ML25290A064

Susquehanna, Units 1 and 2 - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 72, Chapter 8, Section 8.1, Introduction

ML25290A064
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Issue date:	10/13/2025
From:	Talen Energy, Susquehanna
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SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-1 8.1 INTRODUCTION 8.1.1 GENERAL The electric power system of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2 are designed to generate and transmit electric power to supply customer needs utilizing the power network of the PPL and of the PJM Inc. interconnection.

The two independent offsite electric connections to Susquehanna SES are designed to provide reliable power sources for plant auxiliary loads and the engineered safety features loads of both units such that any single failure can affect only one power supply and cannot propagate to the alternate source.

The onsite AC electric power system consists of Class 1E and non-Class 1E power systems. The two offsite power systems provide the preferred AC electric power to all Class 1E loads through the Class 1E distribution system. In the event of total loss of offsite power sources, four onsite independent diesel generators provide the standby power for all engineered safety features loads.

The non-Class 1E AC loads are normally supplied through the unit auxiliary transformer or the startup transformer. However, during plant startup, shutdown, and post-shutdown, power is supplied from the offsite power through the startup transformers.

Onsite Class 1E and non-Class 1E DC systems supply all DC power requirements of the plant.

8.1.2 UTILITY POWER GRID AND OFFSITE POWER SYSTEMS Unit 1 and 2 generators are connected by separate isophase buses to their respective main step-up transformer banks as shown on Dwgs. E-1, Sh. 1 and E-1, Sh. 1A. Unit 1 main step-up transformer bank, with two three-phase, half capacity power transformers, steps up the 24 kV generator voltage to 230 kV; the Unit 2 bank, with three single phase power transformers, steps up the 24 kV generator voltage to 500 kV. As shown on Dwgs. E-1, Sh. 1 and E-1, Sh. 1A, the step-up transformer for Unit 1 connects to the Susquehanna 230 kV switchyard and Talen Energy 230 kV substation SS01 and for Unit 2 to the Susquehanna 500 kV switchyard and Talen Energy 500 kV Substation SS02. The Susquehanna 230kV switchyard is designed for six (6) 230 kV breaker and a half bays (one built as a two (2) single circuit breaker 230 kV bay), a 230 kV capacitor bank and two (2) 230 kV buses. Terminating positions are provided for eight lines, one generator lead, one 230 kV capacitor bank and a yard tie to the 500 kV switchyard. The Susquehanna 500 kV switchyard consists of four (4) bays, containing eight 500 kV circuit breakers. A 230 kV circuit breaker terminates the T21 230 kV yard tie. Each bay, except for Bay 5, can be developed into a full circuit breaker and half configuration. Terminating positions are provided for three lines, one 500 kV generator lead circuit, a circuit to a bank of three single phase 500-230 kV autotransformers and a capacitor bank circuit. The Susquehanna 230 kV switchyard and 500 kV switchyard are approximately 1.9 miles apart and are interconnected by a 500-230 kV bus tie transformer and transmission line. Aerial transmission connects the Susquehanna 230 kV switchyard with Sunbury, Susquehanna T10, Montour, Harwood, Jenkins, Acahela and Mountain -

(owned and operated by UGI Corporation, Luzerne Electric) Substation/Switchyards. Aerial

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-2 transmission lines integrate the Susquehanna 500 kV switchyard into the 500 kV system with connections at Wescosville, Lackawanna and Sunbury. Both the Susquehanna 500 kV switchyard and the 230 kV switchyard are tied into the PJM interconnection.

The plant startup and preferred power for the engineered safety features systems is provided from two independent offsite power sources shown in Dwg. D159760, Sh. 1.

a)

A 230 kV line from the Susquehanna T10 230 kV switchyard feeds the start-up transformer # 10.

b)

A 230 kV tap from the 500-230 kV tie line feeds the startup transformer # 20.

The offsite power systems and their interconnections are described in detail in Section 8.2.

8.1.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS The onsite power system for each unit is divided into two major categories:

a)

Class 1E Power System The Class 1E power system supplies all engineered safety features (ESF) loads, and other loads that are needed for safe and orderly shutdown, and for keeping the plant in a safe shutdown condition.

The Class 1E power system for each unit consists of four independent load group channels, channels A, B, C, and D. Any combination of three out of four load group channels meets the design basis requirements. In addition, two divisionalized load groups are established for those ESF loads which require one out of two load groups to meet the design basis requirements. ESF load group division separation and channel separation are shown in Tables 3.12-1 and 3.12-2 respectively. Physical separation is discussed fully in Subsection 3.12.3.4.

The Class 1E power system distributes power at 4.16 kV, 480V, 120V AC, +/-24V DC, 125V DC, 250V DC voltage levels.

The Class 1E power system is shown on Dwgs. E-1, Sh. 1, E-1, Sh. 1A, E-1, Sh. 2, E-5, Sh. 1, E-5, Sh. 2, E-11, Sh. 1, E-11, Sh. 11, E-13, Sh. 1, E-8, Sh. 4, and E-8, Sh. 8.

b)

Non-Class 1E Power System The non-Class 1E AC portion of the onsite power system supplies electric power to all non-safety related plant auxiliary loads. The non-Class 1E AC auxiliary system distributes power at 13.8 kV, 4.16 kV, 480V, and 208/120V voltage levels. These distribution levels are grouped into two symmetrical bus systems emanating from the 13.8 kV level as shown in Dwgs. E-1, Sh. 1, E1, Sh. 1A, and E-1, Sh. 2.

Power transmitted to the utility grid is discussed in Subsection 8.1.2.

Non-Class 1E DC power is discussed in Subsection 8.3.2.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-3 A detailed description of the onsite power system is found in Subsections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2.

8.1.4 SAFETY RELATED LOADS The Class 1E loads supplied by the Class 1E AC power system are listed in Tables 8.3-1 to 8.3-5A. Class 1E loads supplied by the Class 1E DC system are listed in Tables 8.3-6A, 8.3-6B, 8.3-6C, 8.3-6D, 8.3-6E, 8.3-6F, 8.3-6G, 8.3-6H, 8.3-6I, 8.3-7A, 8.3-7B, 8.3-7C, 8.3-7D, and 8.3-8.

8.1.5 DESIGN BASES 8.1.5.1 Safety Design Bases The following principal design bases are applied to the design of the onsite and offsite power systems:

Offsite Power System a)

Electric power from the offsite power sources to the onsite distribution system is provided by two physically separated transmission lines designed and located to minimize the likelihood of simultaneous failure.

b)

The loss of generating units and the effects on system stability are addressed in Section 8.2.2.2 - Stability Analysis.

Onsite Power System a)

One unit auxiliary transformer per generating unit is provided to supply power to the plant electrical auxiliary distribution system.

b)

Two startup transformers, located onsite within the Protected Area and common to both units, are provided to supply offsite power to the Class 1E power system and common plant auxiliary power system and to supply power to the Unit Auxiliary loads during startup, shutdown, and in the event of loss of a unit auxiliary transformer.

c)

Outage of one startup and/or one engineered safeguard transformer would not jeopardize continued plant operation except where the operation is limited as suggested by Regulatory Guide 1.93. See compliance statement to Regulatory Guide 1.93 in Subsection 8.1.6.1.

d)

Standby diesel generators are shared by two units. See Subsection 8.1.6 responses to Regulatory Guide 1.81, for diesel generator capability and compliance discussions.

e)

Each generating unit has its own independent DC system. Common DC loads can be supplied from the DC system of either Unit 1 or Unit 2. The common system DC loads which are required for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 operation, are provided with two sources of 125V DC control power, from the DC system of either Unit 1 or Unit 2, through a manual transfer switch.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-4 f)

The onsite Class 1E AC electric power system for each unit is divided into four independent load groups. Each load group has its own distribution buses and loads. Minimum engineered safety feature loads required to shut down the unit safely and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition are met by any three of the four load group channels. Each aligned emergency diesel generator supplies one load group of both units. Auxiliary loads in Diesel Generator Bays A-D can be supplied from the AC electric power system of either Unit 1 or Unit 2. All other common loads are supplied from the Unit 1 AC electric power system.

g)

The four Class 1E load groups are subgrouped generally to form two divisions for meeting the design basis of one out of two ESF load requirements.

h)

Automatic or manual transfers are not provided between redundant load groups except swing buses as discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.3.5.

i)

The Class 1E electric systems are designed to satisfy the single failure criterion in accordance with IEEE 379-1972.

j)

The DC system battery banks are individually sized for four hours of operation under the maximum design loading without the support of the battery charger.

k)

Raceways are not shared by Class 1E and non-Class 1E cables. However, the affiliated cables that are supplied from the Class 1E buses are treated as Class 1E cables with regard to redundant system separation and identification criteria.

l)

Special identification criteria applies for Class 1E equipment, cabling, raceways, and affiliated circuits. Affiliated circuits are uniquely identified.

m)

Separation criteria apply which establish requirements for preserving the independence of redundant Class 1E system and providing isolation between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.

n)

Class 1E equipment has been designed with the capability for periodic testing.

8.1.6 Regulatory Guides and IEEE Standards Codes and standards applicable to the onsite power system are listed in Table 3.2-1. Generally, the system is designed in accordance with IEEE Standards 308-1974, 317-1972, 323-1971, 334-1971, 344-1971, 382-1972, 384-1974, 387-1972, and 450-1972. On June 6, 1987 a fifth diesel generator designated Diesel Generator E was added to the standby power system as part of the onsite power system. The modification that added Diesel Generator E was based on applicable codes and standards in effect on September 22, 1983. These later codes and standards are only applicable to the Diesel Generator E building and the modifications in the Diesel Generator A, B, C and D rooms to add the transfer points and interconnections. In general, the Diesel Generator E system is designed in accordance with IEEE Standards 308-1980, 323-1974, 334-1974, 344-1975, 379-1977, 382-1980, 383-1974, 384-1981, 387-1977, 420-1982, 450-1980, 484-1981, 485-1978, 535-1979, 603-1980, 649-1980 and 650-1979.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-5 8.1.6.1 Compliance with Regulatory Guides Compliance with General Design Criteria 17 and 18 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, is discussed in Subsections 8.3.1.11.1 and 8.3.2.2.1. Compliance with applicable Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.9, 1.22, 1.29, 1.30, 1.31, 1.32, 1.40, 1.41, 1.47, 1.53, 1.62, 1.63, 1.68, 1.73, 1.75, 1.81, 1.89, 1.93, 1.106 and 1.148 is discussed below. The Diesel Generator E is based on the Regulatory Guides in effect on September 22, 1983. An

• beside the effective date of the Regulatory Guides listed below indicates the Regulatory Guide applicable to the plant is also applicable to Diesel Generator E.

a)

Regulatory Guide 1.6 (3/71)*

The design of the standby power system is in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.6.

The standby power system consists of four independent load groups. All safety related loads are divided among these four load groups so that loss of any one group will not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. Each load group consists of both standby AC and DC power systems.

Each AC load group has connections to two independent offsite power supplies and to a single onsite diesel generator. The power feeder breakers to each load group are interlocked so that only one of the power supplies can be connected at any one time except during diesel generator load test where the diesel generator is synchronized to one of the preferred offsite power sources. Only one diesel generator is tested at a time.

Each diesel generator is exclusively connected to the corresponding load group of the two units; i.e., Diesel Generator A connects to load group channel A of both units, etc. A fifth Diesel Generator E is used as a replacement for any one of the four Diesel Generators A, B, C or D. The main purpose of the Diesel Generator E is to allow maintenance to be performed on any one of the four diesel generators without the necessity for a two unit outage.

The diesel generator of one load group cannot be paralleled, either manually or automatically, with the diesel generator of the redundant load groups.

No provision exists for automatic transfer of loads between load groups except as discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.3.5.

The DC power system of each of the four load groups consists of a 125V DC battery and a charger. The battery charger is supplied by its corresponding AC power system. The DC power system of any one load group is independent of any other DC power system. The common loads, which require 125V DC, are provided with two sources of control power, through a manual transfer switch. The Class 1E loads are capable of being transferred between the Unit 1 and corresponding Unit 2 source. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 sources can not be cross connected through the common load transfer switches to assure independence between redundant safety related sources. The Diesel Generator E DC power system consists of a separate 125V DC battery and charger.

