ML26020A041
| ML26020A041 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/2026 |
| From: | Matthew Fannon NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB2 |
| To: | Joseph C Duke Energy Progress |
| References | |
| IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26020A041 (0) | |
Text
Carolyne Joseph Site Vice President Duke Energy Progress, LLC 5413 Shearon Harris Road Mail Code: HNP01 New Hill, NC 27562-9300
SUBJECT:
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2025004
Dear Carolyne Joseph:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant. On January 14, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant.
January 22, 2026
C. Joseph 2
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Matthew S. Fannon, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000400 License No. NPF-63
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: Distribution via GovDelivery Signed by Fannon, Matthew on 01/22/26
SUNSI Review x
Non-Sensitive
Sensitive x
Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RII/DORS RII/DORS RII/DORS NAME P. Boguszewski A. Wilson M. Fannon DATE 01/21/2026 01/21/2026 01/22/2026
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report Docket Number:
05000400 License Number:
NPF-63 Report Number:
05000400/2025004 Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-004-0020 Licensee:
Duke Energy Progress, LLC Facility:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Location:
New Hill, NC Inspection Dates:
October 1, 2025, to December 31, 2025 Inspectors:
M. Bates, Senior Operations Engineer P. Boguszewski, Senior Resident Inspector M. Kay, Resident Inspector K. Kirchbaum, Senior Operations Engineer Approved By:
Matthew S. Fannon, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
2
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations Failure to Evaluate Main Steam PORV Hydraulic Fluid Temperature Limits Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000400/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71152A A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified when the licensee failed to provide design control measures to maintain the main steam (MS) power operated relief valve (PORV) operable. Specifically, the licensee failed to include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards were specified and incorporated into design documents. The licensee did not control deviations from those standards when they failed to evaluate the temperature limits of the MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid prior to using temporary heaters to keep the fluid warm. This resulted in exceeding the temperature limits of the hydraulic fluid and the C MS PORV failing to stroke open during surveillance testing on June 10, 2025.
Additional Tracking Items None.
3 PLANT STATUS Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On October 3, 2025, Unit 1 was shutdown for a planned refueling outage. After completion of the refueling outage, operators commenced reactor startup on November 2, 2025. Unit 1 was returned to rated thermal power on November 5, 2025, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY 71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)
Spent fuel pool cooling system after core offload while 'B' safety bus was out of service on October 17, 2025 Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the high head safety injection system on December 3, 2025.
71111.05 - Fire Protection Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)
Reactor auxiliary building steam tunnel on October 2, 2025 (2)
Reactor containment building 221' and 236' elevations on October 8, 2025 (3)
Reactor containment building 261' and 286' elevations on October 8, 2025 (4)
'A' and 'B' 6.9kV switchgear rooms on December 16, 2025
4 (5)
Reactor auxiliary building 324' elevation on December 19, 2025 71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), "Requalification Requirements," of the NRC's "Operator's Licenses." The inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations, and the crew simulator operating examinations in accordance with IP 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance." These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.03, "Requalification Examination Results," of IP 71111.11.
(1)
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam completed on December 18, 2025.
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
(1)
Biennial Requalification Written Examinations The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination completed on March 8, 2024.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
5 Operator License Conditions The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators met the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a reactor shutdown for a planned refueling outage on October 3, 2025.
(2)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during reactor startup on November 1, 2025.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)
Elevated risk due to lowered inventory during refueling outage on October 6, 2025 (2)
Elevated risk due to 'B' safety bus outage during refueling outage on October 10, 2025 (3)
Elevated risk due to lowered inventory for reactor vessel head reinstall during refueling outage on October 23, 2025 71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)
Refueling water storage tank header pipe broken variable spring support (Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 2571834) on December 3, 2025 71111.18 - Plant Modifications Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
6 (1)
Engineering Change 420531, 'B' startup transformer replacement on October 14, 2025 71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated refueling outage H1R26 activities from October 3, 2025, to November 1, 2025.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
(1)
OST-1815, "Remote Shutdown: Test of Interposing MDR Relays Primary and Backup Fuses," following transfer auxiliary relay TRA-1/1746 replacement on October 19, 2025 (2)
OST-1100, "Emergency Safeguards Sequencer 1B-SB Response Time Test,"
following maintenance on October 21, 2025 (3)
OST-1043, "Reactor Coolant System Vent Path Operability," following maintenance on 1RC-905 on October 27, 2025 (4)
LP-L-0926, "Accumulator Tank B Level," following replacement of 'B' cold leg accumulator level transmitter on December 15, 2025 (5)
OST-1824, "1B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test," following multiple relay replacements in the 'B' sequencer on December 19, 2025 Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
LP-P-2001A/B, "Feedwater to Steam Generator A Pressure," loop calibration on October 24, 2025 Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1) 1ED-161, reactor coolant drain tank hydrogen supply and vent, local leak rate testing during refueling outage on October 14, 2025 OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE 71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)
(1)
October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025
7 MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
(1)
October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025 71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)
'C' Main Steam power operated relief valve (PORV) failure to stroke during surveillance testing (NCR 02557590) on December 10, 2025 71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
INSPECTION RESULTS Failure to Evaluate Main Steam PORV Hydraulic Fluid Temperature Limits Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000400/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71152A A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified when the licensee failed to provide design control measures to maintain the main steam (MS) power operated relief valve (PORV) operable. Specifically, the licensee failed to include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards were specified and incorporated into design documents. The licensee did not control deviations from those standards when they failed to evaluate the temperature limits of the MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid prior to using temporary heaters to keep the fluid warm. This resulted in exceeding the temperature limits of the hydraulic fluid and the C MS PORV failing to stroke open during surveillance testing on June 10, 2025.
