NL-14-0249, Enclosure 1, Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report, Enclosure 2, Updated Farley Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Through Attachment 2
| ML14071A061 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/2014 |
| From: | Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-14-0249 | |
| Download: ML14071A061 (114) | |
Text
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Enclosure I Licensing Summary of Walkdown Report to NL-14-0249 Licensing Summary of Walkdown Report LICENSING
SUMMARY
OF WALKDOWN REPORT The report objective is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at the Joseph M.
Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 in response to the NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic". The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis. The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 2), which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. This final report submits the entire body of the report, Attachments 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 (which are revised from Version 1 submitted November 27, 2012), and new Attachments 7 and 8 added by Version 2 of this report.
SNC submitted its original walkdown report for FNP Unit 1 on November 27, 2012, in accordance with the March 12, 2012, NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter. During that initial walkdown, some equipment was identified as not being accessible, as noted in Table 7-1 of SNC's November 27, 2012, response. This equipment could not be accessed because of one of two conditions: (1) plant operating conditions, or (2) component inspections required the opening of cabinet/panel doors which was not permitted by plant Operations personnel during the time of the walkdowns. Consequently, walkdowns had to be deferred until the outage. Additionally, supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse seismic conditions was received after the FNP Unit 1 walkdowns were complete. Consequently, walkdown of equipment affected by this guidance was deferred until after SNC's November response and was included in Table 7-1 of the November 27, 2012, response. Walkdowns of this equipment along with the equipment originally deemed as inaccessible have been completed. Table 7-1 has been updated to show this equipment as complete with the completion date noted.
During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of fourteen (14) Unit 1 Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. Eleven of these were identified and included in Version 1.0 of the FNP Seismic Walkdown Report while 3 were identified during the most recent walkdowns. It has been determined that none of these as-found conditions would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions as defined by Reference 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis. This table has been updated to provide the status of these areas.
During the most recent walkdowns, one item was deemed inaccessible and was removed from the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) 1. Item 34 in Table 7-1 was not inspected as the anchorage was not completely accessible without extensive disassembly. This change to the SWEL is acceptable since an adequate number of similar component walkdowns that satisfy the minimum SWEL component types for this category were performed. The number of samples to be included in the SWEL as required by Reference 2 of this letter is still met.
In conclusion, the Seismic Walkdowns at FNP Unit 1 in response to the NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are complete. FNP Unit 1 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warrant modification to the plant. FNP Unit 1 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit I Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Updated Farley Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic
NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 PROJECT REPORT VERSION 2.0 COVER SHEET Page 1 of 58 Farley Unit I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC432467 For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Prepared by:
James Dovel Date:
Reviewed by:
Approved by: (ENERCON)
Pioject Manager or Designee Date:
Date:
2-Is-wZ0j 2- (z-'
Approved by:
(SNc)
Technical Lead or Designee I Pea-Review Team Leader Approved by:
(SNC)
Project Manager or Designee Date:
I Melanie Brown
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/.7 26WL Te 7ryQ Mitchell Date:
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 2 OF 58 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Pave EX EC U TIV E SU M M A R Y............................................................................................................
3 1.0 SC O PE A N D O BJECTIV E...................................................................................................
4 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH..................
5 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS
SUMMARY
6 3.1 SAFE SHUTDOW N EARTHQUAKE..........................................................................................................
6 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND M ETHODS........................................................................................
8 4.0 PER SO N N EL Q U A LIFIC A TIO N S.....................................................................................
9 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES........................................................................................
1i 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUM M ARIES (Report Version 1)............................................................................
12 4.3 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUM M ARIES (Report Version 2)...............................................................................
17 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING.....................................................................
19 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT.................................
20 6.1 DEVELOPM ENT OF SW EL I............................................................................................................................
21 6.2 DEVELOPM ENT OF SW EL 2............................................................................................................................
24 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS......................................................
26 7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEM S.....................................................................................................................................
28 8.0 R ESU LTS..................................................................................................................................
35 8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISM IC CONDITIONS.................................................................................
35 8.2 EQUIPM ENT OPERABILITY............................................................................................................................
47 8.3 PLANT CHANGES..............................................................................................................................................
47 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS.........................................................................................................
48 9.0 PEER R EV IEW........................................................................................................................
49 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS..................................................................................................................................
49 9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS SUMM ARY........................................................................................................
49 10.0 RE FERE N C ES.........................................................................................................................
57 11.0 A TTA C H M EN TS.....................................................................................................................
58
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 3 OF 58 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The Seismic Walkdowns at Farley Unit I in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are complete as all items on the Seismic Waikdown Equipment List (SWEL) have been inspected. The walkdowns were performed using the methodology outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report 1025286). Plant Farley Unit 1 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to the plant. Plant Farley Unit I had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 4 OF 58 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at Farley Unit 1 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3:
Seismic" (Reference 10.1).
The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2),
which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.
The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Farley Unit 1 are complete as all items on the SWEL have been inspected. This is the final report and documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. This final report submits the entire body of the report, Attachments 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 which are revised from Version 1 submitted November 27, 2012, and the new Attachments 7 and 8 added by Version 2 of this report.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCFI64-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 5 OF 58 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH The requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC endorsed methodology provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance with Reference 10.2, the following topics are addressed in this report:
Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs) in the plant (Section 3.0);
- Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0);
- Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination for External Events IPEEE program (Section 5.0);
" Selection of Seismic Category I SSCs that were inspected in the plant (Section 6.0);
Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);
" Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases (Section 8.0); and
- Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).
Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to be able to inspect the anchorage. At the time of this supplemental guidance/clarification, the Farley Unit 1 walkdowns were complete for the items that were considered accessible. However, the components affected by the supplemental guidance were identified and have been re-inspected with component doors opened. The walkdowns for all components are now complete. Further discussion is given in Section 7.0.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 6 OF 58 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS
SUMMARY
This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.
3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE The criteria for determining the adequacy of Seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment for the Farley Nuclear Plant are described in various areas of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (Reference 10.14). In some cases the criteria are specified in general terms to require verification by tests or analyses. In other cases, more specific criteria are specified such as verification in accordance with IEEE Standard 344-1971. At the time of the original design and licensing of the plant the requirements were changing to the use of IEEE 344-1975. These two separate programs were used to verify the seismic adequacy of Farley's mechanical and electrical equipment.
By letter dated February 19, 1987, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, (Reference 10.4). On May 22, 1992, the NRC issued GL 87-02, Supplement I (Reference 10.8). As documented in NUREG-1211 (Reference 10.9), GL 87-02 is applicable to Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1, since Unit 1 had not previously been audited by the NRC's Seismic Qualification Review Team (SQRT). Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) replied to GL 87-02 by letter dated September 10, 1992. The SNC letter included a commitment to use the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) methodology as documented in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for the resolution of seismic issues identified in GL 87-02 for FNP Unit 1. The SQUG methodology is based on application of earthquake experience data to verify the seismic adequacy of equipment. The seismic evaluation for FNP Unit 1 was completed, and the results were documented in a document entitled, "Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 Summary Report." This document was submitted to the NRC by letter dated May 18, 1995, as a 10 CFR 50.54(f) response. SNC received an SER dated July 9, 1998, concerning FNP Unit I Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 resolution and it stated that SNC's USI A-46 program implementation resulted in safety enhancements beyond the original licensing basis and SNC actions provide sufficient basis to close the USI A-46 review at the facility.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 7 OF 58 Geologic and seismologic surveys of the site have been conducted to establish two "design earthquakes" with different intensities of ground motion. These are the 50 percent SSE ('/2 SSE) and the SSE with different intensities of ground motion. The 1/2/2 SSE, sometimes referred to as the operating basis earthquake (OBE), is postulated to be the earthquake that could be expected to occur at the site during the operating life of the plant. The SSE represents the strongest earthquake that is hypothetically postulated to occur during an infinite period. The intensity postulated to occur at the site for both the V2 SSE and SSE is defined from the history of seismic activity in the area around the site.
The
/2 SSE and SSE are specified in terms of a set of idealized, smooth curves, called the design spectra because they specify a range of values for two of the important properties of an earthquake ground motion, i.e., the maximum ground acceleration and the frequency distribution. The SSE produces the vibratory ground motion for which Category I structures, systems and components are designed to remain functional.
The 1/2 SSE and SSE spectra are each developed for 0%, 0.5%, 1.0%, 2.0%, 3.0%, and 5.0% of critical damping, with a horizontal ground peak acceleration of 0.05 g and 0.10 g, and vertical ground acceleration of 0.033 g and 0.067 g, respectively.
POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS Seismic Category I structures, systems and components are designed so that stresses remain within normal code allowable limits during the 1/22 SSE and to ensure they will perform their required safety-related functions during and after an SSE.
MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASIS The horizontal and vertical OBE and SSE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstrating the structural integrity of Seismic Category II SSCs, where required. In addition, systems supported by more than one structure shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements between the supporting structures.
The seismic analyses of safety related systems, equipment, and components are based on either the response spectra method, the time-history method, or the equivalent static method.
Although original seismic qualification was done to IEEE 344-1971, the USI A-46 Program verified that the original seismic qualification was adequate to support the seismic qualification of the equipment to the later requirements of IEEE 344-1975. Seismic qualification for new and replacement
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 8 OF 58 equipment is therefore based on the guidelines of IEEE 344-1975. Any new, replacement or changes to electrical and mechanical equipment are evaluated to the guidelines contained in IEEE 344-1975.
Damping values are provided in UFSAR Table 3.7-1.
3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND METHODS The design codes and standards for seismic qualification are listed throughout Section 3.0 of the Farley UFSAR (Reference 10.14). Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used in the original design of Farley Unit I are listed below.
ACI 318-71, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), Manual of Steel Construction, 7 th Edition ASME III Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1968 Edition ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Pumps and Valves for Nuclear Power.
ASME VIII Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1968 Edition ANSI B31.1 Power Piping ANSI B3 3.7 Nuclear Power Piping BC-TOP-4, Seismic Analysis of Structures and Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants, September, 1972 IEEE 317-1976, Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class 1 E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 344-1971 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Methods include both analysis and testing.
IEEE 344-1975 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Methods include both analysis and testing.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 9 OF 58 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities per the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 identify the Peer Review Team members and responsibilities for Versions I and 2 of this report, respectively. Section 4.1 provides an overview of the project responsibilities. Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 include brief experience summaries for all project personnel in alphabetical order.
Table 4-1 Project Team Members and Responsibilities Site Equipment Seismic Licensing Name Point of Selection /
Plant Walkdown Basis Contact IPEEE Operations Engineer Reviewer (POC)
Reviewer (SWE)
William Arens X
X Nikole Arrant X
X Maggie Farah X
X Ryan Harlos X
X X
X (See Note 3)
Crystal Lovelady X
X Laura Maclay X
X Paul Miktus*
X X
Ronald Miranda*
X X
Alan Mullenix X
X Brian Nelson X
X X
(See Note 3)
Scott Walden*
X X
Robert Wood X
X Taylor Youngblood X
X X
Stephen Yuan X
X
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 10 OF 58 Table 4-2 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities (Report Version 1)
Name Robert Ashworth*
Melanie Brown*
Richard Starck*
Kenneth Whitmore*
Table 4-3 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities (Report Version 2)
Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal Name Review Peer Peer Basis Peer Report Peer Team Reviewer Reviewer Reviewer Reviewer Leader Melanie Brown*
X X
X X
X Richard Starck*
X X
X X
Notes (Table 4-1, Table 4-2 and Table 4-3):
- 1)
- Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer
- 2) As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of entering the condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the condition with respect to the plant licensing basis. Further licensing basis reviews were performed as discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CAP resolution process by personnel not directly involved in the walkdowns.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHiMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE11OF58
- 3) Brian Nelson was named Site Point of Contact subsequent to the completion of the walkdowns required for Version 2. Prior to this, Ryan Harlos was the Site Point of Contact.
4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with the site equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization. The site POC coordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such as inspection equipment and support from plant operations. The POC was responsible for development of the walkdown schedule and any updates to the schedule based on equipment availability.
Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdowns. The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs. The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program. For this project, site engineers and plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection. The ESP also performed the responsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers. The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scope included a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.
Plant Operations Personnel provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) and Base List to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in a variety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown.
Plant Operations Personnel also assisted in obtaining access to components and component internals and helped to coordinate with plant maintenance. For the Farley Unit I project, the Plant Operations Personnel were either former or currently licensed Senior Reactor Operators.
The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs who had previously completed the Seismic Walkdown Training Class developed by the SQUG were not required to complete training on the NTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities and activities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.
The Licensing Basis Reviewers were responsible for determining whether any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing Basis Reviewers have knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation for the SSCs at Farley.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE12OF58 A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of the walkdowns. The Peer Review Team members have extensive experience in seismic design and qualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience. The Peer Review Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program satisfied the guidance in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES (Report Version 1)
Listed below are the experience summaries of the personnel who contributed to Version 1 of this report.
William Arens (SNC)
Mr. Arens is the Licensing Supervisor at Farley Nuclear Plant. He earned a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Oklahoma in 1980. Mr. Arens served for eight years as an officer in the U.S. Navy nuclear submarine force. He has been employed at Farley Nuclear Plant since 1988, obtaining a Senior Reactor Operator License in 1991. His experience at Farley includes serving as a MOV engineer, Shift Support Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, Operations Superintendent, and Shift Manager.
Mr. Ashworth is a structural engineer with MPR and has more than six years of experience with providing engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components and systems.
His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition, structural modeling and analyses, and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has completed the training course for the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance and is also a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG GIP for resolution of US[ A-46.
Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company, the majority of which has been serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activities associated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including:
Management of the seismic design bases, Seismic equipment qualification,
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCFI64-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE13OF58 Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components, Design documentation and configuration management.
She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants. Ms. Brown is a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG GIP for resolution of USI A-46.
Maggie Farah, SWE (ENERCON)
Ms. Farah is a Structural Engineer with a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the New Jersey Institute of Technology and currently pursuing a Master's degree in Structural Engineering. Ms. Farah has been employed as a structural engineer at ENERCON for more than four years and has extensive experience in performing seismic equipment evaluations and structural analysis. She has performed numerous plant walkdowns as part of seismic design and modifications and had extensive on-site experience at Humboldt Bay and at the Metropolis Works fuel processing plant. She has been involved in various plant modifications, including design of dry fuel storage installations. Ms. Farah completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and was qualified as a SWE.
Mr. Harlos is a mechanical engineer in the Farley Engineering Systems Department at Southern Nuclear Operating Company and has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Auburn University. He has been employed in the nuclear industry for approximately three years and has extensive experience in the design, operation, and monitoring of systems with respect to their applicable design bases. His primary experience is with SSCs on the Primary Side of PWR nuclear operating plants. Mr. Harlos also worked as a co-op employee for Southern Company for more than a year, while in college, prior to joining the staff at Farley Nuclear Station as a full-time employee. Mr. Harlos completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns.