Two independent 250V divisionalized DC power systems are also provided for each unit to supply large DC loads. Loss of any one 250V DC subsystem will not prevent the safety functions from being performed.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-6 Physical separation of Class 1E equipment is fully discussed in Section 3.12.

b)

Regulatory Guide 1.9 (3/71)

The standby diesel generators A, B, C and D comply with Regulatory Guide 1.9 except as noted in 5) and 6) of the following:

1)

The continuous or the 2000 hr rating of the standby diesel generators is greater than the sum of conservatively estimated loads needed to be supplied following any design basis event within one of the two units. Load requirements are listed in Tables 8.3-1 to 8.3-5.

2)

The standby diesel generators are capable of starting and accelerating all engineered safety features and forced shutdown loads to the rated speed in the time frame and sequence shown in Tables 8.3-1 to 8.3-5.

3)

The standby diesel generators are capable of maintaining, during steady state and loading sequence, the frequency and voltage above a level that may degrade the performance of any of the loads.

4)

The standby diesel generators are capable of recovering from transients caused by step load increase or resulting from the disconnection of partial or full load so that the speed does not damage any moving parts.

5)

The suitability of each diesel generator is confirmed by factory qualification testing.

6)

Power quality is in accordance with IEEE 308-1974, Section 4.3. At no time during the loading sequence will the frequency and/or voltage drop to a level that will degrade the performance of any of the loads below their minimum requirements.

The power quality is confirmed by preoperational tests.

c)

Regulatory Guide 1.9 (12/79) (Diesel Generator E Only)

Diesel Generator E complies with Regulatory Guide 1.9 except as noted in 9) of the following:

1)

The continuous or the 2000 hr rating of Diesel Generator E is greater than the sum of conservatively estimated loads needed to be supplied following any design basis event within one of the two units. Load requirements are listed in Tables 8.3-1 to 8.3-5.

2)

Diesel Generator E is capable of starting and accelerating all engineered safety features and forced shutdown loads to the rated speed in the time frame and sequence shown in Tables 8.3-1 to 8.3-5.

3)

At no time during the diesel generator loading sequence does the frequency and voltage decrease to less than 95 percent and 75 percent of nominal, respectively.

Voltage is restored to within 10 percent of nominal within 60 percent of each load sequence time interval. During recovery from transients caused by step load increases or disconnection of the largest single load, the speed of Diesel Generator E does not exceed the nominal speed plus 75 percent of the difference

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-7 between nominal speed and the overspeed trip point. The transient following the complete loss of load does not trip the overspeed trip setpoint.

4)

Where applicable, the Diesel Generator E qualification is in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 323-1974.

5)

Automatic startup, controls and surveillance systems are discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.4.

6)

The Diesel Generator E seismic qualification is in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 344-1975 subject to Regulatory Guide 1.100.

7)

The 300 start qualification testing for Diesel Generator E is based on testing of a similar existing diesel generator.

8)

The load capability qualification test applied the continuous rating of Diesel Generator E to stabilize temperatures at which time the rated short-time load was applied for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> immediately followed by 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> of loading at the continuous rating.

9)

Periodic testing required by the TS of the Diesel Generators is performed at intervals determined in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (see TS 5.5.15). The frequency specified in RG 1.108, Regulatory Position C.2.a of 18 months is not implemented.

d)

Regulatory Guide 1.22 (2/72)*

The design of the Diesel Generator initiation systems and the Class 1E AC Electrical distribution degraded grid undervoltage protection system permits periodic testing of their actuation devices during plant operation.

e)

Regulatory Guide 1.29 (2/76)

Refer to Section 3.13 for compliance statement.

f)

Regulatory Guide 1.29 (9/78)

(Diesel Generator E Only)

Refer to Section 3.13 for compliance statement of Diesel Generator E and the connections to the transfer points in the Diesel Generator A, B, C and D rooms.

g)

Regulatory Guide 1.30 (8/72)*

Refer to Section 3.13 for compliance statement.

h)

Regulatory Guide 1.31 (Diesel Generator E Only)

Refer to Section 3.13 for compliance statement.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-8 i)

Regulatory Guide 1.32 (3/76)

All safety related electric systems are in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.32.

Compliance is discussed as follows:

The portions of Regulatory Guide 1.32 applying to DC power are discussed in Subsection 8.3.2.2.1(d).

The availability of the offsite power meets the criteria set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.32.

The two offsite circuits have immediate access to the transmission network. See response to Regulatory Guide 1.93 for operating restrictions when offsite power is not immediately available.

IEEE 308-1974 is generally accepted by Regulatory Guide 1.32. Compliance with the Regulatory Guide is discussed as follows:

Class 1E AC power systems are designed to ensure that any design basis event, as listed in Table 1 of IEEE 308, does not cause either (1) loss of electric power to more than one load group, surveillance device, or protection system to jeopardize the safety of the reactor unit, or (2) transients in the power supplies, which could degrade the performance of any system.

Controls and indicators for the Class 1E 4.16 kV bus supply breakers are provided in the control room and on the switchgear. Controls and indicators for the standby AC power supplies are also provided in the control room and on the local diesel generator control panels. Control and indication for the standby power system is described in Subsection 8.3.1.

Class 1E equipment and associated design, operating, and maintenance documents are distinctly identified as described in Subsection 8.3.1.3.

Each Class 1E equipment is qualified by analysis, by successful use under required conditions, or by actual test to demonstrate its ability to perform its function under applicable design basis events.

The surveillance requirements of IEEE 308 are followed in design, installation, and operation of Class 1E equipment and consist of the following:

1)

Preoperational equipment and system tests and inspections are performed in accordance with the requirements described in Chapter 14.

2)

Periodic equipment tests are performed in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications or Technical Requirements Manual. The test intervals specified in IEEE Standard 308-1974 may be replaced with performance-based, risk-informed test intervals in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

The standby AC power supplies are shared by both units. The total standby capacity is sufficient to operate the engineered safety feature loads following a design basis accident on one unit and a concurrent forced shutdown of the other unit.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-9 The two preferred offsite power supplies are also shared by both units. The capacity of each offsite power supply is sufficient to operate the engineered safety features of one unit and safe shutdown loads of the other unit.

Connection of non-Class 1E equipment to Class 1E systems is discussed in the response to Regulatory Guide 1.75.

Selection of diesel generator set is discussed in the response to Regulatory Guide 1.9.

j)

Regulatory Guide 1.32 (2/77) (Diesel Generator E Only)

The requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (2/77) are the same as the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (3/76). The compliance to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (2/77) for the Diesel Generator E building and the connections to the transfer points in the Diesel Generator A, B, C and D rooms are the same as the compliance to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (3/76).

k)

Regulatory Guide 1.40 (3/73) (Not Applicable to Diesel Generator E)

Refer to Subsection 3.11.2 for compliance statement.

l)

Regulatory Guide 1.41 (3/73)*

The preoperational testing program conforms to the general guidance provided by Regulatory Guide 1.41 as described in Chapter 14.

The onsite Class 1E electric power system, designed in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.6 and 1.32, is tested as part of the preoperational testing program and also after major modifications. The tests are performed in accordance with the requirements outlined in Chapter 14. Facilities are provided to test the independence between the redundant onsite power sources and their load groups.

The onsite Class 1E electric power system can be tested functionally, one load group at a time, by allowing one load group to be powered only by its associated diesel generator while the bus is isolated 1-14 from the preferred offsite power source. The isolation of the offsite power source can be done by direct actuation of undervoltage relays monitoring the Class 1E system.

Each test may include injection of simulated accident signals, startup of diesel generators, and automatic load applications. Functional performance of the loads is checked. Each test is of sufficient duration to achieve stable operating conditions and thus permit the onset and detection of adverse conditions that could result from improper assignment of loads.

During test of one Class 1E load group, the buses and loads of the redundant load group not under test are monitored to verify independence of load groups.

m)

Regulatory Guide 1.47 (5/73)*

The design of the Class 1E AC Electrical system meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.47.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-10 n)

Regulatory Guide 1.53 (6/73)*

Refer to Section 3.13 for compliance statement.

o)

Regulatory Guide 1.62 (10/73)*

The diesel generator initiation systems are required to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.62, and are discussed in Subsections 7.6.1b.3 and 7.6.2b.

p)

Regulatory Guide 1.63 (10/73) (Not Applicable to Diesel Generator E)

The design of electric penetration assemblies is in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63.

Refer to Section 3.13 for compliance statement.

q)

Regulatory Guide 1.68 (01/77)

Refer to Section 3.13 for compliance statement.

r)

Regulatory Guide 1.68 (08/78)

(Diesel Generator E Only)

Refer to Section 3.13 for compliance statement.

s)

Regulatory Guide 1.73 (1/74) (Not applicable to Diesel Generator E)

Selection of electric valve operators for use inside the containment is in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.73.

The electric valve operators for service inside the containment are type tested in accordance with IEEE 382-1972 as modified by Regulatory Guide 1.73. The tests consist of (1) aging, (2) seismic, and (3) accident or other special environmental requirements.

Test parameters are discussed in Subsection 3.11.2.

See Section 3.13 for compliance statement for GE furnished valve operators.

t)

Regulatory Guide 1.75 (1/75)

The Regulatory Guide endorses the IEEE 384-1974, subject to the additions and clarifications delineated in Section C of the guide. Regulatory compliance for the NSSS scope of supply Power Generation Control Complex (PGCC), Advance Control Room system (ACR) and Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS) local panels are addressed in Section 3.13. All remaining balance of plant (BOP) circuits and equipment meet the requirements of the Regulatory Guide 1.75 except as discussed and clarified in items 4, 5, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 below.

1)

The electric power system has physical independence required by General Design Criterion 3, 17, and 21 of Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50 to provide the minimum number of circuits and equipment to perform the required safety and protective functions assuming a single failure.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-11

2)

The separation of circuits and equipment (including Class 1E from non-Class 1E circuits) is achieved by structural design, distance, or barrier (as defined per IEEE 384-1974 Section 4 and 5), or any combination thereof.

Two basic circuit isolation schemes are used to isolate control circuits of two redundant load groups and Class 1E from non-Class 1E control circuits. The first scheme consisting of an isolation type relay, P&B type MDR relay, is used to isolate interfacing control circuits.

This relay has an internal physical separation between the coil and the electrical contacts.

The relay coil motive power is transmitted through an extended rotary shaft which actuates a contact assembly. This relay is of Class 1E category and is designed for metal plate (barrier) mounting so that the coil circuit is at one side of the plate while the contact circuits are on the other. In all applications of this relay, either the metal plate is wide enough to provide a 6 inch minimal air space between the isolated circuits, or the relay is boxed so that the circuits have no common air space at all.

The second isolation scheme is applicable to non-interlocking control circuits of redundant separation groups (including non-Class 1E) that are housed in the same cabinet for operational expediency. In this case, the isolated circuit device is completely boxed, and all cabinet wiring to the device is either enclosed in a flexible metal conduit or is in a wireway with at least 6 inches of separation from the wiring and devices of the circuits it is isolated from. Isolation devices for power circuits are addressed in Paragraph 5 below.

3)

The mechanical systems that are served by the electrical systems satisfy the physical independence requirements.

4)

"Affiliated" circuits are non-Class 1E circuits which satisfy at least one of the following conditions:

i)

Supply power to non-Class 1E loads from Class 1E power supplies.

ii)

Routed in a common raceway with Class 1E circuits.

iii)

Share the same enclosure with Class 1E circuits without a 6 inch minimum separation or a physical barrier.

"Affiliated" circuits are used in SSES in place of "associated" circuits which are defined in Section 4.5 of IEEE 384-1974. Affiliated circuits are same as associated circuits except the terminal equipment/devices are not subject to the requirements of Class 1E equipment/devices. "Affiliated" circuits encompass the isolation methods described in paragraph 5).

