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{{#Wiki_filter:Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
==Title:==
10 CFR 2.206 Petition RE Vermont Yankee Docket Number:    (n/a)
Location:        (telephone conference)
Date:            Tuesday, April 12, 2011 Work Order No.:  NRC-839                          Pages 1-25 7ORIGINAL NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
.                          (202) 234-4433
1 1                      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2                  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3                                  . . . . .
4            10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 5                              CONFERENCE CALL 6                                      RE 7                              VERMONT YANKEE 8                                  . . . . .
9                                  TUESDAY 10                              APRIL 12,      2011 11 12              The conference call was held, Melanie Galloway, 13  Chairperson of the Petition Review Board,                  presiding.
14  PETITIONER:        MICHAEL MULLIGAN 15  PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS 16  MELANIE GALLOWAY,        Deputy Director, Division of License 17              Renewal,  NRR 18  JAMES KIM,        Petition Manager for 2.206 19              Petition,  NRR/Division of Operating Reactor 20              Licensing 21  ANDREA RUSSELL,        Petition Coordinator,          NRR/Division of 22              Policy and Rulemaking 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202)
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2 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF:
NANCY SALGADO,        Branch Chief,        NRR/Division of Operating Reactor Licensing NRC REGION I STAFF:
THOMAS SETZER,        Division of Reactor Projects ALSO PRESENT:
JIM DEVINCENTIS,        Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433          WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701    www.nealrg ross.com
3 1                          P RO C E E D I NG S 2                                                                      8:59 a.m.
3                    MR. KIM:      Good morning.        I'd  like to thank 4 everybody        for    attending        this    meeting.        My  name      is 5 James Kim and I'm the Vermont Yankee Project Manager.
6                    We are here today to allow the Petitioner, 7 Mr. Michael Mulligan,            to address the Petition Review 8 Board      regarding      to    2.206      petition      dated    March      25, 9 2011.
10                    I'm the Petition Manager for the petition.
11 The      Petition      Review        Board    chairperson      is    Melanie 12 Galloway.
13                    As    part    of    the    Petition    Review    Board, 14 review        of  this    petition,        Mr. Michael    Mulligan        has 15 requested this opportunity to address the PRB.
16                    This meeting          is  scheduled      from 9      to      10 17 a.m.          The  meeting        is    being    recorded      by    the      NRC 18 Operations Center and will be transcribed by a court 19 reporter.        The transcript will become a supplement to 20 the      petition.          The    transcript        will    also    be    made 21 publicly available.
22                    I'd    like      to    open    this    meeting        with 23 introductions.            As we go around the room,                please be 24 sure to clearly state your name,                        your position,          and 25 the office that you work for within the NRC for the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433              WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701          www.nealrgross.com
4 1 record.        I'll    start      off.
2                      This is        James Kim.        I'm a Project Manager 3 for the Division of Operator Reactor Licensing in NRR.
4                      MS. SALGADO:        I'm Nancy Salgado.          I'm the 5 Branch        Chief    in    the    Division        of  Operator    Reactor 6 Licensing in          NRR.
7                      MS. RUSSELL:        Andrew Russell,      Division of 8 Policy and Rulemaking 2.206,                      Division Coordinator.
9                      MS. GALLOWAY:          I'm Melanie Galloway.            I'm 10 the Deputy Director of the Division of License Renewal 11 in    NRR.
12                      MR. KIM:      At this time are there any NRC 13 participants          from the headquarters                on the phone?
14                      (No response.)
15                      Are there any NRC participants                  from the 16 Regional Office on the phone?
17                      MR. SETZER:      Yes,    hi. Good morning.        This 18 is    Tom    Setzer.          I'm a    Senior      Project    Engineer        in 19 Region I.
20                      MR. KIM:      Are there        any representatives 21 for the licensee on the phone?
22                      MR.      DEVINCENTIS:            Yes.      This    is      Jim 23 Devincentis of Entergy Nuclear Operations.
24                      MR. KIM:      Mr. Mulligan,      would you please 25 introduce yourself for the record?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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5 1                    MR. MULLIGAN:            I'm Mike Mulligan and I was 2  a    licensed      operator      at    Vermont      Yankee  and    I'm      a 3  whistleblower on a lot of issues other than nuclear 4  power,        but mainly nuclear power.
5                      MR. KIM:      Thank you.          It is  not required 6  for the members of the public to introduce themselves 7  for this call.          However,      if    there are any members of 8  the public on the phone                that wish to do          so at      this 9  time,      please state your name for the record.
10                      (No response.)
11                      Hearing none,          I'd  like to emphasize that 12  we each need to speak clearly and loudly to make sure 13  that the court reporter can accurately transcribe this 14  meeting.        If  you have something you would like to say, 15  please first          state your name for the record.
16                      For those dialing into the meeting, please 17  remember to mute your phone to minimize any background 18  noise      or distractions.            If    you  do not    have    a mute 19  button,        this can be done by pressing the keys *6                      . To 20  unmute,        press the *6      keys again.          Thank you.
21                      At this time,        I'll    turn it  over to the PRB 22  Chairperson Melanie Galloway.
23                      MS. GALLOWAY:          Good morning.      Welcome to 24  this meeting regarding the 2.206 petition submitted by 25  Mr. Mulligan.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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6 1                    I'd    like to first          share    some background 2  information on our process.                  Section 2.206 of Title X 3 of    the    Code    of    Federal      Regulations        describes          the 4 petition process,            the primary mechanism for the public 5 to request enforcement action by the NRC in                          a public 6 process.        This process permits anyone to petition NRC 7 to      take    enforcement-type            action      related      to      NRC 8 licensees        or licensed activities.                  Depending on the 9 results of its          evaluation,        NRC could modify,        suspend, 10  or    revoke    an NRC-issued          license      or  take  any other 1i  appropriate enforcement action to resolve the problem.
12                      The      NRC    staff's        guidance      for        the 13  disposition of 2.206 petition request is                      in Management 14  Directive 8.11 which is                publicly available.
15                      The purpose of today's meeting is                  to give 16  the      Petitioner,        Mr. Mulligan,        an  opportunity          to 17  provide any additional explanation or support for the 18  petition before            the Petition Review Board's                initial 19  consideration and recommendation.
20                    A few points to note:                this meeting is        not 21  a hearing,        nor is    it  an opportunity for the Petitioner 22  to question or examine                the PRB on the merits or the 23  issues        presented        in    the    petition      request.            No 24  decisions regarding the merits of this petition will 25  be made at this meeting.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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7 1                    Following        this      meeting,      however,          the 2  Petition          Review    Board    will      conduct      its      internal 3 deliberation and the outcome of this internal meeting 4  will be discussed with the Petitioner,                        Mr. Mulligan.
5  The      Petition      Review      Board      typically      consists        of    a 6 chairperson, usually a manager at the Senior Executive 7  Service level at the NRC.                  It  has a Petition Manager 8  and      PRB Coordinator.          Other members of the Board are 9  determined by the NRC staff based on the                            content of 10  the information in            the petition request.
11                      At this time,          I would      like to introduce 12  the    Board.        As  Mr. Kim    already      noted,      my name        is 13  Melanie        Galloway.        And  for this        petition,      I  am the 14  Petition Review Board Chairperson.                      Mr. Jim Kim is        the 15  Petition        Manager    for    the petition          under    discussion 16  today        and  Ms. Andrea      Russell      is    the    Office's        PRB 17  Coordinator.          Our technical staff            includes Mr.        Thomas 18  Setzer        from    NRC    Region      I's    Division        of    Reactor 19  Projects.
20                      As described in our process, the NRC staff 21  may ask clarifying questions of Mr.                      Mulligan in        order 22  to better understand his presentation and to reach a 23  reasoned        decision      whether      to  accept    or    reject        his 24  request for review under 2.206 process.
25                      At this point,          I would like to summarize NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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8 1 the scope of the petition under consideration and the 2  NRC      activities          to    date.      On    March      25,    2011,        Mr.
