NL-14-0249, Enclosure 1, Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report, Enclosure 2, Updated Farley Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Through Attachment 2
| ML14071A061 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/2014 |
| From: | Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-14-0249 | |
| Download: ML14071A061 (114) | |
Text
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Enclosure I Licensing Summary of Walkdown Report
Enclosure 1 to NL-14-0249 Licensing Summary of Walkdown Report LICENSING
SUMMARY
OF WALKDOWN REPORT The report objective is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at the Joseph M.
Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 in response to the NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic". The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis. The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 2), which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. This final report submits the entire body of the report, Attachments 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 (which are revised from Version 1 submitted November 27, 2012), and new Attachments 7 and 8 added by Version 2 of this report.
SNC submitted its original walkdown report for FNP Unit 1 on November 27, 2012, in accordance with the March 12, 2012, NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter. During that initial walkdown, some equipment was identified as not being accessible, as noted in Table 7-1 of SNC's November 27, 2012, response. This equipment could not be accessed because of one of two conditions: (1) plant operating conditions, or (2) component inspections required the opening of cabinet/panel doors which was not permitted by plant Operations personnel during the time of the walkdowns. Consequently, walkdowns had to be deferred until the outage. Additionally, supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse seismic conditions was received after the FNP Unit 1 walkdowns were complete. Consequently, walkdown of equipment affected by this guidance was deferred until after SNC's November response and was included in Table 7-1 of the November 27, 2012, response. Walkdowns of this equipment along with the equipment originally deemed as inaccessible have been completed. Table 7-1 has been updated to show this equipment as complete with the completion date noted.
During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of fourteen (14) Unit 1 Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. Eleven of these were identified and included in Version 1.0 of the FNP Seismic Walkdown Report while 3 were identified during the most recent walkdowns. It has been determined that none of these as-found conditions would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions as defined by Reference 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis. This table has been updated to provide the status of these areas.
During the most recent walkdowns, one item was deemed inaccessible and was removed from the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) 1. Item 34 in Table 7-1 was not inspected as the anchorage was not completely accessible without extensive disassembly. This change to the SWEL is acceptable since an adequate number of similar component walkdowns that satisfy the minimum SWEL component types for this category were performed. The number of samples to be included in the SWEL as required by Reference 2 of this letter is still met.
In conclusion, the Seismic Walkdowns at FNP Unit 1 in response to the NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are complete. FNP Unit 1 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warrant modification to the plant. FNP Unit 1 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit I Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Enclosure 2 Updated Farley Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic
NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 PROJECT REPORT VERSION 2.0 COVER SHEET Page 1 of 58 Farley Unit I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC432467 For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Prepared by: Date: 2- Is- wZ0j James Dovel Reviewed by: Date:
2- (z-'
Approved by: (ENERCON) Date:
Pioject Manager or Designee Approved by:
(SNc) Date: /7 Technical Lead or Designee I I Melanie Brown Pea-Review Team Leader Approved by:
(SNC) 7ryQ Te Mitchell Date: 2 / .7 26WL Project Manager or Designee
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 2 OF 58 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Pave EX EC U TIV E SU MM AR Y ............................................................................................................ 3 1.0 SC O PE AN D O BJECTIV E ................................................................................................... 4 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH .................. 5 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS
SUMMARY
....................................................................... 6 3.1 SAFE SHUTDOW N EARTHQUAKE .......................................................................................................... 6 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND METHODS ........................................................................................ 8 4.0 PER SO N N EL Q U ALIFIC A TIO N S ..................................................................................... 9 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................................................................ 1i 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUM M ARIES (Report Version 1) ............................................................................ 12 4.3 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUM M ARIES (Report Version 2) ............................................................................... 17 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING ..................................................................... 19 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT ................................. 20 6.1 DEVELOPM ENT OF SW EL I ............................................................................................................................ 21 6.2 DEVELOPM ENT OF SW EL 2 ............................................................................................................................ 24 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS ...................................................... 26 7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEM S ..................................................................................................................................... 28 8.0 RESU LTS .................................................................................................................................. 35 8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISM IC CONDITIONS ................................................................................. 35 8.2 EQUIPM ENT OPERABILITY ............................................................................................................................ 47 8.3 PLANT CHANGES .............................................................................................................................................. 47 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS ......................................................................................................... 48 9.0 PEER REV IEW ........................................................................................................................ 49 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS .................................................................................................................................. 49 9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS SUMM ARY ........................................................................................................ 49 10.0 RE FERE N C ES ......................................................................................................................... 57 11.0 A TTA C H M EN TS ..................................................................................................................... 58
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 3 OF 58 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The Seismic Walkdowns at Farley Unit I in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are complete as all items on the Seismic Waikdown Equipment List (SWEL) have been inspected. The walkdowns were performed using the methodology outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report 1025286). Plant Farley Unit 1 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to the plant. Plant Farley Unit I had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 4 OF 58 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at Farley Unit 1 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3:
Seismic" (Reference 10.1).
The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2),
which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.
The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Farley Unit 1 are complete as all items on the SWEL have been inspected. This is the final report and documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. This final report submits the entire body of the report, Attachments 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 which are revised from Version 1 submitted November 27, 2012, and the new Attachments 7 and 8 added by Version 2 of this report.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCFI64-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 5 OF 58 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH The requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC endorsed methodology provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance with Reference 10.2, the following topics are addressed in this report:
" Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs) in the plant (Section 3.0);
- Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0);
- Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination for External Events IPEEE program (Section 5.0);
" Selection of Seismic Category I SSCs that were inspected in the plant (Section 6.0);
- Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);
" Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases (Section 8.0); and
- Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).
Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to be able to inspect the anchorage. At the time of this supplemental guidance/clarification, the Farley Unit 1 walkdowns were complete for the items that were considered accessible. However, the components affected by the supplemental guidance were identified and have been re-inspected with component doors opened. The walkdowns for all components are now complete. Further discussion is given in Section 7.0.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 6 OF 58 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS
SUMMARY
This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.
3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE The criteria for determining the adequacy of Seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment for the Farley Nuclear Plant are described in various areas of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (Reference 10.14). In some cases the criteria are specified in general terms to require verification by tests or analyses. In other cases, more specific criteria are specified such as verification in accordance with IEEE Standard 344-1971. At the time of the original design and licensing of the plant the requirements were changing to the use of IEEE 344-1975. These two separate programs were used to verify the seismic adequacy of Farley's mechanical and electrical equipment.
By letter dated February 19, 1987, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, (Reference 10.4). On May 22, 1992, the NRC issued GL 87-02, Supplement I (Reference 10.8). As documented in NUREG-1211 (Reference 10.9), GL 87-02 is applicable to Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1, since Unit 1 had not previously been audited by the NRC's Seismic Qualification Review Team (SQRT). Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) replied to GL 87-02 by letter dated September 10, 1992. The SNC letter included a commitment to use the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) methodology as documented in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for the resolution of seismic issues identified in GL 87-02 for FNP Unit 1. The SQUG methodology is based on application of earthquake experience data to verify the seismic adequacy of equipment. The seismic evaluation for FNP Unit 1 was completed, and the results were documented in a document entitled, "Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 Summary Report." This document was submitted to the NRC by letter dated May 18, 1995, as a 10 CFR 50.54(f) response. SNC received an SER dated July 9, 1998, concerning FNP Unit I Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 resolution and it stated that SNC's USI A-46 program implementation resulted in safety enhancements beyond the original licensing basis and SNC actions provide sufficient basis to close the USI A-46 review at the facility.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 7 OF 58 Geologic and seismologic surveys of the site have been conducted to establish two "design earthquakes" with different intensities of ground motion. These are the 50 percent SSE ('/2 SSE) and the SSE with different intensities of ground motion. The 1/2/2 SSE, sometimes referred to as the operating basis earthquake (OBE), is postulated to be the earthquake that could be expected to occur at the site during the operating life of the plant. The SSE represents the strongest earthquake that is hypothetically postulated to occur during an infinite period. The intensity postulated to occur at the site for both the V2 SSE and SSE is defined from the history of seismic activity in the area around the site.
The /2 SSE and SSE are specified in terms of a set of idealized, smooth curves, called the design spectra because they specify a range of values for two of the important properties of an earthquake ground motion, i.e., the maximum ground acceleration and the frequency distribution. The SSE produces the vibratory ground motion for which Category I structures, systems and components are designed to remain functional.
The 1/2 SSE and SSE spectra are each developed for 0%, 0.5%, 1.0%, 2.0%, 3.0%, and 5.0% of critical damping, with a horizontal ground peak acceleration of 0.05 g and 0.10 g, and vertical ground acceleration of 0.033 g and 0.067 g, respectively.
POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS Seismic Category I structures, systems and components are designed so that stresses remain within normal code allowable limits during the 1/22 SSE and to ensure they will perform their required safety-related functions during and after an SSE.
MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASIS The horizontal and vertical OBE and SSE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstrating the structural integrity of Seismic Category II SSCs, where required. In addition, systems supported by more than one structure shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements between the supporting structures.
The seismic analyses of safety related systems, equipment, and components are based on either the response spectra method, the time-history method, or the equivalent static method.
Although original seismic qualification was done to IEEE 344-1971, the USI A-46 Program verified that the original seismic qualification was adequate to support the seismic qualification of the equipment to the later requirements of IEEE 344-1975. Seismic qualification for new and replacement
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 8 OF 58 equipment is therefore based on the guidelines of IEEE 344-1975. Any new, replacement or changes to electrical and mechanical equipment are evaluated to the guidelines contained in IEEE 344-1975.
Damping values are provided in UFSAR Table 3.7-1.
3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND METHODS The design codes and standards for seismic qualification are listed throughout Section 3.0 of the Farley UFSAR (Reference 10.14). Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used in the original design of Farley Unit I are listed below.
" ACI 318-71, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete
- American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), Manual of Steel Construction, 7 th Edition
- ASME III Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1968 Edition
- ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Pumps and Valves for Nuclear Power.
" ASME VIII Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1968 Edition
" ANSI B31.1 Power Piping
- ANSI B33 .7 Nuclear Power Piping
- BC-TOP-4, Seismic Analysis of Structures and Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants, September, 1972
" IEEE 317-1976, Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- IEEE 344-1971 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Methods include both analysis and testing.
" IEEE 344-1975 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Methods include both analysis and testing.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 9 OF 58 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities per the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 identify the Peer Review Team members and responsibilities for Versions I and 2 of this report, respectively. Section 4.1 provides an overview of the project responsibilities. Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 include brief experience summaries for all project personnel in alphabetical order.
Table 4-1 Project Team Members and Responsibilities Site Equipment Seismic Licensing Name Point of Selection / Plant Walkdown Basis Contact IPEEE Operations Engineer Reviewer (POC) Reviewer (SWE)
William Arens X X Nikole Arrant X X Maggie Farah X X Ryan Harlos X X X X (See Note 3)
Crystal Lovelady X X Laura Maclay X X Paul Miktus* X X Ronald Miranda* X X Alan Mullenix X X Brian Nelson X X X (See Note 3)
Scott Walden* X X Robert Wood X X Taylor Youngblood X X X Stephen Yuan X X
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 10 OF 58 Table 4-2 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities (Report Version 1)
Name Robert Ashworth*
Melanie Brown*
Richard Starck*
Kenneth Whitmore*
Table 4-3 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities (Report Version 2)
Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal Name Review Peer Peer Basis Peer Report Peer Team Reviewer Reviewer Reviewer Reviewer Leader Melanie Brown* X X X X X Richard Starck* X X X X Notes (Table 4-1, Table 4-2 and Table 4-3):
- 1)
- Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer
- 2) As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of entering the condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the condition with respect to the plant licensing basis. Further licensing basis reviews were performed as discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CAP resolution process by personnel not directly involved in the walkdowns.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHiMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE11OF58
- 3) Brian Nelson was named Site Point of Contact subsequent to the completion of the walkdowns required for Version 2. Prior to this, Ryan Harlos was the Site Point of Contact.
4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with the site equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization. The site POC coordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such as inspection equipment and support from plant operations. The POC was responsible for development of the walkdown schedule and any updates to the schedule based on equipment availability.
Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdowns. The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs. The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program. For this project, site engineers and plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection. The ESP also performed the responsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers. The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scope included a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.
Plant Operations Personnel provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) and Base List to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in a variety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown.
Plant Operations Personnel also assisted in obtaining access to components and component internals and helped to coordinate with plant maintenance. For the Farley Unit I project, the Plant Operations Personnel were either former or currently licensed Senior Reactor Operators.
The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs who had previously completed the Seismic Walkdown Training Class developed by the SQUG were not required to complete training on the NTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities and activities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.
The Licensing Basis Reviewers were responsible for determining whether any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing Basis Reviewers have knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation for the SSCs at Farley.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE12OF58 A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of the walkdowns. The Peer Review Team members have extensive experience in seismic design and qualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience. The Peer Review Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program satisfied the guidance in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES (Report Version 1)
Listed below are the experience summaries of the personnel who contributed to Version 1 of this report.
William Arens (SNC)
Mr. Arens is the Licensing Supervisor at Farley Nuclear Plant. He earned a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Oklahoma in 1980. Mr. Arens served for eight years as an officer in the U.S. Navy nuclear submarine force. He has been employed at Farley Nuclear Plant since 1988, obtaining a Senior Reactor Operator License in 1991. His experience at Farley includes serving as a MOV engineer, Shift Support Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, Operations Superintendent, and Shift Manager.
Mr. Ashworth is a structural engineer with MPR and has more than six years of experience with providing engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components and systems.
His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition, structural modeling and analyses, and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has completed the training course for the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance and is also a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG GIP for resolution of US[ A-46.
Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company, the majority of which has been serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activities associated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including:
" Management of the seismic design bases,
" Seismic equipment qualification,
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCFI64-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE13OF58
- Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components,
- Design documentation and configuration management.
She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants. Ms. Brown is a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG GIP for resolution of USI A-46.
Maggie Farah, SWE (ENERCON)
Ms. Farah is a Structural Engineer with a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the New Jersey Institute of Technology and currently pursuing a Master's degree in Structural Engineering. Ms. Farah has been employed as a structural engineer at ENERCON for more than four years and has extensive experience in performing seismic equipment evaluations and structural analysis. She has performed numerous plant walkdowns as part of seismic design and modifications and had extensive on-site experience at Humboldt Bay and at the Metropolis Works fuel processing plant. She has been involved in various plant modifications, including design of dry fuel storage installations. Ms. Farah completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and was qualified as a SWE.
Mr. Harlos is a mechanical engineer in the Farley Engineering Systems Department at Southern Nuclear Operating Company and has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Auburn University. He has been employed in the nuclear industry for approximately three years and has extensive experience in the design, operation, and monitoring of systems with respect to their applicable design bases. His primary experience is with SSCs on the Primary Side of PWR nuclear operating plants. Mr. Harlos also worked as a co-op employee for Southern Company for more than a year, while in college, prior to joining the staff at Farley Nuclear Station as a full-time employee. Mr. Harlos completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns.
Ms. Lovelady is a civil engineer in the Fleet Design Engineering Mechanical/Civil group at Southern Nuclear Operating Company. She has a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the University of Alabama, Huntsville. She has more than five years of experience in structural analysis and design of structures in the power industry. She has additional experience as a member of the structural monitoring team at Plant Hatch and. Plant Farley. Ms. Lovelady completed training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns to qualify as a SWE.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE14OF58 Laura Maclay, SWE (ENERCON)
Ms. Maclay has over three years of experience as a structural engineer with ENERCON. Her tasks have ranged from assisting with the development and preparation of design change packages to performing design calculations and markups, comment resolutions, and drawing revisions. She worked on-site at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant for a year preparing structural evaluations of SSCs for an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). She designed safety related supports for computer and electrical equipment for the Turbine Digital Controls Upgrade package and other similar packages. Her responsibilities also included the review of calculations, drawings and vendor documentation for the seismic evaluation of the Unit 3 Palfinger Crane inside containment and new platforms in the High Pressure Turbine enclosure. Recent work includes Fukushima flooding walkdowns at Limerick Generating Station. Ms. Maclay recently completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and was qualified as a SWE.
