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| {{#Wiki_filter:Core Damaging Events Objectives1.State how the following parameters respond to a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) following a reactor tripfrom100%power: | | {{#Wiki_filter:Core Damaging Events Objectives |
| 2 trip from 100% power:*PORV tail-pipe temperature*Reactor coolant system pressure
| | : 1. State how the following parameters respond to a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) following a reactor trip from 100% power: |
| *Pressurizer level | | * PORV tail-pipe temperature |
| *Reactor vessel level Objectives2.State the significance of superheated conditions in the reactor coolant system.3.State the key operator errors that contributed to core damage during the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. | | * Reactor coolant system pressure |
| 3 ()4.Describe the event that initiated the core damage sequence at TMI.5.Discuss industry and regulatory changes that resulted from the accident at TMI.6.Describe the differences in technology that make U.S. commercial reactors not susceptible to an event similar to the
| | * Pressurizer level |
| | * Reactor vessel level 2 |
|
| |
|
| Chernobyl accident.
| | Objectives |
| Core Damaging Events*Three Mile Island Accident 4*Chernobyl Accident BWSTOUTSIDESG"B"SG"A"CFTCFTRCPsPZRRCDT TOMAINSTEAMFROMFEEDWATERLETDOWNHEATEXCHANGERCCWRCPsREACTORHPIANDMAKEUPPUMPSMAKEUPTANKFILTERIONEXCHANGERSSCWDHRSCWREACTORBUILDINGAUXILIARYBUILDING Accident Contributors*Equipment failure *Poor design 6*Personnnel error Equipment Failure*PORV failed to close as required 7 Poor Design*PORV position indication *Poor human factors 8*No reactor vessel level indication Personnel Error*Failed to isolate the open PORVRddkfli 9*R e d uce d ma k eup fl ow i n response to PZR level Common Sense vs. Uncommon Sense*Pressurizer level*PORV tail pipe temperature 10 Plant Response to Open PORV 11 12 Industry and Regulatory Response to TMI accident*INPO*Operator training and examination
| | : 2. State the significance of superheated conditions in the reactor coolant system. |
| *EOPs 13*E-Plan
| | : 3. State the key operator errors that contributed to core damage during the Three Mile Island |
| *NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements" Chernobyl Accident 14 15 RBMK-1000*Graphite moderated*Boiling water reactor
| | ((TMI)) accident. |
| *Positivevoidcoefficient(water 16*Positive void coefficient (water is a poison)*Total power coefficient usually negative Transient*Partial loss of flow (test) with positive power coefficient*Voiding causes prompt criticality Tk11000%d 17*Two power pea k s -11 , 000% an d 47,000% of RTP*Core becomes a large burning crater
| | : 4. Describe the event that initiated the core damage sequence at TMI. |
| *30 individual fires where graphite was spewed Why this accident is not possible at U.S. reactors.*Graphite moderation (moderation continues when coolant leaves)*Positive void coefficientNtitbildi 18*N o con t a i nmen t b u ildi ng Objectives1.State how the following parameters respond to a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) following a reactor tripfrom100%power:
| | : 5. Discuss industry and regulatory changes that resulted from the accident at TMI. |
| 19 trip from 100% power:*PORV tail-pipe temperature*Reactor coolant system pressure
| | : 6. Describe the differences in technology that make U.S. commercial reactors not susceptible to an event similar to the Chernobyl accident. |
| *Pressurizer level
| | 3 |
| *Reactor vessel level Objectives2.State the significance of superheated conditions in the reactor coolant system.3.State the key operator errors that contributed to core damage during the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident.