3  Mulligan submitted to the NRC a petition under 2.206 4  in    which      he    expressed      a  concern        on  the    following 5  nuclear plant safety systems at Vermont Yankee that he 6  described in          his petition as non-testable.                    The first 7  one is        the automatic depressurization system or ADS, 8  the main steam safety relief                    system.        The second one 9  is    the Vernon tie.              The  third is        the  service      water 10  system and RHR system tie                    and the emergency cooling 11  tower cell which is              the backup cooling system for the 12  emergency          diesel      generators.            The    fourth      is      the 13  alternate shutdown outside the control room, that is, 14  the Vernon tie            inside of the service water RHR cross-15  connect.            And    the    fifth    one    is    the    emergency        core 16  cooling system functional                  test    at every outage.
17                        In    this    petition      request,      Mr. Mulligan 18  made several requests of NRC.                    The first,        he requested 19  all    non-testable safety systems be immediately tested 20  or the plant shutdown.                  Second, Mr.      Mulligan requested 21  an outside the NRC investigation of this NRC behavior 22  for      tolerating        this      atrocious      regulatory        behavior.
23  Third, he requested that top Vermont Yankee management 24  staff      be fired and replaced before startup.                        Fourth, 25  Mr.      Mulligan        requested        that      Entergy's        corporate NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 nuclear senior staff              be fired and replaced before the 2 restart        of  the    plant.        Fifth,        he    requested          the 3 formation of a local,                public oversight panel                around 4 every        nuclear    power      plant.          Sixth,      Mr. Mulligan 5 requested an emergency NRC senior official                            oversight 6 panel with the aims of reforming the reactor oversight 7 process.            Seventh,        he    requested          a  national        NRC 8 oversight panel of outsiders to oversee and report on 9 the Agency's          activities.          And he        further      suggested 10 that there should be a mix of professional,                            academic 11 people and capable lay people.                      Eighth,      Mr. Mulligan 12 stated that there is              some heavy duty and exceedingly 13 numerous        findings      of  problems        with      Entergy      plants 14 during this inspection reporting cycle and that there 15 should be an analysis of why this is                          occurring.          And 16 last,      Mr. Mulligan requested a              list    of non-testable 17 nuclear safety systems countrywide.
18                    Not let      me summarize the NRC activities                    to 19 date.        On March 31st of 2011,            Mr.      Mulligan requested 20 an opportunity to address the Petition Review Board by 21 telephone        which is      the purpose of today's call.                        On 22 April        5th  of  2011,      the    Petition        Review    Board        met 23 internally to discuss the request for immediate action 24 of    emergency      shutdown      of    Vermont      Yankee.        The      PRB 25 denied the request for immediate action because there NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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10 1 was no immediate safety concern to the plant or to the 2 health and safety of the public.                        On April 5,          2011, 3 Mr. Mulligan was informed of the PRB's decision on the 4 immediate action.
5                    Now as a reminder for phone participants, 6 please identify yourself if                  you make any remarks,                as 7 this will help us in              the preparation of the meeting 8 transcript          that    will    be    made    publicly        available.
9 Thank you.
10                    At this point, Mr.          Mulligan,      I'll      turn it 11 over to you to allow you an opportunity to provide any 12 information that you believe the Petition Review Board 13 should consider as part of your most recent petition.
14                    Mr. Mulligan?
15                    MR. MULLIGAN:        Wow,    another chairman?              I 16 welcome that it's              the first      time the PRB,          a female, 17 was a chairman and I welcome that,                        this.      I    haven't 18 seen this before and it's                a good thing.
19                    Anyway,      non-testable          safety      system      is 20 generally        --  both systems are papier-mache                      systems.
21 They're generally systems that aren't tested to their 22 function.        They might be minimally tested.                        Parts of 23 it    might be      tested.        The    holistic        system      is  never 24 tested,        that type of thing.
25                    Like    I    said,    I've      been    saying        these NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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11 1 problems with these nuclear plants never come from a 2  tsunami      or      an  equipment        failure.        It's    a    people 3  failure.        It's    a communications failure.                We misuse 4  language.            We start        to  use  language      more    to hide 5  things than to disclose things,                      that type of thing.
6  And we get into --                it  just builds and builds and we 7  essentially start turning off safety systems,                              either 8  we      flip    a    switch      or we      use    less  quality      in      the 9  components.              And    we  essentially        turn    off    safety 10  systems one by one until we get into a lot of trouble.
11                        In  1992,      to  go back      shortly,    I    talked 12  about this in            the recent Palisades 2.206,                but I had 13  issues with fuel pool pump intermittent                            short on a 14  fuel pool pump.              They had a requirement              to shift on 15  the reactor in 30 days.                  They didn't have an on-site 16  spare for the motor and then everybody started playing 17  word games and they caution-tagged the breaker and 18  then they danger-tagged the breaker.                          And everybody 19  was afraid to call                it  in-op,    as it    was. I mean we 20  didn't have any engineering proof of the 21  uncertainty gaming I've talked about.                        We didn't have 22  any proof really of the condition of the motor.                                      I 23  mean they made assertions from --                      Vermont Yankee made 24  assertions of the conditions of the motor.                          There was 25  a short        in    it,    but they didn't have any proof that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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12 1 they      called    it    intermittent        short.        And    then      they 2 danger-tagged it,              but they wouldn't call it              in    on.
3                      And    so,    you    know,    there's      essentially 4 language games.            We play games with words and language 5 and that got me to make the complaint to the governor, 6 as I explained.                I mean they didn't have an on-site 7 motor to replace              it. And so we played around for a 8 year until finally, you know,                  I made my complaint.                We 9 got an investigation about that.
10                      Generally,      I said that Vermont Yankee was 11  heading for problems.                We're going to have an accident 12  that we're going to have a lot of equipment failures.
13  We're going to have a trip,                    a simple trip,        and we're 14  going to be confused by a set of equipment failures.
15  A year later,            I was up in      License Training,          they were 16  getting ready to take my license from me.                            And I got 17  a call and they said Mike,                  we had an accident at the 18  plant and we need you to come down for overtime.                                  And 19  that was          the accident        essentially          that  I predicted.
20  We    had    --    they    were    taking      shortcuts        out    in    the 21  switchyard.          They were trying to replace a switchyard 22  power supply and protection system batteries.                            I guess 23  they got --        had issues with the batteries and finally 24  were      forced      to    replace      them.        They    should        have 25  replaced them during the outage.                        They didn't.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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13 1                    And we're up at power and they basically 2 what ended up --        they ended up supplying --                there was 3 two sides of the safety circuits for the switchyard 4 and      they    cross-connected        them,      as    insane      at    that 5  sounds.      And then they tried to power them from one 6 charger,      from one battery charger.
7                    An  operator        disconnected          the      second 8 battery thing and of course the battery charger went 9 wild      and  the  battery      charge      in    itself      was      in    a 10 degraded state,        unknown state,          with diode problems, 11 stuff like that.            They had all sorts of warnings in 12 the past about these charges could go bad and stuff 13 like that and they never took action to correct them.
14                    I mean that's just another symptom of the 15 problem with the defective equipment and so the power 16 surge knocked out all the breakers in the switchyard.
17 There was a loss of off-site power.                      I believe it          was 18 like maybe 12 to maybe 24 hours                    later on before we 19 regained power into the plant.                  We were on the diesel 20 generators,        the diesel      generators        at    --  they had a 21 valve that was out of position.                  They discharged both 22 these generators --          they went into a common header and 23 the valve was throttled and they never thought about 24 that throttling          that valve would have consequences 25 when there was excess --            well,    excess or surface water NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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14 1 flow needed to supply the diesel generators.
