LR-N25-0027, Emergency License Amendment Request to Extend Completion Time for Inoperable D Emergency Diesel Generator

Emergency License Amendment Request to Extend Completion Time for Inoperable D Emergency Diesel Generator

ML25058A095
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	02/27/2025
From:	Emily Larson Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N25-0027, LAR H25-01
Download: ML25058A095 (1)

Text

Eric A. Larson Site Vice President - Hope Creek Generating Station - PSEG Nuclear 2200 Alloway Creek Neck Road PO Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0221 (856) 339-2414 Eric.Larson@PSEG.com LR-N25-0027 10 CFR 50.90 LAR H25-01 February 27, 2025 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN : Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Hope Creek Generating Station Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 NRC Docket No. 50-354 Subject :

Emergency License Amendment Request to Extend Completion Time for Inoperable D Emergency Diesel Generator Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG), is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek). The proposed change to TS 3/4.8.1, A.C. Sources - Operating, is being requested on an emergency basis pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5).

On February 19, 2025, at 0200, the D Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was removed from service to perform an inspection of the lube oil strainer as a follow up to the recent repairs of the D EDG lube oil heat exchanger from January 31, 2025 to February 9, 2025. While the D EDG was removed from service, lube oil samples indicated the presence of water in the lube oil.

Troubleshooting was immediately entered. Testing of the lube oil heat exchanger was performed to identify the source of water intrusion in to the lube oil with the determination that the most likely source was through the lube oil heat exchanger floating end packing rings.

In order to replace the floating end packing rings on the lube oil heat exchanger, multiple mechanical and electrical interferences need to be removed to gain access to the heat exchanger. The removal of these interferences, replacement of the lube oil heat exchanger floating end packing rings, re-installation of the interferences, retest of this equipment, and retesting of the D EDG to establish operability is expected to exceed the 14-day Allowed Outage Time (AOT) duration. Therefore, PSEG requests a one-time AOT of 18-days that begins on February 19, 2025.

provides a description and assessment of the proposed changes along with PSEGs determination that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazard consideration. Enclosure 2 provides the existing TS pages marked to show the proposed changes.

LR-N25-0027 Page 2 10 CFR 50.90 LAR H25-01 PSEG is requesting that the NRC review and approve this request on an emergency basis in accordance with 1 O CFR 50.91 (a)(5). Approval of the proposed changes and issuance of the license amendment is requested by March 4, 2025, to ensure continued full-power operation until the D EOG can be restored to an operable status. Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented as soon as practicable. This is a one-time deterministic emergency change with risk-insights request that will remain in effect until March 9, 2025 at 0200. If the D EOG is not operable by this time, TS Action 3.8.1.1.b.3 will require being in HOT SHUTDOWN by March 9, 2025, at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN by March 10, 2025, at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />.

In accordance with 1 O CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, with enclosures, is being provided to the designated New Jersey state official.

There are no new or revised regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Shane Jurek at Shane.Jurek@PSEG.com.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on February 27, 2025.

Eric A. Larson Site Vice President - Hope Creek Generating Station PSEG Nuclear

Enclosures:

1. Description and Assessment

2. Marked-Up Technical Specification Pages

LR-N25-0027 10 CFR 50.90 Page 3 LAR H25-01 cc:

Administrator, Region 1, NRC NRC Project Manager, Hope Creek NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Hope Creek Manager, New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering PSEG Commitment Tracking Coordinator LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 1 of 16 DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE 1

Summary Description........................................................................................................ 2 2

Detailed Description.......................................................................................................... 2 2.1 System Design and Operation.............................................................................. 2 2.2 Current Technical Specifications Requirements.................................................... 3 2.3 Reason for the Proposed Change......................................................................... 3 2.4 Description of the Proposed Change.................................................................... 5 3

Technical Evaluation......................................................................................................... 5 3.1 Deterministic Evaluation........................................................................................ 5 3.2 Compliance with Branch Technical Position 8-8................................................... 7 3.3 Risk Insights........................................................................................................ 10 3.4 Compensatory measures.................................................................................... 10 4

Regulatory Analysis........................................................................................................ 12 4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria...................................................... 12 4.2 Precedent............................................................................................................ 13 4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination......................................... 14 4.4 Conclusion........................................................................................................... 15 5

Environmental Evaluation............................................................................................... 15 6

References...................................................................................................................... 16 LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 2 of 16 1

Summary Description In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) requests an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 for Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek) for a one-time emergency change. The proposed change to Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1, "AC Sources - Operating," is being requested on an emergency basis pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5).