Paul Miktus, SCE (ENERCON)
Mr. Miktus, P.E., has over 35 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants and process/industrial facilities retrofits. Mr. Miktus held positions of responsibility in a number of supervisory and management positions for ENERCON for clients including Florida Power and Light, Southern Company and Entergy. His design experience includes structural steel design (including anchorages); suspended systems (piping, ductwork, raceways) supports; seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; rigging and scaffolds; piping stress analysis; and concrete slabs, beams and foundations. At River Bend Station, while with Entergy, Mr.
Miktus was Engineering Supervisor for many large projects and completed the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training and the Seismic IPEEE Add-On Training Courses.
Ronald Miranda, SCE (ENERCON)
Mr. Miranda is a member of the ENERCON Senior Technical and Management staff with 40 years of experience in the Nuclear Power Generation industry. He has held various engineering and management positions in the industry, holds a MS degree in Civil Engineering and is a SCE certified by the SQUG. Mr. Miranda is experienced in structural steel and reinforced concrete design, anchorage to concrete, identification and assessment of degraded structural conditions, evaluations using SQUG methodologies, and the management of large, complex, and high-visibility projects. Mr.
Miranda is currently the ENERCON Dry Fuel Storage Product Line Manager responsible for the development and the design of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations at power generating facilities under static, dynamic, and flooding conditions compliant with 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 72
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMiA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE15OF58 regulations and industry standards. Mr. Miranda is recognized as an expert within the dry fuel storage industry.
Alan Mullenix, SWE (ENERCON)
Mr. Mullenix is a Registered Professional Engineer with over five years of Civil/Structural experience.
He has a B.S. in Civil Engineering and a Master of Science degree in Structural Engineering. His primary responsibilities include structural design, seismic design, and Design Change Package development. Mr. Mullenix assisted with 10 CFR 73.55 Nuclear Plant Security upgrades, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations, and other design changes at Plant Farley, Plant Hatch, Brunswick, Crystal River, and Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations. Mr. Mullenix completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.
Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic qualification of nuclear plant equipment. He is the principal author of the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document (Reference 10.2) and developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course to over 200 engineers. He provided technical oversight of work for various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr. Starck developed for SQUG the generic guidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG GIP, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and the SQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE and has performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program. This work included equipment qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction review, outlier resolution, and operability determination.
Mr. Walden is a senior engineer in the Fleet Design Analysis / Civil department at SNC. He has a B.S.
in Civil Engineering from Mississippi State University. Mr. Walden has more than 33 years of experience in structural analysis and design of structures for electric utilities, including extensive experience in seismic analysis of nuclear power plant structures and seismic qualification of equipment. He has extensive experience in the area of analysis of supports and also worked in developing the response spectra curves for Plant Hatch. He also has extensive experience in the Structure Monitoring Program (SMP) for Maintenance Rule and is responsible for oversight of the
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE16OF58 SMP for Plant Farley. He successfully completed the SQUG training course, is a Seismic Capability Engineer and participated in the original IPEEE/SQUG walkdown for Plant Farley and the conduit/cable tray SQUG walkdowns for Plant Hatch. He is a registered Professional Engineer in the states of Alabama and Mississippi.
Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)
Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore is a Seismic Capability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification of nuclear plant components. Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developed the SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peer review of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdowns at Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations at numerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismic tests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components. Mr. Whitmore has significant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience in performing plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr. Whitmore completed his EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE) in June 2012.
Robert Wood (SNC)
Mr. Wood is the Farley Severe Accident Management Program Manager. He holds BS degrees in Physical Science, Mathematics, and Chemistry from Troy State University. Mr. Wood has over 37 years of experience at operating nuclear plants, was licensed as a SRO and served seven years on shift as Shift Support Supervisor and Unit Shift Supervisor. He has supervisory experience in chemistry, work management, strategic analysis and major project management.
Mr. Youngblood is a Site Projects Lead at Plant Farley working primarily in major projects. He has a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the University of Alabama at Birmingham. Mr. Youngblood has 12 years of civil engineering experience with more than four of those years spent at Plant Farley in the areas of civil/structural design. His design experience includes evaluations and calculations for seismically qualifying various supports and structures. His specialties are in the areas of concrete and
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE17OF58 earthwork, and he has developed an expertise in lifting and rigging evaluations. Mr. Youngblood is a registered Professional Engineer in the State of Alabama. Mr. Youngblood completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3.- Plant Seismic Walkdowns in June 2012.
Stephen Yuan, SWE (ENERCON)
Mr. Yuan, P.E., is a Senior Civil Engineer in ENERCON's New Jersey office. He has over 20 years of experience in structural modeling, design, upgrading, electrical facility structure analyses and maintenance of industrial installations and nuclear power plants, including significant experience at Perry, Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee Plant. Mr. Yuan was one of the key civil engineers in support of the transformer replacement project at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. He holds a M.S. in Civil Engineering from the City University of New York. Mr. Yuan recently completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and was qualified as a Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE).
4.3 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES (Report Version 2)
Listed below are the names of personnel who contributed to the work addressed by Version 2 of this report. The personnel shown worked on Version 1 as well as Version 2 unless noted otherwise.
Experience summaries for personnel who only worked on Version 2 are provided below. Experience summaries for the others are provided in Section 4.2. The experience levels of personnel listed in Section 4.2 have not been updated for Version 2.
William Arens (SNC)
Nikole Arrant, SWE (SNC) [Version 2 Only]
David Hall (SNC) [Version 2 Only]
Laura Maclay, SWE (ENERCON)
Alan Mullenix, SWE (ENERCON)
Brian Nelson, SWE (SNC) [Version 2 Only]
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 18 OF 58 Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)
Ms. Arrant is a civil engineer in the Farley Mechanical/Civil Design Department at Southern Nuclear Operating Company. She has a B.S. in Civil Engineering from Florida State University and has been employed in the nuclear industry for approximately four years, all of which have been spent in the Plant Farley Mechanical/Civil Design Department in the area of civil/structural design. Her design experience and specialties include evaluations and calculations for seismically qualifying various supports and structures. Ms. Arrant completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns in February 2013.
David Hall (SNC)
Mr. Hall is the Farley Severe Accident Management Program Manager. He holds a B.S. in Nuclear Science Management from Troy State University. He has over 35 years of experience at operating nuclear plants. He was licensed as an SRO for 30 years and served on shift as Shift Foreman. He has supervisory experience in Operations, Training and major project management.
Mr. Nelson is a Mechanical Engineer in the Farley Site Design Department and has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Auburn University. He has been an employee with Southern Nuclear Operating Company at Plant Farley for approximately four years and has extensive experience in design of components and systems relative to their design basis. His primary experience has been in the area of mechanical design, but has performed calculations for the qualification of supports in the area of seismic design. Mr. Nelson completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns in February 2013.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE19OF58 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING Information on the seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program is reported in . Within this context, "vulnerabilities" means seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings. For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also provides a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability.
Plant Farley completed modifications for all non-relay items on or before December 31, 1995, and for all relays on or before December 31, 1996. The Equipment Selection/IPEEE Reviewers (see Table 4-1) reviewed the IPEEE implementation documents and final report to determine the list of items identified as having vulnerabilities and the required modifications.
The SWEL for Farley Unit I included 28 components for which seismic vulnerabilities were previously identified during the IPEEE program. During the walkdowns, the walkdown teams verified that the recommended resolutions to the IPEEE vulnerabilities associated with these 28 items were resolved.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR I RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE20OF58 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Farley systems and components developed the SWEL. Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided in Section 4.0 of this report. The equipment selection personnel used a SNC-template to ensure compliance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.
Two SWELs were developed (SWEL 1 and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL I consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant.
Attachment I provides the final SWEL I and SWEL 2.
In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with equivalent components. These changes were made when it was determined during the Seismic Walkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve during a walkdown. For example, components located very high in the overhead were replaced with equivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding. All such changes meet the provisions of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Attachment I in Version 1 of this report contains the SWELs after all changes were incorporated (at the time of Version 1 report submittal).
Under Version 2 of this report, Attachment I also contains the final SWELs resulting from the completed walkdowns (items indicated in Table 7-1).
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE21OF58 6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL I SWEL I was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
Screens 1 through 3 These screens were used to select Seismic Category I equipment that does not undergo regular inspection but support the five safety functions described in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Page 3-1 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) lists three screens for use in selecting the Base List 1 if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plant evaluations. Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions listed in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
In accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), page 3-3, Screens 1 through 3 can be satisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Farley IPEEE Report for Unit I (Reference 10.6), Appendix A-Seismic Report, was used as the Base List for the development of SWEL 1.
The intent of the Base List 1 was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity following a SSE. The specific guidance used to create the IPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin", (Reference 10.13). The Seismic SSEL from IPEEE - Seismic was checked and verified to meet the intentions set forth in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
As stated in EPRI Report 1025286, the equipment on the SWEL must include equipment required to perform the following five safety functions:
- Reactor reactivity control
- Reactor coolant pressure control
- Reactor coolant inventory control
- Decay heat removal, and
" Containment function.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUIKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 22 OF 58 The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.0.2 of the IPEEE - Seismic Report. Specifically, one preferred and one alternate path capable of achieving and maintaining a safe-shutdown condition for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a Plant Farley Safe Shutdown Earthquake was selected for each unit. Further, it was assumed that a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) had occurred and as such, the paths were also selected as being capable of mitigating a SBLOCA following an SSE. Plant Operations' input resulted in the inclusion of swing components not listed on the original IPEEE SSEL. Other suggestions by Plant Operations for inclusion in the SWEL, such as instrumentation stanchions and piping components, were determined to be covered by existing plant programs. Based on this, samples of those component types were not required to be added to the SWEL.
Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List, it was determined that the list did satisfy the requirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which is a list comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the aforementioned five safety functions that are used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment cooling integrity.
Base List 1 is presented in Attachment 1.
Screen 4 Screen 4 provides the sample considerations used to select components that make up the SWEL from the components contained in Base List 1. The selection of components for SWEL I was developed through an iterative process that ensured a representative sample of components was included in the SWEL. Various drafts of SWEL I were provided to Farley licensed Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) for review and input. The SROs identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipment important to plant operations.
The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1:
" Variety of systems
" Major new or replacement equipment
- Classes of equipment
- Variety of environments
" Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program
" Risk Significance
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC
_____________________jPAGE I 23OF 58 Variety of Systems - The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that equipment from a variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base List were reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.
Maior New and Replacement Equipment - Major new or replacement equipment installed within the previous 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipment from input from plant personnel familiar with plant modifications and from the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.
Variety of Equipment Classes - A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on the SWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The final SWEL contains a wide variety of components and includes a representative sample of components from each equipment class except classes 11, 13 and 19. The SWEL does not contain Class 11 or 13 components since it was developed from the SSEL associated with the IPEEE as described previously which does not contain Class 11 or 13 equipment. This is consistent with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) for development of the SWEL.
Equipment Class 19 is not in scope for SWEL 1. The only Class 19 components on the Base List are Reactor Coolant System (RCS) RTDs installed on the RCS Piping. This is also consistent with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which states, "The major pieces of equipment in the NSSS that are located inside the containment are excluded from the scope of this program. Also excluded are the supports for this equipment along with all the components mounted in or on this NSSS equipment".
Variety of Environments - The EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that the SWEL contains components located in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and high temperatures. SWEL I includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g.
Containment Building, Main Steam Valve Room), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Auxiliary Building), and Outdoors/Intake Structures (e.g. Valve Boxes, Service Water Intake Structure).
IPEEE Vulnerabilities - SWEL I includes equipment identified as having seismic vulnerabilities as reported in Farley IPEEE Report for Unit 1 (Reference 10.6).
Risk Significance - Information from the Farley Unit 1 PRA and the Maintenance Rule implementation documentation were used to determine whether items were risk significant. A representative sample of Risk Significant items are included on the SWEL. As stated, plant SROs reviewed the SWEL to ensure that equipment important to plant operation were included on the list.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE24OF58 6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment 1.
Screens 1 through 2 The equipment selected through Screens I and 2 provide Seismic Category I components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also accessible for a walkdown. For Farley Unit 1, the only Seismic Category I equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System. The Seismic Category I SSCs in the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System that are accessible and available for a walkdown comprise Base List 2.
Screen 3 Screen 3 is the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment is included in SWEL 2. These considerations include:
" Variety of systems
- Major new or replacement equipment
- Classes of equipment
- Variety of environments Using the Base List 2 developed from the SFP System, the following criteria were used to select a sample of the SFP Seismic Category I equipment and systems:
- Variety of systems - Only one system comprises Base List 2
" Major new or replacement equipment - No major new or replacement equipment installations with the past 15 years.
- Classes of equipment - There are only 3 types of equipment in Base list 2: manual valves, I pump per train, and I heat exchanger per train. Additionally, one heat exchanger was included on SWEL I and therefore this selected heat exchanger was not chosen on SWEL 2 but applies to the SWEL 2 variety of equipment to prevent duplicates. The reason for the inclusion on SWEL I is due to Component Cooling Water (CCW) being the cooling medium for the SFP Heat Exchanger which requires the heat exchanger to maintain structural integrity during a seismic event for both SFP Cooling and CCW.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 25 OF 58 Variety of environments - All SFP components are located in a mild environment and are not submerged.
The Farley SFP System has a very basic system design with very limited component types and the system contains only one active component in each train; the SFP Cooling Pump. Since 3 of the 4 objectives for selecting the sample consideration of items for SWEL 2 did not have any variance, the only remaining criteria to satisfy the sample objectives was to ensure that a component from each category was chosen and these selected equipment varieties were used to comprise SWEL 2.
Screen 4 Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.
For Farley Unit 1, the SFP Cooling and Purification System contains three penetrations; two SFP pump suctions and one pump discharge. Neither the discharge line nor the suction line penetrations are located within 10 feet of the top of the fuel assemblies. However, the SFP discharge piping terminates approximately 6 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies in the SFP. Due to this, the discharge piping has a '/" hole on the bottom side of a 1800 bend at elevation 152'-0". This hole acts as a siphon breaker and is located approximately 23 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies. Since there are no penetrations within 10 feet of the fuel and since the design of the anti-siphon hole in the SFP discharge piping prevents water from being siphoned through this piping, no rapid drain-down of the pool can occur.
Therefore, there are no components associated with rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool included on SWEL 2.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 26 OF 58 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined) SWEL. A Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) was completed for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. Copies of the SWCs can be found in Attachments 3 and 7 while the AWCs are provided in Attachments 4 and 8, for Version I and Version 2 of the report, respectively.
The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown guidance.
Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders that contained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEE walkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings). Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.
The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for the walkdowns. Organization included assignment of specific components to the walkdown teams, review of the walkdown packages, development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdowns/Area Walk-bys and familiarization with the plant.
The second week on site began with the peer reviewers (Whitmore and Ashworth) providing an overview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for the walkdowns were discussed and questions answered. After this overview, each walkdown team performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by in the presence of the other teams and at least one peer reviewer. The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between the teams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potential adverse seismic conditions and to allow team members to ask questions and provide and obtain feedback.
Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians and engineering) was obtained, as required, to access equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components. All Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively. The final status of all SWCs and AWCs indicates one of the following statuses:
" "Y" - Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions,
" "N" - No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition, or
" "U" - Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipment inaccessibility and the condition is not known.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE27OF58 The walkdowns focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions. Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage to the structure. This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered to be anchorage. These connections were evaluated and any potentially adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions."
As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components were evaluated to verify if the anchorage was consistent with plant documentation. The document that provided the anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage in the field was compared to the information on this referenced document. Reference documents for anchorage verifications included plant drawings as well as Screening and Evaluation Worksheet (SEWS) packages created during IPEEE walkdowns of the plant. In some cases, equipment anchorages were verified to be in accordance with SEWS but it was also determined that some equipment had been modified or replaced since the completion of the original accessible walkdowns during which the SEWS were developed.
Anchorage checks performed under these conditions duly verified that anchorage evaluations performed under the IPEEE program were still applicable, appropriate and adequate.
In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e.g. where the anchorage was inside a cabinet that could not be opened except during an outage), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U" (Undetermined) and deferred until an outage when the piece of equipment would be available for inspection. However, as of the issuance of Version 2 of this report, all inspections have been completed and the results are documented on the SWCs (see Attachment 7).
