 3 hour1 8.2.6.E TB-I Non-rated 8.2.7.E TB-I Non-rated 8.2.7.D TB-I Non-rated 8.2.2.A TB-I Non-rated 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated 8.2.1.D TB-I Non-rated 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1

The FHA indicates a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier rating with noncombustible penetration seals and open mechanical penetrations.

4.3-156

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION ZONE 8.2.6.D:

This fire zone borders fire zones 8.2.1.B, 8.2.6.C, 8.2.7.C, 8.2.7.D, and 8.2.7.E. The west wall of this area is an exterior wall that is 1-6 thick concrete except for three sections that are filled with removable concrete block to allow for equipment removal. The north wall is 4-0 thick concrete except for a section constructed of 3-0 thick removable concrete block. The walls along the east side of the zone are minimum 30 thick concrete and the walls along the southern end are 4-0 thick concrete except for a 6-foot wide portion that is made of removable concrete block. None of the walls surrounding this zone are credited with a fire rating. The floor of this zone is the ceiling of fire zone 8.2.1.B. This barrier is constructed of 4-0 thick concrete with openings for stairwells, equipment removal hatches, and penetrations. The ceiling of this area is separates this zone from fire zones 8.2.7.C, 8.2.7.D, and 8.2.7.E and is constructed of 1-6 thick concrete supported on exposed structural steel and contains openings for stairwells and equipment removal hatches.

Automatic and manual fire suppression systems protect this zone. A wet pipe sprinkler system is installed throughout the zone except in the access corridor along the west wall of the turbine building and over the condenser. In that corridor, a deluge system has been installed to protect transient combustibles that are stored there. A hose station, equipped with 100 ft. of hose, and a portable CO2 extinguisher are provided in this zone to support manual fire suppression activities.

This fire zone has moderately heavy fire loading due to lube oil storage in the area. The other major fixed combustible is electrical cable insulation and the other combustibles to be found in the area are transient in nature such as rubber, cotton, and plastic associated with protective clothing.

A wet pipe sprinkler system protects the total zone except for the corridor where oil is stored and in this location a water spray deluge system is provided. These two sprinklers systems provide assurance that any fire that would originate in this area would be controlled and limited in growth (or extinguished) until the fire brigade arrives; therefore, a reasonable assurance that a fire originating in this fire zone will not propagate to adjacent fire zones exists.

4.3-157

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.E Unit 2 Ground Floor Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-13-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 14,660 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area smoke detection in the corridor running along row F between column lines 4 and 12, between the reactor feed pump room and the Unit 2 diesel generator room (above the Unit 2 auxiliary transformer feeds).

Thermal detectors are located in U-2 Trackway.

Suppression: Local area wet pipe sprinkler system protects the reactor feedwater pumps, and in the corridor running along row F between column lines 9 and 12. Local preaction sprinkler system has been installed above the Unit 2 trackway at the north end of the fire zone actuated by thermal detectors.

Manual Suppression: Hose stations, equipped with 100 feet of hose, and portable fire extinguishers.

Other FP features: Flammable liquids cabinet provided. Structural Steel supporting the battery charger rooms are protected by sprinkler system.

Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose lines, or piping breaks will not affect safe shutdown. The effects from these actions would be of no greater severity than those already determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-2N Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [15]

EDG-2 3 Hour CT-2 3 Hour 4.3-158

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.E Unit 2 Ground Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.1.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open One non-labeled door Concrete block at mechanical tube pull pit 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors Open pipe chase mechanical 1.1.2.1* RB-2N Non-rated noncombustible No doors 4'-0" thick concrete floor 11.3.3* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except No doors 2'-0" thick concrete noncombustible floor mechanical and plugs 9.2 EDG-2 3-hour 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />(F-161, 162, Two Class A door 1'-0" thick concrete 163) Fire Dampers.

8.2.7.E TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical on exposed steel 8.2.7.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 3'-0" thick concrete on exposed steel 8.2.6.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open One nonlabeled door. 3'-0" thick (4'-0" at mechanical south wall), concrete block at tube pull pit 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated [5][15] None[15] No doors Open corridor along row F 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 2 personnel access 3'-0" thick concrete hatches/doors floor

[17]

6.2.B TB-I 3-hour 3-hr (F-393) No doors 0'-5 1/2 thick concrete ceiling / floor on sprinkler protected steel 6.2.A TB-I 3-hour 3-hr (F-393) No doors 0'-5 1/2 thick concrete ceiling / floor on sprinkler protected steel 1.1.2.2* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-54) One 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> door at 4'-0" thick concrete interlock. wall (1'-6" thick at interlock)

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-159

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.E Unit 2 Ground Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 7, 9.2 Automatic detection and water suppression in corridor. Also reference [9](5.1 & 5.2.4).

1, 3.1.1(9) Install fire detection system in area of 4kV switchgear 11,12, 21, 22. Also reference

[1](5.17.6).

1, 3.1.8 Relocate exhaust vents for reactor feed pump areas and seal openings. 3-hour barriers installed. Also reference [1](5.17.6 & 5.22.6). Relocated not to expose transformers.

1, 3.1.5f Provide water suppression system for Unit 2 trackway. Also reference [1](5.17.6).

3, (8) PF 38-2 Install fire detection along H wall column row H/15-19 Unit 1 and H/7-11 Unit 2 (high pressure heater bay).

2 Complete detection on ground floor Turbine Building from col. 9 to 17 in eastern corridor and common section, including safe shutdown pump.

2 Automatic sprinkler on ground floor Turbine Building from col. 9 to 17 in eastern corridor and common section, including safe shutdown pump.

2 Detection in far north and south portions of TB corridor and in central portion of 8.2.6.C 12-14/C-F.

10, D.3.c Water suppression provided over major cable concentrations.

1, 3.1.1 Early warning fire detection system will be provided in the HP-Heater Bay near cable penetrations to the RB.

1, 3.1.11 Oil dispensing stations to have approved cabinets and limit quantity to 55-gallons.

1, 3.1.11 Curbs and drains for liquid storage on TB ground floor. Also reference [1](5.17).

1, 5.17.4 Extra-hazard wet pipe sprinkler system for feed water pumps. Pipe schedule system.

7, 9.2 3-hour separation between RB and TB with exceptions. Also reference [4].

11, 3.1.5.f Provide pre-action sprinkler system in trackways. Sized for extra-hazard protection.

11, 3.1.5.f Detection system will comply with NFPA Codes. Heat shields will be provided.

1,5.17.4 Manual fire fighting equipment (portable extinguishers and hose stations) is available.

4.3-160

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.E Unit 2 Ground Floor Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-84 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612 Rev. 1 5 The previous FHA indicates that Exemption Request 5.2 applies to this fire zone.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 Left Intentionally Blank.

9 Left Intentionally Blank 10 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 11 SER, November 5, 1980.

12 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

13 SER, March 2, 1994.

14 Complete detection and suppression has not been provided in this zone. This is justified in GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.003 Rev. 1.

15 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-II, QDC-4100-M-1222.

16 Note: Reference cable tray loading limits in Table 3.6-2.

17 Upgrading the ceiling to a 3-hour barrier including 6 thick 3-hr rated fire seals between column lines 1/2 and G/H per DCP 9900175.

4.3-161

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.6.E AREA: TB-I LOCATION: TB 2, Elev. 595 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 8.2.6.E consists of the north end, ground floor areas of the Unit 2 Turbine Building.

This zone extends from the 595 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 615, and is bounded by the building exterior wall to the north. To the east, the zone is bounded by the building exterior wall and by the wall separating the Turbine Building from Reactor Building 2.

To the west the zone is bounded by the building exterior wall and by the wall separating it from zone 8.2.6.D. To the south, the zone is bounded by the wall separating it from zone 8.2.6.D, the wall separating the Turbine Building from Reactor Building 2, and the interface with zone 8.2.6.C in area TB-II. Fire zone 9.2, the Unit 2 diesel generator room, projects into zone 8.2.6.E along the east wall.

The zone contains the reactor feed pump room, the HP heater room, the Unit 2 trackway, 4kV switchgear fed by the unit auxiliary and reserve auxiliary transformers, and other equipment.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 8.2.1.B, below TB-I 8.2.5, below CT-2 9.2, east EDG-2 8.2.6.D, south & west TB-I 6.2.A, 6.2.B, above TB-I 8.2.7.D, 8.2.7.E, above TB-I 1.1.2.2 RB-2 11.3.3, 1.1.2.1, below RB-2 8.2.6.C TB-II DETECTION:

Smoke detection is provided in the corridor between column line 4 and zone 8.2.6.C in TB-II, in the area between the feed pump room and the diesel generator room. Thermal detectors are provided in the trackway area to activate the preaction sprinkler system.

4.3-162

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

Wet pipe sprinkler protection is provided for:

• The reactor feed pump area;

• The corridor between column line 9 and zone 8.2.6.C in area TB-II.

A preaction sprinkler system is provided in the trackway.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. A minor portion of the combustible loading is lubricating oil. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed through the zone with good spatial separation. This distribution means that the only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a propagating fire from the ignition point to other portions of the zone are the electrical cables and the lubricating oil.

The trays extend contiguously throughout the zone. The oil source is predominantly that associated with the reactor feed pumps. Although the feed pump lube oil systems are located within the confines of the feed pump room and some equipment curbing is provided, the curbing is not placed to confine spills from many potential system break points and no curbing is provided to preclude a large spill from flowing beyond the room boundaries.

Transients account for minor portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The primary hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of propagating the fire away from the area of origin. The primary fixed combustible capable of such propagation is the electrical cables.

The installed smoke detection system, where provided, should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out. The thermal detectors and sprinkler systems also provide for detection and annunciation of fires, albeit somewhat less prompt than for the areas with smoke detectors.

4.3-163

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires;

• Limited fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 8.2.6.E:

The potential for fire spread throughout the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles and the protection provided for the reactor feed pump oil hazard. In the main portion of the area, combustibles loading is vastly made up of electrical cables in the tray system. Thus, significant fire spread in this area is dependent on tray involvement. Should the trays become involved, intervention by the fire brigade will prevent spread throughout. In the feed pump area, the potential exists for spills of large quantities (e.g., >100 gallons) of oil outside the confines of the containment system. Such a spill could result in a large exposure area including equipment outside the feed pump room, however, the feed pump room sprinkler protection will limit fire spread.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area TB-I:

Fire spread to zone 8.2.6.D is unlikely due to the reinforced concrete barrier which separates the zones. Although not fire rated, the barrier is of substantial construction, exhibiting good fire resistive qualities and should not be challenged by the loading in zone 8.2.6.E.

The potential for spread to zone 8.2.7.E is reduced by the reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly separating it from 8.2.6.E. However, due to the numerous unprotected openings in the floor/ceiling assembly and the distribution of combustibles in zone 8.2.7.E vertical fire spread from the unsprinklered portions of 8.2.6.E is possible.

Zone 6.2.A and 6.2.B are separated from 8.2.6.E. below, by a reinforced concrete floor supported by structural steel members protected by automatic suppression system (Ref. FPR 3.6.1). The conduit and piping penetrations are 3-hour fire assemblies providing a 3-hour fire barrier. Fire spread across this barrier is unlikely.

Fire Spread Potential To EDG-2:

Fire zone 9.2, the diesel generator room, is separated from 8.2.6.E by three-hour, fire-rated construction. The combustibles in zone 8.2.6.E are not sufficient to challenge such a barrier.

4.3-164

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Zone 8.2.7.D is located, in part, above zone 8.2.6.E. The separation between these zones consists of a reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly except in the HP heater bay area. The floor in that area is steel grating. The HP heater room between elevations 595 and 615 has low combustible loading except for the cable trays and risers. These risers provide a direct link between the two zones. The wall providing separation from the major hazards in zone 8.2.6.E is of substantial construction to serve as a radiation shield. Its integrity would not be challenged by the expected combustibles in zone 8.2.6.E outside the heater room. However, vertical fire spread between the zones in the HP heater bay area is a distinct possibility should the cables inside the heater room become involved.

Zone 8.2.1.B is located, in part, below zone 8.2.6.E. A reinforced concrete floor ceiling assembly separates these two zones, but the floor is penetrated by a connecting stairwell and a pipe chase. Thus, the potential exists for fire spread to 8.2.1.B if an agent, such as a combustible liquid, is involved which can flow to the lower space. However, there are no significant fixed combustibles in this area which are liquid.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Zone 8.2.6.C in fire area TB-II adjoins zone 8.2.6.E of area TB-1 in the north-south corridor which runs between column lines F and G. No physical separation is provided at their juncture.

The potential for fire spread between areas TB-I and TB-II is affected by a relatively limited combustible loading in this area and a wet pipe sprinkler installation. However, two large cable trays transit this corridor, linking the two areas. The corridor is provided with smoke detection which provides annunciation in the control room when a fire is detected. Based on the distribution of combustibles, the potential for large fires in zone 8.2.6.E is greater in those portions of the zone having high ceilings and large vertical vent paths; not in the corridor area which has a relatively low ceiling with no vertical vent paths. Thus, fires in the corridor are expected to be cable fires resulting from electrical fault ignition or from exposures from transient combustibles. The rate of spread of cable tray fires is low, allowing time for manual intervention before significant spread from the point of ignition occurs. The possibility of this intervention is enhanced with the presence of the smoke detection system provided. The presence of the sprinkler system should be of value in controlling any exposure fires which may occur as well as combating any cable tray fires. To reduce the possibility of propagation to area TB-II, the region of the corridor in this area is designated a "red zone" where transients are not permitted without special review and authorization. The likelihood of a fire spreading to TB-II is limited; but cannot be discounted since the activation of the sprinkler system or timely and effective fire brigade action would be needed to prevent such spread if a fire occurred near the juncture of the two areas.

Fire Spread Potential To CT-2:

Fire Zone 8.2.5, the Unit 2 cable tunnel, is separated from fire zone 8.2.6.E by 3-hour fire rated construction. The combustibles in zone 8.2.6.E are not sufficient to challenge this barrier.

4.3-165

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-2:

Fire area TB-I is separated from fire area RB-2 by three-hour rated barriers and the concrete shield walls of the MSIV room (zone 1.1.2.2). The three-hour rated barriers should not be challenged by the combustible loading in zone 8.2.6.E and, therefore are not a concern. The MSIV room walls have sufficient thickness to withstand a fire of significantly more than three-hour severity. However, there is an unrated penetration in one of the walls, consisting of a non-rated air lock door. The air lock itself is, in effect, a combustible free space between the MSIV room in area RB-2 and the Turbine Building. The portion of zone 8.2.6.E directly outside the air lock is the north-south corridor lying between column lines F and G. The fixed combustibles in the corridor are limited to cable trays in the overhead. Should these become involved in fire, propagation into the air lock is not expected due to the lack of intervening combustibles, the relative elevations of the cable trays and the top of the air lock doorway, and the ceiling elevation of the corridor. In consideration of this, the propagation of a fire from zone 8.2.6.E into the Reactor Building via zone 1.1.2.2 is not credible.

Zone 8.2.6.E of fire area TB-I is located, in part, above zones 1.1.2.1 and 11.3.3 in area RB-2.

Separation between 8.2.6.E and the reactor building is provided by a reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly. This construction, bolstered by the lack of penetrations, is capable of withstanding a fire of significant severity. Considering this and the combustible loading in the portion of 8.2.6.E above 1.1.2.1 and 11.3.3, fire propagation between these zones is not credible.

4.3-166

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 This page intentionally left blank 4.3-167

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.D Unit 2 Mezzanine Floor Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-15-1 General Elevation: 615'-6" Zone Area: 6,039 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area smoke detection around cable risers that are located in the high pressure heater bay.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system except over low pressure heaters 2A1-3101, 2A2-3101, 2A3-3101, and in the corridor along row C, the L.

P. Heater Pull Space.

Manual Suppression: Hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose and portable fire extinguisher(s).

Other FP features: 1-hour rated fire wrap around Bus Duct to SWGR 23-1.

Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose streams, or piping breaks would not adversely affect the ability to safely shut down.

Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system or would flow to the turbine condenser pit where it could be removed via sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: High Equivalent Fire Severity: 4.42 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description 23-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

RB-2N 3 Hour (Equivalent 3 Hour at MSIV Room) [7]

TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour[13]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [14]

4.3-168

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.D Unit 2 Mezzanine Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated[14] noncombustible[14] No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 1.1.2.2* RB-2N Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical floor 1.1.2.3* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, except 4 kV No doors 4'-0" thick concrete bus duct [7]

1.1.2.2* RB-2N 3 hour[6][7] 3 hr(F-58, 59, 60) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.6.E TB-I Non-rated[13] noncombustible[13] No doors Minimum 1'-6" thick concrete 8.2.6.D TB-I Non-rated open No doors open 14.1.2 TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.8.D 23-1 Non-rated[6][7] noncombustible (3 No doors 4'-0" thick concrete hour under SWGR 23-1) 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated noncombustible No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.E TB-I Non-rated noncombustible One unlabeled door. 3'-0" thick concrete and concrete block 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated[14] noncombustible[14] One unlabeled 4'-0" thick concrete door[14] and concrete block

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-169

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.D Unit 2 Mezzanine Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 7, 9.2 Extensive automatic sprinkler protection provided throughout. Except west of Row D.

Also reference [10](5.2.4).

2 Provide 1-hour fire door at 12 and 14/G in shield wall on U1 and U2 Turbine Building mezz. floor.

2 Protect 4-kV bus duct to SWGR 23-1 with 1-hour fire barrier.

2 3-hour seals at bottom of SWGR's 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, and 24-1.

1, 5.18.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided.

1, 5.18.4 Sprinklers provided in the heater bays.

7, 9.2 3-hour separation between RB and TB. Also reference [11].

1, 3.1.1 Provide fire detection in high pressure heater bays (ceiling penetrations and cable penetrations). Also reference [1](5.18).

10, 5.2.4 All penetrations in shield walls sealed with noncombustible materials. Substantial, locked, unlabeled, metal doors.

7, 6.2 Manual fire fighting equipment available in this zone.

4.3-170

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.D Unit 2 Mezzanine Floor Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 Intentionally left blank 5 Exemption Request 5.7 (12-18-84) applies to this fire zone. Exemption for lack of complete detection and suppression for enclosure of cable in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. Exemption granted (9.0) 12-11-87. Exemption request 5.7 was withdrawn.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0613 Rev. 1.

9 Intentionally Left Blank 10 Appendix R Exemption Request 5.2 11 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612 Rev. 1.

12 Complete detection and suppression has not been provided in this zone. This is justified in GL 86-10 Evaluation, NTSC 98-020.003 Rev. 3.

13 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-IV, ER9801623.

14 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-II, QDC-4100-M-1222.

4.3-171

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.7.D AREA: TB-I LOCATION: TB2, Elev. 615-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Mezzanine Floor, North-Central Section FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is less than 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

The Safety Evaluation Reports do not establish combustible loading limits for this zone. The July 21, 1988, SER approves four exemptions that are either directly applicable or related to this zone. Section 3.2.2 of this SER approves non-rated components in the interface between the Unit 2 Reactor Building steam chase (Fire Zone 1.1.2.2) and this fire zone. Section 6.0 of the SER approves the non-rated penetration of the 4-kV bus duct from the Unit 2 Reactor Building to this fire zone. Section 14.0 of the SER approves non-rated components of the fire barrier between this fire zone and Zone 8.2.8.D, on the turbine operating floor. While not directly applicable, Section 9.0 of the SER approves non-rated components of the barrier between the Southern and Central Zone Groups of the Turbine Building. (This fire zone is part of the Northern Zone Group).

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

4.3-172

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.7.D which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated 8.2.7.E TB-I Non-rated 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated 8.2.8.D 23-1 Non-rated 14.1.2 TB-I Non-rated 8.2.6.D TB-I Non-rated 8.2.6.E TB-I Non-rated 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated 1.1.2.2 RB-II Non-rated 1.1.2.3 RB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1 1

The 4 kV bus duct from the 1/2 diesel generator penetrates this wall, and is not sealed.

EVALUATION ZONE 8.2.7.D:

Fire zone 8.2.7.D is completely enclosed by concrete walls. The wall that separates this zone from the unit 2 reactor building is constructed of 4-0 thick reinforced concrete and is 3-hour fire rated except for a 4-kVbus duct penetration for the feed from the swing diesel generator.

The west wall of this zone is constructed of 1-6 thick concrete and removable concrete block and is an exterior wall. Part of the north wall of this zone is an exterior wall constructed of 4-0 thick concrete. The remainder of the north wall is an interior wall separating this zone from fire zone 8.2.6.E and is constructed of 3-0 thick concrete. The south wall is constructed of 4-0 thick concrete and contains an unlabeled door for access to zone 8.2.7.C. The floor of this zone is constructed of minimum 1-6 thick concrete supported on exposed structural steel and separates this zone from fire zones 8.2.6.C, 8.2.6.D, and 8.2.6.E. The ceiling of this zone separates this zone from fire zones 8.2.8.D and 8.2.8.E and is constructed of 4-0 thick concrete supported on exposed structural steel. Both the floor and ceiling contain openings for stairways and equipment removal hatches.

4.3-173

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 This fire zone is protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system installed throughout the zone except over the low pressure heaters and in the corridor along row C. Ionization type fire detectors are installed around cable risers located in the high pressure heater bay. Hose stations, each equipped with 100 ft. of hose, and a portable CO2 extinguisher are also provided in this zone to support manual fire suppression activities. Fixed fire loading in this zone is light. However, this area also has the potential of heavy fire loading due to turbine lube oil piping in the area. The fire suppression and fire detection features assure that a fire within this area would be identified and addressed by an automatic suppression system until the plant fire brigade responded.

Therefore reasonable assurance exists that a fire originating in this fire zone would not progress to adjacent fire zones.

CONCLUSION:

Based on the type of construction, combustible content, and the fire protection features of this zone, the increase in combustible limits for this fire zone are acceptable and will not result in a fire originating within fire zone 8.2.7.D that will spread to adjacent fire zones and damage redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment or cables.

4.3-174

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.E Unit 2 Mezzanine Floor Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-15-1 General Elevation: 615'-6" Zone Area: 9,526 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection except above the equipment removal hatches and the feeds from the generator to the main power transformer, including over the 4kV SWGR buses 23 & 24. Local area heat (thermal) detection above the hydrogen seal oil unit and the feedwater regulating valve hydraulic units.

Suppression: Local area wet pipe sprinkler system in the area between rows F and G and column lines 3 and 4. Local water spray system actuated by thermal detectors protects the hydrogen seal oil unit and the feedwater regulating valve hydraulic units.

Manual Suppression: Hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose and portable fire extinguisher(s).

Other FP features: Curbing around feed reg valve hydraulic units and hydrogen seal oil units. The floor that bounds the 125Vdc Panel Room (Fire Zone 6.2.A) and the Battery Charging Room (Fire Zone 6.2.B) has automatic suppression to protect the structural steel.

Suppression Effects: Water discharge in this area will not affect safe shutdown equipment.

Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system or would travel down stairs to Fire Zone 8.2.6.E.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour [15]

EDG-2 3 Hour 4.3-175

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.E Unit 2 Mezzanine Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 1'-6" thick concrete mechanical 9.2 EDG-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, except Two 3-hour fire dampers 0'-6" thick concrete Exhaust Duct on fire proofed steel Penetration.

8.2.6.E TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated[15] noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[15]

8.2.7.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible One unlabeled door. 3'-0" thick concrete 7.2 TB-I 3-hour 3-hr (F-397, F-398) One class A fire door 1'-0" thick concrete Three, 3-hr Fire Dampers 6.2.B TB-I 3-hour 3-hr (F-394, F-395) One Class A door 1'-0" thick concrete Two dampers.

6.2.A TB-I 3-hour 3-hr (F-394) One Class A fire door 1'-0" thick concrete Two, 3-hr Fire Dampers.

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-176

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.E Unit 2 Mezzanine Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 3.1.5g Relocate manual pull station for Unit 2 Hydrogen seal unit deluge to outside of fire area.

Also reference [1](5.18.6).

8, pg. 4 Install Class A fire doors to DC distribution center Unit 2.

9, 5.2.4 All penetrations in shield walls sealed with noncombustible materials. Substantial, locked, unlabeled, metal doors provided.

1, 3.1.1 Install early warning fire detection system in area of 4kV switchgear 13, 14, 23, and 24.

Ionization fire detectors provided per [7](14.2). Fire detection provided for this zone except above hatches and generator feeds.

1, 5.18.4 Manual fire fighting equipment (portable extinguishers and hose stations) is available for this zone.

1, 3.1.11 Curbs around hydrogen seal oil unit. Also reference [1](5.18.6).

1, 5.18.4 Automatic deluge system provided for hydrogen seal oil unit.

1, 5.18.4 Automatic sprinkler protection provided for hydrogen seal oil area.

7, 9.2 3-hour separation between RB and TB. Also reference [5].

11, F.8 Hydrogen seal oil reservoirs protected by automatic water spray systems.

4.3-177

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.E Unit 2 Mezzanine Floor Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 Interim Compensatory Measures IV. (12-18-84).

5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612 Rev. 1.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 Letter, dated 4-10-74, CECO to NRC.

9 Appendix R Exemption Request 5.2 10 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

11 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 12 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0613 Rev. 1.

13 SER, March 2, 1994.

14 Note: Reference cable tray loading limits in Table 3.6-2.

15 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-IV, ER9801623.

16 Complete detection and suppression has not been provided in this zone. This is justified in GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.003 Rev. 3.

17 Upgrading of walls, including seals, fire door and dampers for adjacent fire zones 6.2.A, 6.2.B and 7.2 per DCP 9900175.

18 Separation Boundary for Unit 2 Diesel Generator Room 86-10 Evaluation Q-ECDS-00-0171.

19 Evaluation for presence of gas cylinders EC 401197.

4.3-178

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.7.E AREA: TB-I LOCATION: TB 2, Elev. 615 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 8.2.7.E consists of the north end of the 615 foot elevation of the Unit 2 Turbine Building.

The zone extends from the 615 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 639 and is bounded by the building exterior wall on the north, east and west sides and by the wall separating it from zone 8.2.7.D. In the north east corner, the zone is bounded, in part, by the west wall of zone 6.2.A and a portion of the south and west walls of 6.2.B and 7.2.

The zone contains various items including switchgear, a battery bank, several MCC's, compressed gas cylinders, the hydrogen seal oil unit, the stator cooling unit, and bus ducting from the main generator.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 8.2.6.D, 8.2.6.E, below TB-I 8.2.7.D, south TB-I 6.2.A, 6.2.B, 7.2, east and north TB-I 8.2.8.E, above TB-IV 9.2, below EDG-2 DETECTION:

Smoke detection is provided throughout the zone except for the equipment hatch areas and the isolated phase bus duct area. Heat detection is provided above the hydrogen seal oil unit and the FWRV hydraulic unit.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

A local wet pipe sprinkler system provides protection for the area between column lines F and G and column lines 3 and 5. An automatic water spray system is provided for the hydrogen seal oil unit and the FWRV hydraulic unit.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> 4.3-179

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. The other significant combustibles are transformer oil, lubricating oil, and hydraulic oil. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consist of various materials distributed with good spatial separation.

Thus, there are several fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a propagating fire from the ignition point to other portions of the zone. With the exception of tray risers from the zones below, the cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor. The bulk of the lubricating oil is contained in the hydrogen seal oil unit. The transformer oil is contained in two separate transformers on the west side of the zone. The hydraulic fluid is contained in a reservoir in the southeast corner of the zone. In general, dikes or curbs are not provided for spill retention.

Compressed gas cylinders, some of which contain hydrogen, are also present. However, even if the cylinders were to leak, the hydrogen concentration in the room would not exceed the lower explosive limit.

Transients account for a moderate portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The real hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which could expose combustibles capable of propagating the fire away from the area of origin. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are the electrical cables and the various oils.

The installed smoke detection system, where provided, should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out. In other areas, brigade call out could be delayed unless there was work being performed in the zone.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

4.3-180

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 8.2.7.E:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles unless the exposed cables become ignited or there is an oil spill fire. Should the trays become involved, propagation throughout the zone could be expected, barring effective fire brigade action. In the event of an oil spill, extensive spread could occur and, if ignition occurred, significant area involvement could occur, including ignition of the cable trays.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area TB-I:

Fire zone 8.2.6.E, below, is separated from 8.2.7.E by a reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly. The integrity of this barrier is compromised by a number of sizable openings, including stairways and equipment handling hatches, and smaller openings for piping and cable trays. The potential for fire spread to the zone below, 8.2.6.E, is not likely, except in the case of spill fires, due to the lack of combustibles penetrating the floor (cable risers penetrating the floor are fire stopped at the floor, preventing downward fire spread along the cables). A significant spill fire could spread to the zone below through the many uncurbed floor penetrations.

Fire zone 8.2.7.D is separated from 8.2.7.E by reinforced concrete shield walls and by portions of the turbine-generator pedestal. All of these barriers are of substantial construction and exhibit fire resistive capabilities. The combustible loading of 8.2.7.E is not sufficient to challenge these barriers. Where cable trays penetrate these walls, seals are installed to preclude fire propagation along the cables from zone to zone. The access door installed in the wall along column line 5, although not rated, is considered to be adequate for the purpose considering the distribution of combustibles in its vicinity and the ceiling heights in the area.

The potential for fire spread into zones 6.2.A, 6.2.B, and 7.2 located in the Northeast corner of the zone is unlikely due to 1 thick intervening reinforced concrete barriers which meet or exceed building code and NPFA requirements for a 3-hour fire barrier. All penetrations through these walls, including cable trays are sealed with 3-hour fire rated seals. The doors and fire dampers are Class A fire components designed to provide 3-hour fire resistance. Fire spread into these zones is not likely.

Fire Spread Potential to Fire Area EDG-2:

Fire spread to fire zone 9.2 is unlikely due to separation by three-hour rated construction. Such construction should not be challenged by any fire which can credibly occur in zone 8.2.7.E.

4.3-181

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-IV:

The potential for fire spread to the zone 8.2.8.E, above, is limited by the reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly which separates the two zones and the discontinuity of combustibles penetrating it. Where openings exist in the floor (e.g., stairways, equipment hatches, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate area and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone above would make fire spread unlikely. Cable riser penetrations are sealed at the floor; precluding flame spread along the cables. Although considerable smoke and combustion gases would vent to zone 8.2.8.E, fire spread is not expected.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 8.2.7.E is addressed below. The issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

11.0 Lack of 3-Hour Barriers Between the Fire Areas 8.2.7.C, 8.2.7.E, and 8.2.8.D and Northern and Central Zone Groups.

Issue: The barrier shared by 8.2.7.E in TB-I and 8.2.8.E in TB-IV is not rated; nor is the barrier separating 8.2.8.E from 8.2.7.C, both of which are in TB-IV. Zones 8.2.7.C and 8.2.7.E contain redundant safe shutdown components. The principle concern is that a fire could originate in 8.2.7.E and spread to 8.2.8.E potentially spreading to 8.2.7.C and endangering redundant safe shutdown components.

Evaluation: This topic has been explored in the discussion of Fire Spread Potential, above.

Based on that exploration, the possibility of fire spread to the zone 8.2.8.E from zone 8.2.7.E, below, is highly unlikely and, therefore, the separation provided is acceptable for the hazard.

This finding is consistent with that of the existing SER.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above for fire zone 8.2.7.E demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

The barrier shared by 8.2.7.E and 8.2.8.E deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant safe shutdown trains. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 8.2.7.E will not result in the loss of the redundant trains. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-182

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.2.A Unit 2 RHR Service Water Pump Room Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-9-1 General Elevation: 547'-0" Zone Area: 496 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose are located in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.1.B.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water removal would be accomplished with sump pumps as there are no drains located within the RHRSW cubicles.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None N/A Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-11" thick concrete (Ceiling) 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible One unlabeled 1'-6" thick concrete Watertight door.

11.1.2.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 4'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.13.6 For the TB Basement floor which includes the SW Pump Rooms, waste oil will be removed from the area and NFPA approved flammable liquid storage cabinets will be provided. Lube oil storage will be limited to 30 gallons. Provided in Fire Zone 8.2.1.B.

2 Smoke detection in rooms housing RHR service water pumps 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D. Thermal detection is provided. See M4-1(2)-83-30 Task 2.18, 2.23.

1, 3.1.5 The turbine building sprinkler system will be extended to provide protection for the RHR service water rooms and Diesel Generator cooling pumps. Also reference [1] (5.13.6).

4.3-183

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.2.A Unit 2 RHR Service Water Pump Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

3 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-I, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.003 Rev. 3.

4.3-184

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.1.2.A AREA: TB-I LOCATION: Unit 2 TB, Elev. 547-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 RHR Service Water Pump Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

All fire zones adjacent to Fire Zone 11.1.2.A are in the same fire area, and are separated by non-fire-rated walls. The walls are constructed of 4-0 thick concrete except for the east wall which is 1-6 thick concrete. Penetrations in these walls are sealed with noncombustible watertight materials, and there is a heavy metal watertight door in the east wall.

CONCLUSION:

The substantial compartment boundaries, even though not fire-rated, are not likely to be challenged by a postulated fire of 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> equivalent fire severity, particularly considering the wet pipe sprinkler protection provided for this zone. Further, since the adjoining fire zones are in the same fire area, spread of fire would not adversely impact safe shutdown capabilities.

4.3-185

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.2.B Unit 2 RHR Service Water Pump Room Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-9-1 General Elevation: 547'-0" Zone Area: 599 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose are located in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.1.B.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water removal would be accomplished with sump pumps as there are no drains located within the RHRSW cubicles.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None N/A Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible One unlabeled 1'-6" thick concrete Watertight door.

11.1.2.C TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 11.1.2.A TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 4'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.13.6 For the TB Basement floor which includes the SW Pump Rooms, waste oil will be removed from the area and NFPA approved flammable liquid storage cabinets will be provided. Lube oil storage will be limited to 30 gallons. Provided in Fire Zone 8.2.1.B.

2 Smoke detection in rooms housing RHR service water pumps 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D. Thermal detection is provided. See M4-1(2)-83-30 Task 2.18, 2.23.

1, 3.1.5 The turbine building sprinkler system will be extended to provide protection for the RHR service water rooms and Diesel Generator cooling pumps. Also reference [1]

(5.13.6).

4.3-186

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.2.B Unit 2 RHR Service Water Pump Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

3 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-I, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.003 Rev. 3.

4.3-187

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.1.2.B AREA: TB-I LOCATION: Unit 2 TB, Elev. 547-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 RHR Service Water Pump Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

All fire zones adjacent to Fire Zone 11.1.2.B are in the same fire area, and are separated by non-fire-rated walls. The walls are constructed of 4-0 thick concrete except for the east wall which is 1-6 thick concrete. Penetrations in these walls are sealed with noncombustible watertight materials, and there is a heavy metal watertight door in the east wall.

CONCLUSION:

The substantial compartment boundaries, even though not fire-rated, are not likely to be challenged by a postulated fire of 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> equivalent fire severity, particularly considering the wet pipe sprinkler protection provided for this zone. Further, since the adjoining fire zones are in the same fire area, spread of fire would not adversely impact safe shutdown capabilities.

4.3-188

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.2.C Unit 2 RHR Service Water Pump Room Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-9-1 General Elevation: 547'-0" Zone Area: 296 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose are located in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.1.B.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water removal would be accomplished with sump pumps as there are no drains located within the RHRSW cubicles.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None N/A Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.2.A TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 2'-3" thick concrete ceiling 8.2.1.B (East) TB-I Non-rated noncombustible One unlabeled 1'-6" thick concrete Watertight Door.

8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 1'-6" thick concrete (South) 11.1.2.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 4'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.13.6 For the TB Basement floor which includes the SW Pump Rooms, waste oil will be removed from the area and NFPA approved flammable liquid storage cabinets will be provided. Lube oil storage will be limited to 30 gallons. Provided in Fire Zone 8.2.1.B.

2 Smoke detection in rooms housing RHR service water pumps 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D. Thermal detection is provided. See M4-1(2)-83-30 Task 2.18, 2.23.

1, 3.1.5 The turbine building sprinkler system will be extended to provide protection for the RHR service water rooms and Diesel Generator cooling pumps. Also reference [1] (5.13.6).

4.3-189

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.2.C Unit 2 RHR Service Water Pump Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

3 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-I, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.003 Rev. 3.

4.3-190

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.1.2.C AREA: TB-I LOCATION: Unit 1 TB, Elev. 547-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 RHR Service Water Pump Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

All fire zones adjacent to Fire Zone 11.1.2.C are in the same fire area, and are separated by non-fire-rated walls. The walls are constructed of 4-0 thick concrete except for the east wall which is 1-6 thick concrete. Penetrations in these walls are sealed with noncombustible watertight materials, and there is a heavy metal watertight door in the east wall.

CONCLUSION:

The substantial compartment boundaries, even though not fire-rated, are not likely to be challenged by a postulated fire of 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> equivalent fire severity, particularly considering the wet pipe sprinkler protection provided for this zone. Further, since the adjoining fire zones are in the same fire area, spread of fire would not adversely impact safe shutdown capabilities.

4.3-191

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 14.1.2 Unit 2 Off Gas Recombiner Room Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-23-1 General Elevation: 626'-6" Zone Area: 8,077 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose, located at elevations 648'-

6" and 668'-0". Portable fire extinguisher(s) located on el. 668'-0". Hose station and portable fire extinguisher(s) located just outside the fire zone on el. 626'-0".

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: No safe shutdown paths would be affected by water release in this zone.

Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour[4]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [5]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.7.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.10 TB-II Non-rated[5] noncombustible, open Two unlabeled 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[5] doors[5]

8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated[4] noncombustible, open No doors 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical[4]

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-192

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 14.1.2 Unit 2 Off Gas Recombiner Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Exemption Request 5.2 applies to this fire zone and involves the lack of 3-hour fire barriers between the Southern and Central Zone Groups.

2 There is a 1-inch oxygen line from the Unit 2 Oxygen Station in Fire Zone 8.2.10 to the Unit 2 offgas system in this fire zone.

3 Complete detection and suppression has not been provided in this zone. This is justified in GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.003 Rev. 3.

4 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-IV, ER9801623.

5 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-II, QDC-4100-M-1222.

6 Evaluation for presence of gas cylinders EC 401197.

4.3-193

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 14.1.2 AREA: TB-I LOCATION: Unit 2 TB, Elev. 626-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Off Gas Recombiner Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones which are adjacent to Fire Zone 14.1.2 but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then the spread of fire to the adjoining fire area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.8.E TB-IV 3 thick concrete - Non-rated 8.2.10 TB-II 4 thick concrete - Non-rated EVALUATION:

The primary concern relative to the affect on safe shutdown capability would be a fire originating in Fire Zone 14.1.2 and spreading to either of the adjacent zones.

There are no safe shutdown cables or equipment in Fire Zones 14.1.2, 8.2.8.E, or 8.2.10.

Therefore, fire spread between Fire Zone 14.1.2 and either adjoining fire area would not affect safe shutdown capability.

4.3-194

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The potential for a fire or explosion due to the Off Gas recombination process has been considered. Noncondensible gases (67 cfm of Hydrogen and 33.5 cfm of Oxygen) are removed from the Unit 2 condenser by the steam jet air ejectors, and processed in the Unit 2 Off Gas Recombiner Room (Fire Zone 14.1.2). Very little energy would be required to ignite the products involved in the process. The presence of potential ignition sources such as the catalytic converter suggests that if a release of hydrogen or a hydrogen/oxygen mixture were to occur a fire or explosion could result. The Off Gas Recombiner process is considered to be a safe operation due to the design features of the process, the substantial separation from adjacent zones, and the negative ventilation provided.

Compressed gas cylinders, some of which contain hydrogen, are present in the zone. However, even if the cylinders were to leak, the hydrogen concentration in the room would not exceed the lower explosive limit.

During turbine operation the Off Gas Recombiner Rooms are High Radiation Areas. These rooms are maintained as negative ventilation areas. Should a hydrogen release occur this negative pressure environment should prevent a buildup of hydrogen in adjacent areas. This would minimize the potential for adverse effect of a fire or explosion to adjacent fire zones.

The Off Gas Recombiner Room consists of three separate levels (three separate rooms). These rooms are located in the northwest section of the Unit 2 Turbine Building. The lowest level is on the 626-6 elevation with the upper two levels located above. The off gas process areas are located well above any safe shutdown related cables or equipment. Hydrogen is lighter than air and should a release occur, it would begin filling the upper levels of Fire Zones 14.1.2 and 8.2.10 (these zones do not have safe shutdown equipment). The roof of Fire Zone 14.1.2 consists, in part, of built up roofing over 1-inch rigid insulation on precast concrete roof slabs supported by exposed structural steel (also for Fire Zone 8.2.10). The remainder is built up roofing over 1-inch rigid insulation on 4-0 thick concrete. The walls are constructed of concrete to a certain level and insulated metal siding for the upper levels. This metal siding and roof panels would be the weak link in the construction in the event of an explosion thus venting the explosion to the exterior.

The Off Gas Recombiner Rooms are separated from adjacent fire zones by substantial concrete barriers (3 to 4 thick). No fire rating has been assigned to these barriers due to their open or nonrated mechanical penetrations. During operation the doors to these rooms are locked shut.

4.3-195

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 5.0 Safe Shutdown Pump Room Fire Area: TB-II F Drawing: F-13-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 565 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection system.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable extinguishers and hose reels equipped with 100 feet of hose are available in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.6.C.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Water or Carbon Dioxide release from portable extinguishers or hose streams in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the room.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-2S 3 Hour RB-2N 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 11.3.1* RB-2S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 2'-0" thick concrete floor 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated noncombustible One 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> damper 3'-0" thick concrete

(#2-9472-149). ceiling 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated noncombustible Double doors 0'-7 5/8" thick

(#1005), One concrete block Damper(#2-9472-150

)

1.1.2.2* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-178] No doors 4'-0"(east) &

5'-0"(north) thick concrete 1.1.2.1* RB-2S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-53] No doors 2'-0" thick concrete floor

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-196

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 5.0 Safe Shutdown Pump Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 3 Fire Zone 5.0 (which is part of fire area TB-II is separated from fire zones 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.2, & 11.3.1 by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated barriers. 3-hour separation provided between Fire Zone 5.0 and the steam chase.

5 Automatic sprinklers on ground floor TB from col 9 to 17 & in SSD Pump Room. Automatic sprinklers are not provided for the SSD pump room. See justification in Exemption Requests [4].

5 Complete detection on ground floor TB from col 9 to 17 in eastern corridor and common section, including safe shutdown pump room.

5 Provide 3-hour barrier around safe shutdown pump room. Not required for Appendix R. FP enhancement (12-18-84) per the FP Commitment Matrix Rev. 3.

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Left Intentionally Blank.

2 SER, July 21, 1988.

3 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612 Rev. 1.

4 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-II, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.002 Rev. 3.

5 Letter B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-84 4.3-197

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 5.0 AREA: TB-II LOCATION: TB 1/2, Elev. 595 0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump Room FIRE SEVERITY: The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR: The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones which are adjacent to Fire Zone 5.0 but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each. In each case, the barrier provides a 3-hour rated separation, or the adjacent zone relies on the same safe shutdown path.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 1.1.2.1 RB-2S 3-Hour 1.1.2.2 RB-2N 3-Hour 11.3.1 RB-2S 3-Hour 4.3-198

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.1 Clean and Dirty Oil Tank Room Fire Area: TB-II F Drawing: F-12-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 910 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and hose reels equipped with 100 feet of hose are available in adjacent fire zone 8.2.6.C.

Other FP features: The doors to the room are elevated 4-'0" above the finished floor with the walls serving as curbing.

Suppression Effects: Sprinkler operation, piping breaks, or use of manual hose streams would not affect safe shutdown as no equipment associated with safe shutdown in this zone. Water runoff would be handled by the floor drainage system in the room.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: High Equivalent Fire Severity: 60.0 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-III 3 Hour RB-1N 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.1.1* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 3'-0" thick concrete floor 1.1.1.2* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> One 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> damper 4'-0" thick concrete

(#1-9472-031). wall (5'-0" thick at MSIV Room) 11.2.3* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 2'-0" thick concrete floor 8.2.7.C TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors, one 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3'-0" thick concrete rated damper ceiling 8.2.6.C TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hr, except for metal Two Class A doors 11-5/8" thick concrete covered hose access (#108, 109). block hatches 8.2.6.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-159 & 160) No doors 5'-0" thick concrete wall

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-199

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.1 Clean and Dirty Oil Tank Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 3, F.8 3-hour separation provided except for two unrated (substantial) hinged metal covers over the access hatches.

1, 5.17.4 The turbine oil storage room is protected by automatic sprinklers. Wet pipe suppression system provided [3](F.8). [6]

1, 3.1.8 Install fire rated dampers in all HVAC penetrations (to the turbine oil storage room). Also reference [1](5.17.6).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 SER, July 21, 1988.

3 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 4 Left Intentionally Blank.

5 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-II, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.002 Rev. 3.

6 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611 Rev. 1.

4.3-200

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.1 AREA: TB-II LOCATION: TB, Elev 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Clean and Dirty Oil Tank Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />. The combustible loading is heavy and is due to the use of this zone for oil storage.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.1 which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.6.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6.C TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.7.C TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 11.2.3 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.1.1 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.1.2 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 4.3-201

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION - ZONE 8.1:

A 2-foot thick concrete floor that is 3-hour fire rated separates this zone from Zone 11.2.3 and a 3-foot thick concrete floor separates this zone from Fire Zone 1.1.1.1. A 3-foot thick concrete ceiling that is 3-hour fire rated separates this zone from Zone 8.2.7.C. The portion of the west wall separating this zone from Fire Zone 8.2.7.A is a 5-foot thick reinforced concrete wall with a 3-hour fire rating as is the south wall separating this zone from Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. The east wall separating this zone from Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 is a 4-foot thick reinforced concrete wall that is 3-hour fire rated. The portion of the west wall and the north wall separating this zone from Fire Zone 8.2.6.C is fire rated for 3-hours and is constructed of 11-5/8 inch concrete blocks. The walls with Fire Zone 8.2.6.C contain two Class A fire doors to provide access to the clean and dirty oil tank room. One door is in the west wall and the other is in the north wall. The doors are installed above a 4-foot high concrete curb, which is provided to contain oil spillage in the event of tank(s) rupture. In addition these two walls each contain a small hatchway and hose access hatches. The covers for these hatches are not fire rated, but are of substantial construction to prevent fire spread.

A wet pipe sprinkler system, including under tank coverage, is provided for this area. Hose stations located in the adjacent fire zones support manual fire suppression actions.

A fire originating within this zone would be addressed by the wet pipe suppression system. In addition, activation of the suppression system would summon the plant fire brigade. This zone is contained within 3-hour fire barriers and the area is provided sufficient overflow containment to contain any tank rupture. Floor drains within the oil tank room are able to handle water runoff from the sprinkler system. Therefore, the growth of any fire originating within this fire zone would be controlled and prevented from spreading to an adjacent fire zone.

CONCLUSION:

The heavy combustible loading in the oil tank room is addressed by a wet pipe suppression system, which would control any fire occurring in this area.

4.3-202

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.10 Off Gas Recombiner Room Fire Area: TB-II F Drawing: F22-1,23-1 General Elevation: 626'-6" Zone Area: 8,511 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Water release from hose line used in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. No safe shutdown equipment is located in this area. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour [1][9]

TB-III Equivalent 3 Hour [1]

TB-I Equivalent 3 Hour [1][10]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated[8] noncombustible, open No doors 0'-5 5/8" thick mechanical[8] concrete block walls (0-8 ceiling) 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 0'-6" thick concrete mechanical floor (open on east side) 14.1.2 TB-I Non-rated[9] noncombustible, open Two unrated doors[9] 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[9]

14.1.1 TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open Two unrated doors. 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-203

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2, 9.2 Substantial shield walls with metal doors between zones. Also reference

[3](5.2.4).

2, 9.2 No safe shutdown cables or equipment in zone. Also reference [3](5.2.4).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Appendix R Exemption Request 5.2 applies to this fire zone and involves the lack of 3-hour fire barriers between the Southern and Central Zone Groups.

2 SER, July 21, 1988.

3 Left Intentionally Blank.

4 November 5, 1991 ComEd letter requested new combustible loading limits for specific fire zones).

5 Oxygen lines enter area from outside, routed to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 oxygen control stations.

6 SER, March 2, 1994.

7 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-II, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.002 Rev. 3.

8 86-10 evaluation supplement for NTSC 98-020.002 Revision 3, Justification for lack of detection and fixed suppression in Fire Zone 8.2.10, EC 368863.

9 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-II and TB-IV, ER9801622.

10 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-II, QDC-4100-M-1222.

4.3-204

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.10 AREA: TB-II LOCATION: TB, Elev 626-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Off Gas Recombiner Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. The combustible loading is light and is due primarily to ventilation filters and transients.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.10 which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated 14.1.2 TB-I Non-rated 14.1.1 TB-III Non-rated EVALUATION - ZONE 8.2.10:

A non-rated barrier constructed of a 6-inch thick concrete floor separates this zone from Fire Zone 8.2.7.C. In addition, a portion of the zone is open to the upper spaces of Fire Zone 8.2.7.C.

The boundary with Fire Zone 8.2.8.E is and unrated wall constructed of 5-5/8 thick concrete block. Boundaries with Fire Zones 14.1.1 and 14.1.2 are unrated walls constructed of 4-0 thick concrete and a ceiling of 6 thick concrete. Fire Zone 8.2.10 is provided with hose stations and portable fire extinguishers to support manual fire suppression activities. No automatic fire suppression systems or fire detection is provided for this zone due to the very light fire loading.

The opening of this zone to Fire Zone 8.2.7.C provides a substantial space volume to absorb the heat and combustion products of a fire occurring within Fire Zone 8.2.10.

4.3-205

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The fire loading in Fire Zone 8.2.10 consists of isolated locations of combustible material separated from adjacent locations by spatial distances of negligible combustible loading. Thus a fire occurring within this fire zone is fuel limited and not likely to spread to adjacent fire zones.

