ML17244A555

Application for Amend to License DPR-18 to Delete Pressurizer Low Level Coincidence from Low Pressurizer Pressure Safety Injection Signal.Supporting Documentation Encl

ML17244A555
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	06/07/1979
From:	White L ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17244A554	List: ML17244A553 ML17244A555
References
NUDOCS 7906130198
Download: ML17244A555 (17)

Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of.

Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation Docket No. 50-244 (R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1)

APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT TO OPERATING LICENSE Pursuant to Section 50.90 of the regulations of the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the "Commission" ), Rochester Gas 1

and Electric Corporation ("RG&E"), holder of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-18, hereby requests that the Technical Specifica-tion Table 3.5-2 set forth in Appendix A to that license be amended in accordance with NRC Bulletin 79-06A, to delete the pressurizer low level coincidence from low pressurizer pressure Safety Injection signal.

The proposed technical'pecification change is set forth in Attachment A to this Application. A safety evaluation is set forth in Attachment B. This evaluation also demonstrates that the proposed change does not involve a significant, change in the types or a significant. increase in the amounts of effluents or any change in the authorized power level of the 'facility. Justi-fication for classification of the amendment pursuant to 10 CFR Section 170.22 is included as .Attachment C. A check for the appropriate fee accompanies this Application.

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t e WHEREFORE, Applicant respectfully requests that Appendix A to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-18 be amended in the form attached hereto as Attachment A.

Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation By L.D. W xt , Jr.

Vice President,,

Electric and Steam Production Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 7~day of June, 1979.

GARY I: s REISS IIOTARY PUBLIC, State of II. Y. Monroe Co,

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March 30, 19.g/

M Commission Expires Ir

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Attachment A Replace Technical Specification page 3.5-5 with the revised page 3.5-5.

TABIE 3.5-2 EMERGENCY COOIING 6

OPERATOR ACTION NO. of MIN. MIN. PERMISSIBIE IF CONDITIONS OF NO. of CHANNELS OPERABLE DEGREE OF . BYPASS COLR1N 3 OR 5 NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNEIS TO TRIP"'"'"'"" CHANNEIS REDUNDANCY CONDITIONS CANNOT BE MET

1. SAFETY INJECTION

a. Manual Primary pressure less Hot Shutdown"='"

than 2000 psig

b. High Containment Pressure Hot Shutdown: '

c. Steam Generator Low Steam Hot Shutdown:

Pressure/Loop -'='ot

d. Pressurizer Iow Pressure Shutdown-'='-

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY

a. Manual Hot Shutdown ='='ot

b. Hi-Hi Containment Pressure 2 sets 2of3 2 per 1/set Shutdown- "

(Containment Spray) of 3 in ea. set set Must actuate 2 switches simultaneously.

If minimum conditions are not met withn 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, steps shall be taken on the affected unit to place the unit in cold shutdown conditions.

If a 4

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functional unit is operating with the minimum operable channels the number of channels to trip the reactor will be column 3 less column 4.

Attachment B The design modification will remove the requirement for pressurizer low level coincident with pressurizer (primary system) low pressure h

for automatic Safety Injection (SI) initiation. The existing logic provides three channels with series pressure and level contacts (logical AND) as shown in Figure l. Any one of these three channels will initiate S.I. on coincident low level and low pressure in the pressurizer. Because steam voids can form during a depressurization event, sufficient primary coolant may be displaced in the reactor vessel to prevent pressurizer level from falling below the low level setpoint, thus blocking automatic initiation of Safety Injection. In accordance with NRC Bulletin 79-06A, this design modification deletes the pressurizer low level coincidence from low pressurizer pressure Safety Injection.

The modified design will initiate safety injection when any two out. of three pressurizer low pressure signals are received as shown in Figure 2.