In cases where the Seismic Walkdown team members identified a potential adverse condition, the condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a Condition Report (CR) was written to document and evaluate/resolve the condition. As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs during the walkdowns. Additionally, detailed licensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required. Conditions that were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE28OF58 Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns. For cases in which the room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures, systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachments 4 and 8.
SWEL I Walkdowns Credit was taken for a total of 114 component inspections that were completed during the combined work performed as documented in Versions 1 and 2 of this report. This is the total number of component inspections required for Farley Unit 1.
A total of 115 component inspections were originally scheduled to be performed as documented in Version 1 of this report. Of these 115 component inspections, 3 were delayed due to inaccessibility, while 42 others were required to be scheduled for re-inspections based on additional guidance/clarification regarding the opening of cabinets to inspect for other adverse conditions.
As documented in Version 2 of this report, the walkdowns of the 3 previously inaccessible components were completed. However, only 41 of the 42 planned cabinet re-inspections could be completed.
During the inspection of Q1R42B001B it was found the anchorage was not completely accessible without racking out the breakers. Therefore the item was removed from the SWEL. Table 7-1 is updated to show the completion of 44 out of 45 items. It is also updated to indicate QIR42BOOIB was not completed and therefore removed from the SWEL. Removal of QIR42BOOIB from the SWEL does not invalidate the conclusion in Section 6.1 that the screening requirements specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) are met. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.
SWEL 2 Walkdowns A total of six component walkdowns were performed. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.
7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns. These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were not completed for these items during the initial phase of walkdowns. These items have been inspected as documented in Version 2 of this report as discussed in "SWEL I Walkdowns" above.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR I RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE29OF58 Inaccessibility of equipment or plant areas, as originally determined during efforts for Version 1 of this Report, occurred due to one of two conditions: (1) plant operating conditions, or (2) component inspections required the opening of cabinet/panel doors which was not conducted, or not permitted by plant Operations personnel during the time of the walkdowns. Items listed in Table 7-1 associated with Item 2 above include those that required walkdowns in accordance with the supplemental guidance, to open cabinets to inspect for other adverse conditions as discussed in Section 2.0.
Based on the above, 45 components were originally determined to be inaccessible. These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys for 44 of these items were performed before and during the Unit 1 outage, IR25 in October 2013. Note 4 following Table 7-1 addresses the remaining component.
Note that in Version 1 of the report, the majority of the checklists associated with the components determined to be inaccessible based on condition 2 indicated that the walkdowns of these components were complete. The supplemental guidance on opening cabinets was received after these walkdowns/checklists were complete. Since the anchorage of these components was accessible without opening the cabinets, cabinet internals were not included in the inspections performed during the walkdowns for Version 1 of the report. The supplemental inspections of these components focused primarily upon those aspects that were not reviewed originally, i.e., the internal inspections. Those checklists were revised to include information from both walkdowns as documented in Version 2 of the report.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 30 OF 58 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Inaccessibility Remaining Walkdown Scope (See Note n)4 Completic Item No. Description (Nt)Scope (See Note In)
QICII1E004B Reactor Trip Switchgear (2) Inspect panel internals Completed No. 2 10/9/13 Ctmt Sump Level (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 2 QI El ILQ3594B Transmitter Power Supply 1/30/13 QIQEI IMOV8701B RHR Inlet Isolation Valve (I) SWC and AWC for Complete 3
Containment El. 105' 9/30/13 4 QI H1INGASC2506C Aux Safeguards C171Cabinet (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
C 1/7/13 QIHIINGB2504J BOP Instrumentation (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
5 Cabinet J 8/9/13 NIS Excore Detector (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
6 QIHI INGNIS2503A Cabinet 1/7/13 Process Control Cabinet (2) Inspect panel internals Completed Channel 2 1/7/13 Radiation Monitor Panel (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
8 QIHI INGR25041 1/7/13 9 QI HI INGSSP2506G Solid State Protection (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
Input Cabinet 9/20/13 4.16KV Switchgear IG (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
Local Cont Panel 1/7/13 QIH2lE5O5 4.16KV Switchgear IJ (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
11 Local Cont Panel 1/7/13 4.16KV Switchgear IK (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 12 Qi H2P Local Cont Panel 1E506 10/16/13
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE31OF58 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Remaining Walkdown Completi n
- Item No. Description Inaccessibility Scope (See Note (Note 2)
Diesel Generator IB (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
Local Cont Panel 10/9/13 Hot Shutdown Panel A (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
14 QIH21NBAFP2605A 1/25/13 Multiplying Relay (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
15 QIH22LOOIE Cabinet IE 1/25/13 Transfer Relay Cabinet 1 (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 16 QI H22L002 1/25/13 17 Q1 H22L503 Diesel Local Relay Panel (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
IB 1/7/13
(!) Complete SWC after Complete(
removal of insulating 10/16/13 Steam Generator 1A material from around the 18 QINI 1PT0476 ScharGePessur instrument. This was not Discharge Pressure allowed by Plant Operations at the time the SWC was performed Containment Purge (1) SWC and AWC for Completed 19 QIP13HV2867D Isolation Inside Ctmt Containment El. 129' 9/30/13 Valve Turb Bldg SW Iso Valve (2) Inspect panel internals Completec 20 QIPl6G5I7B Relay Box 1/30/13 Q1R15A504 4.16KV Switchgear Ii (2) Inspect panel internals Completec 21 1/ 10/14 600V Load Center ID (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 22 QI RI16006 2/11/13
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSjIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 32 OF 58 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Remaining Walkdown Completi n Item No. Description Inaccessibility Scope (Note 2)In (See Note MCC IA (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
23 QIR17BOOI-A 10/16/13 MCC lB (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 24 QlRI7BOO2 2/5/13 MCC 1K (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 25 Q1R17B504-A 10/17/13 MCC IN (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 26 Q1R17B507-A 1 Q10/16/13 QIR18B029 Power Disconnect Switch (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
27 2/11/13 Circuit Breaker Box (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 28 QIR18BO31 2/11/13 Circuit Breaker Box (2) Inspect panel internals Complete 29 Q1R18B035 1/30/I131 Vital AC Breaker Box (2) Inspect panel internals Complete 30 QI R21BOOIA 1/30/13 Q I R21 E009C Inverter IC (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
31 9/20/13 Q1R36A511 4.16KV Switchgear IL (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
32 Surge Arrestor 2/12/13 33 cR1L00IB 125VDC Distribution (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
Panel IB 8/9/13 34 QIR42BOOIB 125VDC Bus 1B (2) Inspect panel internals See Note (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 35 QIR42EOOIA IA Charger Aux Bldg Battery 2/11/13
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 33 OF 58 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Remaining Walkdown Completi* n Inaccessibility Scope (See Note )
Item No. Description 2))Scope (Note (Nt (See Note In)
Sequencer BIF (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 36 QIR43EOOIA 2/11/13 37 Sequencer B IF Aux (2) Inspect panel internals Completed Relay Panel 2/12/13 Diesel Gen I-2A Local (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 38 QSH21E525 Control Panel 10/25/13 Diesel Generator IC (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
Local Control Panel 8/9/13 Service Water B Train (2) Inspect panel internals Completed 40 QSH21L503B Battery Room HVAC 2/6/13 LCS 41 QSH22L502 Diesel Local Relay Panel (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
1-2A 9/26/13 UI Service Water Battery (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(
42 QSR42B516A Fuse Box Train A 2/12/13 43 SW Battery NO. 3 or 4 (2) Inspect panel internals Complete Detection Cabinet 2/8/13 44 SW Building A Train (2) Inspect panel internals Complete Battery SEL SW 2/12/13 45 Svc Water Bldg Battery (2) Inspect panel internals Completed Charger No.2 (Standby) 10/16/13 Table notes:
- 1) Farley Unit I has one transformer (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL 1. It was inspected to the extent practical. All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected. The anchorage for the transformer was visible without opening the component. To inspect the transformer further would
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 34 OF 58 require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection. The inspection of this transformer meets the requirements of the guidance document and the 50.54(0 Letter. The subject transformer is: MPL #QIRI 1B004, LC TRANSFORMER ID
- 2) Entries in Table 7-1 under column heading: "Reason for Inaccessibility" refer to the condition for inaccessibility discussed in Section 7.1.
- 3) 44 of 45 walkdowns were completed. See Note 4 for additional information.
- 4) Table 7-1, Item 34 (QIR42BOOI B, 125VDC BUS IB) was deleted from the SWEL during the performance of the walkdowns as the anchorage was inaccessible.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 35 OF 58 8.0 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic". As potentially adverse conditions were identified, condition reports were initiated in the Plant's Corrective Action Program (CAP) and evaluated. The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and evaluations.
8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the Plant's CAP per Southern Nuclear expectations in a timely fashion. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286. Consequently, the as-found conditions in Table 8-1 do not necessarily indicate that SSCs are deficient or not in conformance with their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.
SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Farley Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Farley seismic qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures for entering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize the key findings from the CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis, and any required plant changes.
During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 14 Unit I Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the CAP. In addition, another 3 were entered that are common to both Units I and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PACE 36 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/ Brief Description of CR # Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve /Closed) the Condition Area A cable from tray 504947 Although this has been WO SNC428446 Closed 121' Piping Pen BHMS06 was found to marked as a potential created - Cable Room 223 be overhanging the edge adverse seismic needs to be placed of the tray in several concern, the seismic back in tray places. At one location, walkdown team has the cable rested on a concluded that it is sharp edge where it unlikely for the cable to crosses the boundary of be damaged to the point the tray. The tray is - 9' that it would not in the overhead behind perform its intended the cubicle wall of the function during a room entrance. The seismic event.
cable needs to be placed back in the cable tray.
Component Breaker racking tools 505403 Seismic walkdown Breaker racking Closed U1 4160V were found hanging personnel determined tools have been Switchgear IG from a 4" long rod - 3' damage to the cabinet removed which (QIR15A007-B) from the UI 4160V would not occur in the eliminates the Breaker Cabinet Switchgear I G event that the tool adverse seismic (Q I R 15A007-B) struck the cabinet, interaction Breaker Cabinet 7 in Rm However, there is condition.
233. During a seismic potential to damage the event the tool will relays located on the potentially fall from the front of the switchgear.
currently staged location The effect of the impact and strike the on the components in switchgear. the cabinet should be evaluated and/or the tool relocated or adequately secured if any adverse impacts are suspected.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE37OF58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/ Brief Description of CR # Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve /Closed) the Condition Component The Seismic Walkdown 505553 An initial assessment of WO SNC428541 Closed QIPI 8C002B Team observed a the condition was removed the potential seismic performed and there are adverse Seismic interaction hazard on the no immediate Spatial Unit I Train B operability concerns. interaction. WO Emergency Air The constant speed closed.
Compressor in Room 189 unloader is used to (Q IPI 8C002B). The prevent overloading the Seismic Walkdown team compressor and is observed a small gap of actuated when the less than 0.5" between a 0.25" dia stainless steel receiver pressure exceeds the pre-set compressor instrument tubing and an insulated pressure for the pipe. The quarter inch auxiliary valve spring.
instrument tubing is When the auxiliary located directly on top of valve opens, air is the compressor at eye routed to the constant level and has been speed unloaders and identified as the constant forces them open. If the speed unloader interconnecting line is interconnecting line. The lost, the auxiliary valve Walkdown Team judged will still mitigate that the insulation could overloading of the impact the tubing since compressor by relieving the lateral displacement pressure to atmosphere of the insulated pipe when pre- set values are during a seismic event exceeded.
could fill the 0.5" gap.
The Seismic Walkdown Engineering Team judged the instrument tubing is too soft to tolerate interaction with the piping.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHiMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 38 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/ Brief Description of CR # Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve /Closed) the Condition Area: UI A Loose bolts were found 507934 The Gaitronics speaker All actions are Closed Charging Pump in the mounting could become a concern completed to room (Room hardware of the if the mounting prevent the 181) Gaitronics system inside hardware was to loosen adverse the U I A Charging further. interaction.
Pump room (room 181 ).
Component A 1 1/2" dia. conduit is 508376 Ops Shift Supervisor WO SNC429765 Closed Multiplying within 1/4"of the side of Review: The cabinet created. TE Relay Cabinet Multiplying Relay and conduit are installed 540860 evaluated IE, Cabinet IE per design. No the condition and QIH22LOOIE (QIH22LOO1E). The indication of missing found the conduit spans - 10' and hardware is evident, condition of the passes the relay panel Installation of stiffening conduit near the about mid-span, and is hardware to minimize Multiplying Relay therefore very flexible. potential for contact Cabinet as The conduit must be between the cabinet and acceptable as is.
moved away from the conduit in the event of a WO SNC429765 panel or supported near seismic event will be voided.
the panel to reduce any pursued via the interaction effects corrective action during a seismic event, process.
An immediate solution is to clamp the small conduit to the adjacent larger conduit to restrain it from the relay cabinet.
(AB, 139', rm. 318). It's possible that no sensitive equipment is in the panel, in which case the interaction effects are credible but insignificant. The walkdown team could not make this determination.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 39 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/ Brief Description of CR# Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse I Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve /Closed) the Condition Component While performing SAM 508387 The panel was re- WO SNC429766 Closed QI H21NBAFP2 NTTF 2.3 Seismic walked down on created.
605A Walkdowns for Farley 10/26/12 and identified Units I & 2 in the Aux to be closed. Latch is Bldg, Room 254, the operable but hard to rear door of Hot operate based on Shutdown Panel A discussions with (QI H21NBAFP2605A) Operations. WO has was found unlatched, been created to fully fix but should be latched to the latch.
minimize impact to the panel from the door during a seismic event.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 40 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/ Brief Description of CR# Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve /Closed) the Condition Area While performing SAM 508690 This configuration has The original Closed Room 184 NTTF 2.3 Seismic been compared against IPEEE SEWs Walkdowns for Farley the original IPEEE package did not Units I & 2 in Room Screening Evaluation specifically refer 184, the seismic Work Sheet (SEWS) to the flex conduit walkdown team which was performed but using pictures observed a flexible cable by qualified SQUG the valve and flex attached to the IA Engineers. The SEWS conduit was Isolation Outside CTMT package shows that the identified to be in Valve with limited flex cable was in the the same state.
flexibility. The flex same configuration Based on this not cable is routed to the during this evaluation at being called out valves upper limit the area where as an issue during switch. flexibility is limited. the original This seismic interaction walkdown, no has previously been further actions are evaluated as acceptable. needed.
This condition was present during SQUG/1PEE walkdowns performed in 1993 and is documented in the SEWS package for QPI19HV361 1.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE41OF58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/ Brief Description of CR # Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve /Closed) the Condition Component While performing SAM 508692 This same configuration TE 509140- DCP Closed QIPI7HV3096A NTTF 2.3 Seismic was observed during the has been Walkdowns for Farley Farley SQUG/IPEEE confirmed to Unit 1, one of the walkdowns back in the remove the seismic walkdown teams mid 90's and there were adverse Seismic noted two (2) potential no identified Condition.
seismic concerns with discrepancies on the the 3096 A valve Seismic Evaluation (QIP17HV3096A): Work Sheets (SEWS)
- 1) Rigid conduit within concerning inadequate
'/" of pressure gage. flexibility of lines During a seismic event, attached to the 3096 A the worst credible valve. Additionally, the failure would result in SEWS package did not breaking the pressure mention any concern for gage glass. the conduit in close
- 2) Insufficient flex in proximity of the cables to the upper and pressure gage. 3096A lower limit switches. also has difficulties in One of the questions of operating and the valve the seismic walkdown is already jacked closed, packages is "Do declared inoperable, and attached lines have is being replaced during adequate flexibility to IR25 so no impact.
avoid damage?"