2                    Mind boggling group of problems.                    Really 3 not equipment problems, but people problems and stuff, 4  like        we  all    know    besides      diesel      generators,          to 5 increase the flow of the diesel generators,                        a surface 6 water flow to diesel generators,                  we know what happened 7 if    we had a LOOP or a LOCA when we would have needed 8 torus cooling and if              there had been additional                flow 9 into that throttle            valve and stuff like that.
10                      I mean that LOOP was kind of an amazing 11  accident.        When    it    was  all    said      and  done  with,        I 12  actually talked to my friends in                  the media and Vermont 13  Yankee was playing games with disclosure of what was 14  going on.        It's    just a terrible          environment to be in 15  when everybody is          hiding stuff, and they're afraid to 16  talk about        what    the problems          and all      that  sort      of 17  stuff      and to    the    outsiders.        It's    just  a  terrible 18  environment            when        really          these      complicated 19  bureaucracies,            what      is      needed        is    accurate 20  communications and freedom to say what you want.
21                    And when it        was all        said and done,        they 22  had the state engineer in              the media talking about the 23  burning time and he was talking about oh well,                              even 24  though we had diesel generator power and if                        we didn't 25  have it,      we'd always go to the tie.                And at the time, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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15 1  the tie      was never tested.              I mean there was no testing 2  whatsoever and again,                  that was --          these systems like 3  this,      at that time was a ghost system,                          a papier-mache 4  system,      you know.            There was no proof,                evidence that 5  that      --  that        it    would    work,      that        we  would      have 6  capability to get on a tie.                      Of course at that time, 7  DBPS      owned        it,      Vermont      Yankee      and      the  dam      which 8  doesn't happen now.                  But anyway --          that's      when we all 9 became exposed to the delusional,                        these mirage systems 10  that are designed really not                      to do a function other 11  than be        talking points to people,                      favorable        to the 12  nuclear industry.
13                        And      again,    those    kind        of    systems,        you 14  know, when we talked about them to ourselves,                                we'd say 15  what are the chances of those,                      we're going to be able 16  to get that right and stuff?                      Again,        the question is, 17  well,      with the tie          working is      an issue,          but the other 18  issue is        what does it          do to everybody?                What does it 19  do the conscience of the employees when they know that 20  some of these systems,                    how we know about                operations 21  and how equipment works and stuff like that, you know.
22  And how problems get hidden inside for some and you 23  don't see them and the only way you discover them is 24  when      you    start        banging    equipment          around      and using 25  them.        And so that's            how I became aware of how we have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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16 1  these systems            that are designed            for talking points, 2  really not designed to protect the plant.
3                        The Vernon tie,            put in    new cables.        They 4  test      them a little            bit,    but again,      they really don't, 5  they don't --              the only way you really test                  it    would 6  be,      you    know,      probably        now    they    scheduled      it    and 7  nobody gets surprised like in                        an accident.        One day, 8  bang,        something          happens      and    you    know,    the    Vernon 9  station          or    distant          control    rooms      for  the    Vernon 10  station,        you know,          they get the call and it            actually 11  becomes tested.
12                        The    fire      system is      another one of these 13  ghost systems when                  you really get down to it.                  It's 14  a backup means beyond design type of thing to cool the 15  core.        And again,          you sit      there and say well,            okay, 16  another        time      turning        the  fire    system    into  an    ECCS 17  system in          the most vulnerable position the plant can 18  be in      when all        the safety systems have been stripped 19  from them and they only had one                          system left      and it 20  really        doesn't      have      the  quality      of  nuclear      safety 21  system.          It  has additional standards of quality,                        but 22  it    doesn't        meet    the      quality    of  an ECCS      system and 23  stuff.
24                        It's    just these sub-standard,              sub-quality 25  systems        that      people        should be      concerned      about.          I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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17 1 think        it's      immoral          and    stuff,        that      damages        the 2 employees in            one way.          It    damages the culture of the 3 employees and it's                  questionable whether that the RHR 4 service waters system,                    I imagine they don't --                    when I 5 was there they didn't do a real-life                                test.
6                        When      I  was  there,        they used to have              --
7 they had problems with                      --    I    forget what it        was,      the 8 inlet or outlet,                but they had --              mud would form down 9 there at the pipes and it                      was clogged for many years.
10 And it        wouldn't work,            type of thing.
11                        The RHR service water                    forced the closed 12 system and it              cools      diesel        generators        and  it    cools 13 torus      cooling,        if    necessary.            And you know,          I don't 14 think --          I just think that the public needs to have a 15 higher        level      of    quality        with      those    kind    of    backup 16 systems.            You just can't have backup systems with less 17 quality and less training and you end up --                                      you say 18 well,        I    have    all      these      backup        systems      so    all    the 19 front-line            safety systems,              you justify          well,    RHR is 20 down      today,        but        because        we    have    so    many      backup 21 systems,          it  doesn't really matter what the RHR system 22 does or defects                it    has    in    it.      It  ends up creating 23 this justification                  system where you tolerate a lot of 24 defects and you tolerate, you discover defects and you 25 make consequences to it.                      So you tolerate more defects NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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18 1  in  these complex systems.
2                        So    really      the    RHR  service    water      cross-3  connect,          why    wasn't      there      --  I    know  it    would        be 4  traumatic for the plant to actually shift                          to that, but 5  you should at least do it                    once and periodically.                You 6  say you have simulators,                  simulator testing on that and 7  everybody knows that the simulator almost sets you up 8  for a non-official environment.                        The simulator could 9 have      fidelity        issues.          There's    no  --  you    simulate 10  people running around, I imagine,                        and stuff like that, 11  but I don't think --                you don't actually test            equipment 12  and open up valves,                that are open.          You don't get that 13  time,      that real time --            it  takes so long for not being 14  able      to    run    out,    to    open    up a    valve    or    --    those 15  systems        should be automatic.                You should be able to 16  push a button,              really,      and everything aligns up in                    a 17  right way.            And you know,          the control the system like 18  that.          You    should      --    what    are    we  doing    nowadays, 19  having these backup systems that are never tested that 20  are clunky and aren't automated.                          And it    doesn't eat 21  up shift          resources.
22                        And you know,            you get      into events        --    if 23  you're in          a fire    and someplace else in            the plant and 24  then you're            going      to go on RHR,            service    water        RHR 25  cross-connect.                I mean,      how many people have you got NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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19 1 on the site?
2                    When I      made my complaint to the Vermont 3 governor,        one of the issues was I didn't think we were 4  --    with    alternate        shutdown        procedure        outside        the 5 control room,          I didn't think we could --                  that system 6 would work.            We    didn't    have      enough people.            I    was 7 thinking and I got              into that investigation                on that, 8 When I made that complaint to the governor and stuff, 9 so    I've      always    had      problems          with  this    alternate 10 shutdown        business.          I  always        thought    it    was      too 11 complicated.          Nobody ever tested it.                We got a lot of 12 panels out there,            RCIC,    locally,        and connected to the 13 release,        locally,      you know,        that sort of stuff.
14                    You know, we have the technology nowadays 15 and we should be able to --                    if    we say we're going to 16 have a safety system,                then we should be able to test 17 it.      We should be able to do that.                    And it's    more than 18 having the equipment                there.        It's    people    testing it 19 over and over again and you are getting all                            the bugs 20 out of it        and that type of thing.                So you really don't 21 end    up with very many              surprises          when  the    big    boom 22 happens,      you know.          You know what I'm saying?