Ms. Lovelady is a civil engineer in the Fleet Design Engineering Mechanical/Civil group at Southern Nuclear Operating Company. She has a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the University of Alabama, Huntsville. She has more than five years of experience in structural analysis and design of structures in the power industry. She has additional experience as a member of the structural monitoring team at Plant Hatch and. Plant Farley. Ms. Lovelady completed training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns to qualify as a SWE.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE14OF58 Laura Maclay, SWE (ENERCON)
Ms. Maclay has over three years of experience as a structural engineer with ENERCON. Her tasks have ranged from assisting with the development and preparation of design change packages to performing design calculations and markups, comment resolutions, and drawing revisions. She worked on-site at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant for a year preparing structural evaluations of SSCs for an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). She designed safety related supports for computer and electrical equipment for the Turbine Digital Controls Upgrade package and other similar packages. Her responsibilities also included the review of calculations, drawings and vendor documentation for the seismic evaluation of the Unit 3 Palfinger Crane inside containment and new platforms in the High Pressure Turbine enclosure. Recent work includes Fukushima flooding walkdowns at Limerick Generating Station. Ms. Maclay recently completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and was qualified as a SWE.
Paul Miktus, SCE (ENERCON)
Mr. Miktus, P.E., has over 35 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants and process/industrial facilities retrofits. Mr. Miktus held positions of responsibility in a number of supervisory and management positions for ENERCON for clients including Florida Power and Light, Southern Company and Entergy. His design experience includes structural steel design (including anchorages); suspended systems (piping, ductwork, raceways) supports; seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; rigging and scaffolds; piping stress analysis; and concrete slabs, beams and foundations. At River Bend Station, while with Entergy, Mr.
Miktus was Engineering Supervisor for many large projects and completed the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training and the Seismic IPEEE Add-On Training Courses.
Ronald Miranda, SCE (ENERCON)
Mr. Miranda is a member of the ENERCON Senior Technical and Management staff with 40 years of experience in the Nuclear Power Generation industry. He has held various engineering and management positions in the industry, holds a MS degree in Civil Engineering and is a SCE certified by the SQUG. Mr. Miranda is experienced in structural steel and reinforced concrete design, anchorage to concrete, identification and assessment of degraded structural conditions, evaluations using SQUG methodologies, and the management of large, complex, and high-visibility projects. Mr.
Miranda is currently the ENERCON Dry Fuel Storage Product Line Manager responsible for the development and the design of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations at power generating facilities under static, dynamic, and flooding conditions compliant with 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 72
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMiA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE15OF58 regulations and industry standards. Mr. Miranda is recognized as an expert within the dry fuel storage industry.
Alan Mullenix, SWE (ENERCON)
Mr. Mullenix is a Registered Professional Engineer with over five years of Civil/Structural experience.
He has a B.S. in Civil Engineering and a Master of Science degree in Structural Engineering. His primary responsibilities include structural design, seismic design, and Design Change Package development. Mr. Mullenix assisted with 10 CFR 73.55 Nuclear Plant Security upgrades, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations, and other design changes at Plant Farley, Plant Hatch, Brunswick, Crystal River, and Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations. Mr. Mullenix completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.
Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic qualification of nuclear plant equipment. He is the principal author of the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document (Reference 10.2) and developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course to over 200 engineers. He provided technical oversight of work for various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr. Starck developed for SQUG the generic guidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG GIP, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and the SQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE and has performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program. This work included equipment qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction review, outlier resolution, and operability determination.
Mr. Walden is a senior engineer in the Fleet Design Analysis / Civil department at SNC. He has a B.S.
in Civil Engineering from Mississippi State University. Mr. Walden has more than 33 years of experience in structural analysis and design of structures for electric utilities, including extensive experience in seismic analysis of nuclear power plant structures and seismic qualification of equipment. He has extensive experience in the area of analysis of supports and also worked in developing the response spectra curves for Plant Hatch. He also has extensive experience in the Structure Monitoring Program (SMP) for Maintenance Rule and is responsible for oversight of the
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE16OF58 SMP for Plant Farley. He successfully completed the SQUG training course, is a Seismic Capability Engineer and participated in the original IPEEE/SQUG walkdown for Plant Farley and the conduit/cable tray SQUG walkdowns for Plant Hatch. He is a registered Professional Engineer in the states of Alabama and Mississippi.
Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)
Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore is a Seismic Capability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification of nuclear plant components. Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developed the SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peer review of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdowns at Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations at numerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismic tests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components. Mr. Whitmore has significant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience in performing plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr. Whitmore completed his EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -
Seismic Walkdowns as a Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE) in June 2012.
Robert Wood (SNC)
Mr. Wood is the Farley Severe Accident Management Program Manager. He holds BS degrees in Physical Science, Mathematics, and Chemistry from Troy State University. Mr. Wood has over 37 years of experience at operating nuclear plants, was licensed as a SRO and served seven years on shift as Shift Support Supervisor and Unit Shift Supervisor. He has supervisory experience in chemistry, work management, strategic analysis and major project management.
Mr. Youngblood is a Site Projects Lead at Plant Farley working primarily in major projects. He has a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the University of Alabama at Birmingham. Mr. Youngblood has 12 years of civil engineering experience with more than four of those years spent at Plant Farley in the areas of civil/structural design. His design experience includes evaluations and calculations for seismically qualifying various supports and structures. His specialties are in the areas of concrete and
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE17OF58 earthwork, and he has developed an expertise in lifting and rigging evaluations. Mr. Youngblood is a registered Professional Engineer in the State of Alabama. Mr. Youngblood completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3.- Plant Seismic Walkdowns in June 2012.
Stephen Yuan, SWE (ENERCON)
Mr. Yuan, P.E., is a Senior Civil Engineer in ENERCON's New Jersey office. He has over 20 years of experience in structural modeling, design, upgrading, electrical facility structure analyses and maintenance of industrial installations and nuclear power plants, including significant experience at Perry, Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee Plant. Mr. Yuan was one of the key civil engineers in support of the transformer replacement project at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. He holds a M.S. in Civil Engineering from the City University of New York. Mr. Yuan recently completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and was qualified as a Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE).
4.3 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES (Report Version 2)
Listed below are the names of personnel who contributed to the work addressed by Version 2 of this report. The personnel shown worked on Version 1 as well as Version 2 unless noted otherwise.
Experience summaries for personnel who only worked on Version 2 are provided below. Experience summaries for the others are provided in Section 4.2. The experience levels of personnel listed in Section 4.2 have not been updated for Version 2.
William Arens (SNC)
Nikole Arrant, SWE (SNC) [Version 2 Only]
David Hall (SNC) [Version 2 Only]
Laura Maclay, SWE (ENERCON)
Alan Mullenix, SWE (ENERCON)
Brian Nelson, SWE (SNC) [Version 2 Only]
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 18 OF 58 Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)
Ms. Arrant is a civil engineer in the Farley Mechanical/Civil Design Department at Southern Nuclear Operating Company. She has a B.S. in Civil Engineering from Florida State University and has been employed in the nuclear industry for approximately four years, all of which have been spent in the Plant Farley Mechanical/Civil Design Department in the area of civil/structural design. Her design experience and specialties include evaluations and calculations for seismically qualifying various supports and structures. Ms. Arrant completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns in February 2013.
David Hall (SNC)
Mr. Hall is the Farley Severe Accident Management Program Manager. He holds a B.S. in Nuclear Science Management from Troy State University. He has over 35 years of experience at operating nuclear plants. He was licensed as an SRO for 30 years and served on shift as Shift Foreman. He has supervisory experience in Operations, Training and major project management.
Mr. Nelson is a Mechanical Engineer in the Farley Site Design Department and has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Auburn University. He has been an employee with Southern Nuclear Operating Company at Plant Farley for approximately four years and has extensive experience in design of components and systems relative to their design basis. His primary experience has been in the area of mechanical design, but has performed calculations for the qualification of supports in the area of seismic design. Mr. Nelson completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns in February 2013.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE19OF58 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING Information on the seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program is reported in. Within this context, "vulnerabilities" means seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings. For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also provides a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability.
Plant Farley completed modifications for all non-relay items on or before December 31, 1995, and for all relays on or before December 31, 1996. The Equipment Selection/IPEEE Reviewers (see Table 4-1) reviewed the IPEEE implementation documents and final report to determine the list of items identified as having vulnerabilities and the required modifications.
The SWEL for Farley Unit I included 28 components for which seismic vulnerabilities were previously identified during the IPEEE program. During the walkdowns, the walkdown teams verified that the recommended resolutions to the IPEEE vulnerabilities associated with these 28 items were resolved.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR I
RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE20OF58 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Farley systems and components developed the SWEL. Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided in Section 4.0 of this report. The equipment selection personnel used a SNC-template to ensure compliance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.
Two SWELs were developed (SWEL 1 and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL I consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant.
Attachment I provides the final SWEL I and SWEL 2.
In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with equivalent components. These changes were made when it was determined during the Seismic Walkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve during a walkdown. For example, components located very high in the overhead were replaced with equivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding. All such changes meet the provisions of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Attachment I in Version 1 of this report contains the SWELs after all changes were incorporated (at the time of Version 1 report submittal).
Under Version 2 of this report, Attachment I also contains the final SWELs resulting from the completed walkdowns (items indicated in Table 7-1).
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE21OF58 6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL I SWEL I was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
Screens 1 through 3 These screens were used to select Seismic Category I equipment that does not undergo regular inspection but support the five safety functions described in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Page 3-1 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) lists three screens for use in selecting the Base List 1 if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plant evaluations. Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions listed in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
In accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), page 3-3, Screens 1 through 3 can be satisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Farley IPEEE Report for Unit I (Reference 10.6), Appendix A-Seismic Report, was used as the Base List for the development of SWEL 1.
The intent of the Base List 1 was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity following a SSE. The specific guidance used to create the IPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin", (Reference 10.13). The Seismic SSEL from IPEEE - Seismic was checked and verified to meet the intentions set forth in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
As stated in EPRI Report 1025286, the equipment on the SWEL must include equipment required to perform the following five safety functions:
- Reactor reactivity control
- Reactor coolant pressure control
- Reactor coolant inventory control
- Decay heat removal, and
" Containment function.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUIKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 22 OF 58 The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.0.2 of the IPEEE - Seismic Report. Specifically, one preferred and one alternate path capable of achieving and maintaining a safe-shutdown condition for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a Plant Farley Safe Shutdown Earthquake was selected for each unit. Further, it was assumed that a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) had occurred and as such, the paths were also selected as being capable of mitigating a SBLOCA following an SSE. Plant Operations' input resulted in the inclusion of swing components not listed on the original IPEEE SSEL. Other suggestions by Plant Operations for inclusion in the SWEL, such as instrumentation stanchions and piping components, were determined to be covered by existing plant programs. Based on this, samples of those component types were not required to be added to the SWEL.
Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List, it was determined that the list did satisfy the requirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which is a list comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the aforementioned five safety functions that are used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment cooling integrity.
Base List 1 is presented in Attachment 1.
Screen 4 Screen 4 provides the sample considerations used to select components that make up the SWEL from the components contained in Base List 1. The selection of components for SWEL I was developed through an iterative process that ensured a representative sample of components was included in the SWEL. Various drafts of SWEL I were provided to Farley licensed Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) for review and input. The SROs identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipment important to plant operations.
The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1:
Variety of systems Major new or replacement equipment Classes of equipment
- Variety of environments
" Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program
" Risk Significance
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC I
________________ _____________________jPAGE 23OF 58 Variety of Systems - The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that equipment from a variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base List were reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.
Maior New and Replacement Equipment - Major new or replacement equipment installed within the previous 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipment from input from plant personnel familiar with plant modifications and from the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.
Variety of Equipment Classes - A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on the SWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The final SWEL contains a wide variety of components and includes a representative sample of components from each equipment class except classes 11, 13 and 19. The SWEL does not contain Class 11 or 13 components since it was developed from the SSEL associated with the IPEEE as described previously which does not contain Class 11 or 13 equipment. This is consistent with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) for development of the SWEL.
Equipment Class 19 is not in scope for SWEL 1. The only Class 19 components on the Base List are Reactor Coolant System (RCS) RTDs installed on the RCS Piping. This is also consistent with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which states, "The major pieces of equipment in the NSSS that are located inside the containment are excluded from the scope of this program. Also excluded are the supports for this equipment along with all the components mounted in or on this NSSS equipment".
Variety of Environments - The EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that the SWEL contains components located in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and high temperatures. SWEL I includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g.
Containment Building, Main Steam Valve Room), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Auxiliary Building), and Outdoors/Intake Structures (e.g. Valve Boxes, Service Water Intake Structure).
IPEEE Vulnerabilities - SWEL I includes equipment identified as having seismic vulnerabilities as reported in Farley IPEEE Report for Unit 1 (Reference 10.6).
Risk Significance -
Information from the Farley Unit 1 PRA and the Maintenance Rule implementation documentation were used to determine whether items were risk significant. A representative sample of Risk Significant items are included on the SWEL. As stated, plant SROs reviewed the SWEL to ensure that equipment important to plant operation were included on the list.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE24OF58 6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment 1.
Screens 1 through 2 The equipment selected through Screens I and 2 provide Seismic Category I components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also accessible for a walkdown. For Farley Unit 1, the only Seismic Category I equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System. The Seismic Category I SSCs in the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System that are accessible and available for a walkdown comprise Base List 2.
Screen 3 Screen 3 is the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment is included in SWEL 2. These considerations include:
" Variety of systems
- Major new or replacement equipment Classes of equipment Variety of environments Using the Base List 2 developed from the SFP System, the following criteria were used to select a sample of the SFP Seismic Category I equipment and systems:
- Variety of systems - Only one system comprises Base List 2 Major new or replacement equipment - No major new or replacement equipment installations with the past 15 years.
- Classes of equipment - There are only 3 types of equipment in Base list 2: manual valves, I pump per train, and I heat exchanger per train. Additionally, one heat exchanger was included on SWEL I and therefore this selected heat exchanger was not chosen on SWEL 2 but applies to the SWEL 2 variety of equipment to prevent duplicates. The reason for the inclusion on SWEL I is due to Component Cooling Water (CCW) being the cooling medium for the SFP Heat Exchanger which requires the heat exchanger to maintain structural integrity during a seismic event for both SFP Cooling and CCW.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 25 OF 58 Variety of environments - All SFP components are located in a mild environment and are not submerged.
The Farley SFP System has a very basic system design with very limited component types and the system contains only one active component in each train; the SFP Cooling Pump. Since 3 of the 4 objectives for selecting the sample consideration of items for SWEL 2 did not have any variance, the only remaining criteria to satisfy the sample objectives was to ensure that a component from each category was chosen and these selected equipment varieties were used to comprise SWEL 2.
Screen 4 Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.
For Farley Unit 1, the SFP Cooling and Purification System contains three penetrations; two SFP pump suctions and one pump discharge. Neither the discharge line nor the suction line penetrations are located within 10 feet of the top of the fuel assemblies. However, the SFP discharge piping terminates approximately 6 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies in the SFP. Due to this, the discharge piping has a '/" hole on the bottom side of a 1800 bend at elevation 152'-0". This hole acts as a siphon breaker and is located approximately 23 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies. Since there are no penetrations within 10 feet of the fuel and since the design of the anti-siphon hole in the SFP discharge piping prevents water from being siphoned through this piping, no rapid drain-down of the pool can occur.