The proposed one-time deterministic emergency change with risk-insights revises TS 3.8.1.1 to extend the allowed outage time (AOT) for Action b.3 from 14 days to 18 days for the D emergency diesel generator (EDG).

The need for this emergency license amendment request was unavoidable. On February 19, 2025, at 0200, the D Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was removed from service to perform an inspection of the lube oil strainer as a follow up to the recent repairs of the D EDG lube oil heat exchanger from January 31, 2025 to February 9, 2025. While the D EDG was removed from service, lube oil samples indicated the presence of water in the lube oil. Troubleshooting was immediately entered. Testing of the lube oil heat exchanger was performed to identify the source of water intrusion in to the lube oil with the determination that the most likely source was through the lube oil heat exchanger floating end packing rings.

In order to replace the floating end packing rings on the lube oil heat exchanger, multiple mechanical and electrical interferences need to be removed to gain access to the heat exchanger. The removal of these interferences, replacement of the lube oil heat exchanger floating end packing rings, re-installation of the interferences, retest of this equipment, and retesting of the D EDG to establish operability is expected to exceed the 14-day AOT.

2 Detailed Description 2.1 System Design and Operation The Hope Creek Class 1E power system supplies all Class 1E loads that are needed for safe and orderly shutdown of the reactor, maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown condition, and mitigating the consequences of an accident. The Class 1E AC power system distributes power at 4.16 kV, 480 V, and 208/120 V. The Class 1E AC power system is divided into four independent power supply channels, A, B, C, and D. Each of these four channels supplies loads in its own load group. Each Class 1E 4.16 kV bus is provided with a normal and an alternate offsite power supply feeder and one EDG feeder. The Class 1E loads are assigned to these channels so that any combination of three out of four load groups has the capability to supply the minimum required safety loads to safely shut down the unit and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The EDGs are designed to start and attain rated voltage and frequency within 10 seconds of the receipt of the starting signal. As the EDG reaches rated voltage and frequency, logic is provided to generate a permissive interlock for the closing of the EDG circuit breaker.

Each EDG provides power to the 1E loads (and selected non-1E loads) in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOP) for its associated divisional 4.16 kV switchgears. EDG support systems are provided as required to maintain the diesel generator in a state of standby readiness. The engine is rated at 6148 BHP (4430 kW net) at 514 rpm (continuous). Calculations demonstrate that the maximum loading of any EDG does not exceed its continuous rating when operating at rated frequency. These EDGs automatically start under loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and/or LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 3 of 16 LOP conditions. The generator, exciter, and voltage regulator are designed to permit the EDG to start the motors and accept loads in the time requirements and sequence as documented in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

2.2 Current Technical Specifications Requirements The D EDG was removed from service on February 19, 2025, at 0200 to perform an inspection of the lube oil strainer as a follow up to the recent repairs of the D EDG lube oil heat exchanger from January 31, 2025 to February 9, 2025. Hope Creek TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.3 was entered, which states:

b. With one diesel generator of the above required AC electrical power sources inoperable,

3. For the inoperable C or D diesel generator, if continued operation is permitted by LCO 3.7.1.3, restore the inoperable diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 14 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The D EDG must be restored to operable status by 0200 on March 5, 2025 or Hope Creek must enter HOT SHUTDOWN by 1400 on March 5, 2025 and COLD SHUTDOWN by 1400 on March 6, 2025.

2.3 Reason for the Proposed Change On February 19, 2025, at 0200, the D EDG was removed from service to perform an inspection of the lube oil strainer as a follow up to the recent repairs of the D EDG lube oil heat exchanger from January 31, 2025 to February 9, 2025. While the EDG was removed from service, lube oil samples indicated the presence of water in the lube oil. Troubleshooting was immediately entered. Testing of the lube oil heat exchanger was performed to identify the source of water intrusion in to the lube oil with the determination that the most likely source was through the lube oil heat exchanger floating end packing rings.

In order to replace the floating end packing rings on the lube oil heat exchanger, multiple mechanical and electrical interferences need to be removed to gain access to the heat exchanger. The removal of these interferences, replacement of the lube oil heat exchanger floating end packing rings, re-installation of the interferences, retest of this equipment, and retesting of the D EDG to establish operability is expected to exceed the 14-day AOT. The projected schedule at the time of submittal is provided in Table 1.

LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 4 of 16 Table 1: Projected D EDG Maintenance Schedule D EDG Timeline Date/Time Task Duration (hrs.)