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RiPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 42 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/ Brief Description of CR # Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve /Closed) the Condition Component A permanent ladder was 508694 This configuration was The condition was Closed QIEl IMOV881 installed in contact with compared against the verified against 2A the Containment Sump original IPEEE the SEWS which Room 131 to RHR Pump IA Screening Evaluation shows the ladder (El. 83') Isolation Valve Work Sheet (SEWS) and valve in the (Q IE 11MOV8812A). which was performed same position and The seismic walkdown by qualified SQUG configurations.
team that performed the Engineers. The SEWS This was not walkdown has package for evaluated as a determined that this is a QI E I MOV8812A Seismic Concern potentially adverse performed during the on the SEWS and seismic condition the SQUG/IPEE thus the condition 8812A. walkdowns in 1993 is SAT.
visually shows that the ladder and valve were in the same configuration during performance of the SEWS. This condition was not called out as an adverse seismic interaction on the SEWS.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 43 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/ Brief Description of CR # Brief discussion of Action Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned Condition to Address/Resolve the Condition Component Seismic Walkdown team 515693 This condition is similar to WO SNC432772 the condition of a SW strainer QIPI6F501A identified corrosion on a created - Clean bolt identified during 1R24 Service Water Strainer (CR:442339 and MDC and coat the bolts.
IA (QIPI6F501A) hold SNC387300) showing down bolt. excessive corrosion. The nut was cleaned and a torque applied to fully seat the nut.
The nut was apparently cocked/cross threaded and could not be moved further.
The torque applied was in excess of i000ft-lbs proving the bolt was sound. After cleaning the nut, the material condition showed little surface degradation. This reference is provided to document that the degradation for this strainer hold down bolt is exacerbated by the wet environment which typically causes the corrosion layer to swell and look significantly worse than the actual sound material condition. Based on known pre and post cleaned condition of one of the strainer anchor bolts/nut, the seismic walkdown team is confident that the strainer bolt is sound and is capable to perform its intended function. The team members are qualified to use engineering judgment to make the Seismic Evaluation based on being qualified either through SQUG or EPRI training for Seismic Evals.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE44OF58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/ Brief Description of CR# Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve /Closed) the Condition 4-Component While reviewing AWBs 539901 Based on initial review TE 540855 Closed QIP18CO02B performed by the from the site POC for created to Seismic Walkdown the Seismic evaluate the Teams, it has been Walkdowns, this condition. Bent discovered that one of condition is not of bolt was found to the four anchor bolts for concern during a be acceptable. TE the UI Auxiliary Steam seismic event. The nut has been closed.
Condensate Tank is bent on the affected anchor and has been bolt appears to be documented as an installed correctly with adverse seismic concern. no gap between it and the concrete pad which results in negligible impact to the load bearing portion of the bolt. Also, the remaining 3 anchor bolts are SAT with no further discrepancies identified. The initial review has also determined that there is no effect on the current seismic design basis since the component is classified as non-seismic, Crit-N.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE45OF58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/ Brief Description of CR # Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve /Closed) the Condition Component Seismic Walkdown team 716676 This condition was Repair existing In QI H2 IE527 found that grout needs to originally noted in the grout around the Progress be placed around all SEWS package dated existing anchors.
anchor bolts on the 5/24/94. Subsequent WO SNC 526618 south side of the panel. evaluation showed this created.
condition is not an operability concern.
Enhancements have been made to the anchorage including:
shimming between the panel and grout pad; adding additional anchors to the North side; welding on a new plate to the South side and installing two new anchors. Therefore this condition is not a seismic concern.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE46OF58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/ Brief Description of CR # Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve /Closed) the Condition Component While performing the 719207 This condition has been The evaluation In QlR17BOOI-A NTTF 2.3 Seismic evaluated for the 2A that addresses the Progress Walkdown for Farley MCC and it has been condition found Unit 1 for IA MCC, determined that the on 2A MCC is there were two instances current mounting attached to TE identified where configuration does not 640206(Closed).
seismically qualified adversely impact the WO SNC527527 Agastat Relays were functionality of any of and SNC 527528 installed with only 3 of the relays in any of its created.
4 required mounting operating modes screws. (before, during, and after a DBE). The U2 evaluation has been reviewed and is bounding for the conditions found on UI IA MCC. Therefore, the condition does not bring into question the operability or functionality of the relays.
Component While performing the 722630 This is not considered to WO SNC528556 In QIR17B507-A NTTF 2.3 Seismic be an operability created to replace Progress Walkdown for Farley concern or a seismic the missing Unit I for IN MCC, one concern due to the mounting screw.
of the terminal strips in minimal weight of the FNBI was found to be strip.
missing a lower mounting screw.
During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of a seismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are warranted.
These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE47OF58 CR 539958: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to storing tools and equipment throughout the plant. Several events were documented where tools and equipment (e.g. breaker racking tools, hot sticks) were stored in such a way that they had the potential to fall and strike nearby equipment (e.g. Switchgears) during a seismic event. The extent of condition should be investigated by the groups that use the tooling, all further conditions corrected, and actions put in place to prevent future recurrences.
CR 539961: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to maintaining the coating on components subject to corrosive environments. Several events were documented where anchorage and associated supports were corroded due to a lack of coatings and preventive maintenance to protect the material. The extent of the damage varied from minor surface corrosion to more significant wastage of the components. The extent of condition should be investigated and appropriate corrective actions put in place to promote the long-term sustainability of anchorage, support, and components subject to corrosive environments.
CR 539962: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to maintaining the housekeeping of cable trays and their cables. Several events were documented where cable trays had damaged panels or cables overhanging the cable tray. The extent of condition should be investigated and appropriate corrective actions, as needed, put in place.
8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY Plant Farley Unit I had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.
8.3 PLANT CHANGES There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions. Plant changes are any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE48OF58 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic adverse conditions. All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were generated as necessary. These issues included water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash, etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the Plant's CAP process and are not specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FuKUsHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE49OF58 9.0 PEER REVIEW 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS The peer review for the NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance with Section 6 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities:
" review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);
" review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys;
- review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse seismic conditions in to the Plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and
" review of the final submittal report.
This report provides a summary of peer review results as well as the results of the above peer review activities. In Section 9, "Version 1" describes the work completed during the initial evaluation and submitted in November 2012. "Version 2" describes the subsequent work completed since that time and transmitted in this final submittal.
9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS
SUMMARY
9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development - Version 1 The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to Section 3 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SSCs to be evaluated during the seismic walkdown were selected as described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the Peer Review Team, which consisted of the peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Team members independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on the SWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from Reference 10.2 were met.
Specifically, the Peer Reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL 1 and 2 were Seismic Category I components that do not undergo regular inspections. Specific considerations for the peer review process are described below for SWEL I and SWEL 2. The peer review checklist of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE50OF58 For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):
- Reactor Reactivity Control;
" Reactor Coolant Pressure Control;
- Reactor Coolant Inventory Control;
- Decay Heat Removal; and
- Containment Function.
For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:
" Various types of systems;
" Major new and replacement equipment;
" Various types of equipment;
" Various environments;
- Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE; and
- Risk insight consideration.
The final SWEL I contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Numerous components perform more than one of the safety functions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list. SWEL 1 contains components from all applicable classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for equipment classes 11, 13 and 19, where there are no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class. The list contains major new and replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in various environments and areas of the plant. All major safety-related systems are represented and risk factors were considered in development of the list.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE51OF58 For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related items complied with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool cooling system at Farley Unit I are Seismic Category I and all different types of components are represented on the SWEL 2. No items that could cause rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool for Farley Unit 1 were identified. Therefore, SWEL 2 does not contain any components associated with potential rapid drain down of the pool. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding items associated with the spent fuel pool were well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
In summary, all of the peer review comments made during development of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 were resolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed by the Peer Review Team and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed. The SWEL was determined to incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.
During the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were not accessible were removed from the list and, in some cases, equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added.
The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and determined that these changes had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELs with respect to the provisions contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed the SWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Checklist for development of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.
9.2.2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development - Version 2 The Peer Review Team was consulted as necessary during the walkdowns to ensure that no equipment substitutions (due to equipment availability, being energized, etc.) would conflict with the EPRI report requirements. One SWEL item was listed as inaccessible in Table 7-1 of the Version 1 walkdown report. Component no. Q1R42B001B 125v DC BUS IB was removed from the SWEL for Version 2 since the item could not be inspected without extensive disassembly. Removing the item from the SWEL I did not invalidate any of the EPRI report requirements such as variety of systems, variety of classes of equipment, variety of environments, etc.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE52OF58 The final SWELs are provided in Attachment I and reflect completion of all seismic walkdowns of equipment. The Peer Review Team reviewed the final SWELs and concluded that both SWELs (for original walkdowns and the outage walkdowns) met the requirements in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Checklist of the final SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.
9.2.3 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys - Version 1 The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The Peer Review was performed as follows:
- Each of the walkdown teams performed an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area Walk-by while being observed by the other teams and at least one member of the walkdown Peer Review Team. The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams.
" During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The Peer Review Team confirmed first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as described in Section 4 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A member of the Peer Review Team accompanied each of the four walkdown teams on at least one full day of walkdowns. SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to carry a copy of Section 4 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it, as necessary, during conduct of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.
" Finally, the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages completed during the first week to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The walkdown Peer Review Team confirmed that the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages were consistent, thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 53 OF 58 The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable. The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions. The SWEs documented the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Team inspected all the checklists completed during the first week of walkdowns, representing approximately 40% of the total number of checklists. Peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances where comments in the checklists required additional explanation and information. Mr. Ashworth and Mr.
Whitmore provided verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly. The SWEs understood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer Review Team.
Since the peer review occurred at the start of the walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to provide comments at the early stages of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for all packages. Subsequently, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate. In addition, all members of the Peer Review Team, including Mr.
Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during the entire Walkdown process.
9.2.4 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys - Version 2 The Peer Review Team was available by phone and email for consultation to the Plant Farley SWEs for the scope of walkdowns covered by Version 2 of this report. SWEs that were involved with work transmitted under Version 1 of this report (particularly Mr. Youngblood, Mr. Harlos, Mr. Mullenix, and Ms. Maclay) performed many of the walkdowns documented in Version 2 of this report.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 54 OF 58 Plant Farley also trained additional SWEs to support completion of the remaining walkdowns. The Peer Review of the new SWEs was performed as follows:
" The new SWEs completed the EPRI NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training course onsite at Plant Farley. The instructor of this session of the course Ken Whitmore had attended the June 12, 2012 session of the EPRI-sponsored Seismic 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training course and used the training materials provided by EPRI. The Peer Team Leader/SNC Seismic Technical Lead, Ms. Brown, attended the training session in order to share Lessons Learned from the previous walkdowns.
- Before the new SWEs performed any walkdowns on the SWEL items, Peer Team Member Ms. Brown as well as Mr. Ashworth (who was part of the Peer Review Team under Version 1 of this report) traveled to Plant Farley to witness the new SWEs perform practice walkdowns in the site Protected Area. Each of the new SWEs performed practice equipment Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys under the observation of the other new SWE team members, Ms. Brown and Mr. Ashworth just as was done during the initial walkdowns (see section 9.2.3). Ms. Brown and Mr. Ashworth interviewed the new SWEs to verify their understanding of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown objectives and their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions. They provided suggestions for performing walkdowns and answered questions raised by the new SWEs. Each of the new SWEs completed practice walkdown checklists which were reviewed and critiqued on site by Ms. Brown and Mr.
Ashworth.
Ms. Brown and Mr. Ashworth concluded that the new SWEs were performing walkdowns and completing checklists in a manner consistent with that witnessed/performed in support of Version 1 of this report. The new SWEs are familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. Additionally, the SWEs adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditions related to anchorage. They also performed anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable.
The new SWEs also demonstrated their ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions. They documented the results of the outage Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
Of the new SWEs trained at Plant Farley, Mr. Nelson and Ms. Arrant performed walkdowns at Plant Farley Unit 1, which are addressed by Version 2 of this report. To be conservative and to ensure consistency, all checklists prepared and provided in Attachments 7 and 8 of this report were reviewed
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE55OF58 by two Peer Review Team members (Ms. Brown and Mr. Richard Starck). This Peer Review of checklists is in addition to the "10 to 25% requirement" that was met during Version 1 of the report.
Verbal and written comments were provided by the Peer Review Team and incorporated by the SWEs.
It is noted that the checklists for Version 2 include several pictures that show the overall condition of the equipment. Having numerous pictures was an efficient way to document resolution of the checklist questions. In addition, the checklists often "retyped" previous information that was handwritten (and was provided in Attachments 3 and 4 in Version 1 of the report) for clarity and consistency purposes.
Preparation of these "retyped" checklists relied upon the results of the inspections from the original checklists.
The Peer Review Team members (Ms. Brown and Mr. Starck) concluded that checklists were completed in a manner consistent with the requirements of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
9.2.5 Licensing Basis Evaluations - Versions 1 and 2 All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP for further review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the Seismic Walkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart from evaluations performed for the CAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive and acceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the Seismic Walkdowns.
9.2.6 Submittal Report- Version 1 The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to provide guidance and input and to verify that the submittal report met the objectives and requirements of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate. The final version of the submittal report includes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE56OF58 9.2.7 Submittal Report - Version 2 Similar to the process for Version 1, the Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to provide input and to verify that the submittal report met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the drafts and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate. The final version of the submittal report included all necessary elements of the Peer Review and met the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE57OF58
10.0 REFERENCES
10.1 10 CFR 50.54(0 Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(0 Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 10.2 EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012 10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.5 Not used.
10.6 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit I and Unit 2, Individual Plant Examination of External Events - Seismic.
10.7 RER SNC432467, SAM NTTF 2.3: Seismic, Unit 1 and 2 Walkdowns at Plant Farley, (Recommendation) 2.3 - Seismic 10.8 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Supplement 1 to Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.9 NUREG-121 1, Regulatory Analysis for Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-46, Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants 10.10 NUREG-0 117 Supplement No. 5 dated March, 1981 Safety Evaluation Report 10.11 Not used 10.12 Not used 10.13 EPRI Report NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin 10.14 Farley Nuclear Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Rev. 24, August 2012 (Version 1) and Rev. 25, December 2013 (Version 2).
10.15 NMP-GM-033-GLO1 Ver. 1.0, SAM NTTF Seismic Walkdowns Guide
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE58OF58 11.0 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT I - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS (Version 1 and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 2 - PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 (Version 1 and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 3 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (Version I and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 4 - AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (Version 1)
ATTACHMENT 5 - IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION (Version 1 and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 6 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS (Version 1 and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 7 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 8 - AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (Version 2)
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Regulatory Licensing Action, Concurrence and NL-006-F03 SOUTHERN, Affairs Version 2.0
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COMPANY E.,W,.S-Y Form .II Verification Page 1 of 4 NL Letter Number: NL-14-0249 Due Date (if applicable): 2/24/2014
Subject:
Farley Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report RLI / Extension: R. Wittschen 7234 CR/TE (if applicable) / Database (C/F/H/V):
SECTION I - CORRESPONDENCE SCREENING (to be completed by RLI) YES NO 1.1. Does this letter affect the FSAR or any other License Basis Documents? If YES, r complete 1. 1.a. If unsure, obtain peer review from 10 CFR 50.59 qualified individual.
1 YES rl- NO:i I.1.a .Has Section III been completed to update each: documentF 1.2. Does this letter require posting per 10 CFR 19? If YES, ensure posting after submittal. f7 W 1.3. Does this letter contain Safeguards Information? If YES, do NOTscan to SNC Intranet. Enter Special HandlingInstructionsbelow and review with the RA 17 P Administrative Assistant (AA).
1.4. Does this letter contain information to be withheld from public disclosure (e.g.,
Proprietary or Non-Safeguards Security-Related Information)? If YES, do NOT scan to SNC Intranet. If Proprietary,include appropriateaffidavit. Enter Special Handling Instructionsbelow and review with the AA.
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Special Handling Instructions for AA Administrative Assistant Date 1.6. Oath or Affirmation Required? If YES, verify properletter template is used. TW F 1.7. Verification Required? If YES, use the guidance of NL-006-GLO4. FW I 1.8. External Affairs and General Counsel Consultation Required? If YES, obtain r rw concurrence signaturein Section II.