==
Description:==
Each main steam supply line is provided with one PORV, Harris has three main steam lines and three associated MS PORVs. The safety-related MS PORVs are designed to remove heat from the nuclear steam supply system when the main steam isolation valves are closed. Additionally, in the event of a ruptured steam generator, the MS PORVs can be used to depressurize the reactor coolant system so that residual heat removal can be placed in service.
During routine surveillance testing in June 2025, the C MS PORV failed to stroke open when the output was raised to 100% from the control room. Operations declared the C MS PORV inoperable and commenced troubleshooting. Two solenoid valves, two pilot operated check valves and one dual pilot check valve that are internal to the hydraulic actuator were
8 examined by the vendor. The vendor identified each solenoid valve had a varnished surface and was sticky to the touch. The two solenoid valves identified as varnished are modulating valves which permit movement of pressurized hydraulic fluid during operation which provides a mode of force for the MS PORV to open or close. The vendor attributed the failure of the solenoid valves to the varnished surface likely caused by overheating. A review of quarterly maintenance on the PORVs identified that in January of 2025, as a result of temporary heater installation, the C MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid was subjected to 160 degrees F, which is the maximum recommended operating temperature for the fluid. Due to being further away from the heaters, the A and B MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid temperature were recorded to be 100 degrees F.
The temporary heaters were previously installed near the MS PORV actuators in April 2024 while Harris Unit 1 was in a refueling outage. During a refueling outage there is no steam in the main steam lines and therefore the steam tunnel experiences colder temperatures. Based on previous issues with MS PORV operations during outages, the vendor recommended keeping the actuator hydraulic fluid temperature above 70 degrees. This was being accomplished with the use of temporary heaters. The heaters were installed using licensee procedure AP-301 Seasonal Weather Preparations and Monitoring, but there is no record (work request or work order) that controlled installation of the heaters. The licensee placed the unit online on May 12, 2024. However, the heaters remained powered and unmonitored.
This resulted in the uncontrolled addition of heat to the MS PORV hydraulic fluid ultimately resulting in the C MS PORV failing to stroke open from the main control room on June 10, 2025.
Per licensee procedure AP-301, drawing/checklist 7-S-5917, Seasonal HVAC Equipment Installations, should have been completed prior to installing the temporary heaters. The licensee failed to complete the checklist, which would provide guidance on whether installation of temporary heater warrants an Engineering Change product. Duke Energy performed a causal evaluation and determined that licensee procedure AP-301 and drawing 7-S-5917 were inadequate to ensure evaluation of the temperature impacts on components are evaluated prior to placement of temporary heaters.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the condition into their corrective action program, performed corrective actions to restore operability of the C MS PORV which included a complete actuator replacement during the most recent refueling outage in October 2025, and completed a causal evaluation. The licensee also established administrative limits for the total acid number based on vendor recommendation which is an indicator of the potential for varnish formation on internal components. The licensee has planned corrective actions to revise AP-301 and drawing 7-S-9517 to ensure that potential temperature impacts on components (including internal fluids and environmental quality temperature impacts) are evaluated prior to use of temporary heaters. Additionally, the licensee plans to revise the vendor manual and preventive maintenance procedure for the MS PORV actuators to include more detailed tracking of MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid health.
Corrective Action References: NCR 02557590 Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to provide design control measures for installation of temporary heaters to maintain the MS PORV actuators operable was a performance deficiency that was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct.
