Latest revision as of 13:38, 17 March 2019

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Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 9.0, Auxiliary Systems
	ML14113A093
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	04/11/2014
From:	; Exelon Generation Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML14113A099	List: ML14113A082; ML14113A083; ML14113A084; ML14113A085; ML14113A086; ML14113A088; ML14113A089; ML14113A090; ML14113A091; ML14113A092; ML14113A093; ML14113A094; ML14113A110; ML14113A112; ML14113A114; ML14113A115; ML14113A116; ML14113A117; ML14113A118; ML14113A119; ML14113A120; ML14113A132; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Submittal of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Ufsar), Revision 20; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Appendix a; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 1.0, Introduction and General Description of Plant; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 10.0, Steam and Power Conversion; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 11.0, Radioactive Waste Management; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 13.0, Conduct of Operations; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 14.0, Initial Test Program; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 15.0, Accident Analyses; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 16.0, Technical Specifications; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 17.0, Quality Assurance; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 2.0, Figure 2.5-19., Sheet 40 Through Figure 2.5-92; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 2.0, Figures 2.1-1 Through Figure 2.5-19., Sheet 39; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 2.0, Site Characteristics; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 4.0, Reactor; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 5.0, Reactor Coolant System and Connected Systems; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 6.0, Engineered Safety Features; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 7.0, Instrumentation and Control Systems; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 8.0, Electric Power; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 9.0, Auxiliary Systems; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Chapter 9.0, Figure 9.1-1 Through Figure 9.4-1; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Table of Contents and List of Effective Pages; RS-14-128, LaSalle, Units 1 & 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Technical Requirements Manual; RS-14-128, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20, Technical Specifications Bases;
References
	RS-14-128
	Download: ML14113A093 (309)
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9.0-i REV. 19, APRIL 2012 .CHAPTER 9.0 - AUXILIARY SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

9.0 AUXILIARY

SYSTEMS 9.1-1 9.1 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING 9.1-1 9.1.1 New Fuel Storage 9.1-1 9.1.1.1 Design Bases 9.1-1 9.1.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.1-1 9.1.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.1-1 9.1.1.2 Facilities Description 9.1-1 9.1.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1-2 9.1.1.4 Testing and Inspection 9.1-4 9.1.2 Spent Fuel Storage 9.1-4 9.1.2.1 Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool 9.1-4 9.1.2.1.1 Design Bases 9.1-4 9.1.2.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.1-4 9.1.2.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.1-4 9.1.2.1.2 Facilities Description 9.1-5 9.1.2.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1-5 9.1.2.1.3.1 Rack Design 9.1-6 9.1.2.1.3.2 Criticality Control 9.1-7 9.1.2.1.3.2.1 GE 8x8 Fuel 9.1-7 9.1.2.1.3.2.2 ATRIUM-9B Fuel 9.1-7 9.1.2.1.3.2.3 GE14 Fuel 9.1-7 9.1.2.1.3.2.4 ATRIUM-10 Fuel 9.1-7 9.1.2.1.3.3 Control of Other Hazards 9.1-7 9.1.2.1.4 Testing and Inspection 9.1-9 9.1.2.1.5 Summary of Radiological Considerations 9.1-9 9.1.2.2 Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool 9.1-9 9.1.2.2.1 Design Bases 9.1-9 9.1.2.2.1.1 Safety Design Basis 9.1-9 9.1.2.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.1-10 9.1.2.2.2 Facilities Description 9.1-10 9.1.2.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1-10 9.1.2.2.3.1 Rack Design 9.1-10 9.1.2.2.3.2 Criticality Control 9.1-11 9.1.2.2.3.2.1 GE 8x8 Fuel 9.1-11 9.1.2.2.3.2.2 ATRIUM-9B Fuel 9.1-11 9.1.2.2.3.2.3 GE14 Fuel 9.1-11 9.1.2.2.3.2.4 ATRIUM-10 Fuel 9.1-11 9.1.2.2.3.3 Control of Other Hazards 9.1-11 9.1.2.2.4 Testing and Inspection 9.1-12 9.0-ia REV. 19, APRIL 2012 CHAPTER 9.0 - AUXILIARY SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.1.2.2.5 Summary of Radiological Considerations 9.1-12 9.1.2.3 Dry Cask Storage 9.1-12 9.1.3 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System (FPCCS) 9.1-12 9.1.3.1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Filters and Demineralizers 9.1-12 9.1.3.1.1 Design Bases 9.1-12 9.1.3.1.1.1 Safety Design Basis 9.1-13 9.1.3.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.1-13 9.1.3.1.2 System Description 9.1-13 9.1.3.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1-14 9.1.3.2 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 9.1-14 9.1.3.2.1 Design Bases 9.1-14 9.1.3.2.1.1 Safety Design Basis 9.1-14 9.1.3.2.2 System Description 9.1-14 9.1.3.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1-15 9.1.3.2.3.1 Introduction and Background 9.1-15 9.1.3.2.3.2 Analysis Assumptions 9.1-16 9.1.3.2.3.3 Analysis Results 9.1-17 9.1.3.2.3.4 Operational Considerations 9.1-18 9.1.3.2.3.5 Fuel Pool Cooling Used as Alternate Decay Heat Removal System 9.1-18 9.1.3.2.3.6 Fuel Pool Cooling Assist Mode, and Emergency Makeup Capabilities 9.1-19 9.1.3.3 Testing and Inspection 9.1-20 9.1.3.4 Radiological Considerations 9.1-20 9.1.4 Fuel Handling System 9.1-20 9.1.4.1 Design Bases 9.1-20 9.1.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.1-20 9.1.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.1-20

LSCS-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.0-ii REV. 19, APRIL 2012 CHAPTER 9.0 - AUXILIARY SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.1.4.2 System Description 9.1-21 9.1.4.2.1 Description of Fuel Transfer 9.1-21 9.1.4.2.1.1 Arrival of Fuel on Site 9.1-21 9.1.4.2.1.2 Refueling Procedure 9.1-21 9.1.4.2.1.3 Departure of Spent Fuel from Site 9.1-22 9.1.4.2.2 Spent Fuel Cask 9.1-23 9.1.4.2.3 Reactor Building Crane 9.1-23 9.1.4.2.3.1 Overall Safety Features 9.1-26 9.1.4.2.3.2 Mechanical Safety Features 9.1-27 9.1.4.2.3.3 Electrical Safety Features 9.1-28 9.1.4.2.4 Refueling, Pool Storage, and Servicing Equipment 9.1-29 9.1.4.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1-29 9.1.4.3.1 Spent Fuel Cask 9.1-29 9.1.4.3.2 Reactor Building Crane 9.1-29 9.1.4.3.3 Refueling, Storage, and Servicing Equipment 9.1-30 9.1.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 9.1-30 9.1.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.1-30 9.1.5 References 9.1-30

9.2 WATER

SYSTEMS 9.2-1 9.2.1 CSCS Equipment Cooling Water System 9.2-1 9.2.1.1 Design Bases 9.2-1 9.2.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-1 9.2.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-4 9.2.1.2 System Description 9.2-4 9.2.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-6 9.2.1.4 Inspection and Tests 9.2-7 9.2.1.5 Instrumentation and Control 9.2-7 9.2.2 Station Service Water System 9.2-8 9.2.2.1 Design Bases 9.2-8 9.2.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-8 9.2.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-8 9.2.2.2 System Description 9.2-9 9.2.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-11 9.2.2.4 Tests and Inspections 9.2-12 9.2.2.5 Instrumentation Application 9.2-12 9.2.3 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System 9.2-12

LSCS-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.0-iii REV. 15, APRIL 2004 9.2.3.1 Design Bases 9.2-12 9.2.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-12 9.2.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-12 9.2.3.2 System Description 9.2-13 9.2.3.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-14 9.2.3.4 Tests and Inspections 9.2-14 9.2.3.5 Instrumentation Application 9.2-14 9.2.4 Demineralized Water Makeup System 9.2-15 9.2.4.1 Design Bases 9.2-15 9.2.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-16 9.2.4.1.2 Power Generation Bases 9.2-16 9.2.4.2 System Description 9.2-18 9.2.4.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-18 9.2.4.4 Testing and Inspection 9.2-19 9.2.4.5 Instrument Application 9.2-19 9.2.5 Potable and Sanitary Water System 9.2-19 9.2.5.1 Design Bases 9.2-19 9.2.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-19 9.2.5.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-19 9.2.5.2 System Description 9.2-20 9.2.5.3 Testing and Inspection 9.2-20

9.2.6 Ultimate

Heat Sink 9.2-20 9.2.6.1 Design Bases 9.2-20 9.2.6.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-20 9.2.6.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-21 9.2.6.2 System Description 9.2-21 9.2.6.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-21 9.2.6.3.1 Worst Case Weather Situations 9.2-22 9.2.6.3.2 Ultimate Heat Sink Temperatures and Evaporation Losses During Shutdown Conditions 9.2-24 9.2.6.3.3 Plant Shutdown 9.2-25 9.2.6.3.4 Gizzard Shed Net 9.2-25 9.2.7 Cycled Condensate System 9.2-25 9.2.7.1 Design Bases 9.2-25 9.2.7.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-25 9.2.7.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-25 9.2.7.2 System Description 9.2-26 9.2.7.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-27 9.2.7.4 Testing and Inspection 9.2-28 9.2.8 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System 9.2-28 9.2.8.1 Design Bases 9.2-28 LSCS-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.0-iv REV. 15, APRIL 2004 9.2.8.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-28 9.2.8.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-28 9.2.8.2 System Description 9.2-28 9.2.8.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-30 9.2.8.4 Tests and Inspections 9.2-30 9.2.8.5 Instrumentation Application 9.2-30 9.2.9 Primary Containment Chilled Water System 9.2-30 9.2.9.1 Design Bases 9.2-31 9.2.9.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-31 9.2.9.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-31 9.2.9.2 System Description 9.2-32 9.2.9.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-32 9.2.9.4 Testing and Inspection 9.2-33 9.2.9.5 Instrumentation and Controls 9.2-33 9.2.10 Station Heating and Heat Recovery System 9.2-33 9.2.10.1 Design Bases 9.2-33 9.2.10.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-33 9.2.10.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-34 9.2.10.2 System Description 9.2-34 9.2.10.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-35 9.2.10.4 Testing and Inspection 9.2-35 9.2.11 Suppression Pool Cleanup System 9.2-36 9.2.11.1 Design Bases 9.2-36 9.2.11.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-36 9.2.11.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-36 9.2.11.2 System Description 9.2-37 9.2.11.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-37 9.2.11.4 Inspection and Testing 9.2-38 9.2.11.5 Radiological Considerations 9.2-38 9.2.12 Chemical Feed System 9.2-38

9.3 PROCESS

AUXILIARIES 9.3-1 9.3.1 Compressed Gas Systems 9.3-1 9.3.1.1 Design Bases 9.3-1 9.3.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.3-1 9.3.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.3-1 9.3.1.2 System Description 9.3-2 9.3.1.2.1 Station Air System 9.3-2 9.3.1.2.2 Drywell Pneumatic System 9.3-2 9.3.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.3-3 9.3.1.4 Testing and Inspection 9.3-4 LSCS-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.0-v REV. 13 9.3.1.5 Instrumentation Applications 9.3-4 9.3.2 Process Sampling System 9.3-5 9.3.2.1 Design Bases 9.3-5 9.3.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.3-5 9.3.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.3-5 9.3.2.2 System Description 9.3-5 9.3.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.3-6 9.3.2.4 Testing and Inspection 9.3-6 9.3.2.5 Instrumentation Application 9.3-6 9.3.3 Equipment and Floor Drainage System 9.3-7 9.3.3.1 Design Bases 9.3-7 9.3.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.3-7 9.3.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.3-7 9.3.3.2 System Description 9.3-7 9.3.3.2.1 Radioactive Equipment Drainage System 9.3-8 9.3.3.2.2 Radioactive Floor Drainage System 9.3-9 9.3.3.2.3 Provision of Spare Pumps 9.3-9 9.3.3.2.4 Miscellaneous Drainage System 9.3-9 9.3.3.3 Safety Evaluation 9.3-9 9.3.3.4 Testing and Inspection 9.3-9 9.3.3.5 Instrumentation Application 9.3-10 9.3.4 Chemical and Volume Controls System (PWRs) 9.3-10

9.3.5 Standby

Liquid Control System (BWRs) 9.3-10 9.3.5.1 Design Bases 9.3-10 9.3.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.3-10 9.3.5.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.3-11 9.3.5.2 System Description 9.3-11 9.3.5.3 Safety Evaluation 9.3-13 9.3.5.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements 9.3-15 9.3.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.3-16 9.3.6 References 9.3-16 9.4 HEATING, VENTILATION, AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS 9.4-1 9.4.1 Control Room Area Ventilation Systems 9.4-1 9.4.1.1 Control Room HVAC System 9.4-1 9.4.1.1.1 Design Bases 9.4-1 9.4.1.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-2 9.4.1.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-3 9.4.1.1.2 System Description 9.4-4 9.4.1.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-6 LSCS-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.0-vi REV. 15, APRIL 2004 9.4.1.1.4 Testing and Inspection 9.4-7 9.4.1.2 Auxiliary Electr ic Equipment Room HVAC System 9.4-8 9.4.1.2.1 Design Bases 9.4-8 9.4.1.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-8 9.4.1.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-9 9.4.1.2.2 System Description 9.4-10 9.4.1.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-12 9.4.1.2.4 Testing and Inspection 9.4-13 9.4.2 Spent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation System 9.4-14 9.4.2.1 Design Bases 9.4-14 9.4.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-14 9.4.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-15 9.4.2.2 System Description 9.4-16 9.4.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-18 9.4.2.4 Testing and Inspection 9.4-19 9.4.3 Auxiliary and Radwaste Area Ventilation Systems 9.4-20 9.4.3.1 Auxiliary Building HVAC Equipment Area Ventilation System 9.4-20 9.4.3.1.1 Design Bases 9.4-21 9.4.3.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-21 9.4.3.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-21 9.4.3.1.2 System Description 9.4-21 9.4.3.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-22 9.4.3.1.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-22 9.4.3.2 Auxiliary Building Office HVAC System 9.4-22 9.4.3.2.1 Design Bases 9.4-22 9.4.3.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-22 9.4.3.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-23 9.4.3.2.2 System Description 9.4-23 9.4.3.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-24 9.4.3.2.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-24 9.4.3.3 Auxiliary Building Laboratory HVAC System 9.4-25 9.4.3.3.1 Design Bases 9.4-25 9.4.3.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-25 9.4.3.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-25 9.4.3.3.2 System Description 9.4-25 9.4.3.3.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-27 9.4.3.3.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-27 9.4.3.4 Radwaste Area Ventilation System 9.4-27 9.4.3.4.1 Design Bases 9.4-27 LSCS-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.0-vii REV. 15, APRIL 2004 9.4.3.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-28 9.4.3.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-28 9.4.3.4.2 System Description 9.4-28 9.4.3.4.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-30 9.4.3.4.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-30 9.4.4 Turbine Building Area Ventilation System 9.4-30 9.4.4.1 Design Bases 9.4.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-30 9.4.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-31 9.4.4.2 System Description 9.4-31 9.4.4.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-33 9.4.4.4 Testing and Inspection 9.4-33 9.4.5 Engineered Safety Features Ventilation Systems 9.4-34 9.4.5.1 Diesel-Generator Facilities Ventilation System 9.4-34 9.4.5.1.1 Design Bases 9.4-34 9.4.5.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-34 9.4.5.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-34 9.4.5.1.2 System Description 9.4-35 9.4.5.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-37 9.4.5.1.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-37 9.4.5.2 Switchgear Heat Removal System 9.4-38 9.4.5.2.1 Design Bases 9.4-38 9.4.5.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-38 9.4.5.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-38 9.4.5.2.2 System Description 9.4-39 9.4.5.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-40 9.4.5.2.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-40 9.4.5.3 ECCS Equipment Areas Cooling System 9.4-40 9.4.5.3.1 Design Bases 9.4-41 9.4.5.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-41 9.4.5.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-41 9.4.5.3.2 System Description 9.4-42 9.4.5.3.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-43 9.4.5.3.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-43 9.4.6 Pump House Ventilation Systems 9.4-44 9.4.6.1 Lake Screen House Ventilation System 9.4-44 9.4.6.1.1 Design Bases 9.4-44 9.4.6.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-44 9.4.6.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-44 9.4.6.1.2 System Description 9.4-45 9.4.6.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-45 LSCS-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.0-viii REV. 15, APRIL 2004 9.4.6.1.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-46 9.4.6.2 River Screen House Ventilation System 9.4-46 9.4.6.2.1 Design Bases 9.4-46 9.4.6.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-46 9.4.6.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-46 9.4.6.2.2 System Description 9.4-46 9.4.6.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-47 9.4.6.2.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-47 9.4.7 Machine Shop Ventilation System 9.4-48 9.4.7.1 Design Bases 9.4-48 9.4.7.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-48 9.4.7.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-48 9.4.7.2 System Description 9.4-48 9.4.7.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-49 9.4.7.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-49 9.4.8 Off-Gas Building HVAC System 9.4-50 9.4.8.1 Design Bases 9.4-50 9.4.8.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-50 9.4.8.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-50 9.4.8.2 System Description 9.4-50 9.4.8.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-52 9.4.8.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-52

9.4.9 Primary

Containment HVAC System 9.4-52 9.4.9.1 Design Bases 9.4-53 9.4.9.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-53 9.4.9.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-53 9.4.9.2 System Description 9.4-53 9.4.9.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-55 9.4.9.4 Testing and Inspection 9.4-55 9.4.10 Primary Containment Purge System 9.4-56 9.4.10.1 Design Bases 9.4-56 9.4.10.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-56 9.4.10.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-57 9.4.10.2 System Description 9.4-58 9.4.10.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-59 9.4.10.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-59 9.4.11 Service Building HVAC System 9.4-59 9.4.11.1 Design Bases 9.4-59 9.4.11.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-59 9.4.11.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-60 9.4.11.2 System Description 9.4-60 9.4.11.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-62 LSCS-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.0-ix REV. 20, APRIL 2014 9.4.11.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-62 9.4.12 Service Building Storeroom Ventilation System 9.4-62 9.4.12.1 Design Bases 9.4-62 9.4.12.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-62 9.4.12.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-62 9.4.12.2 System Description 9.4-63 9.4.12.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-63 9.4.12.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-63 9.4.13 Interim Radwaste Storage Facility Ventilation System 9.4-64 9.4.13.1 Design Bases 9.4-64 9.4.13.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4-64 9.4.13.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4-64 9.4.13.2 System Description 9.4-64 9.4.13.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-65 9.4.13.4 Inspection and Testing 9.4-66