The affiliated circuits are subject to the same requirements as Class 1E circuits, such as unique identification, derating, environmental qualification, flame retardance, splicing restriction, raceway fill, and separation, except circuits located in the Turbine Building. All Class 1E circuits (RPS) and affiliated circuits (control rod drive water pump motors, turbine building chillers, main condensate vacuum pump motors, and instrument air compressors), located in the Turbine Building, are routed in qualified Class 1E raceways although they are supported from a non-Seismic Category I structure.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-12

5)

Reference: Section 4.5 and 4.6 of IEEE 384-1974. Affiliated circuits are avoided wherever possible, but where non-Class 1E loads are connected to a Class 1E power supply, isolation between the Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment is accomplished by either of methods i through iv below. Method V is applicable to non-Class 1E power supply feeding a non-Class 1E circuit which becomes affiliated due to the circuits proximity to Class 1E circuits/devices.

Isolation Methods:

(i)

Shunt-tripping the Class 1E circuit breaker or tripping of the motor contractor (Class 1E) on a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal.

(ii)

Shunt-tripping the Class 1E circuit breaker or tripping of the motor contractor (Class 1E) on a LOCA and total loss of offsite power (LOOP) signal.

(iii)

An isolation system which consists of a Class 1E circuit overcurrent interrupting device is placed in series with a non-Class 1E circuit overcurrent interrupting device. The circuit between the two devices is affiliated. This method is used for a non-Class 1E distribution bus.

(iv)

A Class 1E circuit interrupting device actuated by overcurrent is placed in series with a non-Class 1E equipment. The circuit between the interrupting device and the non-Class 1E equipment is affiliated.

(v)

For non-Class 1E circuit in proximity of Class 1E circuits, an isolation system which trips on an overcurrent is placed in series with the non-Class 1E circuit.

All non-Class 1E loads connected to Class 1E power supplies per isolation methods i through iv are summarized in Table 8.1-2. Circuits using isolation method v are all Class 1E equipment space heaters, utility, or lighting circuits where the minimum physical separation cannot be met (see Para. 16). An isolation system is defined as two separate overcurrent devices (isolation method iii and v) placed in series in a circuit to minimize any failure in the non-Class 1E equipment from causing unacceptable influences in the Class 1E system. The type of isolation devices used actuated by overcurrent are breakers and fuses. One of the overcurrent devices of the isolation scheme is Class 1E and located in or adjacent to the Class 1E equipment. The other is non-Class 1E and located at or near the non-Class 1E equipment. The basis for the selection of two devices in series are:

a)

Both devices are of different type and different electrical characteristic to eliminate the possibility of a common mode failure due to a manufacturing defect.

b)

The devices are selected to minimize the effects on the Class 1E power supply against faults in the non-Class 1E equipment.

c)

The devices are coordinated to clear the fault in the non-Class 1E equipment, without tripping the Class 1E main source breaker.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-13 d)

During a seismic event, the Class 1E devices feeding to non-Class 1E equipment will provide adequate circuit isolation in the event of a non-Class 1E equipment failure.

e)

The devices are selected to protect the Class 1E circuits against faults at the non-Class 1E power circuit (isolation method v) such as short circuit and overvoltage.

6)

Non-Class 1E power and control circuits are separated from the Class 1E and associated circuits by the minimum separation requirements specified in Section 5 of IEEE 384-1974.

Isolation devices are used where a non-Class 1E control circuit and Class 1E control circuits are interfaced (See paragraph 2).

7)

Reference: Position C.7 of Regulatory Guide 1.75 and Sections 5.1.3, 5.1.4 and 5.6.2 of IEEE 384-1974.

Exception to Section 5.1.3 of IEEE 384-1974: The 1" minimum separation requirement of totally enclosed raceway is not met due to space limitation in some areas. This is limited to instrument to instrument, instrument to control, and control to control, and non-Class 1E control to Class 1E power totally enclosed raceway only. For justification, refer to Wyle Lab. Test Report No. NE56719 dated November 20, 1980.

Exception to Section 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 of IEEE 384-1974: The specified horizontal and specified vertical separation distances between free air temporary cables and enclosed Class 1E raceways may not be met. Free air temporary cables can be installed with no separation distance from totally enclosed Class 1E raceways.

Temporary cables are non-Class 1E and have a specified removal date or removal event. Tests have demonstrated the acceptability of a single solid metal cable cover as a barrier when the worst case electrical fault occurs to a cable resting on the metal cable tray cover. The cables inside the cable tray maintained their functional capability during the testing.

Non-Class 1E, low energy circuits for digital/analog information and instrumentation such as annunciators, data loggers, meters, recorders and transient monitoring system are permitted to be connected to Class 1E devices for required inputs.

These non-Class 1E circuits are exempted from separation requirement only with the same channel/division which the circuits are connected for their inputs. The cabling of these non-Class 1E low energy circuits, with the exception of annunciators, are routed exclusively in non-Class 1E instrumentation raceways which do not contain control or power (high energy) circuits except 120V AC.

Non-Class 1E low energy cables, with the exception of annunciator cables, routed in a common pull/junction box with control or power cables are separated in accordance with the requirements of Table 8.3-25.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-14 All annunciator circuits are non-Class 1E. The cable runs of these circuits are separated from Class 1E circuits by the minimum separation requirements specified in Section 5 of IEEE 384-1974. However, annunciator cables are routed only in the non-Class 1E control raceways which contain cables of voltage level of 120V AC, 125V DC and 250V DC.

Annunciator cables routed in a common pull/junction box with high energy cables are separated in accordance with the requirements of Table 8.3-25.

All instrumentation and annunciator cables have fire retardant insulation (see Subsection 8.3.3).

The raceways are of fire retardant materials. Instrumentation cables have grounded shields.

Analysis:

Annunciator and instrumentation circuits are low energy circuits. The annunciator circuits operate in 125V DC high impedance (60 K) source. Most of the instrumentation systems operate on 125V DC signals in high impedance circuits or 4-20 ma signals in low impedance circuits.

Since only low energy can be derived from instrumentation circuits, the probability of these non-Class 1E circuits providing a mechanism of failure to the Class 1E circuits inside Class 1E devices or enclosures is extremely low.

The worst credible event which could affect the Class 1E system through the non-Class 1E low energy circuits is a fire involving a control raceway containing annunciator cables. Assume in the worst case where annunciator cables from redundant Class 1E equipment are both shorted to a 120V AC, 125V DC or 250V DC cable due to the fire, further assume that the sensor contacts are both closed and that the overcurrent protective device of the 120V AC, 125V DC or 250V DC cable does not trip. Then the Class 1E devices could be damaged and therefore prevent the devices from performing their Class 1E function.

To summarize the above failure mode, the redundant Class 1E systems will fail only if all of the following conditions occur at the same time:

a.

Annunciator cable from a Class 1E device is fused to the highest voltage circuit conductors (250V DC).

b.

Annunciator cable from a redundant Class 1E device is also fused to the highest voltage source (250V DC).

c.

The highest voltage (250V DC) circuit conductors are not short circuited or grounded.

d.

The highest voltage (250V DC) circuit protective devices failed (breaker or fuse failed to perform its intended function).

e.

Class 1E device contact closed (alarm state).

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-15

f.

Redundant Class 1E device contact closed (alarm state).

g.

In order for the Class 1E protective system, as designed, to fail due to fire the above six independent low probability events must happen simultaneously. This is considered extremely unlikely. Thus, the low energy non-Class 1E circuits, which are not separated from the Class 1E circuits at the input devices do not provide a mechanism of failure of the Class 1E system.

Analysis of the effects of the following listed potential high voltage sources in the annunciator and computer systems and their interface devices has shown that the Class 1E circuits, from which the annunciator and computer inputs are derived, meet their minimum performance requirements. The installed non-Class 1E interface devices are listed in Table 8.1-3.

Impressed voltage faults in raceway Current Transformers Potential Transformers Rotating Machine and Transformer Temperature Sensors Main Generator Field For new annunciator and computer inputs, developed from Class 1E circuits, Class 1E isolation devices will be used to provide isolation of the Class 1E circuits.

Annunciator and computer input cables are routed in non-Class 1E raceway which may contain 120V AC, 125V DC and 250V DC cables. Potential damage to cables in the raceway may cause accidental imposition of 120V AC, 125V AC or 250V AC on the annunciator or computer input wires and through these wires to Class 1E devices.

For impressed voltage faults in the raceway systems, the annunciator and computer digital input closed contacts could weld shut if sufficient current flowed for a sufficient duration. Analysis of the annunciator and computer digital interface devices shows that the Class 1E circuits from which these inputs are derived meet their minimum performance requirements even if the input interface device contacts weld shut. This is based upon:

The interface devices change position and meet their minimum performance requirements before the contacts are exposed to potential contact welding.

The interface devices are used for alarm and indication only and contacts are not used in Class 1E circuits.

The interface devices meet their minimum performance requirements even with the input contacts welded shut.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-16 The interface devices are in affiliated (associated) circuits and contacts from these devices are not used in Class 1E circuits.

Inputs are developed through electrical isolation devices to provide positive isolation of the circuits.

With the maximum credible voltage impressed on the analog computer inputs, the Class 1E circuits used to develop the computer inputs meet their minimum performance requirements. This is based upon an analysis that shows:

The computer inputs are developed through electrical isolation devices. These devices prevent the specified impressed voltage faults from degrading the operation of the circuits on the Class 1E side of the devices below an acceptable level.

The computer inputs are developed from instruments which are part of the primary coolant pressure boundary. Failure of these instruments does not prevent these devices from maintaining the integrity of the primary coolant boundary which is their sole safety-related function.

The computer inputs are developed from Class 1E Resistance Thermometers Detectors (RTDs) whose failures do not effect the Class 1E circuits.

Current Transformers (CTs) impress short duration high voltage pulses, every half cycle, on connected secondary equipment when the CT secondary circuits are opened under load. These high voltage spikes could cause failure of the transducers used to develop computer inputs and allow the CT open circuit voltage to propagate through the computer to safety systems.

At Susquehanna SES, General Electric (GE) Type 4701 and 4722 series transducers are connected to the CTs and provide inputs to the computer.

The transducers must fail before the high voltage pulses can propagate to the computer. Analysis of Westinghouse CTs with 600/5A and lower CT ratios concludes that the maximum estimated open CT secondary voltage is below the 2120V peak tested dielectric withstand of the Type 4722 transducers. Analysis and testing of Westinghouse CTs with CT ratios greater than 600/5A and GE 18,000/5A CTs shows that the maximum credible voltage produced by these CTs will not break down the insulation of the Type 4701 or 4722 transducers. These CTs will not impact other safety systems.

For the GE 40,000/5A CTs, no open CT secondary voltage data is available. Based on CT excitation curves, these CTs may produce more than the 4100V peak which would exceed the 8-hour dielectric withstand capability of the transducer. Circuit protectors (thyrites) have been installed across the secondary of these CTs to limit the voltage to less than 1500VRMS.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-17 For the McGraw CTs, no open circuit voltage data is available. Based on CT excitation curves, the maximum voltage produced by these CTs may exceed the insulation capability of the Type 4701 or 4722 transducers. In the event the transducers flashover and subsequent flashovers occur at the computer input cabinets, this voltage may be impressed on Class 1E circuits connected to the same cabinet as these CTs if, and only if, the flashover does not involve ground. If the flashover involves ground it will provide a return path to the CT secondary circuit, thus completing the CT circuit and reducing the voltage to its normal value. In the event this voltage did reach the Class 1E circuits connected to the same chassis as these CTs, there is no effect on the safe shutdown of the plant. All Class 1E computer inputs connected to this chassis are developed from other current transformers or potential transformer through transducers. The McGraw CT open circuit voltage does not prevent these Class 1E circuits from meeting their minimum performance requirements.

A failure of potential transformers (PTs) could impress high voltages on the secondary circuits which could fail the transducers used to develop the computer inputs and allow the high voltage to migrate through the computer to other Class 1E circuits. The PTs have several possible failure mechanisms such as primary and secondary open and short circuits which would result in loss of computer signals but would not challenge any other circuits with high voltage. The two areas of concern are primary to secondary hot shorts which would apply primary voltage across the load, usually a transducer. Primary turn to turn shorts may also increase secondary voltage if enough turns failed.

At Susquehanna SES, there are no PTs connected directly to the computer.

The PT circuits provide inputs through GE Types 4701 and 4722 transducers and Westinghouse TypeVP-840 transducers. An analysis shows that PTs will not fail in such a manner as to apply high voltage on the PT secondary circuits. These PTs are not high voltage sources to the computer because of the type of construction and insulation system, and the separation and isolation provided between the primary and secondary terminals. Moreover, the PT circuits are protected by fuses on the primary as well as on the secondary. Therefore, the PTs will not fail in such a manner as to apply high voltage on the PT secondary circuits.

