Text

Joseph M. Farley, Units 1 and 2, Emergency Plan, Rev. 58. Cover Through Page J-11
	ML13037A439
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	01/10/2013
From:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NL-13-0053, FOIA/PA-2015-0025
	Download: ML13037A439 (218)
	v • d • e

Page 3 of 4 Rev. 56 INDEX OF EFFECTIVE PAGES PART I - SITE PLAN PAGE REV. NO. PAGE REV. NO. PAGE REV. NO.

APPENDIX 5(E) (CONT'D) APPENDIX 6(F) APPENDIX 10(J) CONT'D) E-19 49 F-1 44 J-4 56 E-20 49 F-2 DEL J-5 56 E-21 49 J-6 56 E-22 49 APPENDIX 7(G) J-7 56 E-23 49 G-i 41 J-8 56 E-24 49 G-1 41 J-9 56 E-25 49 G-2 41 J-10 56 E-26 49 G-3 49 J-11 56 E-27 49 G-4 56 J-12 56 E-28 49 G-5 41 J-13 56 E-29 49 G-6 41 J-14 56 E-30 49 G-7 41 J-15 56 E-31 49 G-8 41 J-16 56 E-32 49 G-9 41 J-17 56 E-33 49 G-10 46 J-18 56 E-34 49 G-11 41 J-19 42 E-35 49 G-12 41 J-20 56 E-36 49 G-13 41 J-21 56 E-37 49 G-14 44 J-22 56 E-38 49 G-15 41 J-23 56 E-39 49 G-16 41 J-24 56 E-40 49 G-17 41 J-25 56 E-41 49 G-18 55 J-26 56 E-42 49 G-19 52 APPENDIX 11(K) E-43 49 G-20 41 K-i 48 E-44 49 G-21 41 K-1 52 E-45 49 G-22 41 K-2 48 E-46 49 G-23 41 K-3 48 E-47 49 G-24 41 K-4 48 E-48 49 G-25 49 K-5 48 E-49 49 K-6 55 E-50 49 APPENDIX 8(H) K-7 50 E-51 49 H-1 42 K-8 50 E-52 49 H-2 42 K-9 48 E-53 49 H-3 42 K-10 48 E-54 49 K-11 48 E-55 49 APPENDIX 9(I) K-12 48 E-56 49 I-i 42 K-13 48 E-57 49 I-1 56 K-14 48 E-58 49 I-2 56 K-15 48 E-59 49 I-3 56 K-16 48 E-60 49 APPENDIX 10(J) K-17 48 E-61 49 J-i 42 K-18 48 E-62 DEL J-1 42 K-19 48 E-63 DEL J-2 56 K-20 48 E-64 DEL J-3 42 K-21 48

i Rev. 56 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN PART I. SITE PLAN Table of Contents SECTION PAGE NO. I. INTRODUCTION

.....-1 A. PURPOSE...................................................................................................................1 B.

SUMMARY

......-1 C. GENERAL INFORMATION------------------.----.--.2 1. Definitions----------------------------..-2

2. Emergency Ingress and Egress-------------------.-4

II. ORGANIZATION ----------------------------..-..-.5 A. ONSITE------------------------------.-..-.5 1. Technical Support Center (TSC)--------------------5

B. OFFSITE-----------

...--.11 1. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)-----------------.11 2. Corporate Organization-...------------------.---..11 3. Emergency Communication Organization---------------..11 4. Recovery Phase Organization--------------------..12 C. OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS--------------------.--....14 1. Government Agencies------------------------14 2. Contractor and Private Offsite Organizations--------------.17 III. FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT------------------------...32 A. CONTROL CENTERS.-------------------------....32 1. Technical Support Center (TSC)-------------------..32 2. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)-----------------.33 3. NRC Support Facilities-----------------------...35 4. Operations Support Center (OSC)------------------...35

5. Joint Information Center--------------------.--...36

6. APC Corporate Media Center (CMC)................................................................36 . B. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS----------------------36 1. Commercial Telephones-----------------------36

2. Private Automatic Exchange---------------------.37

3. Microwave----------------------------....37

4. APC Load Dispatch Computer Link------------------.37 5. Two-way Radio---------------------------37

ii Rev. 49 PART I. SITE PLAN -Table of Contents - Page Two SECTION PAGE NO. 6. Public Address and Party Lines-------------------..38

7. Sound Powered Telephone---------------------.38

8. Plant Emergency Alar m----------------------....38 9. NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS)-----------.--....39

10. NRC Health Physics Network (HPN)---------------.--.39

11. State/Local Agency Emergency Notification Network (ENN)-------.39 12. NRC Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL)-------------39 13. Protective Measures Counter part Link (PMCL)------------...39 14. Management Counterpart Link (MCL)----------------...40

15. Local Area Network (LAN) Access ---------------.--...40

16. Telecopier----------------------------...40 17. SNC Integrated Data Display System-----------------40

18. Emergency Response Data System-----------------..40 19. Other Communication Systems-------------------..40 C. ASSESSMENT FACILITIES----------------------...-..40 1. Onsite Systems and Equipment -------------------.40

2. Environs Monitoring Facilities and Equipment-------------..42

3. Personnel Monitoring Equipment------------------....44 D. PROTECTION, DECONTAMINATION AND FIRST AID FACILITIES----...--44 1. Protective Facilities and Equipment------------------44

2. Decontamination and First Aid--------------------45 3. Medical Transportation-----------------------.45 4. Medical Treatment-------------------------.47

IV. ASSESSMENT ACTIONS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES ----------..-56 A. CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES------------------.....56 1. Notification of Unusual Event--------------------..K-2

2. Alert-------------------------------.K-2

3. Site Area Emergency------------------------K-3 4. General Emergency------------------------..K-4 B. POST ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT ACTIONS---------------...-56 1. Reactor Coolant Sampling, Containment Atmosphere---------...56 Sampling and Plant Vent Stack Sampling 2. Surveillance of Control Room Monitors---------------.....56 3. In-Plant and Site Surveys---------------------....56

4. Population Exposure------------------------56 5. Environs Surveys and Monitoring-----------------..-.57 C. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS-----...-..-57 1. Onsite Protective Action-----------------------58

2. Offsite Protective Action-----------------------60 V. ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION----------------.66 A. DECLARATION OF AN EMERGENCY------------------..-66 B. ORGANIZATION ACTIVATION-----------------------66 1. Technical Support Center Activation-----------------..67 2. Operations Support Center Activation-----------------67

3. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Activation----------........68 iii Rev. 49 PART I. SITE PLAN -Table of Contents - Page Three SECTION PAGE NO. C. OFFSITE CORPORATE ORGANIZATION ACTIVATION-----------.68 D. OFFSITE LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCIES------------68

VI. NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES------------------------.73 A. STATE AND LOCAL AGENCY NOTIFICATION---------------.73 B. PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE PUBLIC NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION-------------------..74

1. Notification-----------------------------74 2. Information----------------------------...75

3. News Release Coordination & Rumor Control-------------..75

C. NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT----------.....75 D. SAVANNAH RIVER OPERATIONS OFFICE --------------........75 E. MEDICAL-------------------------------...75 F. FIRE -------------------------------...-..76

VII. RECOVERY-----------------------------..--.-78

A. METHODOLOGY -----------------------.--..--78 B. ORGANIZATION------------------------..--.-..79 C. NOTIFICATION-----------------------.--.-.-....79

VIII. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY REPAREDNESS--------------...-...80 A. EXERCISES AND RILLS--

.---.....80

1. Radiation Emergency Exercise------------------..-80 2. Drills------------.----

..------...-..81

B.

TRAINING--.-------------------------------82

1. Training of the Plant Emergency Organization-------------.82

2. Training of the Corporate Emergency Organization----------....84 3. Training of Local Services Groups ------------------.85 4. Training of SNC Emergency Planners-----------------85 C. INSPECTION, CALIBRATION AND TESTING OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ----------------------------..85

D. REVIEW AND UPDATING OF THE PLAN AND PROCEDURES-------..86

iv Rev. 49 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN FIGURES List of Figures PAGE NO.

Figure 1 Facility Organization-------------------------..19 Figure 2 Technical Support Center Emergency Response Organization-------.20 Figure 3 Communications Interfaces ----------------------.21 Figure 4 Deleted -------------------------------22 Figure 5 APC Normal Offsite Corporate Organization ---------------23 Figure 6 Farley Project Normal Organization-------------------24 Figure 7 Deleted -------------------------------25 Figure 8 Deleted-------------------------------.26 Figure 9 Deleted-------------------------------.27 Figure 10 Emergency Operations Facility Recovery Organization----------..28 Figure 11 Deleted-----------------------------.--29 Figure 12 Organizational Relationships Prior to EOF Activation-----------..30 Figure 13 Organizational Relationships Following EOF Activation----------..31 Figure 14 Technical Support Center-----------------------.47 Figure 15 Control Room and Technical Support Center---------------48 Figure 16 Deleted-------------------------------.49 Figure 17 Site Area Emergency Facilities, General Population Support Services and Evacuation Routes----------------..50 Figure 18 Deleted-------------------------------.51 Figure 19 Onsite Evacuation Routes, Site Assembly Areas and Operations Support Center----------------------...52 Figure 20 Radiological Survey and Sampling Reporting Sectors-----------.63 Figure 21 Protective Action Sectors-----------------------..64 Figure 22 Predicted Population in the Vicinity of Farley Nuclear Plant---------65 Figure 23 Deleted-------------------------------.72 Figure 24 Notification Order---------------------------77 v Rev. 49 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN List of Tables

TABLE PAGE NO

Table 1 Emergency Facility Communications Capability-------------.53

Table 2 Meteorological Instrumentation at the Farley Site------------..54 Table 3 FNP Minimum Emergency Staffing Availability-------------...69

Table 4 Emergency Facility Activation---------------------.71 vi Rev. 53 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN List of Appendices

APPENDIX PAGE NO APPENDIX 1(A) Emergency Supplies and Equipment ----------------.A-1

APPENDIX 2(B) Letters of Agreement on File...-------------------.B-1 APPENDIX 3(C) Radiation Monitoring System--------------------C-1

APPENDIX 4(D) Emergency Plan Procedures--------------------D-1

APPENDIX 5(E) Evacuation Time Estimates for the Farley Nuclear Plant--------.E-1

APPENDIX 6(F) Supporting Emergency Plans--------------------F-1

APPENDIX 7(G) Emergency Operations Facility-------------------.G-i APPENDIX 8(H) FNP Emergency Plan - NUREG 0654 Cross Reference Index------H-1

APPENDIX 9(I) Responsibility for the Planning Effort-----------------

I-i APPENDIX 10(J) Emergency Communications Plan------------------J-1

APPENDIX 11(K) Assessment Actions------------------------K-1

1 Rev. 42 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN I. INTRODUCTION A. PURPOSE The purpose of the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Emergency Plan is to protect the health and safety of the general public, persons temporarily visiting or assigned to the plant, and plant employees in accordance with the requirements set forth in Appendix E, "Emergency Plans for Production and Utilization Facilities", of 10CFR50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities".

Detailed procedures concerning the implementation of the Emergency Plan are not included here but are included in the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

These procedures, listed in Appendix 4(D), describe the duties of individuals and groups in the event of an emergency and they also serve as an interface of the Emergency Plan to plant operations, security and radiological control. Supporting emergency plans, which include the emergency plans for the states of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, are listed in Appendix 6(F).

Information submitted in this plan was developed in accordance with the elements outlined in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants". Information that describes the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Southern Nuclear is outlined in Appendix 7(G).

B.

SUMMARY

Southern Nuclear Operating Company corporate management has overall responsibility for maintaining a state of readiness to implement emergency plans for the protection of plant personnel, the general public and property from hazards associated with ionizing radiation originating within a company facility. The authority for planning, developing, and coordinating emergency control measures is discussed in Appendix 9 (I), Responsibility For The Planning Effort.

The Farley Plant Emergency Plan describes the organization and facilities both onsite and offsite that will be used to deal with a spectrum of accidents ranging from minor onsite incidents to those that could affect the general public. There are three phases of responsive action contained within the Farley Plant Emergency Plan. The first phase includes initial actions directed toward the protection of personnel and the elimination of the potential for further exposure to the hazard.

2 Rev. 47 The second phase includes immediate and planned action directed toward termination of the incident, containment of the effluent, establishment of incident boundaries, establishment of control, channeling of information and protection of the facility and equipment. The third phase is to restore the facility to its normal operating condition.

To respond effectively utilizing these phases, emergencies are classified according to increasing severity as Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or

General Emergency. C. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Definitions

a. Affected Persons Individuals who have been radiologically exposed or physically injured as a result of an accident to a degree requiring special attention, e.g.,

decontamination, first aid, or medical services. b. Assessment Actions Those actions taken during or after an accident which are collectively necessary to make decisions to implement specific emergency measures. c. Controlled Area The Controlled Area is the fenced area immediately surrounding the nuclear plant, access to which is controlled for industrial security purposes. d. Corrective Action Those emergency measures taken to terminate an emergency situation at or near the source of the problem. e. Emergency Action Levels Radiological dose rates; specific contamination levels of airborne, waterborne or surface deposited concentrations of radioactive materials; or specific instrument indications (including their rates of change) that may be used as thresholds for initiating such specific emergency measures as designating a particular class of emergency, initiating a notification procedure or initiating a particular protective action. f. EOF Manager The EOF Manager is responsible for the activation of the corporate emergency organization and for providing corporate emergency support prior to and following Emergency Operations Facility activation.

g. Emergency Director The Plant Manager or designated alternate as the Emergency Director is charged with the responsibility of overall direction of the plant emergency activity and with initial interfacing with offsite groups.

3 Rev. 47 h. Hostile Action An act toward an NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, takes hostages, and /or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area.

i. Hostile Force One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

j. Offsite All land and water areas outside the site property lines are considered to be offsite. k. Onsite All land and water areas inside the site property lines, use of which must be authorized by SNC, is referred to as onsite. l. Population at Risk Those persons for whom protective actions are being or would be taken. m. Protected Area The Protected Area is the fenced area immediately surrounding the plant Vital Areas, access to which is limited to those individuals with good cause for

entry. n. Protective Action Guides Projected radiological dose or dose commitment values to individuals in the general population that warrant protective action following a release of

radioactive material. o. Protective Actions Those emergency measures taken after an uncontrolled release of radioactive material has occurred for the purpose of preventing or minimizing radiological exposures that would be likely to occur to persons if the actions were not taken.

4 Rev. 47

p. Radiation Controlled Area The containment and the potentially contaminated portion of the Auxiliary Building and other areas onsite such as High Radiation Area, Radiation

Area, Radioactive Materials Area, Airborne Radioactivity Area or

Contaminated Area. q. Recovery Actions Those actions taken after the emergency to restore the plant as nearly as possible to its pre-emergency condition.

r. Vital Area The Vital Areas are those plant areas which enclose major systems, equipment and components necessary to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident. 2. Emergency Ingress and Egress

a. Emergency Ingress Ingress to any area of the plant can be obtained by the use of keys which

are maintained by the Shift Supervisor and the Senior Security Force Member. In the case of electrically locked doors, keys will override the locking device. The necessary keys will be issued as required to combat the emergency. b. Emergency Egress Egress from any area of the plant is assured without keys, electrical power or

other devices.

5 Rev. 49 II. ORGANIZATION The organization, responsibilities and functions of Southern Nuclear Operating Company onsite and offsite resources are individually discussed below. The onsite and offsite organizations provide emergency response duri ng the activation, emergency, and recovery phases of accident response. Principal federal, state, local and private agencies are also discussed. Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the interrelationships of these organizations before and after Emergency Operations Facility activation respectively. A. ONSITE The normal onsite organization for Farley Nuclear Plant is shown on Figure 1. Management positions in the onsite organization meet the qualification requirements of ANSI N18.1-1971.

The qualifications for the professional-technical level positions also meet the

requirements of ANSI N18.1-1971.

1. Technical Support Center (TSC)

The emergency onsite organization implemented for events requiring activation of the TSC is described in FNP-0-EIP-0 and is shown in Figure 2.

Responsibilities and authorities of personnel in the TSC emergency organization are as follows:

a. Emergency Director (ED)

The ED is charged with the responsibility of overall direction of onsite emergency activity including near-site field monitoring team dispatch and control and interfacing with offsite organizations and agencies until the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is activated. After the EOF is functional, the ED is responsible for overall direction of all in-plant emergency activity. The ED shall supervise the TSC and manage the in plant recovery efforts and the in plant recovery organization. The ED shall communicate directly with the EOF Manager when the EOF is activated and shall have full authority to direct the onsite recovery efforts without further consultation when the situation demands such action. Following EOF activation when time permits the ED will consult with EOF personnel prior to initiating major evolutions or changes in plant configuration. The ED's general responsibilities include:

1) Staffing the TSC. The TSC will be staffed by plant supervisory personnel supplemented by plant engineering, technical and administrative personnel as necessary to staff the TSC 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months a day and discharge the responsibilities discussed below.

2) Evaluating the classification of the emergency and amending as appropriate. Terminating an emergency level will not be delegated to other elements of the emergency organization and will be performed in accordance with approved procedures.

6 Rev. 56 3) Verifying correct control room response to the emergency classification.

4) Determining radiological status and initiating notifications to state agencies (and local agencies for General Emergencies). The decision to notify offsite government agencies may not be delegated to any other element of the emergency organization.

5) Initiating, on initial or upgrade emergency notifications, recommendations to state agencies on advisability of evacuations. Recommendations to local agencies when state authorities cannot be contacted for immediate evacuation may not be delegated to any other element of the emergency organization.

6) Initiating rescue or emergency repair operations as appro-priate. 7) Maintaining plant security.

8) Establishing communications with and providing information to the EOF Manager.

In fulfilling the above listed responsibilities the Emergency Director (ED) is guided by the procedures listed below:

FNP-0-EIP-8.1 Emergency Phone Directory FNP-0-EIP-8.3 Communication Equipment Operating Procedures FNP-0-EIP-9.3 Personal Computer-Automated Dose Assessment Method NMP-EP-110 Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action NMP-EP-111 Emergency Notifications NMP-EP-112 Protective Action Recommendations The ED position is initially filled by the Shift Manager until relieved by the on-call ED. It is the intent of SNC that the ED will be transferred from the Control Room as soon as practicable.

The line of succession of individuals who may serve as the ED is as follows:

Vice President - Nuclear Plant Site Plant Manager

Site Support Manager

Operations Director

On-call Operations Supervisor

Shift Manager

Shift Supervisor Other Managers or staff designated by the Plant Manager

7 Rev. 52 The above line of succession does not preclude higher level management from assuming the role of Emergency Director (ED)in any circumstance which, in the judgment of the manager, is appropriate or necessary to protect the health and safety of the public. This designation also does not relieve higher level management from the responsibility to be aware of those circumstances that may initiate this action. These individuals will be trained as EDs.

b. TSC Manager

The on-call TSC Manager reports to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and is responsible for implementing FNP-0-EIP-6, "TSC Setup and Activation", assisting the ED with classification assessment and emergency plan implementation per NMP-EP-110, "Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action" and coordination of communications between the TSC and other locations per NMP-EP-111, "Emergency Notifications ".

c. Operations Supervisor The on-call Operations Supervisor reports to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and is responsible for coordinating the efforts of the operating crew, advising the ED on emergency operations and facilitating communications between the ED and Shift Supervisor. Supervisory personnel designated by the Plant Manager and holding a Senior Reactor Operator License rotate as the on-call Operations

Supervisor.

d. Maintenance Supervisor

The on-call Maintenance Supervisor reports to the TSC and is responsible for implementing FNP-0-EIP-5, "Maintenance Support to the Emergency Plan",

including coordination of the efforts of Emergency Repair Parties and advising the ED on proposed modifications, alterations or repair to plant systems and on specifics of plant systems and equipment. Supervisory I&C and Maintenance personnel designated by the Plant Manager rotate as the on-call Maintenance

Supervisor.

e. Health Physics Supervisor

The Health Physics Supervisor reports to the TSC and is responsible for implementation of FNP-0-EIP-4, "Health Physics Support to the Emergency Plan",

including coordination of the efforts of in-plant Field Monitoring Teams, decontamination activities, Health Physics and ALARA support, and advising the ED on the status of onsite and offsite radiation protection activities. This individual is also responsible for coordination of out-of-plant and SNC offsite Field

Monitoring Teams until relieved by the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff. The Health Physics Supervisor and other supervisory personnel designated by the Plant Manager and, to the maximum extent possible, meeting the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.8, September 1975, rotate as the on-call Health Physics Supervisor.

f. Security Security supervision is responsible for implementing FNP-0-EIP-7, "Security Support to the Emergency Plan", maintaining site security and advising the ED.

8 Rev. 55 g. Engineering Supervisor The on-call Engineering Supervisor provides engineering expertise for advising the ED in the developement of plans for modifications, alterations, or repairs to plant systems. The on-call Engineering Supervisor is responsible for assisting the on-call Maintenance Supervisor with plant repair and mitigation activities by coordinating the necessary engineering resources.

h. Chemistry Supervisor

The on-call Chemistry Supervisor reports to the TSC and is responsible for implementation of FNP-0-EIP-20, "Chemistry and Environmental Support to the Emergency Plan" including coordination of offsite dose projections and in plant sampling. The on-call Chemistry Supervisor is responsible for coordinating offsite dose projections until relieved by the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff.

i. Emergency Notification Network (ENN) Communicator The on-call ENN Communicator reports to the TSC and is responsible for communications with the state and local government agencies using the guidance found in NMP-EP-111, "Emergency Notifications ".

j. Emergency Notification System (ENS) Communicator

The on-call ENS Communicator reports to the TSC and is responsible for communications with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) using the guidance found in NMP-EP-111, "Emergency Notifications ".

k. Shift Manager The Shift Manager is responsible for directing operational activities to classify and combat the emergency as delineated in NMP-EP-110, "Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action". The Shift Manager acts as the Emergency Director (ED) until relieved by the on-call ED and until relieved has the authority and responsibility to immediately and unilaterally initiate any necessary emergency actions, including providing protective action recommendations to authorities responsible for implementing offsite emergency measures.

l. Emergency Repair Party

The Emergency Repair Party, as shown in Figure 2, is a group of personnel competent in operations and repair work who will be used during an emergency situation to make temporary repairs to systems/components in order to mitigate the effects of the emergency. An Emergency Repair Party for initial re-entry and repair will consist of individuals as required from the following personnel groups:

Operations Personnel Maintenance Personnel Instrumentation and Control Personnel Health Physics Personnel

Chemistry Personnel

9 Rev. 52 m. Field Monitoring Team (FMT)

The Field Monitoring Teams, as shown in Figure 2, consisting of permanent plant employees and/or qualified vendor personnel, will perform onsite and offsite monitoring. They will provide radiation protection support at the Southeast Alabama Medical Center, during transport of potentially irradiated and/or contaminated casualties, and at the Assembly Areas, and at any other location onsite or offsite as instructed by the Emergency Director (ED) or EOF Manager.

To perform these functions a number of teams will be designated consisting of a Team Leader and an Assistant.

Team Leader - A Health Physics Technician or qualified vendor technician. Assistant - Any qualified plant employee or vendor personnel.

n. Dose Assessment Staff The Shift Supervisor is responsible for offsite dose projections until relieved by the Technical Support Center (TSC) staff. Personnel reporting to the

Chemistry Supervisor are responsible for making dose projections until the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is activated, at which time EOF dose assessment personnel become responsible for making offsite dose projections. These projections may initially be made automatically by a computerized dose projection program described in FNP-0-M-007, Emergency Dose Calculation Manual using guidance found in FNP-0-EIP-9.1, "Automated Dose Assessment Method". A manual personal computer methodology is provided in FNP-0-EIP-9.3, "Personal Computer Automated Dose Assessment Method" for long term dose assessment or in the event that the automatic computerized system is inoperable. Normally, dose projections are transmitted to appropriate state authorities by telecopy, commercial telephone, the Emergency Notification Network (ENN) or by posting dose projections on the SNC Integrated Data Display System. The Emergency Notification System (ENS), Health Physics Network (HPN), and commercial telephone lines are available for transmission of dose assessment data to the NRC. Data will be provided as directed by the NRC at the time of need.

o. Additional Plant Staff Assignments

1) Operations Support Center (OSC) Manager The OSC Manager will be considered to be the senior individual in the OSC and will report to the Maintenance Supervisor. The OSC Manager will take the lead in coordinating the activities of the OSC or other location directed by the Emergency Director per FNP-0-EIP-5.0. The senior individual at each of the Assembly Areas will become the supervisor at that location. The Assembly Area senior individual will take the lead in coordinating the activities of the Assembly Area in support of OSC operations as directed by the OSC Manager.

2) Radiological monitoring The Health Physics Group is responsible for all aspects of applied health physics. Emergency monitoring will be provided by a Health Physics Technician on shift, a qualified/trained vendor technician, or qualified member of the plant staff. Health Physics supervision will be responsible for relocation of access control to both units as necessary, and for implementing procedures for handling highly radioactive samples.

10 Rev. 56 3) Fire Fighting and Rescue The plant fire brigade and rescue team on all shifts will be composed of personnel described in NMP-ES-035-010. The fire brigade will be directed by the Fire Brigade Chief with the aid of FNP-0-EIP-13.

4) First Aid At least one person on each shift will be qualified to perform first aid.

5) Decontamination Personnel decontamination is the responsibility of the Health Physics Group and during an emergency the responsibility of the Field Monitoring Team.

Area and equipment decontamination onsite as the result of an accident will be a joint effort of personnel from the Operations, Maintenance, Chemistry

and Health Physics Groups.

6) Personnel Accountability Personnel accountability is the responsibility of each plant supervisor or senior individual onsite in the group. That is, each supervisor is responsible for accounting for each person onsite in his group or visiting his group. Details for personnel accountability are provided by FNP-0-EIP-10, "Evacuation, Personnel Accountability, and Site Dismissal".

Information pertinent to personnel accountability will be kept by security guards at each access control point.

7) Record Keeping A record of all significant events that occur will be kept by the operating crew in the Plant Operator's Logbook. A log will be kept by a designated plant staff member who will be responsible for maintaining communications with the corporate headquarters, and offsite authorities as directed by the Emergency Director. Radiological information such as radiological survey data, personnel exposures, decontamination activities and information from onsite groups will be maintained by the Health

Physics Supervisor.

8) Communications Responsibility for initial offsite communications will be handled by the Shift Supervisor or Emergency Director. After the emergency organization is activated, designated plant staff member(s) may be assigned to maintain communications with the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)and with offsite authorities. If the Emergency Director is not located in the control room he may maintain communications with the control room through an assigned individual. When the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is activated, the EOF staff may handle communication with offsite authorities.

Communications interfaces are shown in Figure 3.

11 Rev. 50 B. OFFSITE The normal Alabama Power Company (APC) offsite company organization is shown in Figure 5. The normal Southern Nuclear Company Corporate organization and its relationship to the onsite organization is shown in Figure 6. The Emergency Communication Organization is shown and described in the Emergency Communications Plan in Appendix

10(J). The offsite emergency organizations and their duties and responsibilities are described

below: 1. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and its relationship to the Technical Support Center (TSC) emergency organization is described in Appendix 7(G).

2. Corporate Organization In the event of an emergency condition at FNP that requires activation of the Corporate Emergency Response Organization (ERO) the organization will be activated to notify Emergency Organization personnel and to provide corporate support from SNC.

a. Corporate Duty Manager The Duty Manager is responsible for the overall management of emergency support at FNP. The Duty Manager is the primary contact for support from off-site agencies, and provides assistance, and advice to the EOF Manager and Emergency Director in decisions involving the overall effect of the event. The Duty Manager will serve as the corporate spokesperson until such time as an alternate Duty Manager or other trained individual is available to assume the role of spokesperson. This position will be filled by a qualified individual designated by the Executive Vice President.

3. Emergency Communication Organization The Emergency Communication Organization (ECO) is discussed in Appendix 10(J).

12 Rev. 56 4. Recovery Phase Organization Upon termination of the emergency condition and at the discretion of the Emergency Director, the SNC Emergency Organization will shift to the Recovery Phase Organization shown in Figure 10. The Recovery Manager has authority to modify the organization as deemed necessary.

Responsibilities and authorities are:

a. Recovery Manager The Recovery Manager shall direct the overall recovery effort.

He has the full authority and responsibility to make decisions regarding plant recovery and return to operation. This position will be filled by the Vice President

- Nuclear Plant Site or designee.

13 Rev. 56 b. Recovery Support Director The Recovery Support Director is responsible for all administrative aspects of recovery activity. The line of succession for the Recovery Support Director shall be designated by the Vice President -Nuclear Plant Site, should the Recovery Organization be required.

c. Technical Support Director The Technical Support Director is responsible for managing all supplemental engineering, technical and licensing support resources needed in the recovery effort. The line of succession for the Technical Support Director shall be designated by the Vice President - Nuclear Plant Site, should the Recovery Organization be required.

d. Recovery Support Supervisor The Recovery Support Supervisor is responsible for coordinating or monitoring operational support recovery activities as directed by the Recovery Support Director. This position will be filled by a qualified individual designated by the Recovery Support Director.

e. Administrative Support Supervisor The Administrative Support Supervisor is responsible for supervising EOF recovery phase administrative activities including:

1) Special communications needs

2) Manpower augmentation

3) Personnel Affairs for temporarily assigned personnel

4) Special Budget Activities

5) Clerical Support

6) Other activities as assigned by the Recovery Support Director

14 Rev. 44 This position will be filled by a qualified individual designated by the Recovery Support Director.

f. Engineering Supervisor The Engineering Supervisor is responsible for offsite engineering resources directed toward design modification, major repair and engineering evaluations associated with recovery and return to operation. Responsibilities include:

1) Coordination of offsite engineering and technical support for design changes and repairs 2) Interfacing with Architect/Engineering firms for detailed technical support

3) Interfacing with NSSS supplier for detailed analyses and technical support

4) Coordinating and expediting procurement activities.