Therefore, there are no components associated with rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool included on SWEL 2.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 26 OF 58 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined) SWEL. A Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) was completed for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. Copies of the SWCs can be found in Attachments 3 and 7 while the AWCs are provided in Attachments 4 and 8, for Version I and Version 2 of the report, respectively.
The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown guidance.
Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders that contained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEE walkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings). Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.
The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for the walkdowns. Organization included assignment of specific components to the walkdown teams, review of the walkdown packages, development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdowns/Area Walk-bys and familiarization with the plant.
The second week on site began with the peer reviewers (Whitmore and Ashworth) providing an overview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for the walkdowns were discussed and questions answered. After this overview, each walkdown team performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by in the presence of the other teams and at least one peer reviewer. The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between the teams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potential adverse seismic conditions and to allow team members to ask questions and provide and obtain feedback.
Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians and engineering) was obtained, as required, to access equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components. All Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively. The final status of all SWCs and AWCs indicates one of the following statuses:
" "Y" - Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions,
" "N" - No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition, or "U" - Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipment inaccessibility and the condition is not known.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE27OF58 The walkdowns focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions. Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage to the structure. This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered to be anchorage. These connections were evaluated and any potentially adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions."
As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components were evaluated to verify if the anchorage was consistent with plant documentation. The document that provided the anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage in the field was compared to the information on this referenced document. Reference documents for anchorage verifications included plant drawings as well as Screening and Evaluation Worksheet (SEWS) packages created during IPEEE walkdowns of the plant. In some cases, equipment anchorages were verified to be in accordance with SEWS but it was also determined that some equipment had been modified or replaced since the completion of the original accessible walkdowns during which the SEWS were developed.
Anchorage checks performed under these conditions duly verified that anchorage evaluations performed under the IPEEE program were still applicable, appropriate and adequate.
In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e.g. where the anchorage was inside a cabinet that could not be opened except during an outage), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U" (Undetermined) and deferred until an outage when the piece of equipment would be available for inspection. However, as of the issuance of Version 2 of this report, all inspections have been completed and the results are documented on the SWCs (see Attachment 7).
In cases where the Seismic Walkdown team members identified a potential adverse condition, the condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a Condition Report (CR) was written to document and evaluate/resolve the condition. As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs during the walkdowns. Additionally, detailed licensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required. Conditions that were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE28OF58 Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns. For cases in which the room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures, systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachments 4 and 8.
SWEL I Walkdowns Credit was taken for a total of 114 component inspections that were completed during the combined work performed as documented in Versions 1 and 2 of this report. This is the total number of component inspections required for Farley Unit 1.
A total of 115 component inspections were originally scheduled to be performed as documented in Version 1 of this report. Of these 115 component inspections, 3 were delayed due to inaccessibility, while 42 others were required to be scheduled for re-inspections based on additional guidance/clarification regarding the opening of cabinets to inspect for other adverse conditions.
As documented in Version 2 of this report, the walkdowns of the 3 previously inaccessible components were completed. However, only 41 of the 42 planned cabinet re-inspections could be completed.
During the inspection of Q1R42B001B it was found the anchorage was not completely accessible without racking out the breakers. Therefore the item was removed from the SWEL. Table 7-1 is updated to show the completion of 44 out of 45 items. It is also updated to indicate QIR42BOOIB was not completed and therefore removed from the SWEL. Removal of QIR42BOOIB from the SWEL does not invalidate the conclusion in Section 6.1 that the screening requirements specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) are met. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.
SWEL 2 Walkdowns A total of six component walkdowns were performed. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.
7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns. These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were not completed for these items during the initial phase of walkdowns. These items have been inspected as documented in Version 2 of this report as discussed in "SWEL I Walkdowns" above.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR I
RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE29OF58 Inaccessibility of equipment or plant areas, as originally determined during efforts for Version 1 of this Report, occurred due to one of two conditions: (1) plant operating conditions, or (2) component inspections required the opening of cabinet/panel doors which was not conducted, or not permitted by plant Operations personnel during the time of the walkdowns. Items listed in Table 7-1 associated with Item 2 above include those that required walkdowns in accordance with the supplemental guidance, to open cabinets to inspect for other adverse conditions as discussed in Section 2.0.
Based on the above, 45 components were originally determined to be inaccessible. These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys for 44 of these items were performed before and during the Unit 1 outage, IR25 in October 2013. Note 4 following Table 7-1 addresses the remaining component.
Note that in Version 1 of the report, the majority of the checklists associated with the components determined to be inaccessible based on condition 2 indicated that the walkdowns of these components were complete. The supplemental guidance on opening cabinets was received after these walkdowns/checklists were complete. Since the anchorage of these components was accessible without opening the cabinets, cabinet internals were not included in the inspections performed during the walkdowns for Version 1 of the report. The supplemental inspections of these components focused primarily upon those aspects that were not reviewed originally, i.e., the internal inspections. Those checklists were revised to include information from both walkdowns as documented in Version 2 of the report.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 30 OF 58 Table 7-1.
Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Remaining Walkdown Completic n Item No.
Description Inaccessibility Scope (See No te )4 (Nt )Scope (See Note In)
Reactor Trip Switchgear (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed QICII1E004B No. 2 10/9/13 2
QI El I LQ3594B Ctmt Sump Level (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed Transmitter Power Supply 1/30/13 3
QIQEI IMOV8701B RHR Inlet Isolation Valve (I)
SWC and AWC for Complete Containment El. 105' 9/30/13 Aux Safeguards Cabinet (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
4 QI H1INGASC2506C C171 C
1/7/13 5
QIHIINGB2504J BOP Instrumentation (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
Cabinet J 8/9/13 6
QIHI INGNIS2503A NIS Excore Detector (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
Cabinet 1/7/13 Process Control Cabinet (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed Channel 2 1/7/13 8
QIHI INGR25041 Radiation Monitor Panel (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
1/7/13 Solid State Protection (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
9 QI HI INGSSP2506G Input Cabinet 9/20/13 4.16KV Switchgear IG (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
Local Cont Panel 1/7/13 11 QIH2lE5O5 4.16KV Switchgear IJ (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
Local Cont Panel 1/7/13 4.16KV Switchgear I K (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed 12 Qi H2P 1E506 Local Cont Panel 10/16/13
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE31OF58 Table 7-1.
Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Remaining Walkdown Completi n Item No.
Description Inaccessibility Scope (See Note (Note 2)
Diesel Generator I B (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
Local Cont Panel 10/9/13 14 QIH21NBAFP2605A Hot Shutdown Panel A (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
1/25/13 15 QIH22LOOIE Multiplying Relay (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
Cabinet IE 1/25/13 16 QI H22L002 Transfer Relay Cabinet 1 (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed 1/25/13 Diesel Local Relay Panel (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
17 Q1 H22L503 IB 1/7/13
(!)
Complete SWC after Complete(
removal of insulating 10/16/13 material from around the Steam Generator 1 A 18 QINI 1 PT0476 ScharGePessur instrument. This was not Discharge Pressure allowed by Plant Operations at the time the SWC was performed Containment Purge (1)
SWC and AWC for Completed 19 QIP13HV2867D Isolation Inside Ctmt Containment El. 129' 9/30/13 Valve 20 QIPl6G5I7B Turb Bldg SW Iso Valve (2)
Inspect panel internals Completec Relay Box 1/30/13 21 Q1R15A504 4.16KV Switchgear Ii (2)
Inspect panel internals Completec 1 / 10/14 22 QI RI16006 600V Load Center I D (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed 2/11/13
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSjIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 32 OF 58 Table 7-1.
Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Remaining Walkdown Completi n Item No.
Description Inaccessibility Scope (See Note (Note 2)In 23 QIR17BOOI-A MCC IA (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
10/16/13 24 QlRI7BOO2 MCC lB (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed 2/5/13 25 Q1R17B504-A MCC 1K (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed 10/17/13 26 Q1R17B507-A MCC IN (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed 1
Q10/16/13 27 QIR18B029 Power Disconnect Switch (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
2/11/13 28 QIR18BO31 Circuit Breaker Box (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed 2/11/13 29 Q1R18B035 Circuit Breaker Box (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete 1/30/I131 30 QI R21BOOIA Vital AC Breaker Box (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete 1/30/13 31 Q I R21 E009C Inverter I C (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
9/20/13 32 Q1R36A511 4.16KV Switchgear IL (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
Surge Arrestor 2/12/13 33 cR1L00IB 125VDC Distribution (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
Panel IB 8/9/13 34 QIR42BOOIB 125VDC Bus 1B (2)
Inspect panel internals See Note 35 QIR42EOOIA Aux Bldg Battery Charger (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed IA 2/11/13
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 33 OF 58 Table 7-1.
Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Remaining Walkdown Completi* n Item No.
Description Inaccessibility Scope (See No te )
(Nt )Scope (See Note In)
(Note 2) 36 QIR43EOOIA Sequencer BIF (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed 2/11/13 37 Sequencer B IF Aux (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed Relay Panel 2/12/13 Diesel Gen I-2A Local (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed 38 QSH21E525 Control Panel 10/25/13 Diesel Generator IC (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
Local Control Panel 8/9/13 Service Water B Train (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed 40 QSH21L503B Battery Room HVAC 2/6/13 LCS Diesel Local Relay Panel (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
41 QSH22L502 1-2A 9/26/13 42 QSR42B516A UI Service Water Battery (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete(
Fuse Box Train A 2/12/13 43 SW Battery NO. 3 or 4 (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete Detection Cabinet 2/8/13 44 SW Building A Train (2)
Inspect panel internals Complete Battery SEL SW 2/12/13 45 Svc Water Bldg Battery (2)
Inspect panel internals Completed Charger No.2 (Standby) 10/16/13 Table notes:
- 1)
Farley Unit I has one transformer (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL 1. It was inspected to the extent practical. All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected. The anchorage for the transformer was visible without opening the component. To inspect the transformer further would
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 34 OF 58 require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection. The inspection of this transformer meets the requirements of the guidance document and the 50.54(0 Letter. The subject transformer is: MPL #QIRI 1B004, LC TRANSFORMER ID
- 2)
Entries in Table 7-1 under column heading: "Reason for Inaccessibility" refer to the condition for inaccessibility discussed in Section 7.1.
- 3) 44 of 45 walkdowns were completed. See Note 4 for additional information.
- 4)
Table 7-1, Item 34 (QIR42BOOI B, 125VDC BUS IB) was deleted from the SWEL during the performance of the walkdowns as the anchorage was inaccessible.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 35 OF 58 8.0 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic". As potentially adverse conditions were identified, condition reports were initiated in the Plant's Corrective Action Program (CAP) and evaluated. The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and evaluations.
8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the Plant's CAP per Southern Nuclear expectations in a timely fashion. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286. Consequently, the as-found conditions in Table 8-1 do not necessarily indicate that SSCs are deficient or not in conformance with their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.
SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Farley Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Farley seismic qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures for entering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize the key findings from the CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis, and any required plant changes.
During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 14 Unit I Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the CAP. In addition, another 3 were entered that are common to both Units I and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PACE 36 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of CR #
Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve
/Closed) the Condition Area A cable from tray 504947 Although this has been WO SNC428446 Closed 121' Piping Pen BHMS06 was found to marked as a potential created - Cable Room 223 be overhanging the edge adverse seismic needs to be placed of the tray in several concern, the seismic back in tray places. At one location, walkdown team has the cable rested on a concluded that it is sharp edge where it unlikely for the cable to crosses the boundary of be damaged to the point the tray. The tray is - 9' that it would not in the overhead behind perform its intended the cubicle wall of the function during a room entrance. The seismic event.
cable needs to be placed back in the cable tray.
Component Breaker racking tools 505403 Seismic walkdown Breaker racking Closed U 1 4160V were found hanging personnel determined tools have been Switchgear IG from a 4" long rod - 3' damage to the cabinet removed which (QIR15A007-B) from the UI 4160V would not occur in the eliminates the Breaker Cabinet Switchgear I G event that the tool adverse seismic (Q I R 15A007-B) struck the cabinet, interaction Breaker Cabinet 7 in Rm However, there is condition.
233. During a seismic potential to damage the event the tool will relays located on the potentially fall from the front of the switchgear.
currently staged location The effect of the impact and strike the on the components in switchgear.
the cabinet should be evaluated and/or the tool relocated or adequately secured if any adverse impacts are suspected.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE37OF58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of CR #
Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve
/Closed) the Condition Component QIPI 8C002B The Seismic Walkdown Team observed a potential seismic interaction hazard on the Unit I Train B Emergency Air Compressor in Room 189 (Q IP I 8C002B). The Seismic Walkdown team observed a small gap of less than 0.5" between a 0.25" dia stainless steel compressor instrument tubing and an insulated pipe. The quarter inch instrument tubing is located directly on top of the compressor at eye level and has been identified as the constant speed unloader interconnecting line. The Walkdown Team judged that the insulation could impact the tubing since the lateral displacement of the insulated pipe during a seismic event could fill the 0.5" gap.
The Seismic Walkdown Engineering Team judged the instrument tubing is too soft to tolerate interaction with the piping.
505553 An initial assessment of the condition was performed and there are no immediate operability concerns.
The constant speed unloader is used to prevent overloading the compressor and is actuated when the receiver pressure exceeds the pre-set pressure for the auxiliary valve spring.
When the auxiliary valve opens, air is routed to the constant speed unloaders and forces them open. If the interconnecting line is lost, the auxiliary valve will still mitigate overloading of the compressor by relieving pressure to atmosphere when pre-set values are exceeded.
WO SNC428541 removed the adverse Seismic Spatial interaction. WO closed.
Closed
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHiMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 38 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of CR #
Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve
/Closed) the Condition Area: UI A Loose bolts were found 507934 The Gaitronics speaker All actions are Closed Charging Pump in the mounting could become a concern completed to room (Room hardware of the if the mounting prevent the 181)
Gaitronics system inside hardware was to loosen adverse the U I A Charging further.
interaction.
Pump room (room 181 ).
Component A 1 1/2" dia. conduit is 508376 Ops Shift Supervisor WO SNC429765 Closed Multiplying within 1/4" of the side of Review: The cabinet created. TE Relay Cabinet Multiplying Relay and conduit are installed 540860 evaluated I E, Cabinet I E per design. No the condition and QIH22LOOIE (QIH22LOO1E). The indication of missing found the conduit spans - 10' and hardware is evident, condition of the passes the relay panel Installation of stiffening conduit near the about mid-span, and is hardware to minimize Multiplying Relay therefore very flexible.
potential for contact Cabinet as The conduit must be between the cabinet and acceptable as is.
moved away from the conduit in the event of a WO SNC429765 panel or supported near seismic event will be voided.
the panel to reduce any pursued via the interaction effects corrective action during a seismic event, process.
An immediate solution is to clamp the small conduit to the adjacent larger conduit to restrain it from the relay cabinet.