High voltage cables (480V and higher) are not potential voltage sources into the computer since these cables run in different and separate raceway systems than the computer input cables and do not come in contact with the computer cables.

Rotating machine and transformer temperature sensors are not high voltage fault sources because these devices have a grounded lead or an insulating disc film which is designed to open and connect to ground during a high voltage fault. When the fault is connected to ground, the fault cannot propagate to the computer and is effectively isolated.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-18

8)

In addition to the minimum separation requirements as outlined in items 6 and 7 above; (a) there are no cable splices in raceways, (b) cables and raceways are flame retardant, (c) cable trays are limited to 30 percent fill and are not filled above the side rails.

9)

Raceway and cable identifications are in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.75.

Detailed description is given in Subsection 1.8.6.

10) Diesel generators A, B, C and D are housed in separate rooms within a Seismic Category I structure with independent air supplies. The auxiliaries and local controls of each unit are also housed in the same room as the unit they serve.

Diesel generator E is housed in a separate Seismic Category I structure with independent air supply. The auxiliaries and local controls for the diesel generator are housed within the same structure as the unit.

11) Redundant Class 1E batteries are located in separate rooms within a Seismic Category I structure; however, each battery room is exhausted by an individual ventilation duct to a common exhaust plenum. Two redundant Class 1E centrifugal exhaust fans service the common exhaust ductwork.

Battery chargers of redundant load groups are physically separated in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75.

12) All redundant Class 1E switchgear, motor control centers, and distribution panels are physically separated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75.

13) Redundant Class 1E containment electrical penetrations are dispersed around the circumference of the containment and are physically separated in accordance with the requirements of Section 5.5 of IEEE 384-1974. Due to limited space, cable penetrations into the suppression pool contain both non-Class 1E and Class 1E circuits. These non-Class 1E circuits are for instrumentation, annunciation, and computer inputs and are not treated as affiliated circuits.

The suppression pool area is serviced by three (3) electrical penetration assemblies: W300, W301, and W330B. Penetrations for Unit I, 1W300 and 1W301, each contains circuits of one division of the Class 1E systems and non-Class 1E circuits. The third penetration, 1W330B, contains only non-Class 1E circuits. The Unit II penetrations 2W300 and 2W301 contain only circuits of one of the redundant Class 1E divisions and the third penetration 2W330B contains all the non-Class 1E circuits to the suppression pool area.

Penetrations W300 and W301 are located in opposite quadrants of the suppression pool for each unit.

Penetrations 1W300 and 1W301 also have non-Class 1E instrument and control circuits. Three of the non-Class 1E instrument circuits are for non-Class 1E RTD inputs (except on affiliated RTD cable, RM1I9804E, which is routed together with non-Class 1E circuits since it cannot be accommodated by another penetration module). These are low energy and do not degrade the Class 1E circuits as discussed in Section 8.l.6.l.q-7). The non-Class 1E control circuits are used for annunciator inputs only. These annunciator circuits derive digital information

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-19 from the same Class 1E equipment as the Class 1E control cables (i.e.,

PSV-15704A2, solenoid valve control and valve position annunciation). No other non-Class 1E circuit cables are routed in the same raceway with the annunciator cables from the Class 1E valve to the penetration inboard to the suppression pool. For further justification on annunciator circuits see Section 8.1.6.1.q-7).

The remainder of non-Class 1E instrument and control circuits are used for the Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT). This testing is performed only when the reactor is in the cold shutdown mode and personnel access to the suppression pool is permitted. After the ILRT test are completed, these circuits are isolated from the rest of the plant as all test instruments and sensors are disconnected and removed from both the suppression pool and the reactor building areas. The segments of the ILRT circuits not disconnected after testing are run in separate plant raceways used only for the ILRT system.

All future non-Class 1E circuits will be routed through the penetration 1W330B reserved for non-Class 1E only.

14) References: Section 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 of IEEE 384-1974.

In general, circuits for redundant Class 1E systems and circuits for non-Class 1E systems are located in separate enclosures such as, boxes, racks, and panels.

However, in cases where redundant channel/division Class 1E circuits or Class 1E and non-Class 1E circuits, or RPS and other Class 1E and non-Class 1E circuits are located in the same enclosure, physical separation is achieved either by minimum of 6" horizontal and vertical separation, steel barriers, metallic enclosure, or metallic flexible conduit (exception to this separation requirement is taken for non-Class 1E low energy circuits discussed in paragraph 7 of this section). Where the above separation methods are not feasible, one of the separation group circuits except for RPS are to be covered with one of the following qualified nonflammable materials:

i.

Have Industries, siltemp sleeving type S and woven tape type WT65.

ii.

Carborundum, Fiberfrax sleeving type HP144T and woven tape type 3L144T.

These materials have been qualified to be used as separation barriers (Wyle Lab.

Test Report No. 56669 dated May, 1980).

Applications of these materials are controlled and documented by the engineering office. Enclosures that contain wiring and devices for Class 1E circuits are labeled distinctively to identify externally the separations system and grouping (see Subsection 3.12.3.2). Internal to enclosures, terminal blocks and devices such as relays, switches and instruments are uniquely identified. In addition, external cables are color coded and marked to be readily identified (see Subsection 3.12.3.4.2). Wire bundles or cables internal to control boards are not distinctively or permanently identified.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-20

15) Due to spatial limitation beneath the reactor vessel, the following is a description of electrical cable separation for the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS), Reactor Protection System (RPS), and Control Rod Drive System (CRD):

i.

All Class 1E cables are routed through enclosed raceway such as enclosed wireways, rigid and flexible conduits except as noted in paragraph iv.

ii.

Non-Class 1E cables are routed in open trays.

iii.

Cables of different systems may be routed in some portion of raceway. But channel separation is maintained.

iv.

Because of space limitation and need for flexibility, the flexible conduits end after the horizontal runs where cables drop down for connection to connectors.

v.

The 1 inch minimum separation requirement of IEEE 384-1974 is not met for enclosed raceways beneath the reactor vessel. Also, the minimum separation requirements of IEEE 384-1974 Section 5.1.3 or 5.1.4 and not met for Class 1E enclosed raceways and non-Class 1E open trays.

All cables (Class 1E and non-Class 1E) beneath the reactor vessel are low energy instrumentations circuits. Fire hazard beneath the reactor vessel is described in Fire Protection Review Report Section 6.2.3 Fire Zone 1-1H.

16) Non-Class 1E circuits inside a Class 1E equipment, such as lighting, utility or space heater circuit, shall be considered affiliated unless a 6" minimum separation or physical barrier from the Class 1E circuits is provided or unless analysis or test shows that the non-Class 1E space heater circuits will not affect the Class 1E system. If power is supplied from a non-Class 1E distribution panel, an isolation device or system (Isolation Method V) is installed at or near the equipment to prevent failures in the non-Class 1E circuits from affecting redundant Class 1E circuits.

Alternatively, the non-Class 1E supply cables may be routed in separate raceways such that no common mode failure could affect redundant Class 1E circuits due to a single event.

17) The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) is a non-Engineered Safeguard system that derives digital and analog information from Safety-Related and non-Safety Related systems. The input cables for the SPDS are assigned the electrical groupings of the system from which the SPDS derives its input. The output information of the SPDS is totally non-Class 1E. SPDS cables routed in the Main Control Room, the Upper and Lower Cable Spreading Rooms, and all General Plant areas are separated as described in Section 8.1.6.1.q-6. SPDS cables, in part, are also routed through the Upper and Lower Relay Room floor modules.

SPDS cables assigned the separation group of Division I and Affiliated are routed in the Upper Relay Room Floor, which primarily contains Division I and non-Class 1E Cables. SPDS cables assigned the separation group of Division II and Affiliated are routed in the Lower Relay Room Floor, which primarily contains Division II and non-Class 1E cables. The SPDS Divisionalized and Affiliated assigned cables

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-21 share partial routings with non-Class 1E control and instrumentation cables in the respective Upper and Lower Relay Room Floor sections, particularly at the transitional intersections of the lateral and longitudinal floor ducts and at the cable convergence area entering the bottom of the Relay Room panels. SPDS Divisionalized and Affiliated assigned cables deriving input from NSSS systems are routed the same as the existing respective Safety Related cables in the Relay Room floor ducts.

For Regulatory Guide compliance for NSSS scope of supply see Subsections 7.1.2.5.8, 7.2.2.1.2.1.10, 7.3.2a.1.2.1.10, 7.3.2a.2.2.1.9, 7.3.2a.3.2.1.2, 7.4.2.1.2.1.11, and 7.6.2 3.2.3.4.

SPDS Cables, assigned to Divisionalized and Affiliated separation groupings, deriving input from BOP systems are also routed the same as the existing respective safety related cables in the Relay Room floor ducts with additional requirement that: No non-Class 1E cable can share a common or partial routing with BOP SPDS cables of redundant safety related systems (i.e., Division I and II).

In the unlikely event that the non-Class 1E control and instrument cables, routed with the BOP SPDS cables Divisionalized and Affiliated, assigned the separation groups that are in the Relay Room ducts, could provide a failure mechanism to the Class 1E system, this event could only affect one of the Redundant Divisions of the Class 1E systems. The cables and components of the unaffected Division will not be degraded and will be available to perform the required Safety Related functions(s).

Affiliated cables are routed between SPDS non-Class 1E components. As per FSAR Section 18.1.17 Plant Safety Parameter Display System Requirements, the cabling between the non-Class 1E SPDS components is required to be installed to withstand an earthquake and therefore was routed in Class 1E raceway which is seismically qualified. Since the SPDS cables are in Class 1E raceway and are not safety Related they were designated affiliated. These cables routed between SPDS non-Class 1E components shall remain affiliated based on SPDS requirements and proximity to Class 1E cables and equipment.

18) Inside containment for low energy non-Class 1E instrumentation and control cables, where the separation requirements with Class 1E/RPS circuits per IEEE 384-1974 is not met due to spatial limitations, for cables in transition from tray to conduit or conduit to tray or penetration box to tray; the effects of lesser separation are analyzed to demonstrate that Class 1E/RPS cables are not degraded below an acceptable level to perform their intended function per IEEE 384-1974 section 4.6.1(3). The analysis is documented in specific calculations per requirements of section C-6 of Regulatory Guide 1.75.

Non-Class 1E instrumentation cables are for Rod Position Indication System (RPIS), transient monitoring system, temperature sensor cables and Integrated Leak Rate System (ILRT).

Non-Class 1E control cables are for SRV flow monitoring system instrumentation, Traversing Incore Probe indexing mechanisms, Drywell sump level sensors and area cooling flow switches, space heaters for Drywell area unit coolers, and annunciation and interlocks for Reactor Recirc. system components.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-22 Analysis The instrumentation systems operate on 1-5 Volt DC signals in high impedance circuits or 4-20 mA signals in low impedance circuits. ILRT cables are used for portable RTD connections during Integrated Leak Rate Testing performed when reactor is in cold shutdown mode and personnel access to suppression pool is permitted. After testing is completed, these circuits are isolated from the rest of the plant as all sensors and instruments are disconnected and removed from suppression pool and reactor building areas. Since only low energy can be derived from these instrumentation circuits, the probability of these non-Class 1E circuits providing a mechanism of failure to the Class 1E/RPS cables with lesser separation is extremely low.

The control systems operate on 120V AC, or less, at relatively low current values.

The two worst case scenarios analyzed involve Drywell area unit cooler space heater and flow switch control circuits. In both cases, assuming a short circuit at the locations where the Zetex wrap is removed, the calculated potential to damage other cables is significantly less than the calculated potential to damage other cables based on actual test results of faulted cables. The probability of these non-Class 1E control circuits providing a mechanism of failure to the Class 1E/RPS cables, based on their calculated potential to damage the cables, is extremely low to non-existent.

The worst credible event which could affect the Class 1E/RPS cables through the non-Class 1E low energy instrumentation and control cables is fully analyzed based on actual test results applicable to specific locations. The analysis determined that there will be no effect on the functional capability of Class 1E/RPS cables, with a conservative assumption of non-Class 1E instrumentation and control cables having a damage potential equal to that of a highest damage potential cable; the maximum temperature to which Class 1E/RPS cables could be subjected to were estimated to be far below the temperatures used during qualification testing of these cables.