This position will be filled by a qualified individual designated by the Technical Support Director.

g. Licensing Supervisor The Licensing Supervisor is responsible for all recovery phase licensing activities. His responsibilities include:

1) Interfacing with the NRC to resolve license issues

2) Interfacing with Architect/Engineer firms or NSSS supplier to obtain technical and engineering analyses as necessary to resolve licensing

issues

3) Coordinating with the Engineering Supervisor on design changes resulting from licensing issue resolution

4) Preparation of NRC required reports associated with the accident or recovery effort.

This position will be filled by a qualified individual designated by the Technical Support Director.

C. OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS Coordination with Governmental agencies is discussed in Appendix 7(G), section E. The following provides additional site specific details to the Appendix 7(G) discussion.

1. Government Agencies The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has published its incident response plan in NUREG-0728, specifying NRC

15 Rev. 50 actions, responsibilities, functions and authorities during an emergency. Written agreements have been reached with the other offsite agencies listed below with regard to the type of support that will be furnished to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant in the event of an emergency.

These agreements have been developed to ensure that there is a clear understanding of assigned responsibilities and that there will be proper coordination of activities in the event of an emergency. Letters of Agreement on File with offsite support groups are given in Part I, Appendix 2(B).

Corporate and/or plant personnel will be dispatched to principal government agencies on an as needed basis.

Anticipated offsite federal assistance is discussed in the individual state plans.

a. Department of Energy Savannah River Operations Office In the event of a General Emergency, the DOE Savannah River Operations Office has agreed to provide a DOE Radiological Assistance Team. This assistance team will be limited to advisory assistance in handling radiological emergencies. The Emergency Director is authorized to request this assistance.

b. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Upon notification of an emergency condition, the NRC will implement the incident

response plan described in NUREG-0728. In addition to fulfilling its regulatory responsibilities, it is expected that the NRC will provide technical assistance and recommendations. For Site Area and General Emergencies, dispatch to SNC facilities of a NRC Region II site team is anticipated with arrival expected 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months following notification. As described in Section III, office space, telephones, etc. have been provided for NRC personnel at the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility.

c. State of Alabama The Alabama Radiation Control Division of the State of Alabama Department of Public Health is responsible for initiating the "Alabama Radiological Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants" in support of an emergency at the Farley Nuclear Plant.

This plan provides a detailed description of the notification procedures and responsibilities and duties of the local and state agencies involved. Since the primary concern of the Alabama Radiation Control Division is for the welfare and safety of the general public, they will have primary responsibility and authority for handling the offsite aspects of the emergency in Alabama.

16 Rev. 31 d. State of Georgia Upon notification of an emergency condition, the Georgia Emergency Management Agency will implement the "State of Georgia Radiological Emergency Plan". The Georgia Emergency Management Agency has the authority and responsibility for coordinating the efforts of local and state agencies in Georgia to provide for the health and safety of the general public in the event of a radiological incident.

e. State of Florida Upon notification of an emergency condition by SNC or the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, the Florida Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency Management, State Warning Point will implement the "State of Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan for Nuclear Power Plants". The Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency Management has the authority and responsibility for coordinating the efforts of local and state agencies in Florida to provide for the health and safety of the general public in the event of a radiological incident. The Department of Health-Bureau of Radiation Control will provide support to the Company in matters related to the Florida ingestion pathway radiological emergency response.

f. Houston County, Alabama The Chairman of the Houston County Commission has the overall responsibility for emergency preparedness and local response in Houston County. Houston County has also accepted responsibility for evacuations in Henry County out to the 10 mile EPZ. The Houston County Emergency Management Agency coordinates planning and operations of all local agencies in support of an incident at Farley Nuclear Plant.

A detailed emergency plan is maintained in case of an emergency at the Farley Nuclear Plant. This plan is Part I of the "Alabama Radiological Response Plan for

Nuclear Power Plants".

g. Early County, Georgia The Chairman, Early County Board of Commissioners, has responsibility for overall radiological emergency response planning. The actual plan development and coordination of emergency actions is carried out by the Blakely-Early County Emergency Management Agency. The "Blakely-Early County Emergency Management Agency Radiological Emergency Plan for Nuclear Incidents/Accidents Involving Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant" is given as part of the "State of Georgia Radiological Emergency Plan".

17 Rev. 39 h. City of Dothan, Alabama - Fire Department In the event an emergency (Section IV) is declared as a result of a fire at Farley Nuclear Plant, the Dothan Fire Department has agreed to provide support to help combat the fire. The Dothan Fire Department resources are listed in FNP-0-EIP-13, "Fire Emergencies". The estimated response time to Farley Nuclear Plant is 30 minutes. The Emergency Director is authorized to request this assistance.

2. Contractor and Private Offsite Organizations

a. Southern Nuclear/Southern Company Services Southern Company Services, Incorporated (SCS), an affiliated service company, served as the original architect-engineer. As a result of the consolidation of SCS and SNC nuclear expertise, and in addition to being the licensee, SNC also serves as its own architect-engineer and performs functions previously performed by SCS to include design, licensing, and fuel management support during normal operation.

b. Bechtel Power Corporation Bechtel is the architect/engineer for portions of Unit 1 and for Unit 2. Bechtel provides support in the areas of new concept design (including drawings, specifications, safety reviews, etc.); modification design; engineering support for licensing issues; and as advisor on component and system operation. The Engineering Support Manager (Emergency Support Phase) and the Technical Support Director (Recovery Phase) interface directly with Bechtel.

c. Westinghouse Westinghouse is the NSSS supplier for both Farley units. Their support activities associated with the NSSS include installation, testing, and corrective action assistance in their scope of supply; engineering support for licensing issues; new concepts design and modification design; advisor on components and systems; and engineering support related to operation, maintenance, and corrective action. The Engineering Support Manager (Emergency Support Phase) and the Technical Support Director (Recovery Phase) provide interface with Westinghouse either directly or through SCSI.

18 Rev. 41 d. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).

Southern Nuclear Operating Company is a participating member of INPO and as such will have available technical expertise from this organization in areas of nuclear power plant operation in accordance with established agreements (Letter of Agreement - Appendix 2(B)). Also, INPO and EPRI have a plan describing their combined emergency information response capabilities. Their assistance is available to Southern Nuclear Operating Company (Letter of Agreement - Appendix

2(B)). e. Maintenance Assistance Assistance in the area of maintenance and repair is made available by contractor organizations.

f. Radiological Monitoring Assistance.

Radiological monitoring in the plant and in the environs both onsite and offsite will

be augmented by outside vendors as necessary. Initial radiological monitoring will be performed by available Southern Company resources, (e.g., Georgia Power Company (GPC) Central Laboratory).

g. Other Utilities Southern Nuclear Operating Company is a signatory to the "Voluntary Assistance Agreement By and Among Electric Utilities Involved in Transportation of Nuclear Materials" and a signatory to the "Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Voluntary Assistance Agreement" (see Appendix 2(B)). Although these agreements do not impose an obligation on any signatory to provide assistance, they establish the contractual framework by which assistance may be requested and provided expeditiously.

19 Rev. 56 FACILITY ORGANIZATION Figure 1

21 Rev. 53 ASSEMBLY AREAS TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER* EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION CONTRACTOR AND PRIVATE OFFSITEORGANIZATIONS COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACES Figure 3 OTHER SNC/APC DEPARTMENTS

- - - - When Activated **Prior To EOF Activated ONSITE OFFSITE 22 Rev. 41

DELETED Figure 4 23 Rev. 33

PRESIDENT&CEOEXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENTVICE PRESIDENT

- Executive Point Of Contact

SENIORVICE PRESIDENT and COMPTROLLER EXECUTIVEVICE PRESIDENTVICE PRESIDENTPUBLIC RELATIONS APC NORMAL OFFSITE CORPORATE ORGANIZATION FIGURE 5 24 Rev. 56 FARLEY NORMAL ORGANIZATION FIGURE 6

25 Rev. 42

DELETED

Figure 7

26 Rev. 41

DELETED

FIGURE 8

27 Rev. 42

DELETED

Figure 9 28 Rev. 46 RECOVERY MANAGER RECOVERY SUPPORTDIRECTOR PUBLIC INFORMATION DIRECTOR SNC NEWS WRITER STAFF ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SUPERVISOR STAFF RECOVERY SUPPORT SUPERVISOR STAFFVICE PRESIDENT -

FARLEY PLANT STAFF TECHNICAL SUPPORTDIRECTOR ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR ENGINEERING SUPPORT STAFF ENGINEERING LOGISTICS STAFFLICENSING SUPERVISOR STAFFFigure 10EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY RECOVERY ORGANIZATIONVICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 29 Rev. 38

DELETED

Figure 11

30 Rev. 42 FNP Onsite Emergency Organization Technical Support Center Staff Repair Parties OSC Field MonitoringTeam Control Room State Of Georgia Offsite Emergency Organization State Of Florida Offsite Emergency Organization State Of Alabama Offsite Emergency Organization Federal Offsite Emergency Organization Emergency Director Other APCO Company Departments INPO SNC Cor p orate Dut y Mana g e r Westinghous e SNC Corporate Headquarters SNC Corporate Staff Organization Control Coordination Communication Early County EMA Medical A ssistanceDothan Fire Departme nOther Private Offsite Organizations Bechtel Southern CompanyServices Emergency Communications Organization Local County & City Support Agencies (GA) Federal Emergency Management Agency Other Federal Support Agencies Dept of Energy Environmental Protection Agency Governor, State of Florida FLA Bureau of Disaster PreparednessOther State Support Agencies (FLA) FLA Department Community Affairs County Agencies Governor, State of AlabamaAlabama Departmentof Public Health Alabama Emergency Management Agency State Support Agencies (AL) Security ECO Ft. Benning Individual Chairman - Early Co. Commission Governor, State of Geor g iaGeorgia Department of Natural Resources NOTE2Georgia Emergency Management Agency State Support Agencies (GA) Chairman- Houston Co. Commission Probate Judge - Henry Co. HoustonCounty EMA NOTE 1 Local County & CitySupport Agencies (AL) Nuclear RegulatoryCommissionLEGEND: Note 1: By mutual agreement, Alabama Department of Public Health communicates with Fla. Department of Community affairs (see V.I.A.). If appropriate, communication will be made directly to all ENN locations (see 11.B.11) Note 2: Onsite emergency organization will communicate directly with private support organizations if deemed necessary by Emergency Director.

ORGANIZATONAL RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO EOF ACTIVATION Figure 12 31 Rev. 56 ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION Technical Support Center Staff ECO Ft. Benning Repair Parties OSCs Security OSC Field Monitoring Teams (in plant) ControlRoom STATE OF GEORGIA OFFSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION STATE OF ALABAMA OFFSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION FEDERAL OFFSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION Emergency Director Chairman Early Co Commission Other APCO Company Departments INPO FieldMonitoring Team (out of plant)

EOF Mana g e r Westinghouse EmergencyOperationsFacility Staff EOF ORGANIZATION LEGEND: INDIVIDUAL ORGANIZATION CONTROL COORDINATION COMMUNICATION Early County EMA Other State Support Agencies (GA) Joint InformationCenter Medical A ssistanceDothan Fire Dept Other Private Offsite Organizations Bechtel Southern Company Services Emergency CommunicationsOrganization Governor, State of Georgia Georgia Emergency Management Agency Georgia Dept of Natural Resources Local County & City Support Agencies (GA) Federal Emergency Management Agency Other Federal Support Agencies Dept of Energy Environmental Protection Agency Governor, State of FloridaFLA Bureau of Disaster PreparednessOther State SupportAgencies (FLA) FLA Department CommunityAffairs County Agencies(FLA) Governor, State of Alabama Chairman Houston Co Commission Probate Judge Henry Co Alabama Departmentof Public Health Alabama EmergencyManagementAgency Houston County Emergency ManagementAgency State Support Agencies (Al) Local County & CitySupport Agencies (AL) Nuclear Regulatory Commission STATE OF FLORIDA OFFSITEEMERGENCYORGANIZATIONORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIP FOLLOWING EOF ACTIVATION Figure 13 32 Rev. 50 III. FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT A. CONTROL CENTERS Principal Southern Nuclear Operating Company emergency facilities and their functions are described individually below. Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the interfaces between the functional activities associated with each facility and state, local, federal and private organizations.

1. Technical Support Center (TSC)

During any emergency condition the center for coordinating all in-plant activities will be the TSC.

Located immediately north of the Unit 2 control room area, the TSC is designed to accommodate up to 25 people for the evaluation of plant status, coordination of damage assessment and emergency actions, and interface with the NRC, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Operations Support Center (OSC).

Provision is also made for control and coordination of communications with offsite agencies and of out-of-plant radiation monitoring activities until the EOF is activated and assumes these functions. The TSC when activated will normally maintain the function of offsite communications for initial and upgrade notifications to federal, state, and local authorities. An overall space of 22 feet x 65 feet, with a 9-foot ceiling height, has been provided. Room layout is as follows:

a. Monitoring Area - Two dedicated Integrated Plant Computer (IPC) terminals are provided for the TSC staff to obtain detailed operational information from either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 IPC to include various plant parameters, radiological data, meteorological data and automated dose assessment as well as providing the ability to activate ERDS. In addition to the dedicated IPC terminals the

monitoring area includes numerous LAN based personal computers which can also provide the TSC staff with Unit 1 or Unit 2 IPC access as well as providing access to the web based manual dose assessment program.

b. Planning and Coordination Area - Includes desks, reference tables, and files for plant procedures and manuals. Phones are provided for full communication capability. Two tables and FTS communication systems are designated for NRC

use.

33 Rev. 41 c. Document Room - Includes files, drawings, data sheets, and indexes.

d. Conference Area - Includes a conference table and chalk board/projection screen. Communications cabinets contain two-

way radio, telephone, Emergency Notification Network and NRC Emergency Notification System/NRC HPN phone facilities. An intercom, sound powered headphones and a telecopier are

also provided.

Figure 14 shows the above layout.

The TSC is designed to be habitable to the same extent as the control

room for postulated radiological accidents. Its ventilation system includes a deep-bed charcoal filter to remove air-borne contamination, and it has the capability of pressurizing the TSC area and recirculating the room air through the charcoal filter. A permanent radiation monitor is provided to continuously indicate radiation dose rates and airborne activity. A radiation alarm in the main control room make-up air supply duct automatically initiates room pressurization and recirculation.

Electrical power sources are such that the HVAC, wall outlets and lighting can be powered from the diesel generators if offsite power is

lost.

The TSC contains a set of piping and instrumentation drawings for each unit and technical manuals on selected major equipment. Other technical

data are readily available from the document control facility in the plant Service Building which may be reached by intra-plant phone from the TSC.

Also available in the TSC are the Emergency Plan, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, Abnormal Operating Procedures, Emergency Response Procedures, Severe Accident Management Guidelines, and Unit Operating Procedures along with other general reference material.

Should the emergency situation so dictate, the Emergency Director may shift the staff to other locations as designated by the Emergency Director.

2. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The EOF facilities and equipment are described in Appendix 7(G).

34 Rev. 41

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35 Rev. 42 3. NRC Support Facilities

Support facilities for the NRC have been provided at the Site Training Facility. Adequate functional working space and telecommunication capability for up to 10 people (approximately

750 ft 2) has been provided in this near-site facility.

4. Operations Support Center (OSC)

The Breakroom (outside the Technical Support Center) will serve as the Operations Support Center (Figure 19), from which emergency operations support will be provided. In the event that the Operations Support Center becomes untenable, it will be relocated onsite or to offsite company facilities in Headland, Webb or Ashford, Alabama (Figure 17) at the discretion of the

Emergency Director.

36 Rev. 56 5. Joint Information Center The Houston County Juvenile Court Services Building (Figure 17) will serve as a working and briefing center for local, state and national news media (Lease Agreement - Appendix 2(B)). All official information released by SNC and APC regarding the emergency will be released from the Joint Information Center once it has been activated.

6. APC Corporate Media Center (CMC)

The APC Corporate Media Center will be staffed by the Emergency Communication Organization and serve as the coordination point for APC corporate public information support.

B. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS Several modes of communication are available, during both normal and emergency conditions, to transmit and receive information within the plant and at locations onsite and offsite.

1. Commercial Telephones The commercial telephone lines consist of several lines connected through local exchanges to the Bell Telephone system. Access to these lines is available through selected private automatic exchange (PAX) telephones located throughout the plant, including the control room, TSC, and Joint Information Center. Commercial telephone lines servicing the Corporate Office may be accessed through off-premises extensions (OPX) of the Corporate Office PAX which are located in selected plant locations, including the TSC, and in the EOF. Availability of OPX and PAX telephones capable of accessing commercial telephone lines is tabulated in Table 1 Commercial telephone.

37 Rev. 56 lines are also available at the Birmingham EOF and the Birmingham Corporate Communication Offices. A facility minimum of thirty (30) commercial telephone lines are available at the Joint Information Center.

2. Private Automatic Exchange

The plant private automatic exchange (PAX) consists of a network of telephones located strategically throughout the plant, at various stations on the site (including the Control Room, TSC and OSC) and at selected offsite locations Joint Information Center, the State of Alabama Forward Emergency Operations Center in Houston County, the State of Georgia Forward Emergency Operations Center in Early County, the AEMA EOC in Clanton, Alabama, the ARCD EOC in Montgomery, Alabama, and the GEMA EOC in Atlanta, Georgia. Selected PAX phones are capable of communication with similar private automatic exchanges at the Corporate Office, other APC/SNC facilities, and facilities of Southern Company affiliates (e.g. Southern Company Services and Georgia Power Company).

In addition to the PAX network, selected phones operate as off-premises extensions (OPX) of the APC Corporate Headquarters private automatic exchange and operate independently of the plant PAX system. These phones may be used for calling APC/SNC facilities and offices connected to the APC Corporate Headquarters PAX system or for accessing Bell Telephone System commercial lines in Birmingham. OPX and PAX phone availability is tabulated in Table 1.

3. Microwave APC's microwave system provides telephone circuits to all of the company's power plants and major offices including the Alabama Power Office in Headland, Alabama. All primary microwave routes are provided with standby RF equipment with automatic switchover. The microwave telephone circuits available may be used by dialing through the PAX system. 4. Alabama Control Center (ACC) Link A computer link to the Alabama Control Center network is located in the Switchhouse.

The link provides for communications with the ACC for purposes of load dispatch and coordination with the Southern Company Power Control Center and other APC plants.

5. Two-Way Radio Two-way radios and base stations are available at the site as follows:

38 Rev. 50 a. Plant operations frequency -

This radio frequency provides communication between the Control Room, TSC, EOF, and personnel in the plant equipped with operations frequency radios. This frequency may be used as a backup frequency for communicating with offsite/onsite field

monitoring teams.

b. Plant security frequency -

This radio frequency provides communication between the Control Room, TSC, EOF, Securi ty Offices, mobile units in security vehicles and other selected company owned vehicles and personnel equipped with security frequency walkie-talkies. c. Plant field monitoring frequency -

This radio frequency provides communication between the TSC, EOF, and personnel in the plant equipped with FMT frequency radios. This frequency may be used as a backup for communicating with offsite/onsite field monitoring teams.

d. Digital radio system (multi frequency) -

This radio system provides both onsite/offsite group and private radio communication. This radio system will be the normal communication system for the field monitoring teams.

6. Public Address and Party Lines A plant wide public address system consisting of six separate and independent communications lines (one page and five party lines) exists to provide quick communications between two or more locations, even in high noise level areas. The page channel is used to call personnel over the speakers, issue plant-wide instructions or to communicate between two or more hand-sets.

The party lines are used to carry on communication after the paged party has answered. One of the party lines will be dedicated as an emergency communications channel during emergency conditions.

7. Sound Powered Telephone Sound powered telephone lines are located between critical points in the plant and are normally used primarily for communications during maintenance and refueling.

8. Plant Emergency Alarm The Plant Emergency Alarm is a variable tone alarm. The warble tone may be used to alert plant personnel, contractors, and visitors onsite in the event of a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency or other condition requiring all personnel to report to their emergency Assembly Areas. The siren tone may be used to muster the fire brigade or at the discretion of the Shift Supervisor in order to alert personnel. Blue beacon lights located in high noise areas or other locations where the alarms may not be audible are also activated to provide a visual emergency notification.

39 Rev. 50 9. NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS)

This dedicated Federal Telephone System (FTS) communications line provides a dialup communications link to the NRC operations office in Bethesda, MD and would be used for continuous communications in the event of an emergency. Phones are located in the control room, TSC, EOF, and in the Shift Foreman's office adjacent to the Control Room.

10. NRC Health Physics Network (HPN)

This dedicated Federal Telephone System (FTS) communications line provides a dialup communications link with the NRC to provide radi ological information. Phones are located in

the TSC and in the EOF.

11. State/Local Agency Emergency Notification Network (ENN)

This communications system provides an immediate communications link with the State of Alabama, the State of Georgia and local county personnel in Alabama and Georgia who would possibly be notified in the event of an emergency. Telephones with speakers on this communication network are located at the EOF; TSC; Shift Foreman's Office adjacent to the control room; Alabama Radiation Control Division; Alabama Emergency Management Agency; State of Alabama Department of Public Safety; Houston County (AL) Sheriff's Dispatcher;

Houston County Office of Radiological Health; Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA); Early County (GA) Sheriff's Dispatcher; Early County Emergency Management Agency; and GEMA Forward Emergency Operations Center (Early County). The communications system locations listed above for the FNP Shift Support Supervisor's Office; the Alabama Department of Public Safety, the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, the Houston County Sheriff's Dispatcher's Office, and the Early County Sheriff's Dispatcher's Office are staffed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months a day.

12. NRC Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL)

This dedicated FTS communications line provides a dialup communications link for the NRC to

conduct internal NRC discussions on plant equipm ent conditions separate from the licensee. Phones are located in the TSC and EOF.

13. Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL)

This dedicated FTS communications line provides a dialup communications link for the NRC to

conduct internal NRC discussions on radiological releases, meteorological conditions, and the need for protective actions. Phones are located in the TSC and EOF.

40 Rev. 54 14. Management Counterpart Link (MCL)

This dedicated FTS communications line provides a dialup communications link for any NRC internal discussions between the NRC Executive Team Director or Executive Team members and the NRC Director of Site Operations or top level licensee management at the site.

Phones are located in the TSC and EOF.

15. Local Area Network (LAN) Access This dedicated FTS communications line provides the NRC site team with access to the NRC Operations Center's LAN. Connections are provided in the TSC and EOF.

16. Telecopier Telecopiers are located at the TSC, EOF, Alabama Radiation Control Division, Alabama Emergency Management Agency, GEMA, Houston County Emergency Management Agency, and Early County Emergency Management Agency.

17. SNC Integrated Data Display System This system provides a direct data link via the internet between Farley Nuclear Plant and at Houston County Emergency Management Agency (EMA), Alabama Radiation Control Division in Montgomery, Georgia EMA in Atlanta, Early County EMA, and the EOF. It may be used to rapidly transmit information on current emergency classification, radiological conditions, and meteorological conditions.

18. Emergency Response Data System (ERDS)

These communications lines provide channels by which raw reactor parametric data is transmitted from the site to the NRC. The affected Unit ERDS will be activated within one hour following the declaration of an Alert emergency or above.

19. Other Communication Systems A cellular phone is provided for use by the EOF Manager while in transit to the EOF.

C. ASSESSMENT FACILITIES In order to carry out the assessment actions described in Section IV, facilities must be available for initial as well as continuous evaluation of emergency conditions.

1. Onsite Systems and Equipment

a. Natural Phenomena Monitors

42 Rev. 53 input signals to a plant computer utilized for offsite dose calculations; computer terminals in the TSC and EOF can be utilized to obtain one minute or 15 minute average effluent activity data. FNP-0-EIP-30, "Post Accident Core Damage Assessment", provides correlations between containment high range area monitor readings and core damage.

c. Post Accident Sampling Facilities Facilities are provided for obtaining highly radioactive samples while minimizing personnel exposure. Reactor coolant samples, both pressurized (RCS) and unpressurized (RHR/containment sump) may be obtained utilizing a remotely operated sampling panel.

The panel provides for obtaining samples of both liquid phase and non-condensable gas phase components. Particulate, iodine and noble gas samples may be obtained from the containment atmosphere or the plant vent stack utilizing remotely operated valves. All systems provide for collection of small aliquots of the sampled media. Sampling capability also exists for the steam generators and steam jet air ejectors. Shielded containers, portable shielding and remote handling apparati allow analysis with minimum exposure.

d. Fire Detection Fire and smoke detection monitors are located in all vital buildings on the plant site with

extensive coverage in the Auxiliary Building, Containment and Turbine Building. A complete description of the fire protection and detection systems is given in FSAR Section 9.5, and fire protection re-evaluation report entitled, "Farley Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program

Re-evaluation".

2. Environs Monitoring Facilities and Equipment A comprehensive environmental monitoring program is established for the Farley Plant covering both onsite and offsite areas. Equipment used in this program that may be used for emergency assessment is as follows:

a. OSLDs b. Air particulate and iodine monitors

c. Portable radiation survey instruments Although the OSLDs and the air particulate and iodine samples may be evaluated by an outside vendor, the capability for evaluating the air particulate and iodine samples exists at the plant. FNP-0-RCP-25 provides methodology for utilizing available air sampling and

monitoring

43 Rev. 50 equipment to measure radioiodine concentrations in air in the plume exposure EPZ as low as 10-7 uCi/ml under field conditions. Interference from noble gas and background radiation will not decrease the minimum detectable activity. A detailed description of the minimum portable and fixed health physics equipment available at the site is given in FSAR Section 12.3. Predesignated monitoring and sampling points are listed in FNP-0-EIP-4, "Health Physics Support to the Emergency Plan".

The states of Georgia and Florida have mobile laboratory facilities that could be used in case of emergencies. All field monitoring data will be transmitted to and analyzed at the EOF (the TSC until the EOF is staffed). The University of Georgia and Oak Ridge National Laboratories have fixed radiological laboratories in the general geographic area that can aid in radiological analysis. It is estimated that the response time for these organizations will range from 2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

The plant is equipped with a computer which utilizes automatically input meteorological data, effluent monitor data and selected plant parameter data (e.g. steam generator pressure, plant vent stack flow rate, etc.) to calculate estimated and projected offsite dose.

The system automatically actuates when effluent monitors indicate abnormal release point activity and continues until manually terminated. Calculational results are available at computer terminals located at the TSC, EOF and other selected locations.

In the event that the above computer is not available and for long term dose assessment, a

manual personal computer method is provided in FNP-0-EIP-9.3, "Personal Computer - Automated Dose Assessment Method". The system calculates estimated and projected offsite dose, and plume dimensions, location and arrival times out to 50 miles from the plant site. Meteorological data, effluent monitor data and plant parameter data utilized in the manual calculations will usually be obtained from local data systems. In the event that the local data systems are not available then data may be obtained from the control room meteorological data recorder, effluent monitor instruments and control room indicators.

A detailed discussion of the automatic offsite dose assessment method is provided in FNP-0-M-007, "Emergency Dose Calculation Manual". A detailed discussion of the manual offsite dose assessment method is provided in the MIDAS (Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System) Technical Manual.

Results of dose estimates and projections are provided to off-site agencies responsible for initiating protective actions using the SNC Integrated Data Display System, telecopy system, ENN, ENS and/or commercial telephones.

44 Rev. 56 3. Personnel Monitoring Equipment In addition to the portable radiological monitors discussed in Section III.C.1.b external dosimetry equipment is available for personnel monitoring and dose assessment. Digital alarming dosimeters (DADs) provide immediate dose assessment for emergency personnel. Dose assessment will also be provided by plant OSLDs and vendor OSLDs which can be processed on an emergency basis within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . All dose results will be retained in permanent records for each individual.

D. PROTECTION, DECONTAMINATION AND FIRST AID FACILITIES

1. Protective Facilities and Equipment The Plant Assembly Areas are designated as the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (Room 2452 - North of TSC), Support Building Auditorium, Support Building Cafeteria, Maintenance Training Center, PAP (Non-PA side), Visitor's Center Audi torium, Switchhouse, Fabrication Shop, and Warehouse Receiving Area (Figure 19). All personnel on the plant site will report to one of these designated assembly areas when the Plant Emergency Alarm is sounded. All personnel will be instructed in advance as to which assembly area to report in the event that the Plant Emergency Alarm is sounded.

Alternate Assembly Areas designated for use at the discretion of the Emergency Director are the Contractor Parking Lot, Switchhouse Parking Lot, an area between the Unit #2, 2A, and 2B Cooling Towers, the Utility Building, the Southeast corner of the Control Room, the OPS Ready Room, and the Health Physics (HP) Office (Figure 19).

The Plant Assembly Areas shall serve as the protective facilities. The control room will provide protection for Operations personnel, and is designed to 10CFR50 Appendix 1(A), criteria 19 as described in FSAR section 3.1.15. Control room protective equipment is listed in Appendix

1(A) of the plan.

The Operations Support Center will provide protection for emergency Operations, Health Physics and Repair Party personnel. An emergency cabinet is provided which contains emergency supplies.

The Maintenance Shop and Central Security Control have emergency cabinets provided which contain emergency supplies.

45 Rev. 56 The Support Building Auditorium will provide for assembly of Maintenance , and Facilities personnel. No protective equipment is provided for this facility; however, if required, all non-essential personnel will be evacuated to a safe location. The Support Building Cafeteria will provide for assembly of Support Building Personnel, Service Building, and Service Building Annex personnel. No protective equipment is provided for this facility; however, if required, all non-essential personnel will be evacuated to a safe location.