9.5 OTHER

AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5-1 9.5.1 Fire Protection System 9.5-1 9.5.1.1 Design Bases 9.5-1 9.5.1.1.1 Identification of Fires 9.5-1 9.5.1.1.2 Fire Characteristics 9.5-1 9.5.1.1.3 Facility Features 9.5-2 9.5.1.1.4 Seismic Design Criteria 9.5-5 9.5.1.1.5 Applicable Regulations, Codes, and Standards 9.5-6 9.5.1.2 System Description 9.5-6 9.5.1.2.1 General 9.5-6 9.5.1.2.2 Fire Protec tion for Areas Containing Safety-Related Equipment 9.5-9 9.5.1.2.2.1 Control Room Carpeting 9.5-11 9.5.1.2.3 Fire Protection for Power Generation Equipment Areas 9.5-12 9.5.1.2.4 Combustion and Combustion Products Control 9.5-15 9.5.1.2.5 Electrical Cable Fire Protection-System Description 9.5-15 9.5.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-18 9.5.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 9.5-19 9.5.1.5 Personnel Qualifications and Training 9.5-19 9.5.1.5.1 Design Phase Responsibility for Fire Protection 9.5-19 9.5.1.5.2 Construction Phase: Responsibilities for Fire Protection 9.5-20 LSCS-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.0-x REV. 20, APRIL 2014 9.5.1.5.3 Deleted 9.5.1.6 Other Administrative Requirements 9.5-20 9.5.2 Communication Systems 9.5-21 9.5.2.1 Deleted 9.5.2.2 System Description 9.5-21 9.5.2.2.1 Public Address System 9.5-22 9.5.2.2.2 Dial Telephone System 9.5-22 9.5.2.2.3 Deleted 9.5.2.2.4 Microwave System 9.5-22 9.5.2.2.5 Intraplant Radio System 9.5-23 9.5.2.2.6 Plant-to-Offsite Radio System 9.5-23 9.5.2.2.7 Sound-Powered Telephone System 9.5-23 9.5.2.2.8 Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) 9.5-22 9.5.2.2.9 Federal Telephone System (FTS) 9.5-23 9.5.2.3 Inspection and Testing Requirements 9.5-23 9.5.3 Lighting Systems 9.5-23 9.5.3.1 Design Bases 9.5-24 9.5.3.2 System Description 9.5-24 9.5.3.2.1 Normal Lighting System 9.5-24 9.5.3.2.2 Emergency (or Standby) Lighting 9.5-25 9.5.3.3 Reliability/Availability/Redundancy Requirements 9.5-26 9.5.4 Diesel-Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System 9.5-27 9.5.4.1 Design Bases 9.5-27 9.5.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.5-27 9.5.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.5-29 9.5.4.2 System Description 9.5-29 9.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-31 9.5.4.4 Testing and Inspection 9.5-32 9.5.4.5 Instrumentation and Controls 9.5-33 9.5.5 Diesel-Generator Cooling Water System 9.5-34 9.5.5.1 Design Bases 9.5-34 9.5.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.5-34 9.5.5.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.5-34 9.5.5.2 System Description 9.5-34 9.5.5.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-35 9.5.5.4 Testing and Inspection 9.5-36 9.5.5.5 Instrumentation and Controls 9.5-36 9.5.6 Diesel-Generator Starting Air System 9.5-36 9.5.6.1 Design Bases 9.5-36 9.5.6.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.5-36 9.5.6.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.5-37 LSCS-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 9.0-xi REV. 20, APRIL 2014 9.5.6.2 System Description 9.5-37 9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-38 9.5.6.4 Testing and Inspection 9.5-39 9.5.6.5 Instrumentation and Controls 9.5-39 9.5.7 Diesel-Generator Lubrication System 9.5-39 9.5.7.1 Design Bases 9.5-39 9.5.7.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.5-39 9.5.7.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.5-40 9.5.7.2 System Description 9.5-40 9.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-41 9.5.7.4 Instrumentation and Controls 9.5-42 9.5.7.5 Testing and Inspection 9.5-42 9.5.8 Diesel-Generator Air Intake and Exhaust System 9.5-42 9.5.8.1 Design bases 9.5-42 9.5.8.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.5-42 9.5.8.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.5-43 9.5.8.2 System Description 9.5-43 9.5.8.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-43 9.5.8.4 Testing and Inspection 9.5-44 9.5.9 Containment Inerting System 9.5-44 9.5.9.1 Design Bases 9.5-45 9.5.9.2 System Description 9.5-45 9.5.9.2.1 Cryogenic Liquid Storage Vessels 9.5-46 9.5.9.2.2 Vaporizer 9.5-47 9.5.9.2.3 Pressure - Temperature Control Manifold 9.5-47 9.5.9.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-48 9.5.9.4 Testing and Inspection 9.5-48 9.5.10 References 9.5-48

LSCS-UFSAR 9.0-xii REV. 15, APRIL 2004 CHAPTER 9.0 - AUXILIARY SYSTEMS LIST OF TABLES NUMBER TITLE 9.1-1 [Deleted] 9.1-2a [Deleted]

9.1-2b [Deleted] 9.1-3 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Related Specifications 9.1-4 Tools and Servicing Equipment 9.1-5 Fuel Grapple and Auxiliary Hoist Load Limits 9.1-6 Spent Fuel Pool Decay Heat Load Analysis Results 9.2-1 Primary Containment Chilled Water System Equipment Data 9.2-2 Station Heat Recovery System Equipment Data 9.3-1 Process Sampling System 9.3-2 Standby Liquid Control System Operating Pressure Temperature Conditions 9.4-1 Deleted 9.4-2 Control Room HVAC System Failure Analysis

9.4-3 Deleted 9.4-4 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC System Failure Analysis 9.4-5 Deleted 9.4-6 Reactor Building Ventilation System Failure Analyis 9.4-7 Deleted 9.4-8 Deleted

9.4-9 Deleted 9.4-10 Auxiliary Building Laboratory HVAC System Failure Analysis 9.4-11 Deleted 9.4-12 Radwaste Area Ventilati on System Failure Analysis 9.4-13 Deleted 9.4-14 Turbine Building Area Ventilation System Failure Analysis 9.4-15 Deleted 9.4-16 Diesel-Generator Facilities Ve ntilation System Failure Analysis 9.4-17 Deleted 9.4-18 Switchgear Heat Removal System Failure Analysis

LSCS-UFSAR LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

NUMBER TITLE 9.0-xiii REV. 14, APRIL 2002 9.4-19 Deleted 9.4-20 ECCS Equipment Areas Cooling System Failure Analysis 9.4-21 Deleted 9.4-22 Deleted 9.4-23 Deleted 9.4-24 Deleted 9.4-25 Off-Gas Building HVAC System Failure Analysis 9.4-26 Deleted 9.4-27 Primary Containment H VAC System Failure Analysis 9.4-28 Deleted 9.4-29 Primary Containment Purge System Failure Analysis

9.4-30 Deleted 9.4-31 Deleted 9.4-32 Deleted 9.5-1 Combustibles Used at the LaSalle County Station LSCS-UFSAR 9.0-xiv REV. 17, APRIL 2008 LIST OF FIGURES AND DRAWINGS FIGURES NUMBER TITLE 9.1-1 New Fuel Storage 9.1-2a Unit 1 Spent Fuel Storage 9.1-2b Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage 9.1-2c Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Plan Arrangement 9.1-2d Unit 1 Spent Fuel Storage Plan Arrangement 9.1-3 Deleted

9.1-4 Deleted 9.1-5 Deleted 9.1-6 Refueling Floor Plan 9.1-7 New Fuel Storage Vault Rack Layout 9.2-1 Capacity Curve for LSCS Ultimate Heat Sink 9.2-2 UHS Temperature Response to LOCA, Worst 31-Day Temperature Conditions 9.2-3 UHS LOCA Drawdown, Worst 30-Day Temperature Period 9.2-4 Deleted 9.2-5 Deleted 9.2-6 UHS Heat Load Following LOCA 9.2-7 Deleted 9.3-1 Sodium Pentaborate Volume Concentration Requirements

9.3-2 Saturation Temperature of Sodium Pentaborate 9.4-1 Typical Service Building HVAC System 9.5-1 Fire Protection System - General Arrangement 9.5-1a Fire Protection System 9.5-2 Deleted 9.5-3 Deleted 9.5-4 Deleted 9.5-5 Diesel-Generator Cooling Water System 9.5-6 Diesel-Generator Lube Oil System 9.5-7 Diesel-Generator Air Intake and Exhaust System

LSCS-UFSAR DRAWINGS CITED IN THIS CHAPTER*

9.0-xv REV. 14, APRIL 2002

The listed drawings are included as "Gen eral References" only; i.e., refer to the drawings to obtain additional detail or to obtain background information. These drawings are not part of the UFSAR. They are controlled by the Controlled Documents Program.

DRAWING* SUBJECT M-1 Property Plant M-2 General Site Plan M-3 Development Plan M-4 General Arrangement - Roof Plan M-5 General Arrangement - Reactor Building Floor Plans M-6 General Arrangement - Reactor Building Floor Plans M-7 General Arrangement - Main Floor Plan M-8 General Arrangement - Mezzanine Floor Plan M-9 General Arrangement - Ground Floor Plan M-10 General Arrangement - Upper Basement Floor Plan M-11 General Arrangement - Basement Floor Plan M-12 General Arrangement - Miscellaneous Floor Plan M-13 General Arrangement - Section "A-A" M-14 General Arrangement - Section "B-B" M-15 General Arrangement - Section "C-C" M-16 General Arrangement - Section "D-D" M-17 General Arrangement - Section "E-E" and "F-F" M-55 Main Steam, Unit 1 (Sheets 1-8 and 10) M-55 Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control System, Unit 1 (Sheet 9) M-57 Feedwater and Zinc, Unit 1 M-58 Condensate, Unit 1 (Sheet 1) M-58 Condensate and Condensate Booster Pump Lube Oil System, Unit 1 (Sheet 2) M-60 Condensate Polishing Demineralizer System, Unit 1 M-61 Feedwater Heater Drains Turbine Cycle M-63 Circulating Water System M-64 Lake Make-up and Blowdown System M-66 Drywell Pneumatic System M-67 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System, Unit 1 M-69 Service Water System, Unit 1 M-71 Fire Protection System - P&ID, Unit 1 M-72 Fire Protection System - P&ID M-74 Cycled Condensate Storage System, Unit 1 M-75 Clean Condensate Storage M-80 Turbine Building Equipment Drains, Unit 1 M-81 Instrument Air System LSCS-UFSAR DRAWINGS CITED IN THIS CHAPTER (Continued)

9.0-xvi REV. 14, APRIL 2002 DRAWING* SUBJECT M-82 Service Air System M-83 Diesel-Generator Starting Air System M-85 Diesel-Generator Oil System, Unit 1 M-86 Primary Containment Chilled Water System, Unit 1 M-87 CSCS - Equipment Cooling Water System, Unit 1 M-88 Off Gas System, Unit 1 M-90 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System, Unit 1 M-91 Reactor Building Equipment Drains, Unit 1 M-92 Primary Containment Vent & Purge, Unit 1 M-92 FD Primary Containment Vent & Purge Flow Diagram M-93 Nuclear Boiler & Reactor Recirculating System, Unit 1 M-96 Suppression Pool Cleanup and Transfer System, Unit 1 M-97 Reactor Water Cleanup System, Unit 1 M-98 Fuel Pool Cooling Filter and Demineralizing System, Unit 1 M-99 Standby Liquid Control System P&ID, Unit 1 M-102 Station Heat Recovery System M-103 P&ID Radwaste Waste Proces sing Subsystem (Sheet 2-5) M-103 P&ID Radwaste Floor Drain Subsystem (6-9) M-103 P&ID Radwaste Floor Drain Subsystem (Sheets 10 and 11) M-103 P&ID Radwaste Laundry Subsystem (Sheet 17) M-103 P&ID Radwaste Filter System (Sheet 18) M-103 P&ID Radwaste Chemical Waste Subsystem (Sheets 19-21) M-104 Reactor Building Floor Drains, Unit 1 M-105 Auxiliary Building Floor Drains, Unit 1 M-106 Turbine Building Floor Drains, Unit 1 M-107 Radwaste Area Floor Drains M-109 Miscellaneous Building Drains M-115 Process Sampling System, Unit 1 M-124 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System, Unit 2 M-126 Fire Protection System - P&ID, Unit 2 M-127 Cycled Condensate Storage System, Unit 2 M-128 Turbine Building Equipment Drains, Unit 2 M-132 Diesel-Generator Oil System, Unit 2 M-133 Primary Containment Chilled Water System, Unit 2 M-134 CSCS - Equipment Cooling Water System, Unit 2 M-136 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System, Unit 2 M-137 Reactor Building Equipment Drains, Unit 2 M-138 Primary Containment Vent & Purge, Unit 2 M-139 Nuclear Boiler & Reactor Recirculating System, Unit 2 M-142 Suppression Pool Cleanup and Transfer System, Unit 2 M-143 Reactor Water Cleanup System, Unit 2 M-144 Fuel Pool Cooling Filter and Demineralizing System, Unit 2 M-145 Standby Liquid Control System P&ID, Unit 2 LSCS-UFSAR DRAWINGS CITED IN THIS CHAPTER*

9.0-xvii REV. 14, APRIL 2002 DRAWING* SUBJECT M-149 Reactor Building Floor Drains, Unit 2 M-150 Auxiliary Building Floor Drains, Unit 2 M-151 Turbine Building Floor Drains, Unit 2 M-159 Process Sampling System, Unit 2 M-737 Interim Radwaste Storage Facility Flow Diagrams and Schedules, Units 1 & 2 M-1442 Auxiliary Building Office HVAC System M-1443 Control Room HVAC System (Sheets 1 & 2) M-1443 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC System (Sheets 3 & 4) M-1444 Diesel-Generator Facilities Ventilation System M-1445 Diesel-Generator Facilities Ventilation System, Unit 1 M-1446 Diesel-Generator Facilities Ventilation System, Unit 2 M-1447 Diesel-Generator Facilities Ventilation System, Unit 2 M-1448 River Screen House Ventilation System M-1449 Lake Screen House Ventilation System M-1450 Machine Shop Ventilation System M-1451 Auxiliary Building Laboratory HVAC System M-1452 Off-Gas Building HVAC System M-1453 Primary Containment HVAC System, Unit 1 M-1454 Primary Containment HVAC System, Unit 2 M-1455 Reactor Building Ventilation System, Unit 1 M-1456 Reactor Building Ventilation System, Unit 2 M-1459 Turbine Building Area Ventilation System, Unit 1 M-1460 Turbine Building Area Ventilation System, Unit 2 M-1461 Radwaste Area Ventilation System M-1462 Switchgear Heat Removal System, Unit 1 M-1463 Switchgear Heat Removal System, Unit 2 M-1464 CSCS Equipment Areas Cooling Systems, Unit 1 M-1465 CSCS Equipment Areas Cooling Systems, Unit 2 M-1466 Primary Containment Vent & Purge M-1467 Auxiliary Building HVAC Equipment Area Ventilation System M-1468 Control Room HVAC System (Sheets 3 & 4) M-1468 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC System (Sheets 5 & 6) M-1468 Auxiliary Building Office HVAC System (Sheet 1) M-1468 Auxiliary Building Laborato ry HVAC System (Sheet 2) M-1468 Off-Gas Building HVAC System M-1468 Service Building HVAC System (Sheets 7 & 8) M-1469 Service Building HVAC System (Sheet 3)

M-2085 Diesel-Generator Oil System, Unit 1 M-2132 Diesel-Generator Oil System, Unit 2 M-3443 Control Room HVAC System (Sheets 1-19; 30-31) M-3443 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC System (Sheets 20-29) M-3444 Diesel-Generator Facilities Ventilation System LSCS-UFSAR DRAWINGS CITED IN THIS CHAPTER*

9.0-xviii REV. 14, APRIL 2002 DRAWING* SUBJECT M-3445 Diesel-Generator Facilities Ventilation System, Unit 1 M-3446 Diesel-Generator Facilities Ventilation System, Unit 2 M-3447 Diesel-Generator Facilities Ventilation System, Unit 2 M-3462 Switchgear Heat Removal System, Unit 1 M-3463 Switchgear Heat Removal System, Unit 2 M-3464 ECCS Equipment Areas Cooling Systems, Unit 1 M-3465 ECCS Equipment Areas Cooling Systems, Unit 2

LSCS-UFSAR TABLE 9.2-1 TABLE 9.2-1 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CHILLED WATER SYSTEM EQUIPMENT DATA EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTIY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY A. Water Chillers Equipment Numbers 1VP01CA 2VP01CA 1VP01CB 2VP01CB Type Motor-driven, Centrifugal Quantity 2 2 Capacity (tons of refrigeration) 550

B. Chilled Water Pumps

Equipment Numbers

Type IVP01PA 2VP01PA 1VP01PB 2VP01PB Centrifugal, Horizontal Quantity 2 2 Capacity (gpm) 1,300 1,300 Head (ft H 2O) 154 154

C. Secondary Condenser 1VP04AA 2VP04AA 1VP04AB 2VP04AB Type Min. 40% by wt. Glycol Solution Quantity 2 2 Flow Rate (gpm) 950 950 Pressure Drop (ft, water) 27 27 Total Heat Removal (Btu/hr) 8.4x10 6 8.4x10 6 D. Water Chillers Equipment Numbers 1VP14S 2VP14S Type Motor-driven, Centrifugal Quantity 1 1 Capacity (tons of refrigeration) 400 400 LSCS-UFSAR TABLE 9.2-2 (SHEET 1 OF 3) TABLE 9.2-2 REV. 13 STATION HEAT RECOVERY SYSTEM EQUIPMENT DATA NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY

1. Heat Recovery Pumps OSHO1PA OSHO1PB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Capacity (gpm) 2,800 Pump Head (ft water) 240 Motor (hp) 300

2. Primary Containment Chiller Secondary Condenser 1VPO4AA 2VPO4AA 1VPO4AB 2VPO4AB See Table 9.2-1 Secondary Condenser

3. Turbine Building Ventilation Supply System Heating Coils 1VTO2AA 2VTO2AA 1VTO2AB 2VTO2AB See Table 9.4-13 Supply Air Heat Recovery Coils

4. Reactor Building Ventilation Supply System Heating Coils 1VRO2A 2VRO2A See Table 9.4-5 Supply Air Heat Recovery Coils

5. Radwaste Building Ventilation Supply System Heating Coils OVWO3A See Table 9.4-11 Supply Air Heat Recovery Coil

6. Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust System Heat Extraction System Coil OVWO4A See Table 9.4-11 Exhaust Air Heat Recovery Coil

7. Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust System Heat Extraction Coils 1VTO4A 2VTO4A See Table 9.4-13 Exhaust Air Heat Recovery Coils

LSCS-UFSAR TABLE 9.2-2 (SHEET 2 OF 3)

TABLE 9.2-2 REV. 13 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY

8. Switchgear Ventilation Exhaust System Heat Extraction Coils 1VXO1A 2VXO1A See Table 9.4-17 Heat Recovery Coil

9. Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust System Heat Extraction

Coils 1VRO4A 2VRO4A See Table 9.4-5 Exhaust Air Heat Recovery Coil

10. Glycol Electric Boilers OSHO1BA OSHO1BB Type Min. 40% by wt. Glycol Solution Quantity 2 Heating Capacity (kW) 1,000 Flow Rate (gpm) 1,300

11. Makeup Tank Pump OSHO2P Type Centrifugal Quantity 1 Capacity (gpm) 100 Pump Head (ft, water) 35 Motor (hp) 3

12. Fill Pump OSHO3P Type Centrifugal Quantity 1 Capacity (gpm) 100 Pump Head (ft, water) 175 Motor (hp) 15

LSCS-UFSAR TABLE 9.2-2 (SHEET 3 OF 3)

TABLE 9.2-2 REV. 13

13. Cooling Water Chillers 0SH01CA to CG Type Air Cooled Water Chiller Capacity (tons) 380

14. Primary Cooling Water Pump 0SH19PA to PG Type Centrifugal Quantity 1 per chiller Capacity (gpm) 690 Pump Head (ft, water) 50 Motor (hp) 15

15. Secondary Cooling Water Pump 0SH20PA to PC Type Centrifugal Capacity (gpm) 1300 Pump Head (ft, water) 220 Motor (hp) 150

16. Makeup Tank Pump 0SH18P Type Centrifugal Quantity 1 Capacity (gpm) 50 Pump Head (ft, water) 53 Motor (hp) 2

LSCS-UFSAR TABLE 9.3-1 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 TABLE 9.3-1 (SHEET 1 OF 6) PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM (Reactor Building Samples)

MAXIMUM OPER COND P&ID UNIT 1 UNIT # 1 SAMPLE NO. UNIT # 2 SAMPLE NO. SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION PRESS PSIA TEMP. F NO SAMPLEPOINTS UNIT 2 NO OF SAMPLE PUMPS REQ'D SAMPLE LINE SIZE IN. UNIT 1 SAMPLE LINE LENGTH FT. UNIT 2 SAMPLE LINE LENGTH FT. CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25

°C CATION CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25

°C PH @ 25°C DISSOLVED OXYGEN ppb SILICA ppb TURBIDITYPpb DISSOLVEDSOLIDS TEMPERATURE TYPE RTD/TC RANGE RADIATION MONITOR POTENTIAL RADIATION ACTIVITY MAX (NOTE 3) REMARKS M-93-2 1A1 2A1 REACTOR WATER 1260 550 1 M-139-2

1/2 SS TUBE 959LS 130

RANGE 0-10 1CE-PS020 *

DO Range 0.1-400 1AE- PS058A DH Range 0-2 ppm 1AE-PS058B

* * *

H Sample line size applies only to tubing downstream of outboard isolation valves M-97-1 1A2 2A2 REACTOR WATER CLEAN UP SYSTEM INLET HEADER 1180 120 1 M-143-1

1/2 SS TUBE 959LS 140

RANGE 0-10 1CE-PS021

DO Range 0.1-400 1AE-PS057A DH Range 0-2 ppm 1AE-PS057B

* * *

H Sample line size applies only to tubing downstream of outboard isolation valves

REACTOR WATER CLEAN UP PUMP COMMON DISCHARGE HEADER 1205 550 1 M-97-1 M-143-1

3/4 SCH. 160 PIPE 35 * * * * * * * ** *

H Periodic metal coupon sample for noble metal compound content M-97-1 1A3-1 1A3-2 1A3-3 2A3-1 2A3-2 2A3-3 REACTOR WATER CLEAN UP DEMINERLIZERS 1A, 1B & 1C DISCHARGE 1145 120 3 M-143-1

1/2 SS TUBE 959LS~ 144 164 180

RANGE 0-1.0 1CE-PS022,23,24

* * * * *

H Sample line size applies only to tubing downstream of outboard isolation valves M-69-1 1A4 2A4 SERVICE WATER, FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET 120 130 1

3/8 109 * * * * * * * * *

B GRAB SAMPLE ONLY M-69-1 1A5 2A5 SEVICE WATER, FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET 120 130 1

3/8 208 * * * * * * * * *

B GRAB SAMPLE ONLY M-90-1 1A6 2A6 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER 100 140 1

3/8 29 * * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY M-96-4 1A7-1 1A7-2 2A7-1 2A7-2 RHR HEAT EXCHANGERS 1A & 1B OUTLETS 500 253 2

3/8 294 188 * * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY M-90-1 1A8 2A8 REACTOR BUILDING EQUIPMENT DRAIN TANK HEAT EXCHANGE (REACTOR BLDG. CCW) 1RE01A 100 140 1

3/8 388 * * * * * * * * *

M GRAB SAMPLE ONLY M-90-1 1A9-1 1A9-2 2A9-1 2A9-2 CLEANUP NON-REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER 1A, INLET 1ST STAGE & OUTLET 2ND STAGE (REACTOR BLDG. CCW) 100 140 2

3/8 65 65 * * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY M-90-3 1A10-1 1A10-2 2A10-1 2A10-2 CLEANUP NON-REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER 18, INLET 1ST STAGE & OUTLET 2ND STAGE (REACTOR BLDG. CCW.)