23                    To get back to the Vernon tie,                    everybody 24 knows        that  last      --    the    first        time  that    I    had      a 25 petition on that,              shortly after that,              the    NRC went NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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20 1 through the alternate shutdown system and they found 2  a flaw in          the main feed pumps on that trip.                  And they 3 dinged          Vermont    Yankee      on    that.        That's    kind        of 4  surprising in this late stage of the game that the NRC 5 would        find a    flaw with all          those      extremely    trained 6 employees at Vermont                  Yankee    and all      the people with 7  the degrees and all                that sort of stuff.            You'd think 8 they'd          scrub    the        alternate        shut-down      procedure 9  perfectly clean.              You know? And there wouldn't                    be    a 10  flaw in        it  and stuff.
11                        You know,      those different things that you 12  discover, you know,              if  you're able to test          the system, 13  you can have a bunch of people on site                        and as you cool 14  down        the    reactor    and    stuff    like      that  you  get      into 15  trouble.            You got extra        people to help you out and 16  stuff, but you know,                I just think that that that's                the 17  philosophy,          the  big philosophy            in  nuclear    industry 18  where they have diverted to these ghost systems,                                  you 19  know,        that don't        really,      aren't      really    tested that 20  much and there"s not much confidence                          they will work 21  with the employees and stuff.
22                        And it's      more used to calm the public that 23  we have more than we really have type of thing.                                That 24  bothers me.
25                        Injecting        boron    into      the  vessel.          Has NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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21 1 anybody ever actually done that?                          Although that's          a --
2 has that actually shut down a large reactor?                                  I don't 3 think so.          I've never --            we've never seen the proof.
4 The F system that powers the reactor coolant valves 5 and stuff like that,                    have you ever had an actual test 6 on that of system conditions?
7                        In    9/11,      there's      all    these    systems        and 8 procedures in              9/11.      You know,      how are we to know that 9 these        are    additional            ghost    systems      or papier-mache 10  systems?          It's        done    to calm the people outside                    the 11  plant and not actually systems,                        real systems that will 12  work.        Who vets those systems?                      Who sits      there with 13  their      skeptical            eye and tries          to    find holes        in    it?
14  Those are the security issues that I've had.                                  When it 15  gets right down to it,                    you use security to hide ghost 16  systems        or      they're        used    to  carry      --  protect        the 17  public.          And that's            what it      gets down to,        you know?
18  The language gaming and the word gaming and --                                  how do 19  we know that you're not using language to con us,                                      to 20  talk      to  us?          How do      we  know    that    we're    not    using 21  security        as      another        tool    to  hide    plant      problems?
22  That's        what      it    comes      down    to.      That's    one    of    the 23  greatest          sins        I    think    you    could      commit      if      you 24  undermine        the issues around potential                      terrorism and 25  stuff like that.                  If  you use security --            we know that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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22 1  in  TVA,    up in      their refuel,          they showed us images of 2  those hoses that were connected up to --                        the header of 3  these stand-by systems and stuff.
4                        One moment,        they're      security and nobody 5  talks about it.            The next moment,          when people get into 6  trouble, when the industry has a black eye,                          everybody 7  starts        showing the stuff a year ago a super secret.
8  It  doesn't        really make        sense to me anyway.              People 9  playing around and saying they're doing one thing and 10  having --          saying they're following rules and security 11  is    a    secret,        a    responsibility.            The  next    minute 12  they're just throwing these things out to try and save 13  themselves.            It    just doesn't make sense.
14                        (Pause.)
15                      The      myth    was    that    in  old  days    as    the 16  industry was developing                  --
17                      MS. GALLOWAY:        Mr. Mulligan?
18                      MR. MULLIGAN:        Yes.
19                      MS. GALLOWAY:        Is  now an appropriate time 20  ask you        if    any    individuals        on    the  phone    have      any 21  clarifying questions of you?
22                      MR. MULLIGAN:        Can I      just have one more 23  minute?
24                      MS. GALLOWAY:        Sure.
25                      MR. MULLIGAN:          The myth was      in  the old NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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23 1  days, you know,        that the NRC controlled the utilities.
2  They used the rules              and regulations          to control          the 3 utilities,        campaign contributions,                and politics        have 4  twisted this around and so the rules and policies are 5 not there to patrol the utilities.                        They're there to 6  control the NRC and to control the NRC inspectors and 7  stuff.        So there's been a shift            with this deregulation 8 business        and  putting      the    --  making    the    inspectors 9 hamstrung        by following        the rules        and not    using the 10  rules to control the behavior of the utilities.
11                      Now I'm done.
12                      MS. GALLOWAY:        Thank you for comments, Mr.
13  Mulligan.          And at this time I'd            like to ask if        there's 14  any staff        at headquarters          that has any questions for 15  Mr. Mulligan?
16                      Seeing none,        is    there any questions from 17  our regional representative,                    Mr. Setzer?
18                      MR. SETZER:      No questions from the region, 19  thank you.
20                      MS.      GALLOWAY:              Does    the      licensee 21  representative have any questions?
22                      MR. DEVINCENTIS:            No,    Entergy      has      no 23  questions.
24                      MS. GALLOWAY:          Okay.      We didn't get          an 25  acknowledgement that were any members of the public on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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24 1 the phone,        but I am going to ask at this time if                    there 2 do happen to be any members of                        the public    they may 3 provide        comments        regarding      the      petition    and      ask 4 questions about the 2.206 petition process.                        However, 5 as noted at the beginning of the meeting,                      the purpose 6 of the meeting is              not to provide an opportunity for 7 the Petitioner or the public to question or examine 8 the Petition Review Board regarding the merits of the 9 petition request.
10                      So    are    there    any    questions    from        any 11  members of the public on the process?
12                      Hearing none,        I would like to take this 13  opportunity to thank Mr.                Mulligan for taking his time 14  to provide the NRC staff with this information on the 15  petition that's            been submitted.          And before we close, 16  does        the    court      reporter        need      any    additional 17  information for the meeting transcript?
18                      COURT REPORTER:          Hello, this is      the court 19  reporter.        I did have one question.                One of the things 20  mentioned        in    the    petition      was      the  Vernon    tie      or 21  burning tie,          what was that phrase?
22                      MS. GALLOWAY:        Vernon tie,      V-E-R-N-O-N.
23                      COURT REPORTER:          And tie,      just T-I-E?
24                      MS. GALLOWAY:        Correct.
25                      COURT    REPORTER:        Okay,    thank  you,        Ms.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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25 1  Galloway.
2                    MS. GALLOWAY:        Sure.      And with that this 3 meeting        is concluded and we will be terminating the 4 phone connection at this point and continuing with our 5 deliberations        regarding the petition as discussed at 6  the beginning of the call.
7                    Thank you all        very much.
8                    (Whereupon,      at 9:39 a.m.,        the conference 9  call was concluded.)
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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CERTIFICATE This is    to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in  the matter of:                  Vermont Yankee Name of Proceeding:          10 CFR 2.206 Petition of Michael Mulligan Docket Number:                (n/a)
Location:                    (teleconference) were      held as    herein appears,          and    that  this  is    the original transcript thereof for the file                    of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company,                    and that the transcript        is    a  true    and    accurate      record    of    the foregoing proceedings.
                                      ,K la Ga i o icialveporter Neal R. Gross & Co.,          Inc.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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Latest revision as of 08:31, 6 December 2019