Contractor Personnel, MODS Building, and ES Building Personnel will assemble in the Fabrication Shop. After accountability, these personnel

will be evacuated if necessary.

OPS Training Center personnel and personnel training in the OPS Training Center will assemble in the Visitor Center Auditorium.

Maintenance Training Center Personnel and personnel training in the Maintenance Training Center will assemble in the Maintenance Training Center. If necessary, Alternate Assembly Areas will be utilized to conduct accountability and non-essential personnel will be evacuated from the plant site. In the event that the PAP becomes untenable due to accident conditions, the Switchhouse and/or Maintenance Training Center will become the alternate shelter(s). Protective equipment for these locations is listed in Appendix 1(A). Under extreme conditions, APCo facilities that may be used as a personnel staging area are available approximately eight miles from the plant site.

2. Decontamination and First Aid A first aid station and a decontamination area are located on the plant site. The decontamination area is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 155 near the Health Physics Office. The first aid station is located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 155 and a Nurses Station is located in the Training/Visitors Center. Personnel decontamination and first aid supplies are provided for each of the two areas. Stretchers and first aid kits are located strategically throughout the plant. There is at least one person on each shift qualified to perform first aid. Plant employees are considered to be first aid qualified upon successful completion of the Company's First Aid Course and are required to be requalified within three years.

3. Medical Transportation

a. Local Rescue Squads Ashford Rescue Squad has agreed to transport contaminated and/or irradiated casualties from the plant site to Southeast Alabama Medical Center (SAMC) in Dothan, Alabama.

Columbia Rescue Squad has agreed to transport contaminated and/or irradiated casualties from the plant site to Southeast Alabama Medical Center (SAMC).

46 Rev. 50 b. Dothan Ambulance Service (Pilchers Ambulance Service), Inc.

Dothan Ambulance Service, Inc. has agreed to transport contaminated and/or irradiated casualties from the plant site to SAMC, University of Alabama Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama or Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site (REAC/TS) of Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

c. American Medical Response Ambulance Service The American Medical Response in Birmingham, Alabama, has agreed to transport contaminated and/or irradiated casualties once they arrive in Birmingham to the University of

Alabama Hospital.

4.Medical Treatment:

The detailed plans for the handling and care of injured personnel potentially contaminated and/or highly irradiated ar e contained in Part II, Medical Plan and FNP-0-EIP-11, "Handling of Injured Personnel". A brief description of the facilities and services available for medical support is given below. Letters of agreement on file from these facilities are found in Part II, Appendix 2(B).

a. Southeast Alabama Medical Center The Southeast Alabama Medical Center in Dothan, Alabama, has agreed to receive and care for injured personnel that may be contaminated or irradiated. In addition to routine medical care, space has been provided for a decontamination and emergency treatment facility and for storage of emergency medical equipment, monitoring equipment and dosimeters. Entrance to this facility will not affect the use of the hospital emergency room.

b. University of Alabama Hospital The Division of Oncology of the University of Alabama Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama, has agreed to provide, on a priority basis, definitive care for irradiated and/or contaminated casualties. An area of the hospital has been modified to provide for such radiological emergencies. At the physicians discretion, persons who have been exposed may be sent to the University of Alabama Medical Center after receiving treatment at the Southeast Alabama

Medical Center.

c. Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education - REAC/TS The Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education-REAC/TS team at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, has agreed to accept any type of radiation accident victim in need of hospitalization. At the physicians discretion, persons who have been exposed may be sent to ORISE-REAC/TS after receiving treatment at the Southeast Alabama Medical Center.

47 Rev. 25 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (Room 2452)

AIRTIGHT DOOR MAIN ENTRY STAIRWELL TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER PLANNING AND COORDINATION AREA AIRTIGHT DOOR CONTROL ROOM TECHNICAL SUPP ORT CENTER Figure 14

49 Rev. 41

DELETED

FIGURE 16 50 Rev. 41

SITE AREA EMERGENCY FACILITIES, GENERAL POPULATION SUPPORT SERVICES AND EVACUATION ROUTES Figure 17 N US 84 US 231 Al 52 Co 42 Co 33 US 431 Ga 62 Al 95Al 95 H.C. Rescue ENC JuvenileServices FN HC Courthous e Chattahoochee Rive r GordoAbbevilleHeadlan d Headland APCO Office Blakel yE.C. Jail (EOC) E.C. High Mass CareEarly Memorial Hos p italColumbiaWebbAshfor d N ation al Guard HC FarmCenter Mass SAMC H osp i taChattahoochee Rive r US 431 N ation al GuardAPCO local office Dothan Air po r t Dothan Flower s Ga 363 Ga. 370 Ga 363 Co 22 Al 52 US 231 Al 53 US 84 25 20 15 1 5 2 51 Rev. 41

DELETED

Figure 18

52 Rev. 56

LEGEND OPERATION SUPPORT CENTER ALTERNATE ASSEMBLY AREAS SDB 1 Room 2452 - North of TSC 12 Contractor Parking Lot ASSEMBLY AREAS 13 Switchhouse Parking Lot

2 Control Room 14 Between 2A & 2B Cooling Towers 3 Technical Support Center (TSC) 15 Utility Building 4 Support Building Auditorium 16 SE Corner of Control Room 5 Support Building Cafeteria 17 OPS Ready Room 6 Maintenance Training Center 18 HP Office Area 7 PAP (OS protected area) 8 Visitor's Center Auditorium 9 Switchhouse EVACUATION ROUTES 10 Fabrication Shop 11 Warehouse Receiving Area

ONSITE EVACUATION ROUTES, ASSEMBLY AREAS AND OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER FIGURE 19 Alabama 95 County 42 Contracto rParking Lot Fabrication Shop Training Center Parking Lo t Unit 1Cooling Towers Unit 2Cooling Towers Wate rTreatmentPlant Utility Building A ux ili ar yBuilding Di ese lBuilding10 N 12 9 14 154 & 5 13 7 8 5 2 16 17 1 3 15 Outage Support Building 19 T ur bi neBuilding S erv i ceBuilding Protecte d AreaDetail A Switchhouse See Detail A CSC Support Bldg HighVoltage Switchyard Warehouse Control Room OSC and TSC PAP CSC 53 Rev. 56 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

LOCATION Technical Support Center

X X

X X X X X X X X X Shift Foremans Office

X

X X X X X Control Room

X

X X X X X Emergency Operations Facility X X X X X X X X X X Joint Information Center X * + X * + X Assembly Areas

X *

X Operations Support Center

X

X X X Directly available

Accessible through the FNP PAX system

+ Accessible through the District Office PAX system

TABLE 1 EMERGENCY FACILITY COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY

Commercial Tele phone Lines PAX Tele p hone General Office Lines TSC - EOF- OSC Bridge Plant Intercom Security Two-Way Radio Operations Two-Way Radio ENN - Emergency Notification Networ k NRC-(ENS) Emergency Notification System NRC-(HPN)

HP Network NRC - RSCL, PMCL, MCL, LAN RMT Two-Way Radio

56 Rev. 50 IV. ASSESSMENT ACTIONS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES A. CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES IS DESCRIBED IN APPENDIX 11(k)

B. POST ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT ACTIONS Effective coordination and direction of all elements of the emergency organization require continuing assessment through the duration of the emergency situation. In addition to continued monitoring of control room instrumentation and plant parameters, some special assessment actions are, initiated if appropriate. These assessment functions are identified below:

1. Reactor Coolant Sampling, Containment Atmosphere Sampling and Plant Vent Stack Sampling.

RCS, containment atmosphere and/or plant vent stack samples will be taken and analyzed to assess the severity of core damage and the potential radiological consequences. The detailed sampling procedures for each area are provided in FNP-0-CCP-1300, "Chemistry and Environmental Activities During a Radiological Accident". FNP-0-EIP-30, "Post Accident Core Damage Assessment" provides a method to estimate the extent of core damage utilizing various plant monitor readings.

2. Surveillance of Control Room Monitors

Surveillance of radiological and meteorological monitors in the control room is primarily the responsibility of operations personnel. However, in the event that offsite assessments based on this data are necessary, an individual designated by the Emergency Director will maintain surveillance over effluent monitor readings and dose projections, periodically reporting them to those designated in FNP-0-EIP-6, "TSC Setup and Activation". If the dose assessment computer is inoperable, the designated individual will periodically log the monitor values.

3. In-Plant and Site Surveys During emergency conditions in-plant, site and site boundary surveys will be performed as appropriate by the Field Monitoring Team as described in FNP-0-EIP-4, "Health Physics Support to the Emergency Plan". The Field Monitoring Team will be capable of sampling under field conditions and will be capable of measuring radioiodine in the presence of noble gas and background radiation to as low as 5 x 10

-8 uCi/cc. 4. Population Exposure

57 Rev. 52 Exposure projections shall be periodically estimated in the affected sectors utilizing projected dose and measured dose rates. The Dose Assessment Supervisor will work with the state/local agency

representatives to determine the Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) exposure (resulting from external exposure and inhalation of the plume and external exposure from deposition) and thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) exposure (resulting from the inhalation of radio-iodines).

5. Environs Surveys and Monitoring

a. Short Term Assessment Short term assessment will involve the use of the estimates and projections provided by the emergency dose calculation computer program s performed in accordance with FNP-0-EIP-9.3, "Personal Computer-Automated Dose Assessment Methods". Onsite and offsite surveys will be performed as necessary to verify release information or as a backup assessment method should the instrumentation used for dose assessment go off-scale or become inoperable. Monitoring teams will normally be dispatched in vehicles and will be equipped with two-way radios for communication with the TSC or EOF. Teams will be equipped with liquid sampling equipment, a GM instrument, an ion chamber instrument, and/or an air sampler as deemed appropriate by the Emergency Director, Health Physics Supervisor or Dose Assessment Supervisor. An environs survey team could be in the field within one hour. Radiological survey and sampling points will be identified by sector as shown in Figure 20. The correlation of various measured parameters (contamination levels, water and air activities) to dose rates for key isotopes and gross radioactivity levels is provided by FNP-0-RCP-25.

b. Long Term Assessment The long term aspects involving offsite assessments of contamination involving analysis of soil, vegetation, food, milk and water will be primarily handled by the states of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida as discussed in their Radiological Emergency Plans. The response of SNC would be to increase the sampling frequency of its established environmental monitoring program.

C. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS The nature of protective actions to be implemented, the criteria for application, and the area involved or groups of persons for whom the protective actions would be taken are given here.

58 Rev. 56 1. Onsite Protective Action

a. Evacuation In the event of a Notification of Unusual Event an area of the turbine building, auxiliary building, or containment may have to be evacuated.

Personnel would be notified to evacuate the affected area via the public address system as directed by the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

Should a Site Area Emergency, General Emergency, or an Alert be declared, immediate notification of all persons onsite may be accomplished by sounding the Plant Emergency Alarm and announcing the condition over the plant public address system.

Personnel onsite would report to their pre-assigned assembly area and preparations for evacuation of nonessential persons from the site would begin. Depending on the severity of the emergency condition, these individuals will be held in an

assembly area, evacuated, or returned to work.

If a site evacuation is warranted, personnel will be advised as to which routes should be used. The normal routes are State Highway 95 North or South and County Road 42 West (Figures 17 and 19). All personnel being evacuated from the site will be monitored before being released. Personnel leaving the site would then proceed, in their own vehicles, on one of these major routes, to their residences. Transportation for persons without vehicles will be arranged.

The details for evacuation and personnel accountability of all categories of personnel listed above are given in FNP-0-EIP-10, "Evacuation, Personnel Accountability, and Site Dismissal" and FNP-0-EIP-14 "Emergency Response Teams".

b. Personnel Accountability Each plant supervisor or the senior individual onsite from his group is responsible for accounting for all persons working in or visiting his group. Accountability within the Protected Area will be determined by the senior individual at the assembly area coordinating with the Security Response Center (SRC) and then will be reported to the Emergency Director by the senior plant security force member at the SRC. Accountability within the Controlled Area will be determined by the senior individual at each assembly area coordinating with the Security Response Center (SRC) Staff and then will be reported to the Emergency Director by the senior individual in the SRC. Contractor personnel assigned to Plant Modification and Maintenance Support (PMMS) report to the Fabrication Shop and will assemble by individual craft. Fitness for Duty Facility personnel outside the Protected Area report to the Visitor's Center Auditorium. No public access areas

59 Rev. 56 pass through or are within the owner controlled area. The owner controlled area is fenced and/or posted. Security patrols are conducted at random intervals as a part of daily routine. Detailed procedures for determining and reporting accountability and Responsibilities for accountability during local evacuations are given in FNP-0-EIP-10, "Evacuation, Personnel Accountability, and Site Dismissal".

Following accountability initiation, security personnel will control site access and egress for the duration of the emergency, maintaining entry/exit logs to allow accountability of all personnel onsite. c. Contamination and Exposure Control Measures The limits for personnel exposure set forth in 10CFR20 shall not

be exceeded without approval of the Emergency Director or his designee. Emergency exposure criteria are:

1) Farley Nuclear Plant personnel who have completed the onsite radiation protection training, may receive o 10 Rem When emergency onsite action is required to eliminate a source or potential source that represents a hazard to the general public or to prevent a substantial loss in property and a lower dose is not practicable.

o 25 Rem For life-saving operations such as rescue and search for known missing persons or for protection of large populations when a

lower dose is not practicable.

o >25 Rem but not to exceed 100 Rem For lifesaving or protection of large populations only on a voluntary basis. The volunteer worker should do so with full awareness of the associated risks for the radiation dose to be incurred.

2) Hospital and Ambulance Service Personnel, may receive o 3 Rem If there is an adequate number of attendants such that rotation may be accomplished without further endangering the patient(s).

o 5 Rem If the number of attendants is limited such that personnel cannot

be rotated.

o 25 Rem To save a life.

60 Rev. 56 Dosimetry, respiratory protection equipment and protective clothing will be issued for use in accordance with established Radiological Control Procedures. A supply of radio protective drugs (potassium iodide) is available onsite and, if necessary, will be issued at the direction of the Emergency Director to emergency personnel remaining or arriving onsite.

The levels of permissible radioactive contamination for personnel and equipment to be released from an RCA during an emergency are as follows:

Personnel Equipment

<5,000 dpm/100 cm 2 ND GMT/100 cm 2 (smearable) and < .25 mR/hr (fixed)

However, the Emergency Director may authorize higher levels based on plant conditions and recommendations from the HP Supervisor. When levels above these values are encountered, decontamination will be initiated. Facilities, supplies and waste disposal capability exists to provide for both personnel (emergency or onsite relocated) and equipment decontamination. Methods for equipment decontamination are discussed in NMP-HP-304, "Decontamination of Areas, Tools, and Equipment" and for personnel in NMP-HP-303, "Personnel Decontamination" with particular attention being given to radioiodine contamination of the skin. Extra clothing for personnel will be provided in the event personal clothing is confiscated. Information on personnel decontamination facilities is contained in Section III.

To prevent or minimize direct or subsequent ingestion exposure to radioactive materials deposited on the ground or other surfaces, access into the exclusion area will be controlled by security personnel. Additionally, if conditions warrant, the site drinking water will be sampled and analyzed for radioactivity and quarantined, if necessary. If a quarantine is placed on the water, it will not be returned to use until the activity has returned to within acceptable limits as dictated by the State of Alabama Board of Health "Regulations Governing Public Water Supplies".

Personnel which are found to be contaminat ed when monitored during evacuation will be returned to the plant for deconning if possible. If the plant is not accessible, the personnel will be transported to the nearest decontamination facility.

Offsite contamination controls are described in the states of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida plans.

2. Offsite Protective Action The states of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida are responsible, in

61 Rev. 45 their respective state, for handling the offsite radiological aspects of any emergency that should develop at the Farley Nuclear Plant. The Emergency Plans for Alabama, Georgia, and Florida are given in each states Radiological Emergency Plan.

The criteria to be used for offsite protective action recommendations is given below. The basis for protective action guides is the "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Action for Nuclear Incidents", EPA-400-R-92-001. It should be noted that these levels are quite low and are used as guidelines for protective action rather than rigid levels of action. Recommendation of sheltering in residences shall be considered when there is radiological puff release that exceeds the projected dosage for a general emergency listed in section a below or there are hazards on or off-site that would make an evacuation dangerous. Areas within a ten mile radius in which protective action is deemed necessary will be referred to by Evacuation Zone as shown in Figure 21. The population distribution within this ten-mile radius has been predicted for the life of the plant and is summarized graphically in Figure 22.

a. Classification of Offsite Incidents SNC Classification Projected Dosage Organ or Media Involved GENERAL 1.0 Rem TEDE

5.0 Rem Thyroid CDE

SITE AREA 0.1 Rem TEDE

0.5 Rem Thyroid CDE

b. Response Classification Protective Actions to be Recommended to State Authorities GENERAL Recommendations based on plant conditions or projected dose:

1.) PAR 1 - Shelter to 2 miles and 5 mile downwind zones. Used when there is radiological puff release that exceeds the projected dosage for a general emergency listed in section a above or there are hazards on or off-site that would make an evacuation dangerous.

2.) PAR 2 - Evacuate to 2 miles and 5 mile downwind zones. Used when a general emergency has been declared but the projected dosage for a general emergency listed in section a above has not been exceeded.

3). PAR 3 - Evacuate to 5 miles and 10 mile downwind zones Used when a general emergency has been declared and the projected dosage for a general emergency listed in section a above has been exceeded.

4) Distribution of potassium iodide (KI) in accordance with State plans.

5) Advise Remainder of EPZ to Monitor Local Radio/TV Stations and TARs for Additional Information.

62 Rev. 51 Classification Protective Actions to be Recommended to State Authorities SITE AREA No Protective Action Recommendations are to be made at the Site Area emergency level. The Emergency Director should upgrade to a General Emergency if PARs are determined to be needed and not already in a

General Emergency.

ALERT No Protective Action Recommendations are to be made at the Alert level. The Emergency Director should upgrade to a General Emergency if PARs are determined to be needed and not already in a General Emergency.

The authority for initiation or relaxation of protective action recommendations is vested solely with the Emergency Director and may not be delegated to any other member of the emergency organization. Processes for development, approval, and notification of protective action recommendations are described in NMP-EP-111, "Emergency Notifications" and NMP-EP-112 "Protective Action Recommendations".

63 Rev. 49 Houston Count yJackson County Geneva County Houston County Dale County Henry Count y Houston County Alabama Georgia Miller Count y Seminole County Chattahoochee River Dotha n Cottonwoo d BlakelyHeadlan d Alabama Florida Ashfor dColumbiaDonalsonville J S D ENE C NE B NNE A N H SSE G SE F ESE E E R NWN Q NW P WNW N W M WSW L SW K SSW US 84US 2 3 1US 4 3 1 Slocomb 52 95 52 2 39George W. AndrewsLock & Dam 20 miles15miles10miles5miles

RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY AND SAMPLING REPORTING SECTORS FIGURE 20

65 Rev. 44 PREDICTED POPULATION IN THE VICINITY OF FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT FIGURE BASED ON FSAR FIGURES 2.1-5, 6 AND 7 FIGURE 22

66 Rev. 55 V. ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION A. DECLARATION OF AN EMERGENCY The Shift Manager shall have the authority and responsib ility to immediately and unilaterally declare an emergency and initiate emergency response.Section IV of this plan delineates criteria for declaring emergency conditions.

Upon declaration of an emergency the Shift Manager will immediately notify the on-call Emergency Director (ED). Until the on-call ED arrives onsite and relieves the Shift Manager, the Shift Manager shall complete the duties of the ED prior to the on-call ED taking full responsibility for implementation of the Emergency Plan. Duties of the Shift Manager as an Emergency Director are addressed in NMP-EP-110, "Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action" and NMP-EP-111, "Emergency Notifications".

The ED, Shift Clerk, or designee will notify the EOF Manager of the emergency condition. The EOF Manager will decide on the appropriate level of activation utilizing the criteria shown in Table 4.

B. ORGANIZATION ACTIVATION During the initial stages of an emergency situation, emergency activities at FNP are directed from the control room. For a Notification of Unusual Event, no other facilities need be activated. For security related events, the activation of emergency facilities may be delayed. Activation of ERO members will be performed for hostile action based events to promptly staff alternative facilities, in order to minimize delays in overall site response. The ERO will be staged in a manner that supports rapid response to limit or mitigate site damage or the potential for an offsite radiological release.

During hostile action, ERO members would likely not have access to the onsite emergency response facilities. A security related emergency may delay the ordering of facility activation in order to protect plant personnel from the security threat. The decision to delay activation of the facilities will be made by the Emergency Director. However, these events still warrant timely ERO augmentation. Alternative facilities have been identified to ensure rapid access to the site by augmented staff. These facilities have been established to minimize delays in overall site response by permitting ERO assembly without exposing responders to the danger of hostile action. These facilities function as staging areas for augmented ERO staff until the site is secured.

The minimum quantity of personnel available on shift and the quantity of additional personnel available within 75 minutes following declaration of the emergency to staff the emergency organization are shown in Table 3.

Each shift shall have a Shift Technical Advisor (STA). The STA will have No duties or responsibilities for manipulation of controls or command of operations during an emergency.

The normal shift crew will consist of at least those positions listed as "on shift" in Table 3. There will be a licensed operator in each unit's control room at all times when fuel is in the core of the respective unit. There will be a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) in the control room (shared) at all times when fuel is in either core. Shift staffing for core alterations will also include either a SRO limited to fuel handling or a SRO not assigned any duties concurrent with core alterations.

Upon receiving notification of an emergency, the Emergency Director will proceed to the site. A shift communicator will coordinate the plant call list to notify those individuals of the Emergency Organization needed to meet initial activation requirements. The EOF Manager will be notified in accordance with NMP-EP-110, "Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action".

Criteria for the activation of the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility are shown in Table 4.

67 Rev. 51 1. Technical Support Center Activation The onsite emergency response organization which will be directed from the TSC is described in Section II. The TSC will be staffed and ready to receive emergency response functions by the following on-call individuals within 75 minutes following declaration of an emergency

requiring TSC activation:

Emergency Director

TSC Manager

Operations Supervisor

Health Physics Supervisor

Engineering Supervisor

Maintenance Supervisor ENN Communicator Within eight hours of the declaration of the emergency one full complement of personnel as designated above will be available to relieve the TSC personnel.

There shall be sufficient personnel available within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months of the declaration of the emergency to ensure that the TSC can be staffed on a 24-hour-a-day basis for at least one week.

2. Operations Support Center (OSC) Activation The Operations Support Center will be staffed and ready to provide support to the emergency response effort as directed by the Emergency Director within 75 minutes following declaration of an emergency requiring OSC activation.

Other members of the Emergency Organization arriving at the plant will report to their assigned assembly areas. Within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months after declaration of an emergency, sufficient personnel shall be available in the OSC to ensure that shift personnel can be relieved by qualified individuals.

Within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months after declaration of an emergency, sufficient personnel shall have been notified and placed on-call to ensure that the OSC can be staffed on a 24-hour-a-day basis for at least

one week.

68 Rev. 42

3. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Activation The corporate emergency response organization which will be activated to respond from the EOF is described in Appendix 7(G).

C. OFFSITE CORPORATE ORGANIZATION ACTIVATION The corporate emergency response organization which will be directed from the EOF is described in Appendix 7(G). The corporate Emergency Communication Organization activation is described in Appendix 10(J). D. OFFSITE LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCIES Notification of offsite governmental agencies is discussed in Section VI. Activation of the state agencies is discussed in their respective plans.

69 Rev. 42 MAJOR FUNCTION AREA ====================

MAJOR TASKS ======================

POSITION TITLE OR EXPERTISE =======================

ON SHIFT* ===== CAPABILITY FOR ADDITIONS WITHIN 75 MINUTES ***** ===================

=Plant Operations and Assessment of Opera-tional Aspects Shift Supervisor (SRO)

Shift SRO Control Room Operators Auxiliary Operators 1 1 2 2 ---- ---- ----

Emergency Direction and Control (Emergency Director)*** Shift Manager or Emergency Director 1** ---- Notification/

Communication**** Notify Licensee, State Local and Federal per-sonnel & maintain com-munication. 2 2 Radiological Accident Assessment and Support of Operational Acci-dent Assessment Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Dir.

Offsite Dose Assessment Senior Manager ---- 1 Senior CHM, & ENV. with Expertise in Offsite Dose Assessment 1 ---- Offsite Surveys ## Onsite (out-of-plant)##

In-plant surveys HP/CHM. Technicians and other trained personnel 2 ---- 2 2 2 2 Chemistry/Radiochemistry CHM Technician 1 1 Plant System Engineering Repair and Corrective Actions Technical Support Shift Technical Advisor# Core/Thermal Hydraulics#

Electrical Mechanical 1 ---- ---- ---- ---- 1 1 1 Repair and Correc-tive Actions Mechanical Maintenance/ Rad Waste Operator Electrical Maintenance Instrument and Control (I&C) Technician 1** 1 1 1 1 1 1

TABLE 3. Page 1 of 2 70 Rev. 52 MAJOR FUNCTION AREA ====================

MAJOR TASKS ======================

POSITION TITLE OR EXPERTISE =======================

ON SHIFT* ===== CAPABILITY FOR ADDITIONS WITHIN 75 MINUTES ***** ================

= Protective Actions (In-plant) Radiation Protection:

a. Access Control

b. HP Coverage for repair, corrective actions, search and rescue first-aid &

firefighting c. Personnel monitoring

d. Dosimetry HP/CHM Technicians or other trained personnel 2 2 Firefighting Fire Brigade per the FSAR Local Support Rescue Operations and First-Aid 2** Local Support Site Access Control and Personnel Accountability Security, firefighting communications, person- nel acountability Security Personnel All per Security Plan T O T A L 19 19 NOTES:

For each unaffected nuclear unit in operation, maintain at least one SRO, one control room operator and or auxiliary operator except that units sharing a control room may share an SRO if all functions are covered.

- May be provided by shift personnel assigned other functions. *** Overall direction of facility response to be assumed by EOF director when all centers are fully manned. Direction of minute-to-minute facility operations remains with senior manager in technical support center or control room.

- - - One Shift Communicator qualified individual and one Shift ENN Communicator qualified individual. ***** Staffing capability in 75 minutes is dependent upon immediate availability of personnel, time of day, weather conditions, or radiological conditions. # The STA performs the needed functions of STA & core/thermal hydraulics monitoring & analysis prior to augmentation during the first 75 minutes. ## A single out-of-plant radiation monitoring team may cover both on-site and off-site surveys prior to augmentation within 75 minutes.

TABLE 3. - Page 2 of 2 71 Rev. 56 TABLE 4 EMERGENCY FACILITY ACTIVATION Unusual Site Area General Event Alert Emergency Emergency

Technical Support

Activate# Activate# Activate Center Operations Support

Activate# Activate# Activate

Center Emergency Operations ** Activate# Activate# Activate Facility APC Corporate ** Activate# Activate# Activate

Headquarters

Joint Information Center ** Activate# Activate# Activate NOTE:

No action, standby or activation at the discretion of the Emergency Director

- No action, standby or activation at the discretion of the On-call EOF Manager

Activation will be to the extent deemed necessary by the Emergency Director and On-call EOF Manager

72 Rev. 42

DELETED

Figure 23 73 Rev. 51 VI. NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES FNP-0-EIP-8.1, "Emergency Phone Directory", contains a listing (updated quarterly) of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the individuals and organizations referred to in this section. A copy of FNP-0-EIP-8.1 will be maintained in the c ontrol room and by the on-call Emergency Director. Figure 24 illustrates the order and responsibilities for notification in the event of an emergency. An authentication method is used to verify any notifications made by FNP utilizing commercial telephones.

A. STATE AND LOCAL AGENCY NOTIFICATION The Emergency Director is responsible for notifying the Alabama Emergency Management Agency and the Georgia Emergency Management Agency of all declared emergencies. The Alabama Emergency Management Agency will notify the Alabama Radiation Control Office of the State of Alabama Department of Public Health who will in turn notify the Florida Division of Emergency Management.

In addition to these State notifications, the Emergency Director will notify local emergency management agencies in Houston County, Alabama and Early County, Georgia utilizing the Emergency Notification Network or commercial telephone.

NMP-EP-111, "Emergency Notifications", contains the initial messages that will be used by the Emergency Director to notify the state and local agencies for the different classifications of emergencies. The content of emergency messages has been mutually agreed upon with State and Local agencies. The procedure to be followed for message authentication is contained in NMP-EP-111, "Emergency Notifications." These initial messages shall contain, at a minimum the following if applicable and available:

1. Class of emergency

2. Actual or potential release information

3. Potentially affected population

4. Advisability of protective measures Required follow-up message information has been agreed upon by the states. NMP-EP-111 makes provisions for follow-up messages to be sent to the states. These messages contain the following information as appropriate:

1. Location of incident and name and telephone number (or communications channel identification) of caller

2. Date/time of accident

3. Class of emergency

74 Rev. 35 4. Type of actual or projected release (airborne, liquid) and estimated duration times

5. Estimate of quantity of radioactive material released or being released and the height of release

6. Chemical and physical form of released material, including estimates of the relative quantities and concentrations of noble gases, iodines, and particulates

7. Meteorological conditions (wind speed, direction (from), stability classification; form of precipitation, if any)

8. Projected dose at site boundary

9. Projected dose at about 2, 5, and 10 miles

10. Emergency response actions underway

11. Recommended emergency actions, including protective measures in sector(s) affected

12. Prognosis for worsening or termination of event based on plant information B. PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE PUBLIC NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION

1. Notification

Southern Nuclear Operating Company has provided the administrative and physical means for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

Siren systems have been installed in the Alabama cities of Columbia, Gordon and Ashford.