100 140 2

3/8 144 144 * * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY M-90-1 1A11 2A11 DRYWELL EQUIPMENT DRAIN SUMP HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET 1RE02A 100 140 1

3/8 154 * * * * * * * * *

M GRAB SAMPLE ONLY NOTE 1: ALL CONTINUOUS LIQUID AND GAS SAMPLES WILL HAVE PROVISIONS AT THE PANEL FOR A MANUAL GRAB SAMPLE. NOTE 2: ALL SAMPLES ON THIS SHEET ARE ON PANEL 1(2)PL145 - REACTOR BUILDING PROCESS SAMPLING PANEL, EXCEPT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 METAL COUPON SAMPLES, THAT ARE FROM THE MATERIAL MONITORING SYSTEM (MMS) PANEL. NOTE 3: THE POTENTIAL ACTIVITY LEVELS ARE AS FOLLOWS: H: ACTIVITY >0.1~ci/M1 M: 0.01 ~ci.M1< ACTIVITY <0.1~ci/M1 L: ACTIVITY <0.1~ci/M1 B: BACKGROUND *NOT APPLICABLE LSCS-UFSAR TABLE 9.3-1 REV. 17, APRIL 2008 TABLE 9.3-1 (SHEET 2 OF 6) (Turbine Building Samples)

MAXIMUM OPERATING CONDITION P&ID UNIT 1 UNIT # 1 SAMPLE NO. UNIT # 2 SAMPLE NO. SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION PSIG F NO. SAMPLEPOINTS UNIT 2 NO OF SAMPLE PUMPS REQ'D SAMPLE LINE SIZE IN. UNIT 1 SAMPLE LINE LENGTH FT. UNIT 2 SAMPLE LINE LENGTH FT. CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25

°C CATION CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25

°C PH @ 25°C DISSOLVED OXYGEN ppb SILICA ppb TURBIDITY ppb DISSOLVEDSOLIDS TEMPERATURE TYPE RTD/TC RANGE RADIATION MONITOR POTENTIAL RADIATION ACTIVITY MAX (NOTE 3) REMARKS M-55-2 1B1 2B1 PRIMARY STEAM 1025 550 1

3/8 "959 LS" 386 * * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY ON 1PL131, STEAM CALORIMETER (TAX-PS050) TO BE FURNISHED FOR LOCAL MOUNTING BY PURCHASER.

M-80-5 1B1-1 THRU 1B2-8 2B2-1 THRU 2B2-8 CONDENSER TRAYS 1.72 Psia 121 8 8 WATER JET EDUCTORS 1/2 SCH. 80 PIPE 1-4,5-8 133 78 139 71 133 71 139 78 *

RANGE 0-1 1CE-PS042A THRU H * * * * * *

H WATER JET EDUCTOR PUMPS & CONDUCTIVITY CELL WITH VALVING ONLY WILL BE LOCATED ON PANEL 1PL37J.

M-58 1B3 2B3 CONDENSER PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER 205 135 1

3/8 70

RANGE 0-1 1CE-PS031

RANGE 0-100 1AX-PS026 RANGE 100 1AX-PS036

* *

M M-58 1B4 2B4 CONDENSER POLISHER INLET HEADER 205 140 1

3/8 134

RANGE 0-1 1CE-PS030

* * * * * *

L M-60-1,2 1B5-1 THRU 1B5-7 2B5-1 THRU 2B5-7 INDIVIDUAL CONDENSATE POLISHER OUTLETS 205 140 7

3/8 1-4, 5-7 191 151 182 162 142 149 128 * * * * * * * * *

H M-58 1B6 2B6 CONDENSATE POLISHER OUTLET HEADER 205 140 1

3/8 161 * *

RANGE 0-100 1AE-PS027 RANGE 0-100 1AX-PS037

* *

H M-57 1B7 2B7 FEEDWATER 2150 425 1

1/2 SCH. 160 PIPE 44

RANGE 0-1 1CE-PS033

DO Range 0.1-200 1AE-PS028A DH Range 0-2 ppm 1AE-PS028B

DUAL RANGE HIGH 0-1000 LOW 1AX-PS044

*

L ALL SENSORS & ANALYZERS ARE ON PANEL 1PL40J WITH INDICATORS &

TRANSMITTERS, *(NOTE 3) RECORDERS ONLY ON PANEL 1PL13J. ADDITIONAL SIGNAL SHALL ALSO BE FURNISHED - SEE BOTTOM OF TURBIDITY COLUMN - THIS SHEET. DO/DH RECORDER 1AR-PS028 IS ON PANEL 1PL40J M-61-1 1B8-1 1B8-2 2B8-1 2B8-2 H.P. HEATERS 16A & 16B DRAIN OUTLETS 1FW01AA & 1FW01AB 345 375 2

3/8 294 170 * * * * *

DUAL RANGE HIGH 0-1000 LOW SURVEY (SHARE WITH B14)

*

H M-61-1 1B9-1 1B9-3 2B9-1 THRU 2B9-3 L. P. HEATERS 15A, 15B & 15C DRAIN OUTLETS 1CB05AA, B, &

C 160 330 3

3/8 78 103 120 * * * * *

SURVEY (SHARE WITH B14) * *

H M-61-1 1B10-1 THRU 1B10-3 2B10-1 THRU 2B10-3 L. P. HEATERS 14A, 14B & 14C DRAIN OUTLETS 1CB04AA, B & C 85 300 3

3/8 78 78 103 * * * * *

SURVEY (SHARE WITH B14) * *

H M-61-2 1B11-1 THRU 1B11-3 2B11-1 THRU 2B11-3 L. P. HEATERS 13A, 13B & C DRAIN OUTLETS 1CB03AA, B & C 55 290 3 *

78 37 145 * * *

RANGE 0-300 SURVEY WITH 1B14

SURVEY (SHARE WITH B14) * *

H M-61-3,4 1B12-1 THRU 1B12-3 2B12-1 THRU 2B12-3 L. P. HEATERS 12A, 12B & 12C DRAIN OUTLETS 1CB02AA, B & C 10 175 3 3 3/8 131 112 149 * * * * *

SURVEY (SHARE WITH B14) * *

H M-61-3 1B13-1 THRU 1B13-3 2B13-1 THRU 2B13-3 L. P. HEATERS 11A, 11B & 11C DRAIN OUTLETS 1CB01AA, B & C 0 130 3 3 3/8 105 106 132 * * * * *

SURVEY (SHARE WITH B14) * *

H M-61-2 1B14 2B14 HEATER DRAIN TANK H. D. PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER 1HD01PA, B, C & D 745 290 1

3/8 54 * * *

RANGE 0-300 1AE-PS029

DUAL RANGE HIGH 0-1000 LOW 1AX-PS045

*

M M-74 1B15 2B15 CYCLED CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK 1CY01T 75 100 1

3/8 108

RANGE 0-10 1CE-PS034

* * * * * *

L M-75-1 1B16 2B16 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK 0MC01T 175 100 1 1 3/8 336

RANGE 0-10 1CE-PS035

* * * * * *

B M-67-1 1B17 2B17 TURBINE BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER 75 130 1

3/8 259 * * * * * * * * *

B GRAB SAMPLE ONLY 1B18 2B18 CIRCULATING WATER 1CD01A 25 130 1 M-63

3/8 162 * * * * * * * * *

B GRAB SAMPLE ONLY 1B19-1 THRU 1B19-7 2B19-1 THRU 2B19-7 INDIVIDUAL CONDENSATE PREFILTER OUTLETS 205 140 7 M-60-7

1/4 1-4 5-7 190 200 180 190 170 180 210 1-4 5-7 190 200 180 190 170 180 210 * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE W/CAPABILITY TO 1(2) PLH4J CORROSION PRODUCT MONITOR M-121-6 NOTE 1: ALL CONTINUOUS LIQUID & GAS SAMPLES WILL HAVE PROVISIONS AT THE PANEL FOR A MANUAL GRAB SAMPLE.

NOTE 2: A PORTION OF THE SAMPLE APPROXIMATELY 1000ML/MIN. MEASURED AT 100 % F SHALL BE ROUTED TO A CORROSION PRODUCT MONITOR STATION ON PANEL 1PL40J WHICH SHALL BE CAPABLE OF PROPORTIONALLY COLLECTING AND CONCENTRATING (ON MEMBRANE FILTERS AND ION EXCHANGE PAPERS OR COLUMNS) AT LEAST 24 HR. SAMPLE FOR LABORATORY ANALYSIS OF METALLIC IMPURITIES.

NOTE 3: ALL SAMPLES ON THIS SHEET ARE ON IPL13J TURBINE BUILDING PROCESS SAMPLING PANEL OR AS INDICATED IN REMARKS COLUMN.

NOTE 4: THE POTENTIAL ACTIVITY LEVELS ARE AS FOLLOWS: H: ACTIVITY > 0.1

µCi/ml M: 0.01

µCi/ml < ACTIVITY < 0.1

µCi/ml L: ACTIVITY < 0.01

µCi/ml B: BACKGROUND *Not Applicable LSCS-UFSAR TABLE 9.3-1 REV. 13 TABLE 9.3-1 (SHEET 3 OF 6) (Radwaste Building Samples)

UNIT SAMPLE #.

UNIT SAMPLE #. MAXIMUM OPERATING COND. P&ID TAP LOCATION UNIT 1 PANEL # OPL - PANEL # OPL - SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION PSIG ºF NO. SAMPLEPOINTS PER UNIT UNIT 2 NO OF SAMPLE PUMPS REQ'D SAMPLE LINE SIZE (NOTE 3) UNIT 1 SAMPLE LINE LENGTH FT. UNIT 2 SAMPLE LINE LENGTH FT. CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25ºC CATION CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25ºC PH @ 25ºC DISSOLVEDOXYGEN ppb SILICA ppb TURBIDITYppb DISSOLVED SOLIDS TEMPERATURE TYPE RTD/TC RANGE RADIATION MONITOR POTENTIAL RADIATION ACTIVITY MAX (NOTE 3) REMARKS M-103-2 1C1 31J 2C1 31J WASTE COLLECTOR TANK (1WE01T OR 2WE01T) 170 100 1 M-103-3

3/8 97 84 * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-2 1C2 32J 2C2 32J WASTE SURGE TANK (1WE02T OR 2WE02T) 170 100 1 M-103-2

3/8 69 58 * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-2 IC3 31J 2C3 31J WASTE MIXED BED DEMINERALIZER (1WE01D & 2WE01D) 170 100 1 M-103-3

3/8 254 207 * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-2 1C4 32J 2C4 32J WASTE SAMPLE FILTER EFFLUENT (1WE01F & 2WE01F) 170 100 1 M-103-3

3/8 286 274 * * * * * * * *

M GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-4 1C5 31J 2C5 31J WASTE SAMPLE TANKS (1WE03T & 2WE03T) 170 100 1 M-103-4

3/8 196 164 * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-4 0C6 31J WASTE SAMPLE TANK (0WE01T) 120 150 1

3/8 203 * * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-5 IC7 31J 2C7 32J WASTE FLOC. TANKS (1WE04T & 2WE04T) 170 100 1 M-103-5

3/8 136 112 * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY M-103-6 1C8 31J 2C8 31J FLOOR DRAIN COLLECTOR TANK (1WF01T OR 2WF01T) 100 100 1 M-103-6

3/8 65 70 * * * * * * * *

M GRAB SAMPLE ONLY M-103-7 1C9 31J 2C9 31J FLOOR DRAIN CONC. FEED TANKS (1WF03TA OR 2WF03TA) 50 100 1 M-103-8

3/8 180 174 * * * * * * * *

M GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-7 1C10 31J 2C10 32J FLOOR DRAIN SAMPLE TANKS (IWF03TB OR 2WF03TB) 100 100 1 M-103-8

3/8 166 190 * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-9 1C11 31J 2C11 31J FLOOR DRAIN SAMPLE TANKS (TWF04T & 2WF04T) 120 150 1 M-103-9

3/8 88 67 * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-10 1C12 32J 2C12 32J RADWASTE DISCHARGE TANKS (1WF05T & 2WF05T) 120 150 1 M-103-10

3/8 101 88 * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-11 1C13 32J 2C13 32J FLOOR DRAIN MIXED BED DEMINERALIZERS (1WF01D & 2WF01D) 100 140 1 M-103-11

3/8 242 190 * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-17 0C14-1 0C14-2 80J LAUNDRY DRAIN COLLECTOR TANKS (0WY01TA & 0WY01TB) 120 150 2 M-103-17

3/8 198 205 * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY M-103-17 0C15 80J INLET REVERSE OSMOSIS UNIT (0WY02F) 150 120 1

3/8 217 * * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-17 0C16 80J OUTLET REVERSE OSMOSIS UNIT (0WY02F) 150 120 1

3/8 217 * * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-17 0C17 32J LAUNDRY DRAIN SAMPLE TANK (0WY02T) 150 150 1

3/8 200 * * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-18 0C18-1 0C18-2 80J DECONTAMINATER COLLECTION TANKS (0WZ02TA & 0WZ02TB) 150 150

M-103-18

3/8 77 89 * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-18 0C19 32J DECONTAMINATER SAMPLE TANK (0WZ04T) 150 150 1

3/8 215 * * * * * * * * *

M GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-19 1C20 31J 2C20 32J CHEMICAL WASTE COLLECTOR TANKS (1WZ01T & 2WZ01T) 50 100 1 M-103-19

3/8 97 92 * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-20 1C21 31J 2C21 32J CHEMICAL WASTE PROCESS TANKS 50 100 1 M-103-20

3/8 157 124 *

UNIT 1 0AE-PS003 UNIT 2 0AE-PS012

* * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-103-21 0C22 31J CHEMICAL WASTE SAMPLE TANK (0WZ01T) 100 140 1

3/8 53

RANGE 0-100 0CE-PS002

* * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-98-2 0C23 31J FUEL POOL FILTER DEMINERALIZER INLET (1FC01DA-B & 2FC01DA-B) 120 140 1

3/8

338 * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE ONLY

M-98-2 1C24-1 1C24-2 31J 2C24-1 2C24-2 32J FUEL POOL FILTER DEMINERLIZER OUTLETS (1FC01DA-B & 2FC01DA-B) 120 140 1

3/8 347 319 330 302 * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE ONLY NOTE 1: ALL CONTINUOUS LIQUID & GAS SAMPLES WILL HAVE PROVISIONS AT THE PANEL FOR A MANUAL GRAB SAMPLE. NOTE 2: ALL SAMPLES ON THIS SHEET ARE ON THE RADWASTE PANELS AS NOTED.

NOTE 3: 3/8"SAMPLE TUBING FOR FIELD ROUTED LINES ARE ST STL WITH .083 WALL. NOTE: THE POTENTIAL ACTIVITY LEVELS ARE AS FOLLOWS: H: ACTIVITY >0.1~Ci.Ml M: 0.01 ~Ci/Ml< ACTIVITY < 0.1 ~Ci.Ml L: ACTIVITY < 0.01~Ci.Ml B: BACKGROUND *Not Applicable LSCS-UFSAR TABLE 9.3-1 REV. 13 TABLE 9.3-1 (SHEET 4 OF 6) (River, Lake, and Blowdown Samples)

MAXIMUM OPERATING CONDITIONS UNIT # 1 SAMPLE NO. UNIT # 2 SAMPLE NO. SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION PSI A ºF NO SAMPLE POINTS P&ID UNIT 1 UNIT 2 NO OF SAMPLE PUMPS REQ'D SAMPLE LINE SIZE UNIT 1 SAMPLE LINE LENGTH FT. UNIT 2 SAMPLE LINE LENGTH FT. CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25ºC CATION CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25ºC PH @ 25ºC DISSOLVED OXYGEN ppb SILICA ppb TURBIDITYppb DISSOLVEDSOLIDS TEMPERATURE TYPE RTD/TC RANGE RADIATIO N MONITOR POTENTIAL RADIATION ACTIVITY MAX REMARKS D-1 LAKE BLOWDOWN VALVE PIT HOUSE AFTER RADWASTE ENTRY (BY PURCHASER) *

1 M64-1 D-6

3/4" 132' * * * * * * * *

SEE GE 22A3012 BACKGROUND TO DETECT DISCHARGE ACTIVITY AND ISOLATE BLOWDOWN ON HI ACTIVITY (BY PURCHASER) D-2 LAKE MAKE-UP PUMP DISCHARGE *

1 * * * * * * * * * *

225-1000 0AE-PS005A*

BACKGROUND COMPOSITE COLLECTION FOR ANALYSIS (BY PURCHASER) D-3 LAKE BLOWDOWN AT RIVER DISCHARGE *

1 * * * * * *

RANGE 5-100AE-PS007 RANGE 1-6 0AE-PS011

225-1000 0AE-PS005B*

BACKGROUND COMPOSITE COLLECTION FOR ANALYSIS (BY PURCHASED)

LAKE BLOWDOWN AT RIVER DISCHARGE (IN FLUME)

4 TEMP. ELEMENTS RTD * * * * * * * * * * *

4 RTD'S 30-100ºF (NOTE 4)

BACKGROUND RTD'S LOCATED IN DISCHARGE FLUME (ALL BY PURCHASER)

RIVER DOWN STREAM

4 TEMP. ELEMENTS RTD

* * * * * * * * * *

4 RTD'S 30-100ºF (NOTE 5)

BACKGROUND RTD'S LOCATED IN RIVER NEAR BOTTOM ON TRIPOD. (0PS02S)

CIRCULATING WATER DISCHARGE TO LAKE (BY PURCHASER)

4 TEMP. ELEMENTS RTD

* * * * * * * * * *

4 RTD'S 30-100ºF (BY PURCHASER)

BACKGROUND (ALL BY PURCHASER)

CIRCULATING WATER INLET FROM LAKE (BY PURCHASER)

4 TEMP. ELEMENTS RTD

* * * * * * * * * *

4 RTD'S 30-100ºF (BY PURCHASER)

BACKGROUND (ALL BY PURCHASER)

RIVER UP STREAM

4 TEMP. ELEMENTS RTD

* * * * * * * * * *

4 RTD'S 30-100ºF (NOTE 2)

BACKGROUND RTD'S LOCATED IN RIVER NEAR BOTTOM ON TRIPOD.