Elapsed TS Action Time Enter TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.3 02/19/25 0200 0

0 Obtained Lube Oil Samples Lube Oil Sample Results 2/20/25 15:33 Entered Trouble Shooting Perform Lube Oil Heat Exchanger Drop Testing 2/23/25 23 Remove Interferences 2/26/25 1700 48 Remove Floating End of Lube Oil Heat Exchanger 2/26/25 2300 6

Remove/Install Packing 2/27/25 0500 6

Reinstall Floating End of Lube Oil Heat Exchanger 2/27/25 1100 6

Post Maintenance Test of Lube Oil Heat Exchanger 2/28/25 0300 12 Reinstall Piping Brackets 3/1/25 1500 36 Reinstall Interferences 3/3/25 1500 60 Close SACS side of Lube Oil Heat Exchanger and remove rigging scaffolding 3/3/25 1500 3

Reinstall pipe spool 3/3/25 1200 1

Remove Crankcase Cover, Install Barring Device, Inspect Crankcase 3/3/25 1500 4

Install Crankcase covers 3/3/25 1500 2

Refill Lube Oil System 3/3/25 2300 8

Release D EDG/Heat Up Jack Water/Heat Up Lube Oil 3/4/25 0500 6

Perform EDG Maintenance Run 3/4/25 1900 2

Perform EDG surveillance testing pre-checks and run 3/4/25 2200 1

D EDG Operable 3/5/25 0100 NA Note 3/5/25

@ 0200 is end of 14 Day AOT LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 5 of 16 If the D EDG is not restored to operable status by 0200 on March 5, 2025, TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.3 requires being in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (i.e., by 1400 on March 5, 2025) and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (i.e., by 1400 on March 6, 2025).

The request to extend the D EDG AOT to 18 days includes additional contingency time to address delays that may arise during restoration and testing of the electrical, instrumentation and mechanical equipment removed to perform work on the lube oil heat exchanger and additional time for restoration of the EDG (e.g, longer time needed for lube oil heat up). As stated in the TS mark up in Enclosure 2, the one-time extension shall expire upon completion of the maintenance to restore the D EDG to OPERABLE status or by 0200 on March 9, 2025, whichever occurs first.

2.4 Description of the Proposed Change The proposed one-time deterministic emergency change with risk-insights revises TS 3/4.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," to provide an extension of the TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.3 allowed outage time from 14 days to 18 days. This provides sufficient time to complete repairs to the D EDG and avoid an unnecessary shutdown without a commensurate benefit in nuclear safety.

contains a marked-up version of the Hope Creek TS showing the proposed changes. No TS Bases changes are proposed for this one-time request.

3 Technical Evaluation 3.1 Deterministic Evaluation 3.1.1 Offsite Power The Electric Power System of Hope Creek is designed to generate and transmit electric power into the power grid managed by PJM.

Offsite power for the plant is fed from the 500 kV system via the plants dedicated 13.8 kV switchyard ring bus. The 500 kV switchyard is connected to the 500-kV grid by three physically independent and geographically diverse transmission lines. There are two physically independent connections from the 500 kV switchyard to the 13.8 kV ring bus. The 500 kV bus sections 10X and 20X connect different sections of the 13.8 kV ring bus through two sets of two station power transformers. The physical independence of the connections in the 500 kV switchyard and 13.8 kV ring bus for alternate sources of offsite power minimizes the likelihood of simultaneous failure of these sources. The physical and operating arrangement of the breakers in the 500 kV switchyard and 13.8 kV ring bus is designed to minimize the possibility of simultaneous failure of the offsite power circuits.

Hope Creek has a robust offsite and onsite electrical distribution design with the desired defense-in-depth design features to ensure adequate power availability to systems designed to mitigate design basis accidents even when an offsite power circuit is out-of-service. Specifically, offsite and onsite power systems are diverse and redundant and meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 17. Each of these offsite power circuits are designed to be fully redundant and comply with the requirements of GDC 17.

The circuits from the offsite system to the onsite distribution system have sufficient capacity and capability to supply the station loads during normal or abnormal operating conditions, accident LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 6 of 16 conditions or plant shutdown conditions independent of the onsite standby power sources. The circuits consist of the Bus 10X and Bus 20X paths described above. The normal alignment path for Bus 10X is through Station Power Transformer (SPT) T1 to the 13.8-to-4.16 kV station service transformer (SST) 1BX501. Similarly, the normal alignment path for Bus 20X is through SPT T4 to the opposite 13.8-to-4.16 kV SST 1AX501. The 13.8 kV ring bus is the preferred source of power to the station during startup, normal operation, shutdown, and post-shutdown. In the event of a fault on an SPT, a transfer trip signal is sent to its associated 500 kV feeder breakers to isolate the fault, resulting in a loss of that offsite circuit.