CONCLUSION:

The light combustible loading in this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge the structural boundaries due to the significant volume available to absorb fire effects and the spatial separation of combustibles from adjacent combustibles.

4.3-206

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.C Unit 1/2 Ground Floor Fire Area: TB-II F Drawing: F-12-1,F-13-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 17,622 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection coverage. Hydrogen leak detection by manlifts.

Suppression: Local automatic wet-pipe suppression systems in the eastern corridors that connect Fire Zone 8.2.6.C with Fire Zones 8.2.6.A and in the common section between the two corridors east of column line E and in the area bounded by column/row 12-13/D-E. Local area wet pipe sprinkler system over the resin storage areas. Pre-action systems are over the two EHC areas and cable risers.

Manual Suppression: Water hose stations each equipped with 100 feet of hose, foam units, wheeled dry chemical units, and portable extinguishers.

Other FP features: The Carbon Dioxide storage tank is located in this area. One partial fire barrier separating the south wall of the south pipe chase and the U-1 CRD pump level.

Suppression Effects: Water release in this zone (including drainage from upper levels of the plant) would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-2N 3 Hours RW Nonrated [14]

RB-2S Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

RB-1N Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

TB-III Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

TB-I Equivalent 3 Hour [15]

CT-2 3 Hour [17]

4.3-207

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.C Unit 1/2 Ground Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 14.1 RW Non-rated[14] noncombustible, open One unlabeled 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical[14] Double door.[14]

8.2.6.B TB-III Non-rated [6][7] noncombustible, open Two unlabeled doors. 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.6.D TB-I Non-rated[15] noncombustible, open Two unlabeled 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[15] doors[15], One three-hour Class A door 8.2.6.E TB-I Non-rated[15] none [5][15] No doors Open corridor along row F.

8.1 TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hr except metal Two Class A doors 0'-11 5/8" thick covered hose hatches . concrete block (F-159,160) 5.0 TB-II Non-rated noncombustible Double fire doors 0'-7 5/8" thick One 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> concrete block damper 1.1.1.2* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-46) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete wall 11.3.1* RB-2S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except floor No doors 2'-0" thick concrete plugs 11.2.3* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> noncombustible, No doors 2'-0" thick concrete non-rated mechanical 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1 equipment access 3'-0" thick concrete hatch/door [17]

8.2.6.A TB-III Non-rated none [5] No doors Open corridor along row F 8.2.3.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 2'-8" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.7.D TB-I Non-rated[15] noncombustible[15] No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 1.1.2.2* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-53) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 0'-6" thick concrete mechanical ceiling on exposed steel 8.2.1.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 0'-11" thick concrete mechanical block enclosed pipe chase 11.1.3 RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except for One Class A Door 3'-0" thick concrete floor plugs [6]

11.1.4 RB-2S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except for No doors 3'-0" thick concrete floor plugs [6]

4.3-208

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.C Unit 1/2 Ground Floor 8.2.3.A TB-III Non-rated [9] noncombustible, open One unlabeled door 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical floor 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated[15] noncombustible, open No doors connected by an open mechanical[15] pipe chase 8.2.2.A TB-I Non-rated[15] noncombustible, open One unlabeled door 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[15] floor 1.1.2.1* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 8.2.2.B TB-I Non-rated[15] noncombustible, open No doors 2'-8" thick concrete mechanical[15]

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-209

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.C Unit 1/2 Ground Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2 Detection in far north and south portions of TB corridor and in central portion of 8.2.6.C 12-14/C-F.

1, 3.1.5e Install sprinkler system in area of EHC reservoirs and adjacent cable riser area. Also reference [1](5.17.6).

1, 3.1.11 Provide curbs and drains by flammable liquid storage area on TB ground floor. Also reference [1](5.17). Flammable liquids stored in oil storage room. No additional curbs or drains provided.

1, 3.1.11 Provide listed flammable liquids cabinet for Turbine Building ground floor. Limit quantity to 55-gallons. Flammable liquids stored in oil storage room. No flammable liquids cabinet provided.

3, (8) PF 38-2 Install fire detection along H wall column row H/15-19 Unit 1 and H/7-11 Unit 2 (high pressure heater bay).

2 Wet pipe fire suppression for U2 cables, Turbine Building ground floor at 12-13/G-H.

2 Complete detection on ground floor Turbine Building from col. 9 to 17 in eastern corridor and common section, including safe shutdown pump.

2 Automatic sprinkler on ground floor Turbine Building from col. 9 to 17 in eastern corridor and common section.

8 Provide Class A fire doors to other fire areas. The only reference noted is the previous FHA, pg. 2.3-51.

2 3-hour barrier around safe shutdown pump room. (Verify no important cabling in western portion of 8.2.6.C or add detection and/or automatic sprinkler). Not required for Appendix R. FP enhancement(12-18-84) per the FP Commitment Matrix Rev. 3.

10, F.8 EHC systems have fire retardant fluid and sprinkler protection. Closed head sprinkler protection provided above EHC units.

7, 9.2 Automatic detection and water suppression provided in corridor. Also reference

[5](5.1 & 5.2.4).

7, 9.2 No continuity of combustibles between fire zones 8.2.3.A and 8.2.6.C. Also reference

[5](5.2.4).

1, 5.17.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided.

1, 5.17.4 The feedwater heater bays protected by automatic sprinklers.

7, 9.2 3-hour separation between TB and RB with exceptions. Also reference [4], [18].

10, D.3.c Water suppression provided over major cable concentrations (the Appendix A response

[10] did not specifically identify 8.2.7.C as a zone bound to this requirement).

2 Seal vertical cable penetrations from U2 cable tunnel thru metal hatch near col/row F/12 and F/25 with substantial fire stop.

4.3-210

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-84 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611 Rev. 1 5 Exemption Request 5.2 (12-18-84), Exemption for the lack of complete 3-hour fire barrier between TB zone groups. Revised to Southern and Central Zone Groups (6-25-86).

Exemption granted (9.0) 12-11-87. Also reference Section 5.1 of the Exemption Requests.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 The existing Fire Hazards Analysis was the only referenced by the Fire Protection Commitment Matrix for certain commitments.

9 A partial one-hour barrier separates the vertical pipe chase adjacent to the west U-1 LP heater bay entrance from zone 8.2.3.A.This barrier protects 1/2 DGCWP cables inside the chase from direct flame impingement. No damper has been installed in the penetrating HVAC ductwork per SE-96-076.

10 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 11 Left Intentionally Blank.

12 SER, November 5, 1980.

13 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-II, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.002 Rev. 3.

14 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-II and RW, ER9801574.

15 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-II, QDC-4100-M-1222.

16 Note: Reference cable tray loading limits in Table 3.6-2.

17 Equipment access hatch/door #304 is a class A fire rated door with a 3-hour fire label (Ref. 9900174).

18 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612 Rev. 1.

4.3-211

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.6.C AREA: TB-II LOCATION: TB1/2, Elev. 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1/2 Turbine Bldg Ground Floor FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.6.C which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

4.3-212

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.6.A TB-III Non-rated 8.2.6.B TB-III Non-rated 8.2.6.D TB-I Non-rated 8.2.6.E TB-I Non-rated 8.1 TB-II 3 hour1 5.0 TB-II Non-rated 1.1.1.2 RB-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 11.3.1 RB-2 3 hour2 11.2.3 RB-1 3 hour3 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.2.B TB-I Non-rated 8.2.3.B TB-III Non-rated 14.1 RW Non-rated 1.1.2.2 RB-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated 8.2.1.A TB-III Non-rated 11.1.3 RB-1 3 hour2 11.1.4 RB-1 3 hour2 8.2.3.A TB-III Non-rated 8.2.2.A TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 5 8.2.1.B TB-I Non-rated 8.2.7.D TB-I Non-rated 1

The FHA indicates a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> seal rating except for metal covered hose hatches.

2 The FHA indicates a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> seal rating except for floor plugs.

3 The FHA indicates a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier rating, but no seal rating.

5 The FHA indicates a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier rating with noncombustible penetration seals and open mechanical penetrations.

4.3-213

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION ZONE 8.2.6.C:

This fire zone shares boundaries on elevation 595-0 with fire zones 8.2.2.B, 8.2.6.A, 8.2.6.B, 8.2.6.D, 8.2.6.E, 8.1, 8.2.7.C, 5.0, the radwaste building, and the unit 1 and unit 2 reactor buildings. The walls that separate this zone from fire zones 8.2.6.B and 8.2.6.D are 4-0 thick reinforced concrete shield walls. All cable penetrations in these walls are sealed, but the wall is not credited as being fire rated. The boundary between this zone and fire zone 8.1 consists of two 3-hour fire rated 11-5/8 thick concrete block walls. Fire zone 5.0 is separated from this zone by 7-5/8 thick concrete block walls. The wall shared with the radwaste building is minimum 3-0 thick concrete and contains an unrated door for access between the zones. The wall shared with the reactor building is 4-0 thick concrete and is 3-hour fire rated. Separation of this zone from fire zones 8.2.6.A and 8.2.6.E is by an open corridor that runs along row F.

The floor of this zone is the ceiling of fire zone 8.2.2.B and is constructed of 2-8 thick concrete with open hatchways and a pipe chase. The ceiling of this area is the floor of fire zone 8.2.7.C and 8.2.7.D and is constructed of 6 thick concrete supported on exposed structural steel and containing openings for stairways and equipment removal hatches.

Fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems are provided to protect this fire zone.

Hydrogen detection is provided near the manlifts to alert the Control Room and isolate the supply should a leak occur in the piping at the condensate pump level (Zones 8.2.1.A and 8.2.1.B). Automatic suppression systems are installed in the eastern corridors that connect with fire zones 8.2.6.A and 8.2.6.E and in the common section between the corridors east of column line E and in the area bounded by rows 12-13 and column lines D-E. A wet pipe sprinkler system is over the resin storage area. Hose stations, each equipped with 100 ft. of hose and portable CO2 extinguishers are also provided in this zone to support manual fire suppression activities. Fire loading in this fire zone is low with the primary combustible loading being from EHC fluid reservoirs and cable insulation. Additional combustible loading is established by a minor amount of lube oil, resin storage, and duct liner insulation. A wet pipe sprinkler system protects the majority of this fire zone and the areas containing the principal hazards. The automatic fire detection and suppression system provided for this zone assure that any fire that would occur here will be alarmed, suppression would be initiated, and fire growth controlled (or fire extinguished) until the arrival of the fire brigade. Therefore, reasonable assurance exists that any fire that occurs in this zone would not propagate to adjacent zones.

CONCLUSION:

Based on the type of construction, combustible content, and the fire protection features of this zone, a fire originating within fire zone 8.2.6.C will not spread to adjacent fire zones and damage redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment or cables.

4.3-214

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.C Unit 1/2 Mezzanine Floor Fire Area: TB-II F Drawing: F14-1,15-1 General Elevation: 615'-6" Zone Area: 14,133 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area smoke detection near the cable penetrations from the reactor building to the turbine building and in the west end of the zone bounded by rows C and D and columns 12 and 14. Local area heat (thermal) detection around the turbine oil tanks.

Suppression: Local area wet pipe sprinkler systems cover the entire zone east of row D and over the resin storage areas. Local area water spray system protects the turbine oil tanks.

Manual Suppression: Water hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose and portable fire extinguishers.

Other FP features: Partial fire proofing on structural steel at the ceiling. Catch basins are provided for the turbine lube oil storage tanks. 1-hour rated fire wrap around Bus Duct to SWGR 13-1.

Suppression Effects: Water release from the fixed suppression systems, manual hose streams, or piping breaks in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system as well as stairways to lower levels.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: High Equivalent Fire Severity: 4.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description 24-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [18]

23-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [18]

14-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [18]

13-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [18]

RW Nonrated [17]

RB-2N Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

RB-1N Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour [18]

TB-III Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

TB-I Equivalent 3 Hour [19]

4.3-215

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.C Unit 1/2 Mezzanine Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 0'-6" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.7.B TB-III Non-rated[6][7] noncombustible One unlabeled door. 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.D TB-I Non-rated[19] noncombustible[19] One unlabeled 4'-0" thick concrete door[19]

8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated[18] noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete.

mechanical[18]

8.2.8.C 24-1 Non-rated[18] noncombustible (3 No doors 4'-0" thick concrete hour under SWGR)[18]

8.2.8.B 13-1 Non-rated[18] noncombustible (3 No doors 4'-0" thick concrete hour under SWGR)[18]

14.1 RW Non-rated[17] noncombustible[17] No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 8.2.8.A 14-1 Non-rated[18[ noncombustible[18] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.10 TB-II Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 0'-6" thick concrete mechanical (open wall) 8.1 TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [1](3.1.8) 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors, one 3 3'-0" thick concrete hour rated damper floor 5.0 TB-II Non-rated noncombustible No doors, one 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3'-0" thick concrete rated damper 1.1.1.2* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 1.1.2.2* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 1.1.1.3* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-58, 59, 3 hr except 2 line No doors 4'-0" thick concrete pens. [6][7]

1.1.2.3* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hr except 1 line No doors 4'-0" thick concrete pen. [6][7]

8.2.8.D 23-1 Non-rated[18] noncombustible[18] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-216

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.C Unit 1/2 Mezzanine Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 7, 14.2 The area directly below 8.2.8.D has detection and suppression.

1, 3.1.1 Provide early warning fire detection by cable penetration near MG oil cooler. Also reference [1](5.18). (Oil cooler replaced by ASD water cooler. Detection system unchanged).

8, (40)PF 35-1 Install fire detectors over cable tray between column 12-14 & G-H.

2 Provide 1-hour fire door at 12 and 14/G in shield wall on U1 and U2 Turbine Building mezz. floor.

2 Detection to areas beneath SWGR's 24-1 and 13-1, and northern portion of 8.2.7.A.

2 Provide detection in 12-14/C-D of Turbine Building mezz. floor. Also reference

[7](14.2).

2 3-hour seals at bottom of SWGR's 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, and 24-1.

5, 5.2.4 All penetrations in shield walls sealed with noncombustible materials. Substantial.

locked, unlabeled, metal doors.

5, 5.2.4 Spot detection provided in western portion of 8.2.7.C.

7, 14.2 Fire detection installed above cable penetrations from RB to TB.

7, 14.2 Fire detection above MG Set oil coolers and pumps. Column / Row 11-15 / G-H. (Oil coolers and pumps removed. Detection remains in place).

7, 14.2 Fixed water suppression in zone except column / row 9-17 / C-D. Combustible loading is minimal in this area.

1, 3.1.11 Provide curb around MG set oil cooler and pump. Also reference [1](5.18.6). (Oil coolers and pumps removed).

9 Manual fire fighting equipment (portable extinguishers and hose stations) is available in this zone. Also reference [1](5.18.4).

12, F.8 Thermal detection provided for the turbine oil reservoir tanks.

9, 5.10.3 No safe shutdown equipment in this zone.

7, 14.2 There are safe shutdown cables in this zone.

4.3-217

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.C Unit 1/2 Mezzanine Floor 1, 3.1.10 Protect tops of electrical cabinets, SWGR, & MCCs from water damage. Also reference

[1](5.18.6).

1, 5.18.4 Automatic deluge system provided for turbine lube oil reservoirs.

1, 5.18.4 Automatic sprinkler protection provided for MG set oil coolers. Oil coolers removed.

sprinkler system left in place.

7, 9.2 3-hour separation between RB and TB. Also reference [4], [11].

12, F.8 Turbine oil reservoir tanks protected by automatic water spray. Supplemented by a ceiling-level wet pipe system.

7, 14.2 Local automatic water spray for turbine oil reservoirs. Actuated by thermal detectors.

Also reference [9](5.10.2.2 & 5.10.4.2).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611 Rev. 1.

5 Exemption Request 5.2 (12-18-84), Exemption for the lack of complete 3-hour fire barrier between TB zone groups. Revised to Southern and Central Zone Groups (6-25-86). Exemption granted (9.0) 12-11-87.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 Letter, CECO to NRC, dated 12-27-78.

9 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0613 Rev. 1.

10 Left Blank Intentionally.

11 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612 Rev. 1.

12 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 13 Left Intentionally Blank.

14 SER, March 2, 1994.

15 Note: Reference cable tray loading limits in Table 3.6-2.

16 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-II, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.002 Rev. 3.

17 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-II and RW, ER9801574.

18 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-II and TB-IV, ER9801622.

19 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-II, QDC-4100-M-1222.

20 Evaluation for presence of gas cylinders EC 401197.

4.3-218

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.7.C AREA: TB-II LOCATION: TB 1/2, Elev. 611 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 8.2.7.C consists of the central section of the Turbine Building on the 611 foot elevation.

The zone extends from the 611 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 639 and is bounded by the reactor building walls to the east, by the walls separating it from zone 8.2.7.D to the north and 8.2.7.B to the south.

The zone contains two sets of 480 Vac switchgear, several MCC's, compressed gas cylinders, the turbine lube oil reservoirs, the TBCCW pumps and heat exchangers, a battery bank, and ASD coolers.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 8.2.7.D, north TB-I 5.0, 8.1, 8.2.6.C, below TB-II 8.2.10, west TB-II 8.2.7.B, south TB-III 8.2.8.A, above 14-11 8.2.8.B, above 13-12 8.2.8.C, above 24-13 8.2.8.D, above 23-14 8.2.8.E, above TB-IV 1.1.1.2, 1.1.1.3, east RB-1 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, east RB-2 DETECTION:

Smoke detection is provided near the cable penetrations from the reactor buildings and in the area bounded by column lines C and D and 12 and 14. Thermal detection is provided over the turbine oil reservoirs, and the ASD coolers.

1 Equivalent Fire Area, as defined in Section 1.4 2

Ibid 3

Ibid 4

Ibid 4.3-219

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

A local wet pipe sprinkler system provides protection for the entire zone east of column line D and over the resin storage areas. A water spray system provides protection for the turbine oil reservoirs.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: High Less than 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of lubricating oil. The other significant combustibles are electrical cables, and transformer oil. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consist of various materials distributed throughout the zone. Thus, there are several fixed combustibles capable of producing serious fires and propagating fire from the ignition area to other portions of the zone. The bulk of the lubricating oil is contained in the turbine oil reservoirs. The transformer oil is contained in two separate transformers on the west side of the zone, one on the north end and one on the south. With the exception of tray risers from the zones below, the cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor. In general, catch basins or curbs are provided for spill retention in the immediate vicinity of equipment containing large volumes of oil. These spill containment features are not designed to cope with major equipment failure, failures in piping or fittings routed outside their boundaries, or failures in pressurized components which may produce a spray or stream of oil. Compressed gas cylinders, some of which contain hydrogen, are present in the zone. However, even if the cylinders were to leak, the hydrogen concentration in the room would not exceed the lower explosive limit.

Transients account for a small fraction of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The primary hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of producing a serious fire and propagating the fire away from the area of origin. As mentioned above, the combustibles capable of such propagation are the electrical cables and the various oils.

The installed smoke detection system, where provided, should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out. In other areas, brigade call out could be delayed unless personnel are working in the area and report the fire.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires; Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers; High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility; Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

4.3-220

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 8.2.7.C:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles unless the exposed electrical cables in the tray system become ignited or there is an oil spill fire.

Should the cable trays become involved, propagation throughout large portions of the zone would not be expected unless the sprinkler system failed to perform effectively. Without actuation of the sprinklers, effective action must be taken by the fire brigade to preclude general area involvement. In the event of a large oil spill outside of a containment boundary, extensive oil spread could be expected and, if ignited, significant area involvement could result, including ignition of the electrical cables.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area TB-II:

Fire zone 8.2.6.C, below, is separated from 8.2.7.C by a reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly. The integrity of this barrier is compromised by a number of sizable openings, including stairways and pipe chases. There are also smaller openings for piping and cable trays.

The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.6.C, below, is limited, except in the case of large oil spill fires. The cable risers penetrating the floor provide a path for fire propagation, but downward fire spread is a slow process; offering significant time for extinguishment. Fire involving an oil spill outside the containment curbs, could spread to the zone below through uncurbed floor penetrations.

The potential for fire spread to zone 5.0, below, is limited by the 3-hour rated, reinforced concrete, floor/ceiling assembly which separates the two.

The potential for fire spread into zone 8.1, located below the southeast corner of zone 8.2.7.C is limited by the presence of a three-hour rated barrier. Although the fire severity for the area is high, the barriers should not be challenged by a fire in zone 8.2.7.C since, the vertical vent paths to the open turbine deck serve to limit the accumulation of hot combustion products and, thereby, limit radiant feedback from superheated combustion gases within the zone. Actuation of the sprinkler system should provide further assurance that the barriers would not be challenged.

Fire spread into zone 8.2.10, to the west and above portions of 8.2.7.C, is somewhat limited by the reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly which provides vertical separation between the two zones. A large fire in 8.2.7.C, however, is likely to spread to or at least damage the equipment in 8.2.10 due to their shared ceiling and the open zone interface on the east side of 8.2.10.

4.3-221

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-I:

Fire zone 8.2.7.D in area TB-I bounds zone 8.2.7.C on the north. The zones are separated by a reinforced concrete shield wall with excellent fire resistive capability. The wall is penetrated by a personnel doorway, fitted with a non-rated steel door, and by a number of cable trays which are sealed at the barrier. Because of the lack of combustible floor and wall finish in the area of the door, the lack of combustibles immediately inside it, and the height of the ceiling on the 8.2.7.C side of the door, fire spread to zone 8.2.7.D via this avenue is not credible. The area around these systems is protected by a curb, but no curb is provided in front of the door. However, a curb is provided inside the door. Thus, flaming or non-ignited oil could flow into 8.2.7.D.

Direct fire spread to zone 8.2.7.D via oil spread is not expected if the automatic suppression system installed in the area functions in a timely manner.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-III:

Fire zone 8.2.7.B in area TB-III bounds zone 8.2.7.C on the south. The zones are separated by a reinforced concrete shield wall with excellent fire resistive capability. The wall is penetrated by a personnel doorway, fitted with a non-rated steel door, and by a number of cable trays which are sealed at the barrier. Because of the lack of combustible floor and wall finish in the area of the door and the lack of combustibles immediately inside it, fire spread to zone 8.2.7.D via this avenue is not credible. This, coupled with the installed suppression system should minimize the prospect of fire spread to zone 8.2.7.B.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-IV:

The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.8.E, above, is limited by the substantial, reinforced concrete, floor/ceiling assembly which separates the two zones. There are a number of penetrations in this assembly, however. Among these are stairway and piping penetrations.

Although there is a discontinuity of combustibles penetrating this assembly, the possible severity of a fire in 8.2.7.C makes spread to 8.2.8.E via the unprotected penetrations a distinct possibility.

The scarcity of combustibles in this portion of 8.2.8.E provides some benefit relative to limiting the involvement of 8.2.8.E.

Fire Spread Potential To Equivalent Fire Areas 14-1, 13-1, 24-1 and 23-1:

Equivalent fire areas 14-1, 13-1, 24-1, and 23-1 (formerly known, respectively, as fire zones 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.D) are separated from 8.2.7.C by a reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly. However, openings exist in the floor (e.g., pipe penetrations). These penetrations are equipped with non-combustible seals. These separation features, coupled with the vertical vent paths from 8.2.7.C to 8.2.8.E and 8.2.10, and the provision for automatic suppression over the most significant exposing hazard on 8.2.7.C, make the potential for direct fire spread to these zones from a fire in 8.2.7.C unlikely.

4.3-222

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 8.2.7.C is addressed below. The issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

11.0 Lack of 3-Hour Barriers Between the Fire Areas 8.2.7.C, 8.2.7.E, and 8.2.8.D5 and Northern and Central Zone Groups.

Issue: The barrier separating 8.2.8.E in TB-IV from 8.2.7.C in TB-II, the central zone group, from the turbine operating floor (zone 8.2.8.E) is not rated. Zones 8.2.7.C and 8.2.7.E contain safe shutdown cables. The principle concern is that a fire could originate in 8.2.7.C, spread to 8.2.8.E, and ultimately spread to 8.2.7.E, endangering redundant safe shutdown components.

Evaluation: This concern has been explored in the discussion of Fire Spread Potential, above.

Based on that exploration, the possibility of fire spread to zone 8.2.8.E from zone 8.2.7.C, below, is possible, should a significant fire occur. However, the scarcity of combustibles in 8.2.8.E between the vent paths from 8.2.7.C and the floor openings connecting 8.2.8.E and 8.2.7.E would preclude spread to 8.2.7.E which is located below the turbine operating floor and a considerable distance (i.e., > 100 feet) from 8.2.7.C. Therefore, the separation provided is acceptable for the hazard. This finding is consistent with that of the existing SER.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above for fire zone 8.2.7.C demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

The barrier shared by 8.2.7.C and 8.2.8.E deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant safe shutdown trains. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 8.2.7.C will not result in the loss of the redundant trains. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

5 The SER cites zone 8.2.8.D, but the narrative indicates that the zone of concern is actually 8.2.8.E. Thus, the following will address 8.2.8.E.

4.3-223

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.1.A Unit 1 Condensate Pump Room Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-9-1,10-1 General Elevation: 547'-0" Zone Area: 4,274 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: Power feed to 1/2 diesel generator cooling water pump is protected by a one hour fire wrap. Flammable liquids cabinet provided.

Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose lines, or piping breaks will not affect safe shutdown as no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-V 3 Hour Except Watertight Door [5]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour (Open Pipe Chase to 8.2.6.C) [1]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated[1] noncombustible, open No doors 0'-11" thick concrete mechanical block enclosed pipe chase 8.2.6.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors, open pipe 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical chase 11.1.1.C TB-III Non-rated noncombustible One nonlabeled 1'-6" thick concrete watertight door.

8.2.6.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.1.1.B TB-V 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [6] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-139) One nonlabeled 1'-6" thick concrete watertight door.

8.2.1.C TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open One unlabeled door. 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.1.1.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible One nonlabeled 1'-6" thick concrete watertight door.

8.2.3.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open Open at upper 2'-3" thick concrete mechanical basement level.

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-224

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.1.A Unit 1 Condensate Pump Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2, 5.13.4 Hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are provided for this zone.

6, 13.2 Complete automatic wet pipe sprinkler system provided with alarms to the control room.

Also reference [2](5.13.4) & [5](5.9.2).

2, 5.13.6 Lube oil storage will be limited to a maximum container size of thirty gallons for both fire zones8.2.1.A and 8.2.1.B. Also reference [2](3.1.11).

6, 9.2 1-hour fire rated wrap provided for the Unit 2 alternate (reserve) feed to DG 1/2 cooling water pump and its cubicle cooler in Unit 1 portion of TB. Also reference [3], [5](5.9.3) and [6](13.2 & 13.3).

2, 5.13.6 Waste oil will be excluded from the area and an NFPA approved flammable liquids storage cabinet will be provided in Turbine Building basement. Also reference

[2](3.1.11).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Fire Zone 8.2.1.A does not border Fire Zone 8.2.6.C, but the north wall contains an opening to a vertical pipe chase to Fire Zone 8.2.6.C above with a 1-hour barrier installed in the opening.

2 SER, July 27, 1979.

3 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 4 Exemption request 5.7 (12-18-84). Exemption granted 11.0 (12-11-87). Exemption for lack of complete detection and suppression for enclosure of cable in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. Located in Volume 4 of the FPR. This exemption was deemed unnecessary and withdrawn.

5 Exemption Request 5.9 (12-18-84). Exemption granted 12.0 (12-11-87). Exemption for lack of complete 3-hour barriers between fire area 11.1.1.B and the Southern Group. Located in Volume 4 of the FPR.

6 SER, July 21, 1988.

7 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

8 Intentionally left blank 9 SER, March 2, 1994.

10 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-III, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.001 Rev. 3.

11 A 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire wrap is installed to protect the 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Cables. However, full detection and suppression has not been provided for this zone. This is justified with GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0609.

4.3-225

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.1.A AREA: TB-III LOCATION: TB 1, Elev. 547 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 8.2.1.A consists of the condensate pump room on elevation 547 of the Unit 1 Turbine Building.

Zone 8.2.1.A, the basement floor of the building, extends from the 547 foot elevation to elevation 572 and is bounded by the exterior building wall on the south, by zone 8.2.1.C to the east, by zones 11.1.1.A, 11.1.1.B, and 11.1.1.C and the building exterior wall to the west, and by the building exterior wall and zone 8.2.3.A to the north.

The zone contains the condensate pumps, the condensate booster pumps, and the condensate transfer pumps for Unit 1.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 11.1.1.A, 11.1.1.C, west TB-III 8.2.1.C, east TB-III 8.2.3.A, north and above TB-III 8.2.6.A, 8.2.6.B, above TB-III 8.2.6.C, above TB-II 11.1.1.B, inside 8.2.1.A TB-V DETECTION:

None.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

Area wet pipe sprinkler system.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is composed primarily of electrical cables. The second and third most prominent combustibles, contributing only a fraction of the loading associated with the cables, are hydrogen and lubricating oil, respectively. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed with good spatial separation. Thus, the only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a severe fire in the zone are the electrical cables or the lubricating oil. Full involvement of the cables is possible, depending on the location of the ignition source. In most instances, full involvement would be precluded by a fire stop located approximately at the north/south mid point of the room. The cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor.

4.3-226

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Hydrogen constitutes the second largest quantity of fuel. This quantity of hydrogen is not normally in the room but, could be released in the room given the failure of a hydrogen system component. The oil is distributed among twelve separate pieces of equipment and a combustible liquid storage locker. The lubricants in the machinery is contained in bearing housings of substantial construction, with the largest single quantity of oil in a housing being two gallons.

Thus, a large spill fire capable of causing full area involvement is unlikely.

Transients account for a significant portion of the combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The hazard associated with transients in this zone is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of producing a severe fire. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are the electrical cables.

Although no detection system is provided, actuation of the sprinkler system would notify operating personnel via a Control Room annunciation. This notification should prompt fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

Type and distribution of combustibles; Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires; Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers; High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility; and Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

Fire brigade performance would be hampered by the need to access the compartment from above.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 8.2.1.A:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the quantities and discontinuity of combustibles, with the exception of the cable trays. Thus, significant fire spread in this area is dependent on tray involvement. Should the trays become involved, combustion could continue to burnout or until limited by suppression. The high ceiling in the area and the vertical vent paths would limit the rate of propagation in the tray system and, barring an exposure fire under the fire stop, involvement of only a portion of the zone's cables would be expected. Proper functioning of the sprinkler system should limit fire development.

4.3-227

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area TB-III:

The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.3.A is limited by the reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly separating the zones vertically. However, the lack of physical horizontal separation between these zones at the southern boundary of 8.2.3.A and the unprotected penetrations in the floor/ceiling assembly (e.g., stairway openings) render damage to components in zone 8.2.3.A from a fire in 8.2.1.A a distinct possibility, even if fire propagation to that zone did not occur.

The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.6.A, above, is limited by the reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly which separates the two zones. The floor/ceiling assembly is penetrated by an equipment hatch which is plugged with a reinforced concrete plug of substantial construction. Although not fire-rated, this barrier exhibits good fire resistive characteristics and should not be challenged by a fire in zone 8.2.6.A.

Fire zone 8.2.6.B is located above zone 8.2.1.A and is separated from it by a barrier of reinforced concrete construction. The combustible loading in zone 8.2.1.A is not sufficient to challenge this barrier. However, there are open mechanical penetrations in the barrier. Thus, fire spread to zone 8.2.6.B is a possibility if the sprinkler system in 8.2.1.A does not function properly.

The potential fire and/or explosion hazard in Fire Zone 8.2.1.A which would be most likely to affect adjacent zones, is the hydrogen water chemistry system. Should a hydrogen release occur, it is expected that hydrogen would rise through the mechanical openings which would expose the fire zones located above (Fire Zones 8.2.3.A and 8.2.6.C). Hydrogen leak detection is provided in Fire Zone 8.2.3.A and in the area of 8.2.6.C above the manlift, stairs, and open pipe chase.

When the detection system senses a release, interlocks stop the flow of hydrogen. Should a significant release of hydrogen occur and a fire or explosion result, the substantial concrete barriers would serve to limit the structural damage to adjacent zones.

Fire zones 11.1.1.A and 11.1.1.C are separated from 8.2.1.A by 3-hour rated fire barriers. To preclude common cause failure of the ECCS related components in these zones from flooding in 8.2.1.A, water tight doors are installed in the personnel access doorways. These doors are of substantial steel construction (they are submarine doors), but are not fire-rated. Other penetrations into these zones are provided with fire rated penetration seals. The possibility of fire spread into these zones from 8.2.1.A, then, becomes a question of the effectiveness of the water tight doors in preventing fire spread. The design of these doors is such that, even when exposed to severe fire conditions, they would remain in place. The only failure mechanism of concern then would be the loss of the door gasket (rubber) when exposed to fire conditions. Loss of the gasket would allow combustion gases to enter the uninvolved zone. This performance under fire conditions was proven during a severe battery fire aboard the U.S.S. Cochino (SS-349). The high ceilings and vertical vent paths in zone 8.2.1.A would preclude the doors being exposed to high temperature combustion gases evolved by a fire anywhere but in the immediate vicinity of the door. A fire in the immediate vicinity of the door (say an oil spill fire) could result in gasket failure after a prolonged exposure. The conditions for such an exposure do not exist in zone 8.2.1.A, thus, fire spread into zones 11.1.1.A or 11.1.1.C would not be expected.

The sprinkler system installed in 8.2.1.A provides further assurance that such is the case.

4.3-228

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire zone 8.2.1.C is located due east of zone 8.2.1.A and is separated from it by a reinforced concrete barrier of substantial construction. This barrier has penetrations in it for personnel access, cable trays, and piping. Due to the high ceiling and vertical vent paths in zone 8.2.1.A and the distribution of combustibles, a fire challenging the barrier separating these zones is not realistic. However, should the cables penetrating the wall become involved, and the sprinklers in 8.2.1.A fail to function properly, fire spread to 8.2.1.C is a possibility.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Fire zone 8.2.6.C is located above the north end of zone 8.2.1.A and is connected to it by a man-lift access and by a stairwell. The barrier separating these zones at elevation 595 is of heavy reinforced concrete construction and exhibits good fire resistive characteristics. Although a fire in 8.2.1.A would not challenge this barrier, openings in it compromise its effectiveness in containing fire. Most notable among these is the opening for the man-lift structure and belt.

This opening, in addition to being a clear space through which combustion gases and smoke can readily pass, is penetrated by the combustible man-lift belt. Thus, a direct route and a combustible for communicating fire between zones exists, and fire spread to 8.2.6.C from 8.2.1.A is a definite possibility. The sprinklers in 8.2.1.A serve to reduce the probability of such an occurrence.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area TB-V:

Fire zone 11.1.1.B, Fire Area TB-V, is separated from 8.2.1.A by 3-hour rated fire barriers. To preclude common cause failure of the ECCS related components in this zone from flooding in 8.2.1.A, a water tight door is installed in the personnel access doorway. This door is of substantial steel construction (they are submarine doors), but are not fire-rated. Other penetrations into this zone are provided with fire rated penetration seals. The possibility of fire spread into this zone from 8.2.1.A, then, becomes a question of the effectiveness of the water tight door in preventing fire spread. The design of this door is such that, even when exposed to severe fire conditions, it would remain in place. The only failure mechanism of concern then would be the loss of the door gasket (rubber) when exposed to fire conditions. Loss of the gasket would allow combustion gases to enter the uninvolved zone. This performance under fire conditions was proven during a severe battery fire aboard the U.S.S. Cochino (SS-349). The high ceilings and vertical vent paths in zone 8.2.1.A would preclude the door being exposed to high temperature combustion gases evolved by a fire anywhere but in the immediate vicinity of the door. A fire in the immediate vicinity of the door (say an oil spill fire) could result in gasket failure after a prolonged exposure. The conditions for such an exposure do not exist in zone 8.2.1.A, thus, fire spread into zones 11.1.1.B would not be expected. The sprinkler system installed in 8.2.1.A provides further assurance that such is the case.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 8.2.1.A is addressed below. The issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

4.3-229

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 10.0 Lack of 3-Hour Barriers Between Fire Zones 8.2.1.A and 11.1.1.B and the Rest of the Southern Zone Group Issue: Fire zones 8.2.1.A and 11.1.1.B are separated from each other by 3-hour fire rated construction except for the connecting personnel access door. The principle concern is that compliance with the requirements of Section III.G.2 with regard to redundant safe shutdown components is not achieved.

Evaluation: As discussed under Factors Influencing Fire Impact, above, the primary fixed combustibles in zone 8.2.1.A are electrical cables located in the overhead trays. Due to their location, these trays do not constitute a direct exposure to the barrier separating zone 8.2.1.A from zone 11.1.1.B. This topic has been explored in the discussion of Fire Spread Potential, above. Based on that exploration, the possibility of fire spread to zone 11.1.1.B is unlikely and, therefore, the separation provided is acceptable for the hazard. This finding is consistent with that of the existing SER.

Additionally, electrical cables for redundant SS/D equipment in zone 11.1.1.B are routed through zone 8.2.1.A. This cable is protected by a one-hour rated fire wrap and the area is sprinklered.

Considering this, a fire in 8.2.1.A will not compromise the integrity of this SS/D cable. Thus, the objectives of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 are satisfied.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above for fire zone 8.2.1.A demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

The barrier shared by 8.2.1.A and 11.1.1.B deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant safe shutdown related cables. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 8.2.1.A will not result in the loss of redundant SS/D trains. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-230

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.1.C Unit 1 Turbine Foundation Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-9-1 General Elevation: 558'-6" Zone Area: 3,850 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: One hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose streams, or piping breaks will not affect safe shutdown as no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Water runoff would be handled by sump pumps of the general area drainage system, these drains are normally closed and would have to be unplugged for water removal.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description CT-2 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open One non labeled door. Concrete block at mechanical tube pull pit 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 8.2.3.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.6.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors, open pipe 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical chase 8.2.1.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open One non labeled door. 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-231

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.13.4 Hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are provided for this zone.

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-III, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.001 Rev. 3 4.3-232

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.1.C AREA: TB-III LOCATION: TB, Elev 558-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Turbine Foundation FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. The combustible loading is light and is due to electrical cable insulation and transients.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone impacting safe shutdown equipment or cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.1.C which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.6. TB-III Non-rated A

8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.3. TB-III Non-rated A

8.2.6. TB-III Non-rated B

8.2.1. TB-III Non-rated A

4.3-233

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION - ZONE 8.2.1.C:

A non-rated barrier constructed of concrete blocks separate this zone from Fire Zone 8.2.6.A in the condenser tube pull pit. A non-labeled door is installed in this barrier. The wall separating this zone from Fire zone 8.2.3.A is 4-foot thick concrete as is the wall separating this zone from Fire zone 8.2.1.A. Electrical penetrations in these walls are sealed with noncombustible material and open mechanical penetrations exist. A 1-6 thick 3-hour fire rated concrete wall separates this fire zone from Fire Zone 8.2.5. A 4-foot thick concrete wall containing one unlabeled door, electrical penetrations sealed with noncombustible material, and open mechanical penetrations separate this zone from Fire Zone 8.2.1.A. The ceiling of this zone serves as the boundary with Fire Zone 8.2.6.B. The electrical penetrations in the ceiling are sealed with noncombustible material and there are open mechanical penetrations. In addition, an open pipe chase exists between these two zones.

Even though the fire-loading limit for this zone is relatively light, a wet pipe sprinkler system is provided for this zone. In addition, a hose station, equipped with 100 feet of hose is located in this fire zone.

The barriers separating this fire zone are unrated except for the boundary with the cable tunnel (fire zone 8.2.5); however, significant structural mass and thermal adsorption capability is associated with the boundaries that provides some degree of fire resistance. The existence of a suppression system provides additional assurance that a fire originating in this zone would not spread to an adjacent zone prior to extinguishment, since the suppression system would actuate, controlling or extinguishing the fire and summoning the plant fire brigade.

CONCLUSION:

The light combustible loading in this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge the structural boundaries due to the material of construction and the associated thermal adsorption capability.

In addition, the zone is provided with a wet pipe suppression system, which would control any fire occurring in this area.

4.3-234

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.3.A Unit 1 Upper Basement Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-10-1 General Elevation: 572'-6" Zone Area: 4,713 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection coverage. Hydrogen leak detection.

Suppression: General area pre-action sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and one hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: Power feed to 1/2 diesel generator cooling water pump is protected by a one hour fire wrap. One partial one hour fire barrier at the north wall vertical pipe chase.

Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose streams, or piping breaks will not affect safe shutdown as no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [3]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.1.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible No doors 4'-0" thick concrete (South) / open 8.2.1.C TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated [3] noncombustible, open One unlabeled door 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical [5]

8.2.6.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 11.1.1.C TB-III Non-rated noncombustible No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 8.2.3.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.1.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 2'-3" thick concrete (Floor) mechanical

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-235

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.3.A Unit 1 Upper Basement Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 6, 9.2 No continuity of combustibles between Fire Zones 8.2.3.A (of the southern group) and 8.2.6.C. Also reference [3](5.2.4).

1, 5.14.4 Hose stations and portable extinguishers provided for area.

2 1-hour protection of Unit 2 alternate feed to DG 1/2 cooling water pump and its cubicle cooler in U1 portion on TB.

1, 5.14.6 Automatic sprinklers will be extended to protect the rod drive feed pumps. Also reference [1](3.1.5), [3](5.2.4) and [6](9.2).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Exemption Request 5.2 applies to this fire zone and involves the lack of 3-hour fire barriers between the Southern and Central Zone Groups. Also see section 9.0 of the July 21, 1988 SER.

4 Exemption Request 5.7 5 A partial one -hour barrier separates the vertical pipe chase along the south wall (Zone 8.2.6.A) and 8.2.3.A. This barrier protects 1/2 DGCWP cables inside the chase from direct flame impingement. No damper has been installed in the penetrating HVAC ductwork per SE-96-076.

6 SER, July 21, 1988.

7 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-III, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.001 Rev. 3.

4.3-236

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.3.A AREA: TB-III LOCATION: TB III, Elev. 572-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Upper Basement FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists fire zones adjacent to Fire Zone 8.2.3.A, which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.6C TB-II Non-rated 4.3-237

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION:

The primary concern relative to the affect on safe shutdown capability would be a fire originating in Fire Zone 8.2.3.A and spreading to adjacent zones which contain components used for safe shutdown in the event of a fire in 8.2.3.A. Fire Zone 8.2.6.C, located in Fire Area TB-II, contains components which are credited for safe shutdown of Units 1 and 2.

The previous FHA described the separation between 8.2.3.A and 8.2.6.C as equivalent to a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier and was described in Exemption Request 5.2. Exemption Request 5.2 applies to the separation between the Southern and Central Zone Groups.

An evaluation was performed concerning the interface between these zones. A 4-0 thick concrete floor on unprotected structural steel separates these zones. Openings in the floor include, a manlift, open stairs, and a pipe hatch. Regardless of these openings, the consequences of a fire in this zone would not adversely impact safe shutdown components or cables located in Fire Zone 8.2.6.C based on the following factors:

General area wet pipe sprinkler protection and smoke detection are provided throughout Fire Zone 8.2.2.A. Hydrogen leak detection is provided in the zone. The hydrogen leak detection system is interlocked with the hydrogen system providing safeguards which will limit the release of hydrogen.

Fire detection is provided in Fire Zone 8.2.6.C. Should products of combustion enter 8.2.6.C from a fire in Fire Zone 8.2.3.A, it would be promptly detected. Hydrogen leak detectors are also provided in Fire Zone 8.2.6.C above the vertical openings from 8.2.3.A.

Except for openings for the manlift, pipe chase, and the door to the stairs, a substantial 4-0 thick concrete floor on structural steel separates these two zones.

Manual fire fighting equipment is available for both of these fire zones.

Should products of combustion travel from Fire Zone 8.2.3.A to 8.2.6.C, the fire brigade is available and properly trained to intervene. Such intervention combined with the fixed protection should provide adequate protection of the safe shutdown equipment located in Fire Zone 8.2.6.C. Pre-fire plans have been developed for these fire zones and are utilized by the fire brigade in training.

As discussed above, Exemption Request 5.2 and Section 9.2 of the July 21, 1988 SER provide additional details concerning the adequacy of the separation between these two zones. Therefore, the increase in the combustible loading limit for Fire Zone 8.2.3.A should not impact the ability to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown.

4.3-238

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.3.B Unit 1 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-10-1 General Elevation: 580'-0" Zone Area: 1,685 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: One hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose, located at column 13.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Use of manual hose streams or piping breaks will not affect safe shutdown as no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-I Equivalent 3 Hour []1]

RW Nonrated[6]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [1]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 14.1 RW Non-rated[6] noncombustible, open No doors 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical[6]

8.2.2.B TB-I None noncombustible, open No doors No wall mechanical 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated [1] noncombustible, open No doors 2'-8" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.3.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-239

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2, 9.2 No safe shutdown cables or equipment in zone. No significant quantity of combustibles.

Also reference [1](5.2.4) and [2](10.2).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Appendix R Exemption Request 5.2 applies to this fire zone and involves the lack of 3-hour fire barriers between the Southern and Central Zone Groups.

2 SER, July 21, 1988.

3 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

4 SER, March 2, 1994.

5 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-III, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.001 Rev. 3.

6 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-III and RW, ER9801580.

4.3-240

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.3.B AREA: TB-III LOCATION: TB III, Elev. 580-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. Based on the existing fire area separation, this fire loading should not challenge cables or equipment in the adjacent fire areas.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.3.B which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.3.A TB-III Non-rated 8.2.2.B TB-I None (no wall) 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated 14.1 RW Non-rated 4.3-241

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION ZONE 8.2.3.B:

This fire zone is the unit 1 turbine building radwaste piping tunnel. The east wall of this zone partially borders the radwaste building. The wall for this portion is constructed of 3-0 thick reinforced concrete and has an open passage to the radwaste building collection and holding area. The remainder of the east wall borders the outside (below grade). The south wall is constructed of 1-6 thick concrete and borders fire zone 8.2.3.A. The remaining walls border below grade areas underneath the turbine building. The tunnel is open to the unit 2 portion of the radwaste piping tunnel on the north end. None of the zones walls are credited as being fire rated. The ceiling of this area is the floor of fire zone 8.2.6.C and is constructed of 3-0 thick concrete with an open hatchway and pipe chase. The radwaste piping tunnel contains no safe shutdown cables or equipment associated with any safe shutdown methodology. There are no automatic fire detection or automatic fire suppression systems installed in this fire zone. There is, however, a hose station, equipped with 100 ft. of hose, provided to support manual fire suppression activity if required. The radwaste-piping tunnels (fire zone 8.2.3.B) fire loading limit is low, however the only specifically identified combustible identified within the tunnel is a half-gallon of lube oil associated with the condensate backwash transfer pump. In the event of a fire occurring within this zone, the significant thermal mass associated with the boundaries and the lack of significant combustibles is likely to result in a slowly growing fire that will not propagate outside the zone due to the lack of continuity of combustibles. Due to the opening of this tunnel to adjacent fire zones, the buildup of significant amounts of hot gasses and smoke is unlikely. As such, a high degree of assurance exists that a fire originating within this area will not spread to adjacent fire zones and damage safe shutdown equipment or cables.

4.3-242

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.A Unit 1 Ground Floor Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-12-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 15,440 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area smoke detection coverage between the reactor feed pump room and the Unit 1 diesel generator room (above the Unit 1 auxiliary transformer feeds), and in the corridor running along row G from column line 24 to column line 14.

Suppression: Local area wet pipe sprinkler system protects the reactor feedwater pumps, and in the corridor from column line 14 to 17. Local preaction sprinkler system has been installed above the Unit 1 trackway at the south end of the fire zone actuated by thermal detectors.

Manual Suppression: Water hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose and portable fire extinguishers. Fire carts also available in this area.

Other FP features: Flammable liquids cabinet provided. The access hatches are curbed to prevent fluid borne fire spread across the fire boundary. The Unit 1 and the Unit 2 cable tunnel hatches are class A fire rated doors with a 3-hour fire label (Ref. DCP 9900059, and DCP 9900174 respectively).

Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose lines or piping breaks will not adversely affect safe shutdown. The effects from these actions would be of no greater severity than those already determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-1S Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

SB-II Nonrated[15]

SB-I 3 Hour TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [5] (3 Hour at Fire Zone 8.1)

CT-2 3 Hour CT-1 3 Hour RB-1N 3 Hour 4.3-243

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.A Unit 1 Ground Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.7.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical on exposed steel 6.1.B TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3-hr (F-386) No doors 0'-5 1/2" thick concrete ceiling on sprinkler protected steel 8.2.6.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open One unlabelled door. 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical (concrete block at pull pit) 9.1 TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-152, 153, One class A fire door, 1'-0" thick concrete 154) Two 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> dampers.

6.3 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [6][7] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-127) One 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> damper 2'-0" thick concrete 19.1 SB-II Non-rated[15] noncombustible, open Unlabeled double 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical[15] doors, One 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> damper.[15]

8.2.4 CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [6][7] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1 equipment access 3'-0" thick concrete hatch/door 1 (4'-0" at TW-1) personnel access hatch/door (16) 6.1.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3-hr (F-386) No doors 0'-5 1/2" thick concrete ceiling on sprinkler protected steel 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated none [5] No doors Open corridor along row F 8.2.1.C TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open One non-labeled door Concrete block at mechanical tube pull pit 1.1.1.2* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [7] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-44, F-45) One Class A fire door, 4'-0" thick concrete (1'-6" thick at interlock) 8.2.7.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible No doors Minimum 1'-6" thick concrete 3.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-131) No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 1.1.1.1* RB-1N/RB-1S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [6][7] noncombustible No doors 3'-0" thick concrete 11.2.1* RB-1S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> equivalent 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 19.2 SB-II Non-rated[15] noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical[15]

8.2.1.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors Open pipe chase mechanical 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [6][7] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1 equipment access 3'-0" thick concrete hatch/door 1 (4'-0" at TW-1) personnel access hatch/door (16)

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-244

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.A Unit 1 Ground Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 5, 5.2.4 Smoke detection provided for major electrical safe shutdown equipment and in corridor.