LAKE BLOWDOWN AT RIVER DISCHARGE (IN PIPE)

4 TEMP. ELEMENTS RTD

* * * * * * * * * *

4 RTD'S 30-100ºF (NOTE 6)

BACKGROUND IN REDUCER LOCATED IN RIVER DISCHARGE VALVE HOUSE. (BY PURCHASER)

RIVER UP STREAM

4 * * * * * * *

RANGE 1-12 NOTE 3 * * * *

BACKGROUND DO2 ANALYZERS LOCATED IN RIVER NEAR BOTTOM ON TRIPOD (0PS01S)

NOTE 1: ALL CONTINUOUS LIQUID & SAMPLES WILL HAVE PROVISIONS AT THE PANEL FOR A MANUAL GRAB SAMPLE NOTE 2: ELEMENTS : 0TE-PS008A 0TE-PS008B 0TE-PS008C 0TE-PS008D NOTE 3: ELEMENTS 0AE-PS006A 0AE-PS006B 0AE-PS006C 0AE-PS006D NOTE 4: ELEMENTS: 0TE-WL038A 0TE-WL038B 0TE-WL038C 0TE-WL038D NOTE 5: ELEMENTS 0TE-PS010A 0TE-PS010B 0TE-PS010C 0TE-PS010D NOTE 6: ELEMENTS: 0TE-WL012A 0TE-WL012B 0TE-WL012C 0TE-WL012D

Not Applicable

LSCS-UFSAR TABLE 9.3-1 REV. 13 TABLE 9.3-1 (SHEET 5 OF 6) (Miscellaneous Liquid Samples)

SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION INITIAL PRESS PSIA COND. TEMP. F NO SAMPLE POINTS P&ID TAP LOCATION PIPING DRAWING TAP LOCATION SAMPLE LINE SIZE SAMPLE LINE LENGTH NO. OF SAMPLE PUMPS REQ'D CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25ºC CATION CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25ºC PH @ 25ºC DISSOLVED OXYGEN ppb SILICA ppb TURBIDITYppb DISSOLVEDSOLIDS TEMPERATURE TYPE RTD/TC RANGE RADIATION MONITOR POTENTIAL RADIATION ACTIVITY MAX (NOTE 2) REMARKS E1 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGE 1WR01AA OUTLET 100 140

M-90-1 B-5 * * * * * * * * * * * *

B B GRAB SAMPLE ONLY E2 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGE 1WR01AB OUTLET 100 140

M-90-1 B-4 * * * * * * * * * * * *

B GRAB SAMPLE ONLY E3 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGE 0WR01A OUTLET 100 140

M-90-1 B-3 * * * * * * * * * * * *

B GRAB SAMPLE ONLY E4 STANDBY LIQUID TANK 1C41-A001 * *

M-99 B-2 * * * * * * * * * * * *

B GRAB SAMPLE ONLY NOTE 1: ALL CONTINUOUS LIQUID AND GAS SAMPLES WILL HAVE PROVISIONS AT THE PANEL FOR A MANUAL GRAB SAMPLE.

NOTE 2: THE POTENTIAL ACTIVITY LEVELS ARE AS FOLLOWS: H: ACTIVITY > 0.1 ~Ci/Ml M: 0.01 ~ Ci/ Ml < ACTIVITY < 0.1 µCi/Ml L: ACTIVITY < 0.01 ~Ci/Ml B: BACKGROUND *Not Applicable

LSCS-UFSAR TABLE 9.3-1 REV. 13 ABLE 9.3-1 (SHEET 6 OF 6) (Gaseous Samples)

SAMPLE NO. SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION INITIAL PRESS PSIA COND. TEMP. F NO SAMPLE POINTS P&ID TAP LOCATION PIPING DRAWING TAP LOCATION SAMPLE LINE SIZE SAMPLE LINE LENGTH NO. OF SAMPLE PUMPS REQ'D CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25ºC CATION CONDUCTIVITY

µmho/cm @ 25ºC PH @ 25ºC DISSOLVED OXYGEN ppb SILICA ppb TURBIDITYppb DISSOLVEDSOLIDS TEMPERATURE TYPE RTD/TC RANGE RADIATION MONITOR POTENTIAL RADIATION ACTIVITY MAX (NOTE 2) REMARKS OF1 VENT (STACK) GAS ATMOS

1 M-88-1 F-7

3/8

2 * * * * * * * *

L PANEL D18-P001 IF2-1 IF2-2 OFF GAS UP STREAM OF SECOND STAGE EJECTORS *

2 M-88-1 B-1 & D-1

3/8

1 * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE VIAL SAMPLER (SAME PANEL AS 1F4) IF3-1 IF3-2 OFF GAS DOWN STREAM OF SECOND STAGE EJECTORS

2 M-88-2 E-B & D-B

3/8

SHARED WITH 1F2 * * * * * * * *

H GRAB SAMPLE VIAL SAMPLER (SAME PANEL AS 1F4) 1F4 OFF GAS LINE UP STREAM OF 30 MINUTE HOLDUP *

2 M-88-2 B-3

3/8

SHARED WITH 1F2 * * * * * * *

SEE PROC. RAD. MONIT. GE 22A3011 M GRAB SAMPLE VIAL SAMPLER D18-J004 IF5 OFF GAS LINE UP STREAM OF CHARCOAL ADSORBERS

1 M-88-4 C-8

3/8

1 * * * * * * * *

M GRAB SAMPLE VIAL SAMPLER (SAME PANEL AS 1F9) 1F6 OFF GAS LINE CHARCOAL TRAIN "A" AFTER 1N62-D008

1 M-88-4 C-7

3/8

SHARED WITH 1FS * * * * * * * *

M GRAB SAMPLE VIAL SAMPLER (SAME PANEL AS 1F9) 1F7 OFF GAS LINE CHARCOAL TRAIN "B" AFTER 1N62-D014

1 M-88-4 A-6

3/8

SHARED WITH 1FS * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE VIAL SAMPLER (SAME PANEL AS 1F9) IF8 OFF GAS LINE DISCHARGE TO PLANT VENT *

1 M-88-4 C-1

3/8

1 * * * * * * *

SEE PROC. RAD. MONIT. GE 22A3011 L PANEL D18-J013 1F9 OFF GAS LINE DISCHARGE TO PLANT VENT *

1 M-88-4 C-1

3/8

SHARED WITH 1FS * * * * * * * *

L GRAB SAMPLE VIAL SAMPLER D18-J014

NOTE 1: ALL CONTINUOUS LIQUID AND GAS SAMPLES WILL HAVE PROVISIONS AT THE PANEL FOR A MANUAL GRAB SAMPLE.

NOTE 2: THE POTENTIAL ACTIVITY LEVELS ARE AS FOLLOWS: H: ACTIVITY > 0.1 ~Ci/Ml M: 0.01 ~ Ci/ Ml < ACTIVITY < 0.1 ~Ci/Ml L: ACTIVITY < 0.01 ~Ci/Ml B: BACKGROUND

Not Applicable

LSCS-UFSAR TABLE 9.3-2 REV. 0 - APRIL 1984 TABLE 9.3-2 STANBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS TEST MODES (a)

STANDBY MODE (a)

CIRCULATION TEST INJECTION TEST(b)

OPERATING MODE (a)

PIPING PRESSURE (psig)(c) TEMPERATURE

(°F)

PRESSURE (psig)(c) TEMPERATURE

(°F)

PRESSURE (psig) (c)

TEMPERATURE

(°F)

PRESSURE (psig) (c)

TEMPERATURE

(°F)

Pump Suction Makeup Water Pressure 70/100 (d)

Test Tank Static Head (e) 70/100 (d)

Storage Tank Head 70/100 (d)

Pump Discharge to Explosive Valve Inlet Makeup Water Pressure 70/100 0/1220 70/100 70 Plus Reactor Static Head 70/100 70 Plus Reactor Static Head to 1220 70/100 Explosive Valve Outlet To But Not Including First Isolation Check Valve Reactor Static Head to 1150 (f) 70/560 (g)

Reactor Static Head 70/560 (g)

Reactor Static Head (b) 125 (b) Reactor Static Head to 1150 (f) 70/560 (g) a The pump flow rate will be zero (pump not operating during the standby mode and at rated during the test and operating modes). b Reactor be at 0 psig and 125

° F before changing from the standb y mode to the inje ction test mode.

c Pressures tabulated represent pressure at the points identified below. To obtain pressure at intermediate points in the system, the pressures tabulated must be adjusted for elevation difference and pressure drop between such intermediate points and the pressure points identified below:

Piping Pressure Point Pump Suction Pump Suction Flange Inlet Pump Discharge to Explosive Valve Inlet Pump Discharge Flange Outlet Explosive Valve Outlet To But Not Including First Isolation Check Valve Explosive Valve Outlet First Isolation Check Valve To The Reactor Reactor Sparger Outlet

d. During chemical mixing, the liquid in the storage tank will be at a temperature of 150

° F maximum.

e Pump suction piping will be subject to demineralized water supply pressure during flushing and filling of the piping and during any testing where suction is taken directly from the demineralized water supply line rather than the test tank.

f Maximum reactor operating pressure is 1150 psig at reactor standby liquid control sparger outlet.

g. 360~ F represents maximum sustained operating temperature.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-1 REV. 14, APRIL 2002

9.5 OTHER

AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5.1 Fire Protection System The purpose of the fire protec tion system is as follows:

a. to prevent a fire from starting by use of fire resistant materials and by minimizing combustibles, b. to quickly detect any fires; annunciating locally and in the control room, c. to quickly suppress a fire in hazard areas by use of automatic fire protection equipment, d. to prevent the spread of a fire by use of fire barriers between hazards, e. to minimize the size of a fire and limit its damage, and f. to provide fire fighting capability for manual fire extinguishment.

9.5.1.1 Design Bases 9.5.1.1.1 Identification of Fires

Appendix H to this document contains a detailed fire hazards analysis for the various design-basis fires.

9.5.1.1.2 Fire Characteristics A detailed analysis of the fire potential in each fire zone of the station is included in Appendix H of this document. Also included is a discussion of materials used within the plant. A listing of combustible materials present is provided in Table H.3-2. Figure 9.5-1 shows the pertinent features relating to fire protection at LSCS, including the location of fire walls, ma jor combustible hazards, safety-related equipment, and fire protection equipment.

Figure 9.5-1a shows the locations of cable trays containing safety-related cables.

The maximum potential for fire affecting safety-related equipment is in the emergency diesel room, diesel day tank room, and diesel fuel storage room. A rupture of a high-pressure core spray (HPCS) diesel-generator day tank, the emergency diesel-generator day tank, or th e main fuel lines to these diesels could release 1700 gallons or 750 gallons respecti vely of #2 diesel fuel. In the rooms LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-2 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 below each emergency diesel are diesel fu el storage tanks with capacities of 34,000 and 40,000 gallons for the HPCS diesel s and emergency diesel generators, respectively. Should a rupture occur, a hi gh energy source of ignition at the floor level would have to be present to ignite this fuel. The potential for the affecting safety-related equipment is discusse d in Appendix H of this document.

Each day tank room and storage tank room is provided with an automatic sprinkler system. These rooms are separated from ea ch other and the plant by a 3-hour rated fire enclosure. Likewise, automatic low-pressure CO 2 fire extinguishing systems and 3-hour rated fire barriers are provided for each of the five diesel rooms. A sprinkler alarm or CO 2 actuation alarm, locally and in the control room, would bring Fire Brigade personnel to contain the fire within the time frame of the confinement rating. Adjacent to these rooms are emergency fire hose stations containing sufficient hose for manual fire fighting purposes.

Areas with hydraulic oils are not considered significant because these oils are of limited volumes and/or characteristically fire resistant (FYRQUEL). For example, the two hydraulic oil reservoirs on the re circulation pump control valve systems are located on elevation 761 feet of the secondary containment at quadrants 90° and 270°, respectively. This area is not no rmally occupied; nor is smoke and toxic contaminant removal an immediate concern. The potential for a fire is minimized through the use of fire resistant materials and hydraulic oils having a fire point in excess of 600° F per ASTM D-992-56. Cabl es and wiring are specified as fire-resistant cable and meet the standards of IEEE-383 (see cable routing criteria 8.3.1.4.2.2). Table 9.5-1 and H.3-2 list the combustibl es used at LaSalle County Station. Piping in Fire Zone 5A3 for lubricating oil from the turbine oil tank package to the turbine is guarded with double-walled pipe to preclude oil leakages in the areas of steam pipes.

9.5.1.1.3 Facility Features The Seismic Category I safety-related structures are of reinforced concrete construction with the exception of the steel superstructure above the refueling floor in the reactor building.

Due to structural or shielding requirements, many walls have a fire rating in excess of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months . Other concrete walls have at least a 3- or 2-hour rating. Nonconcrete walls in the facility generally have at le ast a 2-hour fire rating. All openings through walls have door ratings which are consistent with required wall ratings. See Appendix H for a detailed description of the fire zone boundary walls.

Electrical cabling is suitably rated and cabl e tray loadings are designed to minimize internal heat buildup. Cable trays, genera lly filled to 50% of ca pacity, are suitably separated to avoid loss of redundant channels of safety-related cabling should fires occur. Piping and cable tray penetrations are provided with fire stops to preserve the fire rating of the walls that are pene trated. The arrangement of equipment in protection channels assigned to separate cabinets provides physical separation and LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-3 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 minimizes the effect of a possible fire. Electrical system design is discussed in Chapter 8.0.

Equipment and building drains minimize accumulation of combustible substances from small persistent oil leaks. Drainage in the diesel buildings is to the diesel building sumps. Drainage in potentially radioactive areas is to the radwaste sump system outside of the diesel building. Drainage in the noncontaminated areas is piped to the oil separators or fire sumps for disposal.

Drainage is provided for all areas protected by water spray type fire protection to prevent the spread of combustible liquids.

Automatically actuating hatch type smok e and heat vents are provided in the turbine building roof at a ratio of 1 square foot of venting for every 100 ft of floor area. Smoke and heat venting is provided for in other plant areas by the ventilation systems. The following areas are separated by 3-hour fire rated floors/ceilings, walls, and doors in accordance to Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited Property Loss Prevention Standards (see Figure 9.5-1 and Appendix H for details):

a. turbine building, b. reactor buildings, c. auxiliary building, d. radwaste building, e. diesel-generator buildings, and

f. off-gas filter building.

The station layout was arranged to isolate safety-related systems from unacceptable fire hazards. This is accomplished by ei ther distance or a barrier. The safety-related systems are divisionally separated both mechanically and electrically. Safety-related pumps are located in separate cubicles. Hazardous material in these areas is kept as low as practical.

The reactor building has a low combustible loading throughout. No flammable materials are stored in this area, and the presence of lube oil has been minimized. The fire loading in this area is due primarily to cabling. The effects of the hazards are reduced by physical separation of cabling divisions (see Figure 9.5-1a).

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-4 REV. 18, APRIL 2010 In the diesel-generator building, items of safety-related equipment are physically separated (by division) from each other and from the oil tank rooms by minimum 3-hour rated fire barriers. Additional protec tion from fire is obtained by the use of automatic suppression systems. For a detailed analysis of the potential effects of fire hazards on safety-related systems, see Appendix H.

Reactor Unit 1 and reactor Unit 2 have separate cable spreading rooms. The Division 1 cables are spread over the control room panels and feed into the control cabinets from the top. The Division 2 cables are run in the cable spreading rooms under the control room and feed into the control cabinets from the bottom. The Unit 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms are isolated from each other and other areas of the plant by barriers having a 3-hour fire rating. The only barrier which is an exception is the floor slab, which has a 3-hour rating from an internal source and a 2-hour rating from an external source. The rooms below which could provide the external source each have a combustible load ing equivalent to a fire severity of less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . Therefore, the structural steel supporting the floor was provided with only 2-hour protection.

The majority of interior components used in construction are either noncombustible or treated to be fire-retardant. Not all mate rials used as interior finishes have been tested for flame spread, fuel contribution, and smoke density; those which have been tested are below the limits of 25.

Exceptions are the vinyl base, vinyl asbestos tile, and the silicone foam sealant. Ratings for vinyl base and vinyl asbestos tile are flame spread, 30, fuel contribution, 0, and smoke developed, 50. In some instances the materials being used have no available test data. Use of those materials is believed to be very trivial and cannot contribute significantly to the fire loading. For fire hazard analysis purposes, inte rior/floor coverings and coatings are considered non-combustible if the material has a structural base of noncombustible material, with a nominal depth not over 1/8-inch thick, and has a flame spread rating not higher than 50 as defined by ASTM E-84. Fire Protection engineering evaluates exceptions to these guidelines for acceptability on a case-by-case basis using the NEIL criteria for interior/floor coverings and coatings.

A UL Class A roofing system is used. The roof assembly meets the requirements of Factory Mutual Class I system except th at the purlin spacing exceeds Factory Mutual specification for decking spans and the perimeter of the roof insulation is not mechanically fastened to the deck.

The suspended ceilings are of negligible combustibility (acoustical tile in rooms 299, 300, 401, 404, 405, 406, 406A, 409, 410, 411, 412, 414, 417, 423, and 426 - flame spread, 0, smoke developed, 0; acoustical ceiling panels in auxiliary buiding rooms 419, 420, 421, 422, and 430 - flame spread, 25, and smoke developed, 50; all other acoustical tile - flame spre ad, 15, fuel contribution, 15, and smoke developed, 5; cement plaster - flame spread, 5, fuel cont ribution, 0, smoke developed, 0) and the supports are noncombustible. In the area above the laboratories in the LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-4a REV. 18, APRIL 2010 auxiliary building where there are concentrations of cabling above the suspended ceiling, an automatic water spray system has been provided for the cable trays.

High-voltage, high-amperage transformers installed inside build ings containing safety-related systems are of the dry type.

The unit and systems auxiliary transformers are located within 50 feet of the turbine building, diesel-generator building, and reactor building. The walls of the reactor building which are within 50 feet of the transformers have no structural openings. The diesel-generator building has two openings within 50 feet of the LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-5 REV. 17, APRIL 2008 transformers. One is a UL labeled "A" fire door, and the other is an intake louver located at elevation 736 feet 6 inches on the HVAC equipment floor. There is a block barrier separating the inta ke louvers and the transformers.

A drainage system is provided throughout the station. Automatic sprinkler protection is provided over the turbine building fire sumps and oil separators.

Drainage which is potentially radioactive g oes to the liquid radwaste area, where it is analyzed and processed. Electrical equipment is normally mounted flush with the floor for equipment removal purposes, but the base of the electrical cabinets usually provides 6 inches of floor clearance to electrical components.

The functions of the plant do not always make it possible to enclose separate fire zones by minimum 3-hour fire barriers. Some features which compromise the

3-hour barriers are open stairways and openings in the slabs for equipment operation or removal. In these instances the fire loading was examined, and it was determined that, due to the low fire loadings, propagation would not occur.

Deficiencies in the fire barriers have been identified where they exist. In areas where high loading exists in conjunction with inadequate barriers, automatic suppression systems have been installed.

Fire barrier penetrations by conduit and piping are sealed with silicone foam sealant, grout or ceramic fiber. Fire barrier penetrations by electrical cable risers and cable trays are sealed with CT Gypsum or another suitable fire barrier penetration seal ant. Penetrations through fire barriers for the ventilation system are equipped with fire dampers. Fire dampers are not provided in the ducts penetrating through 3-hour rated wall separating the reactor and auxiliary buildings as malfunction of the fire damper will disrupt the entire reactor building ventilation. These ducts, however, are provided with isolation dampers in series, whose construction (3/8 inch thick steel plate) is more sturdy than 3-hour rated fire dampers. Fire dampers are not provided in the turbine building air riser shaft.

The fire rated doors will be inspected in accordance with Station procedures. The

doors are provided with self-closing mechanisms. Those fire rated doors which also serve as security-related doors are on the controlled access system. An alarm will annunciate in the central alarm station if the security door does not close after a specified time period.

9.5.1.1.4 Seismic Design Criteria The fire protection system is not an engineered safety feature and as such is non-Seismic Category I. The water filled fire protection piping is classified as moderate energy. Appendix J discusses Moderate Energy Line Breaks (MELB).

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-6 REV. 15, APRIL 2004 9.5.1.1.5 Applicable Regulati ons, Codes, and Standards

a. 29 CFR 1910 - Occupational Safety and Health Standards, b. 29 CFR 1926 - Safety and Health Regulations for Construction, c. 10 CFR Part 50 - Fire Protection

d. Applicable National Fire Protection Association - National Fire Codes e. Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited - Property Loss Prevention Standards For Nuclear Power Generating Stations, and

f. American Society for Testing Materials - D992-56 Classification of Flammability Standards.

9.5.1.2 System Description 9.5.1.2.1 General

The fire protection water distribution syst em is capable of supplying cooling lake water to the plant fire hydrants, the water sprinkler and deluge systems, and the hose valve stations under all conditions. The system is normally kept pressurized by one of two fire protection jockey pumps. Each pump has a 75 gpm capacity at a minimum total developed head of 370 feet. They are only used for system pressurization. If a system demand occurs, the intermediate pump is automatically activated. This pump has a 225 GPM capa city at a minimum total developed head of 370 feet. If the system demand exceed s the capacity of this pump the pressure decreases in the fire protection system, thereby automatically starting a diesel fire pump. If system demand is in excess of the capability of a single fire pump or if there is a pump failure, the second fire pump will engage automatically. Each fire pump has a capacity of 2500 gpm at 315 feet total developed head. The sizing basis for the fire pumps was NEIL standards, which assume one pump out of service, a break in the shortest pipe run, and the largest sprinkler system operating plus 500 gpm for fire hoses.