Each 4.16 kV bus is energized by a normally aligned offsite power supply. As a defense in depth design feature, both 1AX501 and 1BX501 SSTs are capable of serving as an alternate source of power to the 4.16 kV station buses served by the opposite SST. If the normally aligned power source is not available at the 4.16 kV bus due to SST or SST feeder protective relay actuation, a fast transfer control scheme initiates the automatic tripping of the normally aligned 4.16 kV feeder breaker and closing of the alternate source feeder breaker on the 4.16 kV bus. If the normal power supply is lost due to degraded grid or loss of voltage conditions, a slow or dead bus transfer to the alternate source takes place. Loss of both the normal and the alternate power sources to any 4.16 kV Class 1E bus, although highly unlikely, results in an auto start of the EDGs and the Class 1E loads on each bus are loaded in a pre-established sequence 3.1.2 Onsite Power The Class 1E AC power system supplies all Class 1E loads that are needed for safe and orderly shutdown of the reactor, maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown condition, and mitigating the consequences of an accident. The system distributes power at 4.16-kV, 480 V, and 208/120 V and is divided into four independent channels. Each power system channel supplies power to loads in its own load group. Each Class 1E 4.16-kV bus is provided with connections to the two offsite power sources. One of these sources is designated as the normal aligned source and the other as the alternate source for the bus. In addition to these two connections to offsite power, each of the 4.16-kV Class 1E buses is connected to its dedicated EDG. These EDGs serve as the standby electric power source for their respective channels in case both the normal and alternate power supplies to a bus are lost.

In addition to the EDGs, a supplemental AC power source (also referred to as the AOT diesels) will be available that is capable of supplying power to either the A or B 4.16 kV Class 1E bus. The capacity of the supplemental source is sufficient to power all safety related loads fed by either the A or B EDG. The supplemental source is comprised of two synchronized diesel generators which can be connected to the plant electrical distribution system via established receptacle panels and cables as a diverse means of power in the event the A or B EDG were to become unavailable.

The supplemental AC power source is described in detail in the Hope Creek TS Amendment 216 (Reference 1).

As discussed in Hope Creek TS Amendment 75 (Reference 2) for the establishment of the 14-day AOT for the C and D EDG, the following is stated on page 5 of the Safety Evaluation:

At Hope Creek Generating Station, the Class 1E AC power supply system is divided into four independent power supply channels. Each of these four channels supplies loads in its own load group and has a dedicated EDG (EDG A, B, C, and D). All Class-1E loads are assigned to these channels so that any combination of three-out-of-four load groups has the capability to supply the minimum required LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 7 of 16 safety loads to safely shut down the unit and mitigate the consequences of a design-basis accident. Under loss of offsite power (LOOP) conditions, either EDG A or B and any other diesel generator would be required to mitigate the consequences of a LOOP. This is because residual heat removal (RHR) pumps A (powered from EDG A) or B (powered from EDG B) would be required to facilitate desired residual heat removal during a LOOP.

Therefore, in the event of a LOOP during the extended AOT, any combination of two of the remaining three EDGs would be capable of carrying the required loads to bring Hope Creek to a safe shutdown condition.

3.2 Compliance with Branch Technical Position 8-8 NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition," Branch Technical Position (BTP) 8-8, "Onsite (Emergency Diesel Generators) and Offsite Power Sources Allowed Outage Time Extensions," specifically discusses the defense-in-depth aspects for onsite power sources from a deterministic perspective for proposed AOT extensions. No permanent changes are being proposed to the current AOTs for the Hope Creek EDGs. The following is a list of critical BTP 8-8 guidance and an explanation as to how Hope Creek complies with the guidance criteria:

a) The supplemental source must have the capacity to bring a unit to safe shutdown (cold shutdown) in case of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) concurrent with a single failure during plant operation (Mode 1).

The Hope Creek EDGs have the capacity to shutdown the unit and maintain the unit in a safe shut down condition. In addition, a supplemental power source is provided for the A and B EDGs as specified in Hope Creek TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.2 that meets this criterion. The supplemental AC power source is described in detail in the Hope Creek TS Amendment 216 (Reference 1).

b) The permanent or temporary power source can be either a diesel generator, gas or combustion turbine, or power from nearby hydro units. This source can be credited as a supplemental source, that can be substituted for an inoperable EDG during the period of extended AOT in the event of a LOOP, provided the risk-informed and deterministic evaluation supports the proposed AOT and the power source has enough capacity to carry all LOOP loads to bring the unit to a cold shutdown.

The supplemental power source for the A and B EDGs are portable diesel generators in weather tight containers that are trailer mounted and stored onsite.

c) Multi-unit sites that have installed a single AAC power source for SBO cannot substitute it for the inoperable diesel when requesting AOT extension unless the AAC source has capacity to carry all LOOP loads to bring the unit to a cold shutdown as a substitute for the EDG in an extended AOT and carry all SBO loads for the unit that has an SBO event without any load shedding.