1, 3.1.1(9) Install fire detection system in area of 4kV switchgear 11,12, 21, 22 (by DG room) &

[1](5.17). And provided by high pressure heater bay (cable penetrations to RB).

1, 3.1.5.f Install sprinkler system in area of Unit 1 trackway. Also reference [1](5.17.6). Also provided adjacent to steam pipe chase.

1, 3.1.8 Relocate exhaust vents for reactor feed pump areas and seal openings. 3-hour barriers installed. Also reference [1](5.17.6 & 5.22.6). Relocated not to expose transformers.

3, (8) PF 38-2 Install fire detection along H wall column row H/15-19 Unit 1 and H/7-11 Unit 2 (high pressure heater bay).

2 Complete detection on ground floor Turbine Building from col. 9 to 17 in eastern corridor and common section, including safe shutdown pump.

2 Automatic sprinkler on ground floor Turbine Building from col. 9 to 17 in eastern corridor and common section, including safe shutdown pump.

2 Seal vertical cable penetrations from U2 cable tunnel thru metal hatch near col/row F/12 and F/25 with substantial fire stop.

2 Detection in far north and south portions of TB corridor and in central portion of 8.2.6.C 12-14/C-F.

8, (40) PF-58-1 3 smoke ejectors will be provided. 3 smoke ejectors on fire cart in Unit 1 Trackway.

10 Provide Class A fire doors to other fire areas. The only reference noted is the previous FHA, pg. 2.3-51.

7, 10.2 Fire detection and suppression above cable tunnel access points.

12, D.3.c Water suppression provided over major cable concentrations.

7, 10.2 Unit 2 cable tunnel electrical seals are 3-hour rated.

7, 10.2 Curbed access at F/17 & F/25 with metal checkered plate.

1, 3.1.11 Oil dispensing stations with approved cabinets. Quantity limited to 55-gallons.

1, 3.1.11 Curbs and drains for liquid storage on TB ground floor. Also reference [1](5.17).

1, 5.17.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided.

1, 5.17.4 Extra-hazard wet pipe sprinkler system provided for feed water pumps. (Pipe schedule system).

7, 9.2 Generally, 3-hour separation between TB and RB. Also reference [4].

11, 3.1.5.f Provide pre-action sprinkler system in trackways. Sized for extra hazard protection.

11, 3.1.5.f Detection system will comply with NFPA Codes. Heat shields will be provided.

7, 9.2 Automatic detection and water suppression provided in corridor. Also reference

[5](5.1 & 5.2.4).

4.3-245

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.A Unit 1 Ground Floor Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611 Rev. 1.

5 Exemption Request 5.2 (12-18-84), Exemption for the lack of complete 3-hour fire barrier between TB zone groups. Revised to Southern and Central Zone Groups (6-25-86). Exemption granted (9.0) 12-11-87. Also reference Section 5.1.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 Letter, CECO to NRC, dated 12-27-78.

9 GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.001 Rev. 3.

11 SER, November 5, 1980.

12 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 13 Note: Reference cable tray loading limits in Table 3.6-2.

14 Intentionally Left Blank.

15 Evaluation for fire area separation between SB-II and TB-III, ER9801620.

16 Equipment access hatches/doors #300 & 301 and personnel access hatches/doors

1. 302 & 303 are class A fire rated doors with a 3-hour fire label (Ref. DCP 9900174 &

DCP 9900591) 17 Upgrading of the ceiling between column lines 24/25 and G/H to a 3-hour barrier, including 6 thick 3-hr rated fire seals per DCP 9900027 / DCN 001905M.

4.3-246

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.6.A AREA: TB-III LOCATION: TB III, Elev. 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Ground Floor (Trackway)

FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is approximately 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists fire zones adjacent to Fire Zone 8.2.6.A, which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 1.1.1.1 RB-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.1.2 RB-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 11.2.1 RB-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 6.3 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 19.1 SB-II Non-rated 19.2 SB-II Non-rated 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6.C TB-II Equivalent 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.4 CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 4.3-247

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION ZONE 8.2.6.A:

The primary concern relative to the effect on safe shutdown capability would be a fire originating in Fire Zone 8.2.6.A and spreading to adjacent zones which contain components used for safe shutdown in the event of a fire in 8.2.6.A.

Fire Area SB-II, which includes fire zones 19.1 and 19.2, contains no cables which are credited for safe shutdown of Units 1 and 2. Fire spread from Fire Zone 8.2.6.A into these adjacent zones would not impact Unit 2 safe shutdown. Fire spread from 8.2.6.A into zones 19.1 and 19.2 would not preclude Unit 1 safe shutdown.

Fire zones 3.0 and 6.3 are separated from Fire Zone 8.2.6.A by 3-hour rated construction. Since the fire severity limit for zone 8.2.6.A is less than the ratings of these barriers, satisfactory fire separation is provided.

The fire zone 1.1.1.2 in Fire Area RB-1 is separated from Fire Zone 8.2.6.A by substantial reinforced concrete barriers which provide protection equivalent to that provided by a 3-hour rated barrier. The increased fire loading limit in zone 8.2.6.A is less than the effective fire resistivity of the barriers separating it from 1.1.1.2. More information on this interface can be found in Exemption Request 3.3 and Section 3 of the July 21, 1988 SER.

Fire zones 8.2.4, 8.2.5 and 8.2.6.C, utilize different safe shutdown paths and are separated from Fire Zone 8.2.6.A by a combination of construction and other fire protection features which is considered equivalent to the required 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> separation.

Fire Zone 8.2.4 is the Unit 1 Cable Tunnel and runs under Fire Zone 8.2.6.A. Separation is provided between these zones by a concrete floor at least 3-0 thick. The floor is considered to provide a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> boundary. All access hatches are curbed. Equipment hatch #300 and personnel hatch #302 are class A fire rated.

Fire Zone 8.2.5 is the Unit 2 Cable Tunnel and runs under Fire Zone 8.2.6.A. Separation is provided between these zones by a 3-0 thick (4-0 thick at the trackway) concrete floor. The floor is considered to provide a fire resistivity of at least three hours. All access hatches are curbed to prevent fluid borne fire spread across fire boundary. Equipment access hatch #301 and personnel access hatch #303 are class A fire rated doors with a 3-hour fire label (Ref.

DCP 9900174). Their performance is enhanced by the provision of automatic fire suppression on each side. Section 10 of the July 21, 1988 Safety Evaluation Report discusses the separation between these fire zones in more detail.

Fire Zone 8.2.6.C interfaces with Fire Zone 8.2.6.A via a connecting corridor with no separating barrier. In lieu of a barrier, more than 50 feet of the corridor has been provided with automatic sprinkler protection and a detection system. The sprinkler provides for suppression of fires occurring in this area and the detection provides for early notification of a fire, thereby facilitating prompt fire brigade response. The increase in the combustible loading limit for Fire Zone 8.2.6.A in the area of the connecting corridor should not challenge the combination of fire protection features provided. Further information on the separation of these zones can be found in Section 9.3 of the July 21, 1988 SER.

4.3-248

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zones 1.1.1.1 and 11.2.1 are separated from Fire Zone 8.2.6.A by substantial reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assemblies (3-0 thick for 1.1.1.1 and 2-0 thick for 11.2.1). The portion of this barrier above zone 11.2.1 has a removable concrete plug. This plug is located in the floor of the D-Heater Bay portion of 8.2.6.A and provides fire resistive capability of at least three hours based on its thickness. The D-Heater Bay is provided with fixed fire detection and suppression systems. Based on the foregoing, the increase in the combustible loading limit for Fire Zone 8.2.6.A does not present a threat of fire spread to zones 1.1.1.1 and 11.2.1 (For more information see Exemption Request 3.3 and Section 3 of the July 21, 1988 SER).

The potential for fire spread into zones 6.1.A and 6.1.B located in the southeast corner of the zone is unlikely due to 6 thick intervening reinforce concrete ceiling supported by structural steel members protected by automatic suppression system (Ref. FPR 3.6.1). The concrete barrier meets or exceeds building code and NFPA requirements for a 3-hour fire barrier. All penetrations through the floor is sealed with 3-hour fire rated seals. Fire spread to these zones is not likely.

4.3-249

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.B Unit 1 Ground Floor Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-12-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 14,660 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area heat detectors in L. P. Heater Pull Space.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system except in the corridor along row C. Local area deluge sprinkler system located along row C in L. P. Heater Pull Space and is actuated by thermal heat detectors.

Manual Suppression: Four hose stations each equipped with 100 feet of hose, and portable fire extinguisher(s) staged right outside this zone during power operation.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose streams, or piping breaks will not affect safe shutdown, as there is no safe shutdown equipment located in this area. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system, sump pumps, or would flow into the condenser pit.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RW Nonrated[10]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

CT-2 3 Hour 4.3-250

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.6.B Unit 1 Ground Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.7.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical 14.1.1 TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 14.1 RW Non-rated[10] noncombustible[10] No doors 3'-0" thick concrete 8.2.1.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.3.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.1.C TB-III Non-rated open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete w/ vertical pipe chase 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> noncombustible No doors 3'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.B TB-III Non-rated open No doors open 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated [6][7] noncombustible, open Two unlabeled doors. 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical and concrete block 8.2.6.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open One unlabeled door. 3'-0" - 4'-0" thick mechanical concrete and concrete block

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-251

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 7, 10.2 Suppression systems in zones adjacent to radwaste tunnel.

7, 10.2 Unit 2 cable tunnel electrical seals are 3-hour rated.

7, 9.2 Substantial shield walls around zone. Cable penetrations sealed with noncombustible material. Also reference [5](5.2.4).

1, 5.17.4 Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations provided.

8 Provide Class A fire doors to other fire areas. The only reference noted is the previous FHA, pg. 2.3-51.

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 Intentionally left blank 5 Exemption Request 5.2 (12-18-84), Exemption for the lack of complete 3-hour fire barrier between TB zone groups. Revised to Southern and Central Zone Groups (6-25-86). Exemption granted (9.0) 12-11-87.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

9 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-III,GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.001 Rev. 3.

10 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-III and RW, ER9801580.

11 Evaluation for moving extinguishers outside of heater bays during power operation EC 618200.

4.3-252

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.6.B AREA: TB-III LOCATION: TB1, Elev. 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Turbine Bldg. Ground Floor FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.6.B which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.6.A TB-III Non-rated 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated 8.2.7.B TB-III Non-rated 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.1.C TB-III Non-rated 8.2.7.A TB-III Non-rated 14.1.1 TB-III Non-rated 8.2.3.A TB-III Non-rated 8.2.1.A TB-III Non-rated 14.1 RW Non-rated 4.3-253

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION ZONE 8.2.6.B:

Fire zones 8.2.6.A, 8.2.6.C, 8.2.7.B, 8.2.5, 8.2.1.C, and 8.2.3.A bound this fire zone. The boundaries between this zone and fire zone 8.2.6.A are minimum 3-0 thick concrete and removable concrete block shield walls. Separation of this zone 8.2.6.B and fire zone 8.2.6.C is by minimum 4-0 thick concrete and concrete block walls. The west wall along column line C is a 1-6 thick concrete and concrete block exterior wall. None of the walls surrounding this fire zone are credited as being fire rated. The floor of this zone is the ceiling of fire zones 8.2.5 and 8.2.3.A. The portion of the floor over the unit 2 cable tunnel (fire zone) is 3-0 thick concrete with electrical penetrations sealed. Above fire zone 8.2.3.A (radwaste piping tunnel) the floor is constructed of 4-0 thick concrete and has openings for stairwells and equipment removal hatches. The ceiling of this zone, which is the floor of fire zone 8.2.7.B, is constructed of minimum 2-6 thick concrete supported by unprotected structural steel and contains openings for stairways. Neither the floor nor ceiling of fire zone 8.2.6.B is credited as being fire rated.

This fire zone is protected with automatic fire detection and suppression systems. The entire zone except the corridor along row C and over the condenser is protected by an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system. A water spray system is installed along row C. Four hose stations, each equipped with 100 ft. of hose, are provided in this area to support manual fire suppression activities. A fire extinguisher is staged outside of the main entrance to 8.2.6.B during power operation. This fire zone has moderately heavy fire loading due to allowance for a turbine oil system piping break. The major fixed combustible is electrical cable insulation and the other combustibles to be found in the area are transient in nature such as rubber, cotton, and plastic associated with protective clothing. A wet pipe sprinkler system protects the total zone except for the corridor along row C where a water spray deluge system is provided. These two sprinklers systems provide assurance that any fire that would originate in this area would be controlled and limited in growth (or extinguished) until the fire brigade arrives; therefore, a reasonable assurance that a fire originating in this fire zone will not propagate to adjacent fire zones exists.

4.3-254

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.A Unit 1 Mezzanine Floor Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-14-1 General Elevation: 615'-6" Zone Area: 9,368 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke except above the equipment removal hatches and the feeds from the generator to the main power transformer, including over the 4kV SWGR buses 13 & 14. Local area heat (thermal) detection above the hydrogen seal oil unit and the feedwater regulating valve hydraulic units.

Suppression: Local area wet pipe sprinkler system in the area between rows F and G and column lines 22 and 23. Local water spray system protects the hydrogen seal oil unit and the feedwater regulating valve hydraulic units.

Manual Suppression: Water hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose and portable fire extinguishers.

Other FP features: The floor that bounds with the U1 DG (Fire Zone 9.1) has had fire proofing applied to the structural steel. Curbing has been installed around the feed reg valve hydraulic units and hydrogen seal oil units.

The floor that bounds with the 125VDC Panel Room (Fire Zone 6.1.A) and the Battery Charging Room (Fire Zone 6.1.B) has automatic suppression to protect the structural steel.

Suppression Effects: Water discharge in this area will not affect safe shutdown as any adverse effects on hot shutdown equipment would be of no greater severity than those already determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system or would travel down stairs to Fire Zone 8.2.6.A. Switchgear panel 13 and 14 are not sealed nor installed on pedestals, and MCCs 18-2 and 19-2 are installed on 3-1/2-inch pedestals with the tops of panels sealed.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description SB-II Equivalent 3 Hour[12]

SB-I 3 Hour TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour [13]

4.3-255

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.A Unit 1 Mezzanine Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated[13] noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[13]

3.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-131) No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 19.2 SB-II Non-rated[12] noncombustible[12] No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 8.2.6.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.6.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical 9.1 TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except exhaust No doors 0'-6" thick concrete duct penetration on fire proofed steel 2.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> One Class A fire door. 2'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open One unlabeled door. 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical 7.1 TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3-hr (F-389, F-390) One class A fire Door 1'-0" thick concrete Three, 3-hr Fire Dampers 6.1.B TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3-hr (F-387, F-388) One Class A 1'-0" thick concrete door, two 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated dampers 6.1.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3-hr (F-388) One Class A 1'-0" thick concrete door, two 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated dampers

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-256

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.A Unit 1 Mezzanine Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 10, F.8 Hydrogen seal oil reservoirs have automatic water spray system.

7, 9.2 3-hour separation between RB and TB with exceptions. Also reference

[9].

1, 5.18.4 Automatic sprinkler protection provided for hydrogen seal oil area.

1, 5.18.4 Automatic deluge system provided for the hydrogen seal oil units.

1, 5.18.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided.

1, 3.1.11 Curbs around hydrogen seal oil units. Also reference [1](5.18.6).

5, 5.2.4 All penetrations in shield walls sealed with noncombustible materials.

Substantial, locked, unlabeled, metal doors provided.

2 Provide detection in areas beneath SWGR's 24-1 and 13-1, and northern portion of 8.2.7.A.

8, pg.4 Install Class A fire doors to DC distribution center Unit 1 and Unit 2.

1, 3.1.1 Install fire detection system in area of 4kV switchgear 13, 14, 23, and 24.

Smoke detection provided for most of fire zone 8.2.7.A. [5](5.2.4).

4.3-257

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.A Unit 1 Mezzanine Floor Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 Intentionally left blank 5 Exemption Request 5.2 (12-18-84) applies to this fire zone. Exemption for the lack of complete 3-hour fire barrier between TB zone groups. Revised to Southern and Central Zone Groups (6-25-86). Exemption granted (9.0) 12-11-87.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 Letter, dated 4-10-74, CECO to NRC.

9 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611 Rev. 1.

10 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 11 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-III, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.001 Rev. 3.

12 Evaluation for fire area separation between SB-II and TB-III, ER9801620.

13 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-III and TB-IV, ER9801624.

14 Intentionally left blank 15 Upgrading of walls, including seals, fire door and dampers for adjacent fire zones 6.1.A, 6.1.B and 7.1 per DCP 9900027 / DCN 001905M.

16 Evaluation for presence of gas cylinders EC 401197.

4.3-258

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.7.A AREA: TB-III LOCATION: TB 1, Elev. 615 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire zone 8.2.7.A consists of the south end of the 615 foot elevation of the Unit 1 Turbine Building.

The zone extends from the 615 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 639 and is bounded by the building exterior wall on the east and west sides, by the wall separating it from the Service Building on the south side, and by the wall separating it from zone 8.2.7.B. on the north. In the south east corner, the zone is bounded, in part, by the west wall of zone 6.1.A and a portion of the north and west walls of 6.1.B and 7.1.

The zone contains various items of switchgear, several MCC's, compressed gas cylinders, the hydrogen seal oil unit, the stator cooling unit, and bus ducting from the main generator.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 8.2.6.B, 8.2.6.A, 9.1, below TB-III 8.2.7.B, north TB-III 6.1.A, 6.1.B, 7.1, east and south TB-III 8.2.8.E, above TB-IV DETECTION:

Smoke detection is provided throughout the zone except for the equipment hatch areas and the isolated phase bus duct area. Heat detection is provided above the hydrogen seal oil unit.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

A local wet pipe sprinkler system provides protection for the area between column lines F and G and column lines 21 and 23. Local water spray protection is provided for the hydrogen seal oil unit. A local water deluge system is provided for the hydraulic unit for the feed water regulator valve positioners.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> 4.3-259

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of electrical cables. The other significant combustibles, each of which contribute only a fraction of the loading contributed by the cables, are transformer oil, lubricating oil, and hydraulic oil. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consist of various materials distributed with good spatial separation. Thus, there are several fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a propagating fire from the ignition point to other portions of the zone. With the exception of tray risers from the zones below and drops to switchgear units, the cable trays are fifteen or more feet above the floor. The bulk of the lubricating oil is contained in the hydrogen seal oil unit. The transformer oil is contained in two separate transformers on the west side of the zone. The hydraulic fluid is contained in a reservoir in the northeast corner of the zone. Dikes or curbs are provided for spill retention around equipment containing large quantities of combustible liquids, but are not provided around floor openings such as stairways or in a position to contain fluids from piping systems. Compressed gas cylinders, some containing hydrogen, are in the zone. However, even if the cylinders were to leak, the hydrogen concentration in the room would not exceed the lower explosive limit.

Transients account for a fraction of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The real hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which could expose combustibles capable of propagating the fire away from the area of origin. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are the electrical cables and the various oils.

The installed smoke detection system, where provided, should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out. In other areas, brigade call out could be delayed unless there was work being performed in the zone.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires; Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers; High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility; Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 8.2.7.A:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles unless the exposed cables become ignited or there is an oil spill fire. Should the trays become involved, propagation throughout the zone could be expected, barring effective fire brigade action. In the event of an oil spill, extensive spread could occur and, if ignition occurred, significant area involvement could result, including ignition of the cable trays.

4.3-260

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area TB-I:

Fire zone 8.2.6.A, below, is separated from 8.2.7.A by a reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly. The integrity of this barrier is compromised by a number of sizable openings, including stairways and equipment handling hatches, and smaller openings for piping and cable trays. The potential for fire spread to the zone below, 8.2.6.A, is not likely, except in the case of spill fires, due to the lack of combustibles penetrating the floor (cable risers penetrating the floor are fire stopped at the floor, preventing downward fire spread along the cables). A significant spill fire could spread to the zone below through the many uncurbed floor penetrations.

Fire spread to fire zone 9.1 is unlikely due to separation by three-hour rated construction. Such construction should not be challenged by any fire which can credibly occur in zone 8.2.7.A.

Fire zone 8.2.7.B is separated from 8.2.7.A by reinforced concrete shield walls and by portions of the turbine-generator pedestal. All of these barriers are of substantial construction and exhibit fire resistive capabilities. The combustible loading of 8.2.7.A is not sufficient to challenge these barriers. Where cable trays penetrate these walls, seals are installed to preclude fire propagation along the cables from zone to zone. The access door installed in the wall along column line 21, although not rated, is considered adequate for the purpose given the distribution of combustibles in its vicinity and the ceiling heights in the area.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-IV:

The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.8.E, above, is limited by the reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly which separates the two zones and the discontinuity of combustibles penetrating it. Where openings exist in the floor (e.g., stairways, equipment hatches, pipe penetrations), the lack of combustibles in the immediate area and the discontinuity of combustibles in the zone above would make fire spread unlikely. Cable riser penetrations are sealed at the floor; precluding flame spread along the cables. Although considerable smoke and combustion gases would vent to zone 8.2.8.E, fire spread is not expected.

Fire Spread Potential to Fire Area TB-III:

The potential for fire spread into zones 6.1.A, 6.1.B, and 7.1, located in the southeast corner of the zone is limited by the presence of intervening reinforced concrete barriers. Although these barriers are not rated, the do exhibit significant fire resistive capability. The cable tray penetrations through these walls are stopped to preclude fire spread along the cables and the ventilation openings are protected with fire dampers. Fire spread to these zones is not likely.

4.3-261

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 4.3-262

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 4.3-263

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.B Unit 1 Mezzanine Floor Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-14-1 General Elevation: 615'-6" Zone Area: 6,075 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area smoke detection around cable risers that are located in the high pressure heater bay.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system except over low pressure heaters1A1-3101, 1A2-3101, 1A3-3101, and in the corridor along row C, the L. P. Heater Pull Space.

Manual Suppression: Hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose and portable fire extinguisher(s) staged right outside the fire zone during power operation.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: The operation of sprinkler systems, use of manual hose, or piping breaks would not adversely affect the ability to safely shut down. Water runoff would be handled by the general area drainage system or would flow to the turbine condenser pit where it could be removed via sump pumps.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: High Equivalent Fire Severity: 4.7 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description 14-1 Equivalent 3 Hour[14]

RW[13] Nonrated RB-1N 3 Hour (Equivalent 3 Hour at MSIV Room) [7].

TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour [14]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

4.3-264

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.7.B Unit 1 Mezzanine Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.1.2* RB-1N Non-rated noncombustible [11] No doors 2'-0" thick concrete (floor) 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated noncombustible No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 14.1.1 TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 1.1.1.3* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [6][7] 3 hr (F-59, 60) [6][7] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 1.1.1.2* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-45) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated[14] noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[14]

8.2.8.A 14-1 Non-rated[14] noncombustible(3 No doors 4'-0" thick concrete hour 14-1 to DG1 ceiling feed)[8][14]

8.2.6.B TB-III Non-rated open No doors open 8.2.6.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors Minimum 1'-6" thick mechanical concrete 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated[6][7] noncombustible One unlabeled door. 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open One unlabeled door. 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical 14.1 RW Non-rated[13] noncombustible[13] No doors 1'-6" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-265

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.18.4 Sprinklers provided for the heater bays.

1, 5.18.4 Portable extinguishers and hose reels provided.

7, 9.2 Extensive automatic sprinkler protection provided throughout except west of Row D.

Also reference [5](5.2.4).

5, 5.2.4 All penetrations in shield walls are sealed with noncombustible materials. Substantial, locked, unlabeled, metal doors.

7 Fixed automatic water suppression is provided. Adjacent to the steam pipe chase. Also reference.

7, 9.2 U1 RB (Mezz. level) separated from TB by 3-hour barrier. Also reference [8].

2 3-hour seals at bottom of SWGR's 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, and 24-1.

2 Provide 1-hour fire door at 12 and 14/G in shield wall on U1 and U2 Turbine Building mezz. floor. Rated fire doors are not provided. Justification is provided in Exemption Request 5.2 [5](5.2).

1, 3.1.1 Provide fire detection in high pressure heater bays (cable penetrations and ceiling penetrations). Also reference [1](5.18).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 Interim Compensatory Measures IV. (12-18-84).

5 Exemption Request 5.2 (12-18-84) applies to this fire zone. Exemption for the lack of complete 3-hour fire barrier between TB zone groups. revised to Southern and Central Zone Groups (6-25-86). Exemption 9.0 granted 12-11-87.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

4.3-266

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 8 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611 Rev. 1.

9 SER, Feb. 25, 1991. Appendix R exemption request 11.0 applies to this fire zone and addresses separation of redundant instrumentation. Exemption issued on 5 91.

10 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-III, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.001 Rev. 3.

11 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-III and RW, ER9801580.

12 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-III and TB-IV, ER9801624.

13 Evaluation for moving extinguishers outside of heater bays during power operation EC 618200.

4.3-267

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.7.B AREA: TB-III LOCATION: TB1, Elev. 615-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Mezzanine Floor, South-Central Section FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 4.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.7.B which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.7.A TB-III Non-rated 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated 8.2.8.A TB-IV Non-rated 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated 14.1 RW Non-rated 14.1.1 TB-III Non-rated 8.2.6.A TB-III Non-rated 8.2.6.B TB-III Non-rated 8.2.6.C TB-II Non-rated 1.1.1.2 RB-I Non-rated 1.1.1.3 RB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 4.3-268

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION:

Fire zone 8.2.7.B is completely enclosed by concrete walls. The boundary wall that separates this zone from the unit 1 reactor building is constructed of 4-0 thick concrete with all penetrations sealed with 3-hour rated fire material. The west wall of this zone is constructed of 1-6 thick concrete and removable concrete block and is an exterior wall. Part of the south wall of this zone is an exterior wall constructed of 4-0 thick concrete. The remainder of the south wall is an interior wall separating this zone from fire zone 8.2.7.A and is constructed of 3-0 thick concrete. The north wall is constructed of 4-0 thick concrete and contains an unlabeled door for access to/from fire zone 8.2.7.C. The floor of this zone is constructed of 1-6 thick concrete supported on exposed structural steel and separates this zone from fire zones 8.2.6.A, 8.2.6.B, and 8.2.6.C. The ceiling separates this zone from fire zones 8.2.8.A and 8.2.8.E and is constructed of 4-0 thick concrete supported on exposed structural steel. Both the floor and ceiling contain openings for stairwells and equipment removal hatches. A 4-kV bus duct penetration (SWGR 14-1 feed from diesel generator 1) is contained in the barrier separating this fire zone from 8.2.8.A and 3-hour fire rated seals have been installed at the bottom of 4-kV switchgear 14-1.

This zone is protected by an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system throughout the fire zone except over low pressure heaters and in the corridor along row C. Ionization type fire detectors are installed around cable risers that are located in the high pressure heater bay. Also present in the zone is manual suppression system equipment consisting of hose stations, each equipped with 100 ft. of hose. A fire extinguisher is staged outside of the main entrance to 8.2.7.B during power operation. Fixed fire loading in this zone is light. However, this area also has the potential of heavy fire loading due to turbine lube oil piping in the area. The fire suppression and fire detection features assure that a fire within this area would be identified and addressed by an automatic suppression system until the plant fire brigade responded. Therefore reasonable assurance exists that a fire originating in this fire zone would not progress to adjacent fire zones.

4.3-269

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 9.1 Unit 1 Diesel Generator Room Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-12-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 1,089 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area heat (thermal) detectors are provided to actuate the Carbon Dioxide suppression system.

Suppression: A wet pipe sprinkler system is provided in the day tank room. The Unit 1 diesel generator room and day tank room are protected by an automatic total flooding CO2system supplied from the CO2 storage tank / unit actuated by thermal detectors.

Manual Suppression: A hose reel and portable fire extinguisher(s) are located outside the entrance to the zone in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.6.A.

Other FP features: The day tank room is curbed. Fire proofing provided for structural steel.

Suppression Effects: Water or Carbon Dioxide release in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design-based fire. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description CT-1 3 Hour CT-2 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 3'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated except No doors 0'-6" thick concrete exhaust duct on fire proofed steel penetration 8.2.6.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-152 ,153 & Two Class "A" fire 1'-0" thick concrete 154) doors, Two Dampers.

8.2.4 CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 3'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-270

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 9.1 Unit 1 Diesel Generator Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.20.2 A 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> enclosure is provided for the diesel day tank.

1, 3.1.8 Electrical supervision of the Unit 1 Diesel Generator Room Doors. Also reference [1](5.20.6).

1, 5.20.4 Carbon Dioxide Suppression System is provided for DG1. Manual and automatic actuation of system provided. Manual smoke venting by portable smoke ejectors. Also reference [1](4.3.2), and [8](F.9).

4, 24.B (pg. 6) Provide fire rated barrier for louvered doors. Doors with louvers removed.

4, 24.C (pg. 6) Install 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire dampers in HVAC ducts. Addressed in 7-31-85 PLC NFPA 90A Review.

4, 24.E (pg. 6) Provide portable ventilation equipment. Three portable ventilators provided on fire cart.

1, 5.20.6 Provide 3-hour rated barriers such as walls, floors, ceilings (includes fire proofing of steel) , Class A doors, and penetrations to separate fire zone 9.1 from surrounding zones. Also reference [1](3.1.8), and [8](F.9).

1, 4.3.2 Local and control room alarms required for DG CO2 systems.

8, F.9.b The DG day tank rooms are protected by an automatic sprinkler system.

1, 5.20.4 Thermostats actuate local and control room alarms, and the total flooding CO2 system.

1, 5.20.4 DG day tank room protected by automatic sprinkler system.

1, 5.20.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided for area.

8, D.4.i Dampers interlocked to close on activation of CO2 system.

8, E.5.a CO2 systems designed per NFPA 12.

8, E.5.b CO2 systems have predischarge alarms. CO2 system nozzles do not discharge directly on equipment. CO2 is discharged into DG and day tank rooms. Also reference [8](E.5.C) and [8](F.9.b).

7, 10.1.1 Emergency lighting will be placed to allow fuse replacement during blackout conditions.

4.3-271

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 9.1 Unit 1 Diesel Generator Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 SER, July 21, 1988.

3 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989, Sec. III (9).

4 Letter 4-10-78, pg. 6 24.B, 24.C from CECO to NRC.

5 Letter 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC). Recommends alt. power feed for DG 1.

6 Perform CO2 concentration test. 10-7-88 open item 254(265)/88021-06. Item closed 2-5-92. DG 1 system failed test. DG 1 system modified (different nozzles and set point changed to increase system discharge time) and tested. Item closed 9-15-95. NRC Inspection Report 254(265)/88021, pg. 20.

7 Exemption Request 10.1 8 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 9 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-II, NDIT QDC-98-133.

4.3-272

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 9.1 AREA: TB-III LOCATION: TB III, Elev. 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Diesel Generator Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 9.1 which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.4 TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.7.A TB-III 3 hour1 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.4 CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1

FHA indicates barrier and seal rating of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except for exhaust duct penetration.

4.3-273

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION ZONE 9.1:

This fire zone is separated from the rest of the plant by 3-hour fire barriers. The walls separating this zone from fire zone 8.2.6.A is constructed of 1-0 thick concrete and contains a Class A fire for access to the zone. The east wall is an unrated exterior wall constructed of 1-6 thick concrete. The floor separates this fire zone from the unit 1 and unit 2 cable tunnels (fire zones 8.2.4 and 8.2.5) and is constructed of 3-0 thick concrete. The ceiling separates this zone from fire zone 8.2.7.A and is constructed of 6 thick concrete supported on fire proofed structural steel. The barriers bounding adjacent fire zones are rated for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of fire resistance. The major combustible material within this fire zone is fuel oil, lube oil, and other miscellaneous combustible material associated with diesel generator support equipment. This zone is provided with a CO2 fire suppression system actuated by thermal detectors. The day tank room is provided a wet-pipe sprinkler system and overflow/tank rupture spill containment. Manual fire suppression equipment is provided near the entrance to this fire zone.

CONCLUSION:

The combustible fire loading limits for this zone are being increased to 2-1/2 hours severity. The barriers separating this zone from adjacent fire zones are rated for 3-hours of fire resistance. In addition, this zone is provided with automatic fire suppression systems, which would actuate in the event of a fire in this zone and control or suppress any fire event. In addition, the systems actuation would summon the plant fire brigade would provide additional assurance that any fire originating in this zone would not grow and spread to an adjacent fire zone and damage redundant safe shutdown equipment and cables. Based on the defense in depth and the fire protection features of this zone, the increase in combustible limits for this fire zone are acceptable and will not degrade the ability to achieve safe shutdown.

4.3-274

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.1.A Unit 1 RHR Service Water Pump Room Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-9-1 General Elevation: 547'-0" Zone Area: 496 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and a hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose are located in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.1.A.

Other FP features: 1-hour wrap provided for U2 alternate feed to DG 1/2 cooling water pump and its cubicle cooler in U1 portion of Turbine Building [3].

Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water removal would be accomplished with sump pumps as there are no drains located within the RHRSW cubicles.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-V 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.1.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-11" thick concrete (Ceiling) 8.2.1.A (wall) TB-III Non-rated noncombustible One unrated 1'-6" thick concrete watertight door.

11.1.1.B TB-V 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [5] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 4'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-275

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.1.A Unit 1 RHR Service Water Pump Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 4, 13.2 1-hour fire wrap provided for swing diesel 1/2 reserve feed.

4, 13.2 Fire hose stations and fire extinguishers are available.

2 Detection in DG 1 and DG 1/2 cooling water pump area.

2 1-hour protection of U2 alternate feed to DG 1/2 cooling water pump and its cubicle cooler in U1 portion of Turbine Building.

2 Smoke detection in rooms housing RHR service water pumps 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D. Thermal detection is provided. See M4-1(2) 30 Task 2.18, 2.23.

1, 5.13.6 For the TB Basement floor which includes the SW Pump Rooms, waste oil will be removed from the area and NFPA approved flammable liquid storage cabinets will be provided. Lube oil storage will be limited to 30 gallons. Provided in Fire Zone 8.2.1.A.

1, 3.1.5 The turbine building sprinkler system will be extended to provide protection for the RHR service water rooms and Diesel Generator cooling pumps. Also reference [1] (5.13.6).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

3 Left Intentionally Blank.

4 SER, July 21, 1988.

5 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

6 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-III, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.001 Rev. 3.

4.3-276

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.1.1.A AREA: TB-III LOCATION: Unit 1 TB, Elev. 547-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 RHR Service Water Pump Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones which are adjacent to Fire Zone 11.1.1.A but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then the spread of fire to the adjoining fire area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 11.1.1.B TB-V 3 Hour EVALUATION:

Since Fire Zone 11.1.1.B is separated from Fire Zone 11.1.1.A by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barrier, and the maximum predicted fire severity in zone 11.1.1.A is 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, no further evaluation is required.

4.3-277

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.1.C Unit 1 RHR Service Water Pump Room Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-9-1 General Elevation: 547'-0" Zone Area: 305 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and a hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose is located in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.1.A.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water removal would be accomplished with sump pumps as there are no drains located within the RHRSW cubicles.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-V 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.3.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 8.2.1.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible One Unlabeled 1'-6" thick concrete Watertight Door.

8.2.1.A TB-III Non-rated noncombustible No doors 1'-6" thick concrete (North) 11.1.1.B TB-V 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [3][4] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-140) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-278

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2 Smoke detection in rooms housing RHR service water pumps 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D. Thermal detection is provided. See M4-1(2) 30 Task 2.18, 2.23.

1, 5.13.6 For the TB Basement floor which includes the SW Pump Rooms, waste oil will be removed from the area and NFPA approved flammable liquid storage cabinets will be provided. Lube oil storage will be limited to 30 gallons. Provided in Fire Zone 8.2.1.A.

1, 3.1.5 The turbine building sprinkler system will be extended to provide protection for the RHR service water rooms and Diesel Generator cooling pumps. Also reference [1] (5.13.6).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

3 SER, July 21, 1988.

4 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

5 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-III, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.001 Rev. 3.

4.3-279

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.1.1.C AREA: TB-III LOCATION: Unit 1 TB, Elev. 547-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 RHR Service Water Pump Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones which are adjacent to Fire Zone 11.1.1.C, but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then the spread of fire to the adjoining fire area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 11.1.1.B TB-V 3 Hour EVALUATION:

Since Fire Zone 11.1.1.C is separated from Fire Zone 11.1.1.B by a 3-hour rated fire barrier, and the maximum predicted fire severity in zone 11.1.1.C is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, no further evaluation is required.

4.3-280

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 14.1.1 Unit 1 Off Gas Recombiner Room Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-22-1 General Elevation: 626'-6" Zone Area: 8,077 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose, located at elevations 648'-

6" and 668'-0". Portable fire extinguisher(s) located on el. 668'-0". Hose station and portable fire extinguisher(s) located just outside the fire zone on el. 626'-0".

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: No safe shutdown paths would be affected by water release in this zone.

Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour [2][7]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [2]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.10 TB-II Non-rated [2] noncombustible, open Two unlabeled doors. 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated [2][7] noncombustible, open No doors 3'-0" thick concrete mechanical[7]

8.2.7.B TB-III Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-281

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 14.1.1 Unit 1 Off Gas Recombiner Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2, 9.2 Provide substantial shield walls w/ metal doors between zones 8.2.10 and 14.1.1. Also reference [1](5.2.4).

2, 9.2 No safe shutdown cables or equipment in this zone. Also reference

[1](5.2.4).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Exemption Request 5.2 applies to this fire zone and involves the lack of 3-hour fire barriers between the Southern and Central Zone Groups.

2 SER, July 21, 1988.

3 ComEd Request letter dated November 5, 1991.

4 There is a 1-inch oxygen line from the Unit 1 Oxygen Station in Fire Zone 8.2.10 to the Unit 1 offgas system in this fire zone.

5 SER, March 2, 1994.

6 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-III, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.001 Rev. 3.

7 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-III and TB-IV, ER9801624.

8 Evaluation for presence of gas cylinders EC 401197.

4.3-282

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 14.1.1 AREA: TB-III LOCATION: Unit 1 TB, Elev. 626-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Off Gas Recombiner Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones which are adjacent to Fire Zone 14.1.1 but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then the spread of fire to the adjoining fire area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.8.E TB-IV 3 thick concrete - Non-rated 8.2.10 TB-II 4 thick concrete - Non-rated EVALUATION:

The primary concern relative to the affect on safe shutdown capability would be a fire originating in Fire Zone 14.1.1 and spreading to either of the adjacent zones.

There are no safe shutdown cables or equipment in Fire Zones 14.1.1, 8.2.8.E, or 8.2.10.

Therefore, fire spread between Fire Zone 14.1.2 and either adjoining fire area would not affect safe shutdown capability.

4.3-283

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The potential for a fire or explosion due to the Off Gas recombination process has been considered. Noncondensible gases (67 cfm of Hydrogen and 33.5 cfm of Oxygen) are removed from the Unit 1 condenser by the steam jet air ejectors, and processed in the Unit 1 Off Gas Recombiner Room (Fire Zone 14.1.2). Very little energy would be required to ignite the products involved in the process. The presence of potential ignition sources such as the catalytic converter suggests that if a release of hydrogen or a hydrogen/oxygen mixture were to occur a fire or explosion could result.

The Off Gas Recombiner process is considered to be a safe operation due to the design features of the process, the substantial separation from adjacent zones, and the negative ventilation provided.

Compressed gas cylinders, some of which contain hydrogen, are present in the zone. However, even if the cylinders were to leak, the hydrogen concentration in the room would not exceed the lower explosive limit.

During turbine operation the Off Gas Recombiner Rooms are High Radiation Areas. These rooms are maintained as negative ventilation areas. Should a hydrogen release occur this negative pressure environment should prevent a buildup of hydrogen in adjacent areas. This would minimize the potential for adverse effect of a fire or explosion to adjacent fire zones.

The Off Gas Recombiner Room consists of three separate levels (three separate rooms). These rooms are located in the northwest section of the Turbine Building. The lowest level is on the 626-6 elevation with the upper two levels located above. The off gas process areas are located well above any safe shutdown related cables or equipment. Hydrogen is lighter than air and should a release occur, it would begin filling the upper levels of Fire Zones 14.1.1 and 8.2.10 (these zones do not have safe shutdown equipment). The roof of Fire Zone 14.1.1 consists, in part, of built up roofing over 1-inch rigid insulation on precast concrete roof slabs supported by exposed structural steel (also for Fire Zone 8.2.10). The remainder is built up roofing over 1-inch rigid insulation on 4-0 thick concrete. The walls are constructed of concrete to a certain level and insulated metal siding for the upper levels. This metal siding and roof panels would be the weak link in the construction in the event of an explosion thus venting the explosion to the exterior.

The Off Gas Recombiner Rooms are separated from adjacent fire zones by substantial concrete barriers (3 to 4 thick). No fire rating has been assigned to these barriers due to their open or nonrated mechanical penetrations. During operation the doors to these rooms are locked shut.

4.3-284

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.5.A Turbine Building Vent Fan Room Fire Area: TB-IV F Drawing: F-16-1 General Elevation: 658'-10" Zone Area: 4,848 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers are provided in the zone.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: There are no fixed suppression systems in this area. Manual Carbon Dioxide extinguishers are located in this zone, but, since no safe shutdown equipment is in the zone, there is no effect on safe shutdown.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description 23-1 Nonrated 24-1 Nonrated 13-1 Nonrated 14-1 Nonrated RB-2N 3 Hour [2]

RB-1N 3 Hour [2]

4.3-285

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.5.A Turbine Building Vent Fan Room Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.2.4* RB-2N 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> [2] 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> No doors 1'-6" thick concrete, 2-hour rated block 1.1.2.5* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [2] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except no No doors 1'-6" thick concrete dampers in HVAC ducts 1.1.1.5* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [2] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except HVAC No doors 1'-6" thick concrete duct penetration (F-115,F-116) 1.1.1.4* RB-1N 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> [2] 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical (partially open) 8.2.8.D 23-1 Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete 8.2.8.C 24-1 Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete 8.2.8.B 13-1 Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete 8.2.8.A 14-1 Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete 1.1.1.6.A TB-IV Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 3 Combustible loading is light.

3 No safe shutdown cables or equipment are located in zone.

3 3-hour separation between RB and TB with exceptions.

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Letter dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton.

2 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612 Rev. 1.

3 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611 Rev. 1.

4 SER, July 21, 1988.

4.3-286

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.1.5.A AREA: TB-IV LOCATION: TB1/2, Elev. 658-10 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1/2 TB/RB Vent Floor FIRE SEVERITY: The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones which are adjacent to Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A, but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then the spread of fire to the adjoining fire area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 8.2.8.A 14-1 Non-rated 8.2.8.B 13-1 Non-rated 8.2.8.C 24-1 Non-rated 8.2.8.D 23-1 Non-rated 1.1.1.4 RB-1 3 hour1 1.1.1.5 RB-1 3 hour1 1.1.2.5 RB-2 3 hour1 1.1.2.4 RB-2 3 hour1 1

The barrier rating is 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> but with noncombustible penetration seals and unprotected HVAC ducts.

4.3-287

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION:

Since Zone 1.1.1.5.A contains no safe shutdown equipment, fire spread to any single adjacent zone will not impair safe shutdown capabilities. However, a fire originating in Zone 1.1.1.5.A, then spreading to two or more zones containing redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. This potential has been evaluated.

The interface between Zone 1.1.1.5.A and Fire Areas RB-1 or RB-2 is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier with noncombustible penetration seals and HVAC duct openings that do not contain fire dampers.

Given the low combustible loading, the potential for fire spread from Zone 1.1.1.5.A to Fire Areas RB-1 or RB-2 is considered low.

Zone 1.1.1.5.A is separated from Zones 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.D by a 6 inch concrete floor/ceiling with equipment removal hatches and stairways. A qualitative review of the interaction and separation between Zone 1.1.1.5.A and Zones 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.D indicates the potential for concurrent fire spread to these zones is low based on the following:

Zone 1.1.1.5.A is located above Zones 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.D; the combustible loading in Zone 1.1.1.5.A is low and does not include lube oil which can migrate to zones below through openings; and these zones are open to the turbine deck which provides a large volume for venting smoke and hot gases.

4.3-288

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 1.1.1.6.A Turbine Building Vent Fan Room Fire Area: TB-IV F Drawing: F-16-1 General Elevation: 678'-10" Zone Area: 2,685 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and two manual hose stations each equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Water release in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire.

No safe shutdown equipment is in this area. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-2N 3 Hour RB-1N 3 Hour Equivelant[4]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.1.6* RB-1N Non-rated[4] Non-rated[4] No doors 1'-0" thick concrete 1.1.1.5.A TB-IV Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete, mechanical metal grating 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated noncombustible No doors 1'-0" thick concrete 1.1.2.5* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [2] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors, no 1'-6" thick concrete dampers in HVAC ducts [3]

1.1.1.5* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [2] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-114, 115, No doors, no 1'-6" thick concrete 116) dampers in HVAC ducts [3]

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-289

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2 3-hour separation between RB and TB.

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Letter dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton 2 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611 Rev. 1.

3 SER, July 21, 1988.

4 Evaluation for fire area separation between RB-1 and TB-IV, ER9801572.

4.3-290

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 1.1.1.6.A AREA: TB-IV LOCATION: TB1/2, Elev. 678-10 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1/2 Turbine Bldg. Vent Fan Room FIRE SEVERITY: The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones which are adjacent to Fire Zone 1.1.1.6.A, but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, then the spread of fire to the adjoining fire area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 1.1.1.5 RB-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.1.2.5 RB-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> EVALUATION:

Since Fire Zones 1.1.1.5 and 1.1.2.5 are separated from Fire Zone 1.1.1.6.A by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barrier, and the maximum predicted fire severity in zone 1.1.1.6.A is 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, no further evaluation is required.

4.3-291

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.E Turbine Operating Floor Fire Area: TB-IV F Drawing: F17-1,18-1 General Elevation: 639'-0" Zone Area: 58,356 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area heat (thermal) detection used to activate turbine bearing water spray systems. Thermal detectors in the exciter housings actuate the CO2 system.

Suppression: Local area water sprays system protects turbine bearings 1 through 9 in both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbines. Local area wet pipe sprinkler system above the bearing lift pumps on each unit. Automatic CO2 system protects the exciter housings for each unit.

Manual Suppression: Hose stations, each equipped with 100 feet of hose and portable fire extinguishers.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Water or Carbon Dioxide discharge in this zone would not affect safe shutdown since no safe shutdown equipment is located in this zone.

Water runoff would be handled by the floor drainage system in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description 23-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [10]

24-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [10]

13-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [10]

14-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [10]

TB-III Equivalent 3 Hour [15]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [13]

TB-I Equivalent 3 Hour [14]

4.3-292

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.E Turbine Operating Floor Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.1.6.A TB-IV Non-rated noncombustible No doors 1'-0" thick concrete 1.1.1.5.A TB-IV Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 1'-0" thick concrete mechanical (partially open) 8.2.7.E TB-I Non-rated[14] noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[14]

8.2.7.D TB-I Non-rated[14] noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[14]

8.2.8.D 23-1 Non-rated [10] none No doors No wall (waterspray) 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated[13] noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[13]

8.2.7.B TB-III Non-rated[15] noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[15]

8.2.7.A TB-III Non-rated[15] noncombustible, open No doors 4'-0" thick concrete mechanical[15]

8.2.10 TB-II Non-rated[13] noncombustible, open No doors 0'-5 5/8" thick mechanical[13] concrete block wall (0'-8" ceiling) 14.1.2 TB-I Non-rated[14] noncombustible[14] No doors 3'-0" thick concrete 14.1.1 TB-III Non-rated[15] noncombustible[15] No doors 3'-0" thick concrete 8.2.8.C 24-1 Non-rated [10] none No doors No wall (waterspray) 8.2.8.B 13-1 Non-rated [10] none No doors No wall (waterspray) 8.2.8.A 14-1 Non-rated [10] none No doors No wall (waterspray)

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-293

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.E Turbine Operating Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 12, F.8 Turbine bearings protected with heat detection and automatic deluge system.

12, F.8 Automatic closed head water suppression system provided for bearing lift pumps.

11, 3.1.6(b) Foam system control panel properly relocated. Foam system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

1, 5.19.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided.

1, 4.3.2 Exciters for both generators protected by CO2 system.

7, 12.2 Foam-water system, curbs, and wet pipe system provided in zones 8.2.8.A-D separate these zones from 8.2.8.E. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per

[7](12.2). Also reference [10](5.8.1).

7, 12.2 No safe shutdown cables or equipment located in zone. Also reference [10](5.8.1).

5, 5.1 Electrical penetrations in TB operating floor sealed with noncombustible material. Also reference [10](5.8.1).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 Interim Compensatory Measures IV. (12-18-84).

5 Appendix R Exemption Requests 6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 The previous FHA indicates that Exemption Request 9 Letter from CECO to NRC dated 4-10-78.

10 Exemption Request 5.8 (12-18-84). Exemption for lack of complete 3-hour barriers between equivalent fire areas 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.D on the TB operating floor. Exemption 12.0 granted 12-11-87.

11 SER, February 12, 1981.

12 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 13 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-II and TB-IV, ER9801622.

14 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-IV, ER9801623.

15 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-III and TB-IV, ER9801624.