1.9. Engineering Independent Technical Review (ITR) Required? If YES, obtain W, 1 concurrence signaturein Section II.
1.10. Challenge Board Required? If YES, complete 1. 10.a. 1 7.
IlO.a HasSection III been completed to document results? r. YES ,i N 1.11 RLI Signature: _ Date: ,,,,
1.12 Licensing Peer Review Signature: Date: 2 -/i ' 2o '1--
Southern Nuclear Operating Company A Regulatory Licensing Action, Concurrence and NL-006-F03
$W I4 Affairs Verification Version 2.0 Form.I,, Page 2 of 4 SECTION II - DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW NOTE: The purpose of Section Il is to document support departmental concurrence and verification regarding the accuracy and completeness of Information provided for submittal of this SNC regulatory correspondence. A concurrence signature In Section II means that the signatory has assured that the submittal is appropriate and consistent with SNC policy, applicable Commitments are approved for implementation and supporting documentation for submittal completeness and accuracy has been prepared.
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Su t R e N e -
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ReglatrySo-uthern Nuclear Operating Company N-0-0 RegulAfators Licensing Action, Concurrence and VrinL 2.00-3,,
COMP11111 Verification ft,.,,._.,,.,, Form IPage 2 of 4 SECTION 11 - DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW NOTE: The purpose of Section II Is to document support departmental concurrence and verification regarding the accuracy and completeness of information provided for submittal of this SNC regulatory correspondence. A concurrence signature In Section IImeans that the signatory has assured that the submittal is appropriate and consistent with SNC policy, applicable Commitments are approved for implementation and supporting documentation for submittal completeness and accuracy has been prepared.
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company Regulatory Licensing Action, Concurrence and NL-006-F03 SOUnuRIA COMPANY Affairs LcnigAtoadVersion Verification 2.0
_FMS,_r._.*. Form Page 2 of 4 SECTION II - DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW NOTE: The purpose of Section Il is to document support departmental concurrence and verification regarding the accuracy and completeness of information provided for submittal of this SNC regulatory correspondence. A concurrence signature in Section 11means that the signatory has assured that the submittal is appropriate and consistent with SNC policy, applicable Commitments are approved for implementation and supporting documentation for submittal completeness and accuracy has been prepared.
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company Regulatory Licensing Action, Concurrence and NL-006-F03 SOUTHERNA Affairs Version 2.0 COMPAN F-,,..-Y-%br, Form Verif V
ication Page 2 of 4 SECTION II - DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW NOTE: The purpose of Section Il is to document support departmental concurrence and verification regarding the accuracy and completeness of information provided for submittal of this SNC regulatory correspondence. A concurrence signature in Section II means that the signatory has assured that the submittal Is appropriate and consistent with SNC policy, applicable Commitments are approved for implementation and supporting documentation for submittal completeness and accuracy has been prepared.
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company Regulatory Licensing Action, Concurrence an NL-006-F03 SOUTHrRN. Affairs Version 2.0 COMPANY Verification F moS,, Page 3 of 4 SECTION IV - FINAL REVIEW AND APPR AL (Mark "NA" for signatures that are not re ir n lu in in ividual signing letter)
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company Regulatory Licensing Action, Concurrence and NL-006-F03 SOUTHERN, Affairs Version 2.0 COMPANY Verification
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ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Paues Unit 1 -Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-37 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 1 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit I - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-37 Unit I - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 2 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. I SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I "LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM C.n.... *USCCUC .Q..0000 C-S.of .ma (1) (2) un~nsffn....n..a.......faf.., .W~ls (6) (7)
(4) (5) 20 TERMINAL BOX AS 100-00 0189 AITBOOl 20 TERMINAL BOX As 100-00 0194 AITBOO6 20 TERMINAL BOX AS 121-00 0223 A1TSOO2 20 TERMINAL BOX AS 121-00 0235 20 9178003 TERMINAL BOX As 100-00 0190 20 TERMINAL BOX AS 100-00 0192 18 0218 NIE21LIO112-3 VCT LEVEL INDICATION AS 121-00 20 NIHI1NGNCS2500A-AB MAIN CONTROL BOARD SECTION A AS 155-00 0401 07 NI1P8PCV2885A PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE AS 100-00 0189 07 N1P1SPCV28B5B PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE As 100-00 0189 07 N1P18PCV2885C PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE AS 100-00 0189 07 N1P19PCV2228A PCV TO PORV BACKUP AIR SUPPLY BOTTLE As 121-00 0218 07 NIP19PCV222SS PCV TO PORV BACKUP AIR SUPPLY PRESSURE As 121-00 0218 CONTROL 23 QilIHOOIi REACTOR VESSEL CB 129-00 C11T 21 Q1821NCOOA STEAM GENERATOR 1A Co 155-00 CTNT 21 QIB21HOO01B STEAM GENERATOR 18 CS 155-00 CTNT 21 Q1821I4001C STEAM GENERATOR IC CS 155-00 CiTM 18 Q1B21PT0402-Pl RCS LOOP 3 WIDE RANGE PRESSURE CS 105-00 CTNT 18 Q1821PT0403-P4 RCS LOOP I WIDE RANGE PRESSURE CB 105-00 CTNT 19 Q1B21TE0410-P2 RCS LOOP 1 COLD LEG RMD C8 105-00 CTNT 19 QIB21TE0413-Pl RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG RTD CB 105-00 CTINT 19 Q1B21TEO42O-P2 RCS LOOP 2 COLD LEG RTID CS 105-00 CTMT 19 RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG RID CS 105-00 ClNT Q1B21TED423-PI 19 RCS LOOP 3 COLD LEG RTD CB 105-00 CTNT Q1821TE0430-P4 19 RCS LOOP 3 NOT LEG RID CB 105-00 CTNT Q1821TE0433-P3 07 PRESSURE RELIEF TANK ISOLATION OUTSIDE AS 121-00 0223 QIB31IIV8028-A CTIT VALVE 0 RCS PRESSURIZER CB 155-00 CIT QIB31KO01 CB 18 Q1B31LT0459-PI PRESSURIZER LEVEL (CONTROL ROOM) 132-00 CINT CB 18 Q1831LT0460-P2 PRESSURIZER LEVEL 132-00 CINT Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: IDNumber Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 Page 3 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 2 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 I""INE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM (1) (2) (3) a ....Mae ... W.00---.----------------a...
(5) (7)
(4) (6) 18 Q1B31LT0461-P3 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CI 132-00 CINT O0A Q1B3IMOVS00OA-A PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE CB 175-00 CTMT 08A Q1831NOV8008B-8 PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE C8 1)5-00 CTNT 07 QIB31PCV0444B-B PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF VALVE CS 155-00 CTMT 07 QI131PCV044SA-A PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF VALVE CB 173-00 CTNT 18 Q1831PTO455-PI PRESSURIZER PRESSURE C8 165-00 CTMT 18 Q1B31PTO456-P2 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 166-00 CThT CB 18 Q1R31PT0457-P3 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 166-00 02 Q1C1IEOO4A-AB REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR NO. I AD 121-00 0235 02 Q1ClIEO04B-AB REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR NO. 2 AB 121-00 0235 18 Q1C22LT0474-PI STEAR GENERATOR 1A NARROW RANGE LEVEL CB 155-00 CTNT 18 Q1C22LTO475-P2 STEAM GENERATOR 1A NARROW RANGE LEVEL CB 155-00 CT1T 18 QlC22LT0476-P3 STEAM GENERATOR iA NARROW RANGE LEVEL CB 155-00 CTNT 18 Q1C22LT0484-PI STEAM GENERATOR 19 NARROW RANGE LEVEL CB 155-00 CTNT 18 QIC22LT0485-P2 STEAM GENERATOR 1B NARROW RANGE LEVEL CS 155-00 CTNT 18 Q1C22LTO486-P3 STEAM GENERATOR 1B NARROW RANGE LEVEL CB 155-00 CTlT 18 QIC22LT0494-PI STEAM GENERATOR 1C NARROW RANGE LEVEL CB 155-00 CTNT 18 Q1C22LT0495-P2 STEAM GENERATOR IC NARROW RANGE LEVEL 155-00 CTMT 18 QIC22LT0496-P3 STEAM GENERATOR IC NARROW RANGE LEVEL C8 155-00 CTNT 0 Q1C51LOO1B-1 NIS NEUTRON DETECTOR BOX 18 (41A & 418) CB 129-00 C1lT 0 QICS5NEOO48-A ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN NEUTRON FLUX DETECTOR CB 139-00 CT1T 20 Q1C5SNMOO4S-A ALTERN SHUTDOWN NEUTRON FLUX MON SIGNAL AB 139-00 0332 AMPLIFIER 08A Q1EIIFCVO602A-A R14R PUMP MINI FLOW VALVE AD 83-00 0128 08A QIEIIFCV0602B-8 RHR PIMP MINI FLOW VALVE AD 83-00 0122 18 Q1E11FIS602A-A RHR PUMP FLOW INDICATING SWITCH AS 83-00 0128 18 Q1E11FIS602B-B RHR PUMP FLOW INDICATING SWITCH AS 83-00 0128 18 QIEI1FTO6SO5A-2 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE FLOW AR 87-00 0120 TRANSMITTER 18 QlElIFT0605B-4 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE FLOW A8 87-00 0120 TRANSMITTER Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 Page 4 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 3 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM a.==am n==usn *tmmuflmanSC====S== CSU UU
- so. .... m0ymu waScaUSS*08 .asses....
(1) (2) (3) (6)
(4) (5) (7) 21 Q1E11HOOIA-A RNR HEAT EXCHANGER IA AS 83-00 0128 21 QE1IHO0O1B-B RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 18 AS 83-00 0128 20 QIEIILQ3594A-A CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPLY AB 139-00 0318 AS 139-00 0318 20 Q1E11LQ3594B-B CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPLY 18 Q1E1ILT3594A-A CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER CB 116-00 CmTl 18 QIEIILT3594B-B CTMT SUIMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER CB 116-00 CTNT 08A Q1ElMOV8701A-A RHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE CB 105-00 CTNT QIE11MOV8701B-B CS 105-00 CINT 08M RHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE C8A QIEIIMOV87O2A-A RHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE CB 105-00 CTNT 0SA Q1E1IMOVe702B-8 PHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE CB 105-00 CTMT CM. QIE11NOVS706A-A RMR LOOP NO. I DISCHARGE TO CVCS AS 83-00 0128 08A Q1E11MOV8706B-B ,HR LOOP NO. 2 DISCHARGE TO CVCS AS 83-00 0128 CBA Q1E1IMOV8809A-A RWST TO RNR PUMP IA SUCTION AD 83-00 0131 08A QIE11MOV8809B-B RWST TO PHR PUMP 19 SUCTION AS 83-00 0129 OCA QIE1INOV8811A-A RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT TRAIN A AS 83-00 0131 OBA Q1E11MOV8811B-B RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT TRAIN 8 AS 83-00 0129 C8A QIE1UMOVSS12A-A CONTAINMENT SUMP TO RHR PUMP 1A ISOLATION AS 83-00 0131 0SA QIE11NOVS812B-B CONTAINMENT SUIMP TO RHR PUMP 18 ISOLATION AS 83-00 0129 08A Q1E11MOVS88A-A LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG AS 121-00 0223 CSA Q1E1JMOV8S8SB-B LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG AS 121-00 0223 06 Q1EI1POOIA-A RHR PUMP IA AS 83-00 0131 06 Q1E11PCO1B-B ,HR PUMP 18 AS 83-00 0129 18 Q1E13PT095O-PI CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION AS 121-00 0223 TRANSMITTER 18 QIEI3PTO9S1-P2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION AS 121-00 0223 TRANSMITTER 18 Q1E13PTO952-P3 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION AS 121-00 0223 TRANSMITTER 18 Q1E13PTO953-P4 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION AS 121-00 0223 TRANSMITTER 10 QIE16HOOIA-A CHG/MSI PUMP ROOM COOLER IA (TRAIN A) AB 100-00 0181 10 Q1E16H0OIC-B CHG/HHSI PIMP ROOM COOLER IC (TRAIN B) AS 100-00 0173 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name &Version: SSEN vO.O Page 5 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 4 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 LINE SYSTER/EQUIPI4ENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM w-wafto ..mmi ...m m
.................... ............. fl* .... nowac (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 10 Q1E16HOO3A-A RHR PUMP ROOM COOLER 1A AB 83-00 0131 10 QE1E6HO038-B RHR PUMP ROOM COOLER 1B AB 83-00 0129 10 QE1E6HO04A-A CCV PUMP ROOM COOLER TRAIN A AB 100-00 0185 10 Q1E16HOO4B-B CCV PUMP ROOM COOLER TRAIN B AB 100-00 0185 10 QIE16HOOSA-A AUX FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM COOLER IA AB 100-00 0190 10 Q1E16HOO5B-B AUX FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM COOLER IB AB 100-00 0192 10 Q1E16HOO6A-A BATTERY CHARGING ROOM COOLERS AB 121-00 0245 10 Q1E16IIO06B-B BATTERY CHARGING ROOM COOLERS AB 121-00 0244 10 Q1E1614007-A 14CC IA ROOM COOLER AS 139-00 0332 10 Q1E16IIOO8A-B MCC 10 ROOM COOLER AB 121-00 0209 10 QIE16HCOSB-B MCC 1B ROOM ACU AB 121-00 0209 10 QIE16HO09-A 600V LOAD CENTER 1D ROOM COOLER AB 139-00 0339 10 QIE16HO10-8B 600V LOAD CENTER IE ROOM COOLER AB 121-00 0228 18 QIE21FT0940 HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW AB 77-00 o111 TRANSMITTER 18 QIE21FT0943 HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW AB 100-00 0175 TRANSMITTER 0 Q1E21HOO2 REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER CB 105-00 CTNT 21 Q1E21HOO3 SEAL WATER HEAT EXCHANGER AD 100-00 0170 21 QIE21HOO4 LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER AB 100-00 0170 07 Q1E21HV8149A-A LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION CB 105-00 C1NT 07 Q1E21HVB149B-A LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION CB 105-00 CTNT 07 Q1E21IV8149C-A LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION CB 105-00 CTNT 07 QIE21HV8152 CVCS ISOLATION OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT VALVE AD 100-00 0184 07 Q1E21HV8942-A BORON INJECTION RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE AB 100-00 0186 07 QIE21HV8945A-A BORON INJECTION SURGE TANK VALVE AB 121-00 0222 O0A Q1E2ILCVOIISB-A RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION VALVE AB 100-00 0172 08A QIE2ILCVOII5C-A VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE AB 121-00 0216 GSA QIE21LCVO115D-B RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION VALVE AB 100-00 0172 08A Q1E21LCVO11SE-B VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE AB 121-00 0216 18 QIE21LT1I2-3 VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER AD 121-00 0217 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O Page 6 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 5 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1