Hope Creek is a single unit that responds to Station Blackout (SBO) as an AC Independent plant relying only on the station batteries as a source of electrical power for the coping duration.

LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 8 of 16 d) For plants using AAC or supplemental power sources discussed above, the time to make the AAC or supplemental power source available, including accomplishing the cross-connection, should be approximately one hour to enable restoration of battery chargers and control reactor coolant system inventory.

As discussed in Amendment 216, the supplemental power source will be made available to supply power to energize the A or B vital bus within three hours.

e) The availability of AAC or supplemental power source should be verified within the last 30 days before entering extended AOT by operating or bringing the power source to its rated voltage and frequency for 5 minutes and ensuring all its auxiliary support systems are available or operational.

See Amendment 216 for verification of the availability of the supplemental power source.

f) To support the one-hour time for making this power source available, plants must assess their ability to cope with loss of all AC power for one hour independent of an AA C power source.

Existing Hope Creek calculation E-4.1(Q), HC Class 1E 125 VDC Station Battery &

Charger Sizing, demonstrates that the station can cope up to four hours during an SBO. See Amendment 216.

g) The plant should have formal engineering calculations for equipment sizing and protection and have approved procedures for connecting the AAC or supplemental power sources to the safety buses.

See Amendment 216 for discussion on sizing of the supplemental power source.

h) The EDG or offsite power AOT should be limited to 14 days to perform maintenance activities. The licensee must provide justification for the duration of the requested AOT (actual hours plus margin based on plant-specific past operating experience.)

PSEG is requesting a temporary one-time 18 day AOT. It is estimated that repair of the D EDG will take 18 days from initial TS action entry as discussed in Section 2.3.

i) The TS must contain Required Actions and Completion Times to verify that the supplemental AC source is available before entering extended AOT.

Hope Creek TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.2.b contains the verification actions for the supplemental power source. In addition see section 3.4 for actions to verify availability of the supplemental power source prior to exceeding the permanent 14-day AOT for the D EDG.

LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 9 of 16 j) The availability of AAC or supplemental AC source shall be checked every 8-12 hours (once per shift). If the AAC or supplemental power source becomes unavailable any time during extended AOT, the unit shall enter the LCO and start shutting down within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This 24-hour period will be allowed only once within any given extended EDG AOT.

As discussed in Section 3.4, the availability of the supplemental power source will be verified every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

k) The extended AOT will be used no more than once in a 24-month period (or refueling interval) on a per diesel basis to perform EDG maintenance activities, or any major maintenance on offsite power transformer and bus.

The one-time extended 18 day AOT will be used once to support restoration of the D EDG.

l) The preplanned maintenance will not be scheduled if severe weather conditions are anticipated.

Repair of the D EDG is an unplanned emergent repair. See section 3.4.

m) The system load dispatcher will be contacted once per day to ensure no significant grid perturbations (high grid loading unable to withstand a single contingency of line or generation outage) are expected during the extended AOT.

See section 3.4.

n) Component testing or maintenance of safety systems and important non safety equipment in the offsite power systems that can increase the likelihood of a plant transient (unit trip) or LOOP will be avoided. In addition, no discretionary switchyard maintenance will be performed.

See section 3.4.

o) TS required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining power sources will be verified to be operable and positive measures will be provided to preclude subsequent testing or maintenance activities on these systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices.

See section 3.4.

p) Steam-driven emergency feed water pump(s) in case of PWR units, and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and High Pressure Coolant Injection systems in case of BWR units, will be controlled as "protected equipment."

Both the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems will be protected during the extended AOT for D EDG.

LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 10 of 16 3.3 Risk Insights This license amendment request is not a risk-informed request and, therefore, a risk evaluation is not required. However, to provide additional information, PSEG is providing risk insights related to the proposed change.

A risk assessment was performed that demonstrated with reasonable assurance that the proposed TS changes are within the current risk acceptance guidelines in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.177 (Reference 3) for one-time changes. This ensures that the TS change meets the intent of the incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) acceptance guidelines established for compatibility with the ICCDP and ICLERP limits of RG 1.177, which is applicable for configuration changes that require normal work controls. This acceptance guideline requires compensatory measures be implemented during the extended completion time (CT), which are discussed below. The risk analysis for the D EDG demonstrates that the proposed TS changes result in an ICCDP of 2.5E-6 and an ICLERP of 5.3E-7, which are within the current risk acceptance guidelines in RG 1.177 for one-time changes with an ICCDP of less than 1E-05, an ICLERP of less than 1E-6, and compensatory measures to be implemented during the extended CT.