4.3-294

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.8.E AREA: TB-IV LOCATION: TB, Elev 639-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Turbine Operating Floor FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.8.E which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 1.1.1.6.A TB-IV Non-rated 1.1.1.5.A TB-IV Non-rated 8.2.7.E TB-I Non-rated 8.2.7.D TB-I Non-rated 8.2.8.D 23-1 Non-rated 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated 8.2.7.B TB-III Non-rated 8.2.7.A TB-III Non-rated 8.2.10 TB-II Non-rated 14.1.2 TB-I Non-rated 14.1.1 TB-III Non-rated 8.2.8.C 24-1 Non-rated 8.2.8.B 13-1 Non-rated 8.2.8.A 14-1 Non-rated 4.3-295

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION - ZONE 8.2.8.E:

Fire zones 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8C, 8.2.8.D, 8.2.7.A, 8.2.7.B, 8.2.7.C, 8.2.7.D, 8.2.7.E, 8.2.10, 14.1.1, and 14.1.2 bound fire zone 8.2.8.E. The water spray protecting the curbed area around MG sets 1A-202-51, 1B-202-51, 2A-202-51, and 2B-202-51 and the wet pipe sprinkler system above each MG set (MG sets abandoned in place) accomplishes separation of fire zone 8.2.8.E from fire zones 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.E. The rest of the fire zone is bounded by exterior walls constructed of insulated metal siding except for those walls that separate fire zone 8.2.8.E from fire zones 8.2.10, 14.1.1, and 14.1.2. The boundary walls with fire zones 14.1.1 and 14.1.2 are constructed of minimum 3-0 thick concrete and exposed structural steel while the wall separating fire zone 8.2.10 is a 5-5/8-inch concrete block wall. The floor separates fire zone 8.2.8.E from fire zone 8.2.7.A, 8.2.7.B, 8.2.7.C, 8.2.7.D, and 8.2.7.E. It is constructed of minimum 8 thick concrete supported on exposed structural steel. This floor contains numerous penetrations for stairwells, equipment removal hatches, pipe and electrical penetrations. The ceiling is the portion of the turbine building roof and is constructed of built-up roofing on 1 rigid insulation over precast concrete channel slabs supported on exposed structural steel.

Neither the floor nor the ceiling of fire zone 8.2.8.E is fire rated.

Automatic fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems protect Fire Zone 8.2.8.E. Local area heat (thermal) detection is used to activate the turbine bearing water spray systems, and thermal detectors actuate a CO2 suppression system in the exciter housing. Water spray systems protect turbine bearings 1 through 9 in both the Unit 1 and 2 turbines, and a wet pipe sprinkler system is provided above the bearing lift pumps on each unit. Hose stations, equipped with 100 feet of hose, a foam cart and portable CO2 fire extinguishers are provided in this fire zone to support manual fire suppression activities if required.

CONCLUSION:

The most significant hazard in this fire zone is from a turbine bearing oil fire or exciter fire.

These areas are protected with automatic suppression systems. The remaining combustibles in the fire zone are widely dispersed and separated by spatial distances with negligible intervening fire loading. As such any fire occurring in fire zone 8.2.8.E is likely to be confined to the area of origination and not spread to adjacent fire zones 4.3-296

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.1.A Unit 1 DC Panel Room Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-14-1 General Elevation: 615'-6" Zone Area: 141 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection system.

Suppression: None.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Water release would not result in adverse effects greater than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area outside the room in Zone 8.2.7.A. There are no floor drains located within the room.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hr (F-386) No doors 0'-5" thick concrete on sprinkler protected steel 7.1 TB-III Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete ceiling 8.2.7.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hr (F-388) One Class A fire door 1'-0" thick concrete Two, 3-hr. wall dampers 6.1.B TB-III Non-Rated noncombustible No doors 0'-7 5/8" thick concrete block

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water and carbon dioxide suppression capability. Portable extinguishers are provided near each room.

1, 5.4.6 Install Class A fire doors to DC distribution center Unit 1 & Unit 2. Also reference

[1](3.1.8).

1, 5.4.6 Install automatic (early warning) fire detection system in the D.C. equipment rooms.

Also reference [1](3.1.1).

4.3-297

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.1.A Unit 1 DC Panel Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 Note: Reference cable tray loading limits in Table 3.6-2.

1 SER July 27, 1979 2 Left Intentionally Blank.

3 An engineering evaluation of the lack of a complete 3-hour fire barrier separating redundant or alternative safe shutdown components was submitted to the NRC for concurrence, and an exemption from Appendix R requirements was granted in SER Section 9, dated July 21, 1988. The evaluation was based in part on the combustible loading of this zone.

4 Upgrading the floor and west wall, including fire proofing of the structural steel and 6 thick 3-hr rated fire seals per DCP 9900027 / DCN 001905M. This excludes the 7 5/8 concrete masonry walls.

4.3-298

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 6.1.A AREA: TB-III LOCATION: Unit 1 TB1, Elev.615-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 DC Panel Room FIRE SEVERITY: The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.6.A, below 6.1.A, is unlikely due to the 3-hour fire resistant reinforced concrete floor on sprinkler protected structural steel members separating the two zones. The floor penetrations and openings are sealed with 3-hour rated fire assemblies.

These combine to provide a 3-hour fire barrier.

The potential for fire spread to zone 7.1, above, is unlikely due to the reinforced concrete ceiling separating the two zones. However, there are unsealed penetrations in the ceiling, which could allow fire to Zone 7.1. If fire does spread from 6.1.A to 7.1 both zones are within fire area BC-1 and there will be no adverse impact to safe shutdown capabilities.

Fire Zone 6.1.A and Fire Zone 6.1.B are separated by a non-rated 7 5/8 concrete masonry block wall having numerous mechanical and electrical penetrations filled with noncombustible sealing material. Each concrete masonry unit is constructed using expanded shale aggregate with an equivalent thickness of 4.04 inches providing a minimum of 2-hr fire rating based on minimum equivalent thickness tables for concrete masonry walls (Ref. NCMA TEK 7-3; Uniform Building Code, 91 ED.; NFPA Code; UL). Since the maximum predicted fire severity in these two adjacent zones is 1-hour, fire spread across these boundaries is unlikely.

Zone 8.2.7.A is separated from 6.1.A by a 3-hour fire reinforced concrete wall with all penetrations, cable tray, fire dampers and door having a fire resistance of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Fire spread across this barrier is unlikely.

CONCLUSION:

Fire spread to the adjoining fire zones 7.1 and 6.1.B is not likely, However 7.1 and 6.1.B are within the same fire area therefore fire spread would not adversely impact safe shutdown capabilities. Also, fire spread to the adjoining zones 8.2.6.A and 8.2.7.A is not likely because combustible loading will not challenge the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated fire barrier between the zones.

4.3-299

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.1.B Unit 1 DC Panel Room Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-14-1 General Elevation: 615'-6" Zone Area: 530 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection system.

Suppression: None.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Water release would not result in adverse effects greater than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area outside the room in Zone 8.2.7.A. There are no floor drains located within the room.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description SB-I 3 Hour TB-III 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 3.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-131] No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 7.1 TB-III Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete ceiling 8.2.6.A TB-III 3-hour 3-hr (F-386) No doors 0'-5 1/2 " thick concrete floor on sprinkler protected steel 6.1.A TB-III Non-Rated noncombustible No doors 0'-7 5/8" thick concrete block 2.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-131 & 135] No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hr (F-387, F-388) One Class A 1'-0" thick concrete door, two 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated dampers

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-300

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.1.B Unit 1 DC Panel Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water and carbon dioxide suppression capability. Portable extinguishers are provided near each room.

1, 5.4.6 Install automatic (early warning) fire detection system in D.C. distribution center. Also reference [1](3.1.1).

1, 5.4.6 Install Class A fire doors to DC distribution center Unit 1 & Unit 2. Also reference

[1](3.1.8).

1, 4.10 Fire Zone 6.1.B (which is part of Fire Area TB-III) is separated from Fire Area SB-I (specifically fire zones 2.0 & 3.0) by 3-hour rated barriers.

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER July 27, 1979 2 Note: Reference cable tray loading limits in Table 3.6-2.

3 Left Intentionally Blank.

4 Upgrading of the floor and walls, including fire proofing of the structural steel and 6 thick 3-hr rated fire seals per DCP 9900027 / DCN 001905M. This excludes the 7 5/8 concrete masonry walls.

4.3-301

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 6.1.B AREA: TB-III LOCATION: Unit 1 TB1, Elev.615-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 DC Panel Room FIRE SEVERITY: The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zone which are adjacent to Fire Zone 6.1.B but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barrier for each. If the fire barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limits, then the spread of fire to the adjoining area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance 2.0 SB-I 3 Hour 3.0 SB-I 3 Hour 8.2.6.A TB-III 3 Hour 8.2.7.A TB-III 3 Hour The walls and floor, including door, dampers and penetrations of fire zone 6.1.B provide a fire resistance of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. This excludes the 7 5/8 concrete masonry walls.

EVALUATION:

Since Fire Zone 2.0 is separated from Fire Zone 6.1.B by a 2-foot thick reinforced concrete wall, which is considered a 3-hour fire barrier. Since the maximum predicted fire severity in Zone 6.1.B is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> and Zone 2.0 is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, fire spread across this boundary is unlikely.

4.3-302

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone 3.0 is separated from Fire Zone 6.1.B by a 2-foot thick reinforced concrete wall, which is considered a 3-hour fire barrier. The maximum predicted fire severity in Zone 3.0 is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, which exceeds the fire resistance rating of the barrier between the zones. Fire Zone 3.0 is equipped with general area smoke detection, a wet pipe sprinkler system, and a closed-head water spray system in the cable trays. This installed detection and suppression systems will provide prompt control over fire growth and notification to the fire brigade prior to a significant challenge to the fire barrier.

Except for the non-rated 7 5/8 concrete masonry block walls between Fire Zone 6.1.B and Fire Zone 6.1.A, the walls and floors of Fire Zone 6.1.B are 3-hour barriers. Since the maximum predicted fire severity in any of these zones is 1 1/2 hours, fire spread across these boundaries is unlikely.

Fire Zone 6.1.A and Fire Zone 6.1.B are separated by a non-rated 7 5/8 concrete masonry block wall having numerous mechanical and electrical penetrations filled with noncombustible sealing material. Each concrete masonry unit is constructed using expanded shale aggregate with an equivalent thickness of 4.04 inches providing a minimum of 2-hr fire rating based on minimum equivalent thickness tables for concrete masonry walls (Ref. NCMA TEK 7-3; Uniform Building Code, 91 ED.; NFPA Code; UL). Since the maximum predicted fire severity in these two adjacent zones is 1-hour, fire spread across these boundaries is unlikely.

CONCLUSION:

Fire spread to the adjoining fire zones 7.1 and 6.1.A is not likely, however 7.1 and 6.1.A are within the same fire area therefore fire spread would not adversely impact safe shutdown capabilities. Also, fire spread to the adjoining zones 8.2.6.A and 8.2.7.A is not likely because combustible loading will not challenge the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated fire barrier between the zones.

4.3-303

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 7.1 Unit 1 Battery Room Fire Area: TB-III F Drawing: F-14-1 General Elevation: 628'-6" Zone Area: 671 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection system.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s).

Other FP features: The ceiling is 0-6 thick reinforced concrete roof on fire proofed structural steel members and provides a fire resistance of 3-hours.

Suppression Effects: Water release would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area outside the battery room in zone 8.2.7.A. There are no floor drains located in zone 7.1.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description SB-I 3 Hour TB-III 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 6.1.B TB-III Non-Rated Non-Combustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete floor.

6.1.A TB-III Non-Rated Non-Combustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete floor.

8.2.7.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hr (F389, F390) one class A fire Door 1'-0" thick concrete Three, 3 hr Fire Dampers 2.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-392, F-393) No doors 2'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-304

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 7.1 Unit 1 Battery Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 4, F.7 NFPA 69 reviewed for battery room explosion prevention. Air flow alarms notify control room if loss of ventilation.

1, 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water and carbon dioxide suppression capability.

Portable extinguishers provided near room. Standpipe, hose, & port.

extinguishers provided for battery rooms. [4](F.7).

2 Flammable battery spacer material was installed. This commitment was apparently closed by accounting for it in the FHA combustible loading information.

1, 3.1.11 Install supervisory circuits to battery room HVAC circuits with an alarm in control room. Electrical supervision for battery room ventilation systems which alarms in air flow loss [1](4.4.1). Air flow supervision for exhaust [1](3.1.11 & 5.4.6).

6 Provide Class A fire doors to battery room.

1, 3.1.1 Provide early warning fire detection in Battery Rooms. Also reference

[1](5.4.6).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 An engineering evaluation of the lack of a complete 3-hour fire barrier separating redundant or alternative safe shutdown components was submitted to the NRC for concurrence, and an exemption from Appendix R requirements was granted in SER Section 9, dated July 21, 1988. The evaluation was based in part on the combustible loading of this zone.

1 SER July 27, 1979 2 Inspection open Items 8-20-84, 254/84011-04, 265/8 3 Appendix R Exemption Requests. See section 5.2 which addresses the lack of 3-hour separation between southern and central zone group.

4 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 5 Left Intentionally Blank.

6 Upgrading the ceiling and walls, including fire proofing of the structural steel, 6 thick 3-hr rated fire seals and incorporation of class A fire door and dampers per DCP 9900027 / DCN 001905M.

4.3-305

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 7.1 AREA: TB-III LOCATION: Unit 1 TB I, Elev. 628-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Battery Room FIRE SEVERITY: The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones which are adjacent to Fire Zone 7.1 but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then the spread of fire to the adjoining fire area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 2.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.7.A TB-III 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> EVALUATION:

Since Fire Zone 2.0 is separated from Fire Zone 7.1 by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barrier, and the maximum predicted fire severity in zone 7.1 is 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, no further evaluation is required.

Fire Zone 8.2.7.A is separated from Fire Zone 7.1 by a 1-foot thick reinforced concrete wall, which is considered a 3-hour fire barrier. Since the maximum predicted fire severity in Zone 7.1 is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> and Zone 8.2.7.A is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, fire spread across this boundary is unlikely.

4.3-306

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.2.A Unit 2 DC Panel Room Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-15-1 General Elevation: 615'-6" Zone Area: 132 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection system.

Suppression: None.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers.

Other FP features: Structural Steel coated with fireproofing.

Suppression Effects: Water release would not result in adverse effects greater than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area outside the room in Zone 8.2.7.E. There are no floor drains located within the room.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-I 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.6.E TB-I 3-hour 3-hr (F-393) No doors 0-5 1/2 thick concrete floor on sprinkler protected steel 7.2 TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete ceiling 8.2.7.E TB-I 3-hour 3-hr (F-394) One Class A 1'-0" thick concrete door, Two, 3-hr.

dampers.

6.2.B TB-I Non-Rated noncombustible No doors 0'-7 5/8" thick concrete block Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water and carbon dioxide suppression capability. Portable extinguishers are provided near each room.

1, 5.4.6 Install Class A fire doors to DC distribution center Unit 1 & Unit 2. Also reference

[1](3.1.8).

1, 5.4.6 Install automatic (early warning) fire detection system in D.C. distribution center. Also reference [1](3.1.1).

4.3-307

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.2.A Unit 2 DC Panel Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 Note: The combustible loading for this zone has been justified.

1 SER July 27, 1979 2 Note: Reference cable tray loading limits in Table 3.6-2.

3 Left Intentionally Blank.

4 Upgrading the floor and west wall, including fire proofing of the structural steel and 6 thick 3-hr rated fire seals per DCP 9900175. This excludes the 7 5/8 concrete masonry walls.

4.3-308

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 6.2.A AREA: TB-I LOCATION: TB 2, Elev. 615 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 6.2.A consists of the DC panel room on elevation 615 of the Unit 2 Turbine Building.

The zone extends from the 615 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 628 and is bounded by the building exterior wall on the north side, by the walls separating it from zone 6.2.B on the east and south sides, and by the wall separating it from zone 8.2.7.E to the west. The zone is bounded above by a floor/ceiling assembly which separates it from the battery room (Zone 7.2). Separation from zone 8.2.6.E, below, is also provided by a floor/ceiling assembly.

The area contains battery chargers and direct current electrical panels.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 8.2.6.E, below TB-I 7.2, above TB-I 6.2.B, east and south TB-I 8.2.7.E, west TB-I DETECTION:

Area smoke detection is provided.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is predominately composed of electrical cables. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of miscellaneous materials distributed about the zone. Thus, the only fixed combustibles capable of producing a severe fire in the zone are the electrical cables. The cable trays are located approximately eight feet above the floor.

Transients account for a significant fraction of the total combustibles which may be in the area.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle.

4.3-309

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The installed detection system should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires; Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers; and Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 6.2.A:

The main combustibles in this zone are the electrical cables in the tray system. Thus, a severe fire in this area is dependent on tray involvement. Should the trays become involved, propagation throughout the tray system could be expected due to the continuity of combustibles, the clearance to the ceiling, and the room size, unless prompt and effective fire brigade response were to occur.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area TB-I:

The potential for fire spread to the zone above, 7.2, is limited by the reinforced concrete floor which separates the zones. An unsealed penetration in the floor provides for some venting of heat and smoke to 7.2, however. Thus spread to 7.2 via this route is possible.

Fire Zone 6.2.A and Fire Zone 6.2.B are separated by a non-rated 7 5/8 concrete masonry block wall having numerous mechanical and electrical penetrations filled with noncombustible sealing material. Each concrete masonry unit is constructed using expanded shale aggregate with an equivalent thickness of 4.04 inches providing a minimum of 2-hr fire rating based on minimum equivalent thickness tables for concrete masonry walls (Ref. NCMA TEK 7-3; Uniform Building Code, 91 ED.; NFPA Code; UL). Since the maximum predicted fire severity in these two adjacent zones is 1-hour, fire spread across these boundaries is unlikely.

Zone 8.2.7.E is separated from 6.2.A by a 3-hour fire reinforced concrete wall with all penetrations, cable tray, fire dampers and door having a fire resistance of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Fire spread across this barrier is unlikely.

The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.6.E, below 6.2.A, is unlikely due to the 3-hour fire resistant reinforced concrete floor on sprinkler protected structural steel members separating the two zones. The floor penetrations and openings are sealed with 3-hour rated fire assemblies.

These combine to provide a 3-hour fire barrier.

4.3-310

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.2.B Unit 2 DC Panel Room Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-15-1 General Elevation: 615'-6" Zone Area: 528 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection system.

Suppression: None.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers.

Other FP features: Structural Steel coated with Fireproofing.

Suppression Effects: Water release would not result in adverse effects greater than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area outside the room in Zone 8.2.7.E. There are no floor drains located within the room.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-I 3 Hour EDG-2 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 7.2 TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete ceiling 9.2 EDG-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 0'-6" thick concrete floor on fire proofed steel 8.2.7.E TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hr (F-394, F-395) One Class A 1'-0" thick concrete door, two 3-hr.

hour rated dampers 8.2.6.E TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hr (F-393) No doors 0'-5 1/2 thick concrete floor on sprinkler protected steel 6.2.A TB-I Non-Rated noncombustible No doors 0'-7 5/8" thick concrete block 4.3-311

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.2.B Unit 2 DC Panel Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water and carbon dioxide suppression capability.

Portable extinguishers are provided near each room.

1, 5.4.6 Install Class A fire doors to DC distribution center Unit 1 & Unit 2. Also reference [1](3.1.8).

1, 5.4.6 Install automatic (early warning) fire detection system in D.C. distribution center. Also reference [1](3.1.1).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 Note: The combustible loading for this zone has been justified.

1 SER July 27, 1979 2 Note: Reference cable tray loading limits in Table 3.6-2.

3 Left Intentionally Blank.

4 Upgrading of the floor and walls, including fire proofing of the structural steel and 6 thick 3-hr rated fire seals per DCP 9900175. This excludes the 7 5/8 concrete masonry walls.

4.3-312

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 6.2.B AREA: TB-I LOCATION: TB 2, Elev. 615 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 6.2.B is one of the two DC panel rooms on elevation 615 of the Unit 2 Turbine Building.

The zone extends from the 615 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 628 and is bounded by the building exterior walls on the north and east sides, by the walls separating it from zone 6.2.A on the west and north sides, and by the wall separating it from zone 8.2.7.E to the south and west. The zone is bounded above by a floor/ceiling assembly which separates it from the battery room, zone 7.2, above. Separation from zone 8.2.6.E and 9.2, below, is provided by a floor/ceiling assembly.

The area contains one division of battery chargers and direct current electrical panels.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 8.2.6.E, below TB-I 9.2, below EDG-2 7.2, above TB-I 6.2.A, west and north TB-I 8.2.7.E, west and south TB-I DETECTION:

Area smoke detection is provided.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is overwhelmingly composed of electrical cables.

The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of miscellaneous materials distributed about the zone. Thus, the only fixed combustibles capable of producing a severe fire in this zone are the electrical cables. The cable trays are located approximately eight feet above the floor.

4.3-313

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a small fraction of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle.

The installed detection system should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires; Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to 3-hour fire resistant concrete barrier with 3-hour fire rated seals, fire dampers and door, and Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 6.2.B:

The main combustibles in this zone are the electrical cables in the tray system. Thus, any severe fire in this area is dependent on their involvement. Should the trays become involved, propagation throughout the tray system could be expected due to the continuity of combustibles involved, the clearance to the ceiling, and the room size, unless prompt fire brigade response were to occur.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area TB-I:

The potential for fire spread to zone 7.2, above, is limited by the reinforced concrete floor which separates the zones. Due to unsealed penetrations in the floor, however, fire spread cannot be discounted.

Fire Zone 6.2.A and Fire Zone 6.2.B are separated by a non-rated 7 5/8 concrete masonry block wall having numerous mechanical and electrical penetrations filled with non-combustible sealing material. Each concrete masonry unit is constructed using expanded shale aggregate with an equivalent thickness of 4.04 providing a minimum of 2-hr fire rating based on minimum equivalent thickness tables for concrete masonry walls (Ref. NCMA TEK 7-3; Uniform Building Code, 91ED.; NFPA Code; UL). Since the maximum predicted fire severity in these two adjacent zones is 1-hour, fire spread across these boundaries is unlikely.

Zone 8.2.7.E is separated from 6.2.B by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire reinforced concrete wall with all penetrations, cable tray, fire dampers and door having a fire resistance of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Fire spread across these two adjacent zones barrier is unlikely.

The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.6.E, below 6.2.B, is unlikely due to the 3-hour fire resistant reinforced concrete floor on sprinkler protected structural steel members separating the two zones. The floor penetrations and openings are sealed with 3-hour rated fire assemblies.

These combine to provide a 3-hour fire barrier.

4.3-314

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Zone 9.2, below, is separated from zone 6.2.B by a three-hour rated floor/ceiling assembly. The combustible loading in zone 6.2.B is not sufficient to challenge this barrier.

4.3-315

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 7.2 Unit 2 Battery Room Fire Area: TB-I F Drawing: F-15-1 General Elevation: 628'-6" Zone Area: 660 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection system.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s).

Other FP features: Room and piping penetrations are curbed with a 3-inch curb. The ceiling is 6 thick reinforced concrete roof on fire proofed structural steel members and provides a fire resistance of 3-hours.

Suppression Effects: Water release would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would travel through piping penetrations (curbed 3-inches) to Fire Zones 6.2.A and 6.2.B, below. Water travel to these zones can be tolerated.

Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general area outside the battery room in zone 8.2.7.E. There are no floor drains or openings available for runoff in zone 7.2.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-I 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 6.2.B TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete floor 6.2.A TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete floor 8.2.7.E TB-I 3-hour 3-hr (F-397, F-398) One class A fire door 1'-0" thick concrete Three, 3-hr floor Fire Dampers

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-316

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 7.2 Unit 2 Battery Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 4, F.7 NFPA 69 reviewed for battery room explosion prevention. Air flow alarms notify control room if loss of ventilation.

1, 5.4.4 Hose stations provide water and carbon dioxide suppression capability. Portable extinguishers provided near room. Standpipe, hose, & port. extinguishers provided for battery roms. Also reference 4](F.7).

2 Flammable battery spacer material was installed. This commitment was apparently closed by accounting for it in the FHA combustible loading information.

1, 3.1.11 Install supervisory circuits to battery room HVAC circuits. For battery room exhaust /

ventilation systems with alarms to control room on air flow loss. Also reference [1](4.4.1

& 5.4.6).

6 Provide Class A fire doors to battery room.

1, 3.1.1 Provide early warning fire detection in Battery Rooms. Also reference [1](5.4.6).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 Note: The combustible loading for this zone has been justified.

1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Inspection open Items 8-20-84, 254/84011-04, 265/8 3 Appendix R Exemption Request. Sections 5.2 and 5.

4 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 5 Left Intentionally Blank.

6 Upgrading the ceiling and walls, including fire proofing of the structural steel, 6 thick 3-hr rated fire seals and incorporation of Class A fire door and dampers per DCP 9900175 4.3-317

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 7.2 AREA: TB-I LOCATION: Unit 2 TB, Elev. 628-6 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Battery Room FIRE SEVERITY: The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

All fire zones adjacent to Fire Zone 7.2 are in the same fire area with the exception of 8.2.7.E.

The barrier with zone 8.2.7.E is 3-hour rated and all other adjacent fire zone barriers are non-rated. Fire spread from Fire Zone 7.2 to 8.2.7.E is not likely because the combustibles on zone 8.2.7.E are not sufficient to challenge the barrier. Redundant safe shutdown capability is provided for this zone 4.3-318

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.4 Unit 1 Cable Tunnel Fire Area: CT-1 F Drawing: F-11-1 General Elevation: 588'-0" Zone Area: 2,592 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection coverage.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system and closed head water spray nozzles provided in the cable trays.

Manual Suppression: A hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose. An additional 100 ft. of fire hose is provided at primary access. Portable fire extinguisher(s) located in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.6.A above.

Other FP features: Access hatches/doors are curbed to prevent fluid born fire spread across fire boundary. Equipment access hatch and personnel access hatch are class A fire rated doors with a 3-hour fire label with exception to Hatch to Fire Zone 6.3. (Ref. DCP 990059).

Suppression Effects: Water release in this zone (including drainage from upper levels of the plant) from sprinkler system operation, hose line use, or piping breaks would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water will not affect undamaged insulated cable. Only cables are present in this zone. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains located in the cable tunnel.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: High Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.9 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description SB-I Equivalent 3 Hour [7][12]

RB-1S 3 Hour TB-III 3 Hour CT-2 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.1.1* RB-1N/RB-1S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-144) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete wall 4.0 SB-I 3 hour[10] Gap filled with No doors Sealed intervening noncombustible cable raceway material [7][12]

9.1 TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [3][4] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 3'-0" thick concrete ceiling 8.2.6.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1 equipment access hatch 3'-0" concrete ceiling 1 personnel access hatch (4'-0" at U1 (13) Trackway) 6.3 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [3][4][10] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-190) Non-rated steel 1'-0" thick concrete hatchway cover ceiling

[10][12]

11.2.1 RB-1S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-144, 145, No doors 1'-0" thick concrete

& 146) floor 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [3](Sec. 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-148, 149, No doors 0'-11 5/8" thick III.9) ,[4](Sec. 10) 150, 151) concrete block wall

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-319

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.4 Unit 1 Cable Tunnel Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 4, 10.2 Cable tunnel electrical penetrations sealed with 3-hour seals except steel access plates. Also reference [8](5.1). Steel access plates between 8.2.4 & 8.2.6.A are 3-hour rated [13].

1, 3.1.5d Modify sprinkler system to prevent propagation between cable trays. Also reference [1](4.10 and 5.15.6).

1, 3.1.4 Provide additional hose on adjacent hose stations by Unit 1 cable tunnel for adequate coverage. Also reference [1](4.3.1.4 and 5.15.6). Hose stations have adequate hose to cover cable tunnel [9](E.3.d).

5, (13)12.C pg.3 Provide portable ventilation equipment for use in this zone. Portable smoke ejectors provided per [1](4.11).

1, 3.1.1(8) Provide fire detection in Unit 1 cable tunnel. Also reference [1](5.15.6),

[4](10.2) and [8](5.1).

9, D.3.c Manual fire fighting equipment available from adjacent zones (from the ground floor).

4, 10.2 Cable tunnels have complete fire detection and water suppression. Also reference [8](5.1).

4, 10.2 Cable tunnels are separated by 3-hour rated construction. Also reference

[1](4.10)[13].

4, 5.2 3-hour separation between fire zone 6.3 and cable tunnels except fire resistive access covers. Also reference [1](3.1.8 and 5.3.6) and [8](6.2.1). This includes doors, dampers, etc.

1, 5.15.4 Automatic sprinkler system provided for cable tunnel.

4, 9.2 3-hour separation between the reactor building and turbine building. Between cable tunnels and reactor building. Also reference [11].

8, 3.2.4.2 Cable penetrations between fire zones 1.1.1.1 and 8.2.4 have fire resistive seals.

4.3-320

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.4 Unit 1 Cable Tunnel Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989. Including Exemption Requests 3.3 and 5.2 which apply to the fire zone.

4 SER, July 21, 1988.

5 Letter dated 4-10-78 from CE to NRC.

6 LER 90-020, Rev.00 (10-19-90).

7 The intervening cable raceway has been sealed with a 1'-0" thick cerafiber /

flammastic and ceraboard fire seal.

8 Appendix R Exemption Requests 9 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 10 Equivalency of steel hatch (#308) justified in DCP 9800275.

11 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611 Rev. 1.

12 Evaluation for fire area separation between SB-I and TB-III, ER9801619.

13 Equipment access hatch #300 and personnel access hatch #302 are class A fire rated doors with a 3-hour fire label (Ref. 9900059).

4.3-321

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.4 AREA: CT-1 LOCATION: TB1, Elev. 588 0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Cable Tunnel FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 2.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. The combustible loading is due to cable insulation almost exclusively.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.4 which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 1.1.1.1 RB-I 3-Hour 11.2.1 RB-I 3-Hour 4.0 SB-I 3-Hour 6.3 SB-I 3-Hour 8.2.5 CT-2 3-Hour 8.2.6.A TB-III 3-Hour 9.1 TB-III 3-Hour 4.3-322

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION - ZONE 8.2.4:

Fire zone 8.2.4s walls are constructed of concrete and concrete block with all electrical penetrations sealed by materials having a 3-hour fire rating except for a gap that opens into fire zone 4.0 which is filled with noncombustible material. The outer walls are constructed of minimum 1-6 thick concrete while an 11-5/8 thick concrete block wall separates the unit 1 cable tunnel from the unit 2 cable tunnel (fire zone 8.2.5). The floor is a minimum 1-0 thick concrete and carries a 3-hour fire rating where it serves as a boundary between fire zone 8.2.4 and fire zone 11.2.1. The access hatches are curbed to prevent fluid borne fire spread across fire boundary. Equipment access hatch #300 and personnel access hatch #302 are class A fire rated doors with a 3-hour fire label (Ref. DCP 9900059).

Penetrations have been sealed to provide a 3-hour barrier. The portion of the ceiling that forms a boundary with fire zone 6.3 is 3-hour fire rated.

The Unit 1 cable tunnel is provided with a fire detection system and an automatic suppression system. The fire detection system utilizes ionization detectors and the automatic suppression system is a wet pipe sprinkler system utilizing closed head directional spray nozzles for the cable trays and a special sprinkler arrangement protecting access hatches to the floor above the tunnel.

No manual fire suppression support equipment is provided within the tunnel, however, hose stations, equipped with 100 ft. of hose, and portable CO2 fire extinguishers are located in the zones above the tunnel. Additional hose is provided to assure adequate hose to cover the cable tunnel.

The Unit 1 cable tunnels fire loading limit is comprised almost entirely of electrical cable insulation. This fire zone has total coverage automatic wet pipe sprinkler protection. This system addresses the cable hazard with directional spray closed head nozzles and special sprinkler coverage around hatchway openings to the zones above. Therefore, ample assurance exists that any fire originating from within the cable tunnel will be confined and controlled or extinguished by the installed sprinkler system. Due to the special coverage of openings to zones above the tunnel, the potential of a fire spreading into the tunnel is minimized. In addition, the openings are curbed to prevent any fluid borne fire from affecting the tunnel and the entrances to the openings are sealed to provide a 3-hour fire barrier, or have 3-hour fire rated doors or equivalent design. Alternate shutdown paths exist in the event of a fire in this fire zone involving safe shutdown associated cables 4.3-323

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.5 Unit 2 Cable Tunnel Fire Area: CT-2 F Drawing: F-11-1 General Elevation: 588'-0" Zone Area: 8,690 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection coverage.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system and closed head water spray nozzles provided in the cable trays. System is arranged to prevent fire spread through hatches to the floor above.

Manual Suppression: A hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose. An additional 100 ft. of fire hose is provided at the primary access. Portable fire extinguisher(s) located in adjacent fire zones.

Other FP features: Access hatches are curbed to prevent fluid borne fire spreading across fire boundary. Equipment access hatches/doors and personnel access hatches/doors are class A fire rated doors with a 3-hour fire label with exception of the hatches to Fire Zone 6.3. (Ref. DCP 9900174).

Suppression Effects: Water release in this zone (including drainage from upper levels of the plant) from sprinkler system operation, hose line use, or piping breaks would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water will not affect undamaged insulated cable. Only cables are present in this zone. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains located in the cable tunnel.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: High Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.9 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description RB-2S 3 Hour SB-I Equivalent 3 Hour [4][14]

RB-2N 3 Hour RB-1N 3 Hour TB-III 3 Hour [4]

TB-II 3 Hour [4][15]

TB-I 3 Hour 4.3-324

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.5 Unit 2 Cable Tunnel Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 11.1.3* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-0" thick concrete floor (1'-6" thick at wall) 9.1 TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4][5] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 3'-0" thick concrete 8.2.1.D TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 8.2.1.C TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 11.1.4* RB-2S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-0" thick concrete floor (1'-6" thick at wall) 8.2.6.E TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 2 personnel access 3'-0" thick concrete hatches/doors

[16]

8.2.6.D TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 3'-0" thick concrete wall (1'-0" thick at ceiling) 8.2.6.B TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4][5] noncombustible No doors 3'-0" thick concrete ceiling 6.3 SB-I 3 hour[4][5] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [F-190]. Non-rated access 1'-0" thick concrete hatch door ceiling

[14]

8.2.6.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4][5] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1 personnel access 3'-0" thick concrete hatch/door ceiling (4'-0" thick at 1 equipment access trackway 1) hatch/door [16]

4.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [9] Gap filled w/ No doors Sealed intervening noncombustible cable raceway material [9][14]

8.2.6.C TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1 equipment access 3'-0" thick concrete hatch/door [16]

11.3.3* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-143) No doors 1'-0" thick concrete floor 11.3.1* RB-2S 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-0" thick concrete floor 8.2.4 CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4][5] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-148, 149, No doors 0'-11 5/8" thick 150, 151) concrete block wall

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-325

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.5 Unit 2 Cable Tunnel Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 5, 5.2 3-hour separation between fire zone 6.3 and cable tunnel except for fire resistive access covers. Also reference [6](6.2.1).

1, 3.1.5d Modify sprinkler system to prevent propagation between trays. Also reference [1](4.10

& 5.16.6).

1, 3.1.4 Provide additional hose on hose stations adjacent to cable tunnel. Hose packs with two 50 feet lengths of hose provided. Also reference [1](4.3.1.4 & 5.16.6) and [12](E.3.d).

2, (13)13.C pg.4 Provide portable ventilation equipment. Also reference [1](4.11).

3 Ensure U2 cable tunnel automatic sprinkler protection is arranged to prevent fire spread thru hatches to floor above at F/12 and F/17. Also see M4-2-84-37 (7-7-87).

5, 10.2 Cable tunnel access have heavy, metal checker plates for access hatches. Also reference

[6](5.1). Replaced with 3-hr. rated hatches per DCP 9900174 [16].

5, 10.2 Cable tunnel electrical penetrations sealed with 3-hour seals.

1, 3.1.1(8) Provide fire detection in Unit 2 cable tunnel. Also reference [1](5.16.6).

5, 10.2 Cable tunnels separated by 3-hour construction. Electrical seals are 3-hour rated. Also reference [1](3.1.8 and 5.3.6), and [6](5.3.4).

12, D.3.c Manual fire fighting equipment available from adjacent zones. Available from ground floor of TB.

5, 10.2 Complete detection and suppression in the cable trays.

5, 10.2 Unit 1 and Unit 2 cable tunnels separated by 3-hour walls.

1, 5.16.4 Automatic sprinkler system provided for cable tunnel.

5, 9.2 3-hour separation between RB and TB.

10, 3.1.5.d Unit 1 cable tunnel sprinkler system is adequate to prevent propagation between trays.

10, 3.1.5.d Single line break would take sprinkler system out of service. Should provide adequate separation of feeds. Separate sprinkler system for each division of cables [11](3.1.5.d).

12, D.3.c Water suppression provided over major cable concentrations.

5, 10.2 Cable tunnels have complete detection and water suppression. Also reference [1](4.10) and [6](5.1).

4.3-326

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.5 Unit 2 Cable Tunnel Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter dated 4-10-78 from CE to NRC.

3 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-84 4 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

5 SER, July 21, 1988.

6 Appendix R Exemption Request 5.2 applies to this fire zone. Also see section 5.1.

7 LER 90-020, Rev.00 (10-19-90).

8 Exemption Request 4.3 9 The intervening cable raceway has been sealed with a 1'-0" thick cerafiber /

flammastic and ceraboard fire seal, per ER 965927.

10 SER, November 5, 1980.

11 SER, February 12, 1981.

12 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 13 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612 Rev. 1.

14 Evaluation for fire area separation between SB-I and TB-I, ER9801618, the equivalency of steel hatch (#301) is justified by DCP 9800275.

15 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-I and TB-II, QDC-4100-M-1222.

16 Equipment access hatches #301 & 304 and personnel access hatches #303, 305 &

306 are class A fire rated doors with a 3-hour fire label (Ref. 9900174) 17 GL 86-10 Evaluation EC 401034 Rev. 0, Fire Seals F-382-(1-14) and F-382(18-21) 4.3-327

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.5 AREA: CT-2 LOCATION: TB, Elev 588-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Cable Tunnel FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 2.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. The combustible loading is heavy due to cable insulation almost exclusively.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 8.2.5 which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 11.1.3 RB-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 9.1 TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.1. TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> D

8.2.1. TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> C

11.1.4 RB-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6. TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> E

8.2.6. TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> D

8.2.6. TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> B

6.3 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6. TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> A

4.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6. TB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> C

11.3.3 RB-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 11.3.1 RB-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.4 CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 4.3-328

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION - ZONE 8.2.5:

Fire zone 8.2.5s walls are constructed of concrete and concrete block with all electrical penetrations sealed by materials having a 3-hour fire rating except for the penetrations to fire zones 8.2.6.A and 8.2.6.C which utilize noncombustible seals and a gap that opens into fire zone 4.0 which is filled with noncombustible material. The outer walls are constructed of minimum 1-6 thick concrete while an 11-5/8 thick concrete block wall separates the unit 2 cable tunnel from the unit 1 cable tunnel (fire zone 8.2.4). The floor is a minimum 1-0 thick concrete and carries a 3-hour fire rating where it serves as a boundary between fire zone 8.2.5 and fire zones 11.3.1, 11.3.3, 11.1.3 and 11.1.4. The ceiling is 1-0 thick concrete with various access hatches and penetrations. All access hatches are curbed. Equipment access hatches/doors #301 & 304 and personnel access hatches #303, 305 & 306 are class A fire rated doors with a 3-hour fire label (Ref. DCP 9900174). The electrical and mechanical penetrations have been sealed to provide a 3-hour fire barrier. The portion of the ceiling that forms a boundary with fire zone 6.3 is 3-hour fire rated.

The unit 2 cable tunnel is provided with a fire detection system and an automatic suppression system. The fire detection system utilizes ionization detectors and the automatic suppression system is a wet pipe sprinkler system utilizing closed head directional spray nozzles for the cable trays and a special sprinkler arrangement protecting access hatches to the floor above the tunnel.

No manual fire suppression support equipment is provided within the tunnel, however, hose stations, equipped with 100 ft. of hose, and portable CO2 fire extinguishers are located in the zones above the tunnel.

The unit 2 cable tunnels fire loading limit is comprised almost entirely of electrical cable insulation. This fire zone has total coverage automatic wet pipe sprinkler protection. This system addresses the cable hazard with directional spray closed head nozzles and special sprinkler coverage around hatchway openings to the zones above. Therefore, ample assurance exists that any fire originating from within the cable tunnel will be confined and controlled or extinguished by the installed sprinkler system. Due to the special coverage of openings to zones above the tunnel, the potential of a fire spreading into the tunnel is minimized. In addition, the openings are curbed to prevent any fluid borne fire from spreading to the tunnel, and the entrances to the openings are sealed to provide a 3-hour fire barrier, or have 3-hour fire rated doors or equivalent design. Alternate shutdown paths exist in the event of a fire in this fire zone involving safe shutdown associated cables 4.3-329

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.B Unit 1 Switchgear Area Fire Area: 13-1 F Drawing: F-5-1, F-17-1 General Elevation: 639/647-6 Zone Area: 2,145 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area heat (thermal) detection protects MG set 1A (abandoned in place) and actuates automatic water spray system. Local area smoke detection protects 4-kV switchgear 13-1 and 480-V switchgears 18 and 19 at the ceiling.

Suppression: Local area wet pipe and automatic water spray sprinkler systems protect reactor recirculation MG set 1A-202-51 (abandoned in place).

Manual Suppression: Located in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.8.E is one hose station, equipped with 100 feet of hose, and portable fire extinguisher(s).

Other FP features: Curbs, spray shields, and floor drains are installed.

Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown through discharge of water or Carbon Dioxide in this area would be no more severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be handled by the floor drains at el. 639'-0". Curbs, spray shields, and floor drains are installed. The spray shields installed at the ceiling will prevent sprinkler water from discharging onto 4-kV switchgear panel 13-1 (no water seals on switchgear or pedestals) and 480-V switchgear panels 18 and 19 (pedestals provided but top of switchgear not sealed).

This area is open to hose stream entry from Fire Zone 8.2.8.E but hose discharge will be deflected by the spray shields at the ceiling and a shield wall between this zone and 8.2.8.C.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description 24-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

14-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

RB-1N 3 Hour TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour[25]

4.3-330

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.B Unit 1 Switchgear Area Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated[25] noncombustible, (3 No doors 4'-0" thick concrete hour under 1.1.1.5.A TB-IV Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete floor (1'-6" thick at 1.1.1.5* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-0" thick concrete 1.1.1.4* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except at 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-68, F-69) No doors 1'-6" thick concrete SBGT line [6][7]

1.1.1.3* RB-1N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-60) No doors 2'-0" thick concrete floor (4'-0" thick at 8.2.8.E TB-IV Open [10] open [10] No doors No wall 8.2.8.C 24-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-173) Two 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> doors 11 5/8" thick concrete block 8.2.8.A 14-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [10] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-170) No doors, one 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 0'-11 5/8" thick rated damper concrete block

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-331

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.B Unit 1 Switchgear Area Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2 3-hour barrier between 4-kV SWGR 13-1 and 14-1 (23-1 and 24-1) along row 15 (11) extending to col G beyond MG sets (MG sets abandoned in place. Oil removed). Also reference [15](5.1), [7](12.2) and [10](5.8.1).

2 3-hour seals at bottom of SWGR's 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, and 24-1. Also reference [15](5.1) and [10](5.8.1).

7, 9.2 Provide 3-hour separation between RB and TB. There are some exceptions. Also reference [5].

7, 12.2 Smoke detection provided at ceiling. Also reference [10](5.8.4.1) and [1](3.1.1).

1, 5.19.6 Drains will be provided for the area enclosed by curbs.

12 Replace foam system protecting MG sets (MG sets abandoned in place. Oil removed) with water spray system and use of thermostat detection. Also reference [7](12.2) and

[10](5.8.4.1).

15, 5.1 There are no unsealed penetrations located near the SWGRs. Also reference [10](5.8.1).

2 Water curtain has been replace by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> wall [23].

7, 12.2 Provide 3-hour barrier (with 2-hour section) between RB and 480V SWGR areas. Also reference [10](5.8.1).

1, 3.1.1(13) Install fire detection system by 480V switchgear. Smoke detection at ceiling per

[7](12.2). Also reference [10](5.8.4.1), [10](5.8.4.2), [1](3.1.1), and [1](5.19.6).

9, (13)22.C pg.5 Install canopies over switchgear 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, and 24-1. Not provided. Also reference [1](3.1.10) and [1](5.19.6).

1, 3.1.6(b) Foam water system replaced with thermally actuated water spray system per [7](12.2).

Also reference [10](5.8.4.1), [1](5.19), and [1](4.3.1.6).

1, 3.1.1 Provide fire detection in area of 4kV and 480V switchgear. Smoke detection at ceiling per [7](12.2). Also reference [10](5.8.4.1), [10](5.8.4.2), and [1](5.19.6).

1, 3.1.11 Provide curb around MG sets (MG Sets abandoned in place. Oil Removed). Also reference [7](12.2), [10](5.8.4.1), and [1](5.19.6).

4.3-332

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 2 3-hour wall between U1 and U2 480-V switchgear area. Also reference [7](12.2) and

[10](5.8.1).

1, 5.19.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided.

15, 5.1 4-kV SWGRs for each unit separated by partial 3-hour barrier.

15, 5.1 Provide automatic fixed water suppression and foam water systems for MG sets (MG sets abandoned in place. Oil removed). Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

17, 3.1.6.b Water supply for U1 foam system also supplies U2 sprinkler system, and water for U2 foam system also supplies U1 sprinkler system. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

7, 12.2 Area beneath water curtain is curbed and drained. Also reference [10](5.8.4.2) and

[15](5.1). Water curtain has been replaced by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> wall [23].

16, 3.1.6.b Modify foam system design to provide 72 gallons of foam. Relocate system controls and have independent feed. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per

[7](12.2).

7, 12.2 Partial (20 ft. high) fire barrier separates division SWGR. Also reference [10](5.8.1).

1, 3.1.6 Independent feed for foam deluge system provided. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

7, 12.2 No intervening combustibles between U1 and U2 SWGR. Also reference

[10](5.8.4.2),[23].

7, 12.2 Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this zone. Also reference [10](5.8.4.1).

7, 12.2 Provide separate automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling for MG sets (MG sets abandoned in place. Oil removed). Provide spray sheilds to prevent damage to SWGR.

Provide water flow indication in control room. Also reference [10](5.8.4.10) and

[1](5.19.4).

10, 5.8.4.1 No continuity of combustibles between 8.2.8.E and equivalent fire areas (8.2.8.A-D).

4.3-333

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.B Unit 1 Switchgear Area Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-84 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 Left blank intentionally 5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611 Rev. 1.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 Left Intentionally Blank.

9 Letter from CECO to NRC dated 4-10-78.

10 Exemption Request 5.8 (12-18-84). Exemption for lack of complete 3-hour barriers between equivalent fire areas 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.D on the TB operating floor. Exemption granted (12.0) 12-11-87.

11 LER 85-018, Rev.00 12-11-85.

12 Letter, J. Wojnarowski (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC).

13 Left Intentionally Blank 14 Left Intentionally Blank.

15 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 5.1 16 SER, November 5, 1980.

17 SER, February 12, 1981.

18 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 19 ComEd Request letter dated November 5, 1991.

20 Left Intentionally Blank.

21 The previous FHA references exemption request 5.6. The exemption request 5.6 has been withdrawn.

22 SER, March 2, 1994.

23 DCP 9700200, Installation of block wall to replace 24 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area 13-1, 24-1, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.004 Rev. 3.

25 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-II and TB-IV, ER9801622.

4.3-334

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.8.B AREA: 13-1 (Equivalent Fire Area) LOCATION: TB, Elev. 639 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 8.2.8.B is on elevation 639 of the Turbine Building, adjacent to the turbine operating floor.

The zone extends from the 639 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 658 and is bounded by zone 8.2.8.A on the south side, by column line G to the west, by zone 8.2.8.C to the north at column line 13, and column line H to the east.

This zone contains the 1A Reactor Recirc. System MG Set (abandoned with oil removed), two oil-filled transformers, a 4kV switchgear, and two 480 volt switchgear.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 8.2.8.E, west TB-IV 8.2.8.A, south 14-11 8.2.8.C, north 24-12 1.1.1.5.A, above TB-IV 8.2.7.C TB-II 1.1.1.5, above RB-1N 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.4, east RB-1N DETECTION:

Heat detection is provided over the MG set, and smoke detection over the switchgear areas.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

Wet-pipe sprinkler protection and a water spray system are provided for the MG set area.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Medium Less than 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is primarily composed of transformer oil, and electrical cables contribute a minor amount to the loading. The rest of the fixed combustibles consist of various materials distributed throughout the zone. The only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a severe fire is the transformer oil. The zone is classified as having medium fire severity, but its combustible loading is generally lower since the MG sets were abandoned with their oil removed.

1 Equivalent Fire Area as defined in Section 4.1 2

Ibid 4.3-335

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a relatively small amount of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The main hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of producing a severe fire. The only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are transformer oil and electrical cables.

The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires in the vicinity of the switchgear and the abandoned MG set and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should prompt fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

Fire brigade performance may be hampered by:

• Fires involving polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's).

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 8.2.8.B:

Several combustibles are capable of producing an extensive fire in this zone. The cables form a continuous combustible path from one end of the zone to the other, providing a means for spreading fire, should they become ignited. The Unit 1 MG sets have been drained of oil and is no longer an oil combustible fire hazard. The sprinkler protection will limit the impact of the fire immediately around the MG set, however, it will have little effect on fire damage in the remainder of the zone. The oil filled transformers are surrounded by curbs which may be effective in containing small spills or leakage, but ineffective in the event of a rupture or other significant failure of the transformer tank. A fire in this zone would be expected to cause damage throughout.

4.3-336

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-IV:

Fire spread to zone 8.2.8.E, west of 8.2.8.B, is likely should a serious fire occur in zone 8.2.8.B due to the lack of any separating barrier. However, due to the discontinuity of combustibles, the sprinkler protection over the abandoned MG set area, and the large volume of zone 8.2.8.E, this should not result in serious damage in zone 8.2.8.E.