The controllers for these fire pumps are located in the fire pump rooms. They annunciate locally and in the control room the following conditions:

a. pump is running;

b. controller main switch is in th e "Off" or "Manual" position; and

c. trouble exists on the engine or controller.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-7 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 Following an automatic start, the engine can be shut down only by the local control panel pushbutton or by the emergency shutdown devices which operate only to prevent destruction of the engine. This installation conforms to NFPA 20, "Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps." The fire pumps take suction from the seis mically designed water tunnel in the lake screen house. This tunnel has multiple intakes from the LSCS cooling lake. A failure in the fire protection system could not affect the ultimate heat sink. Both diesel-driven fire pumps are located in the lake screen house and take suction directly from the water tunnel. The diesel-driven fire pumps are located at opposite ends of the lake screen house in rooms en closed by 3-hour fire enclosures and are protected by automatic sprinkler systems which alarm in the control room upon actuation. As a backup to the diesel driven fire pumps, water can be supplied from the service water system.

The fire hydrant system is supplied by separate header connections to each of the two fire pumps. The system consists of a 14 inch ring header surrounding the main buildings with strategic placement of the fire hydrants, located no more than 250 feet apart.

The common yard loop is sectionalized, permitting independence of each unit if desired. The underground piping consists of welded carbon steel piping buried below the frost line. If tuberculation deposits significantly reduce water pressure, a chemical flush of this piping can be performed through existing test connections. The lateral to each hydrant can be isolated by a key-operated valve, and a section of the loop can be isolated by a post-indicating valve (Drawing No. M-71).

Each fire hydrant has an associated hose house containing the following equipment:

a. 200 feet of 1-1/2-inch woven jacket lined hose, b. two approved 1-1/2-inch adjustable spray nozzles, c. two universal spanners, d. two 2-1/2-inch to 1-1/2-inch adapters; and

e. one hydrant wrench.

The threads on all fire protection equipment are compatible with the local fire department equipment.

Multiple headers from the outside fire loop are brought into the building complex to feed the standpipe and sprinkler systems. Sprinkler systems can be isolated by an LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-8 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 electrically supervised gate valve that will alarm in the auxiliary electric equipment room and the control room; all othe r major valves are locked open.

Actuation of any sprinkler deluge or pre-action system causes an alarm to sound locally and in the control room. Sprinkler systems are designed to NFPA 13 and fixed water spray systems to NFPA 15 (pre-action systems have closed heads). The design basis of these systems are discussed in "The Evaluation of the LaSalle County Station Fire Protection Water Distribution and Standpipe System Report."

Interior manual hoses, which act as a backup to the automatic suppression systems, can serve all areas of the plant except portions of the steam and radwaste pipe tunnels and the primary containments. The pipe t unnels do not contain combustibles. The primary containment normally has hoses brought in during maintenance outages. It also has a containment spray system that can be used as a deluge system. The design of the standpipe system follows NFPA 14. The fire hose nozzles provided are adjustable nozzles suitable for either Class A, B, or C fires.

Nineteen carbon dioxide hose reels, seventeen with 100 feet of hose, two with 50 feet of hose are provided. CO 2 is supplied from a 10-ton refrig erated cryogenic storage vessel.

Portable fire extinguishers have been provid ed throughout the station in accordance with NFPA 10, with the exception of portio ns of the radwaste tunnel, the two steam tunnels, and primary containments. These areas are not normally occupied, contain little or no combustible material, and will have portable extinguishers brought in during maintenance periods. Consideration was given to the nature of the fire hazard and equipment in locating the number and type of extinguishers.

The fire detection system is designed to NFPA 72E. The detectors are electrically supervised and upon detection of a fire annunciate locally and in the control room.

The fire detection system is normally po wered from 120 Vac with automatic transfer to 125 Vdc on loss of power via inverters. The IRSF fire detection system will be normally powered from 120 Vac with automa tic transfer to self-contained battery backup upon loss of power.

Where Halon 1301 Systems are utilized, the inst allation is in accordance with NFPA 12A. Halon 1301 use has been limited to two zones in the station (computer room in the south (new) service building and QA archives in the north (old) service building. The records storage building, separate from the station building, also utilizes a Halon 1301 system because of potential toxicity, decomposition, and particular soak time requirements. Audible and visual predis charge alarms and dead-man-type abort switches are provided. Where Halon 1301 systems are installed, double shot protection is provided.

Carbon dioxide flooding systems are provided for the five diesel-generator rooms and for the turbine-generator alternator exciters. Audible and visual predischarge alarms warn that the CO 2 flooding system is about to actu ate so that personnel may leave the area. Manual actuation switches ar e provided. Actuation of either a LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-9 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 Halon 1301 or CO 2 flooding system automatically shuts down the local fans and closes local dampers. To pr event tampering, electrical and mechanical supervision is provided for the CO 2 flooding system actuation pilot valves.

9.5.1.2.2 Fire Protection For Areas Containing Safety-Related Equipment The control room and the other areas of hi gh cable concentration (both safety and non-safety-related) are provided with ionization detection equipment. Local hand held extinguishers are provided for these areas in conjunction with adjacent carbon dioxide and water hose reel stations.

The control room is surrounded on all side s by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rated fire barriers. The ionization detectors are located in the room and in the outlet plenum of the consoles to detect an incipient fire. Cables are not concealed in floor or ceiling spaces.

Emergency air breathing apparatus is also provided in the control room.

A fixed, automatic extinguishing system is not supplied for the control room because the habitability of this room must be maintained in order to preclude evacuation. Fire protection is accomplished by a combin ation of good housekeeping, fire resistant cables, fire detection equipment, and hand held fire extinguishing equipment.

The cable spreading rooms, the diesel generator corridors, central file (in South Service Building) and the concealed cable space over the laboratories for LaSalle County Station are each equipped with automatic preaction sprinkler systems actuated by ionization detectors. Ionizati on detectors are installed on the ceilings. These detectors are sensitive enough to alarm at the very inception of a fire when combustion products are first being released. Actuation of one ionization detector causes an alarm locally and in the control room and trips the deluge valve, filling the system with water.

Preaction sprinkler heads are located adjacent to each cable tray. A heat source is

then required for the sprinkler head to actuate and flood the tray. This system is also air supervised; and damage to the system or actuation of a sprinkler head actuates an alarm both in the auxiliary electric equipment room (AEER) and in the control room. If for some reason the ionization detection system was not in service or failed to function, the heat of a fire would cause a supervisory alarm and the deluge valve could be manually opened.

The preaction system is electrically superv ised and alarms both locally and in the control room upon a failure. If there is a fire and the detectors do not function for any reason, the melting of the fu sible links energizes an alarm both in the AEER and in the control room by releasing the supervisory air pressure maintained in the dry pipe.

An automatic carbon dioxide (CO

2) total flooding extended discharge system is provided for each of the five diesel generator rooms. Each syst em is activated by a LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-10 REV. 13 fixed temperature rise detector system. Manual activation is also provided. CO 2 release is delayed and an audible alarm sounded to allow personnel who may be in these rooms ample time to escape. The diesel generator rooms have independent ventilation systems, with no cross connection to other diesel generator systems. These ventilation systems are of the once through type, therefore, auxiliary smoke removal systems are not needed. The activation of the CO 2 system automatically stops the ventilation system fans and closes the electro-thermal link fire dampers.

The CO 2 system may also be manually actuated from either of two pushbutton stations for each diesel generator room. Automatic or manual actuation of the CO 2 system automatically sounds an alarm in the control room and in the vicinity of the hazard area. A wet standpipe hose reel is provided outside the main entrance of the diesel generator rooms to supply backup protection.

The diesel generator day tank rooms and o il storage tank rooms are separate from each other and from the diesel generator rooms by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rated fire barriers. The day tank and storage tank rooms are each protected by ordinary hazard automatic sprinkler protection. Each enclosure is ventilated to outside the building to prevent accumulation of oil fumes. Curbing and drai ns are provided to contain the oil in the unlikely event of a tank rupture. Manual fire hoses and portable fire extinguishers are provided as backups.

The auxiliary electric equipment rooms are provided with an electrically supervised low voltage ionization detection system, which alarms in the control room upon system detection. Locally mounted fire hoses, CO 2 hose reels, and portable fire extinguishers are provided for fire suppression. There is no provision for automatic fire suppression in this area.

The primary containment fire protection consists of the containment spray system that can act as a deluge system, automatic fire detection, fire hoses and portable fire extinguishers (which can be brought in during maintenance periods), and fire walls. The fire loading in the primary containment is due to cable insulation and lube oil in the recirculation pumps.

Fire detection is provided in the secondary containment in areas of high cable

concentration. Other than cable insulation, the amount of combustibles in the secondary containment is limited to charcoal filters, ventilation seals, gaskets, some pump lubrication oil and some maintenance materials. Charcoal filters contain temperature detectors that alarm in the control room and remote (and local) manually actuated deluge systems. Hydraulic fluid used for the electrohydraulic control systems is fire resistant.

Safety-related pumps and heat exchangers are located in cubicles in the basement of the reactor building. These cubicles are separated from each other by 48-inch concrete walls and by distance. Each cubi cle has its own safety-related ventilation system. The fire hazard analysis in Appendix H demonstrates that a fire cannot LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-11 REV. 18, APRIL 2010 affect more than one cubicle leaving redundant systems unaffected; therefore automatic protection is not provided.

Manual fire hose protection and portable fi re extinguishers are provided near the spent fuel pool and new fuel storage vault. The refuel floor contains an automatic ultraviolet detection system which alarms in the control room upon system actuation or trouble. A floor drain is provided to prevent accumulation of water in the new fuel storage vault.

Battery rooms are enclosed by 3-hour fire rated barriers and all safety-related battery rooms contain automatic fire detection systems. Ventilation systems in battery rooms are once-through types; the fan sizing is sufficient to prevent hydrogen buildup. Water and CO 2 hose reels and portable fire extinguishers are provided.

The bulk hydrogen storage facility, oriented parallel to the radwaste building, is located approximately 100 feet west of that building. The 20,000 gallon bulk liquid hydrogen facility for the HWC system is located approximately 2012 feet northwest of the nearest safety related structure (Unit 2 Diesel Generator Building. An 11,000 gallon bulk liquid oxygen facility, used in the past to supply the HWC system, and located approximately 680 feet northwest of the near est safety related air intake (Unit 2 Diesel Generator Supply), has been abandoned in place or removed. There are no safety-related wa ter tanks or cooling towers to protect.

Portable CO 2 fire extinguishers and/or dry chemical extinguishers are provided throughout the station.

Building steel is fire protected in the diesel-generator buildings and the auxiliary building. The reactor building is primarily structural reinforced concrete construction. The various buildings are separated by 3-hour fire walls.

9.5.1.2.2.1 Control Room Carpeting The following summary of qualifications of the control room carpeting is recorded to indicate the design measures taken to control the combustibility in this vital area:

Manufacturer: Milliken Carpet Type: P/2903; P/6380 The qualification tests for fire ignition, fi re propagation, and smoke generation are summarized below, along with the obtained results:

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-12 REV. 14, APRIL 2002

a. Radiant Panel Test (ASTM E648)

Class 1 > .45 Watts/CM 2 Critical Radiant Flux required.

Result: 0.54 Watts/CM 2 Critical Radiant Flux (P/2903) 0.50 Watts/CM 2 Critical Radiant Flux (P/6380)

b. Ignition Test Pill Test (Dept. of Commerce FF1-70) which is the ignition of explosive charge in contact with carpet.

Result: Self-Extinguishing (P/2903 and P/6380)

c. Smoke Development Rating (ASTM E662)

Standard of 450 or less.

Result: While flaming - 399 (P/2903) 278 (P/6380)

Non flaming - 154 (P/2903) 150 (P/6380)

The conclusion is that the control room carpeting does not constitute a fire propagation path, and that it does not igni te but rather is self-extinguishing upon removal of the source of intense flame.

9.5.1.2.3 Fire Protection For Power-Generation Equipment Areas Separate individual automatic water deluge systems are used to protect the main power transformers, system auxiliary transformers, unit auxiliary transformers, hydrogen seal oil units, turbine bearings (p reaction), turbine oil tank package areas, cable spreading rooms (preaction), diesel generator corridors (preaction), central file (preaction) and the cables over the labora tory area (preaction). Manual deluge systems are provided for the charcoal adsorbers in the standby gas treatment system, control room emergency makeup filt ers, auxiliary electric room supply air filters, primary containment purge air filters, TSC filters, HRSS filters, and control LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-12a REV. 14, APRIL 2002 room supply air filters. Manual charcoal deluge valves are operated locally (The normally manual closed isolation valves upstream of the deluge valve, in all cases require local actions to initiate water flow) except for those for the auxiliary electric equipment room supply air filters, whic h are operated locally or outside the auxiliary electric equipment room and the TSC and HRSS filter deluge units, which are operated via the local panel hand switches. Each charcoal adsorber LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-13 REV. 13 is also provided with temperature sensors which alarm in the control room due to abnormally high temperatures.

Automatic water suppression systems provide protection to the following areas:

a. dirty and clean oil tank room, b. emergency diesel generator fuel storage tank rooms, c. HPCS diesel fuel storage tank rooms, d. emergency diesel generator day tank rooms, e. HPCS diesel day tank rooms, f. reactor feedwater pump rooms, g. condensate pump rooms, h. north (old) service building ground floor and basement floor storerooms, i. north (old) service building machine and electric shops, j. reactor feedwater pump exhaust duct rooms, k. diesel fire pump rooms, l. radwaste building truck bay and dry waste storage area, m. all levels in the turbine building where oil piping is present and leaking oil could spread, n. turbine oil tank package room, o. hallway outside diesel generator rooms, p. auxiliary building ground floor zone 4F3 cables above ceiling, q. railroad entrance area of reactor building, r. cable spreading room, and

s. security (CAS), and Diesel Generator Day Tank rooms.

t. south (new) service building LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-14 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 Preaction systems are actuated by ionization detectors with wet pipe sprinkler systems initiating by heat responsive sprinkler heads located in the hazard area.

The computer room in the south (new) se rvice building and QA archives in the north (old) service building are provided with automatic Halon 1301 fire protection systems. CO 2 flooding is provided for the generator alternator exciter housing.

All sprinkler systems are provided with alar m check valves to give an alarm in the main control room when the sprinkler system goes into operation. Tamper switches and/or locks are provided for the fire protection isolation valves.

Supervised ionization smoke detector syst ems are provided in the following power generation areas (unless noted otherwise) to alarm in the main control room:

a. inlet and outlet plenums of all air handling equipment as described in Section 9.4 and Appendix H, b. computer room, c. radwaste control room, d. security control center, e. reactor building areas of electrical cable runs and distribution centers, f. electrical switchgear rooms, g. 250 volt and 125 volt battery rooms (photo thermal), h. concentrated cable areas, i. river screen house (heat detectors), j. refuel floor (ultraviolet), k. containment (high voltage ionization), l. lake screen house (heat detectors).

The turbine oil storage tank room and turbine oil tank package room are enclosed

by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months fire rated walls. Oxygen and acetylene are stored outside the station except for the amount in use.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-15 REV. 13 9.5.1.2.4 Combustion and Combustion Products Control Automatic heat and smoke vents are prov ided in the turbine building. The ventilation systems for the reactor build ing and radwaste building are the once-through type. The ventilation systems for all normally occupied areas of the plant may be manually switched to a once-through mode by the operator.

Additionally, recirculation air systems with charcoal adsorbers are provided for the control room HVAC system and auxiliary electric equipment rooms HVAC system.

Smoke detection in the mixed return air duct automatically puts the corresponding HVAC recirculation charcoal adsorbers into service. Smoke detection in the minimum outside air duct automatically puts the corresponding Emergency Makeup Filtration Unit (EMU) into servic

e. The operation of these systems is accompanied by an alarm in the main control room. Inadvertent operation of these systems does not affect the habitability of the areas served, since air flow to the rooms is maintained and redundant equipment is available. The inadvertent actuation of ionization detectors provid ed other HVAC systems in various plant areas does not affect the controlled areas of the plant, since the action in each case is to stop the HVAC system, isolate the ar ea served, and alarm in the main control room. If smoke is detected at the minimum outside air intake during purge operation, the EMU will start, the purge outside isolation dampers will close and the recirculation cross-tie da mpers will open, placing the control room and auxiliary electrical equipment room HVAC system in pressurization mode using outside air supplied by the EMU.

The switchgear heat removal system and auxiliary building equipment area system do not fully meet the criterion that the power supply and controls for mechanical

ventilation systems should be run outside the fire zones served by the systems.

Manually operated water deluge fire protection systems are provided for all charcoal filters.

With the exception of the generator-altern ator-exciter housing, wherever total gas flooding type fire protection systems are provided, fire dampers in the ventilation openings close, and ventilation fans are shut down on initiation of the fire protection system to maintain the gas concentrations.

9.5.1.2.5 Electrical Cable Fire Protection-System Description This topic is further discussed in Section 8.3.

Fire Detection The fire detection system utilizes ionization type fire detectors for detecting incipient fires and products of combustion in various plant zones. Each unit's fire detection system is divided into two groups:

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-16 REV. 16, APRIL 2006

a. warning zones where detectors provide warning; and

b. protection zones where detectors provide warning alarms and initiate the operation of a fire protection system.

The configuration of each area determines the number and actual location of fire detectors. The detectors shown in Figure 9.5-1 merely indicate that the area has detectors. The actual number and spacing of detectors is per NFPA 72E.

Upon detection of a fire, an annunciator lights on the main control board in the main control room. Also, a local alarm sounds. In the main control room, fire alarm status is displayed on the plant process computer.

The fire detection systems are electrically supervised and energize alarms both in the auxiliary equipment room and in the control room upon loss of supply voltage or malfunction of equipment.

Fire Barriers and Separation Between Redundant Cable Trays For information on installation of fire barriers and separation between redundant cable trays, see Subsection 8.3.1.4.2.1 and 8.3.3.4 which include the following:

a. "In Protected Zones," b. "In Hazard Zones," and

c. "In General Plant Zone." Fire Stops

a. Vertical Raceways Fire stops are installed in the cabl e trays at all riser openings in floors. When penetrating a floor, the tray section is completely enclosed for a distance of 6 feet above the floor surface.

Within the tray section, fi re stops are provided that satisfy the fire-resistance requirements for the application.

b. Horizontal Raceways In areas where pressure integrity between walls is required, a sleeve penetration is filled with a nonflowing, fire-resistant material or other suitable fire stop is used. In other walls, cable LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-17 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 tray penetrations utilize fire resistant seals similar to riser fire stops. Cable trays, raceways, conduit trenches, or culverts are used only for cables. All cables entering the control room are terminated there.

Integrity of the Essential (ESF) Electrical Auxiliary Power and Controls See Subsection 8.3.1.1.2 and Subsection 8.3.

2.1.1. Also, see T ables 8.3-1, 8.3-11, 8.3-12, 8.3-13 and 8.3-14 for separation of redundant ESF loads, which ensures integrity of ESF equipment during fires, or other accident conditions.

The following provisions for maintaining integrity of ESF equipment needed for safe shutdown during fires have been incorporat ed into the design of the LaSalle County Station: a. physical separation between redundant divisions of electrical auxiliary power equipment with fireproof walls separating redundant equipment;

b. ESF equipment located only in protected zones (Subsection 8.3.1.4.2.3) having a low probabi lity of being subject to damage from missiles or fire;

c. independent sources of power and controls provided for each redundant ESF division;

d. use of fire barriers wherever there is a possibility of fires occurring; and

e. installation of ESF equipment in Seismic Category I buildings for protection against earthqua kes (which can cause fires).

The following provisions for protection of ESF auxiliary power from the effects of fire-suppressing agents have been incorp orated into the design of the LaSalle County Station:

a. The control and instrument cables installed in the cable spreading room are capable of being immersed in water without damage or loss of function. There are only two penetrations through the floor of the cable spreading room to the auxiliary equipment room below. These pene trations have been specially curbed and also sealed. Floor drains are provided.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-18 REV. 13 b. Use of fireproof walls and barriers for separating redundant ESF equipment prevents spread of fire-suppressing agents such as water, CO 2 , or fire- extinguishing chemicals.

c. See the previous item referring to fire barriers for description of barriers and separation between redundant ESF cable trays.

9.5.1.3 Safety Evaluation See Appendix H for details of this evaluation. Materials selected for construction of the facility are noncombustible or are rate d as having a flame spread rating of 25 or less. Hydraulic oils used within the facility, except diesel-generator rooms (outside the reactor complex), have been selected having a flash point in excess of 600° F per ASTM D-922.56. The systems usin g oils are in separa te fire protected areas. Diesel oil storage in day tanks within the generator enclosures is designed in accordance with the requirements of N FPA 37-1975, Standard for the Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engi nes and Gas Turbines. The propagation resulting from a fire in these fire protected areas would not jeopardize a safety-related system outside this area.