| |
| 20 ()4.Describe the event that initiated the core damage sequence at TMI.5.Discuss industry and regulatory changes that resulted from the accident at TMI.6.Describe the differences in technology that make U.S. commercial reactors not susceptible to an event similar to the
| |
|
| |
|
| Chernobyl accident.}} | | Core Damaging Events |
| | * Three Mile Island Accident |
| | * Chernobyl Accident 4 |
| | |
| | RCDT TO PZR MAIN SG "B" SG "A" STEAM FROM FEEDWATER OUTSIDE RCPs RCPs REACTOR BWST CFT CFT LETDOWN CCW HEAT EXCHANGER REACTOR SCW BUILDING AUXILIARY BUILDING ION DHR EXCHANGERS SCW FILTER HPI AND MAKEUP MAKEUP TANK PUMPS |
| | |
| | Accident Contributors |
| | * Equipment failure |
| | * Poor design |
| | * Personnnel error 6 |
| | |
| | Equipment Failure |
| | * PORV failed to close as required 7 |
| | |
| | Poor Design |
| | * PORV position indication |
| | * Poor human factors |
| | * No reactor vessel level indication 8 |
| | |
| | Personnel Error |
| | * Failed to isolate the open PORV |
| | * Reduced R d d makeup k flflow iin response to PZR level 9 |
| | |
| | Common Sense vs. Uncommon Sense |
| | * Pressurizer level |
| | * PORV tail pipe temperature 10 |
| | |
| | Plant Response to Open PORV 11 |
| | |
| | 12 Industry and Regulatory Response to TMI accident |
| | * INPO |
| | * Operator training and examination |
| | * EOPs |
| | * E-Plan |
| | * NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements 13 |
| | |
| | Chernobyl Accident 14 |
| | |
| | 15 RBMK-1000 |
| | * Graphite moderated |
| | * Boiling water reactor |
| | * Positive void coefficient (water is a poison) |
| | * Total power coefficient usually negative 16 |
| | |
| | Transient |
| | * Partial loss of flow (test) with positive power coefficient |
| | * Voiding causes prompt criticality |
| | * Two T power peaks k - 11,000% |
| | 11 000% and d 47,000% of RTP |
| | * Core becomes a large burning crater |
| | * 30 individual fires where graphite was spewed 17 |
| | |
| | Why this accident is not possible at U.S. reactors. |
| | * Graphite moderation (moderation continues when coolant leaves) |
| | * Positive void coefficient |
| | * No N containment t i tb building ildi 18 |
| | |
| | Objectives |
| | : 1. State how the following parameters respond to a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) following a reactor trip from 100% power: |
| | * PORV tail-pipe temperature |
| | * Reactor coolant system pressure |
| | * Pressurizer level |
| | * Reactor vessel level 19 |
| | |
| | Objectives |
| | : 2. State the significance of superheated conditions in the reactor coolant system. |
| | : 3. State the key operator errors that contributed to core damage during the Three Mile Island |
| | ((TMI)) accident. |
| | : 4. Describe the event that initiated the core damage sequence at TMI. |
| | : 5. Discuss industry and regulatory changes that resulted from the accident at TMI. |
| | : 6. Describe the differences in technology that make U.S. commercial reactors not susceptible to an event similar to the Chernobyl accident. |
| | 20}} |
|
|---|
Category:Training Manual
MONTHYEARML11221A3262011-08-0101 August 2011
521- R326C B&W Tech Cross Training - Chapter 18 Three Mile Island
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ML11216A0992008-07-0101 July 2008
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2011-08-01
[Table view]
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[Table view] |
Text
Core Damaging Events Objectives
- 1. State how the following parameters respond to a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) following a reactor trip from 100% power:
- PORV tail-pipe temperature
Objectives
- 2. State the significance of superheated conditions in the reactor coolant system.
- 3. State the key operator errors that contributed to core damage during the Three Mile Island
((TMI)) accident.
- 4. Describe the event that initiated the core damage sequence at TMI.
- 5. Discuss industry and regulatory changes that resulted from the accident at TMI.
- 6. Describe the differences in technology that make U.S. commercial reactors not susceptible to an event similar to the Chernobyl accident.
3
Core Damaging Events
- Three Mile Island Accident
RCDT TO PZR MAIN SG "B" SG "A" STEAM FROM FEEDWATER OUTSIDE RCPs RCPs REACTOR BWST CFT CFT LETDOWN CCW HEAT EXCHANGER REACTOR SCW BUILDING AUXILIARY BUILDING ION DHR EXCHANGERS SCW FILTER HPI AND MAKEUP MAKEUP TANK PUMPS
Accident Contributors
Equipment Failure
- PORV failed to close as required 7
Poor Design
- No reactor vessel level indication 8
Personnel Error
- Failed to isolate the open PORV
- Reduced R d d makeup k flflow iin response to PZR level 9
Common Sense vs. Uncommon Sense
- PORV tail pipe temperature 10
Plant Response to Open PORV 11
12 Industry and Regulatory Response to TMI accident
- Operator training and examination
Chernobyl Accident 14
15 RBMK-1000
- Positive void coefficient (water is a poison)
- Total power coefficient usually negative 16
Transient
- Partial loss of flow (test) with positive power coefficient
- Voiding causes prompt criticality
- Two T power peaks k - 11,000%
11 000% and d 47,000% of RTP
- Core becomes a large burning crater
- 30 individual fires where graphite was spewed 17
Why this accident is not possible at U.S. reactors.
- Graphite moderation (moderation continues when coolant leaves)
- Positive void coefficient
- No N containment t i tb building ildi 18
Objectives
- 1. State how the following parameters respond to a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) following a reactor trip from 100% power:
- PORV tail-pipe temperature
Objectives
- 2. State the significance of superheated conditions in the reactor coolant system.
- 3. State the key operator errors that contributed to core damage during the Three Mile Island
((TMI)) accident.
- 4. Describe the event that initiated the core damage sequence at TMI.
- 5. Discuss industry and regulatory changes that resulted from the accident at TMI.
- 6. Describe the differences in technology that make U.S. commercial reactors not susceptible to an event similar to the Chernobyl accident.
20