Fire zone 1.1.1.5.A is located above a portion of zone 8.2.8.B. A reinforced concrete floor separates the two zones. There are a number of openings in the floor such that fire spread to 1.1.1.5.A is likely.

Fire Spread Potential To Equivalent Fire Area 14-1:

The potential for spread of fire to zone 8.2.8.A is limited by a three-hour rated barrier which separates the two zones. Given the vent area of zone 8.2.8.B (vents to 8.2.8.E and 1.1.1.5.A) and the sprinkler protection over the abandoned MG set area, a fire in 8.2.8.B is not expected to challenge this barrier. Hot combustion products and possibly flames could intrude into zone 8.2.8A above the level of the barrier, however, this is not expected to impair the safe shutdown components in the zone.

Fire Spread Potential To Equivalent Fire Area 24-1:

The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.8.C is limited by a three-hour rated barrier which separates the two zones. Given the vent area of zone 8.2.8.B (vents to 8.2.8.E and 1.1.1.5.A) and the sprinkler protection over the abandoned MG set area, a fire in 8.2.8.B is not expected to challenge this barrier.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Fire area TB-II (zone 8.2.7.C) is separated from zone 8.2.8.B by the reinforced concrete floor of zone 8.2.8.B. The spread of fire via this avenue is not considered credible since the fire loading in zone 8.2.8.B is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-1N:

Fire zone 8.2.8.B is separated from zones 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.4 and 1.1.1.5 in area RB-1N by three-hour rated barriers. Given the vent area of zone 8.2.8.B (vents to 8.2.8.E and 1.1.1.5.A) and the sprinkler protection over the abandoned MG set area, a fire in 8.2.8.B is not expected to challenge these barriers.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 8.2.8.B is addressed below. The issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

4.3-337

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 9.0 Lack of 3-Hour Fire Barriers Between the Equivalent Fire Areas 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C and 8.2.8.D, Operating Floor, Turbine Building Issue: Fire zones 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C and 8.2.8.D are located on the same elevation of the Turbine Building and share boundaries which deviate from the requirements of Section III. G. 2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, to the extent that it requires installation of 3-hour barriers between redundant divisions of safe shutdown (SS/D) components. The principle concern is that a fire in one of these zones could spread to the adjacent zone(s) and damage redundant SS/D equipment.

Evaluation: The zones adjacent to 8.2.8.B are 8.2.8.A and 8.2.8.C as discussed in Barriers, above. These zones contain switchgear used for safe shutdown purposes under Appendix R.

The potential for fire spread to zones 8.2.8.A and 8.2.8.C is explored in Fire Spread Potential, above. This exploration concludes that spread to zone 8.2.8.A cannot be excluded, but would not cause a severe challenge to safe shutdown components in the zone. With respect to zone 8.2.8.C, the effectiveness of the separation features has been greatly improved by the installation of a three-hour rated barrier in place of a previously existing "water-curtain".

CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above as it relates to the potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.8.A from zone 8.2.8.B demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for zone 8.2.8.B do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

The physical separation between zones 8.2.8.A and 8.2.8.B, in combination with the automatic suppression provided is suitable to prevent fire spread between the zones. Thus, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 8.2.8.B will not result in the loss of redundant SS/D train equipment in zone 8.2.8.A and the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

The evaluation presented above for the potential for fire spread from zone 8.2.8.B to zone 8.2.8.C demonstrates that the separation features provided assures that fire will not spread between the two zones. Thus, the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994, can be substantiated.

The separation provided between zones 8.2.8.B and 8.2.8.C can assure that fire spread between the zones will be precluded. Thus, the loss of redundant SS/D train equipment in zone 8.2.8.C from a fire in 8.2.8.B can be precluded and the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown can be achieved.

4.3-338

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.A Unit 1 Switchgear Area Fire Area: 14-1 F Drawing: F-17-1 General Elevation: 639'-0" Zone Area: 2,940 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area heat (thermal) detection protects abandoned MG set 1B and actuates water spray system. Local area smoke detection protects 4-kV switchgear 14-1.

Suppression: Local area wet pipe and water spray sprinkler systems protect abandoned reactor recirculation MG set 1B-202-51.

Manual Suppression: One hose station, equipped with 100 feet of hose. Another water hose station is located in Fire Zone 8.2.8.E, equipped with 100 feet of hose, a foam cart, and portable fire extinguisher(s).

Other FP features: The abandoned MG Set is curbed.

Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shut down through discharge of water in this area would be no more severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be handled by the floor drains at el. 639'-0". The shield wall between this zone and Fire Zone 8.2.8.B as well as spray shields installed at the ceiling will prevent sprinkler water (from the MG sets sprinkler system) from discharging onto 4-kV switchgear panel 14-1. This panel is not sealed nor installed on a pedestal but curbs are provided for adjacent areas provided with fixed water suppression systems.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description 13-1 Equivalent 3 Hour[7]

TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour[7]

RB-1N 3 Hour TB-III Equivalent 3 Hour[22]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour[21]

4.3-339

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.A Unit 1 Switchgear Area Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.1.5.A TB-IV Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete 8.2.7.A TB-III Non-rated[22] noncombustible[22] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated[21] noncombustible[21] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.B TB-III Non-rated[22] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> seals under No doors 4'-0" thick concrete SWGR[22]

1.1.1.4* RB-1N 3 hour[6][7] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 1.1.1.3* RB-1N 3 hour[6][7] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-58, F-59) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated [10] none No doors No wall 8.2.8.B 13-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [10] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-170) No doors, one 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 0'-11 5/8" thick rated damper concrete block

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-340

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.A Unit 1 Switchgear Area Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 3.1.6 Independent feed for foam deluge system provided. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

1, 3.1.11 Provide curb around MG sets (MG sets are abandoned in place with oil removed). Also reference [1](5.19.6), [10](5.8.4.1), and [7](12.2).

1, 3.1.1 Provide fire detection in area of 4kV and 480V switchgear. Smoke detection provided per [7](12.2). Also reference [10](5.8.4.3), and [1](5.19.6).

1, 3.1.6 An automatic foam suppression system actuated by flame or infrared detectors for each MG set (MG sets are abandoned in place with oil removed). Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2). Also reference [1](5.19), [1](4.3.1.6), and

[10](5.8.4.1).

2 3-hour barrier between 4-kV SWGR 13-1 and 14-1 (23-1 and 24-1) along row 15 (11) extending to col G beyond MG sets. Also reference [15](5.1), [10](5.8.1), [7](12.2).

12 Replace foam system protecting MG sets (MG sets are abandoned in place with oil removed) with water spray system and use of thermostat detection. Also reference

[7](12.2) and [10](5.8.4.1).

1, 5.19.6 Drains will be provided for the area enclosed by curbs.

7,9.2 The U1 RB Mezzanine level is separated from the TB by a 3-hour barrier. Also reference

[5]. There are some exceptions.

15, 5.1 There are no unsealed floor penetrations located near the SWGRs. Also reference

[10](5.8.1).

2 3-hour seals at bottom of SWGR's 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, and 24-1. Also reference [10](5.8.1) and [15](5.1).

7, 12.2 Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this zone. Also reference [10](5.8.4.1).

7, 12.2 Partial (20 ft. high) fire barrier separates division SWGR. Also reference [10](5.8.1).

1, 5.19.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided.

16, 3.1.6.b Modify foam system design to provide 72 gallons of foam. Relocate system controls and have independent feed. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per

[7](12.2).

4.3-341

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 17, 3.1.6.b Two 150 gallon foam storage tanks are provided for systems. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

17, 3.1.6.b Water supply for U1 foam system also supplies U2 sprinkler system, and water for U2 foam system also supplies U1 sprinkler system. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

18, D.1.j Partial fire barriers and a water curtain provided on operating floor. See exemption requests for details.

10, 5.8.4.1 Fire suppression or detection provided. Smoke detection at ceiling per [7](12.2). Also

[10](5.8.4.1).

7, 12.2 Provide 3-hour barrier (with 2-hour section) between RB and 480V SWGR areas. Also reference [10](5.8.1).

10, 5.8.4.1 No continuity of combustibles between 8.2.8.E and equivalent fire areas (8.2.8.A-D).

7, 12.2 Separate automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling to protect MG set (abandoned).

Provide spray shields to prevent SWGR water damage. Provide water flow indication in control room per [1](5.19.4). Also reference [10](5.8.4.1).

15, 5.1 4-kV SWGRs for each unit separated by partial 3-hour barrier.

4.3-342

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.A Unit 1 Switchgear Area Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 Left blank intentionally 5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0611 Rev. 1.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 ComEd Request letter dated November 5, 1991.

9 Letter from CECO to NRC dated 4-10-78.

10 Exemption Request 5.8 (12-18-84). Exemption for lack of complete 3-hour barriers between equivalent fire areas 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.D on the TB operating floor. Exemption granted (12.0) 12-11-87.

11 LER 85-018, Rev.00 12-11-85.

12 Letter, J. Wojnarowski (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 4 13 Left Blank Intentionally.

14 Left Blank intentionally.

15 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 5.1.

16 SER, November 5, 1980.

17 SER, February 12, 1981.

18 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 19 SER, March 2, 1994.

20 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, 24-1, NDIT QDC-98-130.

21 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-II and TB-IV, ER9801622.

22 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-III and TB-IV, ER9801624.

4.3-343

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.8.A AREA: 14-1 (Equivalent Fire Area) LOCATION: TB, Elev. 639 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 8.2.8.A is on elevation 639 of the Turbine Building.

The zone extends from the 639 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 658 and is bounded by the building exterior wall on the south side, by column line G to the west, by zone 8.2.8.B to the north at column line 15, and column line H to the east.

This zone contains the abandoned 1B Reactor Recirc. System MG Set and a 4kV switchgear.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 8.2.8.E, west TB-IV 8.2.8.B, north 13-13 1.1.1.5.A, above, and north TB-IV 8.2.7.C TB-II 8.2.7.A, 8.2.7.B, below TB-III 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.4, east RB-1 DETECTION:

Heat detection is provided over the MG set and smoke detection over the switchgear.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

Wet-pipe sprinkler protection and a water spray system are provided for the MG set area.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Medium Less than 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

Electrical cables contribute a minor amount to the loading. The rest of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed throughout the zone with good spatial separation. The only fixed combustible capable of sustaining a severe fire in the zone is the lubricating oil. The zone is classified as having medium fire severity, but its combustible loading is generally lower since the MG sets were abandoned with their oil removed.

3 Equivalent Fire Area as defined in Section 1.4 4.3-344

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a moderate portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The main hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of producing a severe fire. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of producing such propagation are the electrical cables and the lubricating oil.

The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires in the vicinity of the switchgear and the abandoned recirc. MG set and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should prompt fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires;

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 8.2.8.A:

In general, the potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles. An exception to this is the electrical cables in the tray system. The cables form a continuous combustible path over a portion of the zone, providing a means for spreading fire.

The abandoned MG set has been drained of oil, eliminating the oil as a fire hazard. The sprinkler protection will limit the impact of the fire immediately around the MG set, however, it will have little effect on fire damage in the remainder of the zone. A fire in this zone would be expected to cause damage throughout.

4.3-345

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area TB-IV:

Fire spread to zone 8.2.8.E, west of 8.2.8.A, is likely should a serious fire occur in zone 8.2.8.A due to the lack of any separating barrier. However, due to the discontinuity of combustibles, the sprinkler protection over the MG set area (MG sets abandoned, oil removed) and the large volume of zone 8.2.8.E, this should not result in serious damage in zone 8.2.8.E.

Fire zone 1.1.1.5.A is located above a portion of zone 8.2.8.A. The potential for fire spread to 1.1.1.5.A is limited by the reinforced concrete floor separating the two.

Fire Spread Potential To Equivalent Fire Area 13-1:

The potential for spread of fire to zone 8.2.8.B is limited by a three-hour rated barrier which separates the two zones. Given the vent areas of zone 8.2.8.A (vents to 8.2.8.E), and the sprinkler protection over the MG set area, (MG sets abandoned, oil removed) a fire in 8.2.8.A is not expected to challenge this barrier. Hot combustion products and possible flames could intrude into zone 8.2.8.B above the level of the barrier, however, this is not expected to impair safe shutdown components in the zone.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Fire area TB-II (zone 8.2.7.C) is separated from zone 8.2.8.A by the reinforced concrete floor of zone 8.2.8.A. The spread of fire via this avenue is not considered credible since the fire loading in zone 8.2.8.A is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-III:

Fire area TB-III (zones 8.2.7.A and 8.2.7.B) is separated from zone 8.2.8.A by a heavy reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly. The fire loading in zone 8.2.8.A is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of this barrier. The barrier does have unsealed piping penetrations in it, however. Given the nature and distribution of combustibles in zone 8.2.8.A, fire extension downward to 8.2.7.A is not likely, but cannot be fully discounted.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-1:

Fire zone 8.2.8.A is separated from zones 1.1.1.3 and 1.1.1.4 in area RB-1 by a three-hour rated barrier. Given the vent path to zone 8.2.8.E, the sprinkler protection over the MG set, (MG sets abandoned, oil removed) and the combustible loading, a fire in zone 8.2.8.A is not expected to challenge the integrity of the barrier.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issues identified in the SER relative to zone 8.2.8.A are addressed below. Each issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

4.3-346

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 9.0 Lack of 3-Hour Fire Barriers Between the Equivalent Fire Areas 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C and 8.2.8.D, Operating Floor, Turbine Building Issue: Fire zones 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C and 8.2.8.D are located on the same elevation of the Turbine Building and share boundaries which deviate from the requirements of Section III. G. 2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, to the extent that it requires installation of 3-hour barriers between redundant divisions of safe shutdown (SS/D) components. The principle concern is that a fire in one of these zones could spread to the adjacent zone and damage redundant SS/D equipment.

Evaluation: The zone adjacent to 8.2.8.A is 8.2.8.B as discussed in Barriers, above. These zones contain switchgear and a control panel that is used for safe shutdown purposes under Appendix R. The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.8.B is explored in Fire Spread Potential, above. This exploration concludes that spread to the adjacent zone is not expected, but, without automatic suppression, cannot be discounted.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above for fire zone 8.2.8.A demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

The physical separation between zones 8.2.8.A and 8.2.8.B, in combination with the automatic suppression provided, is suitable to prevent fire spread between the zones. Thus, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 8.2.8.A will not result in the loss of redundant SS/D train equipment in zone 8.2.8.B and the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-347

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.D Unit 2 Switchgear Area Fire Area: 23-1 F Drawing: F-18-1 General Elevation: 639'-0" Zone Area: 2,940 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area heat (thermal) detection protects MG set 2A (abandoned in place, oil removed) and actuates automatic water spray system. Local area smoke detection protects 4-kV switchgear 23-1.

Suppression: Local area wet pipe and automatic water spray sprinkler systems protect reactor recirculation MG set 2A-202-51 (abandoned in place, oil removed).

Manual Suppression: One hose station, equipped with 100 feet of hose, and in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.8.E, is a water hose station, equipped with 100 feet of hose and portable fire extinguishers.

Other FP features: MG Set Unit is curbed (abandoned in place, oil removed).

Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shut down through discharge of water in this area would be no more severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be handled by the floor drains at el. 639'-0". The shield wall between this zone and Fire Zone 8.2.8.C as well as spray shields installed at the ceiling will prevent sprinkler water (from the sprinkler system) from discharging onto 4-kV switchgear panel 23-1. This panel is not sealed nor installed on a pedestal.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description 24-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [10]

TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour [10]

TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour [13][23]

RB-2N 3 Hour TB-I Equivalent 3 Hour [13]

4.3-348

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.D Unit 2 Switchgear Area Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 1.1.2.4* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-75, 76) No doors 1'-6" thick concrete 1.1.2.3* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated[13][23] noncombustible[23] No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.E TB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 8.2.7.D TB-I Non-rated noncombustible (3 No doors 4'-0" thick concrete hour under SWGR)[20]

1.1.1.5.A TB-IV Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete ceiling 8.2.8.E TB-IV Non-rated [10] none No doors No wall 8.2.8.C 24-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-171) No doors, one 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 0'-11 5/8" thick rated damper concrete block

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-349

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.D Unit 2 Switchgear Area Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 7, 6.2 Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this zone. Also reference [10](5.8.4.3) and [7](12.2).

1, 3.1.11 Provide curb around MG sets (MG set abandoned in place, curb retained). Also reference

[7](12.2), [10](5.8.4.3), and [1](5.19.6).

1, 3.1.1 Provide fire detection in area of 4kV and 480V switchgear. Smoke detection provided per [7](12.2). Also reference [7](6.2), [10](5.8.4.3), and [1](5.19.6).

1, 3.1.6(b) An automatic foam suppression system actuated by flame or infrared detectors for each MG set (MG set abandoned in place, sprinkler system retained). Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2). Also reference [1](5.19), [1](4.3.1.6).

2 3-hour barrier between 4-kV SWGR 13-1 and 14-1 (23-1 and 24-1) along row 15 (11) extending to col G beyond MG sets (abandoned). Also reference [15](5.1), [10](5.8.1),

[7](12.2), and [10](5.8.4.3).

12 Replace foam system protecting MG sets with water spray system and use of thermostat detection (MG set abandoned in place, sprinkler system retained). Also reference

[7](12.2), [10](5.8.4.3).

1, 5.19.6 Drains will be provided for the area enclosed by curbs.

7, 9.2 The U1 RB Mezzanine level is separated from the TB by a 3-hour barrier. Also reference

[5].

15, 5.1 There are no unsealed penetrations located near the SWGRs. Also reference [10](5.8.1).

12.2 MG set 2A-202-51 is protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system (MG set abandoned in place, sprinkler system retained). Baffles provided to prevent SWGR damage. Provide water flow indication in control room. Also reference [10](5.8.4.3) and [1](5.19.4).

2 3-hour seals at bottom of SWGR's 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, and 24-1. Also reference [10](5.8.1),

and [15](5.1).

7, 12.2 No intervening combustibles between SWGR divisions. Also reference [10](5.8.4.3).

15, 5.1 4-kV SWGRs for U1 and U2 separated by partial 3-hour barrier.

4.3-350

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 18, D.1.j Partial fire barriers and a water curtain provided on operating floor. See exemption requests for details.

17, 3.1.6.b Water supply for U1 foam system also supplies U2 sprinkler system, and water for U2 foam system also supplies U1 sprinkler system. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

17, 3.1.6.b Two 150 gallon foam storage tanks are provided for systems. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

16, 3.1.6.b Modify foam system design to provide 72 gallons of foam. Relocate system controls and have independent feed. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per

[7](12.2).

1, 3.1.6 Independent feed for foam deluge system provided. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

15, 5.10.5 Provide 1-hour penetration seals through floor to bottom of SWGR. A 3-hour floor rating is required per [15](5.10.5). 3-hour seals at bottom of SWGR's 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, and 24-1. Also reference [10](5.8.1), and [15](5.1).

10, 5.8.4.3 No continuity of combustibles between 8.2.8.E and equivalent fire areas (8.2.8.A-D). No continuity of combustibles through the floor slab.

10, 5.8.1 Provide 3-hour barrier (with 2-hour section) between RB and 480V SWGR areas.

7, 12.2 Complete automatic fire detection provided. Smoke detection at ceiling. Also reference

[10](5.8.4.3).

15, 5.10.4.1 All electrical penetrations except through floor slab and SWGR are sealed with noncombustible material.

7, 12.2 Partial (20 ft. high) fire barrier separates division SWGR. Also reference [10](5.8.1).

1, 5.19.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided.

4.3-351

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.D Unit 2 Switchgear Area Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79 4 Intentionally left blank.

5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612 Rev. 1.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 Intentionally Left Blank.

9 Letter from CECO to NRC dated 4-10-78.

10 Exemption Request 5.8 (12-18-84). Exemption for lack of complete 3-hour barriers between equivalent fire areas 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.D on the TB operating floor. Exemption granted 12-11-87 (12.0).

11 LER 85-018, Rev.00 12-11-85.

12 Letter, J. Wojnarowski (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 4 13 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0613 Rev. 1.

14 Exemption Request 7.1 15 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 5.10.

16 SER, November 5, 1980.

17 SER, February 12, 1981.

18 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 19 ComEd Request letter dated November 5, 1991.

20 The barrier separating fire zone 8.2.8.D from fire zone 8.2.7.D contains 4kV bus duct penetration (SWGR 23-1 feed from the swing diesel generator).

21 SER, March 2, 1994.

22 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, 24-1, NDIT QDC-98-130.

23 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-II and TB-IV, ER9801622.

4.3-352

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.8.D AREA: 23-1 (Equivalent Fire Area) LOCATION: TB, Elev. 639 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 8.2.8.D is on elevation 639 of the Turbine Building.

The zone extends from the 639 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 658 and is bounded by the building exterior wall on the north side, by column line G to the west, by zone 8.2.8.C to the south at column line 11, and column line H to the east.

This zone contains the 2A Reactor Recirc. System MG Set (abandoned, oil removed) and a 4kV switchgear.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 8.2.8.E, west TB-IV 8.2.8.C, south 24-14 1.1.1.5.A, above, and north TB-IV 8.2.7.C TB-II 8.2.7.D, 8.2.7.E, below TB-I 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4, east RB-2N DETECTION:

Heat detection is provided over the MG set (abandoned, oil removed), and smoke detection over the switchgear.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

Wet-pipe sprinkler protection and a water spray system are provided for the MG set area (abandoned, oil removed).

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Medium Less than 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is composed primarily of electrical cables. The rest of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed about the zone. The zone is classified as having medium fire severity, but its combustible loading is generally lower since the MG sets were abandoned with their oil removed.

4 Equivalent Fire Area, as defined in Section 1.4 4.3-353

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a moderate portion of the total combustibles which may be in the zone.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The main hazard associated with transients in this zone is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of producing a severe fire.

The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires in the vicinity of the switchgear and the recirc. MG set (abandoned, oil removed) and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should prompt fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

Fire brigade performance may be hampered by:

• Fires involving combustible liquids FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 8.2.8.D:

In general, the potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles. An exception to this is the electrical cables in the tray system. The cables form a continuous combustible path over a portion of the zone, providing a means for spreading fire.

The fire suppression protection will limit the impact of the fire immediately around the MG set (abandoned, oil removed), however, it will have little effect on fire damage in the remainder of the zone.

4.3-354

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-IV:

Fire spread to zone 8.2.8.E, west of 8.2.8.D, is likely should a serious fire occur in zone 8.2.8.D due to the lack of any separating barrier. However, due to the discontinuity of combustibles, the sprinkler protection over the MG set area (MG sets abandoned, oil removed), and the large volume of zone 8.2.8.E this should not result in serious damage in zone 8.2.8.E.

Fire zone 1.1.1.5.A is located above a portion of zone 8.2.8.D. The potential for fire spread to 1.1.1.5.A is limited by the reinforced concrete floor separating the two.

Fire Spread Potential To Equivalent Fire Area 24-1:

The potential for spread of fire to zone 8.2.8.C (Fire Area 24-1) is limited by a three-hour rated barrier which separates the two zones. Given the vent area of zone 8.2.8.D (vents to 8.2.8.E),

and the sprinkler protection over the MG set area (abandoned), a fire in 8.2.8.D is not expected to challenge this barrier. Hot combustion products and possibly flames could intrude into zone 8.2.8.C above the level of the barrier, however, this is not expected to impair safe shutdown components in the zone.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Fire area TB-II (zone 8.2.7.C) is separated from zone 8.2.8.D by the reinforced concrete floor of zone 8.2.8.D. The spread of fire via this avenue is not considered credible since the fire loading in zone 8.2.8.D is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-I:

Fire area TB-I (zones 8.2.7.D and 8.2.7.E) is separated from zone 8.2.8.D by a heavy reinforced concrete floor/ceiling assembly. The fire loading in zone 8.2.8.D is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of this barrier. The barrier does have unsealed piping penetrations in it, however.

Given the nature and distribution of combustibles in zone 8.2.8.D, fire extension downward to 8.2.7. D is not likely, but cannot be fully discounted.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-2N:

Fire zone 8.2.8.D is separated from zones 1.1.2.3 and 1.1.2.4 in area RB-2N by a three-hour rated barrier. Given the vent path to zone 8.2.8.E, the sprinkler protection over the MG set (abandoned, oil removed), and the combustible loading, a fire in zone 8.2.8.D is not expected to challenge the integrity of the barrier.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 8.2.8.D is addressed below. The issue carries thenumber of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

4.3-355

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 9.0 Lack of 3-Hour Fire Barriers Between the Equivalent Fire Areas 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C and 8.2.8.D, Operating Floor, Turbine Building Issue: Fire zones 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C and 8.2.8.D are located on the same elevation of the Turbine Building and share boundaries which deviate from the requirements of Section III. G. 2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, to the extent that it requires installation of 3-hour barriers between redundant divisions of safe shutdown (SS/D) components. The principle concern is that a fire in one of these zones could spread to the adjacent zone and damage redundant SS/D equipment.

Evaluation: The zone adjacent to 8.2.8.D is 8.2.8.C as discussed in Barriers, above. These zones contain switchgear and a control panel that is used for safe shutdown purposes under Appendix R. The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.8.C is explored in Fire Spread Potential, above. This exploration concludes that spread to the adjacent zone is not expected, but without automatic suppression, cannot be discounted.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above for fire zone 8.2.8.D demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

The physical separation between zones 8.2.8.D and 8.2.8.C, in combination with the automatic suppression provided, is suitable to prevent fire spread between the zones. Thus, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 8.2.8.D will not result in the loss of redundant SS/D train equipment in zone 8.2.8.C and the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-356

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.C Unit 2 Switchgear Area Fire Area: 24-1 F Drawing: F-5-1,18-1 General Elevation: 639/647-6 Zone Area: 2,146 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area heat (thermal) detection protects MG set 2B (abandoned, oil removed) and actuates automatic water spray system. Local area smoke detection protects 4-kV switchgear 24-1 and 480-V switchgear 28 and 29.

Suppression: Local area wet pipe and automatic water spray sprinkler systems protect reactor recirculation MG set 2B-202-51 (abandoned, oil removed).

Manual Suppression: Fire extinguisher(s) available in zone 8.2.8.C. A hose station, equipped with 100 feet of hose, is available in adjacent fire zone 8.2.8.E Other FP features: Curbs, spray shields, and floor drains are installed.

Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shut down through discharge of water or Carbon Dioxide in this area would be no more severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be handled by the floor drains at el. 639'-0". Curbs, spray shields, and floor drains are installed. The spray shields installed at the ceiling will prevent sprinkler water from discharging onto 4-kV switchgear panel 24-1 (no pedestals nor water seals on switchgear) and 480-V switchgear panels 28 and 29 (pedestals provided but top of switchgear not sealed).

This area is open to hose stream entry from Fire Zone 8.2.8.E but hose discharge will be deflected by the spray shields at the ceiling and a shield wall between this zone and 8.2.8.B.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-IV Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

23-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

13-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [7]

RB-2N 3 Hour TB-II Equivalent 3 Hour[24]

4.3-357

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.C Unit 2 Switchgear Area Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.8.D 23-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors, one 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 0'-11 5/8" thick rated damper concrete block wall 8.2.7.C TB-II Non-rated[24] noncombustible (3 No doors 4'-0" thick concrete hour under 1.1.1.5.A TB-IV Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete floor (1'-6" thick at 1.1.2.5* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 1'-0" thick concrete 1.1.2.4* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except at 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-78) One Class A door 1'-6" thick concrete SBGT line [6][7]

1.1.2.3* RB-2N 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 2'-0" thick concrete floor (4'-0" thick at 8.2.8.E TB-IV Open [10] open [10] No doors No wall 8.2.8.B 13-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-73) Two 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> doors 11-5/8" thick concrete block

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-358

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.C Unit 2 Switchgear Area Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2 3-hour barrier between 4-kV SWGR 13-1 and 14-1 (23-1 and 24-1) along row 15 (11) extending to col G beyond MG sets (MG sets abandoned. Curbs and sprinkler system retained). Also reference [15](5.1), [7](12.2) and [10](5.8.4.3).

2 3-hour seals at bottom of SWGR's 13-1, 14-1, 23-1, and 24-1. Also reference [15](5.1) and [10](5.8.1).

15, 5.1 There are no unsealed penetrations located near the SWGRs. Provide Class A Fire Door leading to the Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Building. Also reference [10](5.8.1).

7, 12.2 Area beneath water curtain is curbed and drained. Also reference [10](5.8.4.2) and

[15](5.1). Water curtain has been replaced by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> wall [22].

7, 9.2 Provide 3-hour separation between RB and TB. There are some exceptions. Also reference [5].

7, 12.2 Smoke detection provided at ceiling. Also reference [10](5.8.4.3) and [1](3.1.1).

1, 5.19.6 Drains will be provided for the area enclosed by curbs.

12 Replace foam system protecting MG sets (MG sets abandoned. Curbs and sprinkler system retained) with water spray system and use of thermostat detection. Also reference

[7](12.2) and [10](5.8.4.3).

10, 5.8.4.2 No continuity of combustibles between 8.2.8.E and equivalent fire areas (8.2.8.A-D).

2 Water curtain between units on main operating floor separates U1 and U2 SWGR. Water curtain actuated by separate smoke detection. Also reference [15](5.1), [7](12.2),

[10](5.8.1) and [10](5.8.4.2). Water curtain has been replaced by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> wall [22].

7, 12.2 Provide separate automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling for MG sets (MG sets abandoned. Curbs and sprinkler system retained). Provide spray sheilds to prevent damage to SWGR. Provide water flow indication in control room. Also reference

[10](5.8.4.3) and [1](5.19.4).

1, 3.1.6 An automatic foam suppression system actuated by flame or infrared detectors for each MG set (MG sets abandoned. Curbs and sprinkler system retained). Foam water system replaced with thermally actuated water spray system per [7](12.2). Also reference

[15](5.1), [5](4.3.4), [1](5.19), [1](4.3.1.6).

1, 3.1.1 Provide fire detection in area of 4kV and 480V switchgear. Smoke detection provided per [7](12.2). Also reference [10](5.8.4.2), [1](1.3.1.1), and [1](5.19.6).

1, 3.1.11 Provide curb around MG sets (MG sets abandoned. Curbs and sprinkler system retained). Also reference [7](12.2), [10](5.8.4.2), and [1](5.19.6).

4.3-359

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.C Unit 2 Switchgear Area 2 3-hour wall between U1 and U2 480-V switchgear area. Also reference [7](12.2) and

[10](5.8.1).

17, 3.1.6.b Two 150 gallon foam storage tanks are provided for systems. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

7, 12.2 3-hour barrier separates fire areas along col. G to H at 11. Full height partial fire barrier for div. 4-kV. Also reference [10](5.8.4.3).

7, 12.2 Partial (20' high) fire barrier separates division SWGR. Also reference [10](5.8.1).

4 Fire suppression or detection provided.

15, 5.1 Provide automatic fixed water suppression and foam water systems for MG sets (MG set abandoned, sprinkler system retained). Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2). Also reference [5](4.3.4).

7, 12.2 Provide 3-hour barrier (with 2-hour section) between RB and 480V SWGR areas.

Provide Class A fire door. Also reference [10](5.8.1) and [5](4.3.4).

17, 3.1.6.b Water supply for U1 foam system also supplies U2 sprinkler system, and water for U2 foam system also supplies U1 sprinkler system. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

7, 12.2 Automatic open head water curtain along col. line 13 separates U1 and U2 SWGR. Also reference [10](5.8.1) and [10](5.8.4.2). Water curtain has been replaced by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> wall

[22].

16, 3.1.6.b Modify foam system design to provide 72 gallons of foam. Relocate system controls and have independent feed. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per

[7](12.2).

1, 5.19.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided.

1, 3.1.6 Independent feed for foam deluge system provided. Foam water system replaced with water spray system per [7](12.2).

7, 12.2 No intervening combustibles between SWGR divisions. Also reference [10](5.8.4.3).

7, 12.2 No intervening combustibles between U1 and U2 SWGR. Also reference [10](5.8.4.2).

7, 12.2 1 photoelectric and 2 ionization smoke detectors are provided to actuate water curtain.

Water curtain has been replaced by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> wall [22].

7, 12.2 Manual fire fighting equipment is available for this zone. Also reference [10](5.8.4.3).

19, D.1.j Partial fire barriers and a water curtain provided on operating floor. See exemption requests for details.

4.3-360

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 8.2.8.C Unit 2 Switchgear Area Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 12-18-8 3 Letter, CECO to NRC 3-29-79.

4 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0610 Rev. 1.

5 GL 86-10 Evaluation S040-QH-0612 Rev. 1.

6 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

7 SER, July 21, 1988.

8 Left Intentionally Blank.

9 Letter from CECO to NRC dated 4-10-78.

10 Exemption Request 5.8 (12-18-84). Exemption for lack of complete 3-hour barriers between equivalent fire areas 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C, and 8.2.8.D on the TB operating floor. Exemption granted (12.0) 12-11-87.

11 LER 85-018, Rev.00 12-11-85.

12 Letter, J. Wojnarowski (CECO) to R. Denton (NRC) 4 13 Left Intentionally Blank.

14 ComEd Request letter dated November 5, 1991.

15 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 5.1.

16 SER, November 5, 1980.

17 SER, February 12, 1981.

18 GL 86-10 Evaluation QC-98-009.

19 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 20 The previous FHA references exemption request 5.6. The exemption request 5.6 has been withdrawn.

21 SER, March 2, 1994.

22 DCP 9700200, Installation of block wall to replace Water Curtain.

23 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area 13-1, 24-1, GL 86-10 Evaluation NTSC 98-020.004 Rev. 3.

24 Evaluation for fire area separation between TB-II and TB-IV, ER9801622.

4.3-361

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 8.2.8.C AREA: 24-1 (Equivalent Fire Area) LOCATION: TB, Elev. 639 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 8.2.8.C is on elevation 639 of the Turbine Building, adjacent to the turbine operating floor.

The zone extends from the 639 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor at elevation 658 and is bounded by zone 8.2.8.B on the south side, by column line G to the west, by zone 8.2.8.D to the north at column line 11, and column line H to the east.

This zone contains the 2B Reactor Recirc. MG Set (abandoned), two oil-filled transformers a 4-kV switchgear, and two 480 volt switchgear.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 8.2.8.E, west TB-IV 8.2.8.B, south 13-15 8.2.8.D, north 23-16 1.1.1.5.A, above TB-IV 8.2.7.C TB-II 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4, 1.1.2.5, east RB-2N DETECTION:

Heat detection is provided over the MG set (abandoned), and smoke detection over the switchgear.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

Wet-pipe sprinkler protection and a water spray system are provided for the MG set area (abandoned)..

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Medium Less than 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is composed of residual lubricating oil associated with the MG set (abandoned). Transformer oil is also a significant contributor, and electrical cables contribute a minor amount to the loading. The rest of the fixed combustibles consist of various materials distributed about the zone. The only fixed combustible capable of sustaining a severe fire is the transformer oil. The zone is classified as having medium fire severity, but its combustible loading is generally lower since the MG sets were abandoned with their oil removed.

5 Equivalent Fire Area, as defined in Section 1.4 6

Ibid 4.3-362

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a relatively small amount of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The main hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of producing a severe fire. The only fixed combustibles capable of producing such propagation are the transformer oil and electrical cables.

The installed detection system should provide for detection of fires in the vicinity of the switchgear and the recirc. MG set (abandoned) and notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should prompt fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• High ceilings with vertical vent paths which will allow smoke and heat venting from the zone; minimizing the likelihood that heat and smoke will adversely affect access and visibility;

• Multiple and separate means of access for fire fighting; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

Fire brigade performance may be hampered by:

• Fires involving polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's).

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 8.2.8.C:

Several combustibles are capable of producing an extensive fire in this zone. The cables form a continuous combustible path from one end of the zone to the other, providing a means for spreading fire, should they become ignited. The sprinkler protection will limit the impact of the fire immediately around the MG set (abandoned), however it will have little effect on fire damage in the remainder of the zoned. The oil filled transformers are surrounded by curbs which may be effective in containing small spills or leakage, but ineffective in the event of a rupture or other significant failure of the transformer tank. A fire in this zone would be expected to cause damage throughout.

4.3-363

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-IV:

Fire spread to zone 8.2.8.E, west of 8.2.8.C, is likely should a serious fire occur in zone 8.2.8.C due to the lack of any separating barrier. However, due the discontinuity of combustibles, the sprinkler protection over the abandoned MG set area, and the large volume of zone 8.2.8.E, this should not result in serious damage in zone 8.2.8.E.

Fire zone 1.1.1.5.A is located above a portion of zone 8.2.8.C. A reinforced concrete floor separates the two zones. There are a number of openings in the floor such that fire spread to 1.1.1.5.A is likely.

Fire Spread Potential To Equivalent Fire Area 23-1:

The potential for spread of fire to zone 8.2.8.D is limited by a three-hour rated barrier which separates the two zones. Given the vent area of zone 8.2.8.C (vents to 8.2.8.E and 1.1.1.5.A) and the sprinkler protection over the abandoned MG set area, a fire in 8.2.8.C is not expected to challenge this barrier. Hot combustion products and possibly flames could intrude into zone 8.2.8.D above the level of the barrier, however, this is not expected to impair safe shutdown components in the zone.

Fire Spread Potential To Equivalent Fire Area 13-1:

The potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.8.B is limited by a three-hour rated barrier which separates the two zones. Given the vent area of zone 8.2.8.C (vents to 8.2.8.E and 1.1.1.5.A) and the sprinkler protection over the abandoned MG set area, a fire in 8.2.8.C is not expected to challenge this barrier.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-II:

Fire area TB-II (zone 8.2.7.C) is separated from zone 8.2.8.C by the reinforced concrete floor of zone 8.2.8.C. The spread of fire via this avenue is not considered credible since the fire loading in zone 8.2.8.C is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of the barrier.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area RB-2N:

Fire zone 8.2.8.C is separated from zones 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4, and 1.1.2.5 in area RB-2N by three-hour rated barriers. Given the vent area of zone 8.2.8.C (vents to 8.2.8.E and 1.1.1.5.A) and the sprinkler protection over the abandoned MG set area, a fire in 8.2.8.C is not expected to challenge these barriers.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 8.2.8.C is addressed below. The issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

4.3-364

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 9.0 Lack of 3-Hour Fire Barriers Between the Equivalent Fire Areas 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C and 8.2.8.D, Operating Floor, Turbine Building Issue: Fire zones 8.2.8.A, 8.2.8.B, 8.2.8.C and 8.2.8.D are located on the same elevation of the Turbine Building and share boundaries which deviate from the requirements of Section III. G. 2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, to the extent that it requires installation of 3-hour barriers between redundant divisions of safe shutdown (SS/D) components. The principle concern is that a fire in one of these zones could spread to the adjacent zone(s) and damage redundant SS/D equipment.

Evaluation: The zones adjacent to 8.2.8.C are 8.2.8.B and 8.2.8.D as discussed in Barriers, above. These zones contain switchgear used for safe shutdown purposes under Appendix R.

The potential for fire spread to zones 8.2.8.B and 8.2.8.D is explored in Fire Spread Potential, above. This exploration concludes that spread to zone 8.2.8.D cannot be excluded, but would not cause a severe challenge to safe shutdown components in the zone. With respect to zone 8.2.8.B, the effectiveness of the separation features has been greatly improved by the installation of a three-hour rated barrier in place of a previously existing "water-curtain".

CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above as it relates to the potential for fire spread to zone 8.2.8.D from zone 8.2.8.C demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for zone 8.2.8.C do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

The physical separation between zones 8.2.8.C and 8.2.8.D, in combination with the automatic suppression provided, is suitable to prevent fire spread between the zones. Thus, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 8.2.8.C will not result in the loss of redundant SS/D train equipment in zone 8.2.8.D and the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

The evaluation presented above for the potential for fire spread from zone 8.2.8.C to zone 8.2.8.B demonstrates that the separation features provided assures that fire will not spread between the two zones. Thus, the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994, can be substantiated.

The separation provided between zones 8.2.8.C and 8.2.8.B can assure that fire spread between the zones will be precluded. Thus, the loss of redundant SS/D train equipment in zone 8.2.8.B from a fire in 8.2.8.C can be precluded and the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown can be achieved.

4.3-365

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.1.B Unit 1 RHR Service Water Pump Room Fire Area: TB-V F Drawing: F-9-1 General Elevation: 547'-0" Zone Area: 599 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area heat (thermal) detection.

Suppression: General area wet pipe sprinkler system.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and a hose station equipped with 100 feet of hose are located in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.1.A.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: Any adverse effects on safe shutdown equipment by water discharge would be less severe than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water removal would be accomplished with sump pumps as there are no drains located within the RHRSW cubicles.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-III 3 Hour Except Watertight Door. [6]

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.1.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4][5] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except door One unlabeled 1'-6" thick concrete except door (F-139) (F-139) watertight door.

11.1.1.C TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4][5] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-140) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete 11.1.1.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4][5] 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-138) No doors 4'-0" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-366

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.1.1.B Unit 1 RHR Service Water Pump Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 4, 13.2 Complete fire detection (rate compensated thermal) and automatic water suppression system. Also reference [7] (5.9.2).

4, 9.2 3-hour walls, floor, ceiling, except for closed, substantial metal, and watertight door in the east wall. Also reference [4] (13.2) and [7] (5.9.1).

4, 13.2 Fire hose stations and fire extinguishers are available.

2 Detection in DG 1 and DG 1/2 cooling water pump area.

2 Smoke detection in rooms housing RHR service water pumps 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D. Thermal detection is provided throughout. See M4-1(2)-83-30 Task 2.18, 2.23. Also reference [4] (13.2) and [7] (5.9.2).

1, 5.13.6 For the TB Basement floor which includes the SW Pump Rooms, waste oil will be removed from the area and NFPA approved flammable liquid storage cabinets will be provided. Lube oil storage will be limited to 30 gallons. Provided in Fire Zone 8.2.1.A.

1, 3.1.5 The turbine building sprinkler system will be extended to provide protection for the RHR service water rooms and Diesel Generator cooling pumps. Also reference [1] (5.13.6).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 Letter, dated 12-18-84, B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Dent 3 Exemption for lack of complete 3-hour barriers between fire area 11.1.1.B and the Southern Zone Group. Exemption Request 5.9 located in Volume 4 of the FPR.

4 SER, July 21, 1988.

5 NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989.

6 Fire Zone 11.1.1.B has 3-hour separation except door. NRC Safety Evaluation dated Dec. 11, 1987. Section 13.0 addresses the lack of complete 3-hour separation for Fire Zone 11.1.1.B. Fire Zone 11.1.1.B has a floor, ceiling, and all walls with a 3-hour fire rating except for the east wall that contains a metal, watertight door. Also see [4] (9.0).

7 Appendix R Exemption Requests 8 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

9 SER, March 2, 1994.

4.3-367

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.1.1.B AREA: TB-V LOCATION: TB 1, Elev. 558 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 11.1.1.B is one of the RHR service water pump rooms on elevation 558 of the Unit 1 Turbine Building.

Zone 11.1.1.B, on the basement floor of the turbine building, extends from the 558 foot elevation to elevation 572 and is bounded by the exterior building wall to the west, and by Fire Area TB-III zones 8.2.1.A to the east and above, 11.1.1.A to the south, and 11.1.1.C to the north.

The zone contains two RHR service water pumps and the cooling water pump for the Unit 1/2 diesel generator.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 11.1.1.A, south TB-III 11.1.1.C, north TB-III 8.2.1.A, east and above TB-III DETECTION:

Heat detection is provided throughout.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

A wet pipe sprinkler system is provided throughout.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is composed primarily of electrical cables. The other prominent combustibles are duct liner for the ventilation system and lubricating oil. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed through the area.

Thus, the only fixed combustibles capable of producing a significant fire in the zone are the electrical cables, the duct liner, and the lubricating oil. Full involvement of the cables is possible, depending on the location of the ignition source. The oil is distributed among the bearing housings of three separate pieces of equipment. These bearing housings are of substantial construction, with the largest quantity of oil in a single housing being one gallon.

Thus, a large spill fire capable of causing full area involvement is unlikely.

4.3-368

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a large portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The hazard associated with transients in this zone is the potential for a localized fire which may expose fixed combustibles capable of producing a severe fire. As mentioned above, the only fixed combustibles capable of such propagation are the electrical cables and the ventilation duct lining.

The detection system or the actuation of the sprinkler system would notify operating personnel of a fire in this zone via Control Room annunciation. This notification should prompt fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to rated fire barriers;

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

Fire brigade performance could be hampered by the:

• Restricted access due to door configuration; and

• Small compartment size, allowing quick smoke and heat build up which would adversely affect access and visibility.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 11.1.1.B (Fire Area TB-V):

The potential for a serious fire in the zone is limited by the installed suppression system.

However, due to the zone's limited size and rated construction, any significant fire which occurs has the potential to involve other exposed combustibles in the zone and, should automatic suppression fail, result in full involvement of the zone.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-III:

The potential for fire spread to zones 11.1.1.A, 11.1.1.C, and 8.2.1.A is limited by the three-hour rated barriers separating them from 11.1.1.B. Personnel access to 8.2.1.A from 11.1.1.B is via a water tight door. This door is of heavy steel construction (it is a door used for providing watertight integrity between compartments on a submarine), but is not fire-rated. The design of this door is such that, even when exposed to severe fire conditions, it would remain in place.

The performance of such doors under severe fire conditions was demonstrated during a battery fire aboard the U.S.S. Cochino (SS-349). The only failure mechanism of concern would be the loss of the door gasket (rubber) when exposed to fire conditions. Loss of the gasket would allow combustion gases to enter the uninvolved zone. Should the sprinkler system in zone 11.1.1.B perform as designed, the integrity of the gasket would not be challenged. If the sprinkler system failed, prolonged exposure of the gasket to elevated temperatures could be expected and gasket failure could occur. The impact of such failure should be limited, however, since 8.2.1.A has high ceilings and vertical vent paths, allowing rapid dispersion of any high temperature combustion gases escaping 11.1.1.B. Thus, fire spread into the surrounding TB-III zones would not be expected.

4.3-369

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 11.1.1.B is addressed below. The issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

10.0 Lack of 3-Hour Barriers Between Fire Zones 8.2.1.A and 11.1.1.B and the Rest of the Southern Zone Group Issue: Fire zones 8.2.1.A (TB-III) and 11.1.1.B (TB-V) are separated from each other by 3-hour fire rated construction except for the connecting personnel access door. The principle concern is that compliance with the requirements of Section III.G.2 with regard to redundant safe shutdown components is not achieved.

Evaluation: As discussed under Fire Spread Potential, above, the possibility of fire spread to TB-III is unlikely and, therefore, the separation provided is acceptable for the hazard. Thus, the increase in combustible loading values for zone 11.1.1.B does not constitute a threat of damage to redundant SS/D trains via fire spread into fire area TB-III. This finding is consistent with that of the existing SER.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above for fire zone 11.1.1.B demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

The barrier shared by 8.2.1.A (TB-III) and 11.1.1.B (TB-V) deviates from Appendix R with respect to separation of redundant safe shutdown related cables. However, the separation provided is sufficient for the hazard and a fire in zone 11.1.1.B will not result in the loss of redundant SS/D trains. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-370

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 2.0 Control Room Fire Area: SB-1 F Drawing: F-8-1 General Elevation: 623'-0" Zone Area: 4,161 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection system. HVAC system air return and makeup supply paths contains duct smoke detectors.

Suppression: None.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and portable halon fire extinguisher(s) are located inside the Control Room. Fire hose stations and a low flow capacity booster fire hose reel station are located in the corridor outside of room's south entrance. Portable fire extinguisher(s) located outside of each of the control room's two exits.

Other FP features: The control room floor contains a UL listed floor covering.

Suppression Effects: There are no water suppression systems or piping within the Control Room, any water entry would be from the use of manual hose stations located outside of this zone. Any damage which would result from water discharge within the room would be of no greater severity than that resulting from a design basis fire. Therefore, water discharge from hose streams is considered tolerable. The room has no floor drains so water runoff would be via floor drains located outside of the Control Room.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description SB-II 3 Hour TB-III 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type Exterior Roof Outside 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 19.3 SB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-133 & 134) Two Class "A" fire 1'-6" thick concrete doors, Two- 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire dampers 8.2.7.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-131 & 135) No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 7.1 TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-131 & 135) No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 6.1.B TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-131 & 135) No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 3.0 SB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete (F-194)

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-371

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 2.0 Control Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 4, 5.2 Manual fire fighting equipment (hose reels & port. extinguishers) is available for this zone. Also reference [2](5.1.4), [5](6.3.2), & [11](F.2). Hose stations are available outside entrances. Additional port. extinguishers provided in adjacent areas.

4,5.0 Fire zone 2.0 is separated from fire zones 8.2.7.A, 6.1.B, and 7.1 by 3-hour rated fire barriers. Also see UFHA section 4.12.1. Also see penetration drawings F-131 and 135.

Also reference [4](5.2), [5](6.3.1), [7](6.1), [11](F.2).

4, 5.0 Fire zone 2.0 is separated from fire zone 3.0 by a nonrated barrier. Also see UFHA section 4.12.1. All penetrations are sealed w/ unrated, noncomb. matl. Also see NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989, Sec. III (4). Also [4](5.2), [5](6.3.1), [7](6.1), [11](F.2).

4, 5.0 Fire zone 2.0 is separated from fire zone 19.3 and the outside by a 3-hour rated fire barrier. Also see penetration drawing F-134. Also reference [4](5.2), [5](6.3.1), [7](6.1),

[11](F.2).

4, 5.0 Fire zone 2.0 is separated from the outside by a 3-hour rated fire barrier. Also see UFHA section 4.12.1 and NRC Exemption Aug. 18, 1989, Sec. III (4). Also reference [4](5.2),

[5](6.3.1), [7](6.1), [11](F.2).

1, pg. 2.3-27 False ceiling replaced with complete aluminum grid ceiling. Noncombustible suspended ceiling provided [11](D.1.f).

2, 5.1.4 Provide Class A fire doors for access doors to Control Room.