The control room and associated office areas are constructed of noncombustible materials, including those having a flame sp read rating of 25 or less. There is no provision for automatic fire suppression in these areas.

Ample protected exits are provided in the st airwells as well as protection provided by the fire rated walls and d oors. No travel distance gr eater than 100 feet is needed to get into a fire-safe area. Walls in the reactor building, auxiliary building, and radwaste building are of reinforced concrete which exceed the 3-hour fire ratings.

As required by the NFPA, loss of power to the fire protection system is prevented by using the unit's 125-Vdc power supply for a power source.

The fire protection system, including external storage, is not designed to Seismic Category I. The fire protection system is designed so that fail ure of the system or parts of the system does not result in failure of Seismic Category I systems.

A single failure in the fire protection system does not prevent the system from performing its design function. Two fire pumps are provided with one being sufficient for any plausible demand. If one pump fails to start, the other pump starts and provides water to the fire protection system. The plant is encircled by a 14 inch ring header which feeds the fire protection system inside the station. If pipe rupture occurs, the affected portion of piping can be isolated and water can still be supplied. The fire protection system forms several loops in the plant, permitting portions of the system to be valved-out, thereby assuring continued water supply for the balance of the station.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-19 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 Automatic fire protection systems are electrically supervised, thereby producing system failure annunciation both in the AEER and in the control room. If a system fails to automatically actuate, it may be engaged manually or adjacent equipment (e.g., fire hoses, CO 2 hose reels, or hand held extinguishers) may be utilized.

9.5.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Initial construction and preoperational test ing of the fire protection system were conducted in accordance with the preoperat ional test program defined in Chapter 14 of the FSAR.

Periodic inspections and operational checks to demonstrate integrity are routinely performed on all fire protection systems.

These tests and inspections are identified in the Technical Requirements Manual.

The fire loss prevention program was operat ional prior to Unit 1 fuel loading. Administrative controls are used to delineate jurisdictional responsibilities between operations and construction activities when needed. These items are audited by the EGC corporate fire protection coordinator and independently by the insuring bodies.

The fire protection and detection equipment at LSCS are not classified safety-related, but they are classified as regulatory related to support the power generation objective of the station. Plant modification and plant maintenance controls are therefore exercised to assure integrity and functional responsiveness at all times.

9.5.1.5 Personnel Qualifications and Training 9.5.1.5.1 Design Phase Responsibility for Fire Protection As a member of Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL), EGC utilizes fire protection criteria and guidelines provided in the NEIL Property Loss Prevention Standards for Nuclear Generating Stations

." Sargent & Lundy Engineers designed the fire protection systems for CECo. Th ey are experienced in nuclear station design. During plant design, all drawings which are pertinent to fire protection were submitted to an independent fire pr otection consultant organization, Marsh &

McLennen of Chicago for evaluation. Their comments on design for improvements, modifications, and corrections were submitted directly to CECo for action. A CECo station design engineer reviewed the corrective actions for design changes and judged their effectiveness for fire protection vs. the cost-benefit ratio to determine whether the particular fire protection feature is to be incorporated into the plant. EGC evaluation criteria for fire protection cover the following:

a. plant and personnel safety, LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-20 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 b. credibility of a fi re or fire hazard, c. loss of generation capacity due to fire loss, and

d. protection of surrounding eq uipment resulting from a fire.

An independent and separate evaluation of LSCS fire protection design was made by Sargent & Lundy Engineers, CECo station design engineers, and a graduate fire protection engineer from Schirmer Engi neering Corporation, Niles, Illinois.

9.5.1.5.2 Construction Phase: Responsibilities for Fire Protection The CECo supervisor of safety has a fire protection co ordinator assigned to him with responsibilities for:

a. Adequacy of fire fighting equipment including its operation.

b. Conduct of fire inspections as required by CECo standards, underwriting bureau policies, and insurance company requirements.

c. Conduct of tests on new fire protection and fire fighting equipment; conducting and witnessing acceptance tests on fire equipment after the initial preoperational test is completed.

d. Maintaining CECo contacts with local fire departments and fire prevention organizations.

e. Issuing company policy and procedures for fire prevention and protection; supervising and coordinating the internal fire reporting forms and reports; advising departments on fire prevention rules and standards.

f. Supervising and assisting in th e training of personnel in fire protection, including the use of fire-fighting equipment.

During construction, a fire inspection was performed at LSCS once per month by the CECo fire protection coordinator.

Independently, the site was inspected bimonthly by the NEIL (formerly Nuclear Mutual Limited) Consultants. On-call fire inspections were conducted at the request of the station project superintendent or the LSCS station operations superintendent.

During the construction phase, the stat ion project superintendent had onsite responsibility for fire loss prevention.

9.5.1.6 Other Administrative Requirements LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-21 REV. 20, APRIL 2014 All administrative controls for fire protection that were contained in the Technical Specifications, including the minimum requir ed fire protection systems, limiting conditions for operation, compensatory actions, surveillance requirements, and minimum fire brigade staffing requirements, have been transferred to the Technical Requirements Manual. Changes to the fire protection Technical Requirements Manual are performed in accordance with the standard fire protection license condition(s).

9.5.2 Communication

Systems The purpose of the communications system is to provide reliable intraplant and plant-to-offsite communications. The co mmunication system is designed to be centrally controlled from the main control room. During emergency conditions, when the main control room is not ava ilable, the following communication items are remotely provided in the auxiliary equipment room: the public address system, intraplant radio system, local dial telephones, and a plant-to-offsite radios system. Power supply for the public address system and emergency radio is obtained from buses which can be fed from the standby power system. All equipment within the communication systems is non-Class 1E.

9.5.2.2 System Description The communication subsystems provided within the LSCS are as follows: a public address system, a dial telephone system , a sound-powered telephone system, an intraplant radio system, a plant-to-offsite radio system, a microwave system, the Nuclear Accident Reporting System, and the Federal Telephone System.

9.5.2.2.1 Public Address System The public address system consists of five independent subsystems as follows:

Zone 1 - Unit 1 Zone 2 - Unit 2 Zone 3 - New and existing service buildings Zone 4 - Main (and future receiving) warehouses Zone 5 - Existing gatehouse, central al arm station, new main access facility, (future receiving warehouse security room).

The public address system integrates a system of speakers and handset paging units located throughout the facilities. Paging ca n be initiated from any single handset unit, from handsets within the control room, or from the dial telephone system. By manual selection, paging from the control room will override paging from any handset.

The public address system for the fire zones consists of approximately 130 handset stations, two merge isolator assemblies, an override transmitter assembly, a tone receiver/control switching assembly, a telephone interface, and about 170 speakers.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-22 REV. 20, APRIL 2014 9.5.2.2.2 Dial Telephone System The dial telephone system consists of local telephone company PBX equipment and telephone stations located throughout the plant including the main control room. The power supply to the telephone PBX equipme nt is obtained from either the Unit 2 non-ESF power system or the Technical Support Center diesel generator via an automatic bus transfer switch.

9.5.2.2.4 Microwave System

The microwave system consists of solid-state, battery-powered equipment designed and engineered primarily for the protective relaying of the transmission system. However, a voice channel is provided which serves as an additional offsite communication medium. The tones received via this channel have volume, fidelity, and freedom from extraneous noises comparable with the quality normally obtained on a commercial telephone.

9.5.2.2.5 Intraplant Radio System

The intraplant radio system provides five independent communications channels for the security system and operations personnel. Remote control consoles control the centrally located base stations. The base stations are cabled to remotely located antennas providing communications to portable radios throughout the plant.

Communication from one portable radio to an other is via redundant centrally located repeaters or radio to radio.

9.5.2.2.6 Plant-to-Offsite Radio System Communication outside the plant is maintained through the local telephone company, with emergency offsite backup co mmunication facilities being provided through a licensed, emergency two-way radio transmitter and receiver.

9.5.2.2.7 Sound-Powered Telephone System Sound-powered telephones are used in special areas where instrumentation racks and controls are installed. Jacks for sound-powered te lephones are installed at local instrument racks and panels, on the front of selected control room benchboards, and at two jack stations in each reactor containment. This type of communication is an aid to the instrument mechanics when testing and adjusting instrumentation and controls and it is also used for emergency communications.

9.5.2.2.8 Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS)

The NARS is a dedicated telephone voice communications system that has been installed for the purpose of notifying State and local authorities of declared nuclear emergencies. This system links the CR, EOF, and TSC with state and local authorities as appropriate.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-23 REV. 20, APRIL 2014 9.5.2.2.9 Federal Telephone System (FTS)

The FTS bypasses the Public Switched Network (PSN) to provide telephone communication with the NRC even when the PSN is unavailable due to heavy communications traffic. The FTS cons ists of the following subsystems:

a. Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), The ERDS provides direct electronic transmission of a limited set of station parameters from the main computer to the NRC during an emergency.

b. Emergency Notifications System (ENS), The ENS consists of a dedicated telephone connected to the NRC. The ENS phone is located in the Main Control Room with an extension in the Technical Support Center.

c. Health Physics Network (HPN), The HPN phone is used to establish communications with the NRC to discuss radiological and meteorological conditions (in-plant and off-site). d. Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL), and Phone used to conduct internal NRC discussions on plant and equipment conditions separate from the licensee without interfering with the exchange of information between the NRC and licensee.

e. Protective Measures Co unterpart Link (PMCL) Phone used to conduct internal NRC discussions on radiological releases and meteorological conditions, and the need for protective actions. 9.5.2.3 Inspection and Testing Requirements The inspection and testing requiremen ts for the communication systems are provided as follows:

The plant-to-offsite radio is given an operation check twice a year.

The other communication systems, including the intraplant radio system, are in daily use and are tested and repaired as needed.

9.5.3 Lighting

Systems The general purpose of the lighting systems is to provide sufficient lighting of desired quality in all areas of the stat ion, indoors and outdoors, for normal, essential, and emergency conditions.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-24 REV. 13 9.5.3.1 Design Bases

a. The lighting system is designed for the normal life (40 years) of the plant, with normal replacement of failed bulbs and ballasts.

b. Emergency lighting is supplied from the ESF buses and the normal lighting is supplied from the remaining buses.

c. Balance of plant (BOP) and safe shutdown 8-hour d-c battery pack units are wired directly to the ESF and non-ESF power sources and switch on automati cally if a-c power fails. A sufficient number of BOP battery pack units are installed throughout the plant so as to be readily available to the operators for emergency purposes. In addition 8-hour emergency lighting battery packs required for safe shutdown are installed throughout the plant in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, to provide illumination of safe shutdown equipment and access/egress routes in the event that the normal station lighting system is disabled by a fire.

d. The control room lighting systems are designed to prevent mechanical failure during design basis Seismic Class I conditions. The normal and essential lighting systems are

independent and separate systems, supplied from separate sources. e. The a-c emergency and d-c lighting power supplies (the sources and the distribution equipment) are Class 1E electrical equipment.

f. Lighting fixtures are not seismi cally qualified. The structural supports are seismically qualified in areas where seismic equipment failure could cause injury to operating personnel or to safety-related equipment.

9.5.3.2 System Description 9.5.3.2.1 Normal Lighting System The normal lighting system consists of the following:

a. Incandescent fixtures and outlets are installed in the drywells to provide normal lighting and local lighting for maintenance work areas.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-25 REV. 13 b. Mercury vapor or fluorescent fi xtures are installed throughout the plant for normal lighting, esse ntial, or standby a-c lighting. They are installed in the main control room, auxiliary equipment rooms, computer room, switchgear rooms, radwaste control room, offices, conference rooms, and laboratories.

c. Sodium vapor lighting is installed in the (outdoor) transformer area, switchyard area, and the roadway lighting area (including security lighting).

d. High-pressure sodium-vapor type lighting is installed in the turbine room (main, basement, and mezzanine floors), storerooms (general and bins), screen house, fuel handling areas, radwaste areas, machine shop, oil and diesel rooms, reactor building (ground and mezza nine floors), off-gas building, and the auxiliary building (main, mezzanine, and ground floors). e. Security lighting is referenced in Section 13.7.

A-c station lighting is the normal lighting system used throughout the plant.

The normal a-c lighting cabinets are energized from the non-ESF 480-volt motor control centers. The normal lighting cannot operate if both the system and unit auxiliary transformers are out of service.

9.5.3.2.2 Emergency (or Standby) Lighting A-C Lighting A-c emergency (or standby) station lightin g is the lighting provided for station operation during a loss of normal a-c auxiliary power. It is limited to the lighting required for the control and maintenance of ESF equipment (such as the ESF

switchgear, emergency cooling equipment, control equipment, etc.) and for the access routes to this equipment. It represents approximately 7.5% of all station lighting. It is energized from the 480-Volt ESF motor control centers and thus receives power from the diesel generators when, and if, the sources of normal a-c auxiliary power fail.

The control room emergency lighting system is similar to the normal lighting system except that the source of a-c powe r is supplied from the engineered safety features power distribution system. These lights are normally in service at all times.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-26 REV. 13 Emergency Battery-Operated Lighting 8-hour balance of plant and safe shutdown battery emergency lighting units are provided in various locations in sufficient quantity to provide supplemental lighting for maintenance and supervision of both BOP and safe shutdown equipment.

The battery emergency lighting system in the control room consists of battery operated lighting units located strategically within the control room. The units are normally de-energized and operated automatically upon failure of the ESF or non-ESF a-c lighting systems.

D-C Lighting The d-c emergency lighting system in the control room consists of incandescent lighting fixtures installed in a manner similar to the normal lighting system. The system is normally de-energized and is automatically energized from the 125-volt battery system upon loss of a-c power to the ESF 480-volt buses.

D-c emergency lighting is limited to incandescent lamp fixtures at stairwells and at exit points of various areas of the plant, outside of the control room.

9.5.3.3 Reliability/Availability/Redundancy Requirements Power supply for the a-c emergency light ing system comes from a group of 277/480-volt circuits which in turn are supplied from main ESF switchgroups having standby diesel-generator backup supplies.

Incandescent lighting circuits are supplied at 120-volts from transformers connected to the 277/480-volts circuits.

In the event of a loss of normal onsite and offsite power, provision is made for automatically shedding all but approximately 10% of the normal lighting load so as to avoid excessive loading of the standby diesel-generator system. These lighting circuits can then be manually re-energized by operator action when load conditions permit. Essential lighting in the ESF divisional (safety-related) areas is supplied from its respective diesel-generator feeds. The control room lighting is supplied equally from Unit 1 and Unit 2, (on a 50/50 basis).

In addition, provision is made for automati c transfer of approximately 2.5% of the normal lighting system to the 125-volt batte ry system in the event of a loss of a-c supply so as to provide emergency lighting for essential areas in the plant. The emergency lighting system includes the main control room, safety-related equipment and control areas, standby a-c equipment areas, and access and exit routes.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-27 REV. 18, APRIL 2010 As a supplement to the station battery supplied emergency lighting system, additional self-contained, battery operated emergency lighting units of a portable or semiportable type are provided where required. These are equipped with 4-hour battery supplies.

9.5.4 Diesel-Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System The design objective of the diesel fuel oil storage and transfer system is to supply fuel to the diesel generator during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) as well as for all conditions of shutdown without a LOCA.

9.5.4.1 Design Bases 9.5.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases Specific safety design bases for the five fuel oil storage and transfer systems are as follows:

a. The system is designed consistent with automatic startup of each diesel-generator set such that required loads can be accepted within the required time.

b. All system piping and components required to assure a 7-day supply of fuel to the diesel generators are designed to Seismic Category I and ASME Section III, Class 3 requirements and

are protected from tornadoes, mi ssiles, pipe whip, and floods.

c. The entire diesel-generator sy stem consisting of five diesel generators including the associat ed fuel storage and transfer system is designed to meet single failure criteria. Each fuel system or diesel generator in it self does not need to meet the single failure criteria.

d. The usable diesel fuel volume required to support each Division 1 and 2 diesel generator continuous operation at rated load for 7 days is 32,200 ga llons. The usable diesel fuel volume required to support each Division 1 and 2 diesel generator continuous operation at rated load for 6 days is 27,600 gallons. The onsite diesel fuel storage consists of the storage tank and the day tank.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-28 REV. 18, APRIL 2010

e. The usable diesel fuel volume required to support each Division 3 diesel generator continuous operation at maximum expected load profile for 7 days is 30,000 gallons.

The usable diesel fuel volume required to support each Division 3 diesel generator continuous operation at maximum expected load profile for 6 days is 25,900 gallons.

The onsite diesel fuel storage consists of the storage tank and the day tank. The Division 3 diesel generator minimum required onsite diesel fuel volume requirement is based on the following:

1. High-pressure core spray (HPCS) pump operation at maximum power demand conditions for 25 hours2.893519e-4 days 0.00694 hours 4.133598e-5 weeks 9.5125e-6 months , after which time the pump operates at runout flow for the balance of the 7-day period.

All other Division 3 loads operate at maximum power for the full 7-day period.

2. The diesel fuel consumption rate at maximum expected load profile conditions is 185.3 gallons per hour for the first 25 hours2.893519e-4 days 0.00694 hours 4.133598e-5 weeks 9.5125e-6 months , and 165.5 gallons per hour for both the remaining 143 hours0.00166 days 0.0397 hours 2.364418e-4 weeks 5.44115e-5 months of the7-day period and the remaining 119 hours0.00138 days 0.0331 hours 1.967593e-4 weeks 4.52795e-5 months of the 6-day period. These diesel fuel consumption rates are based on the use of API Gravity 27 Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel Fuel.

3. A 1000 gallon margin over the design basis fuel consumption based on item 1 operational requirements is provided which will allow for future modifications to the HPCS system which increase either the electrical load or the diesel fuel consumption rate. The margin also provides an operating margin to minimize required refilling while allowing for diesel generator testing, diesel fire pump day tank filling, diesel fire pump testing, sampling, and evaporation.

f. Fuel storage and day tanks have low levels annunciated in the main control room. Day tank low level alarm setpoints are such that a minimum of 50 minutes of fuel remains following alarm actuation. Storage tank low level alarms are set such that the minimum 7-day supply is available at alarm actuation.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-29 REV. 18, APRIL 2010

g. Fire protection and provisions to prevent the spread of leaking fuel oil are incorporated. For further criteria and

information concerning fire prot ection, see Subsection 9.5.1.

h. Environmental design bases ar e as follows: during diesel operation, temperatures are limited to 122° F maximum and 50° F minimum with a relative humidity of 0%-100%. When the diesels are not operating, temperatures are limited to 104° F maximum and 50° F minimum with 0%-100% relative humidity. A discussion of the diesel-generator facilities ventilation systems is provid ed in Subsection 9.4.5.

i. System equipment and piping design is based on a 40- year life considering the effects of corrosion, erosion, metal fatigue, and radiation.

j. The system is designed to be operable during all modes of plant operation when electrical power is available to permit verification of operability at any time without disrupting normal plant operations. System components and piping are designed and located to facilitate access for inservice inspection.

k. Consideration is given to the prevention of contaminants and sediment from being drawn into the diesel engine's fuel system. Sample points are provided at each day tank and storage tank to detect and drain off water or sediments which may accumulate.

9.5.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The diesel-generator units, including the fuel storage and transfer systems, are not required during power generation since provisions are made to transfer fuel from the HPCS diesel storage tanks to the diesel fire pump day tanks located in the lake screen house. Piping and equipment associated with this transfer system are not considered nuclear safety related and are therefore not designed to Seismic Category I or ASME Section III requirements except, where loss of integrity could affect the operability of the diesel-generator fuel storage and transfer system.

9.5.4.2 System Description To meet the single failure criteria each diesel-generator unit is provided with a separate fuel storage and transfer system consisting of a day tank, storage tank, one transfer pump, and the associated piping valves, instrumentation and LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-30 REV. 18, APRIL 2010 controls. Electrical separation is maintained by supplying electrical power to each system from the essent ial power supply division of the associated diesel generator. Each of the five fuel st orage and transfer systems is completely independent.

The Division 1 and 2 diesel generator usable diesel fuel storage tank and day tank capacities are 37,724 gallons and 828 gallons each, respectively. The Division 3 diesel generator usable diesel fuel storage tank and day tank capacities are 33,127 gallons and 1,828 gallo ns each, respectively. All tanks are constructed of carbon steel. No internal tank coatings have been applied as these could detach and clog system strain ers; effective corrosion protection is accomplished by the film of fuel oil which will exist on intern al tank surfaces.