Siren activation controls are located at the Houston County Emergency Management Agency Office in Dothan, Alabama. Residents in the siren zones have been instructed to tune to specific emergency alert radio or TV stations if the sirens are activated.

Residents inside the plume exposure pathway EPZ but outside the siren zones have been provided with tone alert radios and a radio station has been installed at the FNP site to transmit pre-taped messages for alerting the public and instructing them to tune to local emergency alert stations for detailed information. The mechanism to initiate an alert is located in the Houston County Emergency Management Agency Director's office.

75 Rev. 42 A written agreement has been established to broadcast the pre-taped messages upon request by the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Houston County Emergency Management Agency or the Georgia Emergency Management Agency. Authentication schemes exist to verify requests for tape broadcast.

The emergency plans for the states of Alabama, Georgia and Florida contain prepared messages for use by emergency alert stations notifying the public of emergency conditions.

2. Information Processes for dissemination of information to local news media and the public annually are discussed in the Emergency Communications Plan, Appendix 10(J).

3. News Release Coordination and Rumor Control Processes for news release coordination and rumor control are discussed in the Emergency Communications Plan, Appendix 10(J).

C. NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT The Emergency Director or his designee will notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of any emergency condition utilizing the Emergency Notification System.

D. SAVANNAH RIVER OPERATIONS OFFICE If conditions warrant, immediate assistance will be requested by the Emergency Director from the DOE Savannah River Operations Office if their assistance is required to protect the health and safety of the general public.

E. MEDICAL As the situation merits, the Shift Supervisor, Emergency Director or EOF Manager will notify one or more of the following:

76 Rev. 31 1. Southeast Alabama Medical Center - Dothan

2. Dothan Ambulance Service (Pilchers Ambulance Service), Inc. - Dothan

3. University of Alabama Hospital - Birmingham

4. American Medical Response Ambulance Service - Birmingham

5. Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education - REAC/TS F. FIRE If necessary, outside firefighting support from the Dothan Fire Department may be requested by the

Shift Supervisor or Emergency Director.

77 Rev. 50 Figure 24 NOTIFICATION ORDER LOCAL & STATE AGENCIES GEORGIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCYEARLY CO. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY STATE OF ALABAMA STATE OF FLORIDA LOCAL & STATE AGENCIE SLOCAL & STATE AGENCIES HOUSTON CO. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY SR00 IRAP NRC BETHESDA MD NRC REGION II ATLANTA ADMIN. AIDE RADIO DISPATCH ROOM SECURITY GUARDS PLANT CALL LIST EMERGENCY DIRECTOR SHIFT SUPERVISOR HEALTH PHYSICS SUPPORT COMPANY CALL LIST ALABAMA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCYEOF MANAGER EOD FT. BENNING NORMAL NOTIFICATION ALTERNATE NOTIFICATION For emergencies below general emergencies Normal notification for general emergency will include Early Co. Emergency Manage-ment Agency and Houston Cty. Emer. Manage-

ment A g enc y.FIRE DEPARTMENT MEDICAL ASSISTANCE INDIVIDUAL DISCOVERING EMERGENCY 78 Rev. 41 VII. RECOVERY A. METHODOLOGY Due to the unforeseeable conditions that would exist in an emergency condition, specific recovery criteria and procedures will be developed when required, considering maximum protection for plant personnel and the general public consistent with reasonable efforts to restore the affected Unit and continuing operation of the unaffected unit.

The decision to relax protective measures will be based upon a comprehensive review of plant system parameters. These shall include but not be limited

to the following:

1. Stability of the reactor shutdown condition i.e., successful movement toward a cold shutdown condition.

2. Integrity of the reactor containment building.

3. Operability of radioactive waste systems and decontamination facilities.

4. The availability and operability of a heat sink.

5. The integrity of power supplies and electrical equipment.

6. The operability and integrity of instrumentation including radiation monitoring equipment. In the latter instance this shall include portable equipment assigned to the emergency.

7. Availability of trained personnel and support services.

The Emergency Director will analyze the input from his advisors in the areas listed above to determine if plant restoration efforts can begin. The following criteria shall be considered appropriate for the consideration of relaxation of protective measures:

1. Plant parameters of operation no longer indicate a potential or actual emergency exists. 2. The release of radioactivity from the plant is controllable and no longer exceeds permissible levels and no danger to the public from this source is credible.

3. The plant is capable of sustaining itself in a long term shutdown condition.

4. Plant entry and clean-up is possible without workers receiving in excess of their permissible exposures.

79 Rev. 56 B. ORGANIZATION The recovery organization which will conduct the activities of returning the plant toward its pre-emergency condition to the extent reasonable is described in Section II.B.3.

C. NOTIFICATION The Emergency Director shall notify the Vice President - Nuclear Plant Site and company management that a decision has been reached to initiate a recovery operation. The ED shall then notify offsite agencies' representatives ensuring the NRC, and state and local authorities are provided with the same information. He shall also inform these agencies if any change in the structure of the recovery organization is to occur.

80 Rev. 42 VIII. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS A. EXERCISES AND DRILLS Periodic drills and exercises will be conducted as described below. The scenarios for use in these drills will include the following elements:

o The basic objective, o The date, time, place(s) and participating organizations, o The simulated event, o A time schedule of real and simulated events, o A narrative summary describing conduct of the drill. Monitoring personnel shall be stationed at various locations to observe each individual's ability to perform his assigned emergency function.

During drills and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) non-evaluated exercises, on-the-spot correction of erroneous performance and a demonstration of proper performance may be made by the monitoring personnel.

1. Radiation Emergency Exercises a. Exercises simulating radiation emergencies will be conducted on a frequency consistent with 10CFR50, Appendix E.IV.F. These scenarios will be varied from exercise to exercise such that all major elements of the plans and emergency organizations are exercised at least once every 5 years. These exercises will be preplanned with the following purposes:

1) To determine the effectiveness of the FNP emergency organization in handling emergencies,

2) To evaluate communications and action support with off-site agencies, 3) To evaluate the interface with and the response of the Company Emergency Organization,

4) Test the adequacy, timing and content of the EIPs,

5) Test emergency equipment and communications networks,

6) Test the public Alert and Notification System, 7) Keep affected personnel aware of their role in the plan.

81 Rev. 56 One (1) exercise may be started between 6 p.m. and 4 a.m. once every six (6) years. One (1) exercise may be performed every six (6) years which is unannounced, except as required for effective coordination with the management of the various agencies and for the evaluation of the health and safety of the general public.

b. Both full-scale and small-scale exercises will be conducted and will include participation by appropriate state and local government agencies as follows:

1) Full scale exercises which test as much of the company, state and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation will be conducted at least once every five years and at such greater frequency as necessary to provide for the following:

(a) Enable each state and local government in the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in at least one full-scale drill per

year, (b) Enable each state in the ingestion pathway EPZ to participate in at least one full-scale drill every six years.

2) A small scale exercise which tests the adequacy of communication links, establishes that response agencies understand the emergency action levels and tests at least one other component (e.g., medical or offsite monitoring) of the offsite emergency response plans for the company and state and local agencies within the plume exposure pathway EPZ will be conducted each year that a full scale drill is not conducted.

c. For Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) evaluated exercises the NRC will be provided with a description of exercise objectives at

least 75 days prior to the exercise. Participation in the exercise by the NRC shall be at their discretion.

d. The Alabama Emergency Management Agency will provide FEMA with a description of exercise objectives at least 90 days prior to a FEMA evaluated exercise. Participation in the exercise by FEMA shall be at their discretion.

e. Formal critiques shall be provided following each exercise to identify areas of weakness. Corrective action, as appropriate, for company onsite and offsite weaknesses shall be the responsibility of the Vice President-Nuclear Plant Site. Corrective action, as appropriate, for company public information weaknesses shall be the responsibility of the APC Public Relations Senior Vice President and the SNC Vice President and General

Counsel. 2. Drills

82 Rev. 49 a. Fire Drills

1) Fire Drills will be conducted with fire brigade members as required by the plant's FSAR.

2) Fire Drills will be conducted annually which will involve the Dothan Fire Department.

b. Medical Emergency Drills A medical emergency drill will be conducted annually which will involve ambulance and offsite medical treatment facility participation.

c. Radiological Monitoring Drills Radiological monitoring drills will be conducted annually which will include initiating onsite and offsite radiological monitoring of vegetation, soil, water, and air.

d. Health Physics Drills Health Physics drills will be conducted semiannually which will involve response to

simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples and direct radiation measurements in the plant environment. Analysis of reactor coolant samples including use of the post accident sampling system will be conducted annually.

e. Appropriate local, state, and federal agencies will be advised of major drills in advance to allow their observation or participation. All observing or participating agencies will be requested to provide comments on drill evaluation and it will be the responsibility of the Plant Manager to implement corrective action as appropriate.

B. TRAINING

1. Training of the Plant Emergency Organization All Farley Nuclear Plant personnel, including those assigned on a temporary basis or in a training status, will receive a thorough orientation on all emergency plans and procedures required to ensure their safety. Changes in emergency plans and EIPs applicable to all plant personnel will be presented using training notices or other appropriate means. Persons with specific duties during an emergency will receive additional training appropriate to their respective assignments. The responsibility for coordinating their training is that of the Plant Training Manager.

83 Rev. 49 Continuing training will be provided to all personnel as described below:

Specific training that will be conducted is listed below:

a. Emergency Director Training (annually) members of the plant staff who may serve as Emergency Director will receive training in:

1) Supervision of emergency teams, 2) Emergency assessment including interpretation of data and estimation of radiation exposure,

3) Coordination and communication with offsite groups.

b. Field Monitoring Team Training (annually)

This training will be given to plant and vendor personnel that may be required to perform surveys in-plant, on the environment, or at SAMC. It will include instruction in the selection and use of survey instruments and air sampling equipment and in re-entry criteria.

c. First Aid Training (triennially)

Plant personnel will be considered first aid qualified upon successful completion of the Company's - First Aid and CPR Course.

d. Fire Control (per FSAR requirements)

A training program for the plant employees that serve on fire fighting teams is conducted under the direction of the Plant Training Manager. This course covers methods and equipment for fighting all types of fires that could occur on the site. Appropriate emphasis is placed on the radiological aspects of fire fighting. Drills and critiques are conducted periodically to train Fire Brigade personnel and to maintain their efficiency.

e. Emergency Repair Party Training (annually)

Maintenance and I and C personnel who may be assigned to the Emergency Repair Party receive training in Radiation Control Procedures as part of their normal plant training.

Personnel selected for Emergency Repair Party work will possess the required journeyman skills for the particular activity.

f. Security Personnel (annually)

84 Rev. 42 Security personnel will receive training on FNP-0-EIP-7, "Security Support to the Emergency Plan", including personnel evacuation and accountability, access control, vehicle escort, and bomb search activities. Personnel will also receive training on Contingency Implementing Procedure 13 covering security activities during fire, explosion, or other catastrophe.

g. Communications Personnel (annually)

Personnel responsible for the transmission of emergency information and instructions will receive training in accordance with Appendix 10(J).

2. Training of the Corporate Emergency Organization Information related to corporate emergency organization training is provided in Appendix 7(G).

85 Rev. 49 3. Training of Local Services Groups Offsite groups, such as fire departments, police and sheriff's departments, and ambulance services, that may participate in onsite activity will be encouraged to attend a training course to ensure that they are familiar with the plant layout and their actions in the event of radiological and non-radiological incidents. The Plant Training Manager is responsible for coordinating this training.

4. Training of SNC Emergency Planners The EP Supervisor, Emergency Planning Coordinator, and other individuals with emergency planning responsibilities are trained by self-study and by attending industry seminars, short courses, workshops, etc.

C. INSPECTION, CALIBRATION AND TESTING OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES To insure the operational readiness of emergency supplies and equipment the following will be performed:

1. Periodic calibration using manufacturers' recommendations as guidelines on all portable emergency instrumentation designated for emergency use. This includes both onsite equipment and offsite equipment at SAMC supplied by APC/SNC.

2. Inspection quarterly of all onsite and SAMC emergency equipment and supplies designated for emergency use and supplied by APC/SNC. The purpose of the inspection is to ensure that the inventory is correct, that the supplies are functional and that instrument calibration is current.

3. An adequate reserve of emergency equipment will be maintained to allow for equipment taken out of service for repair, calibration, or replacement.

86 Rev. 42 4. Communications Checks

a. Communications checks will be performed monthly with all locations which are part of the Emergency Notification Network.

b. The Emergency Notification System shall be tested at least monthly.

c. The telephone numbers of organizations listed in FNP-0-EIP-8.1 will be updated quarterly and verified annually.

d. The EOF/TSC/OSC conference capability will be tested at least annually.

e. Radio communication equipment for Field Monitoring Team communications will be tested at least annually.

f. The public Alert and Notification System will undergo a full activation test at least annually.

D. REVIEW AND UPDATING OF THE PLAN AND PROCEDURES Responsibility for the planning effort, including review and updating of the emergency plans and procedures, is described in Appendix 9(I).

A-1 Rev. 41 APPENDIX 1(A)

EMERGENCY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT I. TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER

Emergency Plan Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures

Drawings of Facility and Plant Site Records Material First Aid Kit

II. CONTROL ROOM

Emergency Plan Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Records Material

Tools and Other Hardware

Stretcher

First Aid Kit

Respiratory Protection Equipment

Survey Instruments

Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

III. OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER

Survey Instruments

Dosimetry Devices

Respiratory Protection Equipment

Protective Clothing

A-2 Rev. 49 IV. CENTRAL SECURITY CONTROL (CSC) BUILDING Ambulance Kit Respiratory Protection Equipment

V. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY

Refer to Appendix G First aid kit

Flashlights

Clipboards, writing materials, and secretarial supplies

EPZ/IPZ maps

VI. AUXILIARY BUILDING Protective Clothing

Decontamination Supplies

Signs and Labels Respiratory Protection Equipment

First Aid Kit and Supplies

Stretchers

Fire Rescue Suit

Fire Brigade Equipment B-1 Rev. 42 APPENDIX 2(B) INDEX Letters of Agreement on File

The following letters of agreement and memorandums of understanding are maintained on file

with the Emergency Planning Coordinator:

Agreement Between Department of Pensions and Security of the State of Alabama, Alabama Department of Public Health, Alabama Emergency Management Agency and Alabama Power Company

Memorandum of Understanding Between Southern Nuclear Operating Company and Georgia Emergency Management Agency and Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protection Division and Early County Sheriff's Department and Chairman, Early County Commission and Mayor, City of Blakely Regarding Notifications Associated

with a Radiological Emergency at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

Media Center Lease Agreement

Agreement for Back-up Fire Protection Services Between the City of Dothan, Alabama and Southern Nuclear Operating Company

Letter - INPO - Certifying plant emergency assistance agreements between INPO and member utilities remain in effect as described in the INPO Emergency Resources Manual located on the INPO website. Agreements include:

Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Voluntary Assistance Agreement

Voluntary Assistance Agreement by and Among Electric Utilities Involved in Transportation of Nuclear Materials

Letter - Department of Energy

Agreement For Notification of the State of Florida of a Radiological Emergency at the J. M.

Farley Nuclear Plant

Assignment of Emergency Planning Agreements

Memorandum of Understanding Between Southern Nuclear Operating Company and Alabama Emergency Management Agency and Alabama Department of Public Health office of Radiation Control and Houston County Sheriff's Department and Chairman, Houston County Commission, and Mayor, City of Dothan Regarding Notifications Associated with a Radiological Emergency at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

C-1 Rev. 41 APPENDIX 3(C) RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM The Radiation monitoring system is divided into three areas. These areas and the channels comprising each area are shown below. The monitors are installed on Units 1 and 2 unless otherwise noted.

1. Area Radiation Monitors Channel Description Range R-1 Control Room 1 x 10-4 to 1 x 10 1 R/hr R-1B Technical Support 1 x 10-4 to 1 x 10 1 R/hr Center R-2 Containment 1 x 10-4 to 1 x 10 1 R/hr R-3 Radiochemistry Lab 1 x 10-4 to 1 x 10 1 R/hr R-4 Charging Pump Room 1 x 10-4 to 1 x 10 1 R/hr R-5 Spent Fuel Bldg.

1 x 10-4 to 1 x 10 1 R/hr R-6 Sampling Room 1 x 10-4 to 1 x 10 1 R/hr R-7 In-core Instru-1 x 10-4 to 1 x 10 1 R/hr mentation Room R-8 Drumming Station 1 x 10-4 to 1 x 10 1 R/hr R-9 Sample Panel 1 x 10-4 to 1 x 10 1 R/hr Room (Unit 2)

R-30 Radwaste Area Ventila-10 to 10 6 cpm tion return from 100 foot elevation and below R-31 Radwaste Area Ventila-10 to 10 6 cpm tion return from 121 foot elevation R-32 Radwaste Area Ventila-10 to 10 6 cpm tion return from 139 foot elevation R-33 Radwaste Area Ventila-10 to 10 6 cpm tion return from 155 foot elevation C-2 Rev. 56 Channel Description Range R-34 Access Control Area Venti- 10 to 106 cpm lation Return (Unit 1 only)

R-35 Computer Room Air Handling 10 to 10 6 cpm (A,B) Unit Air Intake (common for both units)

2. Process Radiation Monitors R-10 Penetration Room Filtration 1 x 10

-9 to 1 x 10

-6 uCi/cc Discharge Monitoring System R-11 Containment Atmosphere 1 x 10

-9 to 1 x 10

-6 uCi/cc Monitoring System R-12 Containment Atmosphere 1 x 10-6 to 1 x 10-3 uCi/cc Monitoring System R-13 Waste Gas Processing 1 x 10

-1 to 1 x 10

+4 uCi/cc System R-14 Plant Vent Gas Monitoring 5 x 10

-7 to 1 x 10

-4 uCi/cc System R-15A Condenser Air Ejector 1 x 10

-6 to 1 x 10

-3 uCi/cc Monitoring System (5 x 10

-7 for Kr-85)

R-17 Component Cooling Water 1 x 10

-5 to 1 x 10

-2 uCi/cc (A,B) Monitoring System R-18 Liquid Waste Processing 1 x 10

-5 to 1 x 10

-2 uCi/cc Monitoring System R-19 S/G Blowdown Processing 1 x 10

-5 to 1 x 10

-2 uCi/cc Monitoring System R-20 (A,B) Service Water Leaving Con- 1 x 10

-5 to 1 x 10

-2 uCi/cc tainment Monitoring System R-21 Vent Stack Monitoring 1 x 10

-9 to 1 x 10

-6 uCi/cc System R-22 Vent Gas Monitoring System 5 x 10

-7 to 1 x 10

-4 uCi/cc C-3 Rev. 33 Channel Description Range R-23 Steam Generator Blowdown 1 x 10

-6 to 1 x 10

-3 uCi/cc (A,B) Processing Monitoring System R-24 Containment Purge 1 x 10

-6 to 1 x 10

-3 uCi/cc (A,B) Monitoring System R-25 Fuel Handling 1 x 10

-6 to 1 x 10

-3 uCi/cc (A,B) Monitoring System R-26 Recycle and Waste 1.0x10

-6 to 1.0 x 10

-3 uCi/cc (A,B) Evaporator Auxiliary Steam Supply System

3. High Range Radiation Monitors

R-15B Condenser Air Ejector .01 - 100 mR/hr Exhaust Monitoring System

R-15C Condenser Air Ejector .01 - 1000 R/hr Exhaust Monitoring System R-27 Containment High Range 1 to 10 7 R/hr (A,B) Monitoring System

R-29B Plant Vent Stack High Per FSAR Table 11.4-2 Range Monitoring System and FSAR section 11.4.2.20

R-60A A Steam Generator Relief & Per FSAR Table 11.4-2 Safety Valve Monitoring System and FSAR section 11.4.2.20

R-60B B Steam Generator Relief & Per FSAR Table 11.4-2 Safety Valve Monitoring System and FSAR section 11.4.2.20

R-60C C Steam Generator Relief & Per FSAR Table 11.4-2 Safety Valve Monitoring System and FSAR section 11.4.2.20

R60D T.D. Aux. Feedwater Pump Per FSAR Table 11.4-2 Steam Exhaust Monitoring and FSAR section 11.4.2.20 System

D-1 Rev. 56 APPENDIX 4(D)

I. EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURES

A. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EIPs) Listing FNP-0-EIP-0.0 Emergency Organization FNP-0-EIP-1.0 Duties of An Individual Who Discovers an Emergency Condition FNP-0-EIP-2.0 Handling of Incoming Calls During Emergencies or Emergency Exercises FNP-0-EIP-4.0 Health Physics Support to the Emergency Plan FNP-0-EIP-5.0 Maintenance Support to the Emergency Plan FNP-0-EIP-6.0 TSC Setup and Activation FNP-0-EIP-7.0 Security Support to the Emergency Plan FNP-0-EIP-8.0 Non-Emergency Notifications FNP-0-EIP-8.1 Emergency Phone Directory FNP-0-EIP-8.2 Plant Personnel Home Telephone Directory FNP-0-EIP-8.3 Communications Equipment Operating Procedures FNP-0-EIP-9.1 Automated Dose Assessment Method FNP-0-EIP-9.3 Personal Computer Automated Dose Assessment Methods FNP-0-EIP-9.5 Determining Technical Specifications/ODCM Radioactive Release Values FNP-0-EIP-10.0 Evacuation, Personnel Accountability, and Site Dismissal FNP-0-EIP-11.0 Handling of Injured Personnel FNP-0-EIP-13.0 Fire Emergencies FNP-0-EIP-14.0 Emergency Response Teams FNP-0-EIP-16.0 Emergency Equipment and Supplies FNP-0-EIP-20.0 Chemistry and Environmental Support to the Emergency Plan FNP-0-EIP-28.0 Termination and Recovery FNP-0-EIP-30.0 Post Accident Core Damage Assessment

D-3 Rev. 56 C. Chemistry-Radiochemistry Control Procedures (CCPs)

FNP-0-CCP-1300 Chemistry and Environmental Activities during a Radiological Accident

D. Administrative Procedures (APs)

FNP-0-AP-45 Farley Nuclear Plant Training Plan

NMP-AP-001 Development and Control of Southern Nuclear Procedures

NMP-ES-035-010 Fire Brigade II. EMERGENCY PLAN/IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE CROSS REFERENCE The following listing indicates for each plan section the procedures that implement actions required by Southern Nuclear Operating Company.

APPLICABLE IMPLE- PLAN SECTION MENTING PROCEDURES

I. Introduction ......... ..................... ..................... ..................... ............................................N/A

II. Organization A. Onsite

1. TSC a. Emergency Director .................................... EIP-0 NMP-EP-110

b. Operations Supervisor .................................... EIP-0, 6

c. Maintenance Supervisor ................................... EIP-0, 6 EIP-5, 6

d. Health Physics Supervisor ................................ EIP-0, 6 EIP-4

e. Security Supervision .................................. EIP-7

f. Engineering Supervisor ..................................... EIP-0, 6 EIP-6

g. Shift Supervisor (Emergency Director).................. EIP-0 NMP-EP-110

h. Emergency Repair Party ................................ EIP-5 EIP-14

i. Field Monitoring Team.............................. EIP-4

j. Dose Assessment Staff ................................ EIP-6 EIP-9 Series

k. Additional Plant Staff Assignments 1) Operations Support Center (OSC) Manager ........... EIP-0

2) Radiological Monitoring ............................ EIP-4

3) Fire Fighting and Rescue ........................... EIP-13

4) First Aid .......................................... EIP-11

5) Decontamination .................................... EIP-4

6) Personnel Accountability ........................... EIP-10

7) Record Keeping ..................................... EIP-6

8) Communications ..................................... EIP-2, 8 Series NMP-EP-111

D-4 Rev. 51 APPLICABLE IMPLE- PLAN SECTION MENTING PROCEDURES B. Offsite

1. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

a. Corporate Duty Manager.............................. NMP-EP-001, 002

b. EOF Manager.................................. NMP-EP-101, 102

c. EOF Support Coordinator........................ NMP-EP-001, NMP-EP-106 d. EOF Technical Supervisor............. NMP-EP-001, NMP-EP-105

e. Licensing Support Manager............................... NMP-EP-001, 103

2. Emergency Communication Organization............... NMP-EP-201 NMP-EP-202 NMP-EP-203 NMP-EP-204 NMP-EP-205 NMP-EP-206

3. Recovery Phase Organization............................ EIP-28.0

a. Recovery Manager.................................... EIP-28.0 EIP-28.0

b. Recovery Support Director........................... EIP-28.0

c. Technical Support Director........................... EIP-28.0

d. Recovery Support Supervisor.......................... EIP-28.0

e. Administrative Support Supervisor..................... EIP-28.0

f. Engineering Supervisor............................... EIP-28.0

g. Licensing Supervisor................................. EIP-28.0

D-5 Rev. 56 APPLICABLE IMPLE- PLAN SECTION MENTING PROCEDURES C. Outside Organizations

1. Government Agencies ................................. EIP-8.1, NMP-EP-111 a. Department of Energy Savannah River Operations Office NMP-EP-110 b. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NMP-EP-110/111 c. State of Alabama ............................... NMP-EP-111

d. State of Georgia................................ NMP-EP-111

e. State of Florida ............................... NMP-EP-111

f. Houston County, Alabama......................... NMP-EP-111

g. Early County, Georgia........................... NMP-EP-111

h. City of Dothan, Alabama Fire Department......... EIP-13 NMP-EP-110 2. Contractor and Private Offsite Organizations a. Southern Company Services....................... N/A

b. Bechtel Power Corporation....................... N/A

c. Westinghouse.................................. N/A

d. INPO, NEI, EPRI................................. N/A

e. Maintenance Assistance.......................... N/A

f. Radiological Monitoring Assistance.......... N/A

g. Other Utilities................................. N/A

III. Facilities and Equipment A. Control Centers

1. Technical Support.................................... EIP-0 EIP-6 2. Emergency Operations Facility........................ NMP-EP-101

3. Operations Support Center............................ EIP-0 EIP-10

4. Joint Information Center.................................... NMP-EP-204

5. Corporate Media Center.................... NMP-EP-203 B. Communications Systems

1. Commercial Telephones................................ N/A

2. Private Automatic Exchange........................... N/A

3. Microwave............................................ N/A

4. APC Load Dispatch Computer Link...................... N/A

5. Two-Way Radio........................................ EIP-8.3

6. Public Address and Party Lines....................... EIP-8.3 NMP-EP-111

7. Sound Powered Telephone.............................. N/A

8. Plant Emergency Alarm................................ N/A

9. NRC Emergency Notification System.................... EIP-8.3 10. NRC Health Physics Network........................... EIP-8.3

11. State/Local Agency Emergency Notification Network.... EIP-8.3 NMP-EP-111

12. RSCL................................................. N/A

13. PMCL................................................. N/A

14. MCL................................................. N/A

15. LAN................................................... N/A

16. Telecopier........................................... NMP-EP-111

17. SNC Integrated Data Display System............... N/A

18. ERDS................................................. NMP-EP-111

19. Other Communication Systems.......................... EIP-8.3 NMP-EP-003

D-6 Rev. 51 APPLICABLE IMPLE- PLAN SECTION MENTING PROCEDURES C. Assessment Facilities

1. Onsite Systems and Equipment a. Natural Phenomena Monitors ......................... N/A b. Radiological Monitors............................... EIP-16 EIP-30

c. Post Accident Sampling Facilities.................. FNP-0-CCP- 1300

d. Fire Detection .................................... N/A

2. Environs Monitoring Facilities and Equipment.......... RCP-25 M-007 EIP-9 Series D. Protection, Decontamination and First Aid Facilities

1. Protective Facilities and Equipment................... EIP-10

2. Decontamination and First Aid ........................ EIP-11

3. Medical Transportation ............................... EIP-11

4. Medical Treatment..................................... N/A

IV. Assessment Actions and Protective Measures A. Classification of Emergencies. NMP-EP-110

1. Notification of Unusual Event......................... NMP-EP-110

2. Alert................................................. NMP-EP-110

3. Site Area Emergency Alert............................. NMP-EP-110

4. General Emergency Alert.............................. NMP-EP-110 B. Post Accident Assessment Actions

1. Reactor Coolant Sampling, Containment Atmosphere Sampling and Plant Vent Stack Sampling Alert.......... EIP-20 CCP-1300 EIP-30 2. Surveillance of Control Room Monitors Alert........... EIP-6

3. In-Plant and Site Surveys Alert....................... EIP-4 RCP-25 4. Population Exposure...................................

5. Environs Surveys and Monitoring a. Short Term Assessment Exposure..................... EIP-4 EIP-9 Series RCP-25 b. Long Term Assessment............................. EIP-9.3

D-8 Rev. 52 APPLICABLE IMPLE- PLAN SECTION MENTING PROCEDURES VII. Recovery A. Methodology .............................................. EIP-28.0

B. Organization ............................................ EIP-28.0

C. Notification ............................................ EIP-28.0 VIII. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness A. Exercises and Drills ..................................... NMP-EP-300

NMP-EP-303 B. Training ................................................. AP-45 NMP-EP-301 FNP Security Plan C. Inspection, Calibration and Testing of Emergency Equipment and Supplies.................................... EIP-8.3 NMP-EP-303 EIP-16 NMP-EP-300 D. Review and Updating of the Plan and Procedures ............. NMP-EP-300

E-4 Rev. 49 Emergency Planning Zone The plume exposure pathway EPZ includes the majority of the 10-mile geographic area surrounding FNP. The land within the plume exposure pathway is divided by the Chattahoochee River. The FNP EPZ covers portions of Houston and Henry counties in Alabama, and Early County in Georgia. The EPZ is primarily a rural farming and lumber harvesting area. Transient population in the EPZ is minimal with the exception of recreational users along the Chattahoochee River, and hunters.

NUREG-0654 recommends that the EPZ be subdivided into evacuation areas, for performing the evacuation time estimate analyses (see Table 1).