(AB, 139', rm. 318). It's possible that no sensitive equipment is in the panel, in which case the interaction effects are credible but insignificant. The walkdown team could not make this determination.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 39 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Area Brief Description of Potentially Adverse Condition I
CR#
Brief discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken/Planned to Address/Resolve the Condition Status (In Progress
/Closed)
Component QI H21NBAFP2 605A While performing SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for Farley Units I & 2 in the Aux Bldg, Room 254, the rear door of Hot Shutdown Panel A (QI H21NBAFP2605A) was found unlatched, but should be latched to minimize impact to the panel from the door during a seismic event.
508387 The panel was re-walked down on 10/26/12 and identified to be closed. Latch is operable but hard to operate based on discussions with Operations. WO has been created to fully fix the latch.
WO SNC429766 created.
Closed
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 40 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Area Brief Description of Potentially Adverse Condition CR#
Brief discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken/Planned to Address/Resolve the Condition Status (In Progress
/Closed)
Area Room 184 While performing SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for Farley Units I & 2 in Room 184, the seismic walkdown team observed a flexible cable attached to the IA Isolation Outside CTMT Valve with limited flexibility. The flex cable is routed to the valves upper limit switch.
508690 This configuration has been compared against the original IPEEE Screening Evaluation Work Sheet (SEWS) which was performed by qualified SQUG Engineers. The SEWS package shows that the flex cable was in the same configuration during this evaluation at the area where flexibility is limited.
This seismic interaction has previously been evaluated as acceptable.
This condition was present during SQUG/1PEE walkdowns performed in 1993 and is documented in the SEWS package for QPI19HV361 1.
The original IPEEE SEWs package did not specifically refer to the flex conduit but using pictures the valve and flex conduit was identified to be in the same state.
Based on this not being called out as an issue during the original walkdown, no further actions are needed.
Closed
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE41OF58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of CR #
Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve
/Closed) the Condition Component While performing SAM 508692 This same configuration TE 509140- DCP Closed QIPI7HV3096A NTTF 2.3 Seismic was observed during the has been Walkdowns for Farley Farley SQUG/IPEEE confirmed to Unit 1, one of the walkdowns back in the remove the seismic walkdown teams mid 90's and there were adverse Seismic noted two (2) potential no identified Condition.
seismic concerns with discrepancies on the the 3096 A valve Seismic Evaluation (QIP17HV3096A):
Work Sheets (SEWS)
- 1) Rigid conduit within concerning inadequate
'/" of pressure gage.
flexibility of lines During a seismic event, attached to the 3096 A the worst credible valve. Additionally, the failure would result in SEWS package did not breaking the pressure mention any concern for gage glass.
the conduit in close
- 2) Insufficient flex in proximity of the cables to the upper and pressure gage. 3096A lower limit switches.
also has difficulties in One of the questions of operating and the valve the seismic walkdown is already jacked closed, packages is "Do declared inoperable, and attached lines have is being replaced during adequate flexibility to I R25 so no impact.
avoid damage?"
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RiPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 42 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of CR #
Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve
/Closed) the Condition Component A permanent ladder was 508694 This configuration was The condition was Closed QIEl IMOV881 installed in contact with compared against the verified against 2A the Containment Sump original IPEEE the SEWS which Room 131 to RHR Pump IA Screening Evaluation shows the ladder (El. 83')
Isolation Valve Work Sheet (SEWS) and valve in the (Q IE 11MOV8812A).
which was performed same position and The seismic walkdown by qualified SQUG configurations.
team that performed the Engineers. The SEWS This was not walkdown has package for evaluated as a determined that this is a QI E I MOV8812A Seismic Concern potentially adverse performed during the on the SEWS and seismic condition the SQUG/IPEE thus the condition 8812A.
walkdowns in 1993 is SAT.
visually shows that the ladder and valve were in the same configuration during performance of the SEWS. This condition was not called out as an adverse seismic interaction on the SEWS.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 43 OF 58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of CR #
Brief discussion of Action Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned Condition to Address/Resolve the Condition Component QIPI6F501A Seismic Walkdown team identified corrosion on a Service Water Strainer IA (QIPI6F501A) hold down bolt.
515693 This condition is similar to the condition of a SW strainer bolt identified during 1 R24 (CR:442339 and MDC SNC387300) showing excessive corrosion. The nut was cleaned and a torque applied to fully seat the nut.
The nut was apparently cocked/cross threaded and could not be moved further.
The torque applied was in excess of i000ft-lbs proving the bolt was sound. After cleaning the nut, the material condition showed little surface degradation. This reference is provided to document that the degradation for this strainer hold down bolt is exacerbated by the wet environment which typically causes the corrosion layer to swell and look significantly worse than the actual sound material condition. Based on known pre and post cleaned condition of one of the strainer anchor bolts/nut, the seismic walkdown team is confident that the strainer bolt is sound and is capable to perform its intended function. The team members are qualified to use engineering judgment to make the Seismic Evaluation based on being qualified either through SQUG or EPRI training for Seismic Evals.
WO SNC432772 created - Clean and coat the bolts.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE44OF58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Area Brief Description of Potentially Adverse Condition CR#
Brief discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken/Planned to Address/Resolve the Condition Status (In Progress
/Closed) 4-Component QIP18CO02B While reviewing AWBs performed by the Seismic Walkdown Teams, it has been discovered that one of the four anchor bolts for the UI Auxiliary Steam Condensate Tank is bent and has been documented as an adverse seismic concern.
539901 Based on initial review from the site POC for the Seismic Walkdowns, this condition is not of concern during a seismic event. The nut on the affected anchor bolt appears to be installed correctly with no gap between it and the concrete pad which results in negligible impact to the load bearing portion of the bolt. Also, the remaining 3 anchor bolts are SAT with no further discrepancies identified. The initial review has also determined that there is no effect on the current seismic design basis since the component is classified as non-seismic, Crit-N.
TE 540855 created to evaluate the condition. Bent bolt was found to be acceptable. TE has been closed.
Closed
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE45OF58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of CR #
Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve
/Closed) the Condition Component Seismic Walkdown team 716676 This condition was Repair existing In QI H2 IE527 found that grout needs to originally noted in the grout around the Progress be placed around all SEWS package dated existing anchors.
anchor bolts on the 5/24/94. Subsequent WO SNC 526618 south side of the panel.
evaluation showed this created.
condition is not an operability concern.
Enhancements have been made to the anchorage including:
shimming between the panel and grout pad; adding additional anchors to the North side; welding on a new plate to the South side and installing two new anchors. Therefore this condition is not a seismic concern.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE46OF58 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of CR #
Brief discussion of Action Status Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In Condition to Progress Address/Resolve
/Closed) the Condition Component While performing the 719207 This condition has been The evaluation In QlR17BOOI-A NTTF 2.3 Seismic evaluated for the 2A that addresses the Progress Walkdown for Farley MCC and it has been condition found Unit 1 for IA MCC, determined that the on 2A MCC is there were two instances current mounting attached to TE identified where configuration does not 640206(Closed).
seismically qualified adversely impact the WO SNC527527 Agastat Relays were functionality of any of and SNC 527528 installed with only 3 of the relays in any of its created.
4 required mounting operating modes screws.
(before, during, and after a DBE). The U2 evaluation has been reviewed and is bounding for the conditions found on UI I A MCC. Therefore, the condition does not bring into question the operability or functionality of the relays.
Component While performing the 722630 This is not considered to WO SNC528556 In QIR17B507-A NTTF 2.3 Seismic be an operability created to replace Progress Walkdown for Farley concern or a seismic the missing Unit I for IN MCC, one concern due to the mounting screw.
of the terminal strips in minimal weight of the FNBI was found to be strip.
missing a lower mounting screw.
During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of a seismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are warranted.
These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE47OF58 CR 539958: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to storing tools and equipment throughout the plant. Several events were documented where tools and equipment (e.g. breaker racking tools, hot sticks) were stored in such a way that they had the potential to fall and strike nearby equipment (e.g. Switchgears) during a seismic event. The extent of condition should be investigated by the groups that use the tooling, all further conditions corrected, and actions put in place to prevent future recurrences.
CR 539961: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to maintaining the coating on components subject to corrosive environments. Several events were documented where anchorage and associated supports were corroded due to a lack of coatings and preventive maintenance to protect the material. The extent of the damage varied from minor surface corrosion to more significant wastage of the components. The extent of condition should be investigated and appropriate corrective actions put in place to promote the long-term sustainability of anchorage, support, and components subject to corrosive environments.
CR 539962: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to maintaining the housekeeping of cable trays and their cables. Several events were documented where cable trays had damaged panels or cables overhanging the cable tray. The extent of condition should be investigated and appropriate corrective actions, as needed, put in place.
8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY Plant Farley Unit I had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.
8.3 PLANT CHANGES There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions. Plant changes are any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE48OF58 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic adverse conditions. All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were generated as necessary. These issues included water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash, etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the Plant's CAP process and are not specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FuKUsHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE49OF58 9.0 PEER REVIEW 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS The peer review for the NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance with Section 6 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities:
" review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);
" review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys;
- review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse seismic conditions in to the Plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and review of the final submittal report.
This report provides a summary of peer review results as well as the results of the above peer review activities. In Section 9, "Version 1" describes the work completed during the initial evaluation and submitted in November 2012. "Version 2" describes the subsequent work completed since that time and transmitted in this final submittal.
9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS
SUMMARY
9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development - Version 1 The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to Section 3 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SSCs to be evaluated during the seismic walkdown were selected as described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the Peer Review Team, which consisted of the peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Team members independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on the SWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from Reference 10.2 were met.
Specifically, the Peer Reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL 1 and 2 were Seismic Category I components that do not undergo regular inspections. Specific considerations for the peer review process are described below for SWEL I and SWEL 2. The peer review checklist of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE50OF58 For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):
- Reactor Reactivity Control;
" Reactor Coolant Pressure Control;
- Reactor Coolant Inventory Control; Decay Heat Removal; and
- Containment Function.
For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:
Various types of systems;
" Major new and replacement equipment;
" Various types of equipment;
" Various environments;
- Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE; and
- Risk insight consideration.
The final SWEL I contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Numerous components perform more than one of the safety functions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list. SWEL 1 contains components from all applicable classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for equipment classes 11, 13 and 19, where there are no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class. The list contains major new and replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in various environments and areas of the plant. All major safety-related systems are represented and risk factors were considered in development of the list.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE51OF58 For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related items complied with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool cooling system at Farley Unit I are Seismic Category I and all different types of components are represented on the SWEL 2. No items that could cause rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool for Farley Unit 1 were identified. Therefore, SWEL 2 does not contain any components associated with potential rapid drain down of the pool. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding items associated with the spent fuel pool were well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
In summary, all of the peer review comments made during development of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 were resolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed by the Peer Review Team and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed. The SWEL was determined to incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.
During the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were not accessible were removed from the list and, in some cases, equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added.
The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and determined that these changes had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELs with respect to the provisions contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed the SWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Checklist for development of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.
9.2.2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development - Version 2 The Peer Review Team was consulted as necessary during the walkdowns to ensure that no equipment substitutions (due to equipment availability, being energized, etc.) would conflict with the EPRI report requirements. One SWEL item was listed as inaccessible in Table 7-1 of the Version 1 walkdown report. Component no. Q1R42B001B 125v DC BUS IB was removed from the SWEL for Version 2 since the item could not be inspected without extensive disassembly. Removing the item from the SWEL I did not invalidate any of the EPRI report requirements such as variety of systems, variety of classes of equipment, variety of environments, etc.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE52OF58 The final SWELs are provided in Attachment I and reflect completion of all seismic walkdowns of equipment. The Peer Review Team reviewed the final SWELs and concluded that both SWELs (for original walkdowns and the outage walkdowns) met the requirements in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Checklist of the final SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.
9.2.3 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys - Version 1 The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The Peer Review was performed as follows:
Each of the walkdown teams performed an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area Walk-by while being observed by the other teams and at least one member of the walkdown Peer Review Team. The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams.
During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The Peer Review Team confirmed first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as described in Section 4 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A member of the Peer Review Team accompanied each of the four walkdown teams on at least one full day of walkdowns. SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to carry a copy of Section 4 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it, as necessary, during conduct of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.
" Finally, the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages completed during the first week to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The walkdown Peer Review Team confirmed that the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages were consistent, thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 53 OF 58 The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable. The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions. The SWEs documented the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Team inspected all the checklists completed during the first week of walkdowns, representing approximately 40% of the total number of checklists. Peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances where comments in the checklists required additional explanation and information. Mr. Ashworth and Mr.
Whitmore provided verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly. The SWEs understood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer Review Team.
Since the peer review occurred at the start of the walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to provide comments at the early stages of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for all packages. Subsequently, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate. In addition, all members of the Peer Review Team, including Mr.
Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during the entire Walkdown process.
9.2.4 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys - Version 2 The Peer Review Team was available by phone and email for consultation to the Plant Farley SWEs for the scope of walkdowns covered by Version 2 of this report. SWEs that were involved with work transmitted under Version 1 of this report (particularly Mr. Youngblood, Mr. Harlos, Mr. Mullenix, and Ms. Maclay) performed many of the walkdowns documented in Version 2 of this report.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 54 OF 58 Plant Farley also trained additional SWEs to support completion of the remaining walkdowns. The Peer Review of the new SWEs was performed as follows:
" The new SWEs completed the EPRI NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training course onsite at Plant Farley. The instructor of this session of the course Ken Whitmore had attended the June 12, 2012 session of the EPRI-sponsored Seismic 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training course and used the training materials provided by EPRI. The Peer Team Leader/SNC Seismic Technical Lead, Ms. Brown, attended the training session in order to share Lessons Learned from the previous walkdowns.
Before the new SWEs performed any walkdowns on the SWEL items, Peer Team Member Ms. Brown as well as Mr. Ashworth (who was part of the Peer Review Team under Version 1 of this report) traveled to Plant Farley to witness the new SWEs perform practice walkdowns in the site Protected Area. Each of the new SWEs performed practice equipment Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys under the observation of the other new SWE team members, Ms. Brown and Mr. Ashworth just as was done during the initial walkdowns (see section 9.2.3). Ms. Brown and Mr. Ashworth interviewed the new SWEs to verify their understanding of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown objectives and their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions. They provided suggestions for performing walkdowns and answered questions raised by the new SWEs. Each of the new SWEs completed practice walkdown checklists which were reviewed and critiqued on site by Ms. Brown and Mr.
Ashworth.
Ms. Brown and Mr. Ashworth concluded that the new SWEs were performing walkdowns and completing checklists in a manner consistent with that witnessed/performed in support of Version 1 of this report. The new SWEs are familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. Additionally, the SWEs adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditions related to anchorage. They also performed anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable.
The new SWEs also demonstrated their ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions. They documented the results of the outage Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
Of the new SWEs trained at Plant Farley, Mr. Nelson and Ms. Arrant performed walkdowns at Plant Farley Unit 1, which are addressed by Version 2 of this report. To be conservative and to ensure consistency, all checklists prepared and provided in Attachments 7 and 8 of this report were reviewed
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE55OF58 by two Peer Review Team members (Ms. Brown and Mr. Richard Starck). This Peer Review of checklists is in addition to the "10 to 25% requirement" that was met during Version 1 of the report.