19) The Class 1E Channel C and D 4.16 kV Buses supply power to divisional and affiliated loads as well as their respective Class 1E channel loads. The trip circuitry for each breaker of divisional and affiliated loads is supplied control power through an automatic transfer logic. The automatic transfer logic transfers the breaker trip logic upon loss of normal control power to an alternate control power source which supplies control power to the trip logic through an isolation scheme. The Channel A/Division I battery is the normal control power source for the trip circuitry of the breaker supplying the divisional or affiliated loads connected to the Class 1E Channel C 4.16 kV Bus. The alternate control power source is the Channel C battery. The Channel B/Division II battery is the normal control power source for the trip circuitry of the breakers supplying the divisional or affiliated loads connected to the Class 1E Channel D 4.16 kV Bus. The alternate control power source is the Channel D battery. The alternate control power source to the breaker trip circuitry of the divisionalized or affiliated loads consists of an isolation scheme which utilizes two Class 1E interrupting devices in series. The isolation scheme is similar to the isolation scheme used to connect non-Class 1E loads to a Class 1E power supply as described in Paragraph 5, isolation method iii. The circuit between the two Class 1E interrupting devices is designed as "affiliated" to be consistent with

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-23 isolation method iii even though the circuit is Class 1E. The circuits using this isolation scheme are summarized in Table 8.1-4. The basis for selection of the two Class 1E interrupting devices in series utilizes similar criteria to isolation method iii, Paragraph 5:

1.

One of the overcurrent devices of the isolation scheme is located in or adjacent to the channelized DC control power source. The other device is located at or near the divisional or affiliated load.

2.

Both devices are of different type and different electrical characteristics to eliminate the possibility of a common mode failure due to a manufacturing defect or design service life.

3.

The devices are selected to minimize the effects on the channelized DC control power source against faults in the trip circuitry of the divisional or affiliated loads.

4.

The devices are coordinated to clear the fault in the trip circuitry of the divisional or affiliated loads, without tripping the main source breaker to the channelized control power source.

5.

During a seismic or accident conditions, the devices feeding the trip circuitry of the divisional or affiliated loads provide adequate circuit isolation in the event of a single failure in the trip circuitry of a divisional or affiliated load.

20) The Containment Radiation Monitors (CRM) are seismically qualified to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.45. The area where the monitors are located in the Reactor Building is a harsh area post-accident. The monitors are not environmentally qualified. The monitors are supplied power and control power from the Class 1E System. Each power supply for the monitors has an isolation scheme which uses a dynamic and environmentally qualified interrupting device in series with a seismically qualified interrupting device. This isolation scheme is similar to the isolation scheme used to connect a non-Class 1E load to a Class 1E power supply as described in Paragraph 5, Isolation Method III. For the CRM, both interrupting devices are Class 1E and the circuit between the two interrupting devices is designated as Class 1E. The circuits using this isolation scheme are summarized in Table 8.1-5. The basis for selection of the two interrupting devices in series utilizes similar criteria to that in FSAR Section 8.1.6.1.q.5:

1.

One of the overcurrent devices of the isolation scheme is located in or adjacent to the divisional power or control power source. The other device is located at or near the divisional load.

2.

Both devices are of different type and different electrical characteristics to eliminate the possibility of a common mode failure due to a manufacturing defect or design service life.

3.

The devices are selected to minimize the effects on the Division I or Division II power or control power sources against faults in the CRM System.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-24

4.

The devices are coordinated to clear the fault in the CRM system, without tripping the main source breaker to the Division I or Division II power or control power source.

5.

During a LOCA event, the devices in the Division I or Division II power or control power sources provide adequate isolation in the event of a CRM system failure.

u)

Regulatory Guide 1.75 (9/78) (Diesel Generator E Only)

The requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75 (9/78) are the same as the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75 (1/75). The compliance and exceptions to Regulatory Guide 1.75 (9/78) for the Diesel Generator E building and the connections to the transfer points in the Diesel Generator A, B, C and D rooms are the same as the compliance and exceptions to Regulatory Guide 1.75 (1/75) for the BOP circuits of the plant.

A transfer scheme for substituting Diesel Generator E for any of the channelized Diesel Generators A, B, C or D utilizes a double-break configuration as an isolation method to assure independence between redundant safety related load groups. Power, control and instrumentation circuits from the channelized Diesel Generators A, B, C and D that tie to Diesel Generator E have two normally open contacts in series for each circuit. The normally open contacts are located in two separate locations. One contact of each circuit is in the channelized Diesel Generator A, B, C or D room. The second normally open contact of each circuit is in the Diesel Generator E building. Substitution of Diesel Generator E is accomplished by closing the normally open contacts of the circuits from the channelized diesel generator for which Diesel Generator E is being substituted. The normally open contacts of the circuits from the other channelized diesel generators continue to be open thereby providing the double-break isolation and maintaining independency.

The Diesel Generator E Class 1E circuitry to the transfer scheme's normally open contacts in the Diesel Generator E Building is designated as a unique Channel H. Cable and raceway for Channel H are separated from non-Class 1E and the other channelized Class 1E channel/division cable and raceway in the Diesel Generator E building.

Whenever Diesel Generator E is substituted for a channelized diesel generator, Diesel Generator E and its auxiliaries are considered to be the channel to which Diesel Generator E is aligned. The Channel H cables and raceway assimilate or are compatible with the channel/division of the substituted channelized diesel generator. The double-break configuration assures the independence of the Diesel Generator E and its auxiliaries from the three remaining channelized diesel generators which were not substituted. Whenever Diesel Generator E is not aligned, the double break configuration assures the independence of Diesel Generator E and its auxiliaries from the four channelized diesel generators.

When Diesel Generator E is aligned only those circuits of the transfer scheme to the substituted diesel generator are energized and operational. The circuits of the transfer scheme between the transfer points of the three remaining channelized diesel generators and Diesel Generator E are de-energized and isolated. Any creditable failure of the de-energized cables will not effect the Channel H cables due to the double break configuration. Likewise, a creditable failure on the Channel H is restricted to the aligned channel by the double break configuration.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-25 When Diesel Generator E is not aligned, the channelized circuitry of the transfer scheme is de-energized and isolated by the double break configuration. The channel H circuitry is operational but isolated from the channelized circuitry of the transfer scheme by the double break configuration.

The channel/divisional Class 1E internal wiring to the transfer switches within the transfer points is isolated by 6 inches or a barrier except within the cover of the transfer switches.

Inside the cover, the internal wiring is routed in separate bundles so as to maximize the distance. However, as indicated above, the transfer switch is either closed which results in the wiring on both sides of the switch assimilating the same separation group or the switch is open which is isolating energized, operable wiring from de-energized, inoperable wiring.

v)

Regulatory Guide 1.81 (1/75)*

The design of the electric power systems meets Regulatory Guide 1.81.

The DC power systems are not shared between the two units.

The standby AC power supplies are shared between the two units. The standby AC power systems have the capability to concurrently supply the engineered safety feature loads of one unit and the safe shutdown loads of the other unit, assuming a total loss of offsite power and a single failure in the onsite power system, such as the loss of one diesel generator.

The standby AC power systems for the two units are designed with minimum interactions between each unit's safety feature circuit so that allowable combinations of maintenance and test operations in either or both units would not degrade the capability to perform the minimum required safety functions in any unit, assuming a total loss of offsite power.

The Unit 1 AC Distribution System is a shared system between both units, since the common equipment (Emergency Service Water, Standby Gas Treatment System, Containment Structure HVAC, etc.) is energized only from the Unit 1 AC Distribution System. There are no Unit 2 specific loads energized from the Unit 1 AC Distribution System. The capacity of the Unit 1 AC Distribution System is sufficient to operate the engineered safety features of one unit and the safe shutdown loads of the other unit.

w)

Regulatory Guide 1.89 (11/74)*

Refer to Section 3.13 for compliance statement.

x)

Regulatory Guide 1.93 (12/74)*

Redundant offsite and onsite power sources are provided to meet the "Limiting Conditions for Operation" as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.93. See Chapter 16 for plant operating restrictions after the loss of power sources.

y)

Regulatory Guide 1.106 (11/75) (3/77)

The requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.106 are met (Position C2).

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-26 The thermal overload protection devices trip setpoints for all safety related motors on motor-operated valves (MOV) in Table 8.1-1 are established in favor of completing the MOVs safety function except for the following MOVs:

HV-01110E HV-01120E HV-01112E HV-01122E Additionally, the thermal overload protection devices for all safety related motors on motor-operated valves (MOV) are continuously bypassed and temporarily placed in force during testing except as discussed.

The thermal overload protection devices for the above MOVs are automatically bypassed when an accident signal occurs with the Diesel Generator E not aligned as discussed in subsection 8.1.6.1.z.

The thermal overload protection devices are periodically tested to ensure continued functional reliability and the accuracy of the trip point and to ensure that these devices operate within the manufacturers performance characteristics.

Continuous bypass is a normally closed (N.C.) contact from either a relay or switch which is connected in parallel across the thermal overload trip contact. Continuous bypass is accomplished by the use of an operate/test or normal/test type selector switch located in Panel 0C697 at rear section of control room:

A.

Operate/Test Type Switches

1.

In the operate position, a set of normally closed (N.C.) contacts for each MOV is connected in parallel across the thermal overload trip contacts, thus bypassing the overload trip.

2.

In the test position, the above set of contacts open thus permitting the overload trip contacts to trip the motor on closing or opening should an overload condition occur.

B.

Normal/Test Type Switches

1.

In the normal position, a set of normally open (N.O.) contacts in series with one or more relays (designated as 95) de-energizes the 95 relays. A set of normally closed relay contacts is paralleled across the thermal overload trip contacts thus bypassing the overload trip. Loss of power to the relays will cause the overloads to be bypassed.

2.

In the test position the above, N.O. contacts close, energizing the 95 relays, and thus opens the contact across the MOV overload trip contacts. This permits a motor overload to trip the motor during a closing or opening test operation.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-27 A bypass indication system is provided to alert the control room operator when a safeguard MOV is in a disabled condition. Loss of power supply, such as when the breaker is tripped for maintenance, or loss of control power is indicated in the bypass indication panel C694 located behind the unit operating benchboard. A Division I or II group alarm will then be made and this will be annunciated at the emergency core cooling benchboard C601.

Table 8.1-1 provides a listing of all MOV's with their thermal overload bypassed during plant operation (refer to Section 1.7 for changes).

Note that in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106, Position C.2, the individual contacts that bypass the thermal overload trip contacts are not periodically tested. Rather, the thermal overload protection devices are periodically tested to ensure continued functional reliability and the accuracy of the trip point.

z)

Regulatory Guide 1.106 (3/77) (Diesel Generator E Only)

The requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.106 are met (Position C.1.b).

When Diesel Generator E is not aligned for Diesel Generator A, B, C or D, the thermal overload protection on the Loop A and B ESW supply and return valves to Diesel Generator E is automatically bypassed. Automatic bypass is a normally open (N.O.)

contact of a relay connected in parallel across the thermal overload trip contact which changes state to a closed contact due to the relay energizing.

When Diesel Generator E is not aligned, automatic bypass is accomplished by a relay energized by a LOCA or LOOP signal.

The bypass initiation system circuitry is periodically tested.

aa) Regulatory Guide 1.118 - PERIODIC TESTING OF ELECTRIC POWER AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS (June 1976) and (June 1978 for the E Diesel Generator only)

The requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.118 are met.

Periodic testing of electrical power and protection systems of the Class 1E AC Electrical system is conducted to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.118 (6/76), which invokes the requirements of IEEE 338-1975.

Periodic testing of electrical power and protection systems of the E Diesel Generator meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.118 (6/78), which invokes the requirements of IEEE 338-1977.

bb) Regulatory Guide 1.148 (03/81) (Diesel Generator E Only)

Refer to Section 3.13 for compliance statement.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-28 8.1.6.2 Compliance with IEEE 338, 344, and 387 IEEE 338-1971, 344-1971 and 387-1972 are applicable to the plant except for the Diesel Generator E where IEEE 338-1977, 344-1975, 387-1977 are applicable.

a.