Transcript of 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Vermont Yankee Conference Call, April 12, 2011, Pages 1-25
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Text

Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

10 CFR 2.206 Petition RE Vermont Yankee Docket Number: (n/a)

Location: (telephone conference)

Date: Tuesday, April 12, 2011 Work Order No.: NRC-839 Pages 1-25 7ORIGINAL NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.

Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

. (202) 234-4433

1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 . . . . .

4 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 5 CONFERENCE CALL 6 RE 7 VERMONT YANKEE 8 . . . . .

9 TUESDAY 10 APRIL 12, 2011 11 12 The conference call was held, Melanie Galloway, 13 Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding.

14 PETITIONER: MICHAEL MULLIGAN 15 PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS 16 MELANIE GALLOWAY, Deputy Director, Division of License 17 Renewal, NRR 18 JAMES KIM, Petition Manager for 2.206 19 Petition, NRR/Division of Operating Reactor 20 Licensing 21 ANDREA RUSSELL, Petition Coordinator, NRR/Division of 22 Policy and Rulemaking 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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2 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF:

NANCY SALGADO, Branch Chief, NRR/Division of Operating Reactor Licensing NRC REGION I STAFF:

THOMAS SETZER, Division of Reactor Projects ALSO PRESENT:

JIM DEVINCENTIS, Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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3 1 P RO C E E D I NG S 2 8:59 a.m.

3 MR. KIM: Good morning. I'd like to thank 4 everybody for attending this meeting. My name is 5 James Kim and I'm the Vermont Yankee Project Manager.

6 We are here today to allow the Petitioner, 7 Mr. Michael Mulligan, to address the Petition Review 8 Board regarding to 2.206 petition dated March 25, 9 2011.

10 I'm the Petition Manager for the petition.

11 The Petition Review Board chairperson is Melanie 12 Galloway.

13 As part of the Petition Review Board, 14 review of this petition, Mr. Michael Mulligan has 15 requested this opportunity to address the PRB.

16 This meeting is scheduled from 9 to 10 17 a.m. The meeting is being recorded by the NRC 18 Operations Center and will be transcribed by a court 19 reporter. The transcript will become a supplement to 20 the petition. The transcript will also be made 21 publicly available.

22 I'd like to open this meeting with 23 introductions. As we go around the room, please be 24 sure to clearly state your name, your position, and 25 the office that you work for within the NRC for the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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4 1 record. I'll start off.

2 This is James Kim. I'm a Project Manager 3 for the Division of Operator Reactor Licensing in NRR.

4 MS. SALGADO: I'm Nancy Salgado. I'm the 5 Branch Chief in the Division of Operator Reactor 6 Licensing in NRR.

7 MS. RUSSELL: Andrew Russell, Division of 8 Policy and Rulemaking 2.206, Division Coordinator.

9 MS. GALLOWAY: I'm Melanie Galloway. I'm 10 the Deputy Director of the Division of License Renewal 11 in NRR.

12 MR. KIM: At this time are there any NRC 13 participants from the headquarters on the phone?

14 (No response.)

15 Are there any NRC participants from the 16 Regional Office on the phone?

17 MR. SETZER: Yes, hi. Good morning. This 18 is Tom Setzer. I'm a Senior Project Engineer in 19 Region I.

20 MR. KIM: Are there any representatives 21 for the licensee on the phone?

22 MR. DEVINCENTIS: Yes. This is Jim 23 Devincentis of Entergy Nuclear Operations.

24 MR. KIM: Mr. Mulligan, would you please 25 introduce yourself for the record?

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5 1 MR. MULLIGAN: I'm Mike Mulligan and I was 2 a licensed operator at Vermont Yankee and I'm a 3 whistleblower on a lot of issues other than nuclear 4 power, but mainly nuclear power.

5 MR. KIM: Thank you. It is not required 6 for the members of the public to introduce themselves 7 for this call. However, if there are any members of 8 the public on the phone that wish to do so at this 9 time, please state your name for the record.

10 (No response.)

11 Hearing none, I'd like to emphasize that 12 we each need to speak clearly and loudly to make sure 13 that the court reporter can accurately transcribe this 14 meeting. If you have something you would like to say, 15 please first state your name for the record.

16 For those dialing into the meeting, please 17 remember to mute your phone to minimize any background 18 noise or distractions. If you do not have a mute 19 button, this can be done by pressing the keys *6 . To 20 unmute, press the *6 keys again. Thank you.

21 At this time, I'll turn it over to the PRB 22 Chairperson Melanie Galloway.

23 MS. GALLOWAY: Good morning. Welcome to 24 this meeting regarding the 2.206 petition submitted by 25 Mr. Mulligan.

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6 1 I'd like to first share some background 2 information on our process. Section 2.206 of Title X 3 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the 4 petition process, the primary mechanism for the public 5 to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public 6 process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC 7 to take enforcement-type action related to NRC 8 licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the 9 results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend, 10 or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any other 1i appropriate enforcement action to resolve the problem.