Verbal and written comments were provided by the Peer Review Team and incorporated by the SWEs.
It is noted that the checklists for Version 2 include several pictures that show the overall condition of the equipment. Having numerous pictures was an efficient way to document resolution of the checklist questions. In addition, the checklists often "retyped" previous information that was handwritten (and was provided in Attachments 3 and 4 in Version 1 of the report) for clarity and consistency purposes.
Preparation of these "retyped" checklists relied upon the results of the inspections from the original checklists.
The Peer Review Team members (Ms. Brown and Mr. Starck) concluded that checklists were completed in a manner consistent with the requirements of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
9.2.5 Licensing Basis Evaluations - Versions 1 and 2 All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP for further review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the Seismic Walkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart from evaluations performed for the CAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive and acceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the Seismic Walkdowns.
9.2.6 Submittal Report-Version 1 The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to provide guidance and input and to verify that the submittal report met the objectives and requirements of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate. The final version of the submittal report includes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE56OF58 9.2.7 Submittal Report - Version 2 Similar to the process for Version 1, the Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to provide input and to verify that the submittal report met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the drafts and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate. The final version of the submittal report included all necessary elements of the Peer Review and met the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE57OF58
10.0 REFERENCES
10.1 10 CFR 50.54(0 Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(0 Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 10.2 EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012 10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.5 Not used.
10.6 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit I and Unit 2, Individual Plant Examination of External Events - Seismic.
10.7 RER SNC432467, SAM NTTF 2.3: Seismic, Unit 1 and 2 Walkdowns at Plant Farley, (Recommendation) 2.3 - Seismic 10.8 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Supplement 1 to Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.9 NUREG-121 1, Regulatory Analysis for Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-46, Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants 10.10 NUREG-0 117 Supplement No. 5 dated March, 1981 Safety Evaluation Report 10.11 Not used 10.12 Not used 10.13 EPRI Report NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin 10.14 Farley Nuclear Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Rev. 24, August 2012 (Version 1) and Rev. 25, December 2013 (Version 2).
10.15 NMP-GM-033-GLO1 Ver. 1.0, SAM NTTF Seismic Walkdowns Guide
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE58OF58 11.0 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT I - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS (Version 1 and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 2 - PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 (Version 1 and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 3 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (Version I and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 4 - AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (Version 1)
ATTACHMENT 5 - IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION (Version 1 and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 6 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS (Version 1 and Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 7 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (Version 2)
ATTACHMENT 8 - AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (Version 2)
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Regulatory Licensing Action, Concurrence and NL-006-F03
- SOUTHERN, Affairs Version 2.0 COMPANY Verification E.,W,.S-Y..,Wo,,
Form
.II Page 1 of 4 NL Letter Number: NL-14-0249 Due Date (if applicable): 2/24/2014
Subject:
Farley Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report RLI / Extension:
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company Regulatory Licensing Action, Concurrence and NL-006-F03
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ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Paues Unit 1 -Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-37 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 1 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit I - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-37 Unit I - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 2 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I Page No. I "LINE NO.
CLASS C.n....
- USCCUC (1)
(2) 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 07 07 07 07 07 23 21 21 21 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 07 0
18 18 MARK NO.
AITBOOl AITBOO6 A1TSOO2 9178003 NIE21LIO112-3 NIHI1NGNCS2500A-AB NI1P8PCV2885A N1P1SPCV28B5B N1P18PCV2885C N1P19PCV2228A NIP19PCV222SS QilIHOOIi Q1821NCOOA QIB21HOO01B Q1821I4001C Q1B21PT0402-Pl Q1821PT0403-P4 Q1B21TE0410-P2 QIB21TE0413-Pl Q1B21TEO42O-P2 Q1B21TED423-PI Q1821TE0430-P4 Q1821TE0433-P3 QIB31IIV8028-A QIB31KO01 Q1B31LT0459-PI Q1831LT0460-P2 SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION BUILDING un~nsffn....n..a.......faf..,
.W~ls (4)
(5)
TERMINAL BOX AS TERMINAL BOX As TERMINAL BOX AS TERMINAL BOX AS TERMINAL BOX As TERMINAL BOX AS VCT LEVEL INDICATION AS MAIN CONTROL BOARD SECTION A AS PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE AS PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE As PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE AS PCV TO PORV BACKUP AIR SUPPLY BOTTLE As PCV TO PORV BACKUP AIR SUPPLY PRESSURE As CONTROL REACTOR VESSEL CB STEAM GENERATOR 1A Co STEAM GENERATOR 18 CS STEAM GENERATOR IC CS RCS LOOP 3 WIDE RANGE PRESSURE CS ELEV
.Q..0000 (6) 100-00 100-00 121-00 121-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 155-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 121-00 129-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 121-00 ROOM C-S.of
.ma (7) 0189 0194 0223 0235 0190 0192 0218 0401 0189 0189 0189 0218 0218 C11T CTNT CTNT CiTM CTNT CTNT CTNT CTINT CTMT ClNT CTNT CTNT 0223 CIT CINT CINT RCS LOOP I WIDE RANGE PRESSURE RCS LOOP 1 COLD LEG RMD RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG RTD RCS LOOP 2 COLD LEG RTID RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG RID RCS LOOP 3 COLD LEG RTD RCS LOOP 3 NOT LEG RID PRESSURE RELIEF TANK ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTIT VALVE RCS PRESSURIZER PRESSURIZER LEVEL (CONTROL ROOM)
PRESSURIZER LEVEL CB C8 CB CS CS CB CB AS CB CB CB 155-00 132-00 132-00 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 Page 3 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 2 I""INE NO.
(1)
CLASS MARK NO.
(2)
(3)
SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION a....
Mae
... W.00---.----------------a...
(4) 18 Q1B31LT0461-P3 O0A Q1B3IMOVS00OA-A 08A Q1831NOV8008B-8 07 QIB31PCV0444B-B 07 QI131PCV044SA-A 18 Q1831PTO455-PI 18 Q1B31PTO456-P2 18 Q1R31PT0457-P3 02 Q1C1IEOO4A-AB 02 Q1ClIEO04B-AB 18 Q1C22LT0474-PI 18 Q1C22LTO475-P2 18 QlC22LT0476-P3 18 Q1C22LT0484-PI 18 QIC22LT0485-P2 18 Q1C22LTO486-P3 18 QIC22LT0494-PI 18 Q1C22LT0495-P2 18 QIC22LT0496-P3 0
Q1C51LOO1B-1 0
QICS5NEOO48-A 20 Q1C5SNMOO4S-A 08A Q1EIIFCVO602A-A 08A QIEIIFCV0602B-8 18 Q1E11FIS602A-A 18 Q1E11FIS602B-B 18 QIEI1FTO6SO5A-2 18 QlElIFT0605B-4 PRESSURIZER LEVEL PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF VALVE PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF VALVE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR NO. I REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR NO. 2 STEAR GENERATOR 1A NARROW RANGE LEVEL BUILDING (5)
CI CB C8 CS CB C8 CB AD AB CB CB CB CB CS CB CB C8 CB CB AB ELEV (6)
STEAM GENERATOR STEAM GENERATOR STEAM GENERATOR STEAM GENERATOR STEAM GENERATOR STEAM GENERATOR STEAM GENERATOR STEAM GENERATOR 1A NARROW RANGE LEVEL iA NARROW RANGE LEVEL 19 NARROW RANGE LEVEL 1B NARROW RANGE LEVEL 1B NARROW RANGE LEVEL 1C NARROW RANGE LEVEL IC NARROW RANGE LEVEL IC NARROW RANGE LEVEL ROOM (7) 132-00 175-00 1)5-00 155-00 173-00 165-00 166-00 166-00 121-00 121-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 129-00 139-00 139-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 87-00 CINT CTMT CTNT CTMT CTNT CTMT CThT 0235 0235 CTNT CT1T CTNT CTNT CTNT CTlT CTNT CTMT CTNT C1lT CT1T 0332 0128 0122 0128 0128 0120 NIS NEUTRON DETECTOR BOX 18 (41A & 418)
ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN NEUTRON FLUX DETECTOR ALTERN SHUTDOWN NEUTRON FLUX MON SIGNAL AMPLIFIER R14R PUMP MINI FLOW VALVE RHR PIMP MINI FLOW VALVE RHR PUMP FLOW INDICATING SWITCH RHR PUMP FLOW INDICATING SWITCH RHR HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE FLOW TRANSMITTER RHR HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE FLOW TRANSMITTER AD AD AS AS AR A8 87-00 0120 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /
Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 4 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 3 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I L INE NO.
CLASS MARK NO.
a.==am n==usn
- tmmuflmanSC====S==
(1)
(2)
(3) 21 Q1E11HOOIA-A 21 QE1IHO0O1B-B 20 QIEIILQ3594A-A 20 Q1E11LQ3594B-B 18 Q1E1ILT3594A-A 18 QIEIILT3594B-B 08A Q1ElMOV8701A-A 08M QIE11MOV8701B-B C8A QIEIIMOV87O2A-A 0SA Q1E1IMOVe702B-8 CM.
QIE11NOVS706A-A 08A Q1E11MOV8706B-B CBA Q1E1IMOV8809A-A 08A QIE11MOV8809B-B OCA QIE1INOV8811A-A OBA Q1E11MOV8811B-B C8A QIE1UMOVSS12A-A 0SA QIE11NOVS812B-B 08A Q1E11MOVS88A-A CSA Q1E1JMOV8S8SB-B 06 Q1EI1POOIA-A 06 Q1E11PCO1B-B 18 Q1E13PT095O-PI 18 QIEI3PTO9S1-P2 18 Q1E13PTO952-P3 18 Q1E13PTO953-P4 SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION CSU UU so.
.... waScaUSS*08 m0y mu (4)
RNR HEAT EXCHANGER IA RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 18 CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPLY CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPLY CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER CTMT SUIMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER RHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE RHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE RHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE PHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE RMR LOOP NO. I DISCHARGE TO CVCS
,HR LOOP NO. 2 DISCHARGE TO CVCS RWST TO RNR PUMP IA SUCTION RWST TO PHR PUMP 19 SUCTION RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT TRAIN A RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT TRAIN 8 CONTAINMENT SUMP TO RHR PUMP 1A ISOLATION CONTAINMENT SUIMP TO RHR PUMP 18 ISOLATION LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG RHR PUMP IA
,HR PUMP 18 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION TRANSMITTER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION TRANSMITTER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION TRANSMITTER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION TRANSMITTER CHG/MSI PUMP ROOM COOLER IA (TRAIN A)
CHG/HHSI PIMP ROOM COOLER IC (TRAIN B)
BUILDING (5)
AS AS AB AS CB CB CB CS CB CB AS AS AD AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS ELEV (6) 83-00 83-00 139-00 139-00 116-00 116-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 121-00 121-00 83-00 83-00 121-00 ROOM
.asses....
(7) 0128 0128 0318 0318 CmTl CTNT CTNT CINT CTNT CTMT 0128 0128 0131 0129 0131 0129 0131 0129 0223 0223 0131 0129 0223 AS AS AS AB AS 121-00 0223 121-00 0223 121-00 0223 10 10 QIE16HOOIA-A Q1E16H0OIC-B 100-00 100-00 0181 0173 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /
Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.O 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 5 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 4 LINE NO.
w-wafto CLASS MARK NO.
..mmi m
m SYSTER/EQUIPI4ENT DESCRIPTION fl*
nowac BUILDING ELEV ROOM (5)
(6)
(7)
(1)
(2) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 18 (3)
Q1E16HOO3A-A QE1E6HO038-B QE1E6HO04A-A Q1E16HOO4B-B QIE16HOOSA-A Q1E16HOO5B-B Q1E16HOO6A-A Q1E16IIO06B-B Q1E1614007-A Q1E16IIOO8A-B QIE16HCOSB-B QIE16HO09-A QIE16HO10-8B QIE21FT0940 RHR RHR CCV CCV AUX PUMP ROOM PUMP ROOM PUMP ROOM PUMP ROOM FEEDWATER (4)
COOLER 1A COOLER 1B COOLER TRAIN A COOLER TRAIN B PUMP ROOM COOLER IA AUX FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM COOLER IB BATTERY CHARGING ROOM COOLERS BATTERY CHARGING ROOM COOLERS 14CC IA ROOM COOLER MCC 10 ROOM COOLER MCC 1B ROOM ACU 600V LOAD CENTER 1D ROOM COOLER 600V LOAD CENTER IE ROOM COOLER HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW TRANSMITTER AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AS AB AB AB AB AB 83-00 83-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 121-00 139-00 121-00 121-00 139-00 121-00 77-00 0131 0129 0185 0185 0190 0192 0245 0244 0332 0209 0209 0339 0228 o111 18 QIE21FT0943 0
Q1E21HOO2 21 Q1E21HOO3 21 QIE21HOO4 07 Q1E21HV8149A-A 07 Q1E21HVB149B-A 07 Q1E21IV8149C-A 07 QIE21HV8152 07 Q1E21HV8942-A 07 QIE21HV8945A-A O0A Q1E2ILCVOIISB-A 08A QIE2ILCVOII5C-A GSA QIE21LCVO115D-B 08A Q1E21LCVO11SE-B 18 QIE21LT1I2-3 HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW AB TRANSMITTER REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER CB SEAL WATER HEAT EXCHANGER AD LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER AB LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION CB LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION CB LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION CB CVCS ISOLATION OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT VALVE AD BORON INJECTION RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE AB BORON INJECTION SURGE TANK VALVE AB RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION VALVE AB VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE AB RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION VALVE AB VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE AB VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER AD Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O 100-00 0175 105-00 100-00 100-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 100-00 121-00 100-00 121-00 121-00 CTNT 0170 0170 C1NT CTNT CTNT 0184 0186 0222 0172 0216 0172 0216 0217
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 6 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 5
"'LINE NO.
CLASS MARK NO.
aesefn.
Dow==.f a===fl amflCC (1)
(2)
(3) 18 Q1E21LT115-1 08A QlE2INOVSLOO-B 08A QIE21MOVS1O6-A 0SA Q1E21OV8107-A GSA Q1E21NOVS108-B GSA Q1E21MOVSL09A-R GSA Q1E21MOV8109C-B GSA QIE21MOV8I12-A 08A QIE21MOV813OA-A 08A Q1E2IMOVSI3OB-B OBA QIE21MOVOI31A-A GSA Q1E21MOVB1318-R GSA Q1E21MOV8132A-A 08A QIE21MOV8132B-B OBA QIE21MOVS133A-A GSA QIE21MOV81338-8 SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT OESCRIPTION (4)
VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER RCP SEAL WATER RETURN ISOLATION CHARGING PUMP MINIFLOW ISOLATION CHARGING PUMP TO RCS ISOLATION CHARGING PUMP TO RCS ISOLATION CHARGING PUMP P002A MINIFLOW VALVE CHARGING PUMP POO2C NINIFLOW VALVE RCP SEAL WATER RETURN ISOLATION CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLATION VALVE CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLAYION VALVE CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLATION VALVE CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLATION VALVE CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION VALVE CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION VALVE CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION VALVE CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION VALVE BORON INJECTION TANK OUTLET ISOLATION BORON INJECTION TANK INLET ISOLATION ACC.