2, 5.1.4 Install 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire dampers in HVAC ducts in Control Room.

2, 3.1.1(1) Install fire detection (early warning) system in consoles, cabinets and general area. Also reference [2](5.1.6), [3](3.1.1.(1), [5](6.3.1)). System provided and alarms locally

[4](5.2), [5](6.3.4) and [7](6.1). Provided above drop ceiling [11](D.1.f).

2, 5.1.6 Replace carpet in Control Room with UL listed covering. Also reference [2](3.1.11).2, 5.1.4 Fire detection (smoke detectors) in makeup air supply to Control Room.

Detectors are also provided in the return air path from the control room. Also reference

[2](3.1.1 & 5.1.6).

2, 5.1.6 Provide two portable halon 1211 extinguishers in the Control Room. Also reference

[2](3.1.7).

2, 5.1.6 Provide low flow booster reel in Control Room. One inch reels with low flow nozzles with shutoff valves. Also reference [2](3.1.4 & 4.3.1.4) and [11](F.2).

4, 5.0 Fire zone 2.0 is separated from fire zone 19.3 by a 3-hour rated fire barrier. Also see UFHA section 4.12.1. Also see penetration drawing F-133. Also reference [4](5.2),

[5](6.3.1), [7](6.1), [11](F.2).

5, 2.2 Safe shutdown makeup pump and RCIC system required for fires in certain areas.

4.3-372

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 11, F.2 Control room vent system designed as a recirculation system with smoke detectors provided in the return air ducts. The vent system may be manually operated to provide purging capability if necessary.

11, F.2 Ionization detection provided above open-grid ceiling. As indicated by the reference, this is from the Appendix A response.

11, D.4.h Adequate SCBAs and spare bottles available for use for control room personnel.

Breathing apparatus available for control room operators [11](F.2).

11, D.3.j Cabling kept to a minimum, no cables in trenches, etc. Cables terminate in room. No cables routed under raised central console area. Also reference [11](F.2).

11, E.1.b Detection alarms and annunciation provided in control room. Local alarms also provided for detection systems.

11, F.2 Fire alarms throughout the plant alarm in the control room. Visual and audible alarms in control room for detection and suppression systems (also for supervisory systems)

[2](4.2).

5, 6.3.5 Local monitoring capability from outside SB-I.

5, 6.3.4 Transient combustibles and ignition sources are administratively controlled.

5, 6.3.4 Fire brigade could respond instantly to a fire condition in the zone.

4, 5.2 Control room is continuously manned. Also reference [5](6.3.4).

11, F.2 Dampers are interlocked with the detection system which operates as a once-through system.

4.3-373

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 2.0 Control Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Updated Fire Hazards Analysis, Amendment 10 (8/93) 2 SER, July 27, 1979.

3 SER, November 5, 1980.

4 SER July 21, 1988.

5 Exemption Request, Sec. 6.3 applies to this fire zone and addresses the lack of suppression in the Control Room.

6 SER, December 30, 1982.

7 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Section 6.1.

8 November 5, 1991 ComEd request letter (establishing combustible loading limits for specific fire zones).

9 Left Intentionally Blank.

10 Left Intentionally Blank.

11 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 12 SER, March 2, 1994.

4.3-374

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 2.0 AREA: SB-I LOCATION: SB , Elev. 623 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 2.0 consists of the Control Room on elevation 623 of the Service Building.

The zone extends from the 623 foot elevation to the bottom of the roof at elevation 639 and is bounded by column line 25 to the north, column line H to the south, by an exterior wall on the west and north sides of the building. A portion of the west side is bounded by a rated barrier separating it from zone 19.3 of the Service Building, and a portion of the north wall abuts a stairwell.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 3.0, below SB-I 19.3, west and south SB-II 8.2.7.A north TB-III 7.1, 6.1.B, north TB-III DETECTION:

Smoke detection is provided throughout the zone. HVAC return and supply paths have duct detectors.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

None.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Low Less than 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is composed primarily of electrical cables. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of a variety of materials distributed about the zone.

Thus, the fixed combustibles capable of producing the most severe fire in the zone are the electrical cables.

Transients account for a significant portion of the total combustibles which may be in the area.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The main hazard associated with transients in this zone is the potential for a localized fire which may expose combustibles capable of producing a severe, propagating fire. As mentioned above, the largest category of fixed combustibles capable of supporting such a fire are the electrical cables.

4.3-375

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The installed detection system should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

• Type and distribution of combustibles;

• Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires;

• Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers; and

• Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

Fire brigade action may be hampered by the:

• Concern with applying water to control and instrument panels; and

• Interference with continuation of operations from this station.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 2.0:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is limited by the discontinuity of combustibles. The exposed combustibles are limited, with the electrical cables being in the various panels or in underfloor conduits or raceways between the panels. Due to this containment, the development of a large fire involving electrical cables is not likely. Ordinary combustibles are limited to those materials required for plant operation (e.g., manuals, procedures, computer terminals, furniture).

The development of a fire resulting in full area involvement is not expected due to the containment and distribution of combustibles, the continuous manning of the area, and the provision of fire detection.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area SB-I:

Fire spread to the zone below, 3.0, is unlikely due to the substantial reinforced floor separating the two zones. Although the numerous penetrations where the electrical cables pass through the floor are not sealed with a rated seal design, they are provided with non-combustible seals. This arrangement should preclude fire propagation to zone 3.0.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area SB-II:

The potential for fire spread to the adjacent zone, 19.3, is limited by the 3-hour rated construction. The control room fire loading is not sufficient to challenge such a barrier.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area TB-III:

Fire area TB-III, zone 8.2.7.A, 6.1.B and 7.1 are separated from zone 2.0 by three-hour rated barriers. The fire loading in zone 2.0 is not sufficient to challenge the integrity of these barriers.

4.3-376

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 2.0 is addressed below. The issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern are satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

13.0 Lack of Complete Suppression System in the Control Room, Fire Zone 2.0 Issue: Section III.G.3 of Appendix R requires the installation of an area-wide fixed fire suppression system in areas for which alternative shutdown capability is provided. The concern is that a fire in the Control Room would damage the normal safe shutdown systems.

Evaluation: As discussed under Factors Influencing Fire Impact, above, the primary fixed combustibles in zone 2.0 are electrical cables. These cables are largely unexposed and are separated in individual cabinets or raceways. Thus, these cables, unlike cables in open trays, do not represent a combustible capable of propagating fire throughout the zone. The constant manning of the Control Room is a factor contributing to early fire detection. For any fires escaping detection by Control Room personnel, the presence of a smoke detection system should assure early signaling of a fire emergency. This early discovery of any fires which may occur provides confidence that the fire brigade will be able to respond in a timely manner. For fires detected early, it is expected that personnel on duty in the control room would be able to extinguish the fires using first aid fire fighting techniques before the brigade arrives.

Considering the forgoing, the installation of a fixed suppression system would not result in a corresponding improvement in safety. This finding is consistent with that of the existing SER.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluations presented above for fire zone 2.0 demonstrate that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

Zone 2.0, a zone for which alternative SS/D is provided, does not comply with Appendix R since fixed suppression is not provided throughout. However, the suppression and detection provided are sufficient to assure a fire in 2.0 would not cause a loss of SS/D capability. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-377

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 3.0 Cable Spreading Room Fire Area: SB-I F Drawing: F-8-1 General Elevation: 609'-0" Zone Area: 4,150 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection system. HVAC system contains duct smoke detectors.

Suppression: General area wet pipe system and closed head water spray system in cable trays.

Manual Suppression: Fire extinguisher(s) and two hose stations, one outside of each entrance, each with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: Room is curbed and contains drains. Structural steel at ceiling is coated with fire proof material.

Suppression Effects: Water release from suppression system operation, hose line use, or piping breaks in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water runoff would be controlled by floor drains in this room. The room is curbed and the doors are elevated.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description SB-II 3 Hour TB-III 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.7.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-131) No doors, One 3-hr. Damper 2'-0" thick concrete 8.2.6.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-131) No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 6.1.B TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-131) No doors 2'-0" thick concrete 19.2 SB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Two Class A 1'-6" thick concrete doors, Four 3-hr. dampers.

4.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> equivalent No doors 0'-6" thick concrete (F-191) [1]

6.3 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> equivalent No doors 0'-6" thick concrete (F-191)[1]

2.0 SB-I Non-rated noncombustible No doors 0'-6" thick concrete (F-194) ceiling

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-378

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 3.0 Cable Spreading Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 5, F.3.a.5 All cable trays accessible for manual suppression.

5, F.3.a.4 Two separate entrances provided for the cable spreading room.

5, F.3.a.1 Safe shutdown for both units can be achieved independent of this fire area. Also reference [5](F.3.b).

8, 2.2 Safe shutdown makeup pump and RCIC system required for shutdown for a fire in this zone.

6, 5.2 Complete fire detection and water suppression for the cable spreading room. Also reference [4](6.1).

6, 5.2 3-hour separation between Fire Zone 3.0 and surrounding zones including doors, dampers, seals, etc. Except ceiling (floor of control room) which has unrated noncombustible penetration seals. Also Reference [4](6.1), [2](3.1.8, 5.3.6), [5](D.1.c, F.3.b).

2, 3.1.5j Install auto. sprinkler system. 11-5-79 two wet pipe sprinkler systems. Provides both area & cable tray protection. Design acceptable on 11-5-80. A zoned deluge system was originally recommended. Also [2](5.2.6), [5](F.3.a.1, D.3.c), & [7](3.1.5.j).

2, 5.2.6 Install water drainage system.

2, 5.2.6 Install cross zoned ionization detection systems in Cable Spread Room.

2, 3.1.8 Provide Class A fire doors in Cable Spread Room. Also reference [2](5.2.6).

2, 5.2.6 Upgrade structural steel fire resistance to 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating in Cable Spread Room. Mod.

complete 4-1/2-78-20.

2, 5.2.6 Install fire rated dampers in all HVAC penetrations.

2, 5.2.4 Hose stations and portable extinguishers located outside of each entrance (provided for backup suppression). Also reference [5](F.3.a.2).

2, 5.2.4 Smoke detectors in the return air duct (from cable spreading room).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Equivalency of fire seal justified in PLC Report "Evaluation of Penetration Seal Systems at the Dresden and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plants" Section 2.12, Dated April 21, 1987. Reference FPPDP Volume 5, Section E.

2 SER, July 27, 1979.

3 SER, November 5, 1989.

4 Appendix R Exemption Requests 5 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 6 SER, July 21, 1988.

7 SER, November 5, 1980.

8 SER, December 30, 1982.

4.3-379

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 3.0 AREA: SB-I LOCATION: SB, Elev. 609-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Cable Spreading Room FIRE SEVERITY: The fire severity for this zone is 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

A review of the Safety Evaluation Reports did not uncover established combustible loading limits for this zone.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones which are adjacent to Fire Zone 3.0 but in different fire areas, and summarizes the fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then the spread of fire to the adjoining fire area is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 19.2 SB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 6.1.B TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.7.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> EVALUATION - GENERAL:

The combustible loading for this zone results in a fire severity of approximately 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

However, this zone is provided with general area smoke detection, a wet pipe sprinkler system, and a closed head water spray system in the cable trays. These systems provide for prompt notification and fire growth control/extinguishment. In addition, the fire brigade should have ample time for successful intervention prior to any significant fire challenge to the barriers.

4.3-380

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 4.0 Old Computer Room Fire Area: SB-I F Drawing: F-8-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 858 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection system.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s).

Other FP features: Structural steel at ceiling is coated with fire proof material.

Suppression Effects: Water release from hose line use in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire. Water runoff from manual hose stream use would be through the door to the auxiliary electrical equipment room.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description CT-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [3][7]

CT-2 Equivalent 3 Hour [3][6]

SB-II 3 Hour Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 19.1 SB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-125) No Doors 1'-6" thick concrete One 3-hour damper 8.2.5 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4] Gap filled with No doors Sealed intervening noncombustible cable raceway materials [4][6]

8.2.4 CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> [4] Gap filled with No doors Sealed intervening noncombustible cable raceway materials [4][7]

6.3 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Two Class A 0'-11 5/8" thick doors. Six, concrete block walls 3-hr. dampers. (1'-0" at ceiling) 3.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> equivalent[1] No doors 0'-6" thick concrete (F-191) ceiling

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-381

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 4.0 Old Computer Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2, 3.1.8 Provide 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated barriers, Class A doors, dampers (in HVAC ducts) &

penetrations to computer room, cable tunnel, CSR & service building. Also reference [2](5.3.6). 3-hour separation from other areas of the service building

[3](5.2), [5](6.1).

2, 5.3.6 Install engineered fire detection system in Aux. Electric Room and Computer Room. Complete early warning fire detection system provided [3](5.2) and

[5](6.1).

2, 5.3.4 Hose stations located outside of each entrance of the auxiliary electric equipment room.

2, 5.3.4 Portable fire extinguishers are provided.

2, 5.3.4 Smoke detectors in the return air duct from the computer room to the Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room.

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Equivalency of fire seal justified in PLC Report "Evaluation of Penetration Seal Systems at the Dresden and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plants" Section 2.12, Dated April 21, 1987. Reference FPPDP Volume 5, Section E.

2 SER, July 27, 1979.

3 SER, July 21, 1988.

4 The intervening cable raceway has been sealed with a 1'-0" thick cerafiber /

flammastic and ceraboard fire seal, per ER 9605927.

5 Appendix R Exemption Requests 6 Evaluation for fire area separation between SB-I and TB-I, ER9801618.

7 Evaluation for fire area separation between SB-I and TB-III, ER9801619.

4.3-382

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 4.0 AREA: SB-I LOCATION: SB, Elev. 595 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire zone 4.0 consists of the computer room on elevation 595 of the Service Building.

The zone extends from the 595 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor/ceiling assembly at elevation 609 and is bounded on the north, east and west sides by fire zone 6.3, the Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room. On the south side, it is bounded by zone 19.1 in Fire Area SB-II.

Below the 595 foot elevation, zone 4.0 interfaces with the cable tunnels, zones 8.2.4 and 8.2.5, to the north.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 3.0, above SB-I 6.3, north, east and west SB-I 19.1, south SB-II 8.2.5, north CT-2 8.2.4, north CT-1 DETECTION:

Smoke detection is provided throughout the zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

None.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Medium Less than 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is overwhelmingly composed of electrical cables.

Thus, the only fixed combustibles capable of sustaining a propagating fire from the ignition point to other portions of the zone are the electrical cables.

Transients account for a very small fraction of the total combustibles which may be in the area.

This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle.

The installed detection system should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out.

4.3-383

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

Relative slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires; Multiple access paths; Low probability of early fire spread to adjacent areas due to presence of substantial concrete barriers; and Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting.

Fire brigade effectiveness could be hampered by the small volume of the room and its relatively high combustible loading; a situation which, once a certain degree of involvement is reached, can serve to significantly accelerate fire growth.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 4.0:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is good given its combustible loading, continuity of combustibles, and the close confines. However, the primary combustibles (i.e., electrical cables) exhibit slow rates of flame spread, allowing for ready extinguishment if the fire is discovered early. To facilitate early detection, this zone is provided with smoke detectors which signal the control room in the event of fire. This should produce timely fire brigade response. If brigade response is slow or ineffective, since, given the small volume of the space radiative feedback from surfaces in the room would tend to promote increasingly rapid fire growth. Thus, full involvement of the space can occur, but would be precluded if brigade response is timely and effective.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area SB-I:

The chance of fire spread to zones 3.0 and 6.3 is not significant. The combustible loading in the fire zone 4.0 is considerably less than the fire barriers three hour rating. The majority of the combustible loading in the fire zone is due to electrical cable insulation which has slow burning characteristics. The fire zone is covered completely by smoke detection which allows prompt response by the fire brigade. When factors such as fire development time, early response detection, and availability of the fire brigade, are considered along with the capability of the barriers, the prospect for fire spread to other zones in SB-I is limited. The presence of full area automatic suppression in zone 3.0 would limit the impact on that zone, should the separating barrier be breached.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area SB-II:

The barrier separating zone 4.0 from fire area SB-II is of three-hour rated construction. The combustible loading in the fire zone 4.0 is considerably less than the fire barriers three hour rating. The majority of the combustible loading in the fire zone is due to electrical cable insulation which has slow burning characteristics. The fire zone is covered completely by smoke detection which allows prompt response by the fire brigade. When factors such as fire development time, early response detection, and availability of the fire brigade, are considered, the prospect of such spread is diminished, but cannot be excluded as a possibility.

4.3-384

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area CT-2:

Fire area CT-2, zone 8.2.5, is separated from 4.0 by a rated penetration seal. The location of this interface, below the floor level of 4.0, is such that it would receive less exposure in a given fire than the barriers surrounding the zone on the sides and above. When coupled with early detection, timely brigade response, and the relatively slow growth rate of cable fires, the prospect of this barrier being challenged is significantly reduced. Should brigade response not be effective, however, fire spread to area TB-I cannot be discounted.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area CT-1:

Fire area CT-1, zone 8.2.4, is separated from 4.0 by a rated penetration seal. The location of this interface, below the floor level of 4.0, is such that it would receive less exposure in a given fire than the barriers surrounding the zone on the sides and above. When coupled with early detection, timely brigade response, and the relatively slow growth rate of cable fires, the prospect of this barrier being challenged is significantly reduced. Should brigade response not be effective, however, fire spread to area TB-III cannot be discounted.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED JULY 21, 1988):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 4.0 is addressed below. The issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern is satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

5.0 Fire Zone 4.0, Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Computer Room Issue: An exemption was requested from Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires installation of a fixed fire suppression system in fire zones for which an alternative safe shutdown capability is provided. The primary concern was that a fixed fire suppression system is not installed in the zones of Fire Area SB-I (e.g., control room, auxiliary electrical equipment room) and a fire could result in the loss of normal safe shutdown capability.

Evaluation: The SER concluded that any fire that might occur "would be promptly detected by the automatic fire detection system, one of the station personnel, or the fire brigade". Further, should extensive fire damage occur, the independent alternative safe shutdown system can be utilized to safely shutdown the plant. Considering that the entire fire area, including the control room, cable spreading room, auxiliary electrical equipment room and the auxiliary computer room, is surrounded by a 3-hour fire rated barrier, it was determined that "the installation of a fixed suppression system would not significantly increase the level of fire protection."

The SER considered that the combustible loading for zone 4.0 was significantly below those that would challenge a 3-hour rated barrier. This limited loading, then, assured that a fire in the area would not affect the alternative safe shutdown system (located outside fire area SB-I). The revised combustible loading figures indicate a higher loading than that used by the reviewers in 1988 (<21,000 BTU/ft2). The loading for zone 4.0 is of medium load. The combustible loading therefore is still within the fire barrier capability to contain a fire in the fire zone 4.0.

4.3-385

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Section III. G.1 of Appendix R establishes performance objectives relative to the safe shutdown of power plants. In Section III. G.2, the NRC specified three alternatives for achieving these objectives. Among these prescriptive alternatives, was the provision of a 3-hour barrier for separating redundant safe shutdown components. The existing configuration satisfies this requirement.

Section III.G.3 of Appendix R requires the installation of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in areas for which alternative safe shutdown is provided. Zone 4.0 is provided with detection as specified, but does not have fixed fire suppression. An exemption from this requirement was granted based on several factors; among which were:

a) Provision of fire detection; b) Availability of manual fire fighting equipment; and c) Fire severity of less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

The SER did not indicate any credit being taken for rated separation between zones 4.0 and 6.3 and between zones 4.0 and 3.0. Indeed, the SER states that zone 4.0 was not separated from the zone above, 3.0, by a rated floor/ceiling assembly.

CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for zone 4.0 do not compromise compliance with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R (zone 4.0 is separated from adjacent areas by 3-hour barriers). However, the basis for the NRC's findings relative to the need for fixed fire suppression as required by Section III.G.3 and as articulated in the July 21, 1988, Safety Evaluation Report, is no longer valid. To wit, the fire severity associated with the zone is no longer less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Despite the increase in combustible loading, the fire barrier is still able to withstand the potential fire. Regardless, considering the nature of cable fire development and the fire resistive capability of the barrier separating zone 4.0 from the areas containing alternative safe shutdown components and the early detection and response capability provided, the ability of the plant to safely shutdown should not be compromised by a fire in zone 4.0.

4.3-386

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.3 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room Fire Area: SB-I F Drawing: F-8-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 3,275 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection system. Smoke detectors are provided in the return air duct from the computer room.

Suppression: None.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s).

Other FP features: Structural steel at ceiling is coated with fire proof material.

Suppression Effects: There are no water suppression systems or piping within the Auxiliary Electric Room so any water entry would be from the use of manual hose stations located outside of this zone. Electrical panels are installed with and without pedestals and the tops of electrical panels are both sealed and unsealed so the possibility does exist for water entry into the panels.

The damage resulting from water discharge within the room would be of no greater severity than that resulting from a design basis fire. Therefore water discharge from hose streams is considered tolerable. The room has no floor drains so water runoff would be either through the door to the service building or via the hatches to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Tunnels which would have to be manually opened to aid in water removal. The water would be removed by floor drains in the cable tunnels.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-III 3 Hour CT-2 Equivalent 3 Hour [2][10]

SB-II 3 Hour CT-1 Equivalent 3 Hour [2][11]

4.3-387

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.3 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 19.1 SB-II 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-125, F-126, Two Class"A" fire 1'-6" thick concrete F-128) doors, 1-3 hr. damper.

8.2.6.A TB-III 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-127) No doors, one 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 2'-0" thick concrete rated damper 8.2.5 CT-1 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-190)[1] One non-rated steel 1'-0" thick concrete hatchway cover[2][10]

8.2.4 CT-2 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-190)[1] One non-rated steel 1'-0" thick concrete hatchway cover[2][11]

4.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-122, F-123, Two Class "A" fire 0'-11 5/8" concrete F-124, F-125) doors, Six- 3 hr fire block wall(1'-0" floor dampers at 4.0) 3.0 SB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> equivalent No doors 0'-6" thick concrete (F-191)[1] ceiling

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-388

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.3 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 6, 2.2 Safe shutdown makeup pump and RCIC system required for shutdown for a fire in this zone.

3, 5.3.4 Smoke detectors are provided in return air paths from computer room.

5, 6.2.4 Transient combustibles and ignition sources are administratively controlled.

5, 6.2.4 Fire brigade can respond quickly to a fire condition in the zone.

4, 5.2 Manual fire fighting equipment (including port. extinguishers, hose reels, water and carbon dioxide supp. capability available for a fire in this zone. Also reference [3](5.3.4) and [5](6.2.2).

4, 5.2 3-hour separation between this zone and U1 Turbine Building. Also reference [5](6.1).

4, 5.2 3-hour separation from other areas of the service building. Also reference [5](6.1 &

6.2.1).

3, 3.1.8 Provide fire barrier between cable tunnels & Aux. Elec. Room. 3-hour except fire resistive access covers. See Reference [2] for equivalency evaluation. Also reference

[4](5.2) and [5](6.2.1).

3, 5.3.6 Provide low flow booster reel in the vicinity of the room with shutoff valves. Also reference [3](3.1.4 & 4.3.1.4).

3, 5.3.6 Install engineered (early warning) fire detection system in Aux. Electric Room and Computer Room. Also reference [3](3.1.1), [4](5.2), [5](6.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.4). Alarms locally and in control room.

3, 5.3.6 The fire barriers between fire zone 6.3 and the adjacent areas will be upgraded to provide 3-hour rated barriers for doors (Class A), dampers (in HVAC), and electrical penetrations to the computer room , cable tunnels, CSR, and service bldg. & [3](3.1.8).

4.3-389

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 6.3 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 Equivalency of fire seal (hatch covers) justified in DCP 9800275.

2 Equivalency of hatchway doors justified in PLC Report "An Evaluation of Fire Doors in Safety Related Areas at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station", Dated April 9, 1987. Reference FPPDP Volume 7, Section 17.

3 SER, July 27, 1979.

4 SER, July 21, 1988.

5 Appendix R Exemption Requests for lack of complete suppression in the auxiliary electric room. 12-11-87 exemption granted (5.0).

6 SER, December 30, 1982.

7 Nov. 5, 1991 ComEd Letter requested revised combustible loading limits.

8 SER, March 2, 1994.

9 Justification to perform manual actions in this zone prior to fire extinguishment can be found in NDIT QDC-98-139.

10 Evaluation for fire area separation between SB-I and TB-I, ER9801618.

11 Evaluation for fire area separation between SB-I and TB-III, ER9801619.

4.3-390

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 6.3 AREA: SB-I LOCATION: SB, Elev. 595 ZONE DESCRIPTION:

Fire Zone 6.3 consists of the auxiliary electrical equipment room on elevation 595 of the Service Building.

The zone extends from the 595 foot elevation to the bottom of the floor/ceiling assembly at elevation 609 and is bounded on the north side by fire zone 8.2.6.A in TB-III. On the east and west sides it is bounded by zone 19.1 in Fire Area SB-II; on the south side, it is bounded by zones 4.0, the computer room, and 19.1 in Fire Area SB-II. Below the 595 foot elevation, zone 6.3 interfaces with the cable tunnels, zones 8.2.4 and 8.2.5., to the north.

BARRIERS:

This zone shares barriers with:

ZONES AREAS 3.0, above SB-I 4.0, west SB-I 19.1, east, west, and south SB-II 8.2.5, below CT-2 8.2.4, below CT-1 8.2.6.A, north TB-III DETECTION:

Smoke detection is provided throughout the zone.

AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION:

No automatic suppression is provided.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING: FIRE SEVERITY:

Calculated Value: Medium Less than 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE IMPACT:

The fixed combustible loading in this zone is composed predominantly of electrical cables. The remainder of the fixed combustibles consists of various materials distributed about the zone.

Thus, the only combustibles capable of producing a severe fire in the zone are the electrical cables.

4.3-391

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Transients account for a small fraction of the total combustibles which may be in the area. This accounting is derived from an analysis of the activities and tasks which normally occur, or may be reasonably expected to occur, during the plant's operating cycle. The main hazard associated with transients in this zone, is the potential for a localized fire which could expose the electrical cables; ultimately producing a severe fire.

The installed detection system should provide for rapid detection of fires and prompt notification of operating personnel via Control Room annunciation. This notification should provide for timely fire brigade call out.

The ability of the fire brigade to extinguish fires in the zone is enhanced by the:

Slow rate of propagation of cable tray fires; Multiple access paths; Low probability of fire spread to adjacent areas due to substantial concrete barriers; Availability of adequate standpipe hose lines for manual fire fighting; and Presence of a smoke removal system.

Fire brigade effectiveness could be hampered by the small volume of the room and its relatively high combustible loading; a situation which, once a certain degree of involvement is reached, can serve to significantly accelerate fire growth.

FIRE SPREAD POTENTIAL:

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Zone 6.3:

The potential for fire spread within the zone is good given its combustible loading, consisting predominantly of multiple layers of cable trays and risers, and its close confines. However, the primary combustible exhibits a slow rate of flame spread, allowing for ready extinguishment if the fire is discovered early. To facilitate early detection, this zone is provided with smoke detectors which signal the control room in the event of fire. This should produce timely fire brigade response. The provision of a smoke removal system serves to limit heat and smoke buildup in the room. Thus, full involvement of the space can occur, but is not expected if fire brigade response is prompt and effective.

Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area SB-I:

Fire zone 6.3 is separated from zones 3.0 and 4.0 by three-hour rated construction. The combustible loading in these fire zones is within the capability of the fire barrier. When additional factors such as fire development time, early response detection, and availability of the fire brigade are considered, however, the prospect of such spread is diminished, and, is not expected to occur.

4.3-392

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Spread Potential Within Fire Area SB-II:

Fire zone 6.3 is separated from fire area SB-II by three-hour rated construction. The combustible loading in these fire zones is within the capability of the fire barrier. When factors such as fire development time, early response detection, and availability of the fire brigade are considered, however, the prospect of such spread is diminished, and, is not expected to occur.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area CT-2:

Fire area CT-2, zone 8.2.5, is separated from 6.3 by 3-hour rated construction. This barrier constitutes a portion of the floor of zone 6.3. As such, it would receive less exposure in a given fire than the barriers surrounding the zone on the sides and above. When coupled with early detection, timely brigade response, and the relatively slow growth rate of cable fires, the prospect of this barrier being challenged is significantly reduced.

Fire Spread Potential To Fire Area CT-1:

Fire area CT-1, zone 8.2.4, is separated from 6.3 by 3-hour rated construction. This barrier constitutes a portion of the floor of zone 6.3. As such, it would receive less exposure in a given fire than the barriers surrounding the zone on the sides and above. When coupled with early detection, timely brigade response, and the relatively slow growth rate of cable fires, the prospect of this barrier being challenged is significantly reduced.

SER ISSUES (SEE SER TRANSMITTED MARCH 2, 1994):

The issue identified in the SER relative to zone 6.3 is addressed below. The issue carries the number of the SER section in which it appears; followed by the topic of the section. The specific issue identified in that section of the SER is paraphrased under Issue. An evaluation of how the objectives of the issue of concern are satisfied is provided under Evaluation.

12.0 Lack of Complete Fixed Fire Suppression and Detection System in the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room of Service Building Fire Zone 6.3 Issue: Section III.G. of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 requires, inter alia, the installation of area-wide fixed suppression in areas for which alternative shutdown is provided. The concern is that a fire in this zone could damage the normal safe shutdown components.

Evaluation: Zone 6.3 has no fixed fire suppression (See Automatic Suppression, above); but is provided with smoke detectors throughout. The combustibles in the zone are limited, with the exception of electrical cables. The presence of the early detection capability, coupled with the fire brigade and considering the growth characteristics of cable fires suggests that any fires which occur could be controlled and extinguished before the integrity of the surrounding barriers was challenged if brigade response is prompt and effective.

The provision of alternative safe shutdown capability provides assurance that shutdown can be achieved even if zone 6.3 were lost so long as the fire does not damage or preclude the execution and maintenance of safe shutdown from the adjacent fire areas, TB-I and TB-II.

4.3-393

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 CONCLUSION:

The evaluation presented above for fire zone 6.3 demonstrates that the changes in combustible loading values for the zone do not compromise the findings of the NRC as articulated in the Safety Evaluation Report transmitted March 2, 1994. To wit:

Zone 6.3, a zone for which alternative SS/D is provided, does not comply with Appendix R since fixed suppression is not provided throughout. However, the suppression and detection capability provided are sufficient to assure a fire in 6.3 would not cause a loss of SS/D capability. Thus, the objective of Appendix R with respect to the ability to establish and maintain safe shutdown is achieved.

4.3-394

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: SBO-1 SBO Work Area Fire Area: SBO F Drawing: None General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 36 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection coverage.

Suppression: None.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and a manual hose station are located nearby.

Other FP features: None.

Suppression Effects: Water, dry chemical and carbon dioxide from manual suppression onto equipment in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water runoff would be controlled through floors drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type SBO-7 SBO 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> No doors or dampers. 8" Concrete Block SBO-3 SBO 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> One 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> rated 8" Concrete Block Door, One fire damper

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment None Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 NDIT No. S040-QH-0413 Station Blackout Building In 4.3-395

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: SBO-1 AREA: SBO LOCATION: SBO, Elev 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: SBO Work Area FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

Established combustible loading limits for this fire zone are not addressed by any previous Safety Evaluation Report.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

Fire zone SBO-1, which is an approximately 5-10 by 6-3 room, is bounded by 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated cement masonry unit (CMU) walls on all sides and a 1-1/2 hour fire rated door. The ceiling is constructed of 6 thick concrete and is fire rated for 1-hour. Fire zones SBO-3 and SBO-7 bound this zone.

EVALUATION - ZONE SBO-1:

The combustible loading within SBO-1 is normal office type material of ordinary combustibles.

The zone is provided with a fire detection system and there is equipment to support manual fire suppression located in the adjacent fire zone. This fire zone is entirely surrounded by fire zones of the SBO and no other plant fire zones. The SBO building is located 15 feet east of the Unit 1 reactor building. The east wall of the unit 1 reactor building is constructed of 1 1/2 foot thick reinforced concrete with no penetrations or connections to the SBO building. The cables/cable trays that exit the SBO building on the west side from the second floor of the SBO run south and west along the exterior wall of the reactor building. At the interface of the turbine and reactor buildings, the trays rise up to the turbine building roof and continue north. If a fire were to originate in the SBO building, it would not spread into the reactor or turbine buildings due to the lack of a fire path. The exterior wall of the SBO building is constructed of noncombustible material. The physical separation, lack of barrier penetrations, noncombustible construction and other fire protection features in the SBO assure that a fire originating in the SBO would not physically compromise safe shutdown equipment and cables in the reactor or turbine buildings due to an exposure fire.

4.3-396

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 CONCLUSION:

The combustible loading limit that is established for this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge its structural boundaries. Due to the type of combustible loading in the fire zone, the detection system, and the availability of manual suppression equipment, assurance exists that a fire originating in this zone would be expediently identified and suppressed by the plant fire brigade. As such, a reasonable assurance exists that, for any fire that occurs in this zone, the potential to spread to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impact the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown does not exist. On this basis, the combustible fire loading limit established for this zone is acceptable.

4.3-397

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: SBO-2 Unit 1 SBO Day Tank Room Fire Area: SBO F Drawing: None General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 132 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: Local wet pipe sprinkler protection.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers, and a manual hose station are located in adjacent Fire Zone 3.

Other FP features: The day tank is enclosed within a curbed area.

Suppression Effects: Water, dry chemical or carbon dioxide from manual suppression onto equipment in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water runoff would be controlled through floors drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: High Equivalent Fire Severity: 16.8 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type SBO-8 SBO 3 Hour 3 Hour No Doors 8" Concrete filled concrete block SBO-3 SBO 3 Hour 3 Hour One Door, 8" Concrete filled Two Fire Dampers Concrete block

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment None Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 NDIT No. S040-QH-0413 Station Blackout Building In 4.3-398

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: SBO-2 AREA: SBO LOCATION: SBO, Elev 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Day Tank Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

Established combustible loading limits for this fire zone are not addressed by any previous Safety Evaluation Report.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown equipment or cables, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

Fire zone SBO-2, which is an approximately 10-0 by 13-2 room, is bounded by 3-hour rated cement masonry unit (CMU) walls on all sides with a 6 thick reinforced concrete roof. A 3-hour fire rated door as well as 3-hour fire rated dampers in the ceiling and wall is provided.

Fire zones SBO-3 and SBO-8 bound this zone.

EVALUATION - ZONE SBO-2:

The combustible loading within SBO-2 is almost exclusively from the 1200 gallons of fuel oil in the day tank. The zone is provided with a wet pipe sprinkler system and there is equipment to support manual fire suppression located in the adjacent fire zone. The day tank room contains a spill confinement dike to retain tank contents in the event of tank rupture. This fire zone is entirely surrounded by fire zones of the SBO and no other plant fire zones. The SBO building is located 15 feet east of the unit 1 reactor building. The east wall of the unit 1 reactor building is constructed of 1 1/2 foot thick reinforced concrete with no penetrations or connections to the SBO building. The cables/cable trays that exit the SBO building on the west side from the second floor of the SBO run south and west along the exterior wall of the reactor building. At the interface of the turbine and reactor buildings, the trays rise up to the turbine building roof and continue north. If a fire were to originate in the SBO building, it would not spread into the reactor or turbine buildings due to the lack of a fire path. The exterior wall of the SBO building is constructed of noncombustible material. The physical separation, lack of barrier penetrations, noncombustible construction and other fire protection features in the SBO assure that a fire originating in the SBO would not physically compromise safe shutdown equipment and cables in the reactor or turbine buildings due to an exposure fire.

4.3-399

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 CONCLUSION:

The combustible loading limit that is established for this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge its structural boundaries. Due to the wet pipe sprinkler suppression system, any fire originating within this zone would be expediently subjected to suppression system actuation, which would extinguish or control the fire. The spill confinement dike would serve to help prevent spread of the fire by liquid born mechanisms. The suppression system actuation would summon the plant fire brigade, which would assure containment and extinguishment of the fire.

As such, a reasonable assurance exists that, for any fire that occurs in this zone, the potential to spread to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impact the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown does not exist.

On this basis, the combustible fire-loading limit that is established for this zone is deemed acceptable.

4.3-400

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: SBO-3 Unit 1 SBO Diesel Generator Room Fire Area: SBO F Drawing: None General Elevation: 595"-0" Zone Area: 2,000 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: Local wet pipe sprinkler protection.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers, and a manual hose station are located within this area.

Other FP features: Fire proofing provided for structural steel.

Suppression Effects: Water, dry chemical or carbon dioxide from manual suppression onto equipment in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water runoff would be controlled through floors drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type SBO-7 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 Hour Door 8" concrete block SBO-5B SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour None 6" thick concrete block SBO-5A SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One Damper 3 hr., non-rated 6" thick concrete Hatch block SBO-4 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour None 8" concrete block SBO-2 SBO 3 Hour 3 Hour 3 Hour Door, Two Fire 8" conrete filled Dampers conrete block SBO-1 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 Hour Door, One 8" concrete block Fire Damper

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment None Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 NDIT No. S040-QH-0413 Station Blackout Building In 4.3-401

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: SBO-3 AREA: SBO LOCATION: SBO, Elev 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Diesel Generator Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

Established combustible loading limits for this fire zone are not addressed by any previous Safety Evaluation Report.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown equipment or cables, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

Fire zone SBO-3, which is an approximately 62-0 by 36-0 room, occupies the southern half of the SBO building ground floor. It is separated from other areas within the building by either 1 or 3-hour rated boundaries. The exterior walls consist of non-rated metal siding with 4 bat insulation except for a portion of the wall required to be 1-hour rated to maintain a 1-hour fire separation between building elevations. A 1-hour fire rated door is provided at the stair vestibule and exterior door are unrated. A 3-hour fire rated damper is provided between this floor and the second floor. In addition, all exposed structural steel is covered with 1-hour fire proofing material. Fire zones SBO-1, SBO-2, SBO-4 and SBO-7 bound this zone on elevation 595-0 and fire zones SBO-5A and SBO-5B are separated from this zone by a ceiling/floor assembly constructed of 6-thick concrete rated for 1-hour of fire resistance.

EVALUATION - ZONE SBO-3:

The combustible loading within SBO-3 is associated with the diesel engines and the electrical generator. The zone is provided with a wet pipe sprinkler system and there is equipment to support manual fire suppression located in this fire zone as well as in the adjacent fire zone SBO-

4. This fire zone is entirely surrounded by fire zones of the SBO and no other plant fire zones.

The SBO building is located 15 feet east of the unit 1 reactor building. The east wall of the unit 1 reactor building is constructed of 1 1/2 foot thick reinforced concrete with no penetrations or connections to the SBO building. The cables/cable trays that exit the SBO building on the west side from the second floor of the SBO run south and west along the exterior wall of the reactor building. At the interface of the turbine and reactor buildings, the trays rise up to the turbine building roof and continue north. If a fire were to originate in the SBO building, it would not spread into the reactor or turbine buildings due to the lack of a fire path. The exterior wall of the SBO building is constructed of noncombustible material. The physical separation, lack of barrier penetrations, noncombustible construction and other fire protection features in the SBO assure that a fire originating in the SBO would not physically compromise safe shutdown equipment and cables in the reactor or turbine buildings due to an exposure fire.

4.3-402

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 CONCLUSION:

The combustible loading limit that is established for this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge its structural boundaries. Due to the wet pipe sprinkler suppression system, any fire originating within this zone would be expediently subjected to suppression system actuation, which would extinguish or control the fire. The suppression system actuation would summon the plant fire brigade, which would assure containment and extinguishment of the fire. As such, a reasonable assurance exists that, for any fire that occurs in this zone, the potential to spread to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impact the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown does not exist. On this basis, the combustible fire-loading limit that is established for this zone is deemed acceptable.

4.3-403

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: SBO-4 Unit 2 SBO Diesel Generator Room Fire Area: SBO F Drawing: None General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 2,000 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: Local wet pipe sprinkler protection.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers, and a manual hose station are located within this area.

Other FP features: Fire proofing provided for structural steel.

Suppression Effects: Water, dry chemical or carbon dioxide from manual suppression onto equipment in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water runoff would be controlled through floors drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type SBO-8 SBO 3 Hour 3 Hour One 3 hr. Door, 8" concrete filled 2 fire dampers Concrete block SBO-7 SBO 1 Hour 1Hour One 1.5 hr. Door 8" concrete block SBO-6B SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour None 6" thick concrete SBO-6A SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One Damper 3 hr., 6" thick concrete Non rated hatch SBO-3 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour None 8" concrete block

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment None Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 NDIT No. S040-QH-0413 Station Blackout Building In 4.3-404

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: SBO-4 AREA: SBO LOCATION: SBO, Elev 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Diesel Generator Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

Established combustible loading limits for this fire zone are not addressed by any previous Safety Evaluation Report.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown equipment or cables, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

Fire zone SBO-4, which is an approximately 62-0 by 36-0 room, occupies the northern half of the SBO building ground floor. It is separated from other areas within the building by either 1 or 3-hour rated boundaries. The exterior walls consist of non-rated metal siding with 4 bat insulation except for a portion of the wall required to be 1-hour rated to maintain a 1 -hour fire separation between building elevations. A 1-hour fire rated door is provided at the stair vestibule and exterior door are unrated. A 3-hour fire rated damper is provided between this floor and the second floor. In addition, all exposed structural steel is covered with 1-hour fire proofing material. Fire zones SBO-3, SBO-7 and SBO-8 bound this zone on elevation 595-0 and fire zones SBO-6A and SBO-6B are separated from this zone by a ceiling/floor assembly constructed of 6-thick concrete rated for 1-hour of fire resistance.

EVALUATION - ZONE SBO-4:

The combustible loading within SBO-4 is associated with the diesel engines and the electrical generator. The zone is provided with a wet pipe sprinkler system and there is equipment to support manual fire suppression located in this fire zone as well as in the adjacent fire zone SBO-

3. This fire zone is entirely surrounded by fire zones of the SBO and no other plant fire zones.

The SBO building is located 15 feet east of the unit 1 reactor building. The east wall of the unit 1 reactor building is constructed of 1 1/2 foot thick reinforced concrete with no penetrations or connections to the SBO building. The cables/cable trays that exit the SBO building on the west side from the second floor of the SBO run south and west along the exterior wall of the reactor building. At the interface of the turbine and reactor buildings, the trays rise up to the turbine building roof and continue north. If a fire were to originate in the SBO building, it would not spread into the reactor or turbine buildings due to the lack of a fire path. The exterior wall of the SBO building is constructed of noncombustible material. The physical separation, lack of barrier penetrations, noncombustible construction and other fire protection features in the SBO assure that a fire originating in the SBO would not physically compromise safe shutdown equipment and cables in the reactor or turbine buildings due to an exposure fire.

4.3-405

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 CONCLUSION:

The combustible loading limit that is established for this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge its structural boundaries. Due to the wet pipe sprinkler suppression system, any fire originating within this zone would be expediently subjected to suppression system actuation, which would extinguish or control the fire. The suppression system actuation would summon the plant fire brigade, which would assure containment and extinguishment of the fire. As such, a reasonable assurance exists that, for any fire that occurs in this zone, the potential to spread to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impact the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown does not exist. On this basis, the combustible fire-loading limit that is established for this zone is deemed acceptable.

4.3-406

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: SBO-5A Unit 1 SBO Switchgear Room Fire Area: SBO F Drawing: None General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 1,250 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection coverage.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers, and a manual hose station are located in the area as well as adjacent Fire Zones 6A.

Other FP features: Fire proofing provided for structural steel.

Suppression Effects: Water, dry chemical or carbon dioxide from manual suppression onto equipment in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water runoff would be controlled through floors drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type SBO-7 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 hr. Door 8" concrete block SBO-6A SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 hr. Double Door 8" concrete block SBO-5B SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One1.5 hr. Door, One fire 8" concrete block damper SBO-3 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One Damper 3 hr., 6" thick concrete Non-rated hatch

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment None Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 NDIT No. S040-QH-0413 Station Blackout Building In 4.3-407

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: SBO-5A AREA: SBO LOCATION: SBO, Elev 615-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Switchgear Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

Established combustible loading limits for this fire zone are not addressed by any previous Safety Evaluation Report.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown equipment or cables, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

Fire zone SBO-5A, which is an approximately 1250-ft2 room, occupies the major portion of the southern half of the SBO building second floor. It is separated from other areas within the building by 1-hour fire rated boundaries. The exterior walls consist of non-rated metal siding with 4 bat insulation except for a portion of the wall required to be 1-hour rated to maintain a 1-hour fire separation between building elevations. The roof deck that forms the ceiling for this fire zone is an Underwriters Laboratory (UL) Class 1-A design. Fire doors rated for 1-hour are provided at the stair vestibule, at the entrance to the unit 1 battery room, and between the unit 2 switchgear room. An exterior door is unrated. A 3-hour fire rated damper is provided between this floor and the second floor and a 1 1/2 hour fire rated damper is provided between this area and the unit 1 battery room. In addition, all exposed structural steel is covered with 1-hour fire proofing material. Fire zones SBO-5B, SBO-6A and SBO-7 bound this zone on elevation 615-0 and fire zone SBO-3 is separated from this zone by a floor/ceiling assembly constructed of 6-thick concrete rated for 1-hour of fire resistance.

EVALUATION - ZONE SBO-5A:

The combustible loading within SBO-5A is associated electrical switchgear and miscellaneous equipment. The zone is provided with an ionization smoke detection system and there is equipment to support manual fire suppression located in this fire zone as well as in the adjacent fire zone SBO-6A. This fire zone is entirely surrounded by fire zones of the SBO and no other plant fire zones. The SBO building is located 15 feet east of the unit 1 reactor building. The east wall of the unit 1 reactor building is constructed of 1 1/2 foot thick reinforced concrete with no penetrations or connections to the SBO building. The cables/cable trays that exit the SBO building on the west side from the second floor of the SBO run south and west along the exterior wall of the reactor building. At the interface of the turbine and reactor buildings, the trays rise up to the turbine building roof and continue north. If a fire were to originate in the SBO building, it would not spread into the reactor or turbine buildings due to the lack of a fire path.

The exterior wall of the SBO building is constructed of noncombustible material.

4.3-408

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The physical separation, lack of barrier penetrations, noncombustible construction and other fire protection features in the SBO assure that a fire originating in the SBO would not physically compromise safe shutdown equipment and cables in the reactor or turbine buildings due to an exposure fire.

CONCLUSION:

The combustible loading limit that is established for this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge its structural boundaries. Due to the automatic ionization smoke detection system, any fire originating within this zone would be expediently identified, which would summon the plant fire brigade, which would assure containment and extinguishment of the fire. As such, a reasonable assurance exists that, for any fire that occurs in this zone, the potential to spread to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impact the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown does not exist. On this basis, the combustible fire-loading limit that is established for this zone is deemed acceptable.

4.3-409

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: SBO-5B Unit 1 SBO Battery Room Fire Area: SBO F Drawing: None General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 200 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection coverage.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers, and manual hose stations are located in adjacent Fire Zones 5A.

Other FP features: Fierier proofing provided for structural steel.

Suppression Effects: Water, dry chemical or carbon dioxide from manual suppression onto equipment in this zone would nor result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water runoff could be controlled through floors drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type SBO-5A SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour 1.5 hr. Door & Damper 8" concrete block SBO-3 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour None 6" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment None Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 NDIT No. S040-QH-0413 Station Blackout Building In 4.3-410

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: SBO-5B AREA: SBO LOCATION: SBO, Elev 615-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 1 Battery Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

Established combustible loading limits for this fire zone are not addressed by any previous Safety Evaluation Report.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown equipment or cables, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

Fire zone SBO-5B, which is an approximately 360-ft2 room, is located in the southeast corner of the unit 1 switchgear room. It is separated from other areas within the building by 1-hour fire rated boundaries. The exterior walls consist of non-rated metal siding with 4 bat insulation except for a portion of the wall required to be 1-hour rated to maintain a 1-hour fire separation between building elevations. The roof deck that forms the ceiling for this fire zone is an Underwriters Laboratory (UL) Class 1-A design. A fire door rated for 1-hour of fire resistance and a 1-1/2 hour fire rated damper is provided between this area and the unit 1 switchgear room.

In addition, all exposed structural steel is covered with 1-hour fire proofing material. Fire zones SBO-5A bounds this zone on elevation 615-0 and fire zone SBO-3 is separated from this zone by a floor/ceiling assembly constructed of 6-thick concrete rated for 1-hour of fire resistance.

EVALUATION - ZONE SBO-5B:

The combustible loading within SBO-5B is comprised of ABS plastic associated with two banks of batteries housed in this room and minor associated equipment. The zone is provided with an ionization smoke detection system and there is equipment to support manual fire suppression located in the adjacent fire zone. This fire zone is entirely surrounded by fire zones of the SBO and no other plant fire zones. The SBO building is located 15 feet east of the unit 1 reactor building. The east wall of the unit 1 reactor building is constructed of 1 1/2 foot thick reinforced concrete with no penetrations or connections to the SBO building. The cables/cable trays that exit the SBO building on the west side from the second floor of the SBO run south and west along the exterior wall of the reactor building. At the interface of the turbine and reactor buildings, the trays rise up to the turbine building roof and continue north. If a fire were to originate in the SBO building, it would not spread into the reactor or turbine buildings due to the lack of a fire path. The exterior wall of the SBO building is constructed of noncombustible material. The physical separation, lack of barrier penetrations, noncombustible construction and other fire protection features in the SBO assure that a fire originating in the SBO would not physically compromise safe shutdown equipment and cables in the reactor or turbine buildings due to an exposure fire.

4.3-411

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 CONCLUSION:

The combustible loading limit that is established for this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge its structural boundaries. Due to the automatic ionization smoke detection system, any fire originating within this zone would be expediently identified, which would summon the plant fire brigade, which would assure containment and extinguishment of the fire. As such, a reasonable assurance exists that, for any fire that occurs in this zone, the potential to spread to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impact the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown does not exist. On this basis, the combustible fire-loading limit that is established for this zone is deemed acceptable.