"'LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT OESCRIPTION NO. CLASS MARK NO. BUILDING ELEV ROOM aesefn. Dow==.f amflCC a===fl (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 18 Q1E21LT115-1 VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER AB 121-00 0217 08A QlE2INOVSLOO-B RCP SEAL WATER RETURN ISOLATION AS 121-00 0223 08A QIE21MOVS1O6-A CHARGING PUMP MINIFLOW ISOLATION AB 100-00 0170 0SA Q1E21OV8107-A CHARGING PUMP TO RCS ISOLATION AB 121-00 0223 GSA Q1E21NOVS108-B CHARGING PUMP TO RCS ISOLATION AB 121-00 0223 GSA Q1E21MOVSL09A-R CHARGING PUMP P002A MINIFLOW VALVE AB 100-00 0181 GSA Q1E21MOV8109C-B CHARGING PUMP POO2C NINIFLOW VALVE AB 100-00 0173 GSA QIE21MOV8I12-A RCP SEAL WATER RETURN ISOLATION CB 129-00 CT1T 08A QIE21MOV813OA-A CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLATION AB 100-00 0181 VALVE 08A Q1E2IMOVSI3OB-B CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLAYION AB 100-00 0175 VALVE OBA QIE21MOVOI31A-A CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLATION AB 100-00 0175 VALVE GSA Q1E21MOVB1318-R CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLATION AB 100-00 0172 VALVE GSA Q1E21MOV8132A-A CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION AB 100-00 0181 VALVE 08A QIE21MOV8132B-B CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION AB 100-00 0175 VALVE OBA QIE21MOVS133A-A CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION AB 100-00 0175 VALVE GSA QIE21MOV81338-8 CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION AS 100-00 0173 VALVE 08A QIE21MOVSBOIA-A BORON INJECTION TANK OUTLET ISOLATION AB 121-00 0223 GSA Q1E21MOVBSO3A-A BORON INJECTION TANK INLET ISOLATION AB 100-00 0172 08A Q1E21NOVSSOSA-A ACC. DISCH. VALVE CB 105-00 CTMT 08A QIE21MOVS8080-8 ACC. DISCH. VALVE CB 105-00 CTNT CB 105-00 CT4T GSA QIE211MOV890SC-A ACC. DISCH. VALVE OSA QIE21MOV8SSSS-B HHSI TO RCS COLD LEG ISOLATION AB 100-00 0184 05 Q1E21PO02A-A CHARGINGA/HSI PUMP P002A TRAIN A AB 100-00 0181 05 Q1E21P002C-B CHARGING/HHSI PUMP P002C TRAIN B AB 100-00 0173 21 QIE21TOO6 BORON INJECTION TANK AS 100-00 0172 18 QF1F6LTO5O1I-A RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER YD 155-00 YARD Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS '5')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 Page 7 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 6 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM ca770-c (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 18 Q1F16LTOS02-B RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER YD 155-00 YARD 21 Q1F16T0501 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK YD 155-00 YARD 07 QIG21HV3376-B RADIOACTIVE DRAIN ISOLATION INSIDE CTMT CI 105-00 CTMT VALVE 07 Q1G21HV3377-A RADIOACTIVE DRAIN ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTNT AB 100-00 0184 VALVE 07 QIG21HV7136-B WASTE PROCESSING ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTNT AS 100-00 0184 VALVE 07 QIG21LCV1003-A WASTE PROCESSING ISOLATION INSIDE CTNT CB 105-00 ORB VALVE 07 QIG24VO03A SG IA SLOWDOWN ISOLATION AS 121-00 0223 07 Q1S24VO03B SG IB BLOWDOWN ISOLATION AB 121-00 0223 07 QIG24VO03C SG 1C SLOWDOWN ISOLATION AS 121-00 0223 21 QIG31IIOOIA-B SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN B AB 155-00 0445 21 QIG31HOO18-A SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN A AB 155-00 0467 20 QIHIINGASC25O6C-8 AUX SAFEGUARDS CABINET C AB 155-00 0416 20 QIH11NGASC2SO6D-A AUX SAFEGUARDS CABINET D AB 155-00 0416 20 QlHllNGB2SO4J-A BOP INSTRUMENTATION CABINET J AB 155-00 0416 20 Q1H11NGB25O4K-B BOP INSTRU4ENTATION CABINET K AB 155-00 0416 20 Q1H11NGCCM2523A-A ICCHS PROCESSOR CABINET TRAIN A AB 155-00 0416 20 Q1H11NGCCN42523B-B ICCMS PROCESSOR CABINET TRAIN 8 AB 155-00 0416 20 QlH11NGNIS25O3A-1 NIS EXCORE DETECTOR CABINET AB 155-00 0416 20 QINIINGPIC250SA-1 PROCESS PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL 1 AS 155-00 0416 20 Q1H1NGPIC2SOSB-2 PROCESS PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL 2 AB 155-00 0416 20 QIHIIZNGPIC25O5C-3 PROCESS PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL 3 AB 155-00 0416 20 Q1HlINGPIC25O5D-4 PROCESS PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL 4 AB 155-00 0416 20 QIH11NGPIC250SE-1 PROCESS CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 1 AB 155-00 0416 20 QIH1I NGPIC25O5F-2 PROCESS CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 2 AB 155-00 0416 20 QlIHNGPIC25O5G-3 PROCESS CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 3 AB 155-00 0416 20 QlI~I NGPIC2S5I4H-4 PROCESS CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 4 AB 155-00 0416 20 QlHlINGR25041-AB RADIATION MONITOR PANEL AB 155-00 0416 20 Q1IH11NGSSP25O6G-B SOLID STATE PROTECTION INPUT CABINET AS 155-00 0416 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.O Page 8 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 7 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I SINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS M4ARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM (c5)anum-0(6)0swas (1) (2) (3) (4) (s) (6) (7) 20 QH1HINGSSP2506J-B SOLID STATE PROTECTION TEST CABINET AS 155-00 0416 20 Q1H11NGSSP2506K-A SOLID STATE PROTECTION INPUT CABINET AS 155-00 0416 20 QIHIINGSSP2506N-A SOLID STATE PROTECTION TEST CABINET As 155-00 0416 20 QIH21EO04-A 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IF LOCAL CONT PANEL AB 139-00 0343 20 Q1H21EOO5-B 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IG LOCAL CONT PANEL AB 121-00 0233 20 QIH2IE504-A 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IH LOCAL CONT PANEL 155-00 0056A 20 Q11421E5O5-S 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IJ LOCAL CONT PANEL DB 155-00 0056C 20 Q1H21ES06-A 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1K LOCAL CONT PANEL Sw 188-06 0072E 20 Q1N21E507-B 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR iK LOCAL CONT PANEL Sw 188-06 00728 20 QIH21ES27-8 DIESEL GENERATOR 18 LOCAL CONTROL PANEL DS 155-00 0058 20 Q1H21NBAFP26O5A-A HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL A AB 121-00 02S4 18 QIH21NBMER2619-B STEAM GENERATOR IC WIDE RANGE LEVEL MCB AB 121-00 0227 ISOLATOR 20 Q1H22LOOIE-A MULTIPLYING RELAY CABINET 1E AB 139-00 0318 20 Q1H22LOO1F-B MULTIPLYING RELAY CABINET IF AS 139-00 0318 20 Q11422L002-A TRANSFER RELAY CABINET I AB 139-00 0347 20 Q11422L003-A TRANSFER RELAY CABINET 2 AB 100-00 0190 20 Q11422L004-B TRANSFER RELAY CABINET 3 AB 139-00 0334 20 Q11422L503-B DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL I1 DB 155-00 0058 20 Q1N23S5448-S DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 15 HVAC LCS 0I IS5-00 00S8 20 QIH25LOOB-A TERMINATION CABINET AS 139-00 0318 20 Q11H25L029-B TERMINATION CABINET AS 139-00 0318 07 QN11HV3369A MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE AS 121-00 0241 07 QlN111HV3369B MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE As 121-00 0241 07 QINIIHV3369C MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE As 121-00 0241 07 QIN11HV337OA-B MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE AB 121-00 0241 07 QlNlIHV33708-B MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE AS 121-00 0241 07 Q1N11HV337OC-8 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE AS 121-00 0241 18 QlNllLT0477-A STEAM GENERATOR 1A WIDE RANGE LEVEL CB 129-00 CTNT 18 QINIILT0487-A STEAM GENERATOR 18 WIDE RANGE LEVEL CB 129-00 C714T Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O Page 9 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. a SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM
=cm.=mc.=m mm.=n==~...s.~mmmm(4)mmmm csm (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 18 QINIILT0497-B STEAM GENERATOR IC WIDE RANGE LEVEL CB 129-00 CTMT 18 Q1N11PT0474-P2 STEAM GENERATOR IA PRESSURE AB 155-00 0462 18 Q1N11PT0475-P3 STEAM GENERATOR IA DISCHARGE PRESSURE AS 155-00 0462 18 Q1N11PTO476-P4 STEAM GENERATOR IADISCHARGE PRESSURE AB 155-00 0462 18 Q1N11PTO4S4-P2 STEAM GENERATOR 1B DISCHARGE PRESSURE AS 155-00 0462 18 Q1NI1PTO4S5-P3 STEAM GENERATOR 1B PRESSURE As 155-00 0462 18 STEAM GENERATOR IB DISCHARGE PRESSURE AS 155-00 0462 QINIIPT0486-P4 18 Q1N11PT0494-P2 STEAM GENERATOR 1C DISCHARGE PRESSURE AS 155-00 0464 18 STEAM GENERATOR 1C DISCHARGE PRESSURE As 155-00 0464 QIN11PTO49S- P3 18 Q1N11PT0496-P4 STEAM GENERATOR 1C PRESSURE AS 155-00 0464 18 QlI~i PT337 lA-A STEAM GENERATOR 1A PRESSURE AS 155-00 0462 18 Q1N11PT3371B-A STEAM GENERATOR lB PRESSURE AS 155-00 0462 18 QINIIPT337IC-A STEAM GENERATOR 1C PRESSURE AS 155-00 0464 07 QiNI 1PV3371A-A MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE As 121-00 0241 07 MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE 121-00 0241 QINIIPV337IB-A AS 07 QlNlIPV337IC-A MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE 121-00 0241 AS 085 QlNllSV3369AC-A SOLENOID VALVE AS 121-00 0241 088 Q1N115V336g5C-A SOLENOID VALVE AS 121-00 0241 089 SOLENOID VALVE 121-00 0241 QlNlISV3369CC-A AB 18 QIN23FI3229AR-A FEEDWATER INTAKE FLOW INDICATION As 100-00 0190 18 QIN23FI3229C FEEDWATER INTAKE FLOW INDICATION AS 100-00 0190 18 QlN23FT3229A-A AUX FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER AS 100-00 0190 18 QlN23FT3229B-A AUX FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER AB 100-00 0189 18 Q1N23FT3229C-B AUX FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER AB 100-00 0194 07 QIN23HV3227A MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAM AS 121-00 0241 GENERATOR IA 07 Q1N23HV32278 MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAM As 121-00 0241 GENERATOR 1B 07 Q1N23HV3227C MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAM As 121-00 0241 GENERATOR IC 08A Q1N23MOV3209A-A SERVICE WATER ISOLATION VALVE TO AUX AS 100-00 0191 FEEDWATER Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Oata Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Nutber Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 Page 10 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 9 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 CINE SYSTEN/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NO. CLASS MARK NO. BUILDING ELEV ROOM maum uauS mmmJommmmmnmmmmmmniuSmnmlmm~u mam ummuuuwum=== .m06000 maaw.ufl..
accfno .l.===an awasmansfav a (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7)
(4) 0SA QIN23MOV3209B-B SERVICE WATER ISOLATION VALVE TO AUX AB 100-00 0192 FEEDWATER OA Q1N23MOV321OA-A SERVICE WATER TO AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 1A AD 100-00 0191 INTAKE 08A QINZ3MOV3210B-B SERVICE WATER TO AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 1B AS 100-00 0192 INTAKE 05 QIN23POOIA-A AUX FEEDWATER PUMP IA AB 100-00 0191 05 Q1N23P0O1B-B AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 18 AB 100-00 0192 18 QIPIILTOS15-A CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER YD 155-00 YARD 18 QIPIILTOS16-B CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER YD 155-00 YARD 21 QIPIITOOl CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK YD 155-00 YARD 07 Q1P13NY2866C-A CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION OUTSIDE C1TT AB 121-00 0223 VALVE 07 QIP13HV2866D-B CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION INSIDE C11IT CB 129-00 C7TMT VALVE 07 Q1P13HV2867C-A CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTMT AD 121-00 0223 VALVE 07 QIPI3HV2867D-B CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION INSIDE CTMT CD 129-00 CTMT VALVE 07 QlPlSHV3103-A PRESSURIZER LIQUID SAMPLE LINE ISOLATION CB 129-00 CT1T VALVE 07 Q1P5INV3105-B RHR HX A SAMPLE VALVE AB 77-00 0128 07 QlP15HV3106-B RHR HX B SAMPLE VALVE As 77-00 0128 07 Q1PI5HV3332-B PRESSURIZER SAMPLE AD 121-00 0223 07 Q1P15HV3333-B RCS HOT LEG SAMPLE LINE ISOLATION VALVE AB 121-00 0223 07 Q1PI5HV3765-A RCS SAMPLE CB 126-00 CTNT 0 QIP16FSO1A-A SW STRAINER IA SW 167-00 0072A 0 Q1P16FSO1B-B SW STRAINER 1B SW 167-00 0072A 07 QIP16FV3009A-B CCW HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE AB 100-00 0185 07 QIPI6FV3009C-A CCV NEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE As 100-00 0185 20 QIP16GS17A-A TURB. BLDG. S.W. ISOL. VALVE RELAY BOX DB 155-00 0060 20 QIP16G517B-B TURB. BLDG. S.W. ISOL. VALVE RELAY BOX DB 155-00 0056C GSA Q1P16MOV3149-A BLOWDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER ISOLATION NOV AB 121-00 0223 06 Q1P16POOIA-A SERVICE WATER PUMP 1A SW 188-06 0072A Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'IS)
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 Page 11 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 10 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM am--a-- . -c---- -.. m bwas.a.. fl Ummm nmmmm flmmmS* w*wwomcoml (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 06 QIPIGPOOIB-A SERVICE WATER PUMP 1B SW 188-06 0072A 06 Q1P16POO1D-B SERVICE WATER PUMP 10 SW 188-06 0072A 06 QIP16POOIE-B SERVICE WATER PUMP 1E SW 188-06 0072A 18 QIP16PDS620-A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH YD 155-00 YARD 18 Q1P16PDS62I-B DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH YD 155-00 YARD 0BA QIP16V514-8 SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION YD 155-00 ISVBi VALVE OSA Q1P16VS15-A SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION YD 155-00 1SVB1 VALVE 08A QIP16V516-B SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION YD 155-00 1SVBI VALVE 08A QIPI6V517-A SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION YD 155-00 1SVB1 VALVE GSA Q1P16V538-8 SERVICE WATER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION TO YD 155-00 1SV82 POND 08A QIP16V539-A SERVICE WATER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION TO YD 155-00 ISVB2 POND 08A Q1P16VS45-B SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE FROM AUXILIARY YD 155-00 1SV84 BUILDING 08A QIP16V546-A SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE FROM AUXILIARY YD 140-00 ISVB4 BUILDING 07 QIP16VS62-B SERVICE WATER DILUTION BYPASS PRESSURE YD 155-00 ISVB2B CONTROL 07 Q1P16V563-A SERVICE WATER DILUTION BYPASS PRESSURE YD 155-00 1SVB2A CONTROL 07 QIP16V577-A A TRAIN SERVICE WATER MINIFLOW SW 188-06 0072A 07 Q1P16VG78-AB A-B TRAIN SERVICE WATER MINIFLOW SW 188-06 0072A 07 QIP16V579-B B TRAIN SERVICE WATER NINIFLOW SW 188-06 0072A 21 QIP17HOOIA-B CCW HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN B AB 100-00 0185 21 QIP17HOO1B-AB SWING CCW HEAT EXCHANGER AS 100-00 0185 21 QIP17HO01C-A CCW HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN A AB 100-00 0185 07 Q1P17HV2229 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUPPLY TO SAMPLE AB 100-00 0162 COOLERS 07 Q1P17HV3045-A CCW RETURN FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIER AB 121-00 0223 ISOLATION 07 QIP17HV3067-B CCW RETURN FROM EXCESS LETDOWN AB 121-00 0223 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name &Version: SSEM vO.0 Page 12 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 11 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM c=U=-= n.US====..=.=..USU=U (2) (3) ..........