Common cause failure for the DGs was not adjusted in the original risk assessment performed for the one-time AOT extension for TS 3.8.1.1. The risk assessment used both the average maintenance internal events and fire PRA models, as well as calculated an ICCDP and ICLERP consistent with the methodology that is used in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report NEI 06-09.

A sensitivity analysis was performed to adjust all common cause failure (CCF) rates that include the failure of the EDG D in the internal events and fire PRA models. For the sensitivity analysis, updated common cause failure rates were developed by dividing the baseline (nominal) CCF probabilities for failure events with the individual failure probability to start of the unaffected EDGs. This is consistent with the methodology outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.177. With the conservative treatment of CCF, the proposed TS changes result in an ICCDP of 4.2E-6 and an ICLERP of 6.7E-7, which are within the current risk acceptance guidelines.

The identification of the risk management actions (RMAs) was derived from a detailed review of the results of the risk assessment. None of the RMAs were credited numerically in the base risk analysis; the identified compensatory actions would further lessen the overall risk incurred during the extended period. The compensatory actions that are outlined below provide additional assurance that the risk during the extended allowed outage time will be minimized.

3.4 Compensatory measures The following compensatory measures have been established while the D EDG remains inoperable.

1. The full response team will remain in place throughout the evolution and the remaining maintenance activities will be completed utilizing 24-hour personnel coverage.

2. The purpose for protecting equipment is to minimize plant risk. This involves limiting or prohibiting operation or maintenance of plant equipment when SSCs are made LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 11 of 16 unavailable. For the duration of the D EDG inoperability, PSEG will avoid discretionary testing and maintenance that could impact the A, B, or C EDGs or discretionary testing and maintenance on equipment powered by the A, B, or C EDGs.

3. Posting protected train signs for all protected equipment including but not limited to A, B, and C 4.16 kV 1E electrical busses, their associated switchgear, and 1E logic; the A, B, and C EDGs; the AK400 chilled water compressor unit, its associated A chilled water pump, the A Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system; the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS); the B and D channel 125 VDC 1E distribution; and A and C Core Spray (CS) pumps.

4. Both the HPCI and RCIC systems will be protected during the extended AOT for D EDG.

5. Current scheduled work is continuously being evaluated and reviewed to ensure no work is performed on the above posted protected trains.

6. Critical non-discretionary work on protected equipment will be evaluated for overall risk with the aggregate of all other work on the protected equipment. The shift manager will discuss with the work group supervisor methods for workers to communicate importance of reporting off-normal conditions at the job site immediately to the control room, and means of communication with the control room. The shift manager will approve work on protected equipment.

7. Component testing or maintenance of safety systems and important non-safety equipment in the offsite power systems that can increase the likelihood of a plant transient, unit trip, or LOP will be avoided. No discretionary switchyard maintenance will be performed.

8. Current scheduled work is continuously being evaluated and reviewed to ensure no work is performed that could cause a loss of planned generation.

9. The AOT diesels are available and are not being credited for Salem Generating Station.

10. Adverse weather conditions will be monitored and evaluated and actions taken in accordance with established procedure guidance.

11. Operating crews will be briefed on the EDG work plan and procedural actions regarding LOP and SBO prior to exceeding the 14 day EDG AOT.

12. The Electric System Operator will be notified when exceeding the 14 day EDG AOT and daily until the AOT is exited.

13. Prior to exceeding 14 days, site services will be notified to arrange for continuous coverage of personnel to support AOT diesel deployment and operation.

14. Prior to exceeding 14 days, ensure the AOT diesel fuel tanks will be filled to 95%.

15. After exceeding 14 days, the AOT diesels (0A-G-504 and 0B-G-504) will be verified to be available every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Consistent with the current TS 3.8.1.1 action b.2.b) #

footnote, the AOT diesels (supplemental power source) may be unavailable for a single LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 12 of 16 period of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> verification of the availability may be suspended during this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

16. After exceeding 14 days, the AOT diesel towing vehicle will be verified to be available.

17. Prior to exceeding 14 days, verify a plan is in place to fill AOT diesel fuel cubes.

18. After exceeding 14 days, verify fuel tanks on both AOT diesels are filled to approximately 95%.

19. After exceeding 14 days, verify 1600 gallons of fuel is available and on site.

20. A narrative entry in the main control room logs will be made shiftly that states::

D EDG is in an extended (>14d) LCO IAW LAR H25-01.