4.3-412

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: SBO-6A Unit 2 SBO Switchgear Room Fire Area: SBO F Drawing: None General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 1,250 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection coverage.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers, and a manual hose station are located in the area as well as adjacent Fire Zones 5A.

Other FP features: Fire proofing provided for structural steel.

Suppression Effects: Water, dry chemical or carbon dioxide from manual suppression onto equipment in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water runoff would be controlled through floors drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type SBO-7 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 hr. Door 8" concrete block SBO-6B SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 hr. Door, 8" concrete block One Damper SBO-5A SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 hr. Double Door 8" concrete block SBO-4 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One Damper 3 hr., 6" thick concrete Non-rated hatch

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment None Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 NDIT No. S040-QH-0413 Station Blackout Building In 4.3-413

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: SBO-6A AREA: SBO LOCATION: SBO, Elev 615-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Switchgear Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

Established combustible loading limits for this fire zone are not addressed by any previous Safety Evaluation Report.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown equipment or cables, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

Fire zone SBO-6A, which is an approximately 1250-ft2 room, occupies the major portion of the northern half of the SBO building second floor. It is separated from other areas within the building by 1-hour fire rated boundaries. The exterior walls consist of non-rated metal siding with 4 bat insulation except for a portion of the wall required to be 1-hour rated to maintain a 1-hour fire separation between building elevations. The roof deck that forms the ceiling for this fire zone is an Underwriters Laboratory (UL) Class 1-A design. Fire doors rated for 1-hour are provided at the stair vestibule, at the entrance to the unit 2 battery room, and between the unit 1 switchgear room. An exterior door is unrated. A 3-hour fire rated damper is provided between this floor and the second floor and a 1 1/2 hour fire rated damper is provided between this area and the unit 1 battery room. In addition, all exposed structural steel is covered with 1-hour fire proofing material. Fire zones SBO-5A, SBO-6B and SBO-7 bound this zone on elevation 615-0 and fire zone SBO-4 is separated from this zone by a floor/ceiling assembly constructed of 6-thick concrete rated for 1-hour of fire resistance.

4.3-414

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION - ZONE SBO-6A:

The combustible loading within SBO-6A is associated electrical switchgear and miscellaneous equipment. The zone is provided with an ionization smoke detection system and there is equipment to support manual fire suppression located in this fire zone as well as in the adjacent fire zone SBO-5A. This fire zone is entirely surrounded by fire zones of the SBO and no other plant fire zones. The SBO building is located 15 feet east of the unit 1 reactor building. The east wall of the unit 1 reactor building is constructed of 1 1/2 foot thick reinforced concrete with no penetrations or connections to the SBO building. The cables/cable trays that exit the SBO building on the west side from the second floor of the SBO run south and west along the exterior wall of the reactor building. At the interface of the turbine and reactor buildings, the trays rise up to the turbine building roof and continue north. If a fire were to originate in the SBO building, it would not spread into the reactor or turbine buildings due to the lack of a fire path.

The exterior wall of the SBO building is constructed of noncombustible material. The physical separation, lack of barrier penetrations, noncombustible construction and other fire protection features in the SBO assure that a fire originating in the SBO would not physically compromise safe shutdown equipment and cables in the reactor or turbine buildings due to an exposure fire.

CONCLUSION:

The combustible loading limit that is established for this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge its structural boundaries. Due to the automatic ionization smoke detection system, any fire originating within this zone would be expediently identified, which would summon the plant fire brigade, which would assure containment and extinguishment of the fire. As such, a reasonable assurance exists that, for any fire that occurs in this zone, the potential to spread to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impact the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown does not exist. On this basis, the combustible fire-loading limit that is established for this zone is deemed acceptable.

4.3-415

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: SBO-6B Unit 2 SBO Battery Room Fire Area: SBO F Drawing: None General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 200 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area smoke detection coverage.

Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers and manual hose station are located in adjacent Fire Zones 6A.

Other FP features: Fire proofing provided for structural steel.

Suppression Effects: Water, dry chemical or carbon dioxide from manual suppression onto equipment in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water runoff would be controlled through floors drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type SBO-6A SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 hr. Door, 8" concrete block One Damper SBO-4 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour None 6" thick concrete

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment None Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 NDIT No. S040-QH-0413 Station Blackout Building In 4.3-416

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: SBO-6B AREA: SBO LOCATION: SBO, Elev 615-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Battery Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

Established combustible loading limits for this fire zone are not addressed by any previous Safety Evaluation Report.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown equipment or cables, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

Fire zone SBO-6B, which is an approximately 360-ft2 room, is located in the northeast corner of the unit 2 switchgear room. It is separated from other areas within the building by 1-hour fire rated boundaries. The exterior walls consist of non-rated metal siding with 4 bat insulation except for a portion of the wall required to be 1-hour rated to maintain a 1-hour fire separation between building elevations. The roof deck that forms the ceiling for this fire zone is an Underwriters Laboratory (UL) Class 1-A design. A fire door rated for 1-hour of fire resistance and a 1-1/2 hour fire rated damper is provided between this area and the unit 2 switchgear room.

In addition, all exposed structural steel is covered with 1-hour fire proofing material. Fire zones SBO-6A bounds this zone on elevation 615-0 and fire zone SBO-4 is separated from this zone by a floor/ceiling assembly constructed of 6-thick concrete rated for 1-hour of fire resistance.

EVALUATION - ZONE SBO-6B:

The combustible loading within SBO-6B is comprised of ABS plastic associated with two banks of batteries housed in this room and minor associated equipment. The zone is provided with an ionization smoke detection system and there is equipment to support manual fire suppression located in the adjacent fire zone. This fire zone is entirely surrounded by fire zones of the SBO and no other plant fire zones. The SBO building is located 15 feet east of the unit 1 reactor building. The east wall of the unit 1 reactor building is constructed of 1 1/2 foot thick reinforced concrete with no penetrations or connections to the SBO building. The cables/cable trays that exit the SBO building on the west side from the second floor of the SBO run south and west along the exterior wall of the reactor building. At the interface of the turbine and reactor buildings, the trays rise up to the turbine building roof and continue north. If a fire were to originate in the SBO building, it would not spread into the reactor or turbine buildings due to the lack of a fire path.

4.3-417

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 The exterior wall of the SBO building is constructed of noncombustible material. The physical separation, lack of barrier penetrations, noncombustible construction and other fire protection features in the SBO assure that a fire originating in the SBO would not physically compromise safe shutdown equipment and cables in the reactor or turbine buildings due to an exposure fire.

CONCLUSION:

The combustible loading limit that is established for this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge its structural boundaries. Due to the automatic ionization smoke detection system, any fire originating within this zone would be expediently identified, which would summon the plant fire brigade, which would assure containment and extinguishment of the fire. As such, a reasonable assurance exists that, for any fire that occurs in this zone, the potential to spread to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impact the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown does not exist. On this basis, the combustible fire-loading limit that is established for this zone is deemed acceptable.

4.3-418

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: SBO-7 SBO Building Stairwell Fire Area: SBO F Drawing: None General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 200 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: Particle wet pipe coverage Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers are located in adjacent Fire Zones 3, 4, 5A and 6A.

Other FP features: Fire proofing provided for structural steel.

Suppression Effects: Water, dry chemical or carbon dioxide from manual suppression onto equipment in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water runoff would be controlled through floor drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type SBO-6B SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 hr. Door 8" concrete block SBO-5A SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 hr. Door 8" concrete block SBO-4 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 hr. Door 8" concrete block SBO-3 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour One 1.5 hr. Door 8" concrete block SBO-1 SBO 1 Hour 1 Hour None 8" concrete block

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment None Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 NDIT No. S040-QH-0413 Station Blackout Building In 4.3-419

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: SBO-7 AREA: SBO LOCATION: SBO, Elev 595-0/615-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Common Stairwell (Vestibule)

FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

Established combustible loading limits for this fire zone are not addressed by any previous Safety Evaluation Report.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown equipment or cables, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

Fire zone SBO-7, which is an approximately 200-ft2 stairwell/vestibule area, provides access to both elevations of the SBO building. It is separated from other areas within the building by 1-hour fire rated boundaries. The roof deck that forms the ceiling for this fire zone is an Underwriters Laboratory (UL) Class 1-A design. All doors into the stairwell from adjacent SBO fire zones are 1-hour rated. In addition, all exposed structural steel is covered with 1-hour fire proofing material. All of the fire suppression control valves as well as the fire detection panel for the SBO building are located in this area. A hose station and hose reel is located in this area.

Fire zones SBO-1, SBO-3, and SBO-4 bound this zone on SBO elevation 595-0 and fire zones SBO-5A and SBO-5B bound this area on elevation 615-0.

EVALUATION - ZONE SBO-7:

The combustible loading within SBO-7 is negligible, as there is no significant combustible material located within this area. This fire zone is entirely surrounded by 1-hour rated fire barriers and fire zones of the SBO and no other plant fire zones. The SBO building is located 15 feet east of the unit 1 reactor building. The east wall of the unit 1 reactor building is constructed of 1 1/2 foot thick reinforced concrete with no penetrations or connections to the SBO building.

The cables/cable trays that exit the SBO building on the west side from the second floor of the SBO run south and west along the exterior wall of the reactor building. At the interface of the turbine and reactor buildings, the trays rise up to the turbine building roof and continue north. If a fire were to originate in the SBO building, it would not spread into the reactor or turbine buildings due to the lack of a fire path. The exterior wall of the SBO building is constructed of noncombustible material. The physical separation, lack of barrier penetrations, noncombustible construction and other fire protection features in the SBO assure that a fire originating in the SBO would not physically compromise safe shutdown equipment and cables in the reactor or turbine buildings due to an exposure fire.

4.3-420

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 CONCLUSION:

The combustible loading limit that is established for this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge its structural boundaries as the fire rating resistance of the barriers separating this area from adjacent fire zones is equal to or greater than the combustible loading limit. In reality, no significant combustibles are located in this area. As such, a reasonable assurance exists that, for any fire that occurs in this zone, the potential to spread to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impact the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown does not exist. On this basis, the combustible fire-loading limit that is established for this zone is deemed acceptable.

4.3-421

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: SBO-8 Unit 2 SBO Day Tank Room Fire Area: SBO F Drawing: None General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 132 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: Local wet pipe sprinkler protection.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers. Manual hose stations are located in the east corner of the area as well as adjacent Fire Zone 4.

Other FP features: The day tank is enclosed within a curbed area.

Suppression Effects: Water, dry chemical or carbon dioxide from manual suppression onto equipment in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design basis fire.

Water runoff would be controlled through floors drains in the general area.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: High Equivalent Fire Severity: 16.8 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type SBO-4 SBO 3 Hour 3 Hour One 3 hr. Door, 8" concrete filled Two Dampers concrete block SBO-2 SBO 3 Hour 3 Hour None 8" concrete filled Concrete block

• Secondary Containment Boundary Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment None Notes and

References:

Number Description 0 NDIT No. S040-QH-0413 Station Blackout Building In 4.3-422

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: SBO-8 AREA: SBO LOCATION: SBO, Elev 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Day Tank Room FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this zone is 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

Established combustible loading limits for this fire zone are not addressed by any previous Safety Evaluation Report.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown equipment or cables, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

Fire zone SBO-8, which is an approximately 10-0 by 13-2 room, is bounded by 3-hour rated cement masonry unit (CMU) walls on all sides with a 6 thick reinforced concrete roof. A 3-hour fire rated door as well as 3-hour fire rated dampers in the ceiling and wall is provided.

Fire zones SBO-2 and SBO-4 bound this zone.

EVALUATION - ZONE SBO-8:

The combustible loading within SBO-8 is almost exclusively from the 1200 gallons of fuel oil in the day tank. The zone is provided with a wet pipe sprinkler system and there is equipment to support manual fire suppression located in the adjacent fire zone. The day tank room contains a spill confinement dike to retain tank contents in the event of tank rupture. This fire zone is entirely surrounded by fire zones of the SBO and no other plant fire zones. The SBO building is located 15 feet east of the unit 1 reactor building. The east wall of the unit 1 reactor building is constructed of 1 1/2 foot thick reinforced concrete with no penetrations or connections to the SBO building. The cables/cable trays that exit the SBO building on the west side from the second floor of the SBO run south and west along the exterior wall of the reactor building. At the interface of the turbine and reactor buildings, the trays rise up to the turbine building roof and continue north.

If a fire were to originate in the SBO building, it would not spread into the reactor or turbine buildings due to the lack of a fire path. The exterior wall of the SBO building is constructed of noncombustible material. The physical separation, lack of barrier penetrations, noncombustible construction and other fire protection features in the SBO assure that a fire originating in the SBO would not physically compromise safe shutdown equipment and cables in the reactor or turbine buildings due to an exposure fire.

4.3-423

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 CONCLUSION:

The combustible loading limit that is established for this zone is unlikely to significantly challenge its structural boundaries. Due to the wet pipe sprinkler suppression system, any fire originating within this zone would be expediently subjected to suppression system actuation, which would extinguish or control the fire. The spill confinement dike would serve to help prevent spread of the fire by liquid born mechanisms. The suppression system actuation would summon the plant fire brigade, which would assure containment and extinguishment of the fire.

As such, a reasonable assurance exists that, for any fire that occurs in this zone, the potential to spread to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone or fire area, and adversely impact the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown does not exist.

On this basis, the combustible fire-loading limit that is established for this zone is deemed acceptable.

4.3-424

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.4.A Crib House Basement Fire Area: CH F Drawing: F-19-1 General Elevation: 559'-8" Zone Area: 4,092 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: None Suppression: None Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguisher(s) and three hose stations, equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: No safe shutdown equipment would be affected by water discharge as there is no safe shutdown equipment in this area. Water runoff would travel to the sump where it would be pumped to either the storm drain system or the discharge bay immediately outside the Crib House.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None N/A Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 11.4.B CH Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical ceiling

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-425

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 2, 3.1.5.(k) Administrative procedures are in place to eliminate excessive oil storage. The total storage quantity is limited to 25 gallons, safety cans and safety cabinets are provided.

1, 5.21.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided for area.

1, 3.1.11 Approved cabinets required for oil dispensing stations. Container size limited to 55-gallon. Also reference [1](5.21.6).

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 SER, November 5, 1980.

4.3-426

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.4.A AREA: CH LOCATION: CH, Elev. 559-8 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Crib House Basement FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

A review of the Safety Evaluation Reports did not uncover established combustible loading limits for this zone.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The only fire zone adjacent to Fire Zone 11.4.A is in the same fire area, and is separated by the non-fire-rated floor.

CONCLUSION:

Since the only adjoining fire zone is in the same fire area, spread of fire would not adversely impact safe shutdown capabilities.

4.3-427

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.4.B Crib House Ground Floor Fire Area: CH F Drawing: F-19-1 General Elevation: 595'-0" Zone Area: 8,676 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: Local area heat (thermal) detection at the two fire pumps.

Suppression: Local area open head water spray (deluge) system to protect the two fire pumps.

Manual Suppression: Portable fire extinguishers, three hose stations equipped with 100 feet of hose.

Other FP features: None Suppression Effects: No safe shutdown equipment would be affected by water discharge as there is no safe shutdown equipment in this area. Water runoff would travel to the sump on the lowest level of the Crib House where it would be pumped to either the storm drain system or the discharge bay immediately outside the Crib House.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Low Equivalent Fire Severity: 1.25 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description None N/A Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 11.4.A CH Non-rated noncombustible, open No doors 2'-0" thick concrete mechanical

• Secondary Containment Boundary 4.3-428

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 11.4.B Crib House Ground Floor Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 4, E.2.d Fire pumps take suction from Mississippi River. Storage tanks are not used. Also reference [4](E.2.c) 4, E.2.c Provide separate valved connections to loop from each pump. Fire pumps generally installed per NFPA 20. Also reference [4](E.2.d).

1, 5.21.4 Provide portable extinguishers and hose stations for area.

1, 4.3.1.3 Provide each pump with a separate 10" discharge line.

1, 4.3.1.2 Provide a system to detect excessive make up water. Water provided from service water system to fire water system.

1, 4.3.1.2 Provide two fire pumps and controllers. Provide an 8-hour diesel fuel supply for each pump. Each pump rated at 2500 gpm at 139 psig.

1, 3.1.5 Provide sprinklers in oil storage locations of crib house. Also reference [1](5.21.6).

Sprinklers still required by NRC; administrative controls not enough [2](3.1.5k).

3, 3.1.5k Maintain 25' and 80' distance between fire pumps and flammable liquids cabinet.

Maintain cabinet contents at <25 gal. oil, <10 gal. grease.

1, 3.1.5 Provide sprinkler coverage in oil storage area. CE no sprinklers 9-25-79 and 1-26-81 (1A). Acceptable 2-12-81. Justification for no sprinklers: Flam. Liq. Cab., admin.

controls to 25 gal. (oil), 10 gal. (grease), spk. for fire pumps, & proximity.

1, 3.1.11 Provide curb and drain around flammable liquid storage area. A flammable liquids cabinet and administrative controls on the quantity and location of flammable liquids storage were provided in lieu of curbs (acceptable 2/12/81). Ref [1](5.21.6).

1, 3.1.5 Install sprinkler system to protect Diesel Fire Pumps. Not required 9-25-79. Also reference [1](5.21.6).

1, 3.1.11 Provide listed flammable liquids cabinet. Limit container size to 55 gallon. Also reference [1](5.21.6). Per [2](3.1.5k) storage limited to a total of 25 gallons, container size limited to 5 gallon.

Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979.

2 SER, November 5, 1980.

3 SER, February 12, 1981.

4 APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A commitments 4.3-429

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 11.4.B AREA: CH LOCATION: CH, Elev. 595 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Crib House Ground Floor FIRE SEVERITY:

The fire severity for this fire zone is 1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

A review of the Safety Evaluation Reports did not uncover established combustible loading limits for this zone.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that starts in one fire area or zone, impacting safe shutdown equipment in that zone, then spreads to an adjacent zone. If the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for a fire in the first zone relies on equipment that could be affected by a fire in the second zone (or vice versa), then the spread of fire could cause the loss of safe shutdown capability.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The only fire zone adjacent to Fire Zone 11.4.B is in the same fire area, and is separated by the non-fire-rated floor.

CONCLUSION:

Since the only adjoining fire zone is in the same fire area, spread of fire would not adversely impact safe shutdown capabilities.

4.3-430

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 9.2 Unit 2 Diesel Generator Room Fire Area: EDG-2 F Drawing: F-13-1 General Elevation: 595-0 Zone Area: 1,089 Ft2 Fire Protection Features:

Detection: General area heat (thermal) detectors are provided to actuate the Carbon Dioxide suppression system.

Suppression: A wet pipe sprinkler system is provided in the day tank room. The Unit 2 diesel generator room and day tank room are protected by an automatic total flooding CO2 system supplied from the CO2 storage tank / unit actuated by thermal detectors.

Manual Suppression: A hose reel and portable extinguishers are located outside the entrance to the zone in adjacent Fire Zone 8.2.6.E.

Other FP features: The day tank room is curbed. Fire proofing provided for structural steel.

Suppression Effects: Water or Carbon Dioxide release in this zone would not result in adverse effects of greater severity than those determined to be acceptable for a design-basis fire. Water runoff would be controlled through utilization of floor drains in the general areas. The day tank room is curbed.

Combustible Loading Limit:

Analyzed Combustible Loading Category: Medium Equivalent Fire Severity: 2.5 Hours Boundary Fire Areas:

Fire Area Barrier Description TB-I 3 Hour (Note 8)

Boundary Fire Zones:

Boundary Zone Area Barrier Rating Seal Rating Doors and Dampers Barrier Type 8.2.7.E TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except exhaust No doors 0'-6" thick concrete duct penetration on fire proofed steel 8.2.6.E TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (F-161, 162 & Two, 3-hour, Class 1'-0" thick concrete 163) "A" door Two, Dampers.

6.2.B TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> No doors 0'-6" thick concrete on fire proofed steel 4.3-431

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 9.2 Unit 2 Diesel Generator Room Fire Protection Commitments:

Reference Section Commitment 1, 4.3.2 Local and control room alarms required for DG CO2 systems.

1, 3.1.8 Upgrade penetrations to 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating. Completed. Also reference [1](5.20.6).

1, 3.1.8 Protect structural steel in room to achieve 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating. Completed MOD 4-1/2-78-20.

Also reference [1](5.20.6).

1, 3.1.8 Electrically supervise door to U2 DG Room. Door is electrically supervised. Also reference [1](5.20.6).

2, pg.6 Provide fire rated barrier for louvered doors. Doors with louvers have been removed.

2, pg.6 Install 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire dampers in HVAC Ducts. Also see PLC NFPA 90A Review 7-31-85.

2, pg.6 Provide portable ventilation equipment. Three portable ventilators provided on fire cart.

1, 5.20.4 Carbon Dioxide Suppression System is provided for DG1. Manual and automatic actuation of system provided. Manual smoke venting by portable smoke ejectors. Also reference [1](4.3.2), and [6](F.9).

1, 3.1.8 Provide Class A fire Doors U2 DG Room.

5, 10.1.1 Emergency lighting placed to allow fuse replacement during blackout conditions.

6, F.9 Provide 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> separation for DG room except around DG exhaust and air supply pipes.

1, 5.20.2 A 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> enclosure is provided for the diesel day tank.

1, 5.20.4 Thermostats actuate local and control room alarms, and the total flooding CO2 system.

1, 5.20.4,6,F.9.b DG day tank room protected by automatic sprinkler system.

1, 5.20.4 Portable extinguishers and hose stations provided for area.

6, D.4.i Dampers interlocked to close on activation of CO2 system.

6, E.5.a CO2 systems designed per NFPA 12. Installation acceptance tests were not performed.

6, E.5.b CO2 systems have predischarge alarms. CO2 system nozzles do not discharge directly on equipment. CO2 is discharged into DG and day tank rooms. Also reference [6](E.5.c) and [6](F.9.b).

1, 3.1.8 Fire zone 9.2 separated from rest of plant by 3-hour rated barriers.

4.3-432

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Fire Zone: 9.2 Unit 2 Diesel Generator Room Notes and

References:

Number Description 1 SER, July 27, 1979 2 Letter 4-10-78 from CECO to NRC.

3 Letter 12-18-84 from B. Rybak (CECO) to R. Denton 4 NTS item 254(265)/88021-07 addresses the need to perform CO2 concentration test.

Item closed 2-5-92.

5 Appendix R Exemption Requests 6 ComEd response to the requirements of Appendix A 7 Lack of complete detection and suppression for Fire Area TB-I, NDIT QDC-98-131.

8 Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluation validating 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> separation from adjacent fire zones, DG 00-00374, Q-ECDS-00-0171.

4.3-433

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 ZONE: 9.2 AREA: EDG-2 LOCATION: TB I, Elev. 595-0 ZONE DESCRIPTION: Unit 2 Diesel Generator Room FIRE SEVERITY:

Less than 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

SER ISSUES:

A review of the Safety Evaluation Reports did not uncover established combustible loading limits for this zone.

ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR:

The accident of concern is a fire that occurs in this zone damaging safe shutdown cable, then spreads to affect redundant or alternative safe shutdown equipment or cable in an adjacent zone, and adversely impacts the ability to achieve or maintain safe shutdown.

FIRE BARRIERS AND ADJACENT FIRE ZONES:

The following table lists all fire zones adjacent to Zone 9.2 which are in separate fire areas or which contain redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment. The table also summarizes fire resistance rating of the fire barriers for each zone. If the barrier rating exceeds the predicted fire severity, based on the increased combustible loading limit, then spread of fire to the adjoining fire zone is not considered credible. If the barrier rating is less than or equal to the predicted fire severity, further evaluation is required to determine the potential for fire spread and the effect on safe shutdown capabilities.

Zone Area Fire Resistance Rating 6.2.B TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.6.E TB-I 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.2.7.E TB-I 3 hour1 1

FHA indicates barrier and seal rating of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> except for exhaust duct penetration.

4.3-434

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 EVALUATION ZONE 9.2:

This fire zone is separated from the rest of the plant by 3-hour fire barriers. The walls separating this zone from fire zone 8.2.6.E is constructed of 1-0 thick concrete and contains two Class A fire for access to the zone. The east wall is an unrated exterior wall constructed of 1-6 thick concrete. The ceiling separates this zone from fire zone 6.2.B and is constructed of 6 thick concrete supported on fire proofed structural steel. The barriers bounding adjacent fire zones are rated for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of fire resistance. The major combustible material within this fire zone is fuel oil, lube oil, and other miscellaneous combustible material associated with diesel generator support equipment. This zone is provided with a CO2 fire suppression system actuated by thermal detectors. The day tank room is provided a wet-pipe sprinkler system and overflow/tank rupture spill containment. Manual fire suppression equipment is provided near the entrance to this fire zone.

CONCLUSION:

The barriers separating this zone from adjacent fire zones are rated for 3-hours of fire resistance.

In addition, this zone is provided with automatic fire suppression systems, which would actuate in the event of a fire in this zone and control or suppress any fire event. In addition, the systems actuation would summon the plant fire brigade would provide additional assurance that any fire originating in this zone would not grow and spread to an adjacent fire zone and damage redundant safe shutdown equipment and cables.

4.3-435

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.0 GUIDELINES OF APPENDIX A TO APCSB 9.5-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.0 GUIDELINES OF APPENDIX A TO APCSB 9.5-1 5.1 OVERALL REQUIREMENTS OF NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance A.1 Personnel Responsibility for the overall fire Comply with intent:

protection program should be assigned to The administrative program was compared with a designated person in the upper level of the detailed recommendations in a 1977 NRC management. This person should retain Supplementary Guidance document entitled, ultimate responsibility even though Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional formulation and assurance of program Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and implementation is delegated. Such Quality Assurance.

delegation of authority should be to staff See Supplementary Guidance Review personnel prepared by training and (F.P.P.D.P.).

experience in fire protection and nuclear plant safety to provide a balanced approach in directing the fire protection programs for nuclear power plants. The qualification requirements for the fire protection engineer or consultant who will assist in the design and selection of equipment, inspect and test the completed physical aspects of the system, develop the fire protection program, and assist in the fire-fighting training for the operating plant should be stated. Subsequently, the FSAR should discuss the training and updating provisions such as fire drills provided for maintaining the competence of the station fire-fighting and operating crew, including personnel responsible for maintaining and inspecting the fire protection equipment.

5.1-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance The fire protection staff should be responsible for:

(a) coordination of building layout and systems design with fire area requirements, including consideration of potential hazards associated with postulated design basis fires, (b) design and maintenance of fire detection, suppression, and extinguishing systems, (c) fire prevention activities, (d) training and manual fire-fighting activities of plant personnel and the fire brigade.

(Note: NFPA 6 - Recommendations for See NFPA Code Review (F.P.P.D.P.).

Organization of Industrial Fire Loss Prevention, contains useful guidance for organization and operation of the entire fire loss prevention program.)

A.2 Design Bases The overall fire protection program Comply:

should be based upon evaluation of See Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of this report and Safe potential fire hazards throughout the Shutdown Report.

plant and the effect of postulated design basis fires relative to maintaining ability to perform safety shutdown functions and minimize radioactive releases to the environment.

5.1-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance A.3 Backup Total reliance should not be placed on a Comply:

single automatic fire suppression system. See Section 4.0 of this report for description of Appropriate backup fire suppression available automatic suppression systems.

capability should be provided. Backup fire suppression equipment is provided in the form of manual hose stations and/or A.4 Single Failure Criterion portable fire extinguishers.

A single failure in the fire suppression Comply with intent:

system should not impair both the A single failure would not impair both the primary and backup fire suppression primary and backup fire suppression capability.

capability. For example, redundant fire Fire water supply is provided by redundant water pumps with independent power diesel driven fire pumps. (See Section 4.0 of this supplies and controls should be provided. report for a discussion of suppression system Postulated fires or fire protection system arrangements.)

failures need not be considered concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomena.

The effects of lightning strikes should be Lightning protection was compared with the included in the overall plant fire requirements of NFPA-78. See NFPA Code protection program. Review (F.P.P.D.P.).

A.5 Fire Suppression Systems Failure or inadvertent operation of the Partially comply:

fire suppression system should not A suppression effects analysis has been incapacitate safety-related systems or conducted to ensure that inadvertent operation or components. Fire suppression systems a pipe break would not adversely affect safe that are pressurized during normal plant shutdown. This review was conducted in operation should meet the guidelines accordance with NRC I&E Temporary specified in APCSB Branch Technical Instruction 2515/62 Rev. 1, Section 0.4.1.f. (See Position 3-1, Protection Against Section 4.0 of this report for suppression Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid effects.)

Systems Outside Containment.

5.1-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance A.6 Fuel Storage Areas Schedule for implementation of Not applicable.

modifications, if any, will be established on a case-by-case basis.

A.7 Fuel Loading Schedule for implementation of Not applicable.

modifications, if any, will be established on a case-by-case basis.

A.8 On multiple-reactor sites where there are Not applicable. Quad Cities is an operating operating reactors and construction of station with no units under construction.

remaining units is being completed, the fire protection program should provide continuing evaluation and include additional fire barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative controls necessary to protect the operating units from construction fire hazards. The superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibility for site fire protection.

A.9 Simultaneous fires in more than one Separation between shared equipment has been reactor need not be postulated, where addressed in the Safe Shutdown Report and separation requirements are met. A fire Exemption Requests.

involving more than one reactor unit need not be postulated except for facilities shared between units.

5.1-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.2 Administrative Procedures, Controls, and Fire Brigade Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance B.1 Administrative procedures consistent Comply with intent:

with the need for maintaining the Administrative procedure guidance in NFPA performance of the fire protection system Codes 4, 4A, 6, 7, and 8 were reviewed for and personnel in nuclear power plants applicability. NFPA Code 4A was found not to should be provided. be applicable. The results of the rest of the reviews are found in the NFPA Code Review Guidance is contained in the following (F.P.P.D.P.)

publications.

NFPA 4 - Organization for Fire Services NFPA 4A - Organization for Fire Department NFPA 6 - Industrial Fire Loss Prevention NFPA 7 - Management of Fire Emergencies NFPA 8 - Management Responsibility for Effects of Fire on Operations NFPA 27 - Private Fire Brigades B.2 Effective administrative measures should Comply:

be implemented to prohibit bulk storage The administrative program was compared with of combustible materials inside or the detailed recommendations in a 1977 NRC adjacent to safety-related buildings or Supplementary Guidance document entitled, systems during operation or maintenance Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional periods. Regulatory Guide 1.39, Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Housekeeping Requirements for Quality Assurance.

Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants See Supplementary Guidance Review provides guidance on housekeeping, (F.P.P.D.P.)

including the disposal of combustible materials.

5.2-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance B.3 Normal and abnormal conditions or other anticipated operations such as modifications (e.g., breaking fire stops, impairment of fire detection and suppression systems) and refueling activities should be reviewed by appropriate levels of management and appropriate special actions and procedures such as fire watches or temporary fire barriers implemented to assure adequate fire protection and reactor safety. In particular:

(a) Work involving ignition sources Comply:

such as welding and flame cutting Work involving ignition sources is covered by an should be done under closely administrative procedure. This procedure was controlled conditions. Procedures reviewed against the criteria of NFPA Code 51B governing such work should be and the 1977 NRC Supplementary Guidance reviewed and approved by entitled, Nuclear Plant Fire Protection persons trained and experienced Functional Responsibilities, Administrative in fire protection. Persons Controls and Quality Assurance. The results of performing and directly assisting these reviews are found in the NFPA Code in such work should be trained Review and the Supplementary Guidance and equipped to prevent and Review (F.P.P.D.P.).

combat fires. If this is not possible, a person qualified in fire protection should directly monitor the work and function as a fire watch.

(b) Leak testing, and similar Comply:

procedures such as air flow The local leak rate test procedures contain a determination, should use one of precaution statement prohibiting the use of open the commercially available flames for any testing of penetration leakage.

aerosol techniques. Open flames These test procedures were reviewed against the or combustion generated smoke guidelines of the 1977 NRC Supplementary should not be permitted. Guidance entitled, Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance.: The results of these reviews are found in the Supplementary Guidance Review (F.P.P.D.P.).

5.2-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (c) Use of combustible material, e.g., Comply with intent:

HEPA and charcoal filters, dry Control of combustibles is accomplished through ion exchange resins or other use of an administrative procedure. This combustible supplies in procedure allows only pressure impregnated safety-related areas should be flame retardant wood to be used in the plant.

controlled. Use of wood inside The procedure was reviewed against the buildings containing guidelines of the 1977 NRC Supplementary safety-related systems or Guidance entitled, Nuclear Plant Fire Protection equipment should be permitted Functional Responsibilities, Administrative only when suitable Controls and Quality Assurance. The results of noncombustible substitutes are this review are found in the Supplementary not available. If wood must be Guidance Review (F.P.P.D.P.).

used, only fire retardant treated wood (scaffolding, lay down blocks) should be permitted.

Such materials should be allowed into safety-related areas only when they are to be used immediately. Their possible and probable use should be considered in the fire hazards analysis to determine the adequacy of the installed fire protection systems.

Comply:

B.4 Nuclear power plants are frequently The station fire brigade is designed to be located in remote areas, at some distance self-sufficient. However, other fire agencies are from public fire departments. Also, first used in periodic drills for experience and response fire departments are often adaptability to function with the station brigade.

volunteer. Public fire department response should be considered in the overall fire protection program.

However, the plant should be designed to be self-sufficient with respect to fire fighting activities and rely on the public response only for supplemental or backup capability.

5.2-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance B.5 The need for good organization, training and equipping of fire brigades at nuclear power plant sites requires effective measures be implemented to assure proper discharge of these functions. The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants, should be followed as applicable.

(a) Successful fire fighting requires Comply with intent:

testing and maintenance of the Fire protection system surveillances are fire protection equipment, performed using detailed procedures describing emergency lighting and the surveillance and acceptance criteria. Periodic communication, as well as testing of fire protection systems and equipment practice as brigades for the people is scheduled and performed with documented who must utilize the equipment. procedures to assure that the equipment will A test plan that lists the properly function and continue to meet the individuals and their design criteria. This test program was reviewed responsibilities in connection with against the guidelines of the 1977 NRC routine tests and inspections of Supplementary Guidance entitled, Nuclear Plant the fire detection and protection Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, systems should be developed. Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance.

The test plan should contain the The results of this review are found in the types, frequency and detailed Supplementary Guidance Review (F.P.P.D.P.).

procedures for testing.

Procedures should also contain instructions on maintaining fire protection during those periods when the fire protection system is impaired or during periods of plant maintenance, e.g., fire watches or temporary hose connections to water systems.

5.2-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (b) Basic training is a necessary Comply with intent:

element in effective fire fighting Fire drills are conducted so that there is one drill operation. In order for a fire held per shift per quarter. The fire scenarios brigade to operate effectively, it include various fire hazards throughout the plant must operate as a team. All covering different safety-related areas. The fire members must know what their drill procedures were reviewed against the individual duties are. They must guidelines of the 1977 NRC Supplementary be familiar with the layout of the Guidance entitled, Nuclear Plant Fire Protection plant and equipment location and Functional Responsibilities, Administrative operation in order to permit Controls and Quality Assurance. The results of effective fire-fighting operations this review are found in the Supplementary during times when a particular Guidance Review (F.P.P.D.P.).

area is filled with smoke or is insufficiently lighted. Such training can only be accomplished by conducting drills several times a year (at least quarterly) so that all members of the fire brigade have had the opportunity to train as a team, testing itself in the major areas of the plant. The drills should include the simulated use of equipment in each area and should be preplanned and post-critiqued to establish the training objective of the drills and determine how well these objectives have been met. These drills should periodically (at least annually) included local fire department participation where possible. Such drills also permit supervising personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of communications within the fire brigade and with the on-scene fire team leader, the reactor operator in the control room, and the offsite command post.

5.2-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (c) To have proper coverage during Comply with intent:

all phases of operation, members The training procedures for training both site of each shift crew should be personnel and off-site fire department personnel trained in fire protection. were reviewed against the guidelines of the 1977 Training of the plant fire brigade NRC Supplementary Guidance entitled, Nuclear should be coordinated with the Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, local fire department so that Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance.

responsibilities and duties are The results of this review are found in the delineated in advance. This Supplementary Guidance Review (F.P.P.D.P.).

coordination should be part of the training course and implemented into the training of the local fire department staff. Local fire departments should be educated in the operational precautions when fighting fires on nuclear power plant sites. Local fire departments should be made aware of the need for radioactive protection of personnel and the special hazards associated with a nuclear power plant site.

(d) NFPA 27, Private Fire Brigade Comply with intent:

should be followed in The criteria of NFPA Codes 27, 194, 196, 197 organization, training, and fire and 601 were reviewed during the NFPA code drills. This standard also is Review. The results of this review are applicable for the inspection and documented in the NFPA Code Review maintenance of fire fighting (F.P.P.D.P.).

equipment. Among the standards referenced in this document, the following should be utilized:

NFPA 194, Standard for Screw Threads and Gaskets for Fire Hose Couplings, NFPA 196, Standard for Fire Hose, NFPA 197, Training Standard on Initial Fire Attacks, NFPA 601, Recommended Manual of Instructions and Duties 5.2-6

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance for the Plant Watchman on Guard. NFPA booklets and pamphlets listed on Page 27-11 of Volume 8, 1971-72 are also applicable for good training references. In addition, courses in fire prevention and fire suppression which are recognized and/or sponsored by the fire protection industry should be utilized.

5.2-7

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.3 Quality Assurance Program Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance C. Quality Assurance (QA) programs of Comply:

applicants and contractors should be Reliability related items are addressed in the developed and implemented to assure appropriate sections of the 10 CFR 50 that the requirements for design, Appendix B program. See the Supplementary procurement, installation, and testing and Guidance Review (F.P.P.D.P.).

administrative controls for the fire protection program for safety-related areas as defined in this Branch Position are satisfied. The program should be under the management control of the QA organization. The QA program criteria that apply to the fire protection program should include the following:

C.1 Design Control and Procurement Document Control Measures should be established to assure that all design-related guidelines of the Branch Technical Position are included in design and procurement documents and that deviations therefrom are controlled.

C.2 Instructions, Procedures and Drawings Inspections, tests, administrative controls, fire drills and training that govern the fire protection program should be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with these documents.

5.3-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance C.3 Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services Measures should be established to assure that purchased material, equipment, and services conform to the procurement documents.

C.4 Inspection A program for independent inspection of activities affecting fire protection should be established and executed by, or for, the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with documented installation drawings and test procedures for accomplishing the activities.

C.5 Test and Test Control A test program should be established and implemented to assure that testing is performed and verified by inspection and audit to demonstrate conformance with design and system readiness requirements. The tests should be performed in accordance with written test procedures; test results should be properly evaluated and acted on.

C.6 Inspection Test and Operating Status Measures should be established to provide for the identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections.

5.3-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance C.7 Nonconforming items Measures should be established to control items that do not conform to specified requirements to prevent inadvertent use of installation.

C.8 Corrective Action Measures should be established to assure that conditions adverse to fire protection, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible material and nonconformances are promptly identified, reported, and corrected.

C.9 Records Records should be prepared and maintained to furnish evidence that the criteria enumerated above are being met for activities affecting the fire protection program.

C.10 Audits Audits should be conducted and documented to verify compliance with the fire protection program including design and procurement documents; instructions; procedures and drawings; and inspection and test activities.

5.3-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.4 General Guidelines for Plant Protection Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance D.1 Building Design (a) Plant layouts should be arranged Comply with intent:

to: The fire area concept as it relates to reactor safety was not implemented in the initial design (1) Isolate safety related of Quad Cities Units 1 & 2. Safety-related and systems from non-safety-related equipment was reviewed.

unacceptable fire hazards, This equipment was combined into specific and shutdown paths. Assurance that one path to achieve safe shutdown will remain free of fire (2) Alternatives: damage is described in the Safe Shutdown Report. Major fire hazards are protected with (a) Redundant safety related systems fixed suppression systems.

that are subject to damage from a single fire hazard should be protected by a combination of fire retardant coatings and fire detection and suppression systems, or (b) a separate system to perform the safety function should be provided.

(b) In order to accomplish (1) (a) The fire hazards analysis is contained in above, safety related systems and Section 4 of this report. It will be updated as fire hazards should be identified discussed in Subsection 1.3.2.

throughout the plant. Therefore, a detailed fire hazard analysis See Section 5.3(C.1) of this report.

should be made. The fire hazards analysis should be reviewed and updated as necessary.

Additional fire hazards analysis should be done after any plant modification.

5.4-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (c) For multiple reactor sites, cable spreading Do not comply:

rooms should not be shared between The Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (AEER),

reactors. Each cable spreading room Control Room, Cable Spread Room and Computer should be separated from other areas of Room are shared between both units. All these the plant by barriers (walls and floors) rooms form one fire area. Both divisions of cable having a minimum fire resistance of three are in the cable spread room; however, safe hours. Cabling for redundant safety shutdown for both units can be achieved independent divisions should be separated by walls of the entire fire area. The cable spread room is having three hour fire barriers. separated from other rooms in the fire area by 3-hour fire barriers that have unrated noncombustible Alternative guidance for constructed penetration seals. See Section 4.0 and Subsection plants is shown in Section E.3, Cable 5.6.3 (F.3) of this report for more detail.

Spreading Room.

(d) Interior wall and structural components, Do not comply:

thermal insulation materials and radiation Minor amounts of combustibles were originally used shielding materials and soundproofing as nailers, seals, caulking and joint fillers, etc. These should be noncombustible. Interior existing materials do not significantly contribute to finishes should be noncombustible or the fire loadings in the plant and do not expose listed by a nationally recognized testing safety-related systems to undue risks. The original laboratory, such as Factory Mutual or Quad Cities HVAC work specification (R-2403 Underwriters Laboratory, Inc. for flame dated January 26, 1970) specified materials to be spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 used for internal and external duct insulation. The or less in its use configuration (ASTM E- materials specified meet NFPA 90A-1976 flame 84 Test, Surface Burning Characteristics spread and combustibility requirements. For duct of Building Materials). coverings and linings, NFPA 90A-1976 requires a flame spread rating not over 25 and a smoke developed rating no higher than 50. Installations since the late 1970s have specified noncombustible or limited combustible surface finishes. Floor coverings in areas containing systems or equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant are generally Class I material as defined in NFPA 101, or generally a flame spread of 25 or less as defined by ASTM E-84. For fire hazard analysis purposes, floor coatings are considered non-combustible if the material has a structural base of non-combustible material, with a nominal depth not over 1/8-inch thick, and has a flame spread rating not higher than 50 as defined by ASTM E-84. Exceptions to these guidelines are evaluated for acceptability by Fire Protection Engineering on a case-by-case basis.

5.4-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (e) Metal deck roof construction Do not comply:

should be noncombustible (see The roofs at Quad Cities are of Class 2 the building materials directory of construction.

the Underwriters Laboratory, Inc.) or listed as Class I by Factory Mutual System Approval Guide.

5.4-2a

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance Where combustible material is used in metal deck roofing design, acceptable alternatives are (i) replace combustibles with noncombustible materials (ii) provide an automatic sprinkler system, or (iii) provide ability to cover roof exterior and interior with adequate water volume and pressure.

(f) Suspended ceilings and their Comply:

supports should be of Suspended ceilings are only in the main control noncombustible construction. room (Fire Zone 2.0), Radwaste Control Room Concealed spaces should be (Fire Zone 14.1), and Service Building Offices devoid of combustibles. (Fire Zone 19.1 and 19.2) and are made of noncombustible material. Fire detection is Adequate fire detection and provided throughout the control room above the suppression systems should be open-grid ceiling. Cables enter control panels provided where full from below.

implementation is not practicable.

(g) High voltage - high amperage transformers installed inside Partially comply:

buildings containing Transformers installed at Quad Cities are safety-related systems should be silicone insulating coolant filled with the of the dry type or insulated and exception of two dry transformers on the main cooled with noncombustible turbine operating floor. These transformers are liquid. only used during a unit outage.

Safety related systems that are exposed to flammable oil filled transformers should be protected from the effects of a fire by:

(i) replacing with dry transformers or transformers that are insulated and cooled with noncombustible liquid; or 5.4-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (ii) enclosing the transformer with a three-hour fire barrier and installing automatic water spray protection.

(h) Buildings containing Comply with intent:

safety-related systems having Protection from the transformer fire hazard is openings in exterior walls closer provided by:

than 50 feet to flammable oil filled transformers should be 1. Water spray system above the protected from the effects of a fire transformers.

by:

2. Reinforced concrete wall up to elevation (i) closing of the opening to 641 feet 2 inches on the east side of the have fire resistance equal turbine building and elevation 639 feet 0 to three hours, inches (plus a 6-inch curb) on the west (ii) constructing a three-hour side of the turbine building.

fire barrier between the transformers and the wall 3. Water spray protection of bus duct openings: or penetrations is provided where the bus ducts enter the west wall of the turbine (iii) closing the opening and building. Where the bus ducts enter the providing the capability to east wall no suppression is provided since maintain to water curtain the transformers are 19 feet from the in case of a fire. wall.

(i) Floor drains, sized to remove Comply with intent:

expected fire fighting water flow Suppression effects analysis was conducted to should be provided in those areas ensure that fire fighting water would not where fixed water fire adversely affect safe shutdown (See Section 4.0 suppression systems are installed. of this report.) NFPA Code 92M was reviewed Drains should also be provided in and deviations justified (F.P.P.D.P.).

other areas where hand hose lines may be used if such fire fighting water could cause unacceptable damage to equipment in the area.

Equipment should be installed on pedestals, or curbs should be provided as required to contain water and direct it 5.4-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance to floor drains. (See NFPA 92M, Waterproofing and Draining of Floors.) Drains in areas containing combustible liquids should have provisions for preventing the spread of the fire throughout the drain system.

Water drainage from areas which may contain radioactivity should be sampled and analyzed before discharge to the environment.

In operating plants or plants under construction, if accumulation of water from the operation of new fire suppression systems does not create unacceptable consequences, drains need not be installed.

(j) Floors, walls and ceilings Comply with intent:

enclosing separate fire areas Fire areas use 3-hour rated barriers and are should have minimum fire rating defined in the Safe Shutdown Analysis.

of three hours. Penetrations in Deviations in these barriers are justified in the these fire barriers, including Exemption Requests (F.P.P.D.P.).

conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire See NFPA code review (NFPA 80 and NFPA resistance rating at least equal to 90A for doors and HVAC respectively) that of the fire barrier itself. Door (F.P.P.D.P.).

openings should be protected with equivalent rated doors, frames Most fire doors are locked and/or alarmed if kept and hardware that have been in the closed position. Some sliding doors are tested and approved by a provided in reactor building barriers. These nationally recognized laboratory. doors are normally open but are equipped with Such doors should be normally fusible links that close the doors in the event of a closed and locked or alarmed with fire.

alarm and annunciation in the control room. Penetrations for ventilation system should be protected by a standard fire 5.4-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance door damper where required.

(Refer to NFPA 80, Fire Doors and Windows.)

The fire hazard in each area Partial fire barriers are used on the operating should be evaluated to determine floor as discussed in the Exemption Requests barrier requirements. If barrier (F.P.P.D.P.).

fire resistance cannot be made adequate, fire detection and suppression should be provided, such as:

(i) water curtain in case of fire, (ii) flame retardant coatings, (iii) additional fire barriers.

D.2 Control of Combustibles (a) Safety related systems should be Comply:

isolated or separated from Major fire hazards are protected by appropriate combustible materials. When this fixed fire suppression systems as identified in is not possible because of the Section 4.0 of this report.

nature of the safety system or the combustible material, special protection should be provided to prevent a fire from defeating the safety system function. Such protection may involve a combination of automatic fire suppression, and construction capable of withstanding and containing a fire that consumes all combustibles present. Examples of such combustible materials that may not be separable from the remainder of its system are:

5.4-6

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (1) Emergency diesel generator fuel oil day tanks (2) Turbine-generator oil and hydraulic control fluid systems (3) Reactor coolant pump lube oil system (b) Bulk gas storage (either Comply with intent:

compressed or cryogenic), should (1) Outside bulk hydrogen storage is located not be permitted inside structures in the yard south of the crib house and is housing safety-related equipment. arranged in a standard manner. Hydrogen piping Storage of flammable gas such as is properly color coded and marked. NFPA 50A hydrogen, should be located and NFPA 6 are addressed in the NFPA code outdoors or in separate detached review (F.P.P.D.P.). The trailer mounted H2 buildings so that a fire or storage tank is situated with long axis parallel to explosion will not adversely the turbine buildings, which is in proximity. The affect any safety related systems permanent H2 storage facility is located with the or equipment. long axis toward the turbine building.

(Refer to NFPA 50A, Gaseous (2) Hydrogen Water Chemistry System Hydrogen Systems.) modification:

Trailer-mounted hydrogen gaseous storage Care should be taken to locate vessels and a 20,000 gallon liquid hydrogen high pressure gas storage storage tank are located outside the security containers with the long axis fence, approximately 1,500 feet south of the parallel to building walls. This nearest safety-related structure. The site also is will minimize the possibility of at least 75 feet from any future or present wall penetration in the event of a buildings. The trailer storage is situated with its container failure. Use of long axis toward the turbine building. The compressed gases (especially hydrogen line is routed underground to a point flammable and fuel gases) inside just west of the Unit 1 turbine building. A buildings should be controlled. branch line proceeds underground to the Unit 1 (Refer to NFPA 6, Industrial Fire and 2 generator hydrogen control cabinet. An Loss Prevention.) excess flow check valve is provided at the hydrogen storage site and outside of the Unit 1 turbine building, to secure hydrogen flow in the event of a line break. An isolation valve interfaced with area hydrogen monitors is installed at the entrance point of the 5.4-7

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance hydrogen line to the Unit 1 or 2 turbine building.