IEEE 338-1971, IEEE 338-1975 and IEEE 338-1977 IEEE 338-1971 is referenced in FSAR sections 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.6. Susquehanna SES, with the exception of the E Diesel Generator, was designed in accordance with IEEE 338-1971. However, Regulatory Guide 1.118 (dated 6/76), Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems, referenced in FSAR Sections 3.13 and 8.1.6.1, endorses the requirements of IEEE 338-1975 as a generally acceptable method for the periodic testing of electric power and protection systems. For the E Diesel Generator, Regulatory Guide 1.118 (dated 6/78) Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems endorses the requirements of IEEE 338-1977.

b.

IEEE 344-1971 and IEEE 344-1975 Compliance with this standard is discussed in Section 3.10c.2.2, Seismic Qualification for Electrical Equipment Operability. See FSAR Table 3.2-1. IEEE 344-1975 is applicable only to Diesel Generator E.

c.

IEEE 387-1972 and IEEE 387-1977 The following paragraphs analyze compliance with the design criteria of IEEE 387, Criteria for Diesel Generator Units as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. IEEE 387-1977 is applicable only to Diesel Generator E. See FSAR Section 8.1.6, Regulatory Guides and IEEE Standards, FSAR Section 8.3.1.4.11.2.c and FSAR Table 3.2-1.

Adequate cooling and ventilation equipment is provided to maintain an acceptable service environment within the diesel generator rooms during and after any design basis event, even without support from the preferred power supply.

Each diesel generator is capable of starting, accelerating, and accepting load as described in Subsection 8.3.1.4. The diesel generator automatically energizes its cooling equipment within an acceptable time after starting.

Frequency and voltage limits and the basis of the continuous rating of the diesel generator are discussed in the compliance statement to Regulatory Guide 1.9 in Subsection 8.1.6.1.

Mechanical and electric systems are designed so that a single failure affects the operation of only a single diesel generator.

Design conditions such as vibration, torsional vibration, and overspeed are considered in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 387.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-29 Each diesel governor can operate in the droop mode and the voltage regulator can operate in the paralleled mode during diesel generator testing. If an underfrequency condition occurs while the diesel generator is paralleled with the preferred (offsite) power supply, the diesel generator will be tripped automatically.

When aligned to a Class 1E 4.16 kV Bus, each diesel generator is provided with control systems permitting automatic and manual control. The automatic start signal is functional except when a diesel generator is not aligned. Provision is made for controlling the aligned diesel generators from the control room and from the diesel generator room/building.

Subsection 8.3.1.4.10 provides further description of the control systems.

Voltage, current, frequency, and output power metering is provided in the control room for the aligned diesel generators to permit assessment of the operating condition of each diesel generator.

Surveillance instrumentation is provided in accordance with IEEE 387 as follows:

1)

Starting System Starting air pressure low alarm.

2)

Lubrication System Lube oil pressure low trip and lube oil temperature high and low alarms. Lube oil pressure low trip is by coincident logic.

3)

Fuel System Fuel oil level in day tank high and low, fuel oil pressure high and low, and fuel oil level in storage tank high and low alarms.

4)

Primary Cooling System Essential service water low pressure.

5)

Secondary Cooling System Jacket coolant temperature high and low, jacket coolant pressure low.

6)

Combustion Air Systems Failure alarm is provided.

7)

Exhaust System Pyrometers located at diesel generator local control panel.

8)

Generator Generator differential, ground overcurrent, and reverse-power, underfrequency, and overvoltage trip and alarm. Neutral overvoltage and overcurrent alarm.

SSES-FSAR Text Rev. 71 FSAR Rev. 72 8.1-30

9)

Excitation System Low field current and overexcitation relay trip and alarm.

10) Voltage Regulation System Diesel generator overvoltage alarm.

11) Governor System Diesel generator underfrequency alarm and trip, and engine overspeed trip.

12) Auxiliary Electric System 4.16 kV bus undervoltage relays initiate bus transfer and alarm.

A detailed list of trip and alarm functions and testing of the diesel generator is discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.4.6

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 54 FSAR Rev. 72 Page 1 of 4 TABLE 8.1-1 Safety-Related Motor Operated Valves With Thermal Overload Protection MOTOR OPERATED VALVE SYS DIV/CH DWG.

HV-11313 CONT. ISO.

I E-147 SH 4 HV-11314 CONT. ISO.

I E-147 SH 3 HV-11345 CONT. ISO.

II E-147 SH 15 HV-11346 CONT. ISO.

II E-147 SH 14 HV-12603 CONT. ISO.

I E-172 SH 2 HV-15766 CONT. ISO.

I E-171 SH 5 HV-15768 CONT. ISO.

II E-171 SH 6 HV-152F001A CS I

E-155 SH 4 HV-152F001B CS II E-155 SH 4 HV-152F004A CS I

E-155 SH 1 HV-152F004B CS II E-155 SH 1 HV-152F005A CS I

E-155 SH 3 HV-152F005B CS II E-155 SH 3 HV-152F015A CS I

E-155 SH 5 HV-152F015B CS II E-155 SH 5 HV-152F031A CS I

E-155 SH 2 HV-152F031B CS II E-155 SH 2 HV-01110E*

ESW H

E-146 SH 19 HV-01112E*

ESW H

E-146 SH 17 HV-01120E*

ESW H

E-146 SH 20 HV-01122E*

ESW H

E-146 SH 18 HV-08693A ESW I

E-214 SH 17 HV-08693B ESW II E-214 SH 21 HV-21144A ESW I

E-216 SH 30 HV-21144B ESW II E-216 SH 31 HV-155F001 HPCI II E-152 SH 5 HV-155F002 HPCI II E-152 SH 16 HV-155F003 HPCI II E-152 SH 13 HV-155F004 HPCI II E-152 SH 12 HV-155F006 HPCI II E-152 SH 9 HV-155F007 HPCI II E-152 SH8 HV-155F008 HPCI II E-152 SH 6 HV-155F011 HPCI II E-152 SH 7

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 54 FSAR Rev. 72 Page 2 of 4 TABLE 8.1-1 Safety-Related Motor Operated Valves With Thermal Overload Protection MOTOR OPERATED VALVE SYS DIV/CH DWG.

HV-155F012 HPCI II E-152 SH 10 HV-155F042 HPCI II E-152 SH 14 HV-155F066 HPCI II E-152 SH 15 HV-155F075 HPCI II E-152 SH 17 HV-155F079 HPCI II E-152 SH 17 HV-156F059 HPCI II E-152 SH 11 HV-141F016 NSSS I

E-170 SH 2 HV-141F019 NSSS II E-170 SH 3 HV-141F020 NSSS I

E-181 SH 5 FV-149F019 RCIC I

E-154 SH 12 HV-149F007 RCIC II E-154 SH 4 HV-149F008 RCIC I

E-154 SH 3 HV-149F010 RCIC I

E-154 SH 11 HV-149F012 RCIC I

E-154 SH 6 HV-149F013 RCIC I

E-154 SH 7 HV-149F022 RCIC I

E-154 SH 15 HV-149F031 RCIC I

E-154 SH 10 HV-149F059 RCIC I

E-154 SH 14 HV-149F060 RCIC I

E-154 SH 13 HV-149F062 RCIC II E-154 SH 17 HV-149F084 RCIC II E-154 SH 16 HV-15012 RCIC I

E-154 SH 8 HV-150F045 RCIC I

E-154 SH 5 HV-150F046 RCIC I

E-154 SH 9 HV-15112 RHR I

E-153 SH 41 HV-151F003A RHR I

E-153 SH 91 HV-151F003B RHR II E-153 SH 11 HV-151F004A RHR I

E-153 SH 19 HV-151F004B RHR II E-153 SH 10 HV-151F004C RHR I

E-153 SH 19 HV-151F004D RHR II E-153 SH 19 HV-151F006A RHR I

E-153 SH 20 HV-151F006B RHR II E-153 SH 36

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 54 FSAR Rev. 72 Page 3 of 4 TABLE 8.1-1 Safety-Related Motor Operated Valves With Thermal Overload Protection MOTOR OPERATED VALVE SYS DIV/CH DWG.

HV-151F006C RHR I

E-153 SH 20 HV-151F006D RHR II E-153 SH 20 HV-151F007A RHR I

E-153 SH 26 HV-151F007B RHR II E-153 SH 93 HV-151F008 RHR II E-153 SH 15 HV-151F009 RHR I

E-153 SH 17 HV-151F010A RHR I

E-153 SH 41 HV-151F010B RHR II E-153 SH 41 HV-151F015A RHR I

E-153 SH 25 HV-151F015B RHR II E-153 SH 16 HV-151F016A RHR I

E-153 SH 95 HV-151F016B RHR II E-153 SH 95 HV-151F017A RHR I

E-153 SH 24 HV-151F017B RHR II E-153 SH 14 HV-151F021A RHR I

E-153 SH 29 HV-151F021B RHR II E-153 SH 29 HV-151F022 RHR I

E-153 SH 37 HV-151F023 RHR II E-153 SH 38 HV-151F024A RHR I

E-153 SH 23 HV-151F024B RHR II E-153 SH 13 HV-151F027A RHR I

E-153 SH 28 HV-151F027B RHR II E-153 HS 95 HV-151F028A RHR I

E-153 SH 96 HV-151F028B RHR II E-153 SH 12 HV-151F040 RHR I

E-153 SH 40 HV-151F047A RHR I

E-153 SH 21 HV-151F047B RHR II E-153 SH 11 HV-151F048A RHR I

E-153 SH 18 HV-151F048B RHR II E-153 SH 9 HV-151F049 RHR II E-153 SH 39 HV-151F103A RHR I

E-153 SH 27 HV-151F103B RHR II E-153 SH 94 HV-151F104A RHR I

E-153 SH 27

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 54 FSAR Rev. 72 Page 4 of 4 TABLE 8.1-1 Safety-Related Motor Operated Valves With Thermal Overload Protection MOTOR OPERATED VALVE SYS DIV/CH DWG.

HV-151F104B RHR II E-153 SH 94 HV-01201A1 RHR SW I

E-150 SH 34 HV-01201A2 RHR SW I

E-150 SH 34 HV-01201B1 RHR SW II E-150 SH 34 HV-01201B2 RHR SW II E-150 SH 34 HV-01222A RHR SW I

E-150-SH 32 HV-01222B RHR SW II E-150- SH 4 HV-01224A1 RHR SW I

E-150 SH 33 HV-01224A2 RHR SW I

E-150 SH 33 HV-01224B1 RHR SW II E-150 SH 8 HV-01224B2 RHR SW II E-150 SH 8 HV-11210A RHR SW I

E-150 SH 10 HV-11210B RHR SW II E-150 SH 11 HV-11215A RHR SW I

E-150 SH 5 HV-11215B RHR SW II E-150 SH 12 HV-112F073A RHR SW I

E-150 SH 5 HV-112F073B RHR SW II E-150 SH 29 HV-112F075A RHR SW I

E-150 SH 5 HV-112F075B RHR SW II E-150 SH 5 HV-14182A RWCU I

E-165 SH 19 HV-14182B RWCU I

E-165 SH 19 HV-144F001 RWCU I

E-165 SH 6 HV-144F004 RWCU II E-165 SH 7 HV-143F031A RX RECIRC I

E-151 SH 10 HV-143F031B RX RECIRC II E-151 SH 10 HV-143F032A RX RECIRC I

E-151 SH 14 HV-143F032B RX RECIRC II E-151 SH 14A Thermal overload is automatically bypassed when an accident signal occurs with the Diesel Generator E not aligned.

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 1 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 1 Control Structure HVAC Chiller Condenser Water Pump OP170A Control Structure H&V Room Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC OB136 i

2 Control Structure HVAC Chiller Condenser Water Pump OP170B Control Structure H&V Room Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC OB146 i

3 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 1V411A Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B236 i

4 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 1V411B Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B246 i

5 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 1V412A Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B236 i

6 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 1V412B Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B246 i

7 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 1V413A Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B236 i

8 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 1V413B Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B246 i

9 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 1V417A Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B236 i

10 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 1V417B Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B246 i

11 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 2V411A Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B236 i

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 2 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 12 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 2V411B Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B246 i

13 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 2V412A Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B236 i

14 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 2V412B Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B246 i

15 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 2V413A Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B236 i

16 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 2V413B Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B246 i

17 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 2V417A Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B236 i

18 Drywell Area Unit Cooler 2V417B Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B246 i

19 Instrument Air Compressor A 1K107A Channel B Div. II Engineered Safeguard Load Center 1B220 ii 20 Instrument Air Compressor B 1K107B Channel D Div. II Engineered Safeguard Load Center 1B240 ii 21 Instrument Air Dryer Panel A 1C142A Reactor Bldg.

Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B247 ii 22 Instrument Air Dryer Panel B 1C142B Reactor Bldg.

Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B226 ii

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 3 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 23 Instrument Air Compressor A 1K205A Reactor Bldg.

Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B217 ii 24 Instrument Gas Compressor B 1K205B Reactor Bldg.

Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B236 ii 25 Instrument Gas Compressor A 2K107A Channel A Div I Engineered Safeguard Load Center 2B210 ii 26 Instrument Air Compressor B 2K107B Channel C Div I Engineered Safeguard Load Center 2B230 ii 27 Instrument Air Dryer Panel A 2C142A Reactor Bldg.

Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B237 ii 28 Instrument Air Dryer Panel B 2C142B Reactor Bldg.

Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B216 ii 29 Instrument Gas Compressor A 2K205A Reactor Bldg.

Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B227 ii 30 Instrument Gas Compressor B 2K205B Reactor Bldg.

Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B246 ii 31 Turbine Area 480V MCC 1B116 Channel A Div I Engineered Safeguard Load Center 1B210 iii 32 Turbine Area 480V MCC 1B126 Channel B Div II Engineered Safeguard Load Center 1B220 iii 33 Instrument AC (Alternate)

UPS1D240 Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B216 iii

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 4 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 34 Instrument AC (Preferred)

UPS1D240 Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B236 iii 35 Instrument AC (Alternate)

UPS1D130 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B226 iii 36 Instrument AC (Preferred)

UPS1D130 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B246 iii 37 Reactor Recirc Pump Suction HV-B31-1F023A Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B237 iv 38 Reactor Recirc Pump Suction HV-B31-1F023B Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B246 iv 39 Computer Power Supply Inverter 1D656 Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B236 iii 40 Vital Power Supply Inverter 1D666 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B246 iii 41 Reactor Recirc Pump Suction HV-B31-2F023A Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B237 iv 42 Reactor Recirc Pump Suction HV-B31-2F023B Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B246 iv 43 125V DC Distribution Panel 1D615 Channel A/Div. I 125V DC Load Center 1D612 iii 44 125V DC Distribution Panel 1D625 Channel B/Div. II 125V DC Load Center 1D622 iii

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 5 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 45 125V DC Distribution Panel 1D635 Channel C 125V DC Load Center 1D632 iii 46 125V DC Distribution Panel 1D645 Channel D 125V DC Load Center 1D642 iii 47 480/277V Essential Lighting Panel 1EP07 Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B217 iii 48 480/277V Essential Lighting Panel 1EP08 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B227 iii 49 480/277V Essential Lighting Panel 1EP03 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B226 iii 50 480/277V Essential Lighting Panel 1EP04 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B246 iii 51 Turbine Area 480V MCC 2B116 Channel A Div. I Engineered Safeguard Load Center 2B210 iii 52 Turbine Area 480V MCC 2B126 Channel B Div. II Engineered Safeguard Load Center 2B220 iii 53 Instrument AC (Alternate)

UPS2D240 Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B216 iii 54 Instrument AC (Preferred)

UPS2D240 Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B236 iii 55 Instrument AC (Alternate)

UPS2D130 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B226 iii

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 6 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 56 Instrument AC UPS2D130 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B246 iii 57 58 59 Computer Power Supply Inverter 2D656 Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B236 iii 60 Vital Power Supply Inverter 2D666 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B246 iii 61 62 63 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D615 Channel A/Div. 1 125V DC Load Center 2D612 iii 64 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D625 Channel B/Div. II 125V DC Load Center 2D622 iii 65 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D635 Channel C 125V DC Load Center 2D632 iii 66 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D645 Channel D 125V DC Load Center 2D642 iii 67 480/277V Essential Lighting Panel 2EP07 Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B217 iii 68 480/277V Essential Lighting Panel 2EP08 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B227 iii

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 7 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 69 480/277V Essential Lighting Panel 2EP03 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B226 iii 70 480/277V Essential Lighting Panel 2EP04 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B246 iii 71 480/277V Essential Lighting Panel 0EP01 Control structure H&V Room Div I. Engineered Safeguard MCC OB136 iii 72 480/277V Essential Lighting Panel 0EP02 Control structure H&V Room Div II Engineered Safeguard MCC OB146 iii 73 480V/277V Essential Lighting Panel 1EP05 Control structure H&V Room Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC OB146 iii 74 Reactor Bldg.

Chiller compressor 1K206A Channel A/Div. I Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 1A201 iv 75 Control Rod Drive Water pump 1P132A Channel A/Div. I Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 1A201 iv 76 Turbine Bldg.

Chiller compressor 1K102A Channel A/Div. I Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 1A201 iv 77 Reactor Bldg.

Chiller compressor 1K206B Channel B/Div. II Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 1A202 iv 78 Main condenser Mechanical vacuum pump 1P105 Channel B/Div. II Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 1A202 iv 79 Turbine Bldg.

Chiller compressor 1K102B Channel B/Div. II Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 1A202 iv The affiliated cable load end terminates at 0TS601.

The affiliated cable load end terminates at 0TS602.

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 8 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 80 Control Rod Drive Water Pump 1P132B Channel D/Div. II Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 1A204 iv 81 Control Structure Passenger Elevator ODS108 Control Structure H&V Room Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC OB136 iv 82 Engr. Safeguard Service Water Pumphouse Lighting Panel OLP16 Div. I Engr. Safeguard Service Water Pumphouse MCC OB517 i

83 Engr. Safeguard Service Water Pumphouse Distribution Panel OPP509A Div. I Engr. Safeguard Service Water Pumphouse MCC OB517 i

84 Engr. Safeguard Service Water Pumphouse Distribution Panel OPP511 Div. II Engr. Safeguard Service Water Pumphouse MCC OB527 i

85 Spray Pond Piping Drain Pump OP513A Div. I Engr. Safeguard Service Water Pumphouse MCC OB517 i

86 Spray Pond Piping Drain Pump OP513B Div. I Engr. Safeguard Service Water Pumphouse MCC OB527 i

87 Reactor Bldg. Closed Cooling Water Pump 1P210A Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B216 iv 88 Reactor Bldg. Closed Cooling Water Pump 1P210B Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B237 iv 89 Deleted 90 Deleted 91 Reactor Bldg.

Service Elevator 1DS204 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B246 iv

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 9 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 92 Process Radiation Monitoring Cabinet 1C604 Div. I 24V DC Distribution Panel 1D672 iv 93 Process Radiation Monitoring Cabinet 1C604 Div. II 24V DC Distribution Panel 1D682 iii 94 Control Rod Drive Water Pump 2P132A Channel A/Div I Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 2A201 iv 95 Turbine Bldg.

Chiller Compressor 2K102A Channel A/Div I Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 2A201 iv 96 Reactor Bldg.

Chiller Compressor 2K206B Channel B/Div. II Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 2A202 iv 97 Main Condenser Mechanical Vacuum Pump 2P105 Channel C/Div. I Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 2A203 iv 98 Reactor Bldg.

Chiller Compressor 2K206A Channel C/Div. I Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 2A203 iv 99 Control Rod Drive Water Pump 2P132B Channel D/Div. II Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 2A204 iv 100 Turbine Bldg.

Chiller Compressor 2K102B Channel D/Div. II Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear 2A204 iv 101 Reactor Bldg. Closed Cooling Water Pump 2P210B Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B247 iv 102 Reactor Bldg. Closed Cooling Water Pump 2P210A Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B226 iv 103 104 105 Process Radiation Div. I 24V DC iv

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 10 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 106 Process Radiation Monitoring Cabinet 2C604 Div. II 24V DC Distribution Panel 2D682 iii 107 Containment Vacuum Relief Valve PSV-15704A1 Div. I 120V Inst.

AC 1Y216 PNL iv 108 PSV-15704B1 iv 109 PSV-15704CI iv 110 PSV-15704DI iv 111 PSV-15704E1 iv 112 PSV-15704A2 Div. II 120V Inst.

AC 1Y226 PNL iv 113 PSV-15704B2 iv 114 PSV-15704C2 iv 115 PSV-15704D2 iv 116 PSV-15704E2 iv 117 PSV-25704A1 Div. I 120V Inst.

AC 2Y216 PNL iv 118 PSV-25704B1 iv 119 PSV-25704C1 iv 120 PSV-25704D1 iv 121 PSV-25704E1 iv 122 PSV-25704A2 Div. II 120V Inst.

AC 2Y226 PNL iv 123 PSV-25704B2 iv 124 PSV-25704C2 iv

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 11 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 125 PSV-25704D2 iv 126 PSV-25704E2 iv 127 Fuel Pool Level Transmitter LT-25347 and Level/Temperature Recorder LR/TR-25347 Div. II 120V Inst.

AC 2Y226 PNL iii 128 129 ES Transformer Cooling Fans and Control OX201 Diesel Generator Rm.

Chi. A Engineered Safeguard MCC OB516 iv 130 ES Transformer Cooling Fans and Control OX203 Diesel Generator Rm.

Ch. B Engineered Safeguard MCC OB526 iv 131 ES Transformer Cooling Fans and Control OX201 Diesel Generator Rm.

Ch. C Engineered Safeguard MCC OB536 iv 132 ES Transformer Cooling Fans and Control OX203 Diesel Generator Rm.

Ch. D Engineered Safeguard MCC OB546 iv 133 HPCI Vacuum Tank Condensate Drain Pump 1P215 Div. II 250V DC Motor Control Center 1D274 iv 134 HPCI Barometric Condensate Vacuum Pump 1P216 Div. II 250V DC Motor Control Center 1D274 iv 135 RCIC Barometric Condensate Vacuum Pump 1P219 Div. I 250V DC Motor Control Center 1D254 iv 136 RCIC Vacuum Tank Condensate Vacuum Pump 1P220 Div. I 250V DC Motor Control Center 1D254 iv 137 SLC Storage Tank Electric Heater A 1E219 Channel C 480V Motor Control Center 1B236 iv 138 SLC Storage Tank Electric Heater B 1E220 Channel C 480V Motor Control Center 1B236 iv

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 12 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 139 HPCI Vacuum Tank Condensate Drain Pump 2P215 Div. II 250V DC Motor Control Center 2D274 iv 140 HPCI Barometric Condensate Vacuum Pump 2P216 Div. II 250V DC Motor Control Center 2D274 iv 141 RCIC Barometric Condensate Vacuum Pump 2P219 Div. I 250V DC Motor Control Center 2D254 iv 142 RCIC Vacuum Tank Condensate Drain Pump 2P220 Div. I 250V DC Motor Control Center 2D254 iv 143 SLC Storage Tank Electric Heater A 2E219 Div. I 480V Motor Control Center 2B236 iv 144 SLC Storage Tank Electric Heater B 2E220 Div. I 480V Motor Control Center 2B236 iv 145 ES Transformer Cooling Fans and Control OX213 Diesel Generator Rm.

Ch. A Engineered Safeguard MCC OB516 iv 146 ES Transformer Cooling Fans and Control OX211 Diesel Generator Rm.

Ch. B Engineered Safeguard MCC OB526 iv 147 ES Transformer Cooling Fans and Control OX213 Diesel Generator Rm.

Ch. C Engineered Safeguard MCC OB536 iv 148 ES Transformer Cooling Fans and Control OX211 Diesel Generator Rm.

Ch. D Engineered Safeguard MCC OB546 iv 149 Essential Ltg. Pnl OLP5B and Transformer OLX5B Diesel Generator E Ch. H Engineered Safeguard MCC OB565 iii 150 125V DC Dist. Pnl OD599 Diesel Generator E Ch. H Engineered Safeguard 125V DC SWBD OD597 iii 151 Deleted

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 13 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 152 Deleted 153 Deleted 154 Deleted 155 Deleted 156 Fuel Pool Level Transmitter LT-15347 and Level/Temperature Recorder LR/TR-15347 Div. II 120V Inst.