Expected exit date/time is:

Salem SM [Shift Manager] has been informed that HC [Hope Creek] is crediting the AOT DGs [Diesel Generators] for LCO extension and is aware of the expected exit date/time.

AOT DGs and required support equipment are available.

Crew has been briefed on LOP/SBO actions in [procedure] AB.ZZ-0135.

Electrical System Operations has been contacted.

Yard Services personnel are on site to support deployment and operation of the AOT diesels.

4 Regulatory Analysis 4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), stipulates that a TS LCO must be established for each item meeting one or more of the following criteria:

1. Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the Control Room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

2. A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of, or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

3. A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

4. A structure, system, or component which operating experience or PRA has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

The proposed changes do not modify any plant equipment that provides emergency power to the safety-related emergency buses. Evaluation of the proposed changes has determined that the reliability of AC electrical sources is not significantly affected by the proposed change and that applicable regulations and requirements continue to be met. The proposed change does not affect Hope Creek compliance with 10 CFR 50.36.

LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 13 of 16 10 CFR 50.63(a), Loss of all alternating current power, requires that each light water-cooled nuclear power plant licensed to operate be able to withstand for a specified duration and recover from a station blackout. The proposed changes do not affect Hope Creek compliance with 10 CFR 50.63(a).

GDC 17 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A:

An onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functioning) shall be to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.

The onsite electric power supplies, including the batteries, and the onsite electric distribution system, shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure.

Electric power from the transmission network to the onsite electric distribution system shall be supplied by two physically independent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. A switchyard common to both circuits is acceptable. Each of these circuits shall be designed to be available in sufficient time following a loss of all onsite alternating current power supplies and the other offsite electric power circuit, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. One of these circuits shall be designed to be available within a few seconds following a loss-of-coolant accident to assure that core cooling, containment integrity, and other vital safety functions are maintained.

Provisions shall be included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies.

PSEG has determined that the proposed changes do not require any exemptions or relief from regulatory requirements, other than the TS, and do not affect conformance with the intent of any GDC differently than described in the UFSAR.

4.2 Precedent The proposed emergency license amendment was developed using relevant information from an approved change for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 dated December 17, 2023 (Reference 4). The Quad Cities precedent involved an emergency request to extend EDG TS AOTs along with suspending the performance of surveillances for the remaining DGs. This proposed license amendment is similar in that PSEG is also requesting an extension to the AOT LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 14 of 16 for an EDG; however, PSEG is not requesting suspension of any DG TS surveillance testing during the extended AOT.

The proposed emergency license amendment was also developed using relevant information from an approved change for Seabrook Station Unit No. 1 dated March 8, 2024 (Reference 5).

Although the Seabrook precedent involved an emergency request to extend the TS AOT for an Offsite Power Circuit, this request also addressed the requirements of NRC BTP 8-8.

4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG), is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek). The proposed change to TS 3/4.8.1, A.C. Sources - Operating, is being requested on an emergency basis pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5). Specifically, the change extends the Allowed Outage Time (AOT) for TS Action 3.8.1.1.b.3 from 14 days to 18 days on a one-time basis. This provides sufficient time to complete repairs to the D Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and avoid an unnecessary shutdown of Hope Creek without a commensurate benefit in nuclear safety.

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

1.

Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed license amendment provides a deterministic one-time change an extension of the allowed outage time (AOT) for Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1 Action b.3 from 14 days to 18 days. The EDGs are safety related components which provide backup electrical power supply to the onsite safeguards distribution system. The EDGs are not accident initiators; the EDGs are designed to mitigate the consequences of previously evaluated accidents including a loss of offsite power (LOP).

The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from performing their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change is consistent with safety analysis assumptions and resultant consequences.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2.

Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 15 of 16 The proposed license amendment provides a deterministic, one-time extension of the AOT for TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.3 from 14 days to 18 days. The proposed change does not involve a modification the physical configuration of the plant (i.e., no new equipment will be installed), create any new failure modes for existing equipment, or create any new limiting single failures. The proposed change does not alter or involve any design basis accident initiators.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.

Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed license amendment provides a deterministic one-time extension of the AOT for TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.3 from 14 days to 18 days. The proposed change does not alter the permanent plant design, including instrument set points, nor does it change the assumptions contained in the safety analyses. The proposed change does not impact the redundancy or availability requirements of offsite power supplies or change the ability of the plant to cope with station blackout (SBO) events.

The EDGs continue to meet their design requirements; there is no reduction in capability or change in design configuration. The EDG response to LOP, Loss of Coolant Accident, SBO, or fire is not changed by this proposed amendment; there is no change to the EDG operating parameters. The remaining operable EDGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite safeguards distribution system. The proposed change does not alter a design basis or safety limit; therefore it does not significantly reduce the margin of safety. The EDGs will continue to operate per the existing design and regulatory requirements.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, PSEG concludes that the proposed changes present no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is justified.