DISCH. VALVE ACC.
DISCH. VALVE ACC.
DISCH.
VALVE HHSI TO RCS COLD LEG ISOLATION CHARGINGA/HSI PUMP P002A TRAIN A CHARGING/HHSI PUMP P002C TRAIN B BORON INJECTION TANK RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER BUILDING (5)
AB AS AB AB AB AB AB CB AB ELEV ROOM (6)
(7) 121-00 0217 121-00 0223 100-00 0170 121-00 0223 121-00 0223 100-00 0181 100-00 0173 129-00 CT1T 100-00 0181 AB AB AB AB AB AB AS 100-00 0175 100-00 0175 100-00 0172 100-00 0181 100-00 0175 100-00 0175 100-00 0173 08A GSA 08A 08A GSA OSA 05 05 21 18 QIE21MOVSBOIA-A Q1E21MOVBSO3A-A Q1E21NOVSSOSA-A QIE21MOVS8080-8 QIE211MOV890SC-A QIE21MOV8SSSS-B Q1E21PO02A-A Q1E21P002C-B QIE21TOO6 QF1F6LTO5O1I-A AB AB CB CB CB AB AB AB AS YD 121-00 100-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 155-00 0223 0172 CTMT CTNT CT4T 0184 0181 0173 0172 YARD Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS '5')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0
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ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 6 LINE NO.
ca770-c (1)
CLASS (2) 18 21 07 MARK NO.
Q1F16LTOS02-B Q1F16T0501 QIG21HV3376-B 07 Q1G21HV3377-A 07 QIG21HV7136-B 07 QIG21LCV1003-A 07 07 07 21 21 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 QIG24VO03A Q1S24VO03B QIG24VO03C QIG31IIOOIA-B Q IG31HOO18-A QIHIINGASC25O6C-8 QIH11NGASC2SO6D-A QlHllNGB2SO4J-A Q1H11NGB25O4K-B Q1H11NGCCM2523A-A Q1H11NGCCN42523B-B QlH11NGNIS25O3A-1 QINIINGPIC250SA-1 Q1H1NGPIC2SOSB-2 QIHIIZNGPIC25O5C-3 Q1HlINGPIC25O5D-4 QIH11NGPIC250SE-1 QIH1I NGPIC25O5F-2 QlIHNGPIC25O5G-3 QlI~I NGPIC2S5I4H-4 QlHlINGR25041-AB Q1IH11NGSSP25O6G-B SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION (4)
RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK RADIOACTIVE DRAIN ISOLATION INSIDE CTMT VALVE RADIOACTIVE DRAIN ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTNT VALVE WASTE PROCESSING ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTNT VALVE WASTE PROCESSING ISOLATION INSIDE CTNT VALVE SG IA SLOWDOWN ISOLATION SG IB BLOWDOWN ISOLATION SG 1C SLOWDOWN ISOLATION SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN B SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN A AUX SAFEGUARDS CABINET C AUX SAFEGUARDS CABINET D BOP INSTRUMENTATION CABINET J BOP INSTRU4ENTATION CABINET K ICCHS PROCESSOR CABINET TRAIN A ICCMS PROCESSOR CABINET TRAIN 8 NIS EXCORE DETECTOR CABINET BUILDING (5)
YD YD CI AB AS CB AS AB AS AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AS AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AS 100-00 0184 100-00 0184 105-00 ORB ELEV (6) 155-00 155-00 105-00 ROOM (7)
YARD YARD CTMT 121-00 121-00 121-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 0223 0223 0223 0445 0467 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 1 CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 2 CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 3 1
2 3
4 PROCESS CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 4 RADIATION MONITOR PANEL SOLID STATE PROTECTION INPUT CABINET Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.O
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ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 7 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I SINE NO.
CLASS (1)
(2) 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 07 07 07 07 07 07 18 18 M4ARK NO.
(3)
QH1HINGSSP2506J-B Q1H11NGSSP2506K-A QIHIINGSSP2506N-A QIH21EO04-A Q1H21EOO5-B QIH2IE504-A Q11421E5O5-S Q1H21ES06-A Q1N21E507-B QIH21ES27-8 Q1H21NBAFP26O5A-A QIH21NBMER2619-B Q1H22LOOIE-A Q1H22LOO1F-B Q11422L002-A Q11422L003-A Q11422L004-B Q11422L503-B Q1N23S5448-S QIH25LOOB-A Q11H25L029-B QN11HV3369A QlN111HV3369B QINIIHV3369C QIN11HV337OA-B QlNlIHV33708-B Q1N11HV337OC-8 QlNllLT0477-A QINIILT0487-A SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION (4)
SOLID STATE PROTECTION TEST CABINET SOLID STATE PROTECTION INPUT CABINET SOLID STATE PROTECTION TEST CABINET 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IF LOCAL CONT PANEL 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IG LOCAL CONT PANEL 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IH LOCAL CONT PANEL 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IJ LOCAL CONT PANEL 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1K LOCAL CONT PANEL 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR iK LOCAL CONT PANEL DIESEL GENERATOR 18 LOCAL CONTROL PANEL HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL A STEAM GENERATOR IC WIDE RANGE LEVEL MCB ISOLATOR MULTIPLYING RELAY CABINET 1E MULTIPLYING RELAY CABINET IF TRANSFER RELAY CABINET I TRANSFER RELAY CABINET 2 TRANSFER RELAY CABINET 3 DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL I1 DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 15 HVAC LCS TERMINATION CABINET TERMINATION CABINET MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GENERATOR 1A WIDE RANGE LEVEL STEAM GENERATOR 18 WIDE RANGE LEVEL BUILDING ELEV (c5)anum-0 (6)0swas (s)
(6)
AS AS As AB AB DB Sw Sw DS AB AB AB AS AB AB AB DB 0I AS AS AS As As AB AS AS CB CB 155-00 155-00 155-00 139-00 121-00 155-00 155-00 188-06 188-06 155-00 121-00 121-00 139-00 139-00 139-00 100-00 139-00 155-00 IS5-00 139-00 139-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 129-00 129-00 ROOM (7) 0416 0416 0416 0343 0233 0056A 0056C 0072E 00728 0058 02S4 0227 0318 0318 0347 0190 0334 0058 00S8 0318 0318 0241 0241 0241 0241 0241 0241 CTNT C714T Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O
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ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I Page No. a LINE NO.
CLASS (1)
(2) 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 07 07 07 085 088 089 18 18 18 18 18 07 MARK NO.
QINIILT0497-B Q1N11PT0474-P2 Q1N11PT0475-P3 Q1N11PTO476-P4 Q1N11PTO4S4-P2 Q1NI1PTO4S5-P3 QINIIPT0486-P4 Q1N11PT0494-P2 QIN11PTO49S-P3 Q1N11PT0496-P4 QlI~i PT337 lA-A Q1N11PT3371B-A QINIIPT337IC-A QiNI 1PV3371A-A QINIIPV337IB-A QlNlIPV337IC-A QlNllSV3369AC-A Q1N115V336g5C-A QlNlISV3369CC-A QIN23FI3229AR-A QIN23FI3229C QlN23FT3229A-A QlN23FT3229B-A Q1N23FT3229C-B QIN23HV3227A SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION
=cm.=mc.=m mm.=n==~...s.~mmmm(4)mmmm csm (4)
STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR IC WIDE RANGE LEVEL IA PRESSURE IA DISCHARGE PRESSURE IA DISCHARGE PRESSURE 1B DISCHARGE PRESSURE 1B PRESSURE IB DISCHARGE PRESSURE 1C DISCHARGE PRESSURE 1C DISCHARGE PRESSURE 1C PRESSURE 1A PRESSURE lB PRESSURE 1C PRESSURE MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE SOLENOID VALVE SOLENOID VALVE SOLENOID VALVE FEEDWATER INTAKE FLOW INDICATION FEEDWATER INTAKE FLOW INDICATION AUX FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER AUX FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER AUX FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAM GENERATOR IA MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAM GENERATOR 1B MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAM GENERATOR IC SERVICE WATER ISOLATION VALVE TO AUX FEEDWATER BUILDING (5)
CB AB AS AB AS As AS AS As AS AS AS AS As AS AS AS AS AB As AS AS AB AB AS As As AS 129-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 CTMT 0462 0462 0462 0462 0462 0462 0464 0464 0464 0462 0462 0464 0241 0241 0241 0241 0241 0241 0190 0190 0190 0189 0194 0241 ELEV ROOM (6)
(7) 07 Q1N23HV32278 07 Q1N23HV3227C 08A Q1N23MOV3209A-A 121-00 0241 121-00 0241 100-00 0191 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Oata Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Nutber Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 Page 10 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 9 CINE NO.
CLASS MARK NO.
accfno
.l.===an awasmansfav a
(1)
(2)
(3) 0SA QIN23MOV3209B-B OA Q1N23MOV321OA-A 08A QINZ3MOV3210B-B 05 QIN23POOIA-A 05 Q1N23P0O1B-B 18 QIPIILTOS15-A 18 QIPIILTOS16-B 21 QIPIITOOl 07 Q1P13NY2866C-A 07 QIP13HV2866D-B 07 Q1P13HV2867C-A 07 QIPI3HV2867D-B 07 QlPlSHV3103-A 07 Q1P5INV3105-B 07 QlP15HV3106-B 07 Q1PI5HV3332-B 07 Q1P15HV3333-B 07 Q1PI5HV3765-A 0
QIP16FSO1A-A 0
Q1P16FSO1B-B 07 QIP16FV3009A-B 07 QIPI6FV3009C-A 20 QIP16GS17A-A 20 QIP16G517B-B GSA Q1P16MOV3149-A 06 Q1P16POOIA-A SYSTEN/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION maum mmmJommmmmnmmmmmmniuSmnmlm uauS m~u ma m (4)
SERVICE WATER ISOLATION VALVE TO AUX FEEDWATER SERVICE WATER TO AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 1A INTAKE SERVICE WATER TO AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 1B INTAKE AUX FEEDWATER PUMP IA AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 18 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION OUTSIDE C1TT VALVE CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION INSIDE C11IT VALVE CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTMT VALVE CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION INSIDE CTMT VALVE PRESSURIZER LIQUID SAMPLE LINE ISOLATION VALVE RHR HX A SAMPLE VALVE RHR HX B SAMPLE VALVE PRESSURIZER SAMPLE RCS HOT LEG SAMPLE LINE ISOLATION VALVE RCS SAMPLE SW STRAINER IA SW STRAINER 1B CCW HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE CCV NEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE TURB.
BLDG.
S.W. ISOL. VALVE RELAY BOX TURB.
BLDG.
S.W.
ISOL. VALVE RELAY BOX BLOWDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER ISOLATION NOV SERVICE WATER PUMP 1A BUILDING ELEV ummuuuwum===
.m06000 (5)
(6)
AB 100-00 ROOM maaw.ufl..
(7) 0192 AD AS AB AB YD YD YD AB CB AD CD CB AB As AD AB CB SW SW AB As DB DB AB SW 100-00 0191 100-00 0192 100-00 100-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 121-00 0191 0192 YARD YARD YARD 0223 129-00 C7TMT 121-00 0223 129-00 CTMT 129-00 CT1T 77-00 77-00 121-00 121-00 126-00 167-00 167-00 100-00 100-00 155-00 155-00 121-00 188-06 0128 0128 0223 0223 CTNT 0072A 0072A 0185 0185 0060 0056C 0223 0072A Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /
Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'IS)
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 11 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 LINE NO.
am--a--
(1)
APPENDIX A Page No. 10 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT CLASS MARK NO.
DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM
-c----
-.. m bwas.a..
fl w*wwomcoml Ummm nmmmm flmmmS*
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7) 06 06 06 18 18 0BA QIPIGPOOIB-A Q1P16POO1D-B QIP16POOIE-B QIP16PDS620-A Q1P16PDS62I-B QIP16V514-8 OSA Q1P16VS15-A 08A QIP16V516-B 08A QIPI6V517-A GSA Q1P16V538-8 08A QIP16V539-A 08A Q1P16VS45-B 08A QIP16V546-A 07 QIP16VS62-B 07 Q1P16V563-A 07 QIP16V577-A 07 Q1P16VG78-AB 07 QIP16V579-B 21 QIP17HOOIA-B 21 QIP17HOO1B-AB 21 QIP17HO01C-A 07 Q1P17HV2229 07 Q1P17HV3045-A 07 QIP17HV3067-B SERVICE WATER PUMP 1B SERVICE WATER PUMP 10 SERVICE WATER PUMP 1E DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION VALVE SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION VALVE SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION VALVE SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION VALVE SERVICE WATER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION TO POND SERVICE WATER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION TO POND SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE FROM AUXILIARY BUILDING SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE FROM AUXILIARY BUILDING SERVICE WATER DILUTION BYPASS PRESSURE CONTROL SERVICE WATER DILUTION BYPASS PRESSURE CONTROL A TRAIN SERVICE WATER MINIFLOW A-B TRAIN SERVICE WATER MINIFLOW B TRAIN SERVICE WATER NINIFLOW CCW HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN B SWING CCW HEAT EXCHANGER CCW HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN A COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUPPLY TO SAMPLE COOLERS CCW RETURN FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIER ISOLATION CCW RETURN FROM EXCESS LETDOWN SW SW SW YD YD YD YD YD YD YD YD YD YD YD YD SW SW SW AB AS AB AB AB AB 188-06 188-06 188-06 155-00 155-00 155-00 0072A 0072A 0072A YARD YARD ISVBi 155-00 1SVB1 155-00 1SVBI 155-00 1SVB1 155-00 1SV82 155-00 ISVB2 155-00 1SV84 140-00 ISVB4 155-00 ISVB2B 155-00 1SVB2A 188-06 188-06 188-06 100-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 0072A 0072A 0072A 0185 0185 0185 0162 121-00 0223 121-00 0223 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 12 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 11 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I LINE NO.
(1)
CLASS MARK NO.