(S) (6) (7)
(1) (4)
AB 121-00 0223 07 QIP17HV3095-B CCW SUPPLY TO EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER 07 Q1P1714V3096A CCi NON-SAFETY ISOLATION AS 100-00 0161 07 QIP17HV3096B CCi NON-SAFETY ISOLATION AS 100-00 0161 07 QlPl7HV3184-B CCW RETURN FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIER CB 129-00 CTNT ISOLATION 07 QIP17HV3443-A CCW RETURN FROM EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT CB 129-00 CThT EXCHANGER 08A Q1P17NOV3046-B CCW RETURN FROM RCPS CB 130-00 CTMT 08A Q1P17MOV3O52-A CCW TO RCP THERMAL BARRIER ISOLATION AS 121-00 0223 OSA QIP17NOV3182-A CCW RETURN FROM RCPS AS 121-00 0223 08A QIP17NOV318SA-A CCV INLET TO RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO. IL AS 83-00 0128 OBA Q1P17NOV3185B-B CCW INLET TO RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO. 2* AS 83-00 0128 05 QIP17PO0IA-B CCV PUMP IA TRAIN B AB 100-00 0185 05 QlPl7PO0IC-A CCV PUM IC TRAIN A AS 100-00 0185 07 Q1PI7PCV3404A CCW RHR PMP 1A SEAL HEAT EXCHANGER PRPESURE AB 83-00 0128 CONTROL 07 QIP17PCV3404B CCV RHR PIMP B SEAL HEAT EXCHANGER PRESURE AS 83-00 0129 CONTROL 21 Q1P17TOOl SURGE TANK (CCW) AS 179-00 0506 12 Q1P1SCOO2A-A TRAIN A EMERGENCY AIR COMPRESSOR AS 100-00 0189 12 Q1P1SCOO2B-B TRAIN S EMERGENCY AIR COMPRESSOR AS 100-00 0189 07 QIP19HV2228-8 PRESSURIZER PORV BACK-UP AIR SUPPLY VALVE AS 121-00 0223 07 Q1P19KV3611-A INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION OUTSIDE AS 100-00 0184 CONTAIPN1ENT VALVE 21 QIP19NCYL-A NITROGEN CYLINDER AS 121-00 0218 21 Q1P19NCYL-B NITROGEN CYLINDER AS 121-00 0218 04 QlRlIB004-A LC TRANSFORMER 10 AS 139-00 0335 04 Q1R11BOO5-B LC TRANSFORMER lE AB 121-00 0229 04 Q1R11B503-A LC TRANSFORMER 1R DS 155-00 0056A 04 QlRllB504-A LC TRANSFORMER 1K Sw 188-06 0072E 04 Q1R1115O5-8 LC TRANSFORMER IL SW 188-06 00728 04 QIR11B507-B LC TRANSFORMER IS DB 155-00 0056C Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name &Version: SSEM v0.0 Page 13 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 12 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1
,ý.1INE NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM
-770.~ .a a c.00U000u0 ....... (5) nn.mflan (6)===
(5) (6) (7)
(2) (3) (4) 03 QlRlSA006-A 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IF AB 139-00 0343 03 QI1RISAD7-8 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IG AB 121-00 0233 03 Q1R15A503-A 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IN DB 155-00 0056A 03 QIRISA504-8 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IJ 08 155-00 0056C 03 Q1R15A5OS-A 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IK SW 188-06 0072E 03 Q1R15A506-B 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IL SW 188-06 0072B 02 QIR16BO06-A 600V LOAD CENTER ID AS 139-00 0335 02 Q1R16B007 -B G00V LOAD CENTER 1E AB 121-00 0229 02 Q1R16B506-A 600V LOAD CENTER lK/2K SW 188-06 0072E 02 Q1R16B507-B 600V LOAD CENTER 11/2L SW 188-06 00728 02 Q1R16B508-A 600V LOAD CENTER 1R/2R 155-00 0056A DB 02 QIR168509-B 600V LOAD CENTER IS/2S 155-00 0056C AB 01 QIR17B001-A MCC IA 139-00 0332 AB 01 QIR178002-0 MCC 1B 121-00 0209 01 Q1R17BODO-A MCC 1U AB 139-00 0347 01 QIR178009-B 1CC 1V AB AS 139-00 0334 Sw 01 Q1R17B5O4-A MCC 1K AS SW 188-06 0072E 01 Q1R17B505-B MCC 1L 188-06 0072B 01 Q1R17B507-A MCC IN DB 155-00 0060 01 Q1R17B$O8-B MCC iP DB 155-00 0057 01 Q1R17B5O9-A MCC iS 155-00 0061 DB 01 QR1R78510-B MCC IT 155-00 0058 02 QlRl8B029-A POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0332 AB 02 QIR18B030-A POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH 139-00 0332 AB 14 QIRIS6031-A CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX 139-00 0332 AB 14 Q1RISB032-A CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX 139-00 0332 AB 02 QIR1BB033-B POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH 139-00 0322 AB 02 QIRIBB034-B POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH 139-00 0322 14 QlRlBB035-B CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX AS 139-00 0322 02 QIRIBB036-6 POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0322 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0 Page 14 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 13 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM (1) SON.. ....n..5;... UMwMeM.M....mmMMmMMM (4) m mm..=n= am..O.
(5) mammasas (6)
.. MsMsm (7) 02 QIR18BO38-A NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0332 02 Q1RISBO39-A NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0332 02 Q1R18B040-A NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AS 139-00 0332 02 QlR1SB041-B NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0312 02 Q1R18042-B NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AS 139-00 0312 02 QIRISB043-B NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0312 14 QLR21BOO1A-1 VITAL AC BREAKER BOX AB 155-00 0416 14 Q1R21BOO1B-2 VITAL AC BREAKER BOX AB 155-00 0416 14 Q1R216001C-3 VITAL AC BREAKER BOX AB 139-00 0318 14 Q1R21BOO1D-4 VITAL AC BREAKER BOX AB 139-00 0318 16 Q1R21EOO9A-1 INVERTER IA AB 121-00 0224 16 Q1R21EO09B-2 INVERTER 1B AB 121-00 0224 16 Q1R21EO09C-3 INVERTER 1C AB 121-00 0226 16 Q1R21EOO9D-4 INVERTER ID AB 121-00 0226 16 Q1R21EOO9F-A INVERTER IF AS 121-00 0224 16 Q1R21E009G-B INVERTER IG AS 121-00 0226 14 QLR21LOO1A-1 VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IA AS 155-00 0416 14 Q1R21LOO1B-2 VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL lB AS 155-00 0416 14 Q1R21LOO1C-3 VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IC AB 139-00 0318 14 Q1R21LOO1D-4 VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ID AD 139-00 0318 14 QIR21LOOSA-A 120V VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IJ AS 121-00 0224 14 QIR21LOOSB-B 120V VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IK AD 121-00 0226 03 QI1R36ASOI-A 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1K SURGE ARRESTOR SW 188-06 0072A 03 Q1R36A502-B 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IL SURGE ARRESTOR SW 188-06 0072A 03 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1K SURGE ARRESTOR D8 155-00 0056A Q1R36A510-A OB 03 QIR36A511-B 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1L SURGE ARRESTOR DB 155-00 0056C 14 Q1R41LOO1A-A 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IA AB 155-00 0416 14 QIR41LOOIB-A 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 15 AB 139-00 0343 14 QIR41LOOIC-A 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IC AS 139-00 0312 14 QIR41LOO1D-B 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1D AB 155-00 0416 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0 Page 15 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 14 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I LINE SYSTEM/ERUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. BUILDING ELEV ROOM c~c~ms~uinau...uIuN om (1) (2) (3)
.unn~mum*n= =.som.. (?o)c.sms (4) (5) (6) (7) 14 Q1R41LOO1E-B 125VOC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1E AS 121-00 0233 14 QIR41LOOIF-B 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IF AB 121-00 0209 02 QIR42BOO1A-A 125VDC BUS 1A AS 121-00 0224 02 QIR42B001B-B 125VDC BUS 1B AS 121-00 0226 16 QIR42E001A-A AUX BLDG BATTERY CHARGER IA AS 121-00 0224 1i QIR42EO01B-B AUX BLDG BATTERY CHARGER 1B AS 121-00 0226 15 Q1R42EOO2A-A AUX BLDG BATTERY IA AS 121-00 0214 is QIR42E002B-8 AUX BLDG BATTERY 1B AS 121-00 0212 17 Q1R43AS02-B DIESEL GENERATOR 1B (SKID) DB 155-00 0058 20 QIR43EO01A-A SEQUENCER BIF AS 139-00 0335 20 QIR43EO01B-B SEQUENCER BIG AS 121-00 0229 20 QIR43EOO2A-A SEQUENCER BIF AUX RELAY PANEL AS 139-00 0343 20 QIR43E002B-8 SEQUENCER BIG AUX RELAY PANEL AB 121-00 0233 20 QIR43ESO1A-A SEQUENCER BUS 1H DB 155-00 0056A 20 Q1R43E501B-B SEQUENCER BUS 13 DO 155-00 0056C 0 QlR43E502B-B DIESEL GENERATOR 1B NEUTRAL GROUNDING OB 155-00 0058 RESISTOR 20 QIR43G510-B DIESEL GENERATOR 16 CT JB D8 155-00 Co58 21 Q1R43TS02-B FUEL OIL DAY TANK 1B DB 155-00 0063 21 QIR43T503 DIESEL GENERATOR 1B STARTING AIR RECEIVER DB 155-00 0058 TANK 21 Q1R43T504 DIESEL GENERATOR lB STARTING AIR RECEIVER DB 155-00 0058 TANK 09 Q1V47CO12A-A AUXILIARY BLDG A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM AB 175-00 0501 EXHAUST FAN 09 QIV47CO12B-B AUXILIARY BLDG B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM AS 175-00 0501 EXHAUST FAN DIESEL GEN 1B FUEL OIL STORAGE TRANSFER YD 155-00 YARD 05 QIY52PS02B-B PUMP 21 Q1Y52T502 FUEL STORAGE TANK 19 YD 155-00 YARD 20 QSHI1NGEPB2508-AS EMERGENCY POWER BOARD AS 155-00 0401 20 QSH21ES25-A DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A LOCAL CONTROL PANEL DB 155-00 0061 20 QSH21ES28-A DIESEL GENERATOR IC LOCAL CONTROL PANEL CB 155-00 0060 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name &Version: SSEM vO.O Page 16 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 15 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I
'LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION NO. CLASS MARK NO. BUILDING ELEV ROOM
=*Donsa.uva
- awa...
ssu W.a.u..wcao wau...mm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 20 QSH21LSO3A-A SERVICE WATER A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM HVAC SW 188-06 00720 LCS 20 QSH21LSO3B-B SERVICE WATER B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM HVAC SW 188-06 0072C LCS 20 QSH22LS02-A DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL 1-2A OB 155-00 0061 20 QSH22L504-A DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL IC OB 155-00 0060 20 QSH23S544D-A DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM IC HVAC LCS DB 155-00 0060 20 QSH23S544E-A DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1-2A HVAC LCS DO 155-00 0061 01 QSRI7BOO6-A MCC IF AB 155-00 0409 01 QSR17BO07-B NCC IG AB 155-00 0409 14 QSR19LO02A-A 120V AC CONTR. PWR. PANEL 1R AB 155-00 0409 14 QSR19LO02B-B 120V AC CONTR. PWR. PANEL IS AB 155-00 0409 14 QSR41LS04-A 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IN SW 188-06 0072E 14 QSR41L5O5-B 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IN SW 188-06 00720 20 QSR42BS16A-A UNIT I SERVICE WATER BATTERY FUSE BOX SW 188-06 0074 TRAIN A 20 QSR42B516B-B UNIT 1 SERVICE WATER BATTERY FUSE BOX SW 188-06 0073 TRAIN 0 20 QSR42B52OA-A SW BATTERY NO. 1 or 2 DETECTION CABINET SW 188-06 0074 20 QSR42B520B-B SW BATTERY NO. 3 or 4 DETECTION CABINET SW 188-06 0073 15 QSR42B523A-A 125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO. Sw 188-06 0074 I
15 QSR42B523B-A 125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO. SW 188-06 0074 2
is QSR42B523C-B 125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO. SW 188-06 0073 3
15 QSR42B5230-B 125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO. SW 188-06 0073 4
20 QSR42BS52SA-A SW BUILDING A TRAIN BATTERY SEL SW SW 188-06 0074 20 QSR42B525B-B SW BUILDING B TRAIN BATTERY SEL SW SW 188-06 0073 16 OSR428526A-A SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. I SW 188-06 0072D (NORMAL) 16 QSR42BS26B-A SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 2 SW 188-06 0072D (STANDBY)
Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O Page 17 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 16 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1
'LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM
=8776=* *fl.Ms cow-oo .ff. Mon.== rMr-"rnrTT-rrlTa I'll 1-1B (5m)a..sfl znow..a= mowns...as (1) (2) (3) .--- moac-ema(4)csu (4) (5) (6) (7) 16 QSR42B526C-B SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 3 SW 188-06 0072C (NORMAL) 16 QSR42B526D-B SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 4 SW 188-06 0072C (STANDBY) 17 QSR43A501-A DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A (SKID) 0B 155-00 0061 17 QSR43A503-A DIESEL GENERATOR IC (SKID) DO 155-00 0060 0 QSR43E502A-A DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A NEUTRAL GROUNDING DB 155-00 0061 RESISTOR 0 QSR43E502C-A DIESEL GENERATOR IC NEUTRAL GROUNDING DB 155-00 0060 RESISTOR 20 QSR43G509-A DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A CT J8 D0 155-00 0061 20 QSR43LOO1A-A DIESEL GEN 1-2A DC CONTROL PWR AUTO XFER DS 155-00 0061 SW (ATS) 20 QSR43LOO1C-A DIESEL GEN 1C DC CONTROL PWR AUTO XFER SW D0 155-00 0060 (ATS) 21 QSR43T501-A FUEL OIL DAY TANK 1-2A Do 155-00 0066 21 QSR43T503-A FUEL OIL DAY TANK IC D8 155-00 0065 21 QSR43TS07 DIESEL GENERATOR IC STARTING AIR RECEIVER DB 155-00 0060 TANK 21 QSR43T508 DIESEL GENERATOR IC STARTING AIR RECEIVER 06 155-00 0060 TANK 21 QSR43T511 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A STARTING AIR DB 155-00 0061 RECEIVER TANK 21 QSR43TS12 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A STARTING AIR DO 155-00 0061 RECEIVER TANK 20 QSV49HS3313AB-A CTRL RM A/C LOCAL CONTROL STATION A As 155-00 0416 20 QSV49HS3313BB-8 CTRL RN A/C LOCAL CONTROL STATION B AB 155-00 0416 10 QSV49KOOIA-A CONTROL ROOM PACKAGE A/C UNIT AB 175-00 0501 10 QSV4gKOOLB-B CONTROL ROOM PACKAGE A/C UNIT AB 175-00 0501 18 QSW41B51SE-B SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SW 1B8-06 0073 18 QSW41B515F-A SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SW 188-06 0074 18 QSW418592B-B SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SW 188-06 0073 18 QSW419592D-A SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SW 188-06 0074 09 QSW41CSO5A-B SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SW 188-06 0072A A
Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Nwuber Filter Criteria: (Eva). Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0 Page 18 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO, SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 17 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUlDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I lINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM Samoa57 m-mnolm..sfl (1) (2) ... -00... ..
ese.l...........a..lnl.amsfltb..lfln lb (5) (7)
(4) (6) 09 QSW41CS05B-B SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SW 188-06 0072A B
09 QSW41C505C-B SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SW 188-06 0072A C
09 QSV4IC5O5D-A SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SW 188-06 0072A D
09 QSW41C5O5E-A SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SW 188-06 0072A E
09 QSW4IC5S5F-A SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SW 188-06 0072A F
09 QSW41C5O6A-0 SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM SW 188-06 00728 EXHAUST FAN 09 QSW41CSO6B-B SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM SW 188-06 0072B EXHAUST FAN 09 QSW4IC5O6C-A SERVICE WATER A TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM SW 188-06 0072E EXHAUST FAN 09 QSW41CS060-A SERVICE WATER A TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM SW 188-06 0072E EXHAUST FAN 09 QSW41C5O7A-B SERVICE WATER B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST SW 188-06 0073 FAN 09 QSW41CSO7B-B SERVICE WATER B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST SW 188-06 0073 FAN 09 QSW41C507C-A SERVICE WATER A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST SW 188-06 0074 FAN 09 QSW41C507D-A SERVICE WATER A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST SW 188-06 0074 FAN 0 QSW4IC5I3A-8 SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM INTAKE LOUVER SW 167-00 0072A 0 QSW41 C513B-8 SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM INTAKE LOUVER SW 167-00 0072A 09 SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM INTAKE LOUVER Sw 0 QSW41C513C-A 167-00 0072A QSW41CS13D-A SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM INTAKE LOUVER SW 167-00 0072A 09 QSW41C514A-B SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWGR ROOM INTAKE SW 188-06 0072B 0 LOUVER 0 QSW41C5I4B-B SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWGR ROOM INTAKE SW 188-06 0072B LOUVER 0 QSW41C514C-A SERVICE WATER A TRAIN 51R ROOM INTAKE SW 188-06 0072E LOUVER QSW41C514D-A SERVICE WATER A TRAIN SWGR ROOM INTAKE SW 188-06 0072E LOUVER Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name &Version: SSEM vO.O Page 19 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS -. N NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 18 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM
.uwu2)S =..We. (fm..s)e
sc7)=
now..= .. ....