During operation each diesel engine requires 4.5 gpm of fuel; excess fuel not used for combustion is returned to the storage tank. Each diesel oil transfer pump has been sized to deliver a minimum of 20 gpm to the day tank with the storage tank at low level. The transf er pumps are constructed entirely of stainless steel and are driven by 5 hp, 460-volt, 3 phase, 60 Hz electric motors.

A strainer is installed in the piping be tween each storage tank outlet and the associated transfer pump to trap sediment particles before oil is transferred to the day tank. In addition, the day tank fuel outlet to the diesel engine is elevated 3 inches above the bottom of the tank and the entire tank is sloped slightly away from the fuel outlet towards a drain connection to permit condensation and fine sediments to be drained off. Storage tank outlet connections are similarly protected with su ction intakes raised off the bottom of the tanks.

All system piping and components, except for fill piping, are located entirely within the diesel buildings. Each storage tank and the associated transfer pump is located in a separate room in the bas ement of the diesel building. Day tanks are located on the grade floor near the diesel-generator unit and are isolated from all other equipment in the diesel-generator room within liquid-tight compartments having a 3-hour fire rati ng. Each storage tank has its own Seismic Category I 3-inch fill pipe which is routed underground to one of two fill stations. The fill pipes terminate 4 feet above ground and are normally capped.

Inside the diesel building, each fill pipe contains a normally closed isolation valve and a drain connection upstream of th e isolation valve. Buried fill piping is protected by coal tar enamel and tape coatings.

Storage and day tank vents are fitted with flame arrestors and are located on an outside wall of the diesel building approximately 15 feet above grade.

The LaSalle diesel fuel oil storage and transfer system substantially conforms to the safety requirements of ANSI N-195 as indicated in the detailed discussion LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-30a REV. 18, APRIL 2010 above. The only exceptions to ANSI N-195 are the following. The standard requires duplex strainers in the transfer pump suction pipe whereas the LSCS diesel engines have a fuel pump suction strainer and duplex filters upstream of the injectors. For Division 1 and 2, this duplex filter unit has a local alarm on high differential pressure. Such alarm is remotely indicated as a diesel engine trouble alarm in the control room. Division 3 does not have a high differential pressure alarm on the duplex filter unit.

Additionally, the fuel lines are filtered at two other locations: one is on the fill line upstream of the separate bulk storage tank for each diesel generator; th e second is upstream of the diesel fuel transfer pump which transfers fuel oil from the dedicated bulk storage tank to the day fuel tank for each separate dies el engine. These strainers are Y-pattern strainers with cleanout traps. See Drawing Nos. M-85, M-132, M-2085, and M-2132 for further details of the system.

In addition, Drawing Nos. M-1 through M-17 show the arrangement of the diesel-generator building and of the equipment inside the diesel-generator rooms.

The permanent connection from the Division 3 fuel oil storage tanks to the diesel driven fire pumps is an ex ception as stated to ANSI N-195. Significant loss of fuel from the Division 3 storage tanks due to failure of the non-seismic diesel fire pump fuel transfer system is prevented by means of a fail-closed solenoid valve.

In addition, the HPCS EDG minimum fu el inventory includes a 1,000 gallon contingency margin for manual diesel fire pump day tank filling, testing and/or sampling, etc.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-31 REV. 15. APRIL 2004 9.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation Only locked open manual valves are installed between the day tank and the diesel engine and each day tank contains sufficient fuel for several hours of operation. Thus, the system requires no electrical power to supply fuel to the diesel engine during starting and initial operation.

Each system is independent of the other four systems and is physically separated from the other systems. Electrical power for transfer pump operation and instrumentation is received from the power supply division of the associated diesel generator. Thus, a single failure within any one of the five systems will affect only the associated diesel genera tor and no others. The remaining four diesel generators provide sufficient electrical power to safely shut down both

units or to mitigate the consequences of an accident in one unit while safely shutting down the other unit.

Sufficient fuel is stored for operation of the associated diesel-generator unit for the five large diesels at the maximum re quired load for 7 da ys. This allows sufficient time to replenish fuel supplies from offsite sources by truck or rail transport. Normally No. 2 diesel fuel is readily available from numerous offsite sources such as fuel oil wholesalers, distributors, and refineries located within a 100-mile radius of the site. Millions of gallons of diesel fuel are produced and stored in the Chicago area for normal consumption by the railroad and trucking industries serving the area.

Fuel oil can be delivered to the site either by truck or railroad and unloaded directly from the transport vehicle into the storage tanks. Also, there is a barge dock near the LSCS site which could be used as an emergency transport route for fuel oil, from which the station could be supplied. Public and site road and railway facilities are discussed in Chapters 1.0 and 2.0. Even assuming a local PMP flood as discussed in Chapter 2.0, fuel oil deliveries would be delayed for only a few hours, it at all, until flood levels receded. Unloading from the transport vehicle would not be affected by a PMP flood, since the fill pipes terminate well above the highest flood level.

The fire pump diesels utilize fuel which is transferred from the main plant diesel storage tanks. These two diesels ea ch have a 550-gallon day tank which contains sufficient fuel to operate each fire pump for a minimum of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months after the low level alarm is received. Additional time is available depending on the initial level in the tanks. Normal operat ion requires only on e fire pump. This fire protection system was designed according to NFPA20 which requires system operation for a minimum of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Even though sequential operation was not the reason for installing a two-pump system (reliability dictated the design), by sequentially operating the two fire pumps to fuel exhaustion (for a hypothetical case of day tank isolation) a minimum of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months is available in which to refuel these day tanks by some method to overcome the isolation fault.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-31a REV. 15, APRIL 2004 Tornado and missile protection is provided by locating all components within the reinforced concrete Seismic Category I diesel building. In the unlikely event that a missile should damage the exposed aboveground portions of the diesel oil storage tank fill pipes, the storage tanks can be filled directly from a truck transport by use of hoses. Also, since the storage and day tanks are each fitted with a separate vent line and the air spaces of the two tanks are connected via the day tank overflow, both tanks will vent through one vent pipe if the exposed part of one vent line is damaged by a missile. In the unlikely event that both day tank and storage tank vents are rendered inoperable by a missile, both tanks will still vent to the storage tank room via the storage tank overflow line.

Significant loss of fuel from the Division 3 storage tanks due to failure of the non-seismic diesel fire pump fuel transfer system is prevented by means of a LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-32 REV. 13 fail-closed solenoid valve. This valve is normally closed ex cept when the diesel fire pump fuel transfer pump is operating.

Water and solid contaminants are prevented from entering the system by locating the fill pipes well above the pr obable maximum flood level and capping the inlets. The flame arrestors on the tank vent lines are likewise located well above the flood level and the flame arrestor design prevents rain from entering.

The normally closed fill pipe isolation valves located inside controlled access areas prevent inadvertent introduction of deleterious materials into the storage tanks. All system components are designed to withstand the environmental operating conditions.

Day tank overflow nozzles are located at an elevation below the engine fuel injectors. This precludes the possibility of an engine cylinder becoming hydraulically locked during standby, shou ld an engine mounted fuel block check valve fail to seat properly. To ensure a reliable fast start, the diesel generator day tank standby level is maintained at an elevation to assure slight positive pressure at the engine pumps. The fuel transfer pump start setpoint and low-level alarm setpoints are established to assure an adequate net positive suction head at the engine fuel pumps and to ensure that the fuel transfer pump will start and deliver the required fuel o il before the low level alarm actuates.

To preclude accidental ignition within the storage and transfer system, the storage and day tanks are isolated by locating them in separate fire-rated enclosures. No open flames are permitte d in the diesel-generator rooms. The only hot surfaces in the diesel-generator rooms are in the diesel exhaust system, and these are insulated as completely as possible. All fuel oil system piping is separated from these hot surfaces by a minimum of 10 feet.

Day tank level instruments are Seismic Category I and Class 1E to assure automatic operation during an emergency.

In the unlikely event of failure of the day tank instruments controlling the transfer pump, the pump can be operated manually to assure a continuous supply of fuel to the diesel generators. The non-Seismic Category I, non-Class 1E storage tank level instruments serve only to provide a means of remote storage tank level indication and to provide an alarm if the 7-day fuel requirement is in jeopardy. Although operation of these instruments can not be assured in an emer gency or loss of offsite power, storage tank level can be determined at any time by visual observation.

9.5.4.4 Testing and Inspection The diesel-generator systems provide stan dby power sources in the event of loss of offsite power. Readiness is demonstrated by periodic testing, simulating as far as possible actual operating conditio ns. The test program demonstrates the LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-33 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 ability to start the diesel-generator units and to run under full load long enough to bring all components of the systems, including the fuel storage and transfer systems, to equilibrium conditions.

Components and piping, except for interconnecting piping between the day tanks and the diesel skids which is encased in the diesel room floor, are accessible for visual inspection.

Fuel oil quality requirements for the diesel generators are in accordance with applicable ASTM Standards and the manufacturer's recommendations. Samples are obtained from the storage tank periodically and analyzed in accordance with the plant technical specifications. Moisture and sediment accumulations in the storage and day tanks can be re moved through drain connections.

9.5.4.5 Instrumentation and Controls Fuel levels in each day tank and storage tank are indicated locally, and storage tank levels are also indicated at each storage tank filling station. Control room alarms annunciate high or low levels in each day tank and low level in each storage tank. All day tank level instruments and diesel-generator transfer pump controls are Seismic Category I and Class 1E. A local pressure indicator is connected to the discharge of each transfer pump to monitor pump discharge head. A local differential pressure indicator is connected across the transfer pump suction strainer to identify a clogged strainer.

Each diesel engine gauge panel includes local gauges for monitoring the following diesel-generator skid-mounted system fuel oil parameters: fuel oil temperature, fuel pump suction strainer inlet and outlet pressure (Divisions 1 and 2 diesel generators only), fuel pump discharge pressure, fuel filter inlet pressure, and fuel filter outlet pressure s (for the Division 3 diesel generators, filter inlet and outlet pressure gauges are mounted on the engine and not on the gauge panel). In addition, pressure switches are installed in the skid-mounted systems to annunciate high fuel filter di fferential pressure for the Divisions 1 and 2 diesel generators and low fuel pu mp discharge pressure for the Division 3 diesel generators. The entire skid-mounted fuel oil system, including instrumentation, is supplied by the engine manufacturer as a part of the diesel engine. Each diesel-generator fuel transfer pump is started and stopped automatically by day tank level control switches. The diesel fire pump fuel transfer pump is started manually; however, it is automatically shut down by day tank high level.

Elapsed time instrumentation monitors diesel-generator transfer pump running time and, when the diesel engine is operating, pump shutdown time. This instrumentation actuates control room alarm lights if pump running time is LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-34 REV. 20, APRIL 2014 excessive or shutdown time is too short to permit remote detection of possible fuel oil leaks at the day tank or diesel generator.

9.5.5 Diesel-Generator Cooling Water System The function of the diesel-generator cooling water system is to transfer the heat rejected from the engine water jacket, the lube oil cooler and the engine air aftercooler to the CSCS equipment cooling water system (CSCS-ECWS).

9.5.5.1 Design Bases 9.5.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases Cooling capacity of this system is based on a diesel-generator output of 2860 kW with an environmental temperature of 122° F maximum and a minimum and maximum lake water temperature of 32° F and 107° F, respectively. Total heat transfer by this system is approximately 7.8 x 10 6 Btu/hr per diesel-generator set at rated engine capacity. The Division I and II diesel cooling water heat exchangers

are sized based on operation of 110% of ra ted load. The Division III diesel cooling water heat exchangers are sized based on operation of 100% of rated load.

High water temperature is alarmed at 200° F and the engine is automatically shut down if the cooling water temperature at the engine outlet exceeds 208° F in order to prevent engine damage due to overheating. This shutdown control is in effect only when the engine is started manually an d bypassed when the diesel generator is started automatically during an emergency.

Heaters are installed in the cooling water pipi ng below the lube oil cooler to maintain the engine water and lube oil in a warm standby condition while the engine is not operating; thus increasing the starting reliability of the diesel generator. Natural convection is employed to circulate the warm engine water through the lube oil cooler during standby.

Each system is designed based on Seismic Category I requirements and is protected from tornadoes, missiles, and flooding.

9.5.5.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The diesel-generator cooling water system is not required during power generation.

Consequently, it possesses no power generation design bases.

9.5.5.2 System Description Each diesel-generator cooling water system is a separate, independent closed loop system supplied with the diesel generator an d located entirely on the diesel-generator skid. It consists of two parallel engine driven centrifugal circulating pumps, a low-pressure expansion tank, an AMOT temperature regulating valve, a LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-35 REV. 13 lube oil cooler, and the engine cooling wate r heat exchanger. The expansion tank is fitted with a 7 psig relief cap which also will relieve vacuum. Engine coolant is demineralized water treated with an added corrosion inhibitor consistent with the engine manufacturer's recommendations.

During operation, cooling water at a flow of 1100 gpm per diesel-generator set is circulated by the engine driven pumps th rough the diesel engine cooling water passages to the lube oil cooler, through the temperature regulating valve, and then to the engine cooling water heat exchanger. See Figure 9.5-5 for additional details.

The engine cooling water heat exchanger is a two-pass shell and tube type heat exchanger having admiralty tubes with a carbon steel water box and shell. Engine cooling water is circulated through the shell side while strained lake water is pumped through the tube side by the CSCS-ECWS (Subsection 9.2.1). Design pressure and temperature is 150 psig and 300° F for both the shell and tube side.

Heat exchangers for the Division 1 and 2 di esel generators are designed, fabricated, and tested in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 3 and TEMA C. The Division 3 diesel-generator heat exchangers are designed, fabricated, and tested in accordance with ASME Section VIII, Division I and TEMA C.

The AMOT temperature regulating valve is a thermostatic control valve which directs cooling water flow either to the c ooling water heat exchanger or to a bypass around the heat exchanger. The ther mal element employs a thermostatic wax which expands when heated and moves a piston connected to the sliding bypass valve. Movement of the piston is resisted by spring force.

The design of the valve is such that flow resistance is constant regardless of valve position. The thermal element is self-contained an d preset to maintain an operating engine cooling water temperature below 200° F.

The diesel cooling water expansion tank is located at the highest point of the system except for a portion of the cooling water return piping between the engine and the temperature-regulating valve. The system is arranged such that no heat transfer surface can become airbound, and piping high points are vented as necessary to the expansion tank.

9.5.5.3 Safety Evaluation Each diesel engine's cooling water system is an independent self-contained system. A failure which would prevent operation of one diesel engine cannot affect operation of the remaining four diesel generators. Adequate power can be generated by four diesel generators to safely shut down both units or to mitigate the consequences of any of the postulated accidents in one uni t while simultaneously shutting down the other unit.

To prevent metal fatigue, flexible connect ions are used where necessary to isolate engine vibration from the cooling water piping.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-36 REV. 13 9.5.5.4 Testing and Inspection The availability of the engine cooling water system is operationally verified as part of the monthly overall engine performance checks. The engine is operated for a sufficient length of time for sy stem temperatures to stabilize.

The engine cooling water is also sampled at regular intervals and is treated or replaced as necessary to maintain wate r quality within the recommended limits established by the engine manufacturer.

9.5.5.5 Instrumentation and Controls

Engine cooling water temperature at the engine outlet and pressure at the circulating pump outlet are indicated on the engine gauge board. In addition, skid mounted instrumentation is provided to monitor engine water temperature at the engine outlet, engine inlet, heat exchanger outlet, and lube oil cooler outlet. Temperature switches installed at the engine outlet actuate local and control room alarms at 200° F and automatically trip the engine at a temperature of 208° F. This automatic trip is bypassed, however, when the engine is started automatically during an emergency.

A temperature switch installed in the lube oil cooler controls the electric immersion heater used to keep the engine in a warm standby condition. Low-temperature switches on the Divisions 1 and 2 diesel generators actuate local and control room alarms if engine temperature drops below 85° F to detect failure of the diesel cooling water heaters.

9.5.6 Diesel-Generator Starting Air System The purpose of the diesel-generator starting air system is to provide a quick, reliable, and automatic start of the generators.

9.5.6.1 Design Bases 9.5.6.1.1 Safety Design Bases The design objective of each diesel starting air system is to automatically start the associated diesel-generator unit such that rated frequency and voltage is achieved and the unit is ready to accept required loads within the required time.

Each Diesel Generator is provided with its own starting air system which is independent of the starting air systems for the other diesel generators.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-37 REV. 15, APRIL 2004 The system design is based on Seismic Ca tegory I requirements and incorporates protection from tornadoes, external missiles, floods, and other natural phenomena.

The starting air system, for each diesel-generator consists of two starting subsystems. The air storage capacity of each subsystem is based on a minimum of five normal cranking cycles in rapid succession without the use of the air compressor for the Division 1 and Division 2 diesel generators and three normal cranking cycles in rapid succession without the use of the air compressor for the Division 3 diesel generators, assuming the second subsystem fails to operate. A normal cranking cycle is assumed to be when the diesel generator will start and accelerate to 900 rpm +5%, -2% within 13 seconds. The minimum receiver pressure at initiation of the starting sequence is less than or equal to the air compressor auto start setpoin t of approximately 200 psig.

The minimum air receiver pressure required to assure a single normal cranking cycle is approximately 165 psig when starting with one subsystem and approximately 140 to 155 psig when starting with both subsystems. Therefore, a low air pressure alarm is set at about 200 psig to ensure prompt notification to the control room of an abnormal pressure condition below approximately 210 psig normal minimum header pressure.

9.5.6.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases Since the diesel generators are not required during plant power generation, the diesel-generator starting air system has no power generation bases. The system, which is available for operational testing during any mode of plant operation, is required to remain in a standby condition.

9.5.6.2 System Description Each diesel generator has its own independ ent starting air system consisting of two full capacity subsyste ms. All system piping and components, except for interconnecting piping to the diesel, are located on the diesel-generator skid and the associated starting air compressor skid.

Basically, each subsystem includes an air compressor and a receiver tank on the compressor skid; on the diesel-generat or skid, each subsystem includes a pressure regulating valve, a strainer, a three-way solenoid valve, an air relay valve, an in-line lubricator, and two pneu matic starting motors. To prevent oil and moisture accumulations, each subsystem is provided with a moisture separator and refrigerated air dryer between the air compressor and air receiver tank. In addition oil, moisture, or rust carry-over is prevented by locating the air receiver outlets approximately 5 feet above the bottom of the LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-37a REV. 15, APRIL 2004 air receivers. Air receivers are checked and drained periodically via their drain valves. Fouling of the air starting valves is prevented by the strainer downstream of the pressure regulating valve. For further details, see Drawing No. M-83.

On receipt of a start signal, both starting air subsystems are engaged simultaneously. Air from the receiver ta nks is reduced in pressure to 185 psig LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-38 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 by the air regulator valve. The start sign al realigns the three-way solenoid valve from the vented position to the start position, which supplies control air to the starting motor pinion actuators and to the air relay valve. Porting of the pinion actuators is such that control air is not supplied to the air relay valve until both pinions engage with the flywheel ring ge ar. The air relay va lve is opened by control air pressure and air is then supplied to the starting air motors.

Cranking is terminated by deenergizi ng the three-way solenoid valve which returns to the vented position. This vents air from the air relay valve operator thereby shutting off air to the starter motors and disengaging the starter pinions. Each system includes two air compressors which are both driven by 460-volt, 3-phase electric motors. Electric power is supplied to air compressor motors from the essential power supply division of the associated diesel generator to maintain electrical separation. Each compressor is automatically started and stopped by a pressure switch on the corresponding air receiver tank.

Each subsystem for the Division 1 and 2 diesel generators is provided with a 32 ft 3 air receiver tank and a 35 ft 3 air receiver tank which have been designed, fabricated, and tested to ASME Section III, Class 3 requirements. Design pressure is 340 psig and the maximum working pressure is 250 psig. The Division 3 diesel generator starting air systems are provided with two 16-ft 3 receivers in each subsystem. These ta nks have been designed, fabricated, and tested to ASME Section VIII, Division I requirements.

Interconnecting piping between the compressor skid and diesel-g enerator skid is ASME Section III, Class 3 for all five diesel generators. Wire braid type flexible hoses are provided at each compressor skid and diesel-generator skid connection with off skid air piping to isolate vibration and prevent metal fatigue.

9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation The starting air systems for each of the five diesel generators are independent and separated from the remaining systems by reinforced concrete walls. Thus, a single failure which could render the starting air system of one diesel inoperative will not affect the remaining four starting air systems. Four diesel generators will provide sufficient power to safely shut down both units or to mitigate the consequences of an accident in one unit while safely shutting down the other unit.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-39 REV. 13 Each diesel-generator's starting air system is located entirely within the reinforced concrete Seismic Category I diesel-generator building and is thereby protected from tornados, missiles, and flooding.

9.5.6.4 Testing and Inspection

The starting air system for each diesel generator is operationally tested any time the diesel generator is started.