(2)
(3) 07 QIP17HV3095-B 07 Q1P1714V3096A 07 QIP17HV3096B 07 QlPl7HV3184-B 07 QIP17HV3443-A 08A Q1P17NOV3046-B 08A Q1P17MOV3O52-A OSA QIP17NOV3182-A 08A QIP17NOV318SA-A OBA Q1P17NOV3185B-B 05 QIP17PO0IA-B 05 QlPl7PO0IC-A 07 Q1PI7PCV3404A SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION c=U=-= n.US====..=.=..USU=U (4)
CCW SUPPLY TO EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER CCi NON-SAFETY ISOLATION CCi NON-SAFETY ISOLATION CCW RETURN FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIER ISOLATION CCW RETURN FROM EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER CCW RETURN FROM RCPS CCW TO RCP THERMAL BARRIER ISOLATION CCW RETURN FROM RCPS CCV INLET TO RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO. I CCW INLET TO RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO. 2 CCV PUMP IA TRAIN B CCV PUM IC TRAIN A CCW RHR PMP 1A SEAL HEAT EXCHANGER PR CONTROL BUILDING ELEV (S)
(6)
AB 121-00 ROOM (7) 0223 0161 0161 CTNT AS AS CB CB 100-00 100-00 129-00 129-00 CThT CB AS AS L
AS AS AB AS PESURE AB 130-00 121-00 121-00 83-00 83-00 100-00 100-00 83-00 CTMT 0223 0223 0128 0128 0185 0185 0128 07 QIP17PCV3404B CCV RHR PIMP B SEAL HEAT EXCHANGER PRESURE AS CONTROL 83-00 0129 21 12 12 07 07 21 21 04 04 04 04 04 04 Q1P17TOOl Q1P1SCOO2A-A Q1P1SCOO2B-B QIP19HV2228-8 Q1P19KV3611-A QIP19NCYL-A Q1P19NCYL-B QlRlIB004-A Q1R11BOO5-B Q1R11B503-A QlRllB504-A Q1R1115O5-8 QIR11B507-B SURGE TANK (CCW)
TRAIN A EMERGENCY AIR COMPRESSOR TRAIN S EMERGENCY AIR COMPRESSOR PRESSURIZER PORV BACK-UP AIR SUPPLY VALVE INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION OUTSIDE CONTAIPN1ENT VALVE NITROGEN CYLINDER NITROGEN CYLINDER LC TRANSFORMER 10 LC TRANSFORMER lE LC TRANSFORMER 1R LC TRANSFORMER 1K LC TRANSFORMER IL LC TRANSFORMER IS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AB DS Sw SW DB 179-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 100-00 121-00 121-00 139-00 121-00 155-00 188-06 188-06 155-00 0506 0189 0189 0223 0184 0218 0218 0335 0229 0056A 0072E 00728 0056C Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /
Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM v0.0 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 13 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 12
,ý.1INE NO.
-770.~
CLASS MARK NO.
.a a c.00U000u0 DESCRIPTION (4)
BUILDING ELEV (5)
(6)===
nn.mflan (5)
(6)
(2) 03 03 03 03 03 03 02 02 02 02 02 02 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 (3)
QlRlSA006-A QI1RISAD7-8 Q1R15A503-A QIRISA504-8 Q1R15A5OS-A Q1R15A506-B QIR16BO06-A Q1R16B007 -B Q1R16B506-A Q1R16B507-B Q1R16B508-A QIR168509-B QIR17B001-A QIR178002-0 Q1R17BODO-A QIR178009-B Q1R17B5O4-A Q1R17B505-B Q1R17B507-A Q1R17B$O8-B Q1R17B5O9-A QR1R78510-B QlRl8B029-A QIR18B030-A QIRIS6031-A Q1RISB032-A QIR1BB033-B QIRIBB034-B QlRlBB035-B QIRIBB036-6 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IF 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IG 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IN 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IJ 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IK 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IL 600V LOAD CENTER ID G00V LOAD CENTER 1E 600V LOAD CENTER lK/2K 600V LOAD CENTER 11/2L 600V LOAD CENTER 1R/2R 600V LOAD CENTER IS/2S MCC IA MCC 1B MCC 1U 1CC 1V MCC 1K MCC 1L MCC IN MCC iP MCC iS MCC IT POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB AB DB 08 SW SW AS AB SW SW DB AB AB AB AB Sw AS AS SW DB DB DB AB AB AB AB AB AB AS AB 139-00 121-00 155-00 155-00 188-06 188-06 139-00 121-00 188-06 188-06 155-00 155-00 139-00 121-00 139-00 139-00 188-06 188-06 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 139-00 139-00 139-00 139-00 139-00 139-00 139-00 139-00 ROOM (7) 0343 0233 0056A 0056C 0072E 0072B 0335 0229 0072E 00728 0056A 0056C 0332 0209 0347 0334 0072E 0072B 0060 0057 0061 0058 0332 0332 0332 0332 0322 0322 0322 0322 01 01 02 02 14 14 02 02 14 02 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 14 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I Page No. 13 L INE NO.
(1)
CLASS MARK NO.
SON......n..5;...
02 02 02 02 02 02 14 14 14 14 16 16 16 16 16 16 14 14 14 14 14 14 03 03 03 03 14 14 14 14 QIR18BO38-A Q1RISBO39-A Q1R18B040-A QlR1SB041-B Q1R18042-B QIRISB043-B QLR21BOO1A-1 Q1R21BOO1B-2 Q1R216001C-3 Q1R21BOO1D-4 Q1R21EOO9A-1 Q1R21EO09B-2 Q1R21EO09C-3 Q1R21EOO9D-4 Q1R21EOO9F-A Q1R21E009G-B QLR21LOO1A-1 Q1R21LOO1B-2 Q1R21LOO1C-3 Q1R21LOO1D-4 QIR21LOOSA-A QIR21LOOSB-B QI1R36ASOI-A Q1R36A502-B Q1R36A510-A QIR36A511-B Q1R41LOO1A-A QIR41LOOIB-A QIR41LOOIC-A QIR41LOO1D-B SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM UMwMeM.M....mmMMmMMM m
mm..=n= am..O.
mammas as..
MsMsm (4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0332 NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0332 NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AS 139-00 0332 NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0312 NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AS 139-00 0312 NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0312 VITAL AC BREAKER BOX AB 155-00 0416 VITAL AC BREAKER BOX AB 155-00 0416 VITAL AC BREAKER BOX AB 139-00 0318 VITAL AC BREAKER BOX AB 139-00 0318 INVERTER IA AB 121-00 0224 INVERTER 1B AB 121-00 0224 INVERTER 1C AB 121-00 0226 INVERTER ID AB 121-00 0226 INVERTER IF AS 121-00 0224 INVERTER IG AS 121-00 0226 VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IA AS 155-00 0416 VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL lB AS 155-00 0416 VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IC AB 139-00 0318 VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ID AD 139-00 0318 120V VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IJ AS 121-00 0224 120V VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IK AD 121-00 0226 4.16KV 4.16KV 4.16KV 4.16KV 125VDC 125VDC 125VDC 125VDC SWITCHGEAR 1K SURGE ARRESTOR SWITCHGEAR IL SURGE ARRESTOR SWITCHGEAR 1K SURGE ARRESTOR SWITCHGEAR 1L SURGE ARRESTOR DISTRIBUTION PANEL IA DISTRIBUTION PANEL 15 DISTRIBUTION PANEL IC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1D SW SW D8 OB DB AB AB AS AB 188-06 188-06 155-00 155-00 155-00 139-00 139-00 155-00 0072A 0072A 0056A 0056C 0416 0343 0312 0416 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 15 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 14 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I LINE NO.
(1)
CLASS MARK NO.
(2)
(3) 14 Q1R41LOO1E-B 14 QIR41LOOIF-B 02 QIR42BOO1A-A 02 QIR42B001B-B 16 QIR42E001A-A 1i QIR42EO01B-B 15 Q1R42EOO2A-A is QIR42E002B-8 17 Q1R43AS02-B 20 QIR43EO01A-A 20 QIR43EO01B-B 20 QIR43EOO2A-A 20 QIR43E002B-8 20 QIR43ESO1A-A 20 Q1R43E501B-B 0
QlR43E502B-B 20 QIR43G510-B 21 Q1R43TS02-B 21 QIR43T503 21 Q1R43T504 09 Q1V47CO12A-A 09 QIV47CO12B-B 05 QIY52PS02B-B 21 Q1Y52T502 20 QSHI1NGEPB2508-AS 20 QSH21ES25-A 20 QSH21ES28-A SYSTEM/ERUIPMENT c~c~ms~uinau...uIuN om (4)
BUILDING
.unn~mum*n=
(5)
ELEV ROOM
=.som..
(?o)c.sms (6)
(7) 125VOC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1E AS 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IF AB 125VDC BUS 1A AS 125VDC BUS 1B AS AUX BLDG BATTERY CHARGER IA AS AUX BLDG BATTERY CHARGER 1B AS AUX BLDG BATTERY IA AS AUX BLDG BATTERY 1B AS DIESEL GENERATOR 1B (SKID)
DB SEQUENCER BIF AS SEQUENCER BIG AS SEQUENCER BIF AUX RELAY PANEL AS SEQUENCER BIG AUX RELAY PANEL AB SEQUENCER BUS 1H DB SEQUENCER BUS 13 DO DIESEL GENERATOR 1B NEUTRAL GROUNDING OB RESISTOR DIESEL GENERATOR 16 CT JB D8 FUEL OIL DAY TANK 1B DB DIESEL GENERATOR 1B STARTING AIR RECEIVER DB TANK DIESEL GENERATOR lB STARTING AIR RECEIVER DB TANK AUXILIARY BLDG A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM AB EXHAUST FAN AUXILIARY BLDG B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM AS EXHAUST FAN DIESEL GEN 1B FUEL OIL STORAGE TRANSFER YD PUMP FUEL STORAGE TANK 19 YD EMERGENCY POWER BOARD AS DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A LOCAL CONTROL PANEL DB DIESEL GENERATOR IC LOCAL CONTROL PANEL CB 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 155-00 139-00 121-00 139-00 121-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 0233 0209 0224 0226 0224 0226 0214 0212 0058 0335 0229 0343 0233 0056A 0056C 0058 Co58 0063 0058 155-00 0058 175-00 0501 175-00 0501 155-00 YARD 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 YARD 0401 0061 0060 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF /
Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 16 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I Page No. 15
'LINE NO.
CLASS MARK NO.
=*Donsa.uva ssu awa W.a.u..wcao (1)
(2)
(3) 20 QSH21LSO3A-A 20 QSH21LSO3B-B 20 QSH22LS02-A 20 QSH22L504-A 20 QSH23S544D-A 20 QSH23S544E-A 01 QSRI7BOO6-A 01 QSR17BO07-B 14 QSR19LO02A-A 14 QSR19LO02B-B 14 QSR41LS04-A 14 QSR41L5O5-B 20 QSR42BS16A-A 20 QSR42B516B-B 20 QSR42B52OA-A 20 QSR42B520B-B 15 QSR42B523A-A 15 QSR42B523B-A is QSR42B523C-B 15 QSR42B5230-B SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION (4)
SERVICE WATER A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM HVAC LCS SERVICE WATER B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM HVAC LCS DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL 1-2A DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL IC DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM IC HVAC LCS DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1-2A HVAC LCS MCC IF NCC IG 120V AC CONTR. PWR. PANEL 1R 120V AC CONTR. PWR. PANEL IS 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IN 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IN UNIT I SERVICE WATER BATTERY FUSE BOX TRAIN A UNIT 1 SERVICE WATER BATTERY FUSE BOX TRAIN 0 SW BATTERY NO. 1 or 2 DETECTION CABINET SW BATTERY NO. 3 or 4 DETECTION CABINET 125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO.
I BUILDING (5)
SW ELEV (6) 188-06 ROOM wau...mm.
(7) 00720 SW OB OB DB DO AB AB AB AB SW SW SW SW SW SW Sw 188-06 0072C 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 188-06 188-06 188-06 0061 0060 0060 0061 0409 0409 0409 0409 0072E 00720 0074 188-06 0073 188-06 188-06 188-06 0074 0073 0074 20 20 16 QSR42BS52SA-A QSR42B525B-B OSR428526A-A 125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO. SW 2
125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO. SW 3
125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO. SW 4
SW BUILDING A TRAIN BATTERY SEL SW SW SW BUILDING B TRAIN BATTERY SEL SW SW SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. I SW (NORMAL)
SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 2 SW (STANDBY)
Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O 188-06 0074 188-06 0073 188-06 0073 188-06 188-06 188-06 0074 0073 0072D 16 QSR42BS26B-A 188-06 0072D
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 17 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 16
'LINE NO.
=8776=*
(1)
CLASS MARK NO.
- fl.Ms cow-oo.ff.
Mon.==
(2)
(3) 16 QSR42B526C-B 16 QSR42B526D-B 17 QSR43A501-A 17 QSR43A503-A 0
QSR43E502A-A 0
QSR43E502C-A 20 QSR43G509-A 20 QSR43LOO1A-A 20 QSR43LOO1C-A 21 QSR43T501-A 21 QSR43T503-A 21 QSR43TS07 21 QSR43T508 21 QSR43T511 21 QSR43TS12 20 QSV49HS3313AB-A 20 QSV49HS3313BB-8 10 QSV49KOOIA-A 10 QSV4gKOOLB-B 18 QSW41B51SE-B 18 QSW41B515F-A 18 QSW418592B-B 18 QSW419592D-A 09 QSW41CSO5A-B SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION
.--- moac-ema(4)csu (4) rMr-"rnrTT-rrlTa I'll 1-1B BUILDING (5m)a..sfl (5)
ELEV ROOM znow..a= mowns...as (6)
(7) 188-06 0072C 188-06 0072C SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 3 SW (NORMAL)
SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 4 SW (STANDBY)
DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A (SKID) 0B DIESEL GENERATOR IC (SKID)
DO DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A NEUTRAL GROUNDING DB RESISTOR DIESEL GENERATOR IC NEUTRAL GROUNDING DB RESISTOR DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A CT J8 D0 DIESEL GEN 1-2A DC CONTROL PWR AUTO XFER DS SW (ATS)
DIESEL GEN 1C DC CONTROL PWR AUTO XFER SW D0 (ATS)
FUEL OIL DAY TANK 1-2A Do FUEL OIL DAY TANK IC D8 DIESEL GENERATOR IC STARTING AIR RECEIVER DB TANK DIESEL GENERATOR IC STARTING AIR RECEIVER 06 TANK DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A STARTING AIR DB RECEIVER TANK 155-00 155-00 155-00 0061 0060 0061 155-00 0060 155-00 155-00 0061 0061 155-00 0060 155-00 155-00 155-00 0066 0065 0060 155-00 0060 155-00 0061 155-00 0061 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A STARTING AIR RECEIVER TANK CTRL RM A/C LOCAL CONTROL STATION A CTRL RN A/C LOCAL CONTROL STATION B CONTROL ROOM PACKAGE A/C UNIT CONTROL ROOM PACKAGE A/C UNIT SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR A
DO As AB AB AB SW SW SW SW SW 155-00 155-00 175-00 175-00 1B8-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 0416 0416 0501 0501 0073 0074 0073 0074 0072A Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /
Sort Criteria: ID Nwuber Filter Criteria: (Eva).
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 18 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO, SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 17 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUlDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I lINE NO.
CLASS (1)
(2)
MARK NO.
Samoa...
57
-00...
SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION ese.l...........a....
lnl.amsfltb..lfln lb (4)
BUILDING m-mnolm..sfl (5)
ELEV (6)
ROOM (7) 09 QSW41CS05B-B 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 0
0 0
0 0
0 09 09 QSW41C505C-B QSV4IC5O5D-A QSW41C5O5E-A QSW4IC5S5F-A QSW41C5O6A-0 QSW41CSO6B-B QSW4IC5O6C-A QSW41CS060-A QSW41C5O7A-B QSW41CSO7B-B QSW41C507C-A QSW41C507D-A QSW4IC5I3A-8 QSW41 C513B-8 QSW41C513C-A QSW41CS13D-A QSW41C514A-B QSW41C5I4B-B QSW41C514C-A QSW41C514D-A SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SW B
SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SW C
SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SW D
SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SW E
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Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O Page 19 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NNO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
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Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.O 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 20 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
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Program File Nane & Version: SSEN vO.O Page 21 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit I - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-37 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 22 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 UNIT I SWEL 1 SWEL Revision Date - 9/18/12
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ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 UNIT 1 SWEL 1 Version 2.0 SWEL Revision Date - 02/13/14 Revlewer:-aW MMo Ops Rviewe. r:Lo e--o..oo:
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ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 A TTACHENT :RU, S*EISRi WAKOVI EUPMN
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ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOIM EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 2i-T,,dL N-
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ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-37 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 33 of 40
ENERCATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-O1, V'fW18P~d'PT"l Farley Unit 1 SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related Items NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns Variety of Environments Variety of types of Major new equipment MPL #
System/Equipment Description or (21 Classes Variety of Not replcmnt from Systems Submerged Submerged Other equpmnt Appendix B)
Location Class #
1 QIG31HOO01A SPENT FUEL HEAT EXCHANGER 1A G31 X
21 AB-155'/0445 2 Q1G31H0001B SPENT FUEL HEAT EXCHANGER 1B G31 X
21 AB-165'/0013 3 Q1G31P002A 1A SFP PUMP G31 X
5 AB-139'/0342 4 Q1G31P002B 1B SFP PUMP G31 X
5 AB-139'/0342 5 Q1G31V001A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION ISO G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 6 QIG31VO01B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION ISO G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 7 QIG31V002A 1A SFP HX INLET ISO G31 X
0 AB-155'/0455 8 Q1G31V002B 1B SFP HX INLET ISO G31 X
0 AB-155'/0423 9 QIG31V003A 1A SFP HX OUTLET ISO G31 X
0 AB-155'/0455 10 Q1G31V003B 1B SFP HX OUTLET ISO G31 X
0 AB-155/0423 11 Q1G31V004A 1A SFP COOLING LOOP TO SFP PURIF G31 0
INLET ISO X
AB-139'/0342 12 Q1G31V004B 1B SFP PUMP COOLING LOOP TO SFP G31 0
PURIF INLET ISO X
AB-139'/0342 13 Q1G31V005 SFP PURIF OUTLET TO SFP G31 X
0 AB-1SS'/0455 14 QIG31V006 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN (KEY Z-G31 0
225)
X AB-139'/0342 15 Q1G31V007 DW TO SFP ISO (KEY Z-335)
G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 16 Q1G31V008A 1A SFP PUMP DISCH PI-652B ROOT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 17 Q1G31V008B 1B SFP PUMP DISCH PI-652D ROOT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 18 Q0G31V009A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION PI-652A ROOT G31 0
X I_
AB-139'/0342 19 Q1G31V009B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION PI-652C ROOT G31 0
X AB-139'/0342 20 Q1G31V017 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN DRN G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 21 Q1G31V018 1B SFP COOLING LOOP DRN G31 X
0 AB-139'/0307 22 Q1G31V019 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN VENT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 23 Q1G31V021A 1A SFP PUMP CASING VENT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 24 Q1G31V021B 18 SFP PUMP CASING VENT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 25 Q1G31V022A 1A SFP PUMP CASING DRN G31 X
0 AB-139'/0345 26 Q1G31V022B 1B SFP PUMP CASING DRN 631 X
0 AB-139'/0345 27 Q1G31V023A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION DRN G31 X
0 AB-139'/0345 28 Q1G31V023B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION DRN G31 X
0 AB-139'/0345 29 QIG31VO24A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION VENT G31 X
0 IAB-139'/0345 30 Q1G31V024B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION VENT G31 K
0 IAB-139'/0345 31 Q1G31V025 SFP HX HIGH POINT VENT G31 I
0
.AB-165'/0013 Page 34 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-37 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 35 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01. VERSION 2.0 Originator: I-omt6 L~, l.J6A&
Originator:
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Date: 9 ?i t2-Date:
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Peer Reviewer: K Peer Reviewer,~
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Peer Reviewer;, fIclkeri (.$16r t
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,z Date; Page 36 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOVN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Farley Unit I SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related Items - Revision Date 9/18/12 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns Screen #3 Screen #4 Anchorage Variety of check MPL#
System/Equipment Location types of Variety of environments required?
Description Major new equipment (50% of or (21 Classes Column B)
Variety of replcmnt from Systems equpmnt Appendix B)
Rapid Drain-Down Comments Hydraulic lines connected to the SFP and the equipment connected to Class #
Submerged Not Submerged Other Yes No those lines Q1G31H0001A SPENT FUEL HEAT AUX BLDG / 155'/ 0445 1
EXCHANGER 1A G31 21 X
X 2 QIG31PO02B 1B SFP PUMP AUX BLDG/ 139' / 0342 G31 5
X X
QIG31VO01A 1A SFP PUMP AUX BLDG / 139' / 0342 3
SUCTION SO G31 0
X X
4 Q1G31V003B 1B SFP HX OUTLET AUX BLDG / 155'/ 0423 ISO G31 0
X X
QlG31VO04A 1A SFP COOUNG AUX BLDG/ 139' /0342 031 0
I X
INLET ISO 6CO.G31V006 SFP COOLING LOOP AUX BLDG / 139' / 0342 031 6
RETURN (KEY Z-225)
Page 37 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32 Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 1.0) 35-36 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 (Version 2.0) 38-40 Page 38 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 UNIT 1 SWEL 2 Version 2.0 SWEL Revision Dat - 11/07/13 Revtewer:
Y7.f-
,- gW400 ops Reviewer:
L~
I1 Daft: J'L2.!ALL Date:,
Daft:
/*
Pe er &M ~welA **2/ Ž ir f
i ii Richard G. Starck II Peer Reviewer:_ S*' 4h S 4=a Date: 2/14/2014 Page 39 of 40
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOMN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01. VERSION 2.0 Farley Unit 1 SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related Items - Revision Date 11/07/13 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns Screen #3 Screen #4 Anchorage Variety of checg check MPL #
System/Equipment Location types of Variety of environments required?
Description Majornew equipment (50% of or 121 Classes Column B)
Variety of replcmnt from Systems equpmnt Appendix B)
Rapid Drain-Down Comments Hydraulic lines connected to the SFP and the equipment connected to Class #
Submerged Not Submerged Other Yes No those lines Q1G31HOO01A SPENT FUEL HEAT AUUX BLDG /155' / 0445 I
EXCHANGER IA G31 21 X
IX 2 QIG31P0028 1B SFP PUMP AUX BLDG/ 139 / 0342 G31 5
X X
QIG31VOO1A IA SFP PUMP AUX BLDG / 139 / 0342 3
SUCTION ISO G31 0
X X
4 Q]G31VO038 18 SIP HX OUTLET AUX BLDG /155'/0423 ISO G31 0
X X
QIG31VO04A L'A SFP COOLING A1UX BLDG / 139- / 0342 G31 0
X X
INLET ISO Q1G31VO06 SFP COOLING LOOP AUX BLDG / 139' / 0342 G31 0XI 6
RETURN (KEY Z-225) I 1
01 1
1 II NOTE - The number of zeros following the system identifier (eg. B31) and before the unique numbering of a component may vary from field, SWC, or SWEL Labeling. This is a unique historical issue related to component identifications at Plant Farley and does not imply a different component, For example, "QIR3SA50I and Q1R36AOS01 are representative of one component in the plant and can be used interchangeably".
Page 40 of 40
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 ATTACHMENT 2 UNIT 1 - PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 (Version 1.0 and Version 2.0)
NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Page 1 of 6
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Sheet 1 of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1 Instructions for Completing Checklist This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist should be used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may have changed to address those findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.
- 1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL I selection?
YN Nil SWEL 1 for Farley Unit I meets the requirements of having 90 to 120 items and addresses allfive safety functions. Many components provide safetyfunctionsfor multiple systems, and/or are part offrontline support systems. Allfive safety functions discussed in EPRI Report 1025286 are well represented in the SWEL 1.
- 2. Does SWEL 1 include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:
- a. Various types of systems?
Yi NEI Items included on the SWEL comprise a variety of systems such as Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliaries, Service Water System, Component Cooling Water System, Automatic Depressurization, Residual Heat Removal System, Vital A/C and DIC systems.
- b. Major new and replacement equipment?
YO NEI New and replacement components are identified in SWEL 1.
- c. Various types of equipment?
YZ NEI SWEL 1 includes at least one example of each of the 21 classes of equipment, except Classes 1) (chillers), 13 (Motor Generators) and 19 (Temperature Sensors). These components did not meet the screening criteria for incorporation in the SWEL as discussed in Section 6 of the submittal report.
All other equipment classes were well represented. In general, the number of components in each class is proportional to the number of safety-related components of that class in the plant as a whole, except that the number of in-line valves is proportionally smaller than anchored equipment. Anchored equipment is more vulnerable to seismic loads.
- d. Various environments?
YN N[I The SWEL contains components in mild, harsh, and outdoor environments. The components are located in different buildings, rooms, and/or on different building elevations. The SWEL also includes components located inside primary containment.
- e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program?
YN Nil]
The SWEL included equipment that had been modified as a result of the IPEEE program. Section 5 and Attachment 5 of the submittal report provides information on resolution of the IPEEE findings. The SWEL and individual component checklists provide information about the IPEEE modifications and verification of modification incorporation.
Page 2 of 6
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Sheet 2 of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1
- f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL I?
Y0 Nol SWEL 1 includes high risk components based on risk significance in the plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. Section 6 of the submittal report discusses the risk insights used for SWEL development.
- 3. For SWEL 2:
- a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in YN NEI SWEL 2?
SWEL 2 includes components for maintaining cooling of the SFP, which are Seismic Category I components.
- b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items not Y0 NEl included in SWEL 2?
Section 6.2 of the submittal report provides the justification for excluding items on SWEL 2. There were no components identified that could contribute to rapid SFP drain down. Note that there were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would have affected equipment that meets the screening requirements to be included on SWEL 2.
- 4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.
The peer review team reviewed the initial SWEL I and SWEL 2 and provided comments and suggestions for enhancement of the SWELs. Comments included suggestions to include additional electrical components and more equipment mounted to the structure, since such equipment has shown more potential to be adversely impacted by seismic loads than in-line mounted components. In addition, comments were made suggesting that certain equipment classes contain more components and that explanations be provided for not including certain equipment (e. g. there are no safety-related or Seismic Category I components in that equipment class installed in the plant). The peer reviewers ensured that the SWELs met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Changes deemed necessary during the walkdown due to inaccessibility were reviewed by the peer reviewers to ensure that the changes did not impact the level of compliance to the EPRI report. The final SWEL meets all requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.
- 5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL?
YZ NEI r Zý44ý Peer Reviewer #1: Robert Ashworth Date:
11/05/2012 Peer Reviewer #2: Melanie Brown*
- rI.,,A,/
.Date:
11/05/2012 Page 3 of 6
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Sheet 1 of 3 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1 Version 2 (Final)
Instructions for Completing Checklist This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist should be used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may have changed to address those findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.
- 1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL I selection?
YZ NI]
SWEL 1 for Farley Unit I meets the requirements of having 90 to 120 items and addresses all five safety functions. Many components provide safety functions for multiple systems, and/or are part offrontline support systems. Allfive safety functions discussed in EPRI Report 1025286 are well represented in the SWEL 1.
- 2. Does SWEL I include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:
- a. Various types of systems?
YJR NE Items included on the SWEL comprise a variety of systems such as Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliaries, Service Water System, Component Cooling Water System, Automatic Depressurization, Residual Heat Removal System, Vital A/C and DIC systems.
- b. Major new and replacement equipment?
YZ NEI New and replacement components are identified in SWEL 1.
- c. Various types of equipment?
YO NEI SWEL 1 includes at least one example of each of the 21 classes of equipment, except Classes 11 (chillers), 13 (Motor Generators) and 19 (Temperature Sensors). These components did not meet the screening criteria for incorporation in the SWEL as discussed in Section 6 of the submittal report.
All other equipment classes were well represented. In general, the number of components in each class is proportional to the number of safety-related components of that class in the plant as a whole, except that the number of in-line valves is proportionally smaller than anchored equipment. Anchored equipment is more vulnerable to seismic loads.
Version 2: Item QIR42BOOIB (125vDC Bus IB) was listed in SWEL I for Version I ofthe walkdown report, but removed for Version 2 since the item could not be completely inspected during the outage walkdowns without excessive disassembly.
However, the anchorage and internals were inspected to the extent possible.
Removing the item from the SWEL Ifor Version 2 of the report did not invalidate any of the EPRI Report requirements such as variety of system2 variety of classes of equipment. variety of environments. etc.
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ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Sheet 2 of 3 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1 Version 2 (Final)
- d. Various environments?
YN NIl The SWEL contains components in mild, harsh, and outdoor environments. The components are located in different buildings, rooms, and/or on different building elevations. The SWEL also includes components located inside primary containment.
- e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program?
YI Ni]
The SWEL included equipment that had been modified as a result of the IPEEE program. Section 5 and Attachment 5 of the sdbmittal report provides information on resolution of the IPEEE findings. The SWEL and individual component checklists provide information about the IPEEE modifications and verification of modification incorporation.
- f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL 1?
YZ NI]
SWEL 1 includes high risk components based on risk significance in the plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. Section 6 of the submittal report discusses the risk insights used for SWEL development.
- 3. For SWEL 2:
- a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in Y!
NEI SWEL 2?
SWEL 2 includes components for maintaining cooling of the SFP, which are Seismic Category I components.
- b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items not YZ NI]
included in SWEL 2?
Section 6.2 of the submittal report provides the justification for excluding items on SWEL 2. There were no components identified that could contribute to rapid SFP drain down. Note that there were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would have affected equipment that meets the screening requirements to be included on SWEL 2.
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ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0 Sheet 3 of 3 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1 Version 2 (Final)
- 4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.
The peer review team reviewed the initial SWEL I and SWEL 2 and provided comments and suggestions for enhancement of the SWEJs. Comments included suggestions to include additional electrical components and more equipment mounted to the structure, since such equipment has shown more potential to be adversely impacted by seismic loads than in-line mounted components. In addition, comments were made suggesting that certain equipment classes contain more components and that explanations be provided for not including certain equipment (e. g. there are no safety-related or Seismic Category I components in that equipment class installed in the plant). The peer reviewers ensured that the SWELs met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Changes deemed necessary during the walkdown due to inaccessibility were reviewed by the peer reviewers to ensure that the changes did not impact the level of compliance to the EPRI report. The final SWEL meets all requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.
Version 2: The peer reviewers reviewed the final report f&r completeness., accuracy. and compliance with the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Comments were provided on the body of the report as well as various attachments and were incorporated. The Linal report meets all requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.
- 5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL?
YIEi NEI Peer Reviewer #l:
e 6
Date: 692- -/1.
"-3 V Peer Reviewer #2:
Date:
02/13/2014 Page 6 of 6