12 The NRC staff's guidance for the 13 disposition of 2.206 petition request is in Management 14 Directive 8.11 which is publicly available.

15 The purpose of today's meeting is to give 16 the Petitioner, Mr. Mulligan, an opportunity to 17 provide any additional explanation or support for the 18 petition before the Petition Review Board's initial 19 consideration and recommendation.

20 A few points to note: this meeting is not 21 a hearing, nor is it an opportunity for the Petitioner 22 to question or examine the PRB on the merits or the 23 issues presented in the petition request. No 24 decisions regarding the merits of this petition will 25 be made at this meeting.

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7 1 Following this meeting, however, the 2 Petition Review Board will conduct its internal 3 deliberation and the outcome of this internal meeting 4 will be discussed with the Petitioner, Mr. Mulligan.

5 The Petition Review Board typically consists of a 6 chairperson, usually a manager at the Senior Executive 7 Service level at the NRC. It has a Petition Manager 8 and PRB Coordinator. Other members of the Board are 9 determined by the NRC staff based on the content of 10 the information in the petition request.

11 At this time, I would like to introduce 12 the Board. As Mr. Kim already noted, my name is 13 Melanie Galloway. And for this petition, I am the 14 Petition Review Board Chairperson. Mr. Jim Kim is the 15 Petition Manager for the petition under discussion 16 today and Ms. Andrea Russell is the Office's PRB 17 Coordinator. Our technical staff includes Mr. Thomas 18 Setzer from NRC Region I's Division of Reactor 19 Projects.

20 As described in our process, the NRC staff 21 may ask clarifying questions of Mr. Mulligan in order 22 to better understand his presentation and to reach a 23 reasoned decision whether to accept or reject his 24 request for review under 2.206 process.

25 At this point, I would like to summarize NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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8 1 the scope of the petition under consideration and the 2 NRC activities to date. On March 25, 2011, Mr.

3 Mulligan submitted to the NRC a petition under 2.206 4 in which he expressed a concern on the following 5 nuclear plant safety systems at Vermont Yankee that he 6 described in his petition as non-testable. The first 7 one is the automatic depressurization system or ADS, 8 the main steam safety relief system. The second one 9 is the Vernon tie. The third is the service water 10 system and RHR system tie and the emergency cooling 11 tower cell which is the backup cooling system for the 12 emergency diesel generators. The fourth is the 13 alternate shutdown outside the control room, that is, 14 the Vernon tie inside of the service water RHR cross-15 connect. And the fifth one is the emergency core 16 cooling system functional test at every outage.

17 In this petition request, Mr. Mulligan 18 made several requests of NRC. The first, he requested 19 all non-testable safety systems be immediately tested 20 or the plant shutdown. Second, Mr. Mulligan requested 21 an outside the NRC investigation of this NRC behavior 22 for tolerating this atrocious regulatory behavior.

23 Third, he requested that top Vermont Yankee management 24 staff be fired and replaced before startup. Fourth, 25 Mr. Mulligan requested that Entergy's corporate NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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9 1 nuclear senior staff be fired and replaced before the 2 restart of the plant. Fifth, he requested the 3 formation of a local, public oversight panel around 4 every nuclear power plant. Sixth, Mr. Mulligan 5 requested an emergency NRC senior official oversight 6 panel with the aims of reforming the reactor oversight 7 process. Seventh, he requested a national NRC 8 oversight panel of outsiders to oversee and report on 9 the Agency's activities. And he further suggested 10 that there should be a mix of professional, academic 11 people and capable lay people. Eighth, Mr. Mulligan 12 stated that there is some heavy duty and exceedingly 13 numerous findings of problems with Entergy plants 14 during this inspection reporting cycle and that there 15 should be an analysis of why this is occurring. And 16 last, Mr. Mulligan requested a list of non-testable 17 nuclear safety systems countrywide.

18 Not let me summarize the NRC activities to 19 date. On March 31st of 2011, Mr. Mulligan requested 20 an opportunity to address the Petition Review Board by 21 telephone which is the purpose of today's call. On 22 April 5th of 2011, the Petition Review Board met 23 internally to discuss the request for immediate action 24 of emergency shutdown of Vermont Yankee. The PRB 25 denied the request for immediate action because there NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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10 1 was no immediate safety concern to the plant or to the 2 health and safety of the public. On April 5, 2011, 3 Mr. Mulligan was informed of the PRB's decision on the 4 immediate action.

5 Now as a reminder for phone participants, 6 please identify yourself if you make any remarks, as 7 this will help us in the preparation of the meeting 8 transcript that will be made publicly available.

9 Thank you.

10 At this point, Mr. Mulligan, I'll turn it 11 over to you to allow you an opportunity to provide any 12 information that you believe the Petition Review Board 13 should consider as part of your most recent petition.

14 Mr. Mulligan?

15 MR. MULLIGAN: Wow, another chairman? I 16 welcome that it's the first time the PRB, a female, 17 was a chairman and I welcome that, this. I haven't 18 seen this before and it's a good thing.

19 Anyway, non-testable safety system is 20 generally -- both systems are papier-mache systems.

21 They're generally systems that aren't tested to their 22 function. They might be minimally tested. Parts of 23 it might be tested. The holistic system is never 24 tested, that type of thing.

25 Like I said, I've been saying these NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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11 1 problems with these nuclear plants never come from a 2 tsunami or an equipment failure. It's a people 3 failure. It's a communications failure. We misuse 4 language. We start to use language more to hide 5 things than to disclose things, that type of thing.

6 And we get into -- it just builds and builds and we 7 essentially start turning off safety systems, either 8 we flip a switch or we use less quality in the 9 components. And we essentially turn off safety 10 systems one by one until we get into a lot of trouble.

11 In 1992, to go back shortly, I talked 12 about this in the recent Palisades 2.206, but I had 13 issues with fuel pool pump intermittent short on a 14 fuel pool pump. They had a requirement to shift on 15 the reactor in 30 days. They didn't have an on-site 16 spare for the motor and then everybody started playing 17 word games and they caution-tagged the breaker and 18 then they danger-tagged the breaker. And everybody 19 was afraid to call it in-op, as it was. I mean we 20 didn't have any engineering proof of the 21 uncertainty gaming I've talked about. We didn't have 22 any proof really of the condition of the motor. I 23 mean they made assertions from -- Vermont Yankee made 24 assertions of the conditions of the motor. There was 25 a short in it, but they didn't have any proof that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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12 1 they called it intermittent short. And then they 2 danger-tagged it, but they wouldn't call it in on.

3 And so, you know, there's essentially 4 language games. We play games with words and language 5 and that got me to make the complaint to the governor, 6 as I explained. I mean they didn't have an on-site 7 motor to replace it. And so we played around for a 8 year until finally, you know, I made my complaint. We 9 got an investigation about that.