AC 1Y226 PNL iii 157 SPDS Regulating Transformer 1x800 Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B216 iv 158 SPDS Regulating Transformer 1x801 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B226 iv 159 SPDS UPS (Alternate) 2D288 Reactor Area Div. I Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B216 iii 160 SPDS UPS (Preferred) 2D288 Division I 250VDC Load Center 2D652 iii 161 SPDS UPS (Alternate) 2D289 Reactor Area Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B226 iii 162 SPDS UPS (Preferred) 2D289 Division II 250VDC Load Center 2D662 iii 163 Reactor Building Steam Line Drain Valve HV-241-2F021 Division II 480V Motor Control Center 2B227 iii 164 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-60401, ES-60405, ES-60409, ES-64901, and ES-65101 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D614-31 iii 165 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-61601, ES-63301, and ES-65501 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D614-34 iii 166 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-63402 and ES-64301 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D614-36 iii 167 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-60402, ES-60406, ES-60410, ES-64902 and ES-65102 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D624-31 iii 168 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-61602 and ES-63401 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D624-34 iii

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 14 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 169 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-63302 and ES-65502 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D624-36 iii 170 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-60403, ES-60407, ES-60411, ES-64903 and ES-65103 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D634-31 iii 171 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-60404, ES-60408, ES-60412, ES-64904 and ES-65104 125V DC Distribution Panel 2D644-31 iii 172 125V/24V DC/DC Converter ES-42401 125V DC Distribution Panel 1D614-05 or 2D614-05 iii 173 125V/24V DC/DC Converter ES-42402 125V DC Distribution Panel 1D624-05 or 2D634-05 iii 174 125V/24V DC/DC Converter ES-42403 125V DC Distribution Panel 1D634-05 or 2D634-05 iii 175 125V/24V DC/DC Converter ES-42404 125V DC Distribution Panel 1D644-05 or 2D644-05 iii 176 Main Steam Line Drain to Condenser Valve HV-141F021 Div I 480V Motor Control Center 1B216 iii 177 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-50401, ES-50403, ES-50405, ES-54901 and ES-55101 125V DC Distribution Panels 1D614-31/2D614-35 iii 178 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-53401, ES-55501, ES-55401, ES-53301 125V DC Distribution Panels 1D614-34/2D614-32 iii 179 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-55403, ES-51601, ES-53001 125V DC Distribution Panels 1D614-36/2D614-38 iii 180 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-50407, ES-54902, ES-50408, ES-55102 and ES-50410 125V DC Distribution Panels 1D624-31/2D624-35 iii 181 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-53402, ES-55402, ES-54301, and ES-53302 125V DC Distribution Panels 1D624-34/2D624-32 iii 182 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-51602, ES-55404, ES-53002, and ES-55502 125V DC Distribution Panels 1D624-36/2D624-38 iii 183 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-50413, ES-50415, ES-50411, ES-54903 and ES-55103 125V DC Distribution Panels 1D634-31/2D634-32 iii 184 125V/24V DC/DC Converters ES-50418, ES-50420, ES-50417, ES-54904 and ES-55104 125V DC Distribution Panels 1D644-31/2D644-32 iii

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 15 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 185 HPCI Oil Temperature Recorder TRE411R605 120V Instrument AC Distribution Panel 1Y216-02 iii 186 RHR Temperature Recorder TRSE111R601 120V Instrument Distribution Panel 1Y216-02 iii 187 HPCI Oil Temperature Recorder TRE411R605 120V Instrument AC Distribution Panel 1Y216-02 iii 188 RHR Temperature Recorder TRSE111R601 120V Instrument Distribution Panel 1Y216-02 iii 189 Drywell Sump Level & Equip. Tank Level Recorder LR/FR 16103 120 V Instrument Distribution Panel 1Y216-02 iii 190 Drywell Sumps / Equipment Drain Tank Level Recorder LR26114 120V Instrument Distribution Panel 2Y216-02 iii 191 Turbine Bldg 250V DC Control Center 1D155 Div. I 250V DC Load Center 1D652 iii 192 Turbine Bldg 250V DC Control Center 1D165 Div. II 250V DC Load Center 1D662 iii 193 Computer Power Supply Inverter 1D656 Div. I 250V DC Load Center 1D652 Iii 194 Vital Power Supply Inverter 1D666 Div. II 250V DC Load Center 1D662 iii 195 Reactor Protection System MG Set Motor 1S237A Div. I Reactor Area Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B217-052 iv 196 Reactor Protection System MG Set Motor 1S237B Div. II Reactor Area Engineered Safeguard MCC 1B227-053 iv 197 Reactor Protection System MG Set Motor 2S237A Div. I Reactor Area Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B217-052 iv 198 Reactor Protection System MG Set Motor 2S237B Div. II Reactor Area Engineered Safeguard MCC 2B227-053 iv 199 480-240/120V Transformer 0X604 Control structure H&V Room Div. II Engineered Safeguard MCC OB146 iii 200 Spent Fuel Pool Instr Sys Pwr Conditioning XFMR 1X690 120 V Instrument AC Distribution Panel 1Y216 iii 201 Spent Fuel Pool Instr Sys Pwr Conditioning XFMR 2X690 120 V Instrument AC Distribution Panel 2Y226 iii 202 480V HCVS Power Distribution Panel 0PP604 Control Structure H&V Room Div. 1. Engineered Safeguard MCC 0B136 iii The affiliated cable load end terminates at 0TS602.

SSES-FSAR Table Rev. 67 FSAR Rev. 69 Page 16 of 16 TABLE 8.1-2 AFFILIATED AND NON-CLASS IE CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT TO CLASS IE POWER SUPPLIES Number NON Class 1E Load Class 1E Power Supply Method of Isolation (Reference FSAR 8.1.6 1t.5) 203 480-208/120V Regulating Transformer 2X297 Div. II 480V Motor Control Center 2B227 iv 204 480-208/120V Regulating Transformer 1X297 Div. I 480V Motor Control Center 1B217 iv 205 DG A Starting Air Compressor 0K507A1 Diesel Generator Rm Ch. A Engineered Safeguard MCC 0B516 iii 206 DG A Starting Air Compressor 0K507A2 Diesel Generator Rm Ch. A Engineered Safeguard MCC 0B516 iii 207 DG B Starting Air Compressor 0K507B1 Diesel Generator Rm Ch. B Engineered Safeguard MCC 0B526 iii 208 DG B Starting Air Compressor 0K507B2 Diesel Generator Rm Ch. B Engineered Safeguard MCC 0B526 iii 209 DG C Starting Air Compressor 0K507C1 Diesel Generator Rm Ch. C Engineered Safeguard MCC 0B536 iii 210 DG C Starting Air Compressor 0K507C2 Diesel Generator Rm Ch. C Engineered Safeguard MCC 0B536 iii 211 DG D Starting Air Compressor 0K507D1 Diesel Generator Rm Ch. D Engineered Safeguard MCC 0B546 iii 212 DG D Starting Air Compressor 0K507D2 Diesel Generator Rm Ch. D Engineered Safeguard MCC 0B546 iii

SSES-FSAR TABLE 8.1-3 NON-CLASS 1E ANNUNCIATOR AND COMPUTER INTERFACE DEVICES Westinghouse MOC Auxiliary Switch Limitorque Limit Switch NAMCO Limit Switch GE CR105 Magnetic Contactor GE HFAS 1 Relay GE HMA 11 Relay Cutler-Hammer Reversing Contactor Cutler-Hammer Type nM" Relay Agastat EGP Relay Agastat E7024 Timing Relay Westinghouse High Speed AR Relay Magnetrol Model 7 51 Level Switch FCI Mode 8-66 Liquid Level Controller Riley 86 T /C Monitor Potter & Brumfield KH-4690 Relay Bailey 7 45 Alarm Unit GE Type CR2940 AGA Type TR Cu1Ier-Hammer Type 10260T P.B.

Potter & Brumfield Type MOR GE Type 2820 Westronics Recorder Barkada1e Pressure Switch Static Inc. Pressure Switch Barton-Pressure Switch Square D Pressure Switch Square D Level Switch Balsbaugh-Conductivity Tl Potter & Brumfield Type KRP Westinghouse MOC Auxiliary Switch Rev. 48, 12/94 Page 1 of 2

SSES-FSAR TABLE 8.1-3 NON-CLASS 1 E ANNUNCIATOR AND COMPUTER INTERFACE DEVICES Limitorque Limit Switch NAMCO Limit Switch GE CR 106 Magnetic Contactor GE HFA51 Relay GE HMA 11 Relay Cutler-Hammer Reversing Contactor Cutler-Hammer Type "M" Relay Agastat EGP Relay Agastat E7024 Timing Relay Westinghouse High Speed AR Relay Megnetrol Model 7 61 Level Switch FCI Mode 8-66 Liquid Level Controller GE Range Switch Potter & Brumfield KH-4690 Relay Rev. 48, 12/94 Page 2 of 2

SSES-FSAR TABLE 8.1.. 4 DIVISIONAL OR AFFILIATED LOADS SUPPLIED FROM CLASS 1 E CHANNEL C OR D 4.16 KV BUS Page 1 of 1 BREAKER TRIP CIRCUIT CLASS 1E CONTROL POWER LOAD LOAD TYPE 4.16 V CHANNEL NORMAL ALTERNATE EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP OP504C DIVISIONAL UNIT 1 CH. C CHANNEL A/

CHANNEL C SWGR. 1A203 DIVISION I RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER REMOVAL DIVISIONAL UNIT 1 CH. C CHANNEL A/

CHANNEL C SERVICE WATER PUMP 1P506A SWGR. 1A203 DIVISION I CONTROL STRUCTURE CHILLER COMPRESSOR OK 112A DIVISIONAL UNIT 1 CH. C CHANNEL A/

CHANNEL C SWGR. 1A203 DIVISION I EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP OP5040 DIVISIONAL UNIT 1 CH. D CHANNEL B/

CHANNEL 0 SWGR. 1A204 DIVISION II RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER PUMP 1 P506B DIVISIONAL UNIT 1 CH. D CHANNEL B/

CHANNEL D SWGR. 1A204 DIVISION II CONTROL STRUCTURE CHIUER COMPRESSOR OK 112B DIVISIONAL UNIT 1 CH. 0 CHANNEL 6/

CHANNEL 0 SWGR. 1A204 DIVISION II CONTROL ROD DRIVE PUMP 1P132B AFFILIATED UNIT 1 CH. D CHANNEL B/

CHANNEL D SWGR. 1A204 DIVISION II REACTOR BUILDING CHILLER COMPRESSOR 2K206A AFFILIATED UNIT 2 CH. C CHANNEL A/

CHANNEL C SWGR. 2A203 DIVISION I MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMP 2P105 AFFILIATED UNIT 2 CH. C CHANNEL A/

CHANNEL C SWGR. 2A203 DIVISION I CONTROL ROD DRIVE PUMP 2P132B AFFILIATED UNIT 2 CH. D CHANNEL B/

CHANNEL D SWGR. 2A204 DIVISION II TURBINE BUILDING CHILLER COMPRESSOR 2K 102B AFFILIATED UNIT 2 CH. D CHANNEL 6/

CHANNEL D SWGR. 2A204 DIVISION 11 Rev. 50, 07/96

SSES-FSAR TABLE 8.1.. 5 CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORS SUPPLIED FROM CLASS 1E SYSTEM Page 1 of 1 LOAD CLASS 1 E CLASS 1 E 480 VAC 120VAC Unit 1 Div. I Unit 1 Div I Containment Radiation Monitor 1 C291 A 480 VAC MCC 120 VAC Dist. Panel 18217 1Y216 Unit 1 Div. II Unit 1 Div II Containment Radiation Monitor 1 C291 B 480 VAC MCC 120 VAC Dist. Panel 1B227 1Y226 Unit 2 Div. I Unit 2 Div I Containment Radiation Monitor 2C291A 480 VAC MCC 120 VAC Dist. Panel 28217 2Y216 Unit 1 Div. II Unit 2 Div II Containment Radiation Monitor 2C291 B 480 VAC MCC 120 VAC Dist. Panel 28227 2Y226 Rev. 51, 02/97