9 Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the temperature limits of the MS PORV hydraulic fluid prior to the placement of temporary heaters. This affected the availability and reliability of the MS PORVs.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined a detailed risk evaluation (DRE) was required. A regional Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a DRE using SAPHIRE 8 Version 8.2.11 and the Harris SPAR Model Version 8.83 dated September 21, 2023. The exposure time was considered to be T/2 since the last successful valve opening test was completed on December 5, 2024, and the date of the failed test occurred on June 10, 2025 (188 days/2), plus repair time until June 30, 2025, when the PORV was returned to service. This is a total of 114 days. The SRA modelled the condition by setting MSS-ARV-CC-MS62 SG 1C PORV MS-62 FAILS TO OPEN, to TRUE.
The dominant accident sequence was a steam generator tube rupture, with a failure of auxiliary feedwater, main feedwater, and a failure of operators to isolate the affected steam generator. The change in core damage frequency was less than 1 E-6 corresponding to a finding of very low safety significance (GREEN).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedure AP-301 and subsequently drawing 7-S-9517 to evaluate the impact of temporary heaters on the MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid. An upper temperature limit was not established due to inadequate control of temporary heaters.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," states in part that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These measures shall include provisions to ensure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are controlled. Measures shall also be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems and components.
Contrary to the above, from April 2024 to June 2025, the licensee failed to assure that appropriate quality standards related to the MS PORV actuator hydraulic fluid were specified and that any deviations are controlled.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
10 EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On January 14, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Carolyne Joseph and other members of the licensee staff.
On December 18, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial licensed operator requalification inspection results to Kevin O'Brien, Training Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
11 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Inspection Procedure Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Date NCR 2577396 WR 20298507 Corrective Action Documents WRs 20296239 20296240 20753755 20296243 20296240 5-S-0550 Simplified Flow Diagram Containment Spray System Unit 1 Revision 18 5-S-1304 Simplified Flow Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System Sheet 2 Revision 14 5-S-1305 Simplified Flow Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System Unit 1 Revision 30 5-S-1308 Simplified Flow Diagram Safety Injection System Revision 12 5-S-1309 Simplified Flow Diagram Safety Injection System Sheet 2 Unit 1 Revision 21 5-S-1310 Simplified Flow Diagram Safety Injection System Sheet 3 Unit 1 Revision 14 Drawings 5-S-1324 Simplified Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal System Unit 1 Revision 12 71111.04 Procedures OP-110 Safety Injection Revision 53 CSD-HNP-PFP-CNMT Containment Building Pre-Fire Plan Revision 0 CSD-HNP-PFP-RAB-261 Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 261 Pre-Fire-Plan Revision 4 CSD-HNP-PFP-RAB-286 Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 286 Pre-Fire Plan Revision 4 71111.05 Procedures CSD-HNP-PFP-RAB-305-324 Reactor Building Elevations 305 and 324 Pre-Fire Plan Revision 6 Drawings TK-1-261-1-CT-H-201 Containment Spray 5/D 71111.15 Procedures DBD-106 Containment Spray System Revision 19
12 Inspection Procedure Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Date 5-S-1309 Simplified Flow Diagram Safety Injection System Revision 23 6-B-401 Sheet 1148 Emergency Load Sequencer ESS Cabinet 1B-SB Revision 14 6-B-401 Sheet 1165 Emergency Load Sequencer ESS Cabinet 1B-SB Sh. 20 Revision 15 6-B-401 Sheet 1750 Emergency Diesel Generator 1B-SB Breaker 126SB Sh. 2 Revision 12 6-B-401 Sheet 1752 6.9 KV Emer Bus 1B-SB to Aux Bus 1E Tie BKR 125 SB Sh.
2 Revision 11 6-B-401 Sheet 2008 Diesel Generator 1B-SB Engine Control Sh. 1 Revision 15 6-B-401 Sheet 2304 ESW Aux Reservoir Bay No. Traveling Screen 1B-SB Revision 13 Drawings 6-B-401 Sheet 3290 Emer Service Water Intake Structure Elec Equipment Room Supply Fan AH-86(1B-SB)
Revision 13 Engineering Changes EC 424373 Accumulator Transmitter Upgrade to Rosemount Revision 12 EST-212 Type C Local Leak Rate Tests Revision 6 Procedures LP-P-0926 Accumulator Tank B Level Revision 8 71111.24 Work Orders 20681859 NCR 2557590 Corrective Action Documents NCRs 2505389 2505381 2512233 2512232 2518442 2526518 2547223 2537547 5-S-0542 Simplified Flow Diagram Main Steam System Unit 1 Revision 28 Drawings 7-S-9517 Seasonal HVAC Equipment Installations Revision 3 Miscellaneous VM-OSO Operators Revision 22 AD-MN-ALL-0800 Temporary Power Revision 3 AP-301 Seasonal Weather Preparations and Monitoring Revision 89 OP-126 Main Steam, Extraction Steam, and Steam Dump Systems Revision 45 71152A Procedures OST-1191 Steam Generator PORV and Block Valve Operability Test Revision 33