This isolation valve will secure the hydrogen flow in the supply line if the monitors sense an approach to an explosive mixture in the turbine building basement.

5.4-7a

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (c) The use of plastic materials Comply:

should be minimized. In The use of plastic materials is minimized. The particular, haloginated plastics use of PVC and neoprene has been severely such as polyvinyl chloride (PVC) restricted. New cable meets the requirements of and neoprene should be used only IEEE-383, IEEE-1202, NFPA 262 or equivalent.

when substitute noncombustible materials are not available. All plastic materials, including flame and fire retardant materials, will burn with an intensity and BTU production in a range similar to that of ordinary hydrocarbons.

When burning, they produce heavy smoke that obscures visibility and can plug air filters, especially charcoal and HEPA.

The haloginated plastics also release free chlorine and hydrogen chloride when burning which are toxic to humans and corrosive to equipment.

(d) Storage of flammable liquids Comply with intent:

should as minimum, comply with NFPA 30 is used as a guideline. See NFPA code the requirements of NFPA 30, review (F.P.P.D.P.).

Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.

D.3 Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations (a) Only noncombustible materials Comply:

should be used for cable tray All cable trays are constructed of construction. noncombustible materials (galvanized sheet metal).

(b) See Section F.3 for fire protection See Subsection 5.6.3 (F.3) for response.

guidelines for cable spreading rooms.

5.4-8

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (c) Automatic water sprinkler Partially comply:

systems should be provided for Water suppression is provided over major cable cable trays outside the cable concentrations (i.e., Units 1 & 2 cable tunnel, spreading room. Cables should cable spread room, ground floor common access be designed to allow wetting corridor, and the eastern portion of the Turbine down with deluge water without Building Central Area). Water suppression is electrical faulting. Manual hose not provided in areas containing major electrical stations and portable hand equipment. Fire detection is provided in these extinguishers should be provided areas. See Exemption Requests (F.P.P.D.P.).

as backup. Safety-related equipment in the vicinity of such Cables are of the waterproof type and not subject cable trays, that does not itself to electrical faulting due to water exposure.

require water fire protection, but Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers is subject to unacceptable damage are provided for all cable areas except the cable from sprinkler water discharge, tunnels, however, manual equipment is available should be protected from to the tunnels from the ground floor of the sprinkler system operation of turbine building. A suppression effects analysis malfunction. was conducted to ensure that unacceptable damage would not result (see Section 4.0 of this report).

When safety related cables do not Alternative safe shutdown capability is available satisfy the provisions of independent of all fire areas - lack of complete Regulatory Guide 1.75, all suppression and detection in these areas is exposed cables should be covered justified in the Exemption Requests (F.P.P.D.P.).

with an approved fire retardant coating and a fixed automatic water fire suppression system should be provided.

5.4-9

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (d) Cable and cable tray penetration Comply:

of fire barriers (vertical and Cable and cable tray penetrations are sealed to horizontal) should be sealed to give protection equivalent to that of the rated fire give protection at least equivalent barrier. The evaluation of existing penetration to that fire barrier. The design of seals is provided in the report entitled Review fire barriers for horizontal and of Existing and Proposed Penetration Seal Fire vertical cable trays should, as a Testing and Installation Program (F.P.P.D.P.).

minimum, meet the requirements of ASTM E-119, Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials, including the hose stream test. Where installed penetration seals are deficient with respect to fire resistance, these seals may be protected by covering both sides with an approved fire retardant material.

The adequacy of using such material should be demonstrated by suitable testing.

(e) Fire breaks should be provided as Comply with intent:

deemed necessary by the fire The Appendix R analysis demonstrates safe hazards analysis. Flame or flame shutdown capability using alternate shutdown retardant coatings may be used as equipment. It has been shown in this analysis a fire break for grouped electrical that for a fire involving redundant cable trains in cables to limit spread of fire in a fire area, an alternate shutdown path will be cable ventings. (Possible cable available outside of the fire area. (See Appendix derating owing to use of such R Analysis which identifies the method to ensure coating materials must be separation of alternate shutdown paths.)

considered during design.) Therefore, the fire stops identified in SER 4.9 and the 4-10-78 letter do not have the significance for safe shutdown they did at the time of the SER. However, some of these fire stops are relied upon to prevent cable tray fire propagation as indicated in the Fire Hazards Analysis. Other fire stops continue to provide divisional separation between redundant trains of safety-related circuits per Appendix A.

5.4-10

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (f) Electric cable constructions Do not comply:

should as a minimum pass the IEEE-383 did not exist at the time of plant current IEEE No. 383 flame test. construction. Modifications after issuance of (This does not imply that cables IEEE-383 have utilized cables designed to meet passing this test will not require the requirements of IEEE-383. For Safety additional fire protection.) Related cables and all cables installed in cable tray or in free air applications will specify cable For cable installation in operating insulation which has been rated to IEEE-383, plants and plants under IEEE-1202, NFPA 262 or equivalent. Automatic construction that do not meet the fire suppression and/or detection is provided IEEE No. 383 flame test where deemed necessary as discussed in Section requirements, all cables must be 4.0 of this report.

covered with an approved flame retardant coating and properly derated.

(g) To the extent practical, cable Future installations of Safety Related cables and construction that does not give off all cables installed in cable tray or in free air corrosive gases while burning applications will specify cable insulation which should be used. For operating has been rated to IEEE-383, IEEE-1202, NFPA plants, this position is only 262 or equivalent. Modifications after issuance applicable to new cable of IEEE-383 have utilized cables designed to installations. meet the requirements of IEEE 383. Upon combustion this cable may give off gases which are corrosive in nature.

(h) Cable trays, raceways, conduit, Comply:

trenches, or culverts should be Cable trays, raceways, conduit, trenches and used only for cables. culverts are used only for cables.

Miscellaneous storage should not be permitted, nor should piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases be installed in these areas.

Installed equipment in cable tunnels or culverts, need not be removed if they present no hazard to the cable runs as determined by the fire hazards analysis.

5.4-11

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (i) The design of cable tunnels, Comply:

culverts and spreading rooms Portable ventilating equipment (smoke ejectors) should provide for automatic or is available for fire brigade use.

manual smoke venting as required to facilitate manual fire fighting capability.

(j) Cables in the control room should Partially Comply:

be kept to the minimum necessary Cabling in the control room is generally kept to a for operation of the control room. minimum for control room operation. All cables All cables entering the control entering the control room terminate there. There room should terminate there. are no cable trenches or culverts in the control Cables should not be installed in room floor.

floor trenches or culverts in the A central console is located on a raised floor.

control room. Power cables under the console are routed in conduit. The remaining wiring feeds the Existing cabling installed in communications and computer equipment in the concealed floor and ceiling spaces control room. The total amount of cable and should be protected with an wiring under console is minimal. The control automatic total flooding halon room is continuously manned and portable fire system. extinguishers are kept in the control room for manual fire fighting. The addition of a Halon flooding system for this concealed floor area is not warranted.

D.4 Ventilation (a) The products of combustion that Partially comply:

need to be removed from a All existing ventilation exhaust air which is specific fire area should be potentially contaminated is monitored prior to evaluated to determine how they release to the atmosphere to ensure that releases will be controlled. Smoke and are within the plant technical specification limits.

corrosive gases should generally Generally, the normal ventilation system would be automatically discharged be shut down in a fire area and manually directly outside to a safe location. restarted post fire. Portable ventilating Smoke and gases containing equipment would be used to remove smoke from radioactive materials should be the area.

monitored in the fire area 5.4-12

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance to determine if release to the environment is within the permissible limits of the plant Technical Specifications.

The products of combustion which need to be removed from a specific fire area should be evaluated to determine how they will be controlled.

(b) Any ventilation system designed Comply:

to exhaust smoke or corrosive Existing ventilation systems are not designed to gases should be evaluated to exhaust smoke or corrosive gas concurrently ensure that inadvertent operation with a fire. It is the intent to manually restart or single failures will not violate existing ventilation systems to provide purge on the controlled areas of the plant a post fire basis. These systems are monitored as design. This requirement noted in Position D.4(a) above.

includes containment functions for protection of the public and maintaining habitability for operations personnel.

(c) The power supply and controls Do not comply:

for mechanical ventilation Power supply and controls for mechanical systems should be run outside the ventilation equipment are not necessarily routed fire area served by the system. outside of fire hazard areas served by the system.

Most ventilation equipment is located within the fire hazard area, thereby requiring electrical cable to be routed accordingly.

5.4-13

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (d) Fire suppression systems should Do not comply:

be installed to protect charcoal Fixed automatic sprinkler system for charcoal filters in accordance with filters are not provided. This design predated Regulatory Guide 1.52, Design requirements for fire protection. The charcoal is Testing and Maintenance Criteria contained in an enclosed metal cabinet and the for Atmospheric Cleanup Air spread of fire is remote. Manual water spray Filtration. systems are provided for charcoal filter in the control room, technical support center, and HRSS building.

It should be noted that Regulatory Guide 1.52 does not specifically require charcoal filters to have fixed automatic suppression systems.

(e) The fresh air supply intakes to Comply:

areas containing safety related Fresh air intakes for the ventilation systems are equipment or systems should be currently constructed with physical separation located remote from the exhaust between exhaust outlets. This is accomplished air outlets and smoke vents of by routing plant ventilation exhaust air to the other fire areas to minimize the station stack which is remotely located from the possibility of contaminating the station. Exhaust air not routed to the stack is intake air with the products of separated from the air intakes.

combustion.

(f) Stairwells should be designed to Do not comply:

minimize smoke infiltration Stairwells are not enclosed. Elevators are during a fire. Staircases should enclosed in masonry shafts with 2-hour fire serve as escape routes and access ratings. Escape and access routes are routes for fire fighting. Fire exit established.

route should be clearly marked.

Stairwells, elevators and chutes should be enclosed in masonry towers with minimum fire rating of three hours and automatic fire doors at least equal to the enclosure construction, at each opening into the building.

Elevators should not be used during fire emergencies.

5.4-14

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance Where stairwells or elevators cannot be enclosed in three-hour fire rated barrier with equivalent fire doors, escape and access routes should be established by pre-fire plan and practiced in drills by operating and fire brigade personnel.

(g) Smoke and heat vents may be Do not comply:

useful in specific areas such as Specifically designed smoke and heat vents are cable spreading rooms and diesel not and will not be installed in structures or fuel oil storage areas and identified fire hazard areas. Existing ventilation switchgear rooms. When systems will be utilized for post fire purging as natural-convection ventilation is applicable.

used, a minimum ratio of 1 sq.

foot of venting area per 200 sq.

feet of floor area should be provided. If forced-convection ventilation is used, 300 CFM should be provided for every 200 sq. feet of floor area. See NFPA No. 204 for additional guidance on smoke control.

(h) Self-contained breathing Comply:

apparatus, using full face positive Adequate self-contained breathing apparatus and pressure masks, approved by spare bottles are available for use. A manifold NIOSH (National Institute for breathing air system is available for control room Occupational Safety and Health - personnel.

approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) should be provided for fire brigade, damage control and control room personnel. Control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical. Service or operating life should be a minimum of one half hour for the self-contained units.

5.4-15

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance At least two extra air bottles should be located onsite for each self-contained breathing unit. In addition, an onsite 6-hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air should be used.

Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants.

(i) Where total flooding gas Comply:

extinguishing systems are used, Where total flooding gas extinguishing systems area intake and exhaust method is utilized, dampers are installed to ventilation dampers should close isolate the ventilation supply and exhaust upon initiation of gas flow to ductwork. These dampers are interlocked to maintain necessary gas close on the initiation of the gas system and are concentration. (See NFPA 12, reopened to permit post fire purging. An Carbon Dioxide Systems, and example would be the diesel generator room at 12A, Halon 1301 Systems.) the station. See NFPA Code Review (F.P.P.D.P.).

D.5 Lighting and Communication Lighting and two way voice communication are vital to safe shutdown and emergency response in the event of fire. Suitable fixed and portable emergency lighting and communication devices should be provided to satisfy the following requirements:

5.4-16

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (a) Fixed emergency lighting should Comply:

consist of sealed beam units with Fixed emergency lighting is installed at selected individual 8-hour minimum locations throughout the plant per Appendix R, battery power supplies. Section III.J requirements. See Section 6.5 of the Safe Shutdown Report.

(b) Suitable sealed beam battery Comply:

powered portable hand lights Sealed beam battery powered portable hand should be provided for emergency lights are available at the station for emergency use. use.

(c) Fixed emergency communication Comply:

should use voice powered head Two-way telephones and a paging system exist sets at pre-selected stations. throughout the plant. A limited number of voice powered head set stations are provided for maintenance use.

(d) Fixed repeaters installed to permit Comply with intent:

use of portable radio Most fires remote from the repeaters will have communication units should be no impact on the repeater equipment. However, protected from exposure fire communications will not be interrupted in the damage. event of a fire as described in Section 6.6 of the Safe Shutdown Report.

5.4-17

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.5 Fire Detection and Suppression Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance E.1 Fire Detection (a) Fire detection systems should as a Comply:

minimum comply with NFPA Fire detection systems have been reviewed 72D, Standard for the against the criteria of NFPA 72D. The results of Installation, Maintenance and Use this review are found in the NFPA Code Review of Proprietary Protective (F.P.P.D.P.).

Signaling Systems.

Deviations from the requirements of NFPA 72D should be identified and justified.

(b) Fire detection system should give Partially Comply:

audible and visual alarm and Audible and visual alarms and annunciation are annunciation in the control room. provided in the control room. Local alarms are Local audible alarms should also present on most of the suppression systems but sound at the location of the fire. are not installed on the fire detection systems or fire suppression systems that have been installed (c) Fire alarms should be distinctive since 1986. The Operations procedure for and unique. They should not be responding to a fire directs the use of the PA capable of being confused with system to alert personnel to the location of a any other plant system alarms. potential fire. This is an acceptable replacement of local alarms.

(d) Fire detection and actuation systems should be connected to the plant emergency power Comply:

supply. The station fire alarm is distinct from other station alarms.

E.2 Fire Protection Water Supply Systems (a) An underground yard fire main Comply:

loop should be installed to furnish The present fire detection and actuation system is anticipated fire water connected to the plant uninterruptible power requirements. NFPA 24 - source.

Standard for Outside Protection -

gives necessary guidance for installation.

Partially comply:

A looped 10-inch water main surrounds the plant. Unlined pipe was used in the buried loop.

5.5-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance It references other design codes Additional cross connections are provided to and standards developed by such improve system hydraulics and reliability.

organizations as the American Sectionalizing valves are provided to minimize National Standards Institute adverse impact on systems.

(ANSI) and the American Water Works Association (AWWA). NFPA 24 code reviews justified the deviation of Lined steel or cast iron pipe the unlined piping in the yard main. Condition should be used to reduce internal of piping interior is monitored by conducting tuberculation. Such tuberculation C-factor tests every 3 years. Suppression deposits in an unlined pipe over a systems were conservatively designed to allow period of years can significantly for deterioration in the underground piping.

reduce water flow through the Hydrants are utilized in the periodic flushing of combination of increased friction the system.

and reduced pipe diameter.

Means for treating and flushing NFPA-24 was reviewed and deviations are the systems should be provided. justified. (F.P.P.D.P.) See hydraulic calculation Approved visually indicating (F.P.P.D.P.).

sectional control valves, such as Post Indicator Valve, should be No underground valves are provided within the provided to isolate portions of the security fence except for hydrant laterals.

main for maintenance or repair without shutting off the entire system.

The fire main system piping should be separated from service or sanitary water system piping.

Visible location marking signs for underground valves are acceptable. Alternative valve position indicators should also be provided.

For operating plants, fire main system piping that can be isolated from service or sanitary water system piping is acceptable.

5.5-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (b) A common yard fire main loop Comply with intent:

may serve multi-unit nuclear Common yard main fire loops and water supplies power plant sites, if cross are utilized for multiple units. Individual loops connected between units. are not provided around each unit, since units are Sectional control valves should not separated from one another. Refer to Section permit maintaining independence 5.5(E.2.e) for fire water supply capacity.

of the individual loop around each unit. For such installations, common water supplies may also be utilized. The water supply should be sized for the largest single expected flow. For multiple reactor sites with widely separated plants (approaching 1 mile or more), separate yard fire main loops should be used.

Sectionalized systems are acceptable.

(c) If pumps are required to meet Partially Comply:

system pressure or flow Two 100% diesel driven fire pumps are requirements, a sufficient number provided. These pumps are located in the crib of pumps should be provided so house. The fire pumps are rated at 2500 gpm at that 100% capacity will be 139 psig. The fire pump takes suction from the available with one pump inactive Mississippi River. The fire pumps are not (e.g., three 50% pumps or two separated by fire walls. Separate valved 100% pumps). The connection to connections are provided to the loop from each the yard fire main loop from each pump. The fire system does not have a pressure fire pump should be widely maintenance pump because it is normally separated, preferably located on supplied by the service water pumps through a opposite sides of the plant. Each restricted orifice.

pump should have its own driver with independent power supplies Fire pumps are generally installed in accordance and control. At least one pump (if with NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of not powered from the emergency Centrifugal Fire Pumps. Alarms indicating diesels) should be driven by pump running, mechanical trouble, loss of d-c non-electrical means, preferably power and diesel day tank level are provided.

diesel engine. Pumps and drivers NFPA 20 Code Review justified any deviation in should be located in rooms the installation of these pumps (see F.P.P.D.P.).

separated from the remaining 5.5-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance pumps and equipment by a minimum three-hour fire wall.

Alarms indicating pump running, driver availability, or failure to start should be provided in the control room.

Details of the fire pump installation should as a minimum conform to NFPA 20 Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps.

(d) Two separate reliable water Comply with intent:

supplies should be provided. If The fire pumps take suction from the Mississippi tanks are used, two 100% River. Storage tanks are not used.

(minimum of 300,000 gallons each) system capacity tanks should be installed. They should be so interconnected that pumps can take suction from either or both. However, a leak in one tank or its piping should not cause both tanks to drain. The main plant fire water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in a minimum of eight hours.

Common tanks are permitted for fire and sanitary or service water storage. When this is done, however, minimum fire water storage requirements should be dedicated by means of a vertical standpipe for other water services.

5.5-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (e) The fire water supply (total Comply with intent:

capacity and flow rate) should be Hydraulic calculations have been conducted to calculated on the basis of the verify that each system demand can be satisfied largest expected flow rate for a with 1) either fire pump operating or 2) the period of two hours, but not less hydraulically shortest leg of the fire protection than 300,000 gallons. This flow supply out of service. An allowance of 500 gpm rate should be based was utilized for additional hose stream use (conservatively) on 1,000 gpm for simultaneous with fixed system operation.

manual hose streams plus the greater of: In most cases, the hose stream allowance assumed a 100 gpm flow from a nearby hose (1) all sprinkler heads opened station and 400 gpm from a hydrant in the yard and flowing in the largest main. Water supply exceeds water requirements.

designed fire area; or See QDC-4100-M-0537 for specific requirements for each system.

(2) the largest open head deluge system(s) Comply:

operating. Failure of the fire protection system will not degrade the function of the ultimate heat sink.

(f) Lakes or fresh water ponds of sufficient size may qualify as sole source of water for fire protection, but require at least two intakes to the pump supply. When a common water supply is permitted for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the following conditions should also be satisfied:

(1) The additional fire protection water requirements are designed into the total storage capacity; and (2) Failure of the fire protection system should not degrade the function of the ultimate heat sink.

5.5-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (g) Outside manual hose installation Comply with intent:

should be sufficient to reach any Fire hydrant spacing is in accordance with NFPA location with an effective hose 24 and is less than 400 feet, except in the area of stream. To accomplish this, the crib house where spacing is about 500 feet.

hydrants should be installed Post indicator type valves are generally provided approximately every 250 feet on for fire hydrant laterals.

the yard main system. The lateral to each hydrant from the yard Hose houses are not used in favor of a fire main should be controlled by a truck. This truck is equipped with at least twice visually indicating or key the equipment required by NFPA 24. All fire operated (curb) valve. A hose hose threads are compatible with the local fire house, equipped with hose and department hose threads.

combination nozzle, and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, Outside Protection, should be provided as needed but at least every 1,000 feet.

Threads compatible with those used by local fire departments should be provided on all hydrants, hose couplings and standpipe risers.

E.3 Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems Comply with intent:

Automatic sprinkler system and manual hose (a) Each automatic sprinkler system stations are supplied from interior loops and and manual hose station standpipe mains. All loops and interior mains have a should have an independent minimum of two connections to the underground connection to the plant loop. No single failure will impair both primary underground water main. and backup systems.

Headers fed from each end are permitted inside buildings to Automatic sprinkler systems and standpipe supply multiple sprinkler and systems are equipped with OS&Y gate valves or standpipe systems. When other approved valves. Waterflow alarms are provided, such headers are provided for automatic sprinkler systems, but not considered an extension of the for standpipe systems.

yard main system. The header arrangement should be such that no single failure can impair both the primary and backup fire protection systems.

5.5-6

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance Each sprinkler and standpipe Special water shields or baffles are provided for system should be equipped with some safety-related equipment. A suppression OS&Y (outside screw and yoke) effects analysis was performed to ensure that gate valve, or other approved water discharge would not adversely affect safe shutoff valve, and water flow shutdown of the plant. The results of this alarm. Safety-related equipment analysis are documented in Section 4.0 of this that does not itself require report.

sprinkler water fire protection, but is subject to unacceptable damage if wetted by sprinkler water discharge should be protected by water shields or baffles.

(b) All valves in the fire water Comply:

systems should be electrically Electrical supervision is generally provided for supervised. The electrical valves controlling individual fixed extinguishing supervision signal should indicate systems. Interior and exterior sectional control in the control room and other valves are not electrically supervised. Valves are appropriate command locations in sealed or locked in the proper position and the plant (See NFPA 26, inspected quarterly. NFPA-26 was reviewed and Supervision of Valves.). deviations justified (F.P.P.D.P.).

When electrical supervision of fire protection valves is not practicable, and adequate management supervision program should be provided. Such a program should include locking valves open with strict key control; tamper-proof seals; and periodic, visual check of all valves.

(c) Automatic sprinkler systems Comply with intent:

should as a minimum conform to Fixed water extinguishing systems are installed requirements of appropriate in accordance with the appropriate NFPA standards such as NFPA 13, standards. NFPA 13 and 15 have been reviewed Standard for the Installation of and deviations justified (F.P.P.D.P.).

Sprinkler Systems, and NFPA 15, Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems.

5.5-7

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (d) Interior manual hose installation Comply with intent:

should be able to reach any Manual hose stations are not provided for cable location with at least one effective tunnel and containment drywells, however hose stream. To accomplish this, adequate hose is provided for access to these standpipes with hose connections areas.

equipped with a maximum of 75 feet of 1-1/2-inch woven Quad Cities utilizes rubber lined hose and hose jacket-lined fire hose and suitable lengths do not exceed 100 feet. A few hose nozzles should be provided in all standpipes serving multiple hose connections are buildings, including containment, less than 4-inch diameter, and several standpipes on all floors and should be spaced serving single hose connections are less than at not more than 100-foot 2-1/2-inch diameter. Calculations have been intervals. Individual standpipes done to verify the adequacy of supply from these should be of at least 4-inch smaller pipes. Other portions of the standpipe diameter for multiple hose and hose systems comply with NFPA 14, connections and 2-1/2-inch Standpipe and Hose Systems.

diameter for single hose connections. These systems Hose stations are generally located outside of should follow the requirements of unoccupied areas. Shutoff valves are provided NFPA No. 14 for sizing, spacing for all standpipes or sections of interior piping.

and pipe support requirements Additional shutoff valves are not provided for (NELPIA). areas housing safety-related equipment.

Standpipe systems are installed and tested in Hose stations should be located accordance with NFPA 14, Standpipe and Hose outside entrances to normally Systems. Cross connections to essential service unoccupied areas and inside water systems are not provided within the plant.

normally occupied areas.

Standpipes serving hose stations NFPA 14 was reviewed and deviations justified in areas housing safety-related (F.P.P.D.P.).

equipment should have shutoff valves and pressure reducing Signs are installed warning of hose station high devices (if applicable) outside the pressure.

area.

(e) The proper type of hose nozzles Comply:

to be supplied to each area should Electrically safe nozzles are provided at be based on the fire hazard locations where electrical equipment or cabling analysis. The usual combination is located.

spray/straight-stream nozzle may .

cause unacceptable mechanical damage (for 5.5-8

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance example, the delicate electronic equipment in the control room) and be unsuitable. Electronically safe nozzles should be provided at locations where electrical equipment or cabling is located.

(f) Certain fires such as those Fixed foam protection is not provided for involving flammable liquids flammable or combustible liquid hazards.

respond well to foam suppression. Portable foam extinguishers are provided to Consideration should be given to supplement manual equipment.

use of any of the available foams for such specialized protection application. These include the more common chemical and mechanical low expansion foams, high expansion foam and the relatively new aqueous film forming foam (AFFF).

E.4 Halon Suppression Systems The use of Halon fire extinguishing Comply with intent:

agents should as a minimum comply with Quad Cities utilize Halon 1301 for protection of the requirements of NFPA 12A and 12B, the records storage vault and new computer Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent room. This installation meets the requirements Systems-Halon 1301 and Halon 1211. of NFPA 12A.

Only UL or FM approved agents should be used. NFPA 12A was reviewed and deviations justified (F.P.P.D.P.).

In addition to the guidelines of NFPA Surveillance is conducted in accordance with 12A and 12B, preventative maintenance documented procedures.

and testing of the systems, including check weighing of the Halon cylinders should be done at least quarterly.

5.5-9

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance Particular consideration should also be given to:

(a) minimum required Halon concentration and soak time (b) toxicity of Halon (c) toxicity and corrosive characteristics of thermal decomposition products of Halon.

E.5 Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems The use of carbon dioxide extinguishing Partially comply:

systems should as a minimum comply Compliance with NFPA 12 is documented in the with the requirements of NFPA 12, NFPA Code Review (F.P.P.D.P.).

Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems.

Particular consideration should also be given to:

(a) Minimum required CO2 (a) NFPA 12 was used in design although concentration and soak time; installation acceptance tests were not specifically performed.

(b) toxicity of CO2; (b) All carbon dioxide systems have predischarg alarms.

(c) possibility of secondary thermal (c) Nozzles do not discharge directly on shock (cooling) damage; equipment.

(d) offsetting requirements for (d) See part (a).

venting during CO2 injection to prevent overpressurization versus sealing to prevent loss of agent; (e) design requirements from (e) See part (a).

overpressurization; and 5.5-10

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (f) possibility and probability of CO2 (f) Carbon dioxide systems are not provided systems being out of service with individual shutoff valves and are not because of personnel safety taken out of service for equipment consideration. CO2 systems are maintenance or at other times when disarmed when ever people are personnel are present.

present in an area so protected.

Areas entered frequently (even though duration time for any visit is short) have often been found with CO2 systems shut off.

E.6 Portable Extinguishers Fire extinguishers should be provided in Do not comply:

accordance with guidelines of NFPA 10 Standpipes are generally used in lieu of Class A and 10A, Portable Fire Extinguishers, extinguishers. CO2 and dry chemical portable Installation, Maintenance, and Use. Dry extinguishers are available for use on Class B chemical extinguishers should be and C hazards.

installed with due consideration given to cleanup problems after use and possible NFPA 10 and 10A were reviewed and deviations adverse effects on equipment installed in justified (F.P.P.D.P.).

the area.

5.5-11

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6 Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas 5.6.1 Primary and Secondary Containment Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.1 (a) Normal Operation Fire protection requirements for Comply with intent:

the primary and secondary Fire protection for the primary and secondary containment areas should be containment fire hazards were considered in provided on the basis of specific plant design.

identified hazards. For example:

Lubricating oil or hydraulic fluid systems for the coolant pumps Cable tray arrangements and cable penetrations Charcoal filters Fire suppression systems should Local water suppression systems are provided be provided based on the fire over specific fire hazards (i.e., HPCI room).

hazards analysis. Water suppression systems are also provided to separate fire areas as described in the Exemption Fixed fire suppression capability Requests (F.P.P.D.P.). There are no fire should be provided for hazards protection features inside primary containment.

that could jeopardize safe plant The primary containment is inerted with nitrogen shutdown. Automatic sprinklers during operation. No gaseous suppression is are preferred. An acceptable used in secondary containment.

alternate is automatic gas (Halon or CO2) for hazards identified as requiring fixed suppression protection.

The Safe Shutdown Report describes the effects An enclosure may be required to of a fire on safe plant shutdown. The Exemption confine the agent if a gas system Requests (F.P.P.D.P.) provided justification for is used. Such enclosures should not installing complete suppression.

not adversely affect safe shutdown, or other operating equipment in containment.

5.6-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance Operation of the fire protection systems should not compromise integrity of the containment or the other safety related systems. Fire protection activities in the containment areas should function in conjunction with total containment requirements such as control of contaminated liquid and gaseous release and ventilation.

Automatic fire suppression Administrative procedures and controls are capability need not be provided in enforced during refueling and maintenance the primary containment operations to control any additional hazards that atmospheres that are inerted would be introduced to the primary containment during normal operation. area.

However, special fire protection requirements during refueling and maintenance operations should be satisfied as provided below.

Fire detection systems should Automatic fire detection is provided throughout alarm and annunciate in the most areas of the reactor building (secondary control room. The type of containment). (See Section 4.0 of this report.)

detection used and the location of The Exemption Requests (F.P.P.D.P.) provide the detectors should be most justification for not installing complete fire suitable to the particular type of detection systems. Suppression or detection fire that could be expected from systems are not being installed in the primary the identified hazard. A primary containment since it is inerted during operation.

containment general area fire detection capability should be provided as backup for the above described hazard detection. To accomplish this, suitable smoke detection (e.g., visual obscuration, light scattering and particle counting) should be installed in the air recirculation system ahead of any filters.

5.6-2

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (b) Refueling and Maintenance Refueling and maintenance Comply:

operations in containment may Combustibles and ignition sources are controlled introduce additional hazards such through administrative procedures.

as contamination control materials, decontamination supplies, wood planking, temporary wiring, welding and flame cutting (with portable compressed fuel gas supply).

Possible fires would not necessarily be in the vicinity of fixed detection and suppression systems.

Management procedures and controls necessary to assure adequate fire protection are discussed in Section 3a.

In addition, manual fire fighting Hose stations and portable CO2 extinguishers are capability should be permanently located at various areas in the secondary installed in containment. containment. Sufficient hose length is provided Standpipes with hose stations, and to reach into the primary containment.

portable fire extinguishers, should be installed at strategic locations throughout containment for any required manual fire fighting operations.

Equivalent protection from portable systems should be provided if it is impractical to install standpipes with hose stations.

Adequate self-contained breathing Adequate self-contained breathing apparatus is apparatus should be provided near provided near primary containment entrances.

the containment entrances for fire fighting and damage control personnel. These units should be 5.6-3

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance independent of any breathing apparatus or air supply systems provided for general plant activities.

5.6-4

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.2 Control Room Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.2 The control room is essential to safe Comply with intent:

reactor operation. It must be protected Complete 3-hour fire barriers are provided with against disabling fire damage and should the exception of the floor between the control be separated from other areas of the plant room and the cable spread room. This floor is a by floors, walls, and roofs having 3-hour barrier except for unrated noncombustible minimum fire resistance rating of three penetration seals. The AEER, cable spread, hours. computer room and control room form one fire area. Safe shutdown for both units can be achieved independent of this fire area. See Safe Shutdown Report.

Hose stations adjacent to the control Comply:

room with portable extinguishers in the Hose stations and portable extinguishers are control room are acceptable. provided as shown on Drawing F-8-1.

Nozzles that are compatible with the Comply:

hazards and equipment in the control Appropriate nozzles are provided.

room should be provided for the manual hose station. The nozzles chosen should satisfy actual fire fighting needs, satisfy electrical safety, and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement.

Fire detection in the control room Comply with intent:

cabinets and consoles should be provided Ionization detection is provided throughout the by smoke and heat detectors in each fire control room, both above and below the false area. Alarm and annunciation should be ceiling. Fire alarms throughout the plant alarm provided in the control room. Fire alarms and annunciate in the control room.

in other parts of the plant should also be alarmed and annunciated in the control room.

5.6-5

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance Breathing apparatus for control room Comply with intent:

operators should be readily available. Breathing apparatus is available for control room Control room floors, ceiling, supporting operators. Discussion of the fire barriers is structures, and walls, including provided in the first paragraph above and Section penetrations and doors, should be 5.4(D.1.j.).

designed to a minimum fire rating of three hours. All penetration seals should be air tight.

The control room ventilation intake Comply:

should be provided with smoke detection The control room ventilation system is designed capability to alarm locally in order to as a recirculation system with the smoke allow control room personnel to detectors installed in the return air ducts. Upon manually operate ventilation dampers to detection of smoke, dampers automatically prevent smoke from entering the control reposition enabling the system to operate as a room. Manually operating venting once-through type. The ventilating system may should be available so that operators have be manually operated from the control room to the option of venting for visibility. provide a purging capability if necessary.

Cables should not be located in concealed Comply:

floor and ceiling spaces. All cables that Cabling in the control room is generally kept to a enter the control room should terminate minimum for control room operation. All cables in the control room. That is, no cabling entering the control room terminate there. There should be simply routed through the are no trenches or culverts in the control room control room from one area to another. floor.

A central console is located on a raised floor.

Power cables under the console are routed in conduit. The remaining wiring feeds the communications and computer equipment in the control room. The total amount of cable and wiring under console is minimal. The control room is continuously manned and portable fire extinguishers are kept in the control room for manual fire fighting. The addition of a Halon flooding system for this concealed floor are is not warranted.

5.6-6

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.3 Cable Room Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.3(a) (1) Automatic water system such as Comply:

closed head sprinklers, open head Wet pipe suppression is provided in the cable deluge, or open directional spray spread room.

nozzles. Deluge and open spray systems should have provisions Both divisions of cable for both units are located for manual operation at a remote in this area, however, safe shutdown for both station; however, there should units can be achieved independent of this fire also be provisions to preclude area. See Safe Shutdown Analysis and inadvertent operation. Location Exemption Requests.

of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray sizing and arrangements to assure adequate water coverage. Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting. Open head deluge and open directional spray systems should be zoned so that a single failure will not deprive the entire area of automatic fire suppression capability. The use of foam is acceptable, provided it is of a type capable of being delivered by a sprinkler or deluge system, such as an Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF).

(2) Manual hoses and portable Comply:

extinguishers should be provided Manual hoses and portable extinguishers are as backup. provided as backup. See Section 4.0.

(3) Each cable spreading room of Do not comply:

each unit should have divisional Both divisions of cable for both units are located cable separation, and be separated in this area, however, alternative shutdown from the other and the rest of the capability has been provided per provisions of plant by a minimum three-hour Appendix R. See Safe Shutdown Report.

rated fire wall (Refer to NFPA 251 5.6-7

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance or ASTM E-119 for the fire test resistance rating).

(4) At least two remote and separate Comply:

entrances are provided to the Two separate entrances are provided to the cable room for access by fire brigade spread room.

personnel; and (5) Aisle separation provided Comply with intent:

between tray stacks should be at All cable trays are accessible for manual least three feet wide and eight feet suppression.

high.

(b) For cable spreading rooms that do not Comply with intent:

provide divisional cable separation of (a) The cable spreading room is separated from all (3), in addition to meeting (a) (1), (2), other plant areas by complete three-hour barriers (4), and (5) above, the following should except for the control room above and AEER also be provided: below which are considered part of the same fire area. The cable spread room is separated from (1) Divisional cable separation the control room by a 3-hour fire barrier that has should meet the guidelines of unrated noncombustible penetration seals. Fire Regulatory Guide 1.75, Physical retardant coatings are not provided on the Independence of Electric cabling. Safe shutdown can be achieved Systems. independent of this fire area. See Safe Shutdown Report.

(2) All cabling should be covered with a suitable fire retardant coating.

(3) As an alternate to (a) (1) above, automatically initiated gas systems (Halon or CO2) may be used for primary fire suppression, provided a fixed water system is used as a backup.

(4) Plants that cannot meet the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.75, in addition to meeting (a)

(1), (2), (4), and (5) above, an auxiliary 5.6-8

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance shutdown system with all cabling independent of the cable spreading room should be provided.

5.6-9

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.4 Plant Computer Room Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.4 Safety-related computers should be The plant computers are not safety-related at separated from other areas of the plant by Quad Cities.

barriers having a minimum three-hour resistant rating. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Manual hose stations and portable water and halon fire extinguishers should be provided.

5.6-10

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.5 Switchgear Rooms Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.5 Switchgear rooms should be separated Comply with intent:

from the remainder of the plant by No switchgear rooms were provided in the minimum three-hour rated fire barriers to design of Quad Cities. Essential switchgear and the extent practicable. MCCs are located in the turbine and reactor buildings. Alternative shutdown capability has been identified in all areas containing switchgear and MCCs. See Safe Shutdown Report.

Automatic fire detection should alarm Automatic fire detection is provided in the and annunciate in the control room and vicinity of all switchgear and MCCs which alarm locally. alarms in the control room.

Fire hose stations and portable Hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are extinguishers should be readily available. provided for switchgear and MCCs.

Acceptable protection for cables that pass Not applicable (see above).

through the switchgear room is automatic water or gas agent suppression. Such automatic suppression must consider preventing unacceptable damage to electrical equipment and possible necessary containment of agent following discharge.

5.6-11

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.6 Remote Safety-Related Panels Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.6 The general area housing remote Comply with intent:

safety-related panels should be protected In general, local panels which are used for safe with automatic fire detectors that alarm shutdown are in areas that are provided with fire and annunciate in the control room. detectors and/or suppression.

Combustible materials should be controlled and limited to those required for operation. Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations should be provided.

5.6-12

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.7 Station Battery Room Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.7 Battery rooms should be protected Comply:

against fire explosions. NFPA 69 was reviewed and deviations justified (F.P.P.D.P.). Air flow alarms are provided in ventilation system to notify the control room upon loss of ventilation.

Battery rooms should be separated from Comply with intent:

each other and other areas of the plant by The battery rooms are separated from the rest of barriers having a minimum fire rating of the turbine building by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barriers, with three hours inclusive of all penetrations the exception of DC switchgear rooms below the and openings. battery rooms. The battery rooms and their respective switchgear rooms have been evaluated as one fire area and have been evaluated as one fire area and have been demonstrated to comply with the requirements of App. R (See Safe Shutdown Report).

Ventilation system in the battery rooms See the first paragraph above.

should be capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration well below 2 volume percent hydrogen concentration.

Standpipe and hose and portable Comply:

extinguishers should be provided. See F-drawings F-14-1 and F-15-1.

Alternatives: Not applicable.

(a) Provide a total fire rated barrier enclosure of the battery room complex that exceeds the fire load contained in the room.

(b) Reduce the fire load to be within the fire barrier capability of 1-1/2-hours.

(c) Provide a remote manual actuated sprinkler system in each room and provide the 1-1/2-hour fire barrier separation.

5.6-13

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.8 Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil Storage and Use Areas Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.8 A blank fire wall having a minimum Comply with intent:

resistance rating of three hours should The clean and dirty oil room has a 3-hour fire separate all areas containing rating except for two hose access hatches and is safety-related systems and equipment protected by wet pipe sprinklers. The hatches from the turbine oil system. have unrated hinged covers, however, they are of substantial construction, and therefore, a fire will When a blank wall is not present, open not spread through these hatches.

head deluge protection should be provided for the turbine oil hazards and All other areas containing oil are provided with automatic open head water curtain an automatic water protection system as protection should be provided for wall described below.

openings.

The turbines for Units 1 and 2 are equipped with separate electrohydraulic control (EHC) systems using approved fire retardant fluid. Closed head sprinkler protection is provided above the EHC units.

Bearing lift pump oil systems are located on the main turbine floor outside of the radiation shield wall. An automatic closed head water suppression system protects the bearing lift pumps.

The turbine oil reservoir tanks with a capacity of 13,000 gallons are located on the mezzanine floor of the turbine building. These tanks are protected with an automatic water spray supplemented by a ceiling-level wet pipe sprinkler system. Thermal detectors are provided for the turbine oil reservoir tanks.

The hydrogen seal oil reservoirs are protected with automatic water spray systems and the turbine bearings are protected with heat detectors and an automatic deluge system.

5.6-14

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.9 Diesel Generator Area Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.9 Diesel generators should be separated Comply with intent:

from each other and other areas of the DG cells 1 and 2 are separated and each is plant by fire barriers having a minimum enclosed with complete 3-hour rated barriers resistance rating of three hours. except for the annular spaces around the DG exhaust and air supply pipes. The DG 1/2 cell is separated from the reactor buildings by complete 3-hour barriers.

Automatic fire suppression such as AFFF Comply:

foam, or sprinklers, should be installed to An automatic total flooding CO2 system is combat any diesel generator or provided in each DG room. Manual smoke lubricating oil fires (automatic gas venting is provided by portable smoke ejectors.

systems may be used in lieu of foam or sprinklers). Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Drainage for fire fighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided.

Day tanks with total capacity up to 1100 Do not comply:

gallons are permitted in the diesel Although the day tank enclosure is masonry, it is generator area under the following not 3-hour rated. Furthermore, the room is not conditions: ventilated although the tanks are vented to outside the building. The day tank rooms are (a) The day tank is located in a considered part of the DG cell.

separate enclosure, with a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours, including doors or penetrations. These enclosures should be capable of containing the entire contents of the day tanks. The enclosure should be ventilated to avoid accumulation of oil fumes.

5.6-15

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance (b) The enclosure should be protected Comply:

by automatic fire suppression The DG day tank rooms are provided with systems such as AFFF or automatic sprinkler protection. Upon actuation sprinklers. of the CO2 system in the DG area, CO2 is discharged into the day tank rooms.

5.6-16

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.10 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.10 Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity Comply:

greater than 1100 gallons should not be Diesel fuel oil storage tanks are buried located inside the buildings containing underground, thus meeting the 3-hour fire safety-related equipment. They should separation criteria.

be located at least 50 feet from any building containing safety-related equipment, or if located within 50 feet, they should be housed in a separate building with construction having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours. Buried tanks are considered as meeting the three hour fire resistance requirements. See NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, for additional guidance.

5.6-17

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.11 Safety-Related Pumps Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.11 Pump houses and rooms housing Comply with intent:

safety-related pumps should be protected Safety-related pumps are located in the turbine by automatic sprinkler protection unless a building and reactor building.

fire hazards analysis can demonstrate that a fire will not endanger other Automatic sprinkler protection and/or detection safety-related equipment required for safe is provided as deemed appropriate by the fire plant shutdown. Early warning fire hazards analysis (see Section 4.0).

detection should be installed with alarm and annunciation locally and in the Local hose stations and portable fire control room. Local hose stations and extinguishers are provided throughout portable extinguishers should also be safety-related pump areas.

provided.

Equipment pedestals or curbs and drains Equipment pedestals, curbs and drains are should be provided to remove and direct provided to remove and direct water away from water away from safety-related safety-related equipment.

equipment.

Provisions should be made for manual Ventilation to safety-related pump areas may be control of the ventilation system to manually controlled by adjusting the balancing facilitate smoke removal if required for dampers to either reduce or increase the air flow manual fire fighting operation. rate into these areas. Exhaust from these areas is vented through the reactor building stack.

5.6-18

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.12 New Fuel Area Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.12 Hand portable extinguishers should be Partially comply:

located within this area. Also, local hose Portable fire extinguishers and local hose stations should be located outside but stations are located immediately outside of the within hose reach of this area. new fuel storage area.

Automatic fire detection should alarm Automatic fire detection is not provided for this and annunciate in the control room and area since the combustible loadings present are alarm locally. minor and would not affect any systems or equipment important to safe reactor shutdown or radioactivity control.

Combustibles should be limited to a Combustibles are limited by administrative minimum in the new fuel area. controls in the new fuel area.

The storage area should be provided with The storage area is provided with a drain to a drainage system to preclude preclude accumulation of water.

accumulation of water.

The storage configuration of new fuel The geometric configuration of the new fuel should always be so maintained as to storage racks precludes criticality for total preclude critically for any water density flooding of the storage area. Also fog nozzles that might occur during fire water are not used at any of the hose stations near the application. fuel storage area.

5.6-19

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.13 Spent Fuel Pool Area Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.13 Protection for the spent fuel pool area Partially comply:

should be provided by local hose stations Portable fire extinguishers and local hose and portable extinguishers. stations are located throughout the spent fuel pool area.

Automatic fire detection should be No automatic fire detection is provided for this provided to alarm and annunciate in the area since the combustible loadings present are control room and to alarm locally. minor and would not affect any systems or equipment important to safe reactor shutdown or radioactivity control.

5.6-20

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.14 Radwaste Building Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.14 The radwaste building should be Do not comply:

separated from other areas of the plant by The wall shared with the turbine building is fire barriers having at least three-hour constructed of unrated masonry. The safe ratings. shutdown analysis has demonstrated that a fire in the radwaste building will not prevent safe shutdown.

Automatic sprinklers should be used in No automatic sprinklers are provided based on a all areas where combustible materials are fire hazards analysis of the radwaste building.

located.

Automatic fire detection should be No detection has been provided in the Radwaste provided to annunciate an alarm in the Building, due to the low combustible leading and control room and alarm locally. minimal effect on the plant.

During a fire, the ventilation systems in these The ventilation system is independent of other areas should be capable of being isolated. plant ventilation systems and is capable of being shut down in the event of a fire and restarted for post-fire purge.

Water should drain to liquid radwaste building sumps. Water drains to the liquid radwaste building sumps.

Acceptable alternative fire protection is automatic fire detection to alarm and annunciate in the control room, in addition to manual hose stations and portable extinguishers consisting of hand held and large wheeled units.

5.6-21

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.15 Decontamination Areas Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.15 The decontamination areas should be Not applicable:

protected by automatic sprinklers if Decontamination areas are treated as part of the flammable liquids are stored. areas in which they are located. No flammable liquids are stored in these areas.

Automatic fire detection should be provided to annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm locally.

The ventilation system should be capable of being isolated.

Local hose stations and hand portable extinguishers should be provided as backup to the sprinkler system.

5.6-22

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.16 Safety-Related Water Tanks Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.16 Storage tanks that supply water for safe Comply with intent:

shutdown should be protected from the Safety-related water tanks are located outside effects of fire. and are protected from the effects of a fire by fire hydrants located in the area.

See position above.

Local hose stations and portable extinguishers should be provided.

Portable extinguishers should be located in nearby hose houses.

Major hazards such as transformers are located Combustible materials should not be within 50 feet but are protected automatic stored next to outdoor tanks. A minimum suppression.

of 50 feet of separation should be provided between outdoor tanks and combustible materials where feasible.

5.6-23

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.17 Cooling Towers Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.17 Not applicable. Quad Cities does not have cooling towers.

5.6-24

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.6.18 Miscellaneous Areas Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance F.18 Miscellaneous areas such as records Comply:

storage areas, shops, warehouses, and Miscellaneous areas are located or protected so auxiliary boiler rooms should be so as to minimize effects of a fire on any located that a fire or effects of a fire, safety-related systems and equipment. Portable including smoke, will not adversely fire extinguishers and hose stations are provided affect any safety-related systems or in the various areas.

equipment. Fuel oil tanks for auxiliary boilers should be buried or provided with dikes to contain the entire tank contents.

5.6-25

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 5.7 Special Protection Guidelines Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance G.1 Welding and Cutting, Acetylene -

Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems This equipment is used in various areas Comply with intent:

throughout the plant. Storage locations A permit system is used when welding and should be chosen to permit fire protection cutting work is being done. The bulk storage of by automatic sprinkler systems. Local this material is outdoors in designated storage hose stations and portable equipment areas under administrative procedures. Hose should be provided as backup. The stations and portable fire extinguishers are requirements of NFPA 51 and 51B are provided throughout the plant. NFPA 51 and applicable to these hazards. A permit 51B were reviewed and deviations justified system should be required to utilize this (F.P.P.D.P.).

equipment. (Also refer to 2f herein.)

G.2 Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange Resins Dry ion exchange resins should not be Comply with intent:

stored near essential safety-related Resins are temporarily stored in various systems. Dry unused resins should be locations within the turbine building away from protected by automatic wet pipe sprinkler vital equipment. Wet pipe sprinkler protection is installations. Detection by smoke and provided for major concentrations of resins heat detectors should alarm and located in the turbine building. See the NFPA annunciate in the control room and alarm 92M code review with respect to plant drainage locally. Local hose stations and portable (F.P.P.D.P.). Detection is provided in most areas extinguishers should provide backup for containing dry resin storage. A fire involving these areas. Storage areas of dry resin dry resins will not prevent achieving a safe should have curbs and drains. (Refer to shutdown.

NFPA 92M, Waterproofing and Draining of Floors.)

G.3 Hazardous Chemicals Hazardous chemicals should be stored Comply with intent:

and protected in accordance with the Hazardous chemicals are kept in proper recommendations of NFPA 49, containers in accordance with fire protection Hazardous Chemicals Data. recommendations. Ventilation and flood 5.7-1

QUAD CITIES 1&2 REVISION 23 OCTOBER 2017 Implementation or Justification for Section NRC Position Noncompliance Chemicals storage areas should be well protection are provided. NFPA 49 and 30 were ventilated and protected against flooding reviewed and deviations justified in the NFPA conditions since some chemicals may code review (F.P.P.D.P.).

react with water to produce ignition.

G.4 Materials Containing Radioactivity Materials that collect and contain Comply with intent:

radioactivity such as spent ion exchange Materials such as resins and filters which collect resins, charcoal filters, and HEPA filters and contain radioactivity are stored in controlled should be stored in closed metal tanks or areas and kept in closed containers.

containers that are located in areas free from ignition sources or combustibles.

These materials should be protected from exposure to fires in adjacent areas as well. Consideration should be given to requirements for removal of isotopic decay heat from entrained radioactive materials.

5.7-2