4.4 Conclusion Based on the considerations discussed above: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5 Environmental Evaluation The proposed changes would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed changes do not involve (i) a LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 16 of 16 significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed changes meet the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed changes.

6 References

1. Letter from J. Kim (U.S. NRC) to P. Sena (PSEG Nuclear LLC), Hope Creek Generating Station - Issuance of Amendment No. 216 RE: Revise Technical Specification 3/4.8.1, A.C. Sources - Operating, Action for Inoperable Diesel Generator (EPID L-2018-LLA-0079), dated April 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19073A073)

2. Letter from D. Moran (U.S. NRC) to L. Eliason (Public Service Electric & Gas Company),

Hope Creek Generating Station (TAC No. M90040), Hope Creek Amendment 75, dated August 1, 1995 (ADAMS Accession No. 9508110165)

3. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.177, Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications, Revision 2, dated January 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20164A034)

4. Letter from R. Kuntz (U.S. NRC) to D. Rhoades (Constellation Energy Generation, LLC),

"Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendment Nos. 298 and 294 RE: Increase Completion Time in Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4 (EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES) (EPID L-2023-LLA-0171)), dated December 17, 2024 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23349A162)

5. Letter from V. Sreenivas (U.S. NRC) to B. Coffey (Florida Power & Light Company),

"Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Issuance of Amendment No. 173 RE: Revise Technical Specification 3/4.8.1 to Allow Replacement of Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES) (EPID L-2024-LLA-0024), dated March 8, 2024 (ADAMS Accession No. ML24067A262)

LR-N25-0027 LAR H25-01 Page 1 of 1 Marked-Up Technical Specification Pages The following Pages for Renewed Facility Operating License NPF-57 are affected by this change request:

TS Pages 3/4.8.1 3/4 8-2

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 AC. SOURCES AC. SOURCES - OPERATING 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following AC. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1 E distribution system, and

b.

Four separate and independent diesel generators, each with:

1.

A separate fuel oil day tank containing a minimum of 360 gallons of fuel,

2.

A separate fuel storage system consisting of two storage tanks containing a minimum of 44,800 gallons of fuel, and

3.

A separate fuel transfer pump for each storage tank.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

Note: LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.

a.

With one offsite circuit of the above required AC. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining AC. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. Restore the inoperable off site circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b.

With one diesel generator of the above required AC. electrical power sources inoperable,

1.

Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the above required AC. offsite sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. If the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 separately for each diesel generator within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s*

unless the absence of any potential common mode failure for the remaining diesel generators is demonstrated.

This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored to OPERABILITY.

HOPE CREEK 3/48-1 Amendment No. 188 For Information Only

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION <Continued}

ACTION: (Continued)

2.

For the inoperable A or B diesel generator, if continued operation is permitted by LCO 3.7.1.3:

a) b)

Restore the inoperable diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or Verify the supplemental power source is available within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereaftet, and restore the inoperable diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3.

For the inoperable C or D diesel generator, if continued operation is permitted by LCO 3. 7.1.3, restore the inoperable diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 14 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

c.

With one offsite circuit of the above required A.C. sources and one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. If a diesel generator became inoperable due to any causes other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators separately for each diesel generator by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> unless the absence of any potential common mode failure for the remaining diesel generators is demonstrated*. If continued operation is permitted by LCO 3.7.1.3, restore at least two offsite circuits and all four of the above required diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from time of the initial loss or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. A successful test(s) of diesel generator OPERABILITY per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 performed under this ACTION statement for the OPERABLE diesel generators satisfies the diesel generator test requirements of ACTION Statement b.

d.

With both of the above required offsite circuits inoperable, restore at least one of the above required offsite circuits to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. With only one offsite circuit restored to OPERABLE status, restore at least two offsite circuits to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable diesel generator is restored, to OPERABILITY.

After the initial verification period, the supplemental power source may be unavailable for a single period of up to 24-hours and the once-per 12-hour requirement to verify that the supplemental power source is available may be suspended during this period.

HOPE CREEK 3/4 8-2 Amendment No. 216

1. 1. For D EDG inoperability starting February 19, 2025 at 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />, restore the D EDG to operable status within 18 days. The compensatory measures within Section 3.4 of PSEG letter LR-N25-0027 shall be implemented and shall remain in effect during the extended period. The one-time extension shall expire upon completion of the maintenance to restore the D EDG to OPERABLE status or by 0200 on March 9, 2025, whichever occurs first.