5 TABLE 1: EVACUATION AR EAS FOR ETE ANALYSIS Radius Area Approximately 2 miles Four 90° sectorsApproximately 5 miles Four 90° sectorsApproximately 10 miles (EPZ)

Four 90° sectorsApproximately 10 miles (EPZ)Entire EPZ The State of Georgia and State of Alabama Radiological Emergency Plans (REPs) define the geographical and political boundaries of the EPZ. Based on the geographic and political boundaries in the EPZ, one 0-2-mile area, four 0-5-mile areas, and four 0-10-mile areas were identified. For evacuation and emergency response planning purposes, these areas have been further divided into 19 protective action zones (PAZs).

6 The zone descriptions were obtained and verified from the FNP's 2007 public outreach calendar 7, county radiological response plans 8, and discussions with SNC and plant representatives. The zones were selected based on existing political boundaries and prominent physical features, either natural (e.g., rivers and lakes) or manmade (e.g., roads), to enhance direction and coordination of the public in the affected area.

5 NUREG-0654. p. 4-4. 6 Protective Action Zone is also referred to as "Zone" in this document. 7 2007 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Information Calendar. 8 State of Georgia REP Plan, Blakely-Early County Plan: Blakely-Early County Emergency Management Agency Radiological Emergency Plan for Nuclear Incidents/Accidents Involving the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant, February 2004, p. D-2, D-11; Dothan-Houston County Emergency Management Agency, Standard Operating Guidelines for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant Incidents, p. C-5, C-6.

E-6 Rev. 49 The relationship between the evacuation areas and zones is summarized in Table 2.

TABLE 2:

SUMMARY

OF EVACUATION AREA S AND PROTECTIVE ACTION ZONES Evacuation Area Zones 0-2 Miles A 0-5 Miles, SW A, B-5, C-5, D-5 0-5 Miles, NW A, E-5, F-5 0-5 Miles, NE A, I-5 0-5 Miles, SE A, J-5, K-5 0-5 Miles A, B-5, C-5, D-5, E-5, F-5, I-5, J-5, K-5 0-10 Miles, SW A, B-5, C-5, D-5, B-10, C-10, D-10 0-10 Miles, NW A, E-5, F-5, E-10, F-10 0-10 Miles, NE A, I-5, G-10, H-10, I-10 0-10 Miles, SE A, J-5, K-5, J-10, K-10 0-10 Miles, Full EPZAll 19 Evacuation Zones E-7 Rev. 49 Assumptions and Methodology General Assumptions IEM made the following general assumptions to model the population evacuation study: The ETEs include the times associated with warning diffusion, public mobilization, and travel time out of the EPZ. Following initial notification, all persons within the EPZ will evacuate. Evacuation of the EPZ will be considered complete after all evacuating vehicles are outside the EPZ. Existing lane utilization patterns will prevail during the course of the evacuation. There will be traffic control points (TCPs) in the network to allow efficient flow of traffic toward the reception centers. Reception centers are modeled as defined in the 2007 public outreach calendar. All households having more than one vehicle will only use one automobile. This is consistent with empirical data, which indicates that family members, when possible, prefer to evacuate as a unit.

9 Non-auto-owning households will evacuate with neighbors, friends, and relatives, or will be evacuated through coordinated efforts by State and county emergency management officials. This is also consistent with the 2007 public outreach calendar. For evacuation modeling purposes, it is assumed that one vehicle will be made available to evacuate each household of this population segment. To model the population evacuation during adverse weather conditions, speed limits are reduced by 40%, and road capacities are reduced by 25%. This is consistent with research that concludes that during adverse weather conditions, drivers may reduce their velocity by nearly 40%, which can result in a 25-30% reduction in capacity

.10 Weather-related capacity reductions of 20-25% are generally used in current evacuation studies for bad weather roadway conditions.

11 Methodology IEM used PTV Vision VISUM, a computer simulation model, to perform the ETEs for the FNP site.12 PTV Vision is the leading software suite for transportation planning and operations analyses used in more than 70 countries. Detailed information on the evacuation time analysis methodology using PTV Vision is provided in Section 0. PTV Vision quality assurance and industry acceptance information is provided in Appendix C

9 R.W. Perry, M.K. Lindell, M.R. Greene. Evacuation Planning in Emergency Management. 1981. 10 National Research Council, Committee on Weather Research for Surface Transportation.

Where the Weather Meets the Road: A Research Agenda for Improving Road Weather Services; Transportation Research Board (TRB), Board on Atmospheric Services. 2004. 11 Urbanik, T. E. and J. D. Jamison, State of the Art in Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG/CR-4831; PNL-7776). Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1992. Page 5. 12 PTV Vision can be found online at http://www.ptvamerica.com.

E-8 Rev. 49 Sources of Data The most up-to-date data sources were reviewed and analyzed to prepare appropriate input data for running the traffic simulation and providing the best ETEs. These data sources are explained

below: Population estimates were based on data obtained from Synergos Technologies, contact with individual facilities, and discussions with the SNC emergency planning

staff.13 The peak estimated employment level at the plant reflects office or operations personnel. Roadway geometric data was obtained from PTV. PTV data is based on high-quality, regularly updated, NAVTEQ street network data. NAVTEQ networks are detailed and include neighborhood streets in every communi ty in North America. This data was validated by IEM during a "ground truthing" field trip in November 2007. Roadway and intersection approach capacities were calculated using the concepts and procedures defined in the Highway Capacity Manual.

14 Warning diffusion and mobilization times were based on the data presented in Evaluating Protective Actions for Chemical Agent Emergencies.

15 This data was collected during evacuations executed in response to large-scale chemical spills, and it explicitly incorporates the time required for communication of the warning (warning diffusion) and the time required for an individual to respond to the warning (mobilization). The data collected in this meta-study were based on transient, permanent, and special populations. Vehicle occupancy rates for the different population categories were derived based on average household size and discussions with the counties' and plant's emergency planning staffs.

13 Synergos Technologies, Inc. Online: http://www.synergos-tech.com. 14 Transportation Research Board, National Research Council. Highway Capacity Manual. Washington, D.C. 2000. 15 Rogers, G. O., et al., Evaluating Protective Actions for Chemical Agent Emergencies (ORNL-6615). Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1990.

E-9 Rev. 49 Scenarios Modeled In accordance with NUREG-0654 guidelines, ETEs for each of the evacuation areas (refer to Table 2) have been prepared for several temporal and weather conditions. Based on the discussion with the SNC emergency planning staff, estimates have been prepared for weekday normal and adverse weather conditions, weekni ght normal and adverse weather conditions, and weekend normal and adverse weather conditions.

Normal weather refers to conditions where roads are clear and dry and visibility is not impaired.

Adverse weather refers to rainy or snowy conditions where road capacities are reduced by 25%

and speed limits are reduced by 40%.

Evacuation conditions are modeled for the populations of the year 2010. Table 3 presents the snapshot of the ETE scenarios that were modeled for the study.

TABLE 3: ETE SCENARIOS MODELED Normal Weather Adverse Weather Weekday Weekday Weeknight Weeknight Weekend Weekend The various population components for different scenarios are summarized below: Weekday: This situation represents a typical weekday period when the workforce is at a full daytime level. Assumptions on the population levels for this condition include the following:

Permanent residents within the EPZ will evacuate from their places of residence.

The plant site employment is at an estimated peak daytime level.

Workplaces are fully staffed at daytime levels.

Schools are in session.

Recreational activities, such as hunting and fishing, are at daytime levels. Weeknight: This situation reflects a typical nighttime period when the workforce is at a nighttime level. Assumptions on the population levels for this condition include the following:

Permanent residents within the EPZ will evacuate from their places of residence.

The plant site is staffed at an estimated peak nighttime level.

Workplaces are at nighttime levels.

Schools are closed.

There are no recreational (hunting and fishing) activities.

E-10 Rev. 49 Weekend: The weekend situation represents a daytime period when recreational activities are at peak levels. This condition would most likely occur during any weekend day during the hunting season. Assumptions on the population levels for this condition include the following:

Permanent residents within the EPZ will evacuate from their places of residence.

The plant site is at an estimated peak weekend level.

Workplaces are at weekend levels.

Schools are closed.

Recreational (hunting and fishing) activities are at a peak estimated level. Population and Vehicle Demand Estimation IEM identified three population categories within the EPZ surrounding FNP, as specified in the NUREG-0654 guidelines. These populations include the permanent resident population, the transient population, and the special facility population. The permanent resident population is made up of individuals residing in the 10-mile EPZ. The transient population is composed of individuals working and/or visiting within the EPZ but not living there. For instance, the transient population consists of workers employed within the area, recreational sportsmen, and visitors to the area. Special facility populations may require additional consideration in the event of an evacuation. For the purpose of this study, only special facilities holding populations of more than fifty people are considered under the special facility category. Facilities with less than fifty people are considered under the transient population category.

FNP is located in a rural area of Alabama. There are no concentrated population centers, and there is minimal transient population with in the 10-mile EPZ. There are several types of special facilities within the EPZ, including seven schools and five major employers including the plant itself. The majority of the population consists of permanent residents and workers.

IEM derived the 2010 permanent population estimates from 2007 third-quarter population estimates and the 2012 population forecast obtained from Synergos Technologies, Inc. Local school data was obtained through contact with individual facilities. The recreational visitors' population figures were based on discussions with FNP's emergency planning staff, and staff contact with individual parks. After discussion with the appropriate facilities and the site emergency planning personnel, it was estimated that the 2007 school and recreational user information applies to the year 2010 since no major change in the land use patterns within the EPZ is expected in the next three years. These population estimates formed the basis for determining the evacuee demand used in the analysis for any given evacuation scenario. The populations from these sources were assigned to each applicable zone.

E-11 Rev. 49 Permanent Residents IEM used GIS software to process the geographic data and associated population counts for census blocks in each of the counties surrounding FNP. IEM then aggregated these populations over each zone to generate a permanent resident population count, which comprises the nighttime population.

To calculate population by each zone and radial sector, census block population was aggregated within each of the sectors. Since boundaries of the sectors do not follow census block boundaries, many of the blocks had to be divided into sub-areas based on sector boundaries. To do this, IEM overlaid the census blocks with the zones and 10-mile radius sectors. The blocks were then split into sub-areas and the block population was allocated to sub-areas based on an area ratio method. The populations of the block sub-areas within the sector boundaries were then aggregated for each radius sector.

The area ratio method assigns each sub-area a portion of the block population based on the ratio of the area of each block part to the area of the entire block. For example, if a particular sub-area contains one-fourth the area of the total block area, the sub-area receives one-fourth of the block's total population. Figure 3 illustrates this principle, in which one-fourth of the total area is located in the sub-area, which includes one-fourth of the population. The area ratio method assumes that the population within the block is evenly distributed, a reasonable assumption in most cases.

E-13 Rev. 49 The populations of the block sub-areas within the sector boundaries were then aggregated for each sector. This method was also used in the few instances in which the zone boundaries did not follow block boundaries, making it necessary to split blocks along a particular zone boundary.

Additionally, the permanent resident population is divided into auto-owning and non-auto-owning populations. Auto-Owning Population It was assumed that one vehicle would evacuate from each permanent resident household. This assumption is consistent with the research indicating the tendency of evacuees to evacuate, where possible, as a family unit.16 The population projections and estimates indicate that 92% of the households within the EPZ have at least one vehicle. The data also indicates an average household size of 2.5 persons for the FNP EPZ.

Non-Auto-Owning Population The population projections and estimates indicate that 8% of the households within the EPZ do not own a vehicle. It is assumed that privately-owned vehicles of friends and/or relatives will be available to evacuate this population component. This assumption is used since it provides the most realistic representation of evacuation traffic generated from the non-auto-owning households. For an estimate of the vehicle demand associated with the non-auto-owning population, IEM assumed one vehicle would be made available to evacuate each household. This is based on the previously-stated assumptions that a family would use a vehicle from neighbors, friends, and relatives, or will be evacuated through coordinated efforts by county emergency management officials.

17 Table 4 shows the distribution of the 2010 total permanent resident population by sector and ring, while Figure 4 presents the same data graphically. Table 5 shows the distribution of the permanent resident population by zone. Figure 5 presents this data graphically.

16 R.W. Perry, M.K. Lindell, M.R. Greene. Evacuation Planning in Emergency Management. 1981. 17 2007 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Information Calendar; State of Georgia REP Plan, Blakely-Early County Plan, February 2004, p. H-1, H-2, J-3; Dothan/Houston County Emergency Management Agency, Standard Operating Guidelines for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant Incidents, p. B-10, H-1, H-2.

E-14 Rev. 49 TABLE 4: 2010 PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR AND RING Sector 18 Ring 19 Permanent Resident Population 2010 N 2 1 N 5 809 N 10 92 NNW 2 5 NNW 5 83 NNW 10 216 NW 2 1 NW 5 135 NW 10 480 WNW 2 0 WNW 5 102 WNW 10 909 W 2 2 W 5 48 W 10 897 WSW 2 7 WSW 5 117 WSW 10 2602 SW 2 6 SW 5 102 SW 10 888 SSW 2 2 SSW 5 145 SSW 10 384 S 2 0 S 5 46 S 10 380 18 There 48 sectors, each measured 22.5

°. Sectors of 22.5

°are designated by compass direction going outward from the plant on the centerline of the sector (e.g., the sector from 348.75

° to 11.25° is designated "N" for north). The remaining sectors are designated NNW, NW, WNW, W, WSW, SW, SSW, S, etc. 19 Rings are defined as the area between two circles of radius 0 and 2 miles, 2 and 5 miles, and 5 and 10 miles.

E-15 Rev. 49 Sector 18 Ring 19 Permanent Resident Population 2010 SSE 2 0 SSE 5 5 SSE 10 376 SE 2 0 SE 5 75 SE 10 220 ESE 2 0 ESE 5 79 ESE 10 158 E 2 0 E 5 7 E 10 189 ENE 2 1 ENE 5 40 ENE 10 178 NE 2 5 NE 5 92 NE 10 174 NNE 2 1 NNE 5 192 NNE 10 107

E-17 Rev. 49 TABLE 5: 2010 PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY ZONES Zone Permanent Resident Population 2010 A-AL 24 A-GA 7 B-5 96 B-10 774 C-5 184 C-10 895 D-5 157 D-10 3421 E-5 162 E-10 1567 F-5 999 F-10 525 G-10 120 H-10 225 I-5 318 I-10 110 J-5 161 J-10 282 K-5 0 K-10 331

E-19 Rev. 49 Transient Populations The transient population of the FNP EPZ area is derived from employment data and data on recreation populations. The employment data was obtained from Synergos. These populations were combined with other contributors, such as the percentage of the population that is of working age, to daytime population estimations and assigned to population centroids in a manner similar to the permanent resident populations. The daytime populations incorporate employment and workforce information, such as county working-age population and unemployment statistics.

The recreational population shown for the FNP site considers users of parks and waterways, primarily boaters on the Chattahoochee River. Through conversations with FNP's emergency planning staff and with staff from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's Mobile office, IEM estimated there will be approximately 120 hunters/boaters throughout the EPZ on weekdays during the hunting season and approximately 575 hunters/boaters on peak weekends during the hunting season. In addition, there will be approximately 20 picnickers /campers at parks during the weekdays, and 90 picnickers/campers on the weekends.

A vehicle occupancy rate of 1.5 was used to estimate the number of vehicles used by recreational area users, such as hunters and fishermen. Table 6 shows the distribution of the transient population by sector and ring, while Figure 6 presents the same data graphically. Table 7 shows the distribution of the transient population by zone. Figure 7 presents this data graphically.

E-20 Rev. 49 TABLE 6: TRANSIENT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR AND RING Sector RingTransient PopulationN 2 0 N 5 668 N 10 40 NNW 2 2 NNW 5 32 NNW 10 97 NW 2 1 NW 5 51 NW 10 248 WNW 2 0 WNW 5 39 WNW 10 465 W 2 1 W 5 20 W 10 444 WSW 2 2 WSW 5 47 WSW 10 1167 SW 2 2 SW 5 41 SW 10 440 SSW 2 1 SSW 5 58 SSW 10 156 S 2 0 S 5 20 S 10 150 SSE 2 1 SSE 5 105 SSE 10 224 SE 2 1 SE 5 31 SE 10 109 ESE 2 1 ESE 5 32 E-21 Rev. 49 Sector RingTransient PopulationESE 10 73 E 2 1 E 5 5 E 10 86 ENE 2 1 ENE 5 17 ENE 10 75 NE 2 3 NE 5 38 NE 10 78 NNE 2 0 NNE 5 76 NNE 10 90

E-23 Rev. 49 TABLE 7: TRANSIENT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY ZONES ZoneTransient Population A-AL 9 A-GA 8 B-5 141 B-10321 C-5 73 C-10421 D-5 64 D-101561 E-5 62 E-10804 F-5 641 F-10246 G-1098 H-1096 I-5 228 I-10 48 J-5 68 J-10 126 K-5 3 K-10221

E-25 Rev. 49 Special Facility Populations IEM identified several special facilities within the EPZ, consisting of schools and major employers, including Farley Nuclear Plant (Table 8 and Table 9). The special facilities include the

following: Five major employers (including FNP) Seven schools-combination of public and private

Table 8 shows the major employers' peak population. Table 9 shows the peak population of schools within the EPZ. Figure 8 presents the same data graphically.

E-26 Rev. 49 TABLE 8: PEAK POPULATION OF MAJOR EMPLOYER Facility Name Address County Zone Peak Farley Nuclear Plant 7388 N State Hwy 95 Houston A-AL 52220Georgia-Pacific - Containerboard12551 Hwy 273 W Early K-5 500 Republic Conduit 39832 Georgia Tubing RdEarly K-10 112 Qualico Steel 7797 E State Hwy 52 Houston E-10 180 Amx Trucking 10720 E US Hwy 84 Houston D-10 100

20 There are approximately 522 daytime employees and approximately 75 night and weekend employees. Approximately 200 employees may evacuate the facility during a daytime incident and it is possible that no one may evacuate during a nighttime or weekend incident.

E-27 Rev. 49 TABLE 9: PEAK SCHOOL POPULATION Facility Name Address County Zone Population (Children and Adults) Ashford Elementary School 100 Barfield St Houston D-10 930 Ashford High School 607 Church St Houston D-10 880 Houston County High School 202 W Church St Houston F-5 486 Webb Elementary School 178 Depot St Houston E-10 534 Houston County Career And Technical Center 801 Eighth Ave Houston D-10 150 Camp E-Tu-Nake 313 E-Tu-Nake Place Early G-10 75 Ashford Academy 1100 N Broadway St Houston D-10 245

E-29 Rev. 49 Different vehicle occupancy rates (VORs) were used for the various categories of population (e.g., one vehicle per household for permanent; 1.5 people per vehicle for recreational area users). All transient populations were assumed to evacuate with a VOR of 1.25. A vehicle occupancy rate of 1.1 was used to estimate the number of vehicles to be evacuated by the FNP onsite population, as was discussed with SNC and plant emergency planning staff. After consultation with SNC emergency planners, students were assumed to evacuate via buses at a rate of 52 students per bus, with the remaining school population departing mostly in their own cars (occupancy rate of 1.25). Table 10 shows the VORs by different population categories used for the evacuation modeling.

E-30 Rev. 49 TABLE 10: VEHICLE OCCUPANC Y RATES BY POPULATION CATEGORIES Population Category Population SubtypeVehicle Occupancy RatePermanent Residents Auto-Owning Permanent2.5 Non-Auto-Owning Permanent2.5 Transients Work Force Transients 1.25 Recreational Transients1.5 Special Facilities Schools Students52 Staff1.25 Farley Nuclear Plant 1.1 E-31 Rev. 49 The Evacuation Roadway Network The evacuation routes were modeled based on the information provided in the FNP's 2007 public

outreach calendar. Additional information regarding the evacuation routes was obtained from the past ETE report for the FNP site and the county radiological emergency response plans. The maps and descriptions in both documents were used by IEM as the basis of network verification activity. IEM personnel also met with the FNP emergency response planning staff regarding additional information and clarifications.

The public outreach calendar included a detailed description of the evacuation routes for both the Alabama and Georgia sides within a 10-mile radius. It provided descriptive information on recommended protective actions and the names and locations of reception centers for each zone. The map in the calendar clearly marked the evacuation routes and the direction of evacuation towards the respective reception centers. The reception centers are located well beyond the 10-mile EPZ.

IEM personnel drove along the designated evacuation routes in the direction of an evacuation, and all the way to the reception centers to collect complete and accurate information about the physical state of the roads. Any differences between information indicated in the calendar, NAVTEQ data, and existing field conditions were noted and, where necessary, were incorporated into the analyses. Figure 9 shows the entire evacuation network.

E-33 Rev. 49 Network Definition IEM performed a complete review of the evacuation roadway network. The evacuation network was developed using published evacuation routes and GIS road network data representing roads

available from NAVTEQ 21 and the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT).

22 The high accuracy NAVTEQ street network GIS data, obtained for the PTV Vision simulation software, was used for field validation purposes and to build the digital evacuation network database. The GDOT data was used to supplement the NAVTEQ data where required. To ensure the accuracy of this data, the entire evacuation network, including those roads outside the 10-mile EPZ leading to the reception centers, was verified by traveling each route in the network in the direction of evacuation and collecting detailed information regarding the properties of each road section using a Global Positioning System (GPS)-enabled device. The GPS allowed IEM personnel to locate-with a high degree of precision-any sections that had changed in channelization, curvature, speed limits, or other necessary network information.

The specific network attributes that were collected during the field trip included number of lanes, speed, turns, traffic controls, pavement type and wi dth, shoulder width, and any other information required to model the traffic capacity of each link in the network.

Evacuation Route Descriptions The evacuation network modeled for the ETE analyses covers Henry and Houston counties in Alabama, and Early County in Georgia. The evacuation routes were originally developed by the Alabama and Georgia Emergency Management Agencies and county emergency officials. The evacuation route network is composed of three kinds of roads: highways, major arterial (roads connecting to highways), and minor arterial or connector roads (residential roads connecting to major arterial roads).

An example of a highway in the EPZ is United States Highway 84 (US-84). Examples of major arterials are Alabama State Road 95 (AL-95), Alabama State Road 52 (AL-52), Georgia State

Road 62 (SR-62), and Georgia State Road 370 (SR-370). An example of a connector road is Bill Yance Road in Alabama. The connector roads, although not part of the evacuation routes described in the calendar, actually load the evacuee population onto the evacuation routes. The following items are descriptions of each evacuation route as mentioned in the calendar (see also Figure 10 and Figure 11).

21 PTV America, Inc. "NAVTEQ Data for PTV VISION." Online: http://www.ptvamerica.com/navteq_tiles/index.html (last accessed December 13, 2007). 22 Georgia Department of Transportation. Online: http://www.dot.state.ga.us. GDOT road network data was downloaded from the Georgia GIS Clearinghouse Web site: https://gis1.state.ga.us/index.asp. No such information was readily available on the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) website.

E-36 Rev. 49 Reception Center/Shelter for Alabama Residents: Houston County Farm Center: Go west on US-84 or AL-52 to Ross Clark Circle in Dothan. Then go south on Ross Clark Circle to Houston County Farm Center located at the intersection of Ross Clark Circle and Cottonwood Road (AL-53). Reception Center/Shelter for Georgia Residents: Early County High School gymnasium in Blakely, GA: Go east to SR-39. Then go north to Blakely or take SR-62 into Blakely.

Each evacuation route leads to one of two designated reception centers. Table 11 lists the designated reception centers and their physical addresses. Figure 9 shows the reception centers graphically.

TABLE 11: RECEPTION CENTERS Reception Center Address Houston County Farm Center1701 E Cottonwood Road Dothan, AL 36301 Early County High School 12020 Columbia Street Blakely, GA 39823 Evacuation Network Characteristics The evacuation network, as modeled using the NAVTEQ street network data, contains 1,077 links in the direction of evacuation and includes the connector roads.23 The total length of the network, again in the direction of evacuation and all the way to the reception centers, is about 454 miles. Detailed information regarding the roads that make up the evacuation network is provided in Appendix B.

The highways generally have a posted speed limit of 50-65 mph. The major and minor arterial or connector roads generally have a posted speed limit of 35-45 mph. On some of the roads, especially the highways, the posted speed limit decreases to 25 mph near city limit boundaries. Unpaved roads or dirt roads do not have posted speed limits, so a speed limit of 20-25 mph was

assumed for modeling purposes based on comfortable and safe driving speeds achieved by IEM personnel on these roads during field verification. Most of the links in the evacuation network (including some highways) generally have one lane available in the direction of evacuation. There are no interstates within the 10-mile EPZ. Two roads in the EPZ have network links with two lanes in the direction of evacuation- US-84 west towards Ross Clark Circle in Dothan, Alabama, and US-84 east toward Jakin, Georgia. AL-52 and GA SR-62 also have two lanes in the direction of evacuation along some sections (due to the presence of passing lanes). US-84 has three lanes available in the direction of evacuation as it approaches Ross Clark Circle in Dothan..

23 A link is defined as a road section where its characteristics (e.g., speed limit, number of lanes) are constant. An intersection starts a new link or ends a link.

E-37 Rev. 49 Traffic control along the evacuation routes is mostly managed using stop signs. In Alabama, traffic lights were found along AL-95 (approaching center of Columbia), along AL-52 (approaching Dothan), along Ross Clark Circle (in Dothan), at the intersection of Broadway and Old US-84 (in Ashford), and along US-84 (approaching Dothan). In Georgia, a traffic light was found at the intersection of Church Street and Columbia Road in Blakely. Evacuation Time Estimate Methodology

ETEs are developed using VISUM, one of the core components of the PTV Vision software suite.

VISUM is used to estimate evacuation times for different scenarios (e.g., day vs. night or normal vs. adverse weather) for user-defined spatial networks. Information provided by PTV Vision includes evacuation or clearance times, operational characteristics (e.g., average evacuation speed, average distance traveled), points of congestion, and other data necessary to evaluate evacuation plans.

The evacuation network was defined based on the information provided in 2007 public outreach calendar. IEM Subject Matter Experts drove the designated routes to ensure complete and accurate information about the state of the roads and to evaluate the appropriate selection of routes given the current conditions onsite.

Population (number of cars) loaded onto the network is based on the data and methods described above in the Section 0. Loading times for the evacuation network are described below.

Additional details about the methodology are included in the following sections. Assumptions Key assumptions that have a substantial impact on the results of the analysis are detailed in the following sections. Any assumptions associated with the development of population estimates are included in Section 0. Loading of the Evacuation Network The timing of network loading24 is derived from data presented in Evaluating Protective Actions for Chemical Agent Emergencies.25 This data was collected during evacuations executed in response to large-scale chemical spills and explicitly incorporates the time required for communication of the warning (warning diffusion) and the time required for an individual to respond to the warning (mobilization). The data collected in this meta-study was based on transient, permanent, and special populations and is therefore appropriate to use as "general" warning diffusion and public mobilization curves for all three population types.

The underlying assumption regarding the applicability of Rogers' mobilization curves in the ETE study is that public perception of radiological emergencies differs from the actual characteristic of such an event. The familiarity of the hazard and the social assessment of the risks associated with the hazards are among the underlying forces that guide the decision-making process in an evacuation scenario. People are more likely to respond to calls for evacuation when the assessment of threat in the community is high and dangers to life and property are recognized.

The reality may be different. The alarm associated with social response in a radiological emergency makes the use of Rogers' mobilization curves prudent for the ETE study.

24 Loading is defined as the appearance of evacuating vehicles on the roads. 25 Rogers, G. O., et al., Evaluating Protective Actions for Chemical Agent Emergencies (ORNL-6615), Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1990.

E-38 Rev. 49 It should also be noted that these curves were developed from the empirical data collected from real-life evacuations in response to actual events. No similar study developed specifically for radiological events is readily available. Therefore, the widely accepted Rogers' mobilization

curves were used for this study. The implications of assuming public behavior in absence of real data are unknown. Actual data taken from a somewhat similar real-life scenario and similar public response is more applicable than some manufactured assumptions about how people will

behave.

The specific timing used for warning diffusion is detailed in Figure 12. Since the distribution of times depends on the warning system employed, the alert and notification systems (ANS) around the site were evaluated based on the description in the emergency plans. The warning diffusion time distribution was chosen based on the availability of sirens, tone alert radios (TARs), and the emergency alert system (EAS) in the EPZ. It was also assumed that in boating and recreational areas, local emergency officials will sound sirens and/or use loud speakers to warn visitors. Any deviations from this assumption will impact the evacuation times. For example, any loss of the capability of the ANS components will potentially increase the evacuation times. For example, Figure 12 shows that if only EAS is used, the evacuation times will be longer since it takes comparatively more time for warning to diffuse.

The mobilization curve (Figure 13) is combined with the warning diffusion curve to form a composite loading curve that reflects the actual time distribution of cars loaded on the network.

It is important to note that the starting point for this curve is the time at which public notification begins-not the start time of a hypothetical event.

E-39 Rev. 49 FIGURE 12: WARNING DIFFUSION FOR SELECTED NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS 26 26 Ibid. 0%10%20%30%40%

50%

60%

70%

80%90%100%020406080100120140Percent of Population Receiving WarningMinutes from Warning StartPercentage of Population Receiving Warningby Warning System and Time Elapsed*TARS, Siren & EASSiren & EAS EAS E-40 Rev. 49 FIGURE 13: POPULATION MOBILIZATION TIMES27

27 Ibid. 0%10%20%30%

40%

50%

60%70%80%

90%100%0102030405060Percent of Population MobilizedMinutes from Warning ReceivedPercentage of Population Mobilized After Warning Received*

E-41 Rev. 49 Evacuation Simulation Evacuations were simulated using the population and vehicle demand data, evacuation network data, and loading distribution data discussed in the previous sections. VISUM was used to simulate evacuations. Figure 14 describes the framework of the analysis and three of its main features: the demand model, the network model, and the impact model.