System components are accessible for visual inspection at any time during plant operation.

9.5.6.5 Instrumentation and Controls Local pressure indicators are installed on each receiver tank but not auxiliary receiver tanks for Division 1 and 2 diesel generators. Pressure switches located on the receiver outlet for the Divi sion 1 and 2 systems and immediately upstream of the air relay valve for the Division 3 systems actuate local (Division 3 only) and control room alarms on low air pressure.

Each air compressor is controlled by a pressure switch connected to the corresponding air receiver. The compresso r is started at approximately 210 psig and is stopped at approximately 240 psig.

For the refrigerated air dryers provided, indicators are installed to identify a malfunction of the air dryer unit.

9.5.7 Diesel-Generator Lubrication System The function of the diesel-generator lube oil system is to supply lube oil to the engine bearing surfaces at controlled pressure, temperature, and cleanliness conditions.

9.5.7.1 Design Bases 9.5.7.1.1 Safety Design Bases

a. The system is based on reliable fast starting such that the diesel generator can accept loads within the required time. A minimum lube oil temperature of 85° F is required for reliable fast starting. To accomplish this, the lube oil is

heated above 100° F when the engine is not operating by an immersion heater in the engine cooling water system (Subsection 9.5.5). The warm lube oil is circulated to the turbocharger bearing, engine crankshaft bearings, and oil filter during shutdown by two electric circulating pumps.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-40 REV. 13

b. To meet the single failure criterion, each diesel-generator lube oil system is independent and located entirely on the diesel-generator skid.

c. System piping and components are designed to meet Seismic Category I requirements. Tornado, missile, and flood protection is provided by loca ting the diesel-generator skid within the Seismic Category I reinforced concrete diesel-generator building. Protection against pipe whip is not necessary as the only high energy piping located within the diesel-generator building is the diesel-generator starting air system piping. The diesel generators and their associated auxiliary systems are separated from each other by reinforced concrete walls.

9.5.7.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases Since the diesel generators' sole function is to provide an onsite source of standby power to safely shut down the plant and mitigate the consequences of an accident, the diesel generators are not required to operate during plant power generation except to verify operability. Consequently, there is no power generation design basis for the diesel-generator lube oil system.

9.5.7.2 System Description The entire diesel-generator lube oil system is designed and supplied by the engine manufacturer. Each system actually consists of four separate subsystems each having a different function. These are the scavenging oil system, main lubricating system, piston cooling system, and the oil circulating and soak-back system. The complete lube oil system is shown schematically in Figure 9.5-6.

The scavenging oil system's function is to supply cooled and filtered oil to the main lubricating and piston cooling systems. Oil is drawn from the oil pan sump through a six mesh strainer and is pumped through the oil filter and oil cooler to the oil strainer tank. The scavenging oil pump is a positive displacement helical gear type pump driven directly by the diesel engine. The full-flow oil filter has a 13 micron retention rating and is provided with an automatic bypass to assure a continuous supply of oil to the engine. The lube oil co oler consists of a steel housing with brass oil cooler cores. Engine water flows through the cores while lube oil flows around the outside of the cores through extended finned surfaces.

The main lubricating oil system takes suction from the oil strainer tank and supplies oil under pressure to the various moving parts of the engine, including the turbocharger during diesel operation. The main lube oil pump is a positive displacement helical gear-type pump driven directly from the engine. A relief valve LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-41 REV. 13 on the pump discharge limits the pump discharge pressure by venting excess oil to the oil pan.

The piston cooling oil system supplies oil for piston cooling and lubrication of the piston pin bearing surfaces and cylinders. The system also takes suction from the oil strainer tank through a forty mesh strainer which is shared with the main lube oil system. The piston cooling oil pump is also a positive displacement helical gear-type pump which is mounted in tandem with and is driven by a driveshaft common with the main lube oil pump. Oil is pumped through each of two cooling oil manifolds extending the entire length of the engine. A cooling oil pipe at each cylinder directs a stream of oil through the piston carrier to the piston pin and underside of the piston.

The oil circulating and soak-back system circulates oil through the lube oil cooler, oil filter, and engine crankshaft and maintains oil pressure on the turbocharger bearings during standby. The lube oil is heated in the lube oil cooler by immersion heaters in the engine cooling water system as described in Subsection 9.5.5. One 6 gpm electrically driven pump is provided to circulate oil to the oil cooler, oil filter, and engine crankshaft, and two 3 gpm electrically driven pumps are provided in parallel to accomplish the soak-back function. The 6 gpm circulating oil pump is driven by a 1-hp, 460-Vac, 3-phase motor and one of the 3 gpm soakback pumps is driven by a 3/4-hp, 460 VAC, 3-phase moto

r. Both of these pumps are normally operating at all times while the diesel generator is shut down or operating. The other 3 gpm soak-back pump is driven by a 3/4-hp, 125-Vdc motor. This pump is energized when the AC soakback oil pump is not running to prelubricate the turbocharger bearings. A 75-psi check valve installed between the circulating and soakback lines to insure proper oil flow during engine shutdown and operation. A separate filter is provided for the turbocharger oil supply.

9.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation The diesel-generator lubrication system is an integral part of each diesel unit. The total diesel power system meets the single failure criterion in that if a failure in this system prevents the satisfactory operation of the associated diesel generator, the other four divisions of the emergency power system, described in Section 8.3, will provide adequate power to safely shut down the station or to mitigate the consequence of any of the postulated accidents.

To protect the engine in the unlikely even t of a crankcase explosion, the crankcase handhole covers will blow off. This will effectively relieve crankcase pressures before serious damage is done to the engi ne. Handhole covers are light-gauge sheet metal weighing a total of approximately 5 pounds. Consequently, they will not pose a threat to the reinforced concrete missile barriers separating adjoining diesel generators.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-42 REV. 15, APRIL 2004 9.5.7.4 Instrumentation and Controls Local indication is provided for lube oil filter inlet and outlet pressure, main lube oil manifold pressure and temperature, and soakback lube oil pressure. During engine operation switches provide local alarms for main lube oil low pressure and high temperature, lube oil filter high-differential pressure (Division 1 and 2 only) and high crankcase pressure. When the engine is shutdown, local alarms are provided for low oil cooler outlet temperature, low circulating oil pressure, and low soakback oil pressure. All local alarms are annunc iated in the main control room. Other pressure switches provide low oil pressure cranking lockout and low oil pressure engine shutdown when the diesel generator is operated manually; during operation after an automatic start these shutdown controls are bypassed.

9.5.7.5 Testing and Inspection Satisfactory operation of the entire diesel-generator lubrication system is verified as part of the regularly scheduled overall engine performance test.

Engine lube oil is sampled periodically per the engine manufacturer's recommendations to detect dilution by fuel oil or excessive oxidation, as well as water contamination. If oil is not within the engine manufacturer's specifications, it is drained completely and replaced.

External system leakage is readily detected by visual observation. Internal leakage through interfacing components can be detected by a decreasing or increasing engine lube oil level and a corresponding increasing or decreasing engine coolant level. Excessive internal leakage not resulting in a net loss of lube oil (e.g., a stuck-open relief valve) can be detected by low oil pressure instrumentation.

9.5.8 Diesel-Generator Ai r Intake and Exhaust System The function of the diesel-generator air intake system is to supply filtered air to the diesel engine for use in combustion. Th e diesel-generator exhaust system directs the exhaust gases out of the diesel building and reduces the noise level of the

exhaust. Exhaust silencing is not a safety-related function. The intake and exhaust systems are shown in Figure 9.5-7.

9.5.8.1 Design Bases 9.5.8.1.1 Safety Design Basis

a. Sizing of the intake system is based on supplying sufficient air for diesel operation at rated capacity with system pressure loss below the diesel manufacturer's recommended maximum.

Similarly, the sizing basis for the exhaust system is diesel LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-42a REV. 15, APRIL 2004 operation at rated capacity with exhaust back pressure within the engine manufacturer's recommended limit.

b. To meet single failure criteria, each diesel engine has its own completely separate and independent intake and exhaust system.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-43 REV. 13 c. Intake and exhaust system piping and component classifications are as given in Section 3.2. Pr otection against tornados, floods, and missiles is provided for the air intake and exhaust system by locating the system within the reinforced concrete diesel-generator building.

d. The air intakes and exhaust outlets are located to minimize the possibility of recirculating the exhaust gases. Additionally, pressurized gases are not stored in the vicinity of the diesel building nor are there any high or moderate energy fluid systems near the intakes.

9.5.8.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The diesel generators and consequently the air intake and exhaust system are not required during power generation except to be available for operational testing and immediate startup upon loss of power.

9.5.8.2 System Description

Each diesel generator is provided with a separate air intake and exhaust system. The intake system consists of an intake filter and 24-inch carbon steel piping connecting the filter to the diesel engine turbocharger. A 24-inch wire braid type flexible hose is installed between the diesel engine and the interconnecting piping to isolate engine vibration. The dry type inta ke filter is located on the floor above the diesel-generator unit and is supplied with filtered outside air through the diesel building ventilation system intakes.

The exhaust system consists of an exhaus t silencer and 22-inch and 30-inch alloy steel piping. An exhaust expansion bellows is installed at the turbocharger outlet to permit unrestrained expansion of the exhaust piping and to isolate engine vibration. The silencer is suspended from the ceiling above the diesel generator and the exhaust piping is routed to the roof of the diesel building where the gases are discharged horizontally away from ventilation system intakes. A 1/4-inch mesh stainless steel screen is fitted over the open end of the exhaust pipe to prevent birds and small animals from entering the exhaust system while the diesel engine is not operating.

9.5.8.3 Safety Evaluation Since each diesel generator's air intake and exhaust system is independent, a single failure which could prevent satisfactory oper ation of the associated diesel generator would not affect the remaining four diesel generators. As described in Section 8.3, four diesel generators can provide adequate power to safely shut down the station or mitigate the consequences of any of the postulated accidents.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-44 REV. 15, APRIL 2004 Due to the arrangement of the air intake an d exhaust outlets, dilution of intake air by recirculated exhaust gases in quantities su fficient to affect diesel operation is not possible. The diesel engine intake air is supplied through the diesel building ventilation system; this provides double f iltration of airborne particulates. The Division 2 and 3 ventilation system intake s are located on the diesel building wall facing the auxiliary building, and the Division 1 intake is extended up to the Auxiliary Building roof level, thus making complete blockage highly improbable.

The intake system is completely protected against missiles by locating the entire system within the diesel-generator building.

The small amount of exhaust piping on the diesel building roof is protected agains t missiles from all directions except in line with the exhaust pipe discharge. Therefore, missile damage to an exhaust pipe is very unlikely due to the small projected area and, since the exhaust pipes are physically separated, damage to more than one exhaust pipe by a single missile is not possible. Pipe whip or internally gene rated missile damage to the intake and exhaust system is not possible as there are no high or moderate energy systems (except the diesel-generator starting air system, Subsection 9.5.6) located in the vicinity of the air intake and exhaust syst em. A failure in the starting air system which could damage the intake and exhaust system would in itself prevent operation of the associated diesel generator and would constitute the single failure. The diesel

generators and their associated auxiliaries are separated by reinforced concrete walls. Low barometric pressure at the site would have no effect on diesel-generator output since the particular diesel engines used retain their full rated output up to an altitude of 7000 feet assuming a mini mum sea level barometric pressure of 28.25-inch Hg.

9.5.8.4 Testing and Inspection The diesel-generator air intake and exhaust sy stem is operationally tested as part of the regularly scheduled diesel-generator performance tests. A restriction indicator on the intake filter identifies a filter element needing replacement.

All portions of the system are readily accessible for visual inspection when necessary.

To assure an unrestricted exhaust and a ready supply of combustion air, no flow control devices are installed in the intake or exhaust flow paths. In addition, no part of the diesel intake and exhaust system is located so as to be exposed to adverse environmental conditions such as ice, fr eezing rain, or snow which could cause restriction of intake or exhaust flow.

9.5.9 Containment

Inerting System The containment inerting system is designed to maintain the containment atmosphere at less than 4% of oxygen. If large quantities of hydrogen are generated LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-45 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 following a postulated LOCA, the inerted containment atmosphere will not have sufficient oxygen to support the combustion of hydrogen.

9.5.9.1 Design Bases The following design bases were used for the containment inerting system design:

a. The inerting system is not a safety-related system and is not designed to meet seismic and other related criteria except where containment penetration and isolation is concerned, b. Inert the primary containment (drywell) and wetwell prior to power operation, c. Maintain the oxygen content of the primary containment below 4% during power operations, and

d. Provide nitrogen storage for two containment purges or re-inerting operations.

9.5.9.2 System Description The containment inerting system is designed to provide gaseous nitrogen automatically to both of the reactor containments. This system will provide gaseous nitrogen at 200,000 (SCFH) prior to power op eration when it is necessary to purge the containment atmosphere of oxygen to a concentration less than 4% by volume.

Gaseous nitrogen will also be provided as needed during reactor operation at rates of up to 5000 scf/day to maintain oxygen concentration at less than 4% by volume.

The liquid nitrogen will be stored in one 11,020 gallon tank and one 9025 gallon tank, piped together. See Drawin g Nos. M-92, M-1466, and M-138.

For high flow requirements (inerting), liquid nitrogen is drawn from both tanks simultaneously and fed to an electric water bath vaporizer rated to provide gaseous nitrogen at 200,000 scfh. This vaporizer will feed the gaseous nitrogen to a high flow pressure-temperature control manifold unit.

For low flow requirements (makeup), gaseous nitrogen is drawn simultaneously from the gaseous space of both tanks and fed to an ambient air vaporizer which will warm the nitrogen. For both the high flow and low flow requirements, gas pressure is regulated to below the design pressure of the downstream piping. Downstream piping is also protected from low temperature by flow isolation at -20°F.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-46 REV. 13 The flow of nitrogen into containment is controlled by a pressure control circuit that senses containment pressure and compares it to a manually adjustable setpoint at a manual/auto station and positions a supply valve accordingly. A handswitch in the circuit allows the choice of controlling eith er the inerting (high flow) supply or the makeup (low flow) supply as required. The handswitch as well as the containment pressure indicator and the manual/auto station are located in the control room.

9.5.9.2.1 Cryogenic Liquid Storage Vessels One 11,020 gallon tank and one 9025 gallon tank are provided. Both tanks combine to give a total system storag e of 1,866,300 scf of nitrogen.

The storage vessels consist of an aluminum inner tank supported by a carbon steel outer tank. Cryogenic liquid is stored in the aluminum inner vessel. The annular space is filled with dry powered perlite insulation and then evacuated to a high vacuum to minimize heat leakage. The tank is constructed so that it can be filled from the top and bottom alternately or simultaneously, without discontinuing service. The top and bottom fill allows the tank pressure to be maintained constant during fill operations.

a. Economizer Circuit A pressure control valve is included in the tank piping system of each tank and will bleed gas from the vapor spaces of the tanks preferentially to withdrawing liquid for vaporization. Thus, the gas which accumulated in the tank during periods of low flow will be withdrawn before the liquid for low flow requirements.

b. Pressure Buildup Circuit During high flow withdrawal, as liquid level decreases, the vapor space increases. In order to maintain the required tank pressure, a pressure buildup circui t is provided in the electric water bath vaporizer. The pressure buildup circuit draws liquid from the bottom of both storage vessels, vaporizes it through a coil in the water bath vaporizer and returns the gas thus generated to the vapor space of the storage vessels to build and maintain pressure at a suitable level above feed line pressure.

In addition, each storage vessel has its own externally mounted pressure buildup coil in a circuit which automatically vaporizes

liquid nitrogen and returns it to its vapor space. These three circuits ensure that the common storage vessel pressure is maintained at a suitable level above the houseline pressure.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-47A REV. 14, APRIL 2002 9.5.9.2.2 Vaporizer

a. 200,000 scfh High Flow Requirement For a high flow of 200,000 scfh over an 8-hour period, an electric

water bath vaporizer is provided. Nine 120 kW electric heaters are used to heat a water-glycol mixture, coils carry the nitrogen through this mixture which vapo rizes and heats the nitrogen.

b. 5000 scf/day Low Flow Requirement For low makeup flow, the economizer circuit will be used.

9.5.9.2.3 Pressure-Temperature Control Manifold

a. 200,000 scfh High Flow Requirement For a 200,000 scfh flow rate, a hi gh flow-pneumatic controlled nitrogen pressure temperature control manifold is provided. A low temperature shut off control valve (TCV) senses temperature of the nitrogen and throttles gas flow to protect downstream piping from liquid nitrogen. The TCV is totally shut off at -20°F. Downstream nitrogen pressure is used to control a pressure control valve (PCV) that regulates the downstream pressure to less than piping design pressure.

b. 5000 scf/day Low Flow Requirement The low flow nitrogen Pressure-Temperature control Manifold is skid mounted. A low temperature shut off control valve (TCV) senses temperature of the nitrogen and throttles gas flow to protect downstream piping from liquid nitrogen. The TCV is totally shut off at -20°F. Downstream nitrogen pressure is used to control a pressure control valve (PCV) that regulates the downstream pressure to less than piping design pressure.

LSCS-UFSAR 9.5-48 REV. 14, APRIL 2002 9.5.9.3 Safety Evaluation The containment inerting system is not a safety-related system. All lines penetrating the primary containment are provided with containment isolation valves which meet the requirements of Ge neral Design Criterion 56 of Appendix A of 10 CFR 50. Containment isolation is discussed in detail in Section 6.2.

9.5.9.4 Testing and Inspection Inspection of equipment is made and system performance verified periodically and after maintenance.

9.5.10 References

1. Letter from Commercial Testing Company dated June 20, 1990 on Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials. Action Item Number 373-160-91-00021.

2. Letter from A.T. Go dy, Jr., NRR, to D.L.

Farrar, CECo, Issuance of Amendment 97 to LaSalle Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 and Amendment 81 to LaSalle Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 and including Safety Evaluation Report dated March 10, 1994.

LSCS - UFSAR TABLE 9.5-1 TABLE 9.5-1 REV. 0 - APRIL 1984 LARGE LIQUID COMBUSTIBLES USED AT LA SALLE COUNTY STATION COMBUSTIBLE AMOUNT LOCATION REMARKS Recirculation pump control valve systems 236 gallons Adjacent to control rod driver modules FYRQUEL electro hydraulic control fluid HPCS diesel day tanks 1,700 gallons In tank room near diesel-generator #2 diesel oil, enclosed by 3-hour barriers, sprinkler system HPCS diesel storage tanks 34,000 gallons In tanks, inside vault below HPCS diesel- generator room #2 diesel oil, enclosed by 3-hour barriers, sprinkler system Emergency diesel-generator day tanks 750 gallons In tank room near diesel-generator #2 diesel oil, enclosed by 3-hour barriers, sprinkler system Emergency diesel-generator storage tanks 40,000 gallons In tanks, inside vent below emergency diesel-generator room #2 diesel oil, enclosed by 3-hour barriers, sprinkler system Diesel fire pump day tanks 550 gallons Lake screen house, 2 floors above the CSCS cooling water supply piping #2 fuel oil, enclosed by 3-hour barriers, sprinkler system Turbine oil tank packages 10,150 gallons Not adjacent to any safety-related equipment Automatic deluge system H 2 seat oil units 575 gallons Not adjacent to any safety-related equipment Enclosed by curbing, automatic deluge system Clean turbine oil tank 15,000 gallons Not adjacent to any safety-related equipment Automatic sprinkler protection plus CO 2 nozzle port Turbine dirty oil tank 15,000 gallons Not adjacent to any safety-related equipment Automatic sprinkler protection plus CO 2 nozzle port Turbine electro hydraulic control 800 gallons Not adjacent to any safety-related equipment FYRQUEL electro hydraulic control fluid HPCS diesel-generator lubricating oil sump 465 gallons HPCS diesel-generator Lube oil, automatic CO 2 flooding provided Standby diesel-generator lubricating oil sump 465 gallons Diesel-generator rooms Lube oil; automatic CO 2 flooding provided

ML14113A093: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 13:38, 17 March 2019

Contents

Text

9.0 AUXILIARY

9.2 WATER

9.2.6 Ultimate

9.3 PROCESS

9.3.5 Standby

9.4.9 Primary

9.5 OTHER

9.5 OTHER

9.5.2 Communication

9.5.3 Lighting

9.5.9 Containment

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ML14113A093: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 13:38, 17 March 2019

Text

9.0 AUXILIARY

9.2 WATER

9.2.6 Ultimate

9.3 PROCESS

9.3.5 Standby

9.4.9 Primary

9.5 OTHER

9.5 OTHER

9.5.2 Communication

9.5.3 Lighting

9.5.9 Containment

Navigation menu

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