10 Generally, I said that Vermont Yankee was 11 heading for problems. We're going to have an accident 12 that we're going to have a lot of equipment failures.

13 We're going to have a trip, a simple trip, and we're 14 going to be confused by a set of equipment failures.

15 A year later, I was up in License Training, they were 16 getting ready to take my license from me. And I got 17 a call and they said Mike, we had an accident at the 18 plant and we need you to come down for overtime. And 19 that was the accident essentially that I predicted.

20 We had -- they were taking shortcuts out in the 21 switchyard. They were trying to replace a switchyard 22 power supply and protection system batteries. I guess 23 they got -- had issues with the batteries and finally 24 were forced to replace them. They should have 25 replaced them during the outage. They didn't.

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13 1 And we're up at power and they basically 2 what ended up -- they ended up supplying -- there was 3 two sides of the safety circuits for the switchyard 4 and they cross-connected them, as insane at that 5 sounds. And then they tried to power them from one 6 charger, from one battery charger.

7 An operator disconnected the second 8 battery thing and of course the battery charger went 9 wild and the battery charge in itself was in a 10 degraded state, unknown state, with diode problems, 11 stuff like that. They had all sorts of warnings in 12 the past about these charges could go bad and stuff 13 like that and they never took action to correct them.

14 I mean that's just another symptom of the 15 problem with the defective equipment and so the power 16 surge knocked out all the breakers in the switchyard.

17 There was a loss of off-site power. I believe it was 18 like maybe 12 to maybe 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> later on before we 19 regained power into the plant. We were on the diesel 20 generators, the diesel generators at -- they had a 21 valve that was out of position. They discharged both 22 these generators -- they went into a common header and 23 the valve was throttled and they never thought about 24 that throttling that valve would have consequences 25 when there was excess -- well, excess or surface water NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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14 1 flow needed to supply the diesel generators.

2 Mind boggling group of problems. Really 3 not equipment problems, but people problems and stuff, 4 like we all know besides diesel generators, to 5 increase the flow of the diesel generators, a surface 6 water flow to diesel generators, we know what happened 7 if we had a LOOP or a LOCA when we would have needed 8 torus cooling and if there had been additional flow 9 into that throttle valve and stuff like that.

10 I mean that LOOP was kind of an amazing 11 accident. When it was all said and done with, I 12 actually talked to my friends in the media and Vermont 13 Yankee was playing games with disclosure of what was 14 going on. It's just a terrible environment to be in 15 when everybody is hiding stuff, and they're afraid to 16 talk about what the problems and all that sort of 17 stuff and to the outsiders. It's just a terrible 18 environment when really these complicated 19 bureaucracies, what is needed is accurate 20 communications and freedom to say what you want.

21 And when it was all said and done, they 22 had the state engineer in the media talking about the 23 burning time and he was talking about oh well, even 24 though we had diesel generator power and if we didn't 25 have it, we'd always go to the tie. And at the time, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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15 1 the tie was never tested. I mean there was no testing 2 whatsoever and again, that was -- these systems like 3 this, at that time was a ghost system, a papier-mache 4 system, you know. There was no proof, evidence that 5 that -- that it would work, that we would have 6 capability to get on a tie. Of course at that time, 7 DBPS owned it, Vermont Yankee and the dam which 8 doesn't happen now. But anyway -- that's when we all 9 became exposed to the delusional, these mirage systems 10 that are designed really not to do a function other 11 than be talking points to people, favorable to the 12 nuclear industry.

13 And again, those kind of systems, you 14 know, when we talked about them to ourselves, we'd say 15 what are the chances of those, we're going to be able 16 to get that right and stuff? Again, the question is, 17 well, with the tie working is an issue, but the other 18 issue is what does it do to everybody? What does it 19 do the conscience of the employees when they know that 20 some of these systems, how we know about operations 21 and how equipment works and stuff like that, you know.

22 And how problems get hidden inside for some and you 23 don't see them and the only way you discover them is 24 when you start banging equipment around and using 25 them. And so that's how I became aware of how we have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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16 1 these systems that are designed for talking points, 2 really not designed to protect the plant.

3 The Vernon tie, put in new cables. They 4 test them a little bit, but again, they really don't, 5 they don't -- the only way you really test it would 6 be, you know, probably now they scheduled it and 7 nobody gets surprised like in an accident. One day, 8 bang, something happens and you know, the Vernon 9 station or distant control rooms for the Vernon 10 station, you know, they get the call and it actually 11 becomes tested.

12 The fire system is another one of these 13 ghost systems when you really get down to it. It's 14 a backup means beyond design type of thing to cool the 15 core. And again, you sit there and say well, okay, 16 another time turning the fire system into an ECCS 17 system in the most vulnerable position the plant can 18 be in when all the safety systems have been stripped 19 from them and they only had one system left and it 20 really doesn't have the quality of nuclear safety 21 system. It has additional standards of quality, but 22 it doesn't meet the quality of an ECCS system and 23 stuff.

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17 1 think it's immoral and stuff, that damages the 2 employees in one way. It damages the culture of the 3 employees and it's questionable whether that the RHR 4 service waters system, I imagine they don't -- when I 5 was there they didn't do a real-life test.

6 When I was there, they used to have --

7 they had problems with -- I forget what it was, the 8 inlet or outlet, but they had -- mud would form down 9 there at the pipes and it was clogged for many years.

10 And it wouldn't work, type of thing.

11 The RHR service water forced the closed 12 system and it cools diesel generators and it cools 13 torus cooling, if necessary. And you know, I don't 14 think -- I just think that the public needs to have a 15 higher level of quality with those kind of backup 16 systems. You just can't have backup systems with less 17 quality and less training and you end up -- you say 18 well, I have all these backup systems so all the 19 front-line safety systems, you justify well, RHR is 20 down today, but because we have so many backup 21 systems, it doesn't really matter what the RHR system 22 does or defects it has in it. It ends up creating 23 this justification system where you tolerate a lot of 24 defects and you tolerate, you discover defects and you 25 make consequences to it. So you tolerate more defects NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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18 1 in these complex systems.

2 So really the RHR service water cross-3 connect, why wasn't there -- I know it would be 4 traumatic for the plant to actually shift to that, but 5 you should at least do it once and periodically. You 6 say you have simulators, simulator testing on that and 7 everybody knows that the simulator almost sets you up 8 for a non-official environment. The simulator could 9 have fidelity issues. There's no -- you simulate 10 people running around, I imagine, and stuff like that, 11 but I don't think -- you don't actually test equipment 12 and open up valves, that are open. You don't get that 13 time, that real time -- it takes so long for not being 14 able to run out, to open up a valve or -- those 15 systems should be automatic. You should be able to 16 push a button, really, and everything aligns up in a 17 right way. And you know, the control the system like 18 that. You should -- what are we doing nowadays, 19 having these backup systems that are never tested that 20 are clunky and aren't automated. And it doesn't eat 21 up shift resources.

22 And you know, you get into events -- if 23 you're in a fire and someplace else in the plant and 24 then you're going to go on RHR, service water RHR 25 cross-connect. I mean, how many people have you got NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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19 1 on the site?