FIGURE 14: ETES ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK USING VISUM The Demand Model The demand model contains the travel demand data. The total number of vehicles originating from a zone is calculated by dividing a population with its expected vehicle occupancy rate. The total number of vehicles originating from a zone is then distributed to different time intervals based on the loading distribution curve for the zone. The loading distribution curve for the zone depends on the warning system available for that zone. The travel demand is described by an origin-destination (OD) matrix. The OD matrix refers to a time interval and the total number of vehicles departing in that time interval.

The Network Model The network model describes the relevant suppl y data of an evacuation network. The supply data consists of traffic zones, nodes, links, speed limits, and capacities. Traffic zones describe areas with particular boundaries based on demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and local jurisdictions. They represent the origin and destination of trips within the evacuation network. Nodes define positions of intersections in the evacuation network. Links connect nodes and, therefore, describe the road infrastructure. Every network object is described by its attributes (e.g., speed limits and capacities for the links). The travel time of a vehicle on a given link depends on the speed permitted on and the capacity of-the traffic volume that a road can handle before the formation of a jam-the link. The capacity calculations in the analysis are based on the Transportation Research Board's Highway Capacity Manual.28 The Impact Model The impact model takes its input data from the demand model and the network model. PTV Vision provides different impact models to anal yze and evaluate the evacuation network. A user model simulates the behavior of travelers. It calculates traffic volumes and service indicators, such as travel time. VISUM traffic assignment procedure chosen for this analysis simulates movement of vehicles on the network as time passes in the evacuation, and outputs volumes for each link at each time after analyzing the queuing behavior. This time-dynamic functionality allows for loading of the network via distributions, as when using a range of mobilization times.

The ETE is measured by noting when the last car passes the boundary of the EPZ. VISUM displays the calculated results in graphic and tabular forms and allows graphical analysis of results. In this way, for example, routes per OD pair, traffic flow, and isochrones can be displayed

and analyzed.

28 Transportation Research Board, National Research Council. Highway Capacity Manual. Washington, D.C. 2000.

E-42 Rev. 49 Analysis of Evacuation Times Evacuation times were estimated in order to give emergency planners in the area an approximate time required for evacuation of various parts of the footprint. The estimates were derived by using population (demand) data to determine the number of vehicles and then modeling the travel of the vehicles along the evacuation routes from their origin to their assigned reception center.

The evacuation time estimates are composed of two components. The first is loading time, which is the time required for residents within the area to prepare and then begin their evacuation. The second is travel time, which is the time between the residents' departure and when they cross the EPZ boundary. Loading time depends, in part, on how long it takes residents to receive the warning, and is thus dependent on the warning systems in their area.

As a part of the analysis, zones in the study area were grouped into scenarios to represent the different areas that might need to be evacuated during an incident. So that planners could more effectively order evacuations, scenarios were based on zones and potential wind direction. These scenarios are discussed in more detail in Section 0.

Each zone had been assigned a set of evacuation routes by State and local EMA planners, and these route restrictions were reflected in the modeling of the scenarios. These guidelines generally route evacuees based on the county where these are located at the time of the

incident.

The evacuation routes are described in more detail in Section 0. Summary of ETE Results The evacuation time estimate results are displayed in Table 12. Evacuation times listed include warning diffusion, public mobilization, and travel time out of the EPZ. It is important to note that the evacuation time is the time from the moment at which public notification begins-not the start time of a hypothetical event.

E-43 Rev. 49 TABLE 12 : 2010 ETES IN MINUTES 29 Evacuation Area Zones Impacted Normal Weather Adverse Weather Weekday Weeknight Weekend Weekday Weeknight Weekend 0-2 Miles A 80 75 75 90 85 85 0-5 Miles, SW A, B-5, C-5, D-5, 140 105 165 150 110 175 0-5 Miles, NW A, E-5, F-5 155 155 175 165 160 185 0-5 Miles, NE A, I-5 145 95 160 150 100 165 0-5 Miles, SE A, J-5, K-5 130 120 135 140 135 150 0-5 Miles A, B-5, C-5, D-5, E-5, F-5, I-5, J-5, K-5160 155 180 170 160 190 0-10 Miles, SW A, B-5, C-5, D-5, B-10, C-10, D-10 155 140 170 170 155 185 0-10 Miles, NW A, E-5, F-5, E-10, F-10 155 155 175 165 160 185 0-10 Miles, NE A, I-5, G-10, H-10, I-10 145 115 165 150 120 170 0-10 Miles, SE A, J-5, K-5, J-10, K-10 150 130 170 165 140 185 0-10 Miles, Full EPZ All Zones 175 155 185 195 170 200

29 Note: The scenarios are each considered individually; if combinations of the geographic evacuation areas are to be evacuated together, the larger of the two numbers should be used as the evacuation time. For example, if zones E-5, F-5, J-5, and K-5 (combination of 5-mile NW and 5-mile SE scenarios) were to be evacuated on a normal 2010 weekday, the ETE would be the greater of the two ETEs or 155 minutes.

E-44 Rev. 49 Discussion of Scenario Results General Trends The ETEs in both normal and adverse weather are driven more by the warning system and available speeds rather than the roadway capacities because vehicular demand is low compared to available roadway capacities. Adverse weather conditions increase ETEs by approximately 5 to 20 minutes, due primarily to reduced travelling speeds, and to a lesser degree, to reduced roadway capacities. For each evacuation area except for the two-mile radius, the weekend scenario produced the highest evacuation times. This is due to the increased amount of recreational transients in the area (hunters and boaters and park visitors) on the weekend. This population has a higher warning and diffusion time than other populations-up to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 5 minutes, compared to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 30 minutes for EAS and sirens, and 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 5 minutes for EAS and TARs.

Evacuation Area 1: 0-2 Miles The majority of the population within the two-mile radius, Zone A, consists of Plant Farley employees. This population will evacuate to the Houston/Henry County Evacuation Center in Alabama, primarily using Pleasant Grove Road to US-84.There is also a small amount of permanent population, transient employees, and recreational hunters in the area. These populations will primarily use SR 370 to SR 62 to exit the EPZ for the Early County reception center in Georgia, and US-84 to exit the EPZ to Houston and Henry counties in Alabama. The evacuation times range from 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 15 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 30 minutes. The highest evacuation times are for the Weekday Scenario, when the Plant population is at its peak. No significant congestion occurs in this scenario.

Evacuation Area 2: 0-5 Miles SW This evacuation area includes all population in the two-mile radius (Zone A), and additional population in the five-mile radius in Houston County west of the Chattahoochee River and south of Nuclear Plant Road/Edsel Deese Road (Zones B-5, C-5 and D-5). This population includes permanent residents, transient employees, Plant Farley employees, recreational visitors to the Chattahoochee River, and hunters. There are no special facilities in this evacuation area. The population evacuating this area will primarily use US-84 to leave the 10-mile EPZ. The small population that will evacuate to the Early County reception center will primarily use State Route

370 to State Route 62 to exit the EPZ. The evacuation times range from 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 45 minutes to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 15 minutes and are highest for the Weekend Scenario. These times are driven by warning and diffusion times and are not influenced by significant congestion.

E-45 Rev. 49 Evacuation Area 3: 0-5 Miles NW This evacuation area includes all population in the two-mile radius (Zone A), and additional population in Houston County in the five-mile radius west of the Chattahoochee River and north of Nuclear Plant Road/Edsel Deese Road (Zones E-5 and F-5). This population includes permanent residents, transient employees, Plant Farley employees, recreational park visitors, and hunters. This area also includes two special facilities: a day care center and Houston County High School. The population evacuating this area will primarily use Alabama Highway 52 and US-84 to leave the 10-mile EPZ. The small population that will evacuate to the Early County reception center will primarily use State Route 370 to State Route 62 to exit the EPZ. The evacuation times range from 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 35 minutes to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 5 minutes and are highest for the Weekend Scenario. These times are driven by warning and diffusion times and are not influenced by significant congestion.

Evacuation Area 4: 0-5 Miles NE This evacuation area includes all population in the two-mile radius (Zone A), and additional population in Early County east of the Chattahoochee River in Zone I-5. The population includes permanent residents, transient employees, Plant Farley employees, recreational visitors to the Chattahoochee River, hunters, and special facility workers. The population evacuating to the Houston/Henry County reception center will primarily use Pleasant Grove Road to US-84 to exit the EPZ. The population evacuating to the Early County reception center will primarily use State Route 62 to exit the EPZ. The evacuation times range from 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 35 minutes to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 5 minutes and are highest for the Weekend Scenario. These times are driven by warning and diffusion times and are not influenced by significant congestion.

Evacuation Area 5: 0-5 Miles SE This evacuation area includes all population in the two-mile radius (Zone A), and additional population in Early County east of the Chattahoochee River in Zones J-5 and K-5. The population includes permanent residents, transient employees, Plant Farley employees, hunters, and special facility workers. The population evacuating to the Houston/Henry County reception center will primarily use Pleasant Grove Road to US-84 to exit the EPZ. The population evacuating to the Early County reception center will primarily use State Route 273, State Route 370, Cedar Springs Highway, and State Route 62 to exit the EPZ. The evacuation times range from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 0 minutes to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 30 minutes and are highest for the Weekend Scenario. These times are driven by the warning and diffusion times and are not influenced by significant congestion.

Evacuation Area 6: 0-5 Miles This area includes the entire five-mile EPZ, consisting of zones A, B-5, C-5, D-5, E-5, F-5, I-5, J-5 and K-5.The evacuation times for the entire 5-mile EPZ are similar to the maximum evacuation times by sector for each scenario. The evacuation routes for the entire 5-mile radius were similar to those for each sector. The evacuation times ranged from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 35 minutes to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 10 minutes. For each scenario (Weekday, Weeknight, and Weekend), the evacuation times for the overall five-mile EPZ were 0-5 minutes higher than the highest time for each sector. This indicates that there will not be excess congestion from adjacent sectors evacuating together.

E-46 Rev. 49 Evacuation Area 7: 0-10 Miles SW This evacuation area includes all population in the five-mile SW radius (Zones A, B-5, C-5 and D-5), and additional population in the 10-mile radius in Houston County west of the Chattahoochee

River and south of Nuclear Plant Road/Edsel Deese Road (Zones B-10, C-10 and D-10). This population includes permanent residents, transient employees, Plant Farley employees, recreational visitors to the Chattahoochee River, and hunters. The area includes a day care, Ashford Elementary School, Ashford High School, Houston County, Career and Technical Center, Ashford Academy, and several other special facilities. The population evacuating this area will primarily use Alabama Highway 52 and US-84 to leave the 10 mile EPZ. The small population that will evacuate to the Early County reception center will primarily use State Route 370 to State Route 62 to exit the EPZ. The evacuation times range from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 20 minutes to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 5 minutes and are highest for the Weekend Scenario. These times are driven by warning and diffusion times and are not influenced by significant congestion.

Evacuation Area 8: 0-10 Miles NW This evacuation area includes all population in the five-mile NW radius (Zones A, E-5 and F-5 ), and additional population in Houston and Henry counties in the 10-mile radius west of the Chattahoochee River and north of Nuclear Plant Road/Edsel Deese Road (Zones E-10 and F-10). This population includes permanent residents, transient employees, Plant Farley employees, recreational park visitors, and hunters. This area also includes three special facilities: a day care center, Houston County High School, and Webb Elementary School. The population evacuating

this area will primarily use Alabama Highway 52 and US-84 to leave the 10-mile EPZ. The small population that will evacuate to the Early County reception center will primarily use State Route 370 to State Route 62 to exit the EPZ. The evacuation times range from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 35 minutes to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 5 minutes and are highest for the Weekend Scenario. These times are driven by warning and diffusion times and are not influenced by significant congestion.

Evacuation Area 9: 0-10 Miles NE This evacuation area includes all population in the five-mile NE radius (Zones A and I-5), and additional population in Early County east of the Chattahoochee River in Zones G-10, H-10 and I-

10. The population includes permanent residents, transient employees, Plant Farley employees, recreational visitors to the Chattahoochee River, recreational park visitors, hunters, special facility workers, and Camp E-Tu-Nake school. The population evacuating to the Houston/Henry County reception center will primarily use US-84 to exit the EPZ. The population evacuating to the Early County reception center will primarily use State Route 62 to exit the EPZ. The evacuation times range from 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 55 minutes to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 50 minutes and are highest for the Weekend Scenario.

These times are driven by warning and diffusion times and are not influenced by significant congestion.

E-47 Rev. 49 Evacuation Area 10: 0-10 Miles SE This evacuation area includes all population in the five-mile SE radius (Zones A, J-5 and K-5), and additional population in Early County east of the Chattahoochee River in Zones J-10 and K-

10. The population includes permanent residents, transient employees, Plant Farley employees, recreational visitors to the Chattahoochee River, recreational park visitors, hunters, and special facility workers. The population evacuating to the Houston/Henry County reception center will primarily use US-84 to exit the EPZ. The population evacuating to the Early County reception center will primarily use Cedar Springs Highway , State Route 39, Ades Springs Road and State Route 62 to exit the EPZ.

Evacuation Area 11: 0-10 Miles The evacuation time of the entire 10-mile EPZ was similar to the evacuations of the separate 10-mile 90° areas. For all scenarios, the 10-mile radius evacuation times were 0-20 minutes longer than the highest individual sector times. These times show that as traffic from each 90° area merges, congestion in the network will not significantly contribute to increased evacuation time.

Some routes such as Ross Clark Circle, US-84 and Alabama Highway 52 (leading to Houston/Henry County reception center), and State Route 62 leading to Early County reception center may experience some congestion as the volumes reach levels that are near the capacity of the road.

E-48 Rev. 49 Supplemental Analysis The analyses related to confirmation of evacuation and potential mitigating measures to effectively manage the traffic flow were performed and are provided in the following sections.

Confirmation of Evacuation Confirmation of the evacuation process determines whether the evacuation has been completed. The time required for confirmation of evacuation is dependent upon the method employed. The

most time-consuming method typically employed is to use ground vehicles. The time required involves the driving time for each route selected.

Informing people to leave some standard signs on their doors or windows, such as tying a white cloth to the front doorknob of the house or to the mailbox (as mentioned in the public outreach calendar), when they leave their houses would help the authorities in the confirmation of evacuation. Presence of TCPs and Access Control Points (ACPs) at strategic locations within the evacuation network could provide real-time feedback regarding the progress of the evacuation process. All evacuees are recommended to register at the designated county reception centers as they arrive. This procedure helps the authorities to account for the population within the designated county. This can be accounted as one of the means of confirmation of evacuation only under the assumption that all the evacuees would actually report to the reception centers and nowhere else. Telephoning people at their homes could also be considered as a possible means of ensuring completion of evacuation.

As noted in the county radiological emergency response plans, evacuation confirmation will be accomplished by the county Sheriff's Department and supporting law enforcement agency personnel, who will traverse roadways throughout the affected area to ensure that the residential population has evacuated their homes. Personnel from the State Department of Natural Resources Law Enforcement Section and the county Emergency Management Agency will ensure that hunters and fishermen within the 10-mile EPZ are evacuated. Additional assistance is available from other State agencies. Officials from the plant will advise the county EOCs when evacuation is confirmed at the plant site.

The actual time associated with the confirmation process would depend on both the number of personnel and the amount of equipment available. These resources may change significantly under various emergency conditions. Evacuation Traffic Management Locations and Other Potential Mitigating Measures In order to efficiently promote smooth movement of traffic flow during an evacuation, several TCPs have been identified by the plant and county emergency response planning personnel. These TCPs are listed in Table 13 and shown graphically in Figure 15. The responsibility of supervising traffic controls during an evacuation will be shared between State and county emergency management and law enforcement pers onnel, as available. Each TCP will be manned and/or road blocks will be established to direct evacuees out of the EPZ and to deny access into the affected area. Also, route markers will be placed along the evacuation routes at critical intersections and road block locations to promote more efficient traffic flow out from the

EPZ.

E-49 Rev. 49 TABLE 13: TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS FOR THE FNP EPZ Location ID Description Operation Control State 1 3840 E. Cook Road and 1 Lamp Brothers Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 2 4185 Hunter Road and 10031 N. State Hwy 95 Houston County Sheriff Alabama 3 3928 Ed Tolar Road and 4415 N. State Hwy 95 Houston County Sheriff Alabama 4 2475 Nuclear Plant Road and 1 Macedonia Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 5 North Main Street (AL

-95) and State Hwy 134 (Henry County

53) Houston County Sheriff Alabama 6 12412 N. State Hwy 95 and 16742 E. State Hwy 52 Houston County Sheriff Alabama 7 517 Pea Market Road and 7841 Bill Yance Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 8 13832 E. State Hwy. 52 and 315 Jesse Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 9 3564 Cedar Springs Road and 1766 Ebenezer Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 10 2898 Cedar Springs Road and 1 King Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 11 2141 Cedar Springs Road and 3239 Edsel Deese Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 12 1308 Cedar Springs Road and 2465 N. County Road 33 Houston County Sheriff Alabama 13 1 Cedar Springs Road and 1869 Pleasant Grove Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 14 2697 N. County 75 Road and 1530 Bruner Pond Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 15 1372 N. County 75 Road and 1 Ed Tolar Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 16 306 N. County 75 Road and 1

Liberty Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 17 6190 Pansey Road and 150 E.

Cook Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 18 2195 N. County 81 Road and 2213 N. State Hwy 95 Houston County Sheriff Alabama 19 Henry Co.

- State Hwy 95 and County Road 112 (1st Road N. of Foster Creek) Henry County Sheriff Alabama 20 Henry Co.

- County Road 77 and County Road 53 Henry County Sheriff Alabama 21 Henry Co.

- County Road 63 and County Road 77 (County Road 6)Henry County Sheriff Alabama 22 7188 E. County Road 22 and 7160 N. County Road 55 Houston County Sheriff Alabama E-50 Rev. 49 Location ID Description Operation Control State23 1245 Randall Wade Road and 2241 Bill Yance Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 24 4260 Enon Road and 7695 E.

State Hwy 52 Houston County Sheriff Alabama 25 2626 Enon Road and 4230 Glen

Lawrence Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 26 1366 Enon RoadHouston County Sheriff Alabama27 1 Broadway Avenue (County Road 55) and 7076 E. State Hwy 52 Houston County Sheriff Alabama 28 489 Battles Road and 1230 Broadway Avenue Houston County Sheriff Alabama 29 1890 Silcox Road and 1 Enterprise Church Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 30 2208 S. County Road 33 and 1026 Enterprise Church Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 31 6220 Lucy Grade Road (County Road 24) and 3935 S. County 55 Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 32 1110 Antioch Church Road and 1221 Coot Adams Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 33 795 Bobby Hill Road (Creek

Church Road) and 5096 S. Rocky Creek Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 34 4894 E. County Road 8 and 4565 S. County Road 75 Houston County Sheriff Alabama 35 6526 E. County Road 8 and 3271 S. County Road 81 Houston County Sheriff Alabama 36 8222 E. County Road 8 and 3435 S. Springhill Church Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 37 10616 E. County Road 8 and 4593 S. County Road 85 Houston County Sheriff Alabama 38 3090 S. State Hwy 95Houston County Sheriff Alabama39 2468 Barksdale RoadHouston County Sheriff Alabama40 1 N. County Road 33 and 899 N.

Broadway Street Houston County Sheriff Alabama 41 399 Main Street and 799 N.

Broadway Street Houston County Sheriff Alabama 42 399 Church Street and 499 N.

Broadway Street Houston County Sheriff Alabama 43 1994 Old Hwy 84 and 299 N.

Broadway Street Houston County Sheriff Alabama 44 1 Wallace Buie Road and 635

Webb to Kinsey Road Houston County Sheriff Alabama 45 Highway 62 at Chattahoochee River (Early/Houston County

Line) Early County Sheriff Georgia E-51 Rev. 49 Location ID Description Operation Control State46 Highway 62 at Highway 370Early County SheriffGeorgia47 Highway 62 at County Road 25 (Martin Rd) Early County Sheriff Georgia 48 Highway 62 at County Road 145 (Rock Hill Rd) Early County Sheriff Georgia 49 Highway 62 (Columbia Rd) at Reception Center (Early County

High School) Early County Sheriff Georgia 50 Highway 363 (Cedar Springs Rd) at Chattahoochee Street Early County Sheriff Georgia 51 Highway 363 (Cedar Springs Hwy) at County Road 25 (Martin Rd) Early County Sheriff Georgia 52 Highway 363 (Cedar Springs Hwy) at County Road 279 (Damascus Hilton Rd) Early County Sheriff Georgia 53 Highway 363 (Cedar Springs Hwy) at County Road 284 (Allen Chapel Rd) Early County Sheriff Georgia 54 Highway 370 at County Road 103 (Dowry Rd) Early County Sheriff Georgia 55 Highway 370 at Highway 273Early County SheriffGeorgia56 County Road 50 (Spooner

Quarter Rd) at County Road 48 (Kilarney Rd) Early County Sheriff Georgia 57 US Highway 84 at

Chattahoochee River (Early/Houston County Line) Early County Sheriff Georgia 58 US Highway at Howards Mill Road Early County Sheriff Georgia

E-53 Rev. 49 Conclusion and Recommendations The ETEs developed for 11 evacuation areas within the 10-mile FNP EPZ measured the time from the public notification to when the last evacuating vehicle exited the EPZ boundary.

ETEs for the evacuation areas ranged from 75 minutes to 185 minutes for the normal scenarios, and from 85 minutes to 200 minutes for those occurring in adverse weather. Variations in ETEs between scenarios generally correlated to differences in the number of evacuating vehicles, the capacity of the evacuation routes, the roadway conditions, or the distance from the origin zones to the EPZ boundary. The weekend scenario produced the highest evacuation times due to the longer mobilization time for the higher number of recreational transients in the area (hunters and boaters) on the weekend.

The analysis shows that the capacity of the roadway network within the EPZ is adequate to accommodate the population for all scenarios. Based on the data gathered and the results of the evacuation study conducted, IEM believes that the existing evacuation strategy is functional for the year 2010 conditions, given the lack of severe congestion or very high ETEs.

E-54 Rev. 49 Appendix A: Geographical Boundaries of Evacuation Zones Evacuation Zones Zone Boundaries Landmark Descriptions A-AL North: Hunter Road, then line due east to Chattahoochee River West: Macedonia Road and Jackson Creek South: Cedar Creek East: Chattahoochee River Includes Farley Nuclear Plant A-GA North, South, East - 2 mile boundary West - Chattahoochee River B-5 North: Cedar Creek and Ed Tolar Road West: Cook Road South: Pansey Road, then Mixon Road, then County Road 81, then Main Street in Gordon, then Boat Landing Road East: Chattahoochee River Gordon Boat Ramp B-10 North: Pansey Road, then Mixon Road, then County Road 81, then Main Street in Gordon, then Boat Landing Road West: Fire Tower Road South: County Road 8, then County Road 85, then Greenhouse Road, then creek turning east to Chattahoochee River East: Chattahoochee River Includes town of

Gordon C-5 North: Lamp Brothers Road, Jackson Creek, and Cedar Creek West: County Road 75 South: Pansey Road and Ed Tolar Road East: Cook Road and Alabama Highway 95 C-10 North: Pansey Road, then County Road 75, then U.S. Highway 84, then McDaniel Road, then Cosby Road, then Meadows Road, then Garrett Road, then Buster Road West: County Road 55 South: Coot Adams Road, then Bowen Road, then County Road 8 East: Fire Tower Road, to U.S. Highway 84, to Mixon Road

E-55 Rev. 49 Evacuation Zones Zone Boundaries Landmark Descriptions D-5 North: Nuclear Plant Road, then County Road 33, then Edsel Deese Road West: Cedar Springs Road South: Pleasant Grove Road, then Bruner Pond Road, then County Road 75, then Ed Tolar Road, then Paul Lamp Road and Lamp

Brothers Road East: Jackson Creek D-10 North: Edsel Deese Road, then Ben Ivey Road, then Johnnie Ingram Road West: Enon Road, then Bluffspring Road, then Bluff Springs Road, then U.S. Highway 84, then Broadway Avenue, becoming Avon Road South: Aspen Road becoming Enterprise Church Road, then County Road 33, then Lucy Grade Road, then County Road 55, then Buster Road, to Garrett Road, to Meadows Road, to Cosby Road, to McDaniel Road, to U.S.

Highway 84 East: County Road 75, to Bruner Pond Road, to Cedar Springs Road Includes town of Ashford, Ingram Lake, and Enterprise Church E-5 North: Hunter Road, then County Road 33, then Alabama Highway 52, then Jesse Road, then

Ebenezer Road West: Cedar Springs Road South: Edsel Deese Road, to County Road 33, to Nuclear Plant Road East: Macedonia Road Hunters Cemetery E-10 North: Bill Yance Road, to J D Love Road, to County Road 22 West: Gilley Mill Road, to Webb Kinsey Road, to Enon Road South: Ingram Road, to Ben Ivey Road, to Edsel Deese Road East: Cedar Springs Road, to Ebenezer Road, to Jesse Road Qualico Steel, Webb Elementary School E-56 Rev. 49 Evacuation Zones Zone Boundaries Landmark Descriptions F-5 North: Northern boundary of Columbia, to Omussee Creek, to Alabama Highway 52, to Bill Yance Road West: Jesse Road, to Alabama Highway 52, to County Road 33 South: Hunter Road, then line east to Chattahoochee River East: Chattahoochee River Includes town of Columbia, Omussee Creek State Park F-10 North: County Road 112, Alabama Highway 95, County Roads 277 and 77, then County Road 63, then Alabama Highway 134 West: County Road 56/55 South: County Road 22, then J D Love Road, then Bill Yance Road, then Alabama Highway 52, then Omussee Creek, then northern boundary of Columbia East: Chattahoochee River Spring Hill Church G-10 North: 10 mile boundary West: Chattahoochee River South and East: Georgia Highway 62 Includes Coheelee Creek Park and boat landing, and Camp E-TU-NAKE H-10 North and West: Georgia Highway 62 South: County Road 1691 East: 10 mile boundary I-10 North: County Road 1691 West: County Road 13 South: Power line from Farley Nuclear Plant East: 10 mile boundary J-5 North: Power line from Farley Nuclear Plant West: 2 mile boundary South: Georgia Highway 370 East: 5 mile boundary, Georgia Highway 363, and County Road 26 J-10 North: Power line from Farley Nuclear Plant West: County Road 26 and Georgia Highway 363 South: Georgia Highway 273/Cedar Springs Road East: 10 mile boundary Green Cemetery, Cedar Springs Church E-57 Rev. 49 Evacuation Zones Zone Boundaries Landmark Descriptions K-5 North: 2 mile boundary West: Chattahoochee River South/Southeast: 5 mile boundary East/Northeast: Georgia Highway 370 Georgia Pacific K-10 North: Cedar Springs Road/Georgia Highway 273

Northwest: 5 mile boundary Southwest: Chattahoochee River East/Southeast: 10 mile boundary Navy Yard Landing, Republic Conduit E-58 Rev. 49 Appendix B: Evacuation Network Links (Detailed Information)

Road Name State Number of Links Number of Lanes (max) Length (miles) Speed Limit (max) AL-134 Alabama 20 1 17.03 45AL-52 Alabama 122 2 32.05 55 AL-52/W Church St Alabama 18 1 1.72 55AL-53/E Cottonwood Rd Alabama 6 1 0.43 45AL-95 Alabama 22 1 19.54 55AL-95/George H Grimsley Hwy Alabama 54 1 24.69 55AL-95/N Main St Alabama 18 1 2.03 55 Ades Springs Rd Georgia 14 1 5.10 55 Allen Chapel Rd Georgia 6 1 4.20 25 Antioch Church Rd Alabama 6 1 2.20 45Avon Rd Alabama 16 1 3.20 45Balkum Rd Alabama 2 1 0.68 45 Barksdale Rd Alabama 4 1 3.97 45Ben Ivey Rd Alabama 2 1 0.88 45 Benton Store Rd Alabama 14 1 6.48 45 Big Pine Rd Georgia 16 1 7.97 25 Bill Yance Rd Alabama 38 1 16.71 45 Bluff Springs Rd Alabama 2 1 0.07 45 Bluffspring Rd Alabama 6 1 0.50 45Boat Landing Road Star Route Alabama 4 1 1.85 40 Bobby Hill Rd Alabama 2 1 1.48 45Bowen Rd Alabama 2 1 2.53 45Broadway Alabama 10 1 1.18 45 Bruner Pond Rd Alabama 8 1 3.57 45 Buie Rd Alabama 2 1 2.00 45 Buster Rd Alabama 2 1 1.19 25CR-22 Alabama 46 1 18.73 55CR-75 Alabama 18 1 9.26 45CR-77 Alabama 4 1 3.84 35CR-8 Alabama 18 1 11.43 45CR-85 Alabama 14 1 9.24 45Cedar Springs Hwy/Rd Georgia 52 1 25.27 45 Cedar Springs Rd Alabama 42 1 14.79 55Choice Adams Rd Alabama 2 1 2.00 35 E-59 Rev. 49 Road Name State Number of Links Number of Lanes (max) Length (miles) Speed Limit (max)