The design modification shall conform with all applicable require-ments of IEEE Std. 279-1971. In particular Section 4.7.3 states that, "where a single random failure can cause a control system action that, results in a condition requiring protective action and can also prevent proper action of a protection system channel designed to protect against the condition, the remaining redundant, protection channels shall be capable of providing the protective action even when degraded by a second random failure." The

protective channels used in this design are also utilized to; open the pressurizer power-operated relief valves on high primary pressure. In order to assure that no single channel failure (fail high) can cause spurious open'ing of the PORV, a coincident 1

(logical AND) high pressure signal from an independent channel shall be required for PORV actuation. The permissive high pressure setpoint,.shall be set above the operating range so that, the system does not normally operate with a permissive signal present.

The control logic is shown in Figures 3(a) and 3(b) for existing and proposed setpoints.

Pressurizer spray is actuated by either channel 429 or 431.

Analyses have been performed to determine if a failure (fail high) of one of these channels, causing spurious operation of the pressurizer spray, can result in a plant condition requiring Safety Injection. This analysis shows that'he safety injection setpoint is reached in approximately three minutes. Either a pressure channel independent of the SI system shall be used for spray actuation, or the input to the SI system, now from a channel also actuating pressurizer spray (431), shall be instead supplied by a channel independent of the pressurizer spray system (449).

When any channel goes into alarm, it shall be annunciated in the Main Control Room in a manner consistent with the existing Safe-guards Systems.

The Safety Injection actuation shall be annunciated, in the Main Control Room and transmitted to the plant computer in a manner consistent with the existing Safeguards Systems.

.r l Test, switches shall be provided to provide capability for testing during power operation in accordance with Section 4.10 of IEEE 279-1971 and IEEE 338-,1977.

The purpose of this Technical Specification Change is to revise Table 3.5-2 to reflect the deletion of low pressurizer level coincidence from low pressurizer pressure SI.

The deletion of the low level coincidence from the low pressurizer pressure SI has negligible effect on the Plant Transient Analysis or the ECCS Analysis for R. E. Ginna. The analysis was done with SI initiated on coincidence of low pressurizer pressure .and level signals. The effect of changing to a pressure only signal will result in either an earlier initiation of SI, or no change in the time of SI initiation. Therefore, current Plant Transient and small break analysis assumptions concerning SI initiation time are appropriate.

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ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORA~

Pl Ll P2 L2 P3 L3 SX Figure 1 P2 P3 SX Figure 2

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ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORAT Pressurizer Relief Valve Operation 429 431 430 449 2185 2335 2335 2185 Ps3.g Ps3.g Ps3.g Ps3.g PCV 430 (Press. Relief:Valve) PCV 431 (Press. Relief Valve)

Figure 3(a)'Existing Setpoints 429 431 430 449.

2335 2335 ?335 P)3.g Ps3.g Ps3.g P s3.g PCV 430 (Press. Relief Valves) PCV 431 (Press. Relief Valve)

Figure 3(b) Modified Setpoints

Attachment B As a result of the Three Nile Nile Island accident the NRC issued IE Bulletin No.79-06A which required changes to the low pressurizer;.

pressure Safety Injection (SI) logic. Prior to the Bulletin one method of generating a SI signal was a low pressurizer pressure in coincidence with low pressurizer level. The Bulletin postulated that pressurizer level may not represent the level in the reactor coolant system under certain transient conditions. Therefore, pressurizer low level coincidence should be deleted from low pressurizer pressure SI.

The purpose of this Technical Specification Change is to revise Table 3.5-2 to reflect the deletion of low pressurizer level coincidence from low pressurizer pressure SI.

The deletion of the low level coincidence from the low pressurizer pressure SI has negligible effect. on the Plant Transient Analysis or the ECCS Analysis for R. E. Ginna. The analysis was done with SI initiated on coincidence of low pressurizer pressure and level signals. The effect of changing to a pressure only signal will result in either an earlier initiation of SI, or no change in the time of SI initiation. Therefore, current Plant Transient and small break analysis assumptions concerning SI initiation time are appropriate.

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Attachment C The proposed Amendment, to the Provisional Operating License has been evaluated and determined to fall within the definition of Class 1

III of 10 CFR Section 170.22 thereby requiring a fee of $ 4,000. The proposed amendment simply revises Table 3.5-2 for the deletion of low pressurizer level coincidence from low pressurizer pressure Safety Injection as required by IE Bulletin No.79-06A.

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