2 When I made my complaint to the Vermont 3 governor, one of the issues was I didn't think we were 4 -- with alternate shutdown procedure outside the 5 control room, I didn't think we could -- that system 6 would work. We didn't have enough people. I was 7 thinking and I got into that investigation on that, 8 When I made that complaint to the governor and stuff, 9 so I've always had problems with this alternate 10 shutdown business. I always thought it was too 11 complicated. Nobody ever tested it. We got a lot of 12 panels out there, RCIC, locally, and connected to the 13 release, locally, you know, that sort of stuff.

14 You know, we have the technology nowadays 15 and we should be able to -- if we say we're going to 16 have a safety system, then we should be able to test 17 it. We should be able to do that. And it's more than 18 having the equipment there. It's people testing it 19 over and over again and you are getting all the bugs 20 out of it and that type of thing. So you really don't 21 end up with very many surprises when the big boom 22 happens, you know. You know what I'm saying?

23 To get back to the Vernon tie, everybody 24 knows that last -- the first time that I had a 25 petition on that, shortly after that, the NRC went NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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20 1 through the alternate shutdown system and they found 2 a flaw in the main feed pumps on that trip. And they 3 dinged Vermont Yankee on that. That's kind of 4 surprising in this late stage of the game that the NRC 5 would find a flaw with all those extremely trained 6 employees at Vermont Yankee and all the people with 7 the degrees and all that sort of stuff. You'd think 8 they'd scrub the alternate shut-down procedure 9 perfectly clean. You know? And there wouldn't be a 10 flaw in it and stuff.

11 You know, those different things that you 12 discover, you know, if you're able to test the system, 13 you can have a bunch of people on site and as you cool 14 down the reactor and stuff like that you get into 15 trouble. You got extra people to help you out and 16 stuff, but you know, I just think that that that's the 17 philosophy, the big philosophy in nuclear industry 18 where they have diverted to these ghost systems, you 19 know, that don't really, aren't really tested that 20 much and there"s not much confidence they will work 21 with the employees and stuff.

22 And it's more used to calm the public that 23 we have more than we really have type of thing. That 24 bothers me.

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21 1 anybody ever actually done that? Although that's a --

2 has that actually shut down a large reactor? I don't 3 think so. I've never -- we've never seen the proof.

4 The F system that powers the reactor coolant valves 5 and stuff like that, have you ever had an actual test 6 on that of system conditions?

7 In 9/11, there's all these systems and 8 procedures in 9/11. You know, how are we to know that 9 these are additional ghost systems or papier-mache 10 systems? It's done to calm the people outside the 11 plant and not actually systems, real systems that will 12 work. Who vets those systems? Who sits there with 13 their skeptical eye and tries to find holes in it?

14 Those are the security issues that I've had. When it 15 gets right down to it, you use security to hide ghost 16 systems or they're used to carry -- protect the 17 public. And that's what it gets down to, you know?

18 The language gaming and the word gaming and -- how do 19 we know that you're not using language to con us, to 20 talk to us? How do we know that we're not using 21 security as another tool to hide plant problems?

22 That's what it comes down to. That's one of the 23 greatest sins I think you could commit if you 24 undermine the issues around potential terrorism and 25 stuff like that. If you use security -- we know that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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22 1 in TVA, up in their refuel, they showed us images of 2 those hoses that were connected up to -- the header of 3 these stand-by systems and stuff.

4 One moment, they're security and nobody 5 talks about it. The next moment, when people get into 6 trouble, when the industry has a black eye, everybody 7 starts showing the stuff a year ago a super secret.

8 It doesn't really make sense to me anyway. People 9 playing around and saying they're doing one thing and 10 having -- saying they're following rules and security 11 is a secret, a responsibility. The next minute 12 they're just throwing these things out to try and save 13 themselves. It just doesn't make sense.

14 (Pause.)

15 The myth was that in old days as the 16 industry was developing --

17 MS. GALLOWAY: Mr. Mulligan?

18 MR. MULLIGAN: Yes.

19 MS. GALLOWAY: Is now an appropriate time 20 ask you if any individuals on the phone have any 21 clarifying questions of you?

22 MR. MULLIGAN: Can I just have one more 23 minute?

24 MS. GALLOWAY: Sure.

25 MR. MULLIGAN: The myth was in the old NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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23 1 days, you know, that the NRC controlled the utilities.

2 They used the rules and regulations to control the 3 utilities, campaign contributions, and politics have 4 twisted this around and so the rules and policies are 5 not there to patrol the utilities. They're there to 6 control the NRC and to control the NRC inspectors and 7 stuff. So there's been a shift with this deregulation 8 business and putting the -- making the inspectors 9 hamstrung by following the rules and not using the 10 rules to control the behavior of the utilities.

11 Now I'm done.

12 MS. GALLOWAY: Thank you for comments, Mr.

13 Mulligan. And at this time I'd like to ask if there's 14 any staff at headquarters that has any questions for 15 Mr. Mulligan?

16 Seeing none, is there any questions from 17 our regional representative, Mr. Setzer?

18 MR. SETZER: No questions from the region, 19 thank you.

20 MS. GALLOWAY: Does the licensee 21 representative have any questions?

22 MR. DEVINCENTIS: No, Entergy has no 23 questions.

24 MS. GALLOWAY: Okay. We didn't get an 25 acknowledgement that were any members of the public on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

24 1 the phone, but I am going to ask at this time if there 2 do happen to be any members of the public they may 3 provide comments regarding the petition and ask 4 questions about the 2.206 petition process. However, 5 as noted at the beginning of the meeting, the purpose 6 of the meeting is not to provide an opportunity for 7 the Petitioner or the public to question or examine 8 the Petition Review Board regarding the merits of the 9 petition request.

10 So are there any questions from any 11 members of the public on the process?

12 Hearing none, I would like to take this 13 opportunity to thank Mr. Mulligan for taking his time 14 to provide the NRC staff with this information on the 15 petition that's been submitted. And before we close, 16 does the court reporter need any additional 17 information for the meeting transcript?

18 COURT REPORTER: Hello, this is the court 19 reporter. I did have one question. One of the things 20 mentioned in the petition was the Vernon tie or 21 burning tie, what was that phrase?

22 MS. GALLOWAY: Vernon tie, V-E-R-N-O-N.

23 COURT REPORTER: And tie, just T-I-E?

24 MS. GALLOWAY: Correct.

25 COURT REPORTER: Okay, thank you, Ms.

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25 1 Galloway.

2 MS. GALLOWAY: Sure. And with that this 3 meeting is concluded and we will be terminating the 4 phone connection at this point and continuing with our 5 deliberations regarding the petition as discussed at 6 the beginning of the call.

7 Thank you all very much.

8 (Whereupon, at 9:39 a.m., the conference 9 call was concluded.)

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of: Vermont Yankee Name of Proceeding: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition of Michael Mulligan Docket Number: (n/a)

Location: (teleconference) were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

,K la Ga i o icialveporter Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.

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