Columbia Rd Georgia 20 1 2.71 50 Columbia Rd/Cr-33 Alabama 10 1 2.65 45Coot Adams Rd Alabama 4 1 2.87 45CR-53 Georgia 10 1 2.84 25CR-112 Alabama 2 1 3.69 35CR-129 Alabama 4 1 2.02 45CR-2 Alabama 4 1 5.19 45CR-24/Lucy Grade Rd Alabama 4 1 1.46 45CR-36/Glen Lawrence Rd Alabama 10 1 2.98 35CR-48 Alabama 2 1 0.34 35CR-48/Wallace Buie Rd Alabama 20 1 5.64 35CR-53 Alabama 6 1 8.04 35CR-55 Alabama 32 1 14.23 45CR-6 Alabama 2 1 0.46 35CR-60 Alabama 4 1 1.56 35CR-63 Alabama 6 1 8.33 45CR-73 Alabama 10 1 2.75 45CR-77 Alabama 10 1 5.53 45CR-81 Alabama 22 1 12.84 45 Creek Church Rd Alabama 12 1 4.50 45 Damascus Hilton Rd Georgia 46 1 17.82 45Dowry Rd Georgia 4 1 4.05 25 E Cook Rd Alabama 22 1 10.44 45E CR-8 Alabama 18 1 9.78 45 Ebenezer Rd Alabama 8 1 6.37 45 Ed Tolar Rd Alabama 16 1 7.84 45 Edsel Deese Rd Alabama 16 1 8.91 45 Enon Rd Alabama 26 1 8.53 45 Enterprise Church Rd Alabama 8 1 3.98 45Evans Rd Georgia 2 1 5.66 25 Fellows Rd Alabama 4 1 0.93 45 Firetower Rd Alabama 18 1 7.27 45Flat Creek Rd Georgia 14 1 8.94 25Fryer Rd Georgia 54 1 29.63 45GP Plant Rd Georgia 2 1 0.63 35 E-60 Rev. 49 Road Name State Number of Links Number of Lanes (max) Length (miles) Speed Limit (max) Garrett Rd Alabama 2 1 0.50 45 Gilley Mill Rd Alabama 10 1 5.22 45 Glen Lawrence Rd Alabama 28 1 9.99 45 Greenhouse Rd Alabama 2 1 0.70 15 Hudson Rd Alabama 4 1 1.29 45Hunter Rd Alabama 18 1 8.22 45J D Love Rd Alabama 8 1 3.09 45Jakin Rd Georgia 12 1 6.91 45Johnnie Ingram Rd Alabama 4 1 2.83 45Kilarney Rd Georgia 24 1 11.92 45 Kitts Rd Alabama 2 1 0.82 20Lamp Brothers Rd Alabama 2 1 4.45 25 Macedonia Rd Alabama 4 1 5.24 35 Mae Howard Rd Georgia 6 1 1.30 25Main St Alabama 18 1 2.50 35Martin Rd Georgia 20 1 9.79 35Mayhaw Rd Georgia 18 1 4.16 25 McDaniel Rd Alabama 14 1 3.57 45 Meadows Rd Alabama 4 1 1.37 45 Mills St Alabama 2 1 0.43 35Mixon Rd/CR-2 Alabama 4 1 4.15 45N Broadway Alabama 54 1 3.92 35N CR-33 Alabama 26 1 12.55 45N CR-55 Alabama 10 1 6.26 45N CR-75 Alabama 34 1 12.87 45 N Pearl St Georgia 6 1 1.12 45 Nuclear Plant Rd Alabama 8 1 7.30 45 Old Ashford Hwy Alabama 24 1 4.39 45Old Hwy 84 Alabama 4 1 3.23 45 Old River Rd Georgia 18 1 12.71 35Pansey Rd Alabama 24 1 10.43 45 Paul Lamp Rd Alabama 4 1 2.76 45Pleasant Grove Rd Alabama 24 1 6.88 45 Powell Rd Georgia 6 1 6.10 25Ramp Alabama 8 1 0.39 55 E-61 Rev. 49 Road Name State Number of Links Number of Lanes (max) Length (miles) Speed Limit (max)

Randall Wade Rd Alabama 12 1 5.56 45Rock Hill Rd Georgia 12 1 5.04 35Ross Clark Cir Alabama 30 2 4.32 50 S Church Rd Georgia 6 1 2.32 45S CR-33 Alabama 18 1 7.47 45S CR-55 Alabama 24 1 8.89 45 S Pearl St Georgia 8 1 0.75 45S Railroad St/Old Ashford Hwy Alabama 34 1 4.39 45 Sid Hughes Rd Alabama 2 1 1.57 0 Silcox Rd Alabama 2 1 0.39 35 Sowhatchee Rd Georgia 28 1 13.23 25Spooner Quarter Rd Georgia 24 1 18.44 45 State Route 273 Georgia 34 1 17.70 55 State Route 363 Georgia 4 1 1.61 55 State Route 370 Georgia 66 1 25.23 55 State Route 39 Georgia 60 1 32.66 55 State Route 62 Georgia 46 2 22.22 55US Highway 84 Georgia 18 2 9.96 65US Highway 84 Alabama 150 3 39.33 65 Wallace Buie Rd Alabama 10 1 3.88 35Webb-Kinsey Rd Alabama 8 1 2.29 45 Whitaker Rd Georgia 8 1 5.24 20Wilkie Mosley Rd Georgia 24 1 15.65 45 ¶ F-1 Rev 44 APPENDIX 6(F)

SUPPORTING EMERGENCY PLANS Plan Source NUREG 0728 NRC Incident Response Plan U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM.

Emergency Response Plan Water Reactors Division

Westinghouse Electric Corporation

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. Inter Agency Radiological Assistance Plan U.S. Department of Energy Region 3 (For interim use and guidance)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY State of Georgia Radiological Emergency Plan STATE OF GEORGIA Alabama Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants

STATE OF ALABAMA State of Florida Radiological Emergency Plan for Fixed Nuclear Facilities

STATE OF FLORIDA

APPENDIX 7(G)

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY

G-i Rev. 41

G-1 Rev. 41 A. INTRODUCTION A.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this appendix is to outline the function of the Emergency Operations Facility for the Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC).

Additionally, this appendix delineates the actions to be taken by SNC Corporate Staff in the event of an emergency at any (SNC) site.

A.2 SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY This appendix provides the framework for operations of the EOF for SNC. This appendix is an integral part of the site specific emergency plan(s).

This appendix may be implemented to coordinate a SNC response to an emergency at any SNC facility or in response to a transportation accident involving

radioactive material.

Additionally, this appendix provides the mechanism for obtaining and providing additional emergency response support and resources to SNC site(s) in the event of an emergency.

The SNC Corporate Staff will be responsible for offsite emergency response support and resources as requested. Overall management of the emergency will be accomplished at the specific site(s)[Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) and Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)].

A.3

SUMMARY

The site specific Emergency Plan, is activated by the Emergency Director (ED). Upon notification of an ALERT or higher classification or as directed by the ED, the EOF will be activated as described in emergency implementing procedures. When notified, the designated corporate emergency organization management report to the EOF to be briefed on current conditions and perform their assigned tasks.

Each manager's support staff will operate from that group's office area. Offsite support personnel and equipment will be dispatched to the site Operations Support Center (OSC) or Technical Support Center (TSC)upon request from the specific site Emergency Director. The corporate emergency organization will provide offsite emergency response support and resources to SNC sites 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months per day

until the emergency has been terminated.

The EOF will be activated for an ALERT, SITE AREA or GENERAL emergency classification. This facility will be operational within about an hour of the initial notification. SNC's goal is to begin notification of all required on-call Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel as soon as practicable, within 15 minutes, following the declaration of an Alert emergency or higher emergency classification at any SNC site. Minimum EOF staff for facility activation will include the EOF Manager, the Dose Assessment Supervisor, the Dose Analyst, the Field Team Coordinator, the ENN Communicator, and the Licensing Support

Coordinator.

Access control for the EOF is established through the use of electronic card readers.

G-2 Rev. 41 During the emergency, the emergency director will normally be located in either the TSC or Control Room at his/her option. The emergency director is responsible for the management of the emergency response. Specific duties and responsibilities are provided in the site specific Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

SNC has taken precautions to ensure that the EOF can be quickly accessed and made operational within about an hour of the initial notification and is safe-guarded against unauthorized personnel. The common EOF is located in a secure building. The building itself has posted security guards and video surveillance cameras. Any outside doors that do not have security guards are accessible only by SNC ID badges. Additionally, the EOF facility door is accessible only to people with ID badges that have been pre-approved for access. If an event were to occur during off-normal hours, a guard will be posted at the main entrance to Building 40 to allow access to offsite agency or other responders without pre-designated ID access.

B. EOF ORGANIZATION

The EOF Organization consists of selected management and staff members located in the SNC Corporate Office. This organization is responsible for providing offsite emergency response support and resources, as needed. The EOF Organization is displayed in Figure 1 and typical duty assignments are shown on Table 1. This organization may be supplemented or reduced by the EOF Manager, as required, to respond to the specific emergency situation but will not be reduced to below the minimum staff as specified in A.3 above.

SNC normally maintains ERO positions in a duty rotation. Several positions have been designated as plant specific and, as such, have personnel designated for each of the 3 sites. Specifically each of the following EOF positions has site-specific personnel designated: EOF Manager

G-3 Rev.49 EOF Technical Supervisor In order to augment additional staff that may be needed in the unlikely event of a multi-site accident, SNC will re-activate its ERO notification system. When the EOF is activated, all EOF staff pagers are activated, and all EOF personnel are expected to report to the EOF. Personnel that are not needed to augment positions are briefed and dismissed with a stand-by status.

B.1 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) MANAGER The EOF Manager manages the following activities:

Overall direction and control of the offsite response for SNC

Communication of radiological information to State and local emergency response agencies as needed

After consultation with the ED, provides support for initial activities associated with planning for recovery operations.

The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Manager will be assumed by designated SNC corporate personnel. The designated individual will be assigned according to a predetermined rotation schedule and will typically have either previous plant specific operational expertise or long-term supervisory/management

experience.

The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Manager are as follows:

1. Manage the EOF and direct the activities of the EOF organization. 2. Ensure activation of the EOF at ALERT or higher classification, or as directed by the ED. 3. Support site efforts for the following:

Determining the cause of the incident.

Assessing the overall damage, including personnel, equipment, systems, facilities and/or fuel.

Developing recovery plans. 4. Keep corporate management informed regarding the emergency response and emergency classification upgrades. 5. Ensure that the joint owners, as applicable, are kept appraised of significant changes in the emergency status including upgrades and terminations.

G-4 Rev. 56 6. Keep the GPC/APCO public information director fully appraised regarding the status of the emergency. 7. Identify the available resources within and outside the company to assist in mitigation and recovery, as necessary. 8. Procure outside services and equipment, as necessary. 9. Obtain assistance from SNC Environmental Services regarding non-radiological and hazardous materials environmental considerations. 10. Request assistance from legal counsel as appropriate. 11. Coordinate NRC inquiries/activities requiring a response from the Corporate Office. Obtain licenses and/or amendments to licenses, if required, for repair of the affected unit and disposal of waste products. 12. Approve news releases issued from the Emergency Response Center (ERC) or the Joint Information Center (JIC). 13. Communicate developed PARs to the ED once offsite communication responsibility is transferred to the EOF. The EOF Manager and ED will determine which facility will communicate the PARs to offsite agencies.

Normally, initial PARs will be communicated to offsite agencies by the TSC while changes in PARs will be communicated to offsite agencies by the EOF. 14. Ensure that necessary support is provided to the SNC News writer, the SNC Spokesperson, and the Public Information Director to ensure timely and accurate information flow to the public. An unaffected EOF Manager will be available to assist the affected EOF Manager in Company Spokesperson interface activities.

G-5 Rev. 41 B.2 EOF TECHNICAL SUPERVISOR The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Technical Supervisor will be assumed by SNC corporate support personnel. The designated individual will be will be assigned according to a predetermined rotation schedule and will typically have plant specific long-term engineering/design experience. Reporting to the EOF Technical Supervisor are the emergency communicators and the necessary engineering technical, and licensing personnel needed to support tasks assigned to the EOF.

The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Technical Supervisor are as follows:

1. Provide technical interface to vendors, utility groups, consultants and technical investigation groups. 2. Assist in establishing a list of plant equipment/system modifications required to bring the plant to cold shutdown, recovery and/or startup. 3. Develop an engineering support plan compatible with the plant mitigation and recovery plan. Provide engineering support developing site recovery procedures. This plan will include engineering personnel resources. 4. Coordinate the work performed by SNC engineering, Southern Company Services, the architect engineer, the nuclear steam supply system supplier, and other engineering consultants. Coordinate the transmittal of engineering modification/design documents (Design Change Packages (DCP), Request for Engineering Assistance (REA), etc) to the site staff, and site and SNC procurement groups. 5. Coordinate the receipt and assessment of technical information related to plant systems and facility operations, and submit recommendations to the TSC Manager through the EOF Manager. 6. Provide licensing support, as requested, through utilization of the licensing support. 7. Provides communications support for offsite notifications (Emergency Notification Network(ENN), as requested.

G-6 Rev. 41 B.3 EOF SUPPORT COORDINATOR The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Support Coordinator will be assumed by SNC corporate support personnel. The individuals designated to assume the position will be indicated on a predetermined rotational schedule. Reporting to the EOF Support Coordinator are the non-technical personnel needed to support tasks assigned to the EOF. Additionally, the News writer is matrixed to the EOF Support Coordinator from the corporate communications organization. The duties and responsibilities of the EOF Support Coordinator are as follows: 1. Provide assistance to the EOF Support Coordinator in the Technical Support Center (TSC) for ordering equipment and materials needed. Establish a standby list of personnel to provide additional technical support, as required. 2. Obtain materials, supplies, and equipment that are needed in the EOF. 3. Process expense accounts, distribute checks from payroll, and conduct other financial aspects of the emergency organization. 4. Provide logistics arrangements for support personnel called in to assist in the emergency, including communications hardware, transportation, food, and lodging. 5. Obtain assistance from corporate financial staff to communicate, as necessary, with banks, financial institutions, investors, joint owners and insurers regarding the emergency situation. 6. During the initial phase of the emergency, provide the official log of actions and the course of the emergency from the EOF. 7. Provide administrative services for the Corporate Emergency Response Organization, such as clerical, typing, and duplication. 8. Provide administrative, logistic, financial, and procurement support as appropriate during the recovery phase.

G-7 Rev. 41 B.4 DOSE ASSESSMENT SUPERVISOR The duties and responsibilities of the Dose Assessment Supervisor will be assumed by SNC corporate support personnel. The individuals designated to assume the position will be indicated on a predetermined rotation schedule.

Reporting to the Dose Assessment Supervisor are the Dose Analyst, Field Team Coordinator, Field Team Communicator, and Radiological Status Communicator. The TSC will initially be responsible for dose projection and field team control activities. When the EOF is activated and ready to assume functions of dose projection/assessment activities, then the EOF Dose Assessment Supervisor will coordinate transfer of dose assessment, field team control, and protective action determination from the TSC to the EOF. Coordination will include ED/EOF Manager mutual approval of the transfer with the intention of transferring dose assessment from the TSC to the EOF as rapidly as possible while ensuring a smoothly coordinated transfer of this critical function. The duties and responsibilities of the Dose Assessment Supervisor are as follows: 1. Support the plant dose assessment supervisor as necessary. Be prepared to assume offsite dose projection if requested. Keep the EOF Manager informed of any offsite dose assessments performed by the site or corporate staff. 2. Provide an as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) exposure review of engineering modifications and tasks proposed by the emergency organization, including necessary documentation of those reviews. 3. Develop methods for treatment and/or disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from the emergency and recovery operations. 4. Compare calculations and measurements with State and Federal groups performing radiological assessments. 5. Coordinate distribution of dose assessment information with offsite authorities. 6. Coordinate assistance to the State for transportation incidents involving radioactive material, as requested. 7. Develop protective action recommendations (PARs) and communicate to the EOF Manager the need for PAR communication once control is transferred to the EOF.

G-8 Rev. 41 B.5 SECURITY COORDINATOR The duties and responsibilities of the Security Coordinator will be assumed by SNC corporate security personnel. The individuals designated to assume the position will be indicated on a predetermined rotation schedule. The duties and responsibilities of the Security Coordinator are as follows:

1. Support the plant security manager as necessary. Keep the EOF Manager informed of any security events/issues. 2. Provide assistance to the security supervisor at the site, as requested.

3. Establish and maintain access control for the EOF.

B.6 Offsite Response Coordinator The duties and responsibilities of the Offsite Response Coordinator will be assumed by SNC Corporate Emergency Planning Coordinators and designated staff. The individuals designated to assume the position will be indicated on a predetermined rotation schedule. The duties and responsibilities of the Offsite Response Coordinator are as follows: 1. Coordinate activities concerning the dispatch and update of technical liaisons to State and Local authorities, as appropriate. 2. Monitor EOF functional areas to facilitate coordination between the licensee and State and Local agencies.

B.7 ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT STAFF 1. The Engineering/Technical Support staff and administrative support staff will report to the EOF, as directed. These job titles refer to a number of individuals performing a variety of designated tasks. Their numbers will depend on the type and duration of the emergency. 2. The Engineering/Technical Support staff are personnel designated by the management of the Corporate Emergency Organization. They provide management, technical, regulatory and licensing support during an emergency. This staff reports through the EOF Technical Supervisor to the EOF Manager.

G-9 Rev. 41 3. The administrative support staff are the non-technical members of the Corporate Emergency Response Organization. They perform duties designated by the EOF Support Coordinator or appropriate manager which include but are not limited to the following: a. Providing clerical and secretarial support to the Emergency Organization. b. Operation of word processors.

c. Operation of telecopiers.

d. Making entries to and retrieving data from Nuclear Network. e. Retrieval of file documents. f. Updating status boards using information provided from the sites.

G-10 Rev. 46 C. NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION Initial notifications or emergency response personnel will follow the guidelines specified in the site specific Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. This appendix contains the emergency notification of Corporate Management and the appropriate offsite support groups not specified in the site

specific Emergency Plan(s).

C.1 NOTIFICATION OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT The On-call EOF Manager will be notified of all emergencies classified at any SNC site. The EOF Manager is responsible for activation of the EOF Staff and notifying the appropriate Corporate Management.

1. The EOF Manager is responsible for assuring that the Corporate Emergency Organization is notified 2. The EOF Manager will also be responsible for ensuring that the corporate emergency staff members report directly to the EOF. 3. Notification of personnel may be accomplished through the use of an automated or manual system.

C.2 NOTIFICATION OF OFFSITE SUPPORT AGENCIES Offsite support agencies will be notified by the appropriate emergency organization member(s), as requested by VEGP, FNP, and HNP.

G-11 Rev. 41 D. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Following the declaration of an emergency, response activity will be coordinated at a number of facilities. These emergency response facilities are described in the site specific emergency plans. The EOF is a common facility for all SNC sites and is described in this section.

D.1 EOF DESCRIPTION The EOF is the central location for management of the offsite emergency response, coordination of radiological assessment, and management of initial recovery operations. The EOF is located in Birmingham, Alabama and serves as the EOF for all SNC sites (VEGP, FNP, and HNP). The EOF will be activated as prescribed in the site specific Emergency Plan implementing procedures. From the EOF, SNC corporate management personnel assist the states and other governmental bodies by communicating protective action recommendations approved by the Emergency Director to ensure public health and safety. Plant systems information, radiological data, and meteorological data are provided via the SNC Integrated Data Display System to EOF personnel as needed to: assess environmental conditions, coordinate radiological monitoring activities, and recommend implementation of offsite emergency plans. Data displays provide periodic and timely conditions of the affected plant and periodic and timely assessment of radiological conditions in the plant environs.

The SNC integrated data display system utilizes data provided by the plant specific data links. These station data links are described in each site specific plan. These displays may be either manual or electronic. Data displays are located in the main caucus area of the EOF, dose assessment area, plant status area, and engineering area within the facility. Other displays may be located in the command center area. Data is also available to all state agencies responding to the EOF. Data is available both in the main caucus area and the area designated for the particular state agency. Similarly, this data is available to state and local authorities via a secure network dedicated to data distribution among the various offsite emergency response facilities. The data display system provides the user with a "master view" for the monitoring of multiple site events simultaneously. Data required to support EOF operations is provided by an extensive ring bus transport network. Data may also be obtained manually via telephone from the Control Room and the TSC to the EOF.

G-12 Rev. 41 Contained within the facility will be the manpower and equipment necessary to provide dedicated direct communication links to the plant site(s). In addition, there are commercial and company wide phone systems to and from the site(s). A communication link will be established and maintained between the Emergency Operations Facility and the Technical Support Center (TSC) until the emergency director determines that the communication link is no longer needed.

Other communications equipment accessible to the EOF includes Nuclear Network (an intra-industry computer-based information exchange network),

telecopiers, and computer workstations designated for emergency use. Computer workstations are dedicated for performing dose assessment for multiple sites.

The EOF is the distribution center for all field data and sample analyses. This information will be available to county, State, and Federal representatives. The EOF is sized to accommodate 35 persons, including 25 pre-designated persons, 9 persons from the NRC, and 1 person from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Provisions have also been made for the relocation of NRC staff (including NRC communications capabilities) from the EOF to a near-site location, if requested. It is anticipated that representatives from the state(s) of Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, and Florida will be dispatched to the EOF for an event at specific SNC site(s). The EOF has been designed to accommodate these representatives. Agreements exist between the appropriate State agencies and SNC to ensure rapid response of state personnel dispatched to the EOF. Table 4 provides additional information concerning EOF communications capabilities.

Upon activation of the EOF, Corporate personnel will provide staffing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months per day until directed otherwise by the Emergency Director.

The emergency director, located at the affected site(s), is responsible for the management of the emergency response. Specific duties and responsibilities are provided in the site specific Emergency.

The EOF consists of several rooms, as shown, together with the location of key personnel, in Figure 2. The EOF is a dedicated facility. The designated emergency planning coordinator for each of the three sites maintains an office within the EOF to ensure readiness and daily operability.

Based on the physical location of the EOF, specialized ventilation systems are not required. The EOF ventilation system is consistent in design with G-13 Rev. 41 standard building codes. Similarly, EOF functions would not be interrupted by radiation releases from any SNC site.

Normal power to the EOF is from a reliable offsite source. Emergency lighting is provided by battery operated lights. Back-up power for the EOF is supplied by onsite diesel generation. All essential equipment is backed up by the diesel generation system.

The EOF is located adjacent to the document management section for SNC.

The following records or information are available:

Technical Specifications.

Selected plant operating procedures.

Emergency Plans.

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

FSARs.

State and local emergency response plans.

Savannah River Site Emergency Plan.

The following records or information can be transmitted to the EOF manually, electronically or by facsimile:

Environs radiological monitoring records.

SNC employee radiation exposure histories.

System piping and instrumentation diagrams and HVAC flow diagrams.

Piping area diagrams.

Electrical one-line, elementary, and wiring diagrams. The above records or information are available in current form and updated as necessary to ensure currency and completeness. Operations at this facility are directed by the EOF manager.

D.2 Contingency Planning Optimum functionality and availability was considered in the decision to locate the EOF in Birmingham, Alabama. At this location, functionality of the EOF would be uninterrupted by radiation releases, natural phenomena, and security based events at any of the SNC sites. Support operations and coordination with Federal, State and local organizations would continue. If personnel were to be dispatched to the sites, then personal protection equipment would be available

from G-14 Rev. 44 the local emergency management agency or from one of the unaffected SNC plant sites.

In the unlikely event that individuals should need to respond to the EOF from within the 10 mile EPZ of any SNC plant, they would be surveyed prior to release by local emergency authorities at the reception centers in accordance with State and Local emergency response plans.

In the unlikely event that the EOF becomes uninhabitable, resources and personnel will be transferred to the Corporate Headquarters of Alabama Power Company, located in Birmingham, Alabama. These actions will be taken as part of the normal business continuity plan.

E. COORDINATION WITH GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES The site specific Emergency Plan(s) delineate the governmental agencies to be notified and specifies the information to be initially conveyed. It is anticipated that representatives of various agencies will be dispatched to the EOF for an event at an SNC facility. Arrangements have been made between the appropriate State agencies and SNC to ensure rapid response of state personnel dispatched to the EOF.

E.1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Coordination with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) may be underway at several locations simultaneously. For details of the NRC response, see the NRC Incident Response Plan NUREG 0728.

Initial notification of the NRC will proceed as specified in the site specific Emergency Plan. The resident NRC inspector(s) and plant personnel have direct communications from the site control room to the NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. and to the regional headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.

The resident inspector(s) may be reinforced by additional NRC personnel shortly after notification of an emergency. The Emergency Director is responsible for coordinating NRC activities to reduce duplication of effort and reduce impact on the plant staff during the emergency situation.

Provisions have been made to have direct NRC FTS lines in the TSC and the EOF during an emergency. This will allow personnel in the control room to continue responding to the emergency while personnel in the TSC or EOF respond to questions and input from the NRC.

G-15 Rev. 41 NRC activities requiring response from the licensee will be coordinated by the EOF Technical Coordinator through the EOF manager.

E.2 STATE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES The government notifications are outlined in the site specific Emergency Plan(s).

Coordination of offsite responses to the emergency is the responsibility of State agencies as outlined in the State Radiological Emergency Response Plans.

E.3 LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES Notification of local government officials is outlined in the site specific Emergency Plan(s). Coordination with local government agencies will normally be through the responsible State agency.

E.4 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Notification of DOE officials is outlined in the site specific Emergency Plan.

F. OFFSITE SUPPORT Offsite resources that may be available to support an emergency response effort include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Southern Nuclear Operating Company

2. Georgia Power Company

3. Alabama Power Company

4. Southern Company Services, Inc. 5. The architect engineers 6. NSSS supplier

7. Nuclear industry

8. Contract laboratories F.1 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY (SNC)

1. SNC is divided into three projects: the Farley Project, the Hatch Project, and the Vogtle Project. Each of the projects is further divided into a plant staff and a corporate staff. These represent a pool of positions of which approximately two-thirds would be additional assets that could be made available to support an individual site emergency organization, as required. a. Plant Staffs - The permanent plant staffs consist of personnel who possess expertise in at least one of the following areas: operations, G-16 Rev. 41 maintenance, engineering, administration, or technical support. These personnel would be available to assi st in an emergency or recovery situation at an SNC nuclear facility. b. Corporate Staffs - These staffs consist of personnel who provide management, technical, clerical, procurement, and regulatory support to the nuclear facilities.

F.2 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY (GPC)

1. The GPC Fossil and Hydro Power Generation Department is responsible for the operations and maintenance of all GPC non-nuclear generating facilities including diesel and combustion turbine facilities. This represents a large source of technical expertise which could provide support to the emergency organization, if required. 2. The GPC Power Delivery Department manages the activities of the divisions and areas of the company which provide the electrical services to customers. This organization has a large resource of people and heavy equipment which may be of assistance following a nuclear emergency. 3. Other GPC assets, including maintenance and repair facilities, training facilities, engineering staffs, and headquarters personnel represent additional resources available for emergency support. 4. The GPC Central Laboratory has personnel and facilities available to provide offsite monitoring, sample analysis, and dosimetry processing for the affected site.

F.3 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY (APCO)

1. The APCO Fossil and Hydro Power Generation Department is responsible for the operations and maintenance of all APCO non-nuclear generating facilities including diesel and combustion turbine facilities. This represents a large source of technical expertise which could provide support to the emergency organization, if required. 2. The APCO Power Delivery Department manages the activities of the divisions and areas of the company which provide the electrical services to customers. This organization has a large resource of people and heavy equipment which may be of assistance following a nuclear emergency. 3. Other APCO assets, including maintenance and repair facilities, training facilities, engineering staffs, G-17 Rev. 41 and headquarters personnel represent additional resources available for emergency support.

F.4 SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES, INC. (SCS)

1. SNC has the primary responsibility for engineering support of VEGP, FNP and HNP. SCS may be utilized in response to a plant emergency or for subsequent recovery operations as deemed necessary by SNC.

F.5 ARCHITECT ENGINEERS The architect engineers will provide support as requested through the engineering services manager. The architect engineers are SNC and Bechtel Power Corporation.

1. SNC serves as its own Architect/Engineer. SCS, an associate company to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, will be used to the extent appropriate in responding to nuclear emergencies.

2. Bechtel Power Corporation, headquartered in Gaithersburg, Maryland, also performs architect engineer services for SNC. Bechtel's technical staffs are engaged in all phases of public utility engineering, design, construction, purchasing, inspection, and expedition of materials, as well as consultation on utility operating matters. Bechtel has available a broad range of engineering, construction, and consulting experience. Bechtel's nuclear experience includes engineering studies, the evaluation of reactor systems, safety evaluations, detailed engineering design, construction, and startup and testing of nuclear power facilities.

F.6 NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM VENDOR The applicable NSSS vendor will provide support through the engineering services manager. Plant specific references to t he appropriate vendor are specified in the plant specific base plans. The NSSS maintains a large staff of technically qualified people in all the engineering disciplines related to the design, construction, and operation of a nuclear power plant. These same skills would be necessary in the evaluation of, and recovery from, an emergency at any SNC site. Assistance would most likely be sought for large-scale core analysis, special tool design, and

licensing.

G-18 Rev. 55 F.7 NUCLEAR INDUSTRY The nuclear industry provides a large reservoir of personnel with a wide range of technical expertise and knowledge. A nuclear industry national inventory of personnel who might be called upon to supplement Company personnel has been developed through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).

In addition, a number of utilities have entered into an INPO coordinated Voluntary Assistance Agreement program. This provides a mechanism to draw upon industry resources during an emergency.

Support may be called upon from neighboring utilities would include the following:

1. Manpower and equipment to assist in in-plant and emergency field monitoring. 2. Engineering, design, and technical expertise to assist in determining the cause of the accident and to support recovery. 3. Manpower and equipment to assist in ma intenance and repairs to the facility.

F.8 CONTRACT LABORATORIES Teledyne Isotopes, Inc. for emergency analytical services.