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Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.O Page 20 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 19 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
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Program File Nane &Version: SSEN vO.O Page 21 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit I - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-37 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 22 of 40
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ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 UNIT 1 SWEL 1 Version 2.0 SWEL Revision Date - 02/13/14 Date: zj- ,,
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Rl7 X JPEEE:INA0EQUATE ANC1OkAE IN THE FEAR OF TIlE MCC AND AD.,ACENTMCC BAYS NOT MoDiFYiNGANC0O -ANDOCHNECinGNECIC Page 30 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHENT :RU,S*EISRi WAKOVI EUPMN LSTS, NO./0NCFI6A-RPT-0A VERSION 2.0 AU RIID .IC A/OE U.KE A A X I 's BI:
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C51 -43* LBD/LGENERA70E*RI--(SI)DESEL BUILCING 6I/_3 X X 2tETAITE- A ýPE I FRO OVERHEADx Page 31 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOIM EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 2i-T,,dL N- -TfI.d T- - - ... .~b.h~LW ~ ~ p ~
I .Wt,.-vT hQR4I'p 4k6F5I, Page 32 of40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-37 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 33 of 40
ENERCATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-O1, V'fW18P~d'PT"l Farley Unit 1 SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related Items NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns Variety of Environments Variety of types of Major new equipment MPL # System/Equipment Description or (21 Classes Variety of Not replcmnt from Systems Submerged Submerged Other equpmnt Appendix B) Location Class #
1 QIG31HOO01A SPENT FUEL HEAT EXCHANGER 1A G31 X 21 AB-155'/0445 2 Q1G31H0001B SPENT FUEL HEAT EXCHANGER 1B G31 X 21 AB-165'/0013 3 Q1G31P002A 1A SFP PUMP G31 X 5 AB-139'/0342 4 Q1G31P002B 1B SFP PUMP G31 X 5 AB-139'/0342 5 Q1G31V001A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION ISO G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342 6 QIG31VO01B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION ISO G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342 7 QIG31V002A 1A SFP HX INLET ISO G31 X 0 AB-155'/0455 8 Q1G31V002B 1B SFP HX INLET ISO G31 X 0 AB-155'/0423 9 QIG31V003A 1A SFP HX OUTLET ISO G31 X 0 AB-155'/0455 10 Q1G31V003B 1B SFP HX OUTLET ISO G31 X 0 AB-155/0423 11 Q1G31V004A 1A SFP COOLING LOOP TO SFP PURIF G31 0 INLET ISO X AB-139'/0342 12 Q1G31V004B 1B SFP PUMP COOLING LOOP TO SFP G31 0 PURIF INLET ISO X AB-139'/0342 13 Q1G31V005 SFP PURIF OUTLET TO SFP G31 X 0 AB-1SS'/0455 14 QIG31V006 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN (KEYZ- G31 0 225) X AB-139'/0342 15 Q1G31V007 DW TO SFP ISO (KEYZ-335) G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342 16 Q1G31V008A 1A SFP PUMP DISCH PI-652B ROOT G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342 17 Q1G31V008B 1B SFP PUMP DISCH PI-652D ROOT G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342 18 Q0G31V009A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION PI-652A ROOT G31 0 X I_ AB-139'/0342 19 Q1G31V009B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION PI-652C ROOT G31 0 X AB-139'/0342 20 Q1G31V017 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN DRN G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342 21 Q1G31V018 1B SFP COOLING LOOP DRN G31 X 0 AB-139'/0307 22 Q1G31V019 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN VENT G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342 23 Q1G31V021A 1A SFP PUMP CASING VENT G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342 24 Q1G31V021B 18 SFP PUMP CASING VENT G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342 25 Q1G31V022A 1A SFP PUMP CASING DRN G31 X 0 AB-139'/0345 26 Q1G31V022B 1B SFP PUMP CASING DRN 631 X 0 AB-139'/0345 27 Q1G31V023A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION DRN G31 X 0 AB-139'/0345 28 Q1G31V023B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION DRN G31 X 0 AB-139'/0345 29 QIG31VO24A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION VENT G31 X 0 IAB-139'/0345 30 Q1G31V024B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION VENT G31 K 0 IAB-139'/0345 31 Q1G31V025 SFP HX HIGH POINT VENT G31 I 0 .AB-165'/0013 Page 34 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-37 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 35 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01. VERSION 2.0 Originator: I-omt6 L~, l.J6A& Date: w Originator: ?2X ( T 1d,~ Date:
Reviewer-,~Z& /~~~toO~ Date: 9 ?i t2-Ops Reviewer- i i;I Aj 4 e.cLm
.JIL.-&-, Date:
Peer Reviewer: 1'L-- Aj.-~ Date: ..- Y-I.
Peer Reviewer: K Date: to Peer Reviewer,~ cV-IeAS1ýý?~ ~ Date:
Peer Reviewer;, fIclkeri (.$16r t ~ ,z Date; ____
Page 36 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOVN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Farley Unit I SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related Items - Revision Date 9/18/12 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns Screen #3 Screen #4 Anchorage Variety of check MPL# System/Equipment Location types of Variety of environments required?
Description Major new equipment (50% of or (21 Classes Column B)
Variety of replcmnt from Systems equpmnt Appendix B) Rapid Drain-Down Comments Hydraulic lines connected to the SFP and the equipment connected to Class# Submerged Not Submerged Other Yes No those lines Q1G31H0001A SPENT FUELHEAT AUXBLDG/ 155'/ 0445 1 EXCHANGER 1A G31 21 X X 2 QIG31PO02B 1B SFP PUMP AUX BLDG/ 139' / 0342 G31 5 X X QIG31VO01A 1A SFP PUMP AUXBLDG/ 139' / 0342 3 SUCTION SO G31 0 X X 4 Q1G31V003B 1B SFPHX OUTLET AUX BLDG/ 155'/ 0423 ISO G31 0 X X QlG31VO04A 1A SFPCOOUNG AUXBLDG/ 139' /0342 031 0 I X LOOP TO SFP PURIF 5 INLET ISO _ __ _
6CO.G31V006 SFPCOOLING LOOP AUXBLDG/ 139' / 0342 031 6 RETURN (KEY Z-225)
Page 37 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-36 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 38 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 UNIT 1 SWEL 2 Version 2.0 SWEL Revision Dat - 11/07/13 Daft: J'L2.!ALL Revtewer: ,-Y7.f-gW400 Date:,
ops Reviewer: L~ I1 * /*
Daft:
Peer &M ~welA **2/ Ž ir f i ii Richard G. Starck II Peer Reviewer:_ S*' 4h S 4=a Date: 2/14/2014 Page 39 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOMN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01. VERSION 2.0 Farley Unit 1 SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related Items - Revision Date 11/07/13 NTTFRecommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns Screen #3 Screen #4 Anchorage checg Variety of check MPL # System/Equipment Location types of Variety of environments required?
Description Majornew equipment (50% of or 121Classes Column B)
Variety of replcmnt from Systems equpmnt Appendix B) Rapid Drain-Down Comments Hydraulic lines connected to the SFP and the equipment connected to Class # Submerged Not Submerged Other Yes No those lines Q1G31HOO01A SPENT FUELHEAT AUUX BLDG/155' / 0445 I EXCHANGER IA G31 21 X IX 2 QIG31P0028 1B SFP PUMP AUX BLDG/ 139 / 0342 G31 5 X X QIG31VOO1A IA SFP PUMP AUXBLDG/ 139 / 0342 3 SUCTION ISO G31 0 X X 4 Q]G31VO038 18 SIP HXOUTLET AUXBLDG/155'/0423 ISO G31 0 X X QIG31VO04A L'ASFPCOOLING A1UXBLDG/ 139- / 0342 G31 0 X X LOOPTO SEPPURIP S INLET ISO Q1G31VO06 SFPCOOLING LOOP AUX BLDG/ 139' / 0342 G31 0XI 6 _ RETURN (KEY Z-225) I 1 01 1 1 II __
NOTE- The number of zeros following the system identifier (eg. B31) and before the unique numbering of a component may vary from field, SWC, or SWEL Labeling. This is a unique historical issue related to component identifications at Plant Farley and does not imply a different component, For example, "QIR3SA50I and Q1R36AOS01 are representative of one component in the plant and can be used interchangeably".
Page 40 of 40
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 2 UNIT 1 - PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 (Version 1.0 and Version 2.0)
NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Page 1 of 6
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Sheet 1 of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1 Instructions for Completing Checklist This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist should be used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may have changed to address those findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.
- 1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL I selection? YN Nil SWEL 1for Farley Unit I meets the requirementsof having 90 to 120 items and addressesallfive safety functions. Many components provide safetyfunctionsfor multiple systems, and/orarepart offrontline support systems. Allfive safetyfunctions discussed in EPRI Report 1025286 are well represented in the SWEL 1.
- 2. Does SWEL 1 include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:
- a. Various types of systems? Yi NEI Items included on the SWEL comprise a variety of systems such as Emergency Diesel Generatorsand Auxiliaries, Service Water System, Component Cooling Water System, Automatic Depressurization,Residual Heat Removal System, Vital A/C and DIC systems.
- b. Major new and replacement equipment? YO NEI New and replacementcomponents are identified in SWEL 1.
- c. Various types of equipment? YZ NEI SWEL 1 includes at least one example of each of the 21 classes of equipment, except Classes 1) (chillers), 13 (Motor Generators)and 19 (Temperature Sensors). These components did not meet the screening criteriafor incorporationin the SWEL as discussed in Section 6 of the submittal report.
All other equipment classes were well represented. In general, the number of components in each class is proportionalto the number of safety-related components of that class in the plant as a whole, except that the number of in-line valves is proportionallysmaller than anchored equipment. Anchored equipment is more vulnerable to seismic loads.
- d. Various environments? YN N[I The SWEL contains components in mild, harsh, and outdoor environments. The components are locatedin different buildings, rooms, and/or on different building elevations. The SWEL also includes components located inside primary containment.
- e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program? YN Nil]
The SWEL included equipment that had been modified as a result of the IPEEE program. Section 5 and Attachment 5 of the submittal reportprovides information on resolution of the IPEEEfindings. The SWEL and individualcomponent checklists provide information about the IPEEEmodificationsand verification of modification incorporation.
Page 2 of 6
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Sheet 2 of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1
- f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL I? Y0 Nol SWEL 1 includes high risk components based on risk significance in the plant probabilisticrisk assessment (PRA) models. Section 6 of the submittal report discusses the risk insights usedfor SWEL development.
- 3. For SWEL 2:
- a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in YN NEI SWEL 2?
SWEL 2 includes componentsfor maintainingcooling of the SFP, which are Seismic Category I components.
- b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items not Y0 NEl included in SWEL 2?
Section 6.2 of the submittal report provides the justificationfor excluding items on SWEL 2. There were no components identified that could contribute to rapidSFP drain down. Note that there were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would have affected equipment that meets the screening requirements to be included on SWEL 2.
- 4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.
The peer review team reviewed the initial SWEL I and SWEL 2 and provided comments and suggestions for enhancement of the SWELs. Comments included suggestions to include additionalelectrical components and more equipment mounted to the structure,since such equipment has shown more potential to be adversely impacted by seismic loads than in-line mounted components. In addition, comments were made suggesting that certain equipment classes contain more components and that explanations be providedfor not including certain equipment (e. g. there are no safety-relatedor Seismic Category I components in that equipment class installed in the plant). The peer reviewers ensured that the SWELs met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Changes deemed necessary during the walkdown due to inaccessibility were reviewed by the peer reviewers to ensure that the changes did not impact the level of compliance to the EPRI report. The final SWEL meets all requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.
- 5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL? YZ NEI Peer Reviewer #1: Robert Ashworth rZý44ý Date: 11/05/2012 Peer Reviewer #2: Melanie Brown* . *rI.,,A,/
.Date: 11/05/2012 Page 3 of 6
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Sheet 1 of 3 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1 Version 2 (Final)
Instructions for Completing Checklist This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist should be used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may have changed to address those findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.
- 1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL I selection? YZ NI]
SWEL 1for Farley Unit I meets the requirementsof having 90 to 120 items and addresses allfive safetyfunctions. Many components provide safety functionsfor multiple systems, and/or arepart offrontline supportsystems. Allfive safety functions discussed in EPRI Report 1025286 are well representedin the SWEL 1.
- 2. Does SWEL I include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:
- a. Various types of systems? YJR NE Items included on the SWEL comprise a variety of systems such as Emergency Diesel Generatorsand Auxiliaries, Service Water System, Component Cooling Water System, Automatic Depressurization,Residual Heat Removal System, Vital A/C and DIC systems.
- b. Major new and replacement equipment? YZ NEI New and replacement components are identified in SWEL 1.
- c. Various types of equipment? YO NEI SWEL 1 includes at least one example of each of the 21 classes of equipment, except Classes 11 (chillers), 13 (Motor Generators)and 19 (Temperature Sensors). These components did not meet the screening criteriafor incorporationin the SWEL as discussed in Section 6 of the submittal report.
All other equipment classes were well represented. In general, the number of components in each class is proportionalto the number of safety-related components of that class in the plant as a whole, except that the number of in-line valves is proportionallysmaller than anchoredequipment. Anchored equipment is more vulnerable to seismic loads.
Version 2: Item QIR42BOOIB (125vDC Bus IB) was listed in SWEL I for Version I ofthe walkdown report,but removed for Version 2 since the item could not be completely inspectedduring the outage walkdowns without excessive disassembly.
However, the anchorageand internals were inspected to the extent possible.
Removing the item from the SWEL Ifor Version 2 of the report did not invalidate any of the EPRI Report requirementssuch as variety of system2 variety of classes of equipment. variety of environments. etc.
Page 4 of 6
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Sheet 2 of 3 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1 Version 2 (Final)
- d. Various environments? YN NIl The SWEL contains components in mild, harsh, and outdoor environments. The components are located in different buildings, rooms, and/or on different building elevations. The SWEL also includes components located inside primary containment.
- e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program? YI Ni]
The SWEL included equipment that had been modified as a result of the IPEEE program. Section 5 and Attachment 5 of the sdbmittal reportprovides information on resolution of the IPEEEfindings. The SWEL and individual component checklists provide information about the IPEEE modifications and verification of modification incorporation.
- f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL 1? YZ NI]
SWEL 1 includes high risk components based on risk significance in the plant probabilisticrisk assessment (PRA) models. Section 6 of the submittal report discusses the risk insights used for SWEL development.
- 3. For SWEL 2:
- a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in Y! NEI SWEL 2?
SWEL 2 includes componentsfor maintaining cooling of the SFP,which are Seismic Category I components.
- b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items not YZ NI]
included in SWEL 2?
Section 6.2 of the submittal reportprovides the justificationfor excluding items on SWEL 2. There were no components identified thatcould contribute to rapidSFP drain down. Note that there were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would have affected equipment that meets the screening requirements to be included on SWEL 2.
Page 5 of 6
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Sheet 3 of 3 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1 Version 2 (Final)
- 4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.
The peer review team reviewed the initial SWEL I and SWEL 2 and provided comments and suggestions for enhancementof the SWEJs. Comments included suggestions to include additionalelectrical components and more equipment mounted to the structure,since such equipment has shown more potentialto be adversely impacted by seismic loads than in-line mounted components. In addition, comments were made suggesting that certainequipment classes contain more components and that explanationsbe providedfor not including certainequipment (e. g. there are no safety-relatedor Seismic Category I components in that equipment class installedin the plant). The peer reviewers ensured that the SWELs met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Changes deemed necessary during the walkdown due to inaccessibilitywere reviewed by the peer reviewers to ensure that the changes did not impact the level of compliance to the EPRI report. The final SWEL meets all requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.
Version 2: The peer reviewers reviewed the final reportf&r completeness., accuracy. and compliance with the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Comments were provided on the body of the reportas well as various attachments and were incorporated. The Linal report meets all requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.
- 5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL? YIEi NEI Peer Reviewer #l: e 6 - Date: 692- -/1. "-3V Peer Reviewer #2: * '
- Date: 02/13/2014 Page 6 of 6