AREVA NP for emergency analytical services

G. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS G.1 ORGANIZATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

1. Training

Corporate personnel identified in the Emergency Response Organization receive training. The training consists of familiarization with the Site Emergency Plans and applicable emergency implementing procedures required to carry out their specific functions. The corporate emergency planning coordinator(s) will ensure that personnel in the Corporate Emergency Response Organization are familiar with the Emergency Plans and able to respond promptly. A training matrix for corporate personnel assigned to the ERO is shown in Table 2, and training course summaries are presented in Table 3. Training will be documented in accordance with established practices.

G-19 Rev. 52 The corporate emergency planning coordinator(s) are responsible for assuring that training is conducted for corporate emergency response personnel each calendar year.

2. Drills/Exercises

Drills/ exercises will be conducted each calendar year to test the performance of implementing procedures, personnel, and emergency equipment. These drills/exercises will be conducted with each SNC site. SNC's goal is to activate the EOF in support of all site activities that involve TSC activation. EOF activation is required at least 3 times annually (1 scenario per site per year) in accordance with the existing Emergency Plans. At least 1 activation every 5 years will require a concurrent EOF support response for more than one SNC site. Each drill/exercise will test, as a minimum, the communication links and notification procedures to assure the prompt notification of the corporate staff. Provisions are made for critique of all drills/exercises. Critique items will be forwarded to the site emergency preparedness supervisor for processing in the site specific corrective action program.

G.2 REVIEW AND UPDATE OF PLAN AND PROCEDURES Reviews of the site Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures will be performed in accordance with site specific emergency plans. These reviews will be utilized to update the Plans and procedures and to improve emergency preparedness.

G-20 Rev. 41 TABLE 1 TYPICAL CORPORATE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENTS EMERGENCY POSITION ASSIGNMENT EOF Manager

Supervision from corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 EOF Technical Supervisor

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 EOF Support Coordinator

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 EOF Dose Assessment Supervisor

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Dose Analyst

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Field Team Coordinator

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Field Team Communicator

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Radiological Status Communicator

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Plant Status Loop Communicator

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 ENN Communicator

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 ENS Communicator

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Licensing Support Coordinator

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Security Coordinator

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Offsite Response Coordinator

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Engineering/Technical Support Staff

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Administrative Support Staff

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Liaisons

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Public Information Director

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Company Spokesperson

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 News writer

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 Other Public Information Emergency Communications Organization Staff

Corporate staff as designated in NMP-EP-001 G-21 Rev. 41 TABLE 2 CORPORATE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION TRAINING MATRIX Subject Area Position Emergency Plan Overview Position Specific Items Offsite Dose Assessment EOF Manager X X EOF Technical Supervisor X X EOF Support Coordinator X X EOF Dose Assessment Supervisor X X X Dose Analyst X X X Field Team Coordinator X X X Field Team Communicator X X Radiological Status Communicator X X Plant Status Loop Communicator X X ENN Communicator X X ENS Communicator X X Licensing Support Coordinator X X Security Coordinator X X Offsite Response Coordinator X X Engineering/Technical Support Staff X X Administrative Support Staff X X Liaisons X X Public Information Director X X Company Spokesperson X X News writer X X Other Public Information Emergency Communications Organization Staff X X G-22 Rev. 41 TABLE 3 DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING SUBJECT AREAS

Subject Area Description Emergency Plan Overview An overview of the Emergency Plan with special attention to emergency planning zones (EPZs); emergency classification system; emergency response organizations; responsibilities of emergency response personnel; site accountability; and site dismissal. Offsite Dose Assessment Dose pr ojection methodology including manual

and computerized methods; methods for obtaining meteorological and radiological data; operation of

the dose assessment computer; and interpretation of offsite dose calculation results. Position Specific Items An overview of this appendix with an emphasis on organization, interactions with other elements of the emergency organization, and position specific responsibilities as delineated in the emergency implementing procedures. This overview training may be conducted as part of classroom, table-top, drill, or exercise.

G-23 Rev. 41 TABLE 4 TYPICAL EOF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY Communications Functions VEGP HNP FNP EOF Management with TSC Commercial Telephone lines TSC/EOF/OSC

Conference Bridge

Radio Commercial Telephone lines TSC/EOF/OSC

Conference Bridge

Radio Commercial Telephone lines TSC/EOF/OSC

Conference Bridge

Radio Resource Management Commercial Telephone lines OPX Public Address System Commercial Telephone lines OPX Public Address System

Ringdown Commercial Telephone lines OPX Public Address System Radiological Monitoring Southern LINC Kenwood Radio System Southern LINC Kenwood Radio System Southern LINC Kenwood Radio System Off-site (PARs) ENN ENN ENN NRC Use ENS HPN RSCL PMCL MCL LAN Conference Phones (3)

Notes:

1. The Offsite Premises Extension (OPX) lines to the three SNC plant sites bypass the local phone switch. These lines may be referenced as company tie lines. 2. Intra-facility public address and intra-building public address systems are also available.

Figure 1 G-24 Rev. 41

Positions used to meet augmentation requirements for EOF direction and

notification/communication.

G-25 Rev. 49

FIGURE 2 EOF LAYOUT

H-1 Rev. 42 FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN NUREG 0654 CROSS REFERENCE INDEX NUREG 0654 Rev.1 Ref. Section FNP EP Ref. Section NUREG 0654 Rev.1 Ref. Section FNP EP Ref. Section A.1.a Part I, Sec.II.C, App. 7(G) E.1 Part I, Sec.VI.A A.1.b Part I, Sec.II.A E.2 Part I, Sec.V, App. 7(G)

Part I, Sec.II.B E.3 Part I, Sec.VI.B.1 A.1.c Part I, Fig. 12 E.4 Part I, Sec.VI.A Part I, Fig. 13 E.4.a Part I, Sec.VI.A A.1.d Part I, Sec.II.A E.4.b Part I, Sec.VI.A Part I, Sec.II.B E.4.c Part I, Sec.VI.A A.1.e Part I, Sec.II.A E.4.d Part I, Sec.VI.A A.2.a N/A E.4.e Part I, Sec.VI.A A.2.b N/A E.4.f Part I, Sec.VI.A A.3 Part I, App. B E.4.g Part I, Sec.VI.A A.4 Part I, Sec.II.A.1, App. 7(G) E.4.h Part I, Sec.VI.A Part I, Sec.II.B.2.a E.4.i Part I, Sec.VI.A Part I, Sec.V.B.1 E.4.j Part I, Sec.VI.A B.I Part I, Sec.II.A E.4.k Part I, Sec.VI.A B.2 Part I, Sec.II.A.1 E.4.l Part I, Sec.VI.A Part I, Sec.V.A E.4.m Part I, Sec.VI.A B.3 Part I, Sec.II.A.1 E.4.n Part I, Sec.VI.A B.4 Part I, Sec.II.A.1 E.5 N/A B.5 Part I, Sec.II.A E.6 Part I, Sec.VI.B.1 Part I, Sec.II.B, App. 7(G) E.7 Part I, Sec.VI.B.1, App. 10(J)

Part I, Sec.V.B F.1.a Part I, Sec.III.B.11, App. 7(G) B.6 Part I, Sec.II.A, App. 7(G) F.1.b Part I, Sec.III.B, App. 7(G)

Part I, Sec.II.B, App. 7(G) F.1.c Part I, Sec.III.B, App. 7(G)

Part I, Fig. 12 F.1.d Part I, Sec.III.B, App. 7(G)

Part I, Fig. 13 F.1.e Part I, Sec.V, App. 7(G) B.7 Part I, Sec.II.B, App. 7(G)

Part I, Sec.VI B.7.a Part I, Sec.II.B.1, App. 7(G) F.1.f Part I, Sec.III.B.9, App. 7(G)

Part I, Sec.II.B.2 Part I, Sec.III.B.10 B.7.b Part I, Sec.II.B.3, App. 7(G) F.2 Part I, Sec.III.B B.7.c Part I, Sec.II.B.2, App. 7(G)

Part I, Sec.III.D.3 B.7.d Part I, Sec.II.B.2 F.3 Part I, Sec.VIII.C.4 B.8 Part I, Sec.II.C.2, App. 7(G) G.1 Part I, Sec.VI.B.2, App.10(J) B.9 Part I, Sec.II.C.2 G.2 Part I, Sec.VI.B.2, App. 10(J) B.5 Part I, Sec.III.D.3 G.3.a Part I, Sec.II.B.2, App. 10(J)

Part I, Sec.III.D.4 Part I, Sec.III.A.5 Part I, App.B G.3.b Part I, Sec.III.A.5, App. 10(J) C.1.a Part I, Sec.II.C.1.a G.4.a Part I, Sec.II.B.2.a, App. 10(J) C.1.b Part I, Sec.II.C, App. 7(G) G.4.b Part I, Sec.VI.B.3, App. 10(J) C.1.c Part I, Sec.III.A G.4.c Part I, Sec.VI.B.3, App. 10(J) C.2.a N/A G.5 Part I, Sec.VI.B.2.b, App. 10(J) C.2.b Part I, Sec.II.C.1, App. 7(G) H.1 Part I, Sec.III.A.1 C.3 Part I, Sec.II.C.2, App. 7(G)

Part I, Sec.III.A.4 C.4 Part I, Sec.III.C.2, App. 7(G) H.2 Part I, Sec.III.A.2, App. 7(G)

D.1 Part I, Sec.IV.A Part I, Sec.III.A.3 D.2 Part I, Sec.IV.A H.3 N/A D.3 N/A H.4 Part I, Sec.IV, App. 7(G)

D.4 N/A H.5 Part I, Sec.IV H.5.a Part I, Sec.III.c.1.a

H-2 Rev. 42 NUREG 0654 CROSS REFERENCE INDEX - Page Two NUREG 0654 Rev.1 Ref. Section FNP EP Ref. Section NUREG 0654 Rev.1 Ref. Section FNP EP Ref. Section H.5.b Part I, Sec.III.C.1.b J.10.g N/A H.5.c Part I, Sec.IV J.10.h N/A H.5.d Part I, Sec.III.C.1.d J.10.i N/A H.6.a Part I, Sec.III.C1.a J.10.j N/A H.6.b Part I, Sec.III.C.2 J.10.k N/A Part I, Sec.III.C.3 J.10.l N/A H.6.c Part I, Sec.III.C.2 J.10.m Part I, Sec.IV.C.2 H.7 Part I, Sec.III.C.2 J.11 N/A H.8 Part I, Sec.III.C.1.a, App.7(G) J.12 N/A H.9 Part I, Sec.III.A.4 K.1.a Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c Part I, Sec.III.D.1 K.1.b Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c H.10 Part I, Sec.VIII.C K.1.c Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c H.11 Part I, App.A K.1.d Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c H.12 Part I, Sec.III.A.2, App.7(G) K.1.e Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c I.1 Part I, Sec.IV K.1.f Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c I.2 Part I, Sec.III.C.1.b K.1.g Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c Part I, Sec.III.C.1.c K.2 Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c Part I, Sec.IV.B K.3.a Part I, Sec.III.C.3 I.3.a Part I, Sec.III.C.1.b Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c I.3.b Part I, Sec.III.C.2 K.3.b Part I, Sec.III.C.3 I.4 Part I, Sec.III.C.2 K.4 N/A I.5 Part I, Sec.III.C.2, App. 7(G) K.5.a Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c I.6 Part I, Sec.III.C.2 K.5.b Part I, Sec.III.D.2 I.7 Part I, Sec.III.C.2 Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c I.8 Part I, Sec.II.A.9 K.6.a Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c Part I, Sec.IV.B.5.a K.6.b Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c Part I, Sec.V.B.1 K.6.c Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c I.9 Part I, Sec.III.C.2 Part I, Sec.IV.A.4 I.10 Part I, Sec.IV.B.4 K.7 Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c Part I, Sec.IV.B.5 L.1 Part II, Sec.II.B I.11 N/A Part II, Sec.II.C J.1.a Part I, Sec.IV.C.1 Part II, Sec.II.D J.1.b Part I, Sec.IV.C.1 L.2 Part I, Sec.III.D.2 J.1.c Part I, Sec.IV.C.1 L.3 N/A J.1.d Part I, Sec.IV.C.1 L.4 Part I, Sec.III.D.3 J.2 Part I, Sec.IV.C.1 M.1 Part I, Sec.V11 J.3 Part I, Sec.IV.C.1 M.2 Part I, Sec.II.B.3 J.4 Part I, Sec.IV.C.1 M.3 Part I, Sec.VII J.5 Part I, Sec.IV.C.1 M.4 Part I, Sec.IV.B.4 J.6.a Part I, Sec.IV.C.1 N.1.a Part I, Sec.VIII.A.1 J.6.b Part I, Sec.IV.C.1 N.1.b Part I, Sec.VIII.A.1 J.6.c Part I, Sec.IV.C.1.c N.2.a Part I, Sec.VIII.C J.7 Part I, Sec.IV.C.2 N.2.b Part I, Sec.VIII.A.2.a J.8 Part I, App. E N.2.c Part I, Sec.VIII.A.2.b J.9 N/A N.2.d Part I, Sec.VIII.A.2.c J.10.a Figure 17 N.2.e(1) Part I, Sec.VIII.A.2.d Figure 19 N.2.e(2) Part I, Sec.VIII.A.2.d Figure 20 N.3.a Part I, Sec.VIII.A Figure 21 N.3.b Part I, Sec.VIII.A J.10.b Part I, Sec.IV.C.2 N.3.c Part I, Sec.VIII.A J.10.c Part I, Sec.VI.B.1 N.3.d Part I, Sec.VIII.A J.10.d NA J.10.e N/A J.10.f N/A H-3 Rev. 42 NUREG 0654 CROSS REFERENCE INDEX - Page Three

NUREG 0654 Rev.1 Ref. Section FNP EP Ref. Section NUREG 0654 Rev.1 Ref. Section FNP EP Ref. Section N.3.e Part I, Sec.VIII.A N.3.f Part I, Sec.VIII.A.1.c Part I, Sec.VIII.A.1.d Part I, Sec.VIII.A.2.e N.4 Part I, Sec.VIII.A.1.e N.5 Part I, Sec.VIII.A.1.e O.1 Part I, Sec.VIII.B, App. 7(G)

O.1.a Part I, Sec.VIII.B.3 O.1.b N/A O.2 Part I, Sec.VIII.A Part I, Sec.VIII.A.2 O.3 Part I, Sec.VIII.B.1.c O.4.a Part I, Sec.VIII.B.1.a, App. 7(G)

Part I, Sec.VIII.B.2.a O.4.b Part I, Sec.VIII.B.I.a Part I, Sec.VIII.B.2.a O.4.c Part I, Sec.VIII.B.1.b, App. 7(G)

O.4.d Part I, Sec.VIII.B.1.d Part I, Sec.VIII.B.1.f O.4.e Part I, Sec.VIII.B.1.e O.4.f Part I, Sec.VIII.B.1.c O.4.g Part I, Sec.VIII.B.3 O.4.h Part II, Sec.VI.C Part II, Sec.VI.D O.4.i Part I, Sec.VIII.B.2, App. 7(G)

O.4.j Part I, Sec.VIII.B.1.g, App. 7(G)

O.5 Part I, Sec.VIII.B, App. 7(G)

P.1 Part I, Sec.VIII.B.4 P.2 Part I, Sec.I.B, App. 9(I)

P.3 Part I, Sec.I.B, App. 9(I)

P.4 Part I, Sec.VIII.D, App. 9(I)

P.5 Part I, Sec.VIII.D, App 9(I)

P.6 Part I, App. F P.7 Part I, App. D P.8 Part I, Table of Contents P.9 Part I, Sec. VIII.D, App 9(I)

P.10 Part I, Sec.VIII.C.4

I-i Rev. 42

APPENDIX 9(I)

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLANNING EFFORT

I-2 Rev. 56 The Fleet Emergency Preparedness Manager performs a review of the emergency plans for Southern Nuclear once each calendar year. The review includes a comparison for consistency of a ll emergency plans for the specific sites including the Security Plan, State, Count y, and the Savannah River Site plan, as appropriate.

The Emergency plans and EIPs are revised in accordance with applicable site procedures.

Emergency Plan changes which are judged to reduce the effectiveness of the Plan will be submitted to the NRC for approval prior to implementation. The

Emergency Planning Coordinator will review Emergency Plan changes to determine if the effectiveness of the site specific plan has been reduced prior to submitting the proposed change for departmental review and subsequently to the

PRB for approval.

As required by 10CFR50.54(t). An annual independent audit of the emergency preparedness program is conducted by the SNC Nuclear Oversight Department.

This audit is conducted as part of the standard audit program and will include a review of the Emergency Plan, its im plementing procedures and practices, emergency preparedness training, annual exercises, equipment, and emergency response facilities. In addition, an audit of the interfaces with offsite agencies is performed by the Corporate SNC Nuclear Oversight department.

Each audit is nominally conducted every 12 months.

Audits are performed in accordance with SNC Nuclear Oversight department procedures. Audit reports are written and distributed to management and, in addition, applicable portions of the corpor ate audit reports are made available to affected Federal, State, and local agenci es, as appropriate, in accordance with 10CFR50.54(t).

Appropriate departments are responsible for implem enting corrective actions resulting from the audit findings. Records of these audits and exercise findings are maintained in accordance w ith plant procedures.

In addition to this Plan, several other formal emergency plans have been developed to support the overall emergency response effort. These supporting plans and their sources are listed in procedure NM P-EP-300, SNC Corporate Emergency Preparedness, Conduc t of Operations.

I-3 Rev. 56 Emergency Preparedness Organization Figure I

J-i Rev 42

APPENDIX 10(J)

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

J-1 Rev. 42 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS PLAN TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page # 1.0 Purpose---------------------------.--.4 2.0 Policy------------------------------..5 3.0 Relationship with Other Agencies----------------.--.5 4.0 Flow of Emergency Pub lic Information-----------.--.---6 5.0 Emergency Communications Facility-----------------.7 Locations and Functions 6.0 Emergency Communications Plan Activation-----------.-...10 7.0 Emergency Communications Staff Functions-------------11 8.0 News Releases-...------------------------14 9.0 Press Briefings......------------------------.14 10.0 Public Response..................

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...........15 11.0 Telecommunications.........................................

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.............15 12.0 Transportation.................................................

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..............................16 13.0 Security.............

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..............................16 14.0 Print and Audiovisual Aids........

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...............16 15.0 Special Requests...................................................

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...........17 16.0 Public Information Plan for Recovery.............

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..............................17 17.0 Training.............

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..............................18 18.0 Public Information and E ducation Program..................................................18 19.0 Procedures......................................................................................

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J-2 Rev. 56 LIST OF FIGURES Page #

A. Flow of Public Information During an Emergency 22

B. Initial/Early Flow of Public Information At CMC 23 (Prior to JIC Activation)

C. Emergency Communications Information Flow 24 (After JIC Activation)

D. Public Response Flow Chart 25

E. Emergency Communications Reporting Structure 26

J-3 Rev. 42 LIST OF TABLES Page #

Table 1 Emergency Communications Training Matrix 21

J-4 Rev. 56 1.0 PURPOSE The Southern Nuclear Emergency Communications Plan (ECP) is a portion of the Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) site Emergency Plan submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The SNC-ECP is reviewed and

updated annually in conjunction with review and update of the site Emergency Plans.

The Vice President and General Counsel, SNC Corporate Council and Compliance, is responsible for c oordination and adminis tration of the Emergency Communications Plan (ECP or the Plan). The Plan will be

reviewed and updated annually.

The ECP is designed to:

A. Coordinate the public communications effort through the issuance of timely, accurate information during an emergency and maintain an orderly flow of

information during the recovery period.

B. Describe the means to activate and staff emergency communications positions in the Alabama Power/Georgia Power (APC/GPC) Corporate Media Center (CMC) in Birmingham/Atlanta, the Joint In formation Center (JIC), and the SNC Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

C. Describe the process of information dissemination through news releases and press briefings.

D. Describe the training of personnel in their functions and testing of the response to be made pursuant to the ECP.

E. Maintain an orderly flow of information during the recovery period.

F. Describe the Public Education an d Information Program for the periodic dissemination of emergency planning instructional materials to residents and transients in the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone.

G. Provide for 24-hour/day Emergency Co mmunications Organization (ECO) staff coverage in the event of an emergency.

H. Describe the training and testing of personnel in their functions under the Plan.

I. Assign responsibilities to and duty locations for the Emergency Communications response team.

J-5 Rev. 56 2.0 POLICY The public information policy described below provides guidance for use during an emergency at a SNC nuclear plant (the Plant).

A. The Southern Company has a policy of full disclosure and will maintain honest and open communications with public officials, the public (especially in the immediate vicinity of the plant), and it s employees at all times. This attitude stem s from resolve to operate all facilities safely and prudently and to communicate clearly and completely any significant

breach of safety.

B. The company will provide the public with prompt and accurate information through established news and information channels.

C. The company will make every effort to meet the info rmation needs of the public and employees while communicating promptly with appropriate local, state, and federal officials during the period of the emergency.

D. Statements to the news media and the public concerning the Plant and its operation during any emergencies are to be made only with the knowledge and guidance of the appropriate GPC/

APC Public Relations/Corporate Communication Departments and appropriate Southern Nuclear management.

3.0 RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER AGENCIES A. The Emergency Communications Organi zation (ECO) is responsible for the coordination and issuance of all news announcements related to emergency conditions at the Plant.

Federal, state and county emergency management agencies are responsible for the issuance of public announcements relating to off-site conditions, including recommended

protective actions.

B. A Joint Information Center (JIC) will be operated where the Utility, the state(s), the federal agencies (incl uding the SRS as ap propriate), and counties will coordinate information, issue news releases, make announcements, and may participate jointly in news briefings. Public

response activities will be conducted and coordinated jointly with state and county agencies as appropriate. prior to JIC activation the Corporate Media Center (CMC) at APC/GPC Corporate Headquarters may coordinate these functions.

J-6 Rev. 56 C. Work areas for public information offi cers of the federal , state, and county emergency response agencies are available at the JIC.

Telecommunications facilities are also available to these agencies.

D. Utility news announcements will be provided to representatives of government agencies prior to their dist ribution to the news media or the public.

E. The county and state emergency m anagement agencies should advise the Utility of announcements for the news media or the Emergency Alert Stations (EAS) prior to their distribution to the news media.

F. Public response may include st ate agency representatives and utility employees coordinated by the CMC/JIC Public Response Coordinator.

Rumors related to off-site matte rs will be referred to the appropriate federal, state, or county agency repres entatives for proper response.

Rumors related to on-site matters which agencies are aware of should be

relayed to the CMC/JIC Public Res ponse Coordinator for the necessary actions.

4.0 FLOW OF EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION

Information release for a Notification of Unusual Event is managed by the SNC Corporate Communication Manager in coordination with Southern Nuclear management and APC/GPC Corporate Communication.

At an Alert classification or higher, appr oval of news releases, other than the Initial News Release (INR), is requi red from both the EOF Manager and the Public Information Director (P ID) or their designee(s).

The following figures are designed to show the flow of information for emergencies classified as Alert or higher.

A. Flow of Public Information During an Emergency B. Initial/Early Stage Flow of Public Information for Corp orate Media Center (Prior to JIC Activation) C. Emergency Communications Inform ation Flow (After JIC Activation) D. Public Response E. Emergency Communications Reporting Structure J-7 Rev. 56 5.0 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY LOCATIONS AND FUNCTIONS The PI Director is responsible for all emergency communications response activities and staff.

At an alert classification or higher , the Emergency Communications public response will be handled initially from the CMC by the PI Director. The PI Director and the Nuclear Spokesperson will contact the EOF Manager for briefing on the emergency. The EOF will issue an Initial News Release (INR).

If the decision is made to activate t he JIC, the PI Direc tor and the Nuclear Spokesperson move to that facility. Upon activation of the JIC, primary utility Emergency Communications response will be conducted from the JIC. The CMC staff will maintain communications with the JIC and EOF, keep APC/GPC/SNC personnel notified of plant conditions, and support JIC

activities.

A. Corporate Media Center - Atlanta/Birmingham

1. The Corporate Media Center, located at the Atlanta/Birmingham corporate headquarters building of Georgia Power Company/Alabama

Power Company, as appropriate, is the official location for coordination and issuance of news announcements and responses to news media

inquiries until the JIC has been activated. The CMC may function as a Joint Public Information Center (J PIC) and may conduct these activities as long as appropriate and necessary.

2. Prior to activation of the JIC at an Alert or higher classification, corporate staff assigned to the JIC will assemble at the CMC. They will proceed to the JIC when directed by the Public Information Director.

3. The following staff are assigned to the Corporate Media Center

PI Director (until JIC activation)

CMC Manager

CMC Media Relations Representative

CMC Facility Coordinator

CMC Public Response Coordinator

CNC Public Response Team

Government Relations Liaison

Financial Response Liaison

Employee Communications Coordinator

Internet Coordinator

CMC Assistant

CMC Support Staff J-8 Rev. 56 4. Following activation of the JIC, the CMC staff re sponsibilities will continue. Responsibilities will include the following:

a. Support of the JIC in all functions common to the two facilities such as telephone response, media monitoring, media response, news

release reparation and distribution, etc.

b. Functions specific to the CMC, including, but not limited to:

Employee communications

Financial response

Governmental response

Coordination with senior management

Internet activities

Providing additional trained st aff to support the ECO effort B. Emergency Operations Center (EOF)

1. The EOF will serve as the source of information about an incident to staff in the CMC and JIC.

2. Emergency Communications staff will:

Serve as the source of information for the Nuclear Spokesperson and PID

Develop and issue the INR

Develop and obtain nuclear approval for subsequent news releases

Confirm or correct rumors identified

Perform other communications responsibilities as needed

J-9 Rev. 56 C. Joint Information Cente r 1. After the initial notif ication of an emergency at t he Alert classification or higher, the PI Director decides whether to activate the JIC. Once the JIC is activated, it becomes the "s ingle source" for media information.

2. Upon activation of t he JIC, the PI Director tran sfers to that facility, maintaining overall responsibility for emergency communications

response. The PI Director will manage the emergency communications response and is responsible for a ll functions of the JIC. These functions include:

Final approval and distri bution of press statements

Coordination of press briefi ngs and joint news announcements with interface with the media and local officials

Requests for interviews and photos

Recorded information line updates

Public response It is the PI Director's responsibilit y to assure all information is fully coordinated with and among the appropriate state and federal government public information officers (PIOs).

3. Upon activation, the JIC will obtain information from the EOF.

4. News briefings will be held at regular intervals during the emergency. The PI Director will preside over the press briefings. The Nuclear Spokesperson will explain emergency conditions and actions the Utility has taken at the plant. Off-site issues will be handled by off-site agency representatives.

5. If radiological conditions pe rmit, an area near the plant may be designated as a site for televi sion and news photographs. The Media Relations Representative, in cons ultation with the PI Director and the ED or his designee, and AEMA

/GEMA management, as appropriate, will arrange for escorted visits to photographic locations.

J-10 Rev. 56 6. The following positions will be assigned to the Joint Information Center:

PI Director

JIC Manager

Nuclear Spokesperson

JIC Media Relations Representative

JIC Public Response Coordinator

JIC Public Response Team

JIC Facility Coordinator

JIC Assistant

Community Relations Coordinator

Admin Staff

Technical Assistants

Security Officers

AV Support Staff NOTE: The JIC is sometimes referr ed to as the "Joint Media Center", "Joint Public Information Center", or the "Joint Information Center" in off-site agency emergency plans. All ti tles refer to the same facility.

6.0 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS PLAN ACTIVATION

A. Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE)

The SNC Corporate Communication Manager will be notified of an NOUE and will in turn notify APC Public Re lations/GPC Corporate Communication management, as appropriate. The notification will include t he status of the emergency and a brief description of the event. The SNC Corporate Communication Manager will confer with appropriate SNC management and affected owner-company management to determine the need for:

1. Additional notifications

2. Issuance of a news release

B. Alert and Higher Classifications The SNC On-Call Media Rep will be adv ised of an event classified as Alert level or higher. The SNC rep will notify the APC/GPC On-Call Media Rep, as appropriate, with a description of t he situation. The APC/GPC on-call media rep will notify the PID who will:

1. Formally activate the Emergency Communications Plan.

2. Notify emergency communica tions staff per Nuclear Management Procedure-Emergency Pl anning (NMP-EP-002).

J-11 Rev. 56 3. Establish contact with t he Emergency Operation Facility.

4. Establish contact with appropriate local, state and federal agencies.

5. Issue news release(s).

In addition, the PI Director will evaluate the following actions:

1. Activating the JIC and dispatch staff accordingly.

2. Conducting news briefings at the CMC or the JIC, which will include to the maximum extent possible, a panel composed of the Nuclear

Spokesperson and representativ es of government agencies.

7.0 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS STAFF FUNCTIONS

The following is a description of res ponsibilities of principal Emergency Communications staff.

A. Public Information Director (PID): The Public Information Director (P ID) is responsible for directing all emergency communications personnel assignments. The PID, or a designee, is responsible for coor dinating approvals and dissemination of all utility public information regar ding the emergency. Upon activation of the CMC/JIC, the PID will be responsible for overall facility direction. Those duties may include coordinating approval and dissemination of utility news releases, facilitating news briefings, overseeing public response, meeting special medi a requests, and coordination among company and non-utility representatives in the facility and liaison with the media. The PID wil l be responsible for coordinating emergency communications response and coordi nating with the SNC Corporate Duty Manager in evaluating the emergen cy's severity in terms of public interest and safety.

B. Nuclear Spokesperson The Nuclear Spokesperson speaks on behalf of the company, providing plant status updates during news briefings. The Spokesperson also may do one-on-one media interviews. The position works with the Technical Assistant in keeping abr east of the event status and keeps the PID posted on that status. The position may first report to the EOF and then proceed to the CMC/JIC.

NL-13-0053, Joseph M. Farley, Units 1 and 2, Emergency Plan, Rev. 58. Cover Through Page J-11

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