IR 05000339/2024040

Supplemental Inspection Supplemental Report 05000339/2024040 and Follow Up Assessment Letter

ML25021A004
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	01/24/2025
From:	James Baptist Division of Operating Reactors
To:	Carr E Dominion Energy
References
IR 2024040
Download: ML25021A004 (14)

Text

SUBJECT:

NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 - 95001 SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 05000339/2024040 AND FOLLOW-UP ASSESSMENT LETTER

Dear Eric S. Carr:

On December 19, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a supplemental inspection using Inspection Procedure (IP) 95001, "Supplemental Inspection Response to Action Matrix Column 2 (Regulatory Response) Inputs, and discussed the results of this inspection and the implementation of your corrective actions with Lisa Hilbert, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The NRC performed this inspection to review your stations actions in response to a White finding in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone which was documented and finalized in NRC Inspection Report 05000339/2024090. On December 11, 2024, you verbally informed the NRC that your station was ready for the supplemental inspection.

The NRC determined that your staffs evaluation identified the cause of the White finding.

Specifically, the root cause of the failure to have documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for foreign material control was inadequate rigor in the 2008 legacy design change process. The process failed to address foreign material as a design consideration which caused the selected and installed Unit 2 'J' emergency diesel generator K1 relay design to be susceptible to foreign material intrusion. The licensee revised the Design Attributes Review Checklist, identified and implemented special modification considerations and controls concerning foreign material control susceptibility for the current K1 relay design, and revised receipt and warehouse instructions for handling and opening packaging of the K1 relays.

The inspectors determined that the root cause evaluation was documented at a sufficient level of detail, included relevant operating experience, and identified the root causes, extent of conditions, and extent of causes of the performance issue. Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors concluded the objectives of the IP were met.

The NRC determined that completed or planned corrective actions were sufficient to address the performance issue that led to the White finding. The finding is considered closed and will no longer be considered an Action Matrix item as of December 19, 2024. Based on the results of January 24, 2025 this inspection and our Action Matrix assessment, the NRC has determined that North Anna Unit 2 transitioned to the Licensee Response Column (Column 1), as of December 19, 2024.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, James B. Baptist, Chief Projects Branch 4 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000339 License No. NPF-7

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000339

License Number:

NPF-7

Report Number:

05000339/2024040

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2024-040-0007

Licensee:

Dominion Energy

Facility:

North Anna Unit 2

Location:

Mineral, VA

Inspection Dates:

December 17, 2024, to December 19, 2024

Inspectors:

C. Even, Senior Project Engineer

D. Turpin, Resident Inspector

Approved By:

James B. Baptist, Chief

Projects Branch 4

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviewed the licensees corrective actions to address a White finding documented in inspection report 05000339/2024090 by performing a supplemental inspection using Inspection Procedure 95001, Supplemental Inspection Response to Action Matrix Column 2 Inputs, at North Anna, Unit 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

The inspectors determined that the licensees problem identification, causal analysis, and corrective actions sufficiently addressed the performance issue that led to the White finding.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000339/2024-001-01 LER 2024-001-01 for North Anna Power Station Loss of Generator Field for 2J EDG during 2-PT-82.28 71153 Closed NOV 05000339/2024090-01 Failure to Prescribe Instructions Appropriate to the Circumstances for Inspection of the Unit 2 'J'

Emergency Diesel Generator K1 Relay EA-24-126 95001 Closed

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event report (LER):

(1) LER 05000339/2024-001-01, Loss of Generator Field for 2J EDG during 2-PT-82.28 (ADAMS Accession number: ML24233A245). The circumstances surrounding this LER were documented in inspection report 05000339/2024090 (ADAMS Accession Number:

ML24330A016). This LER is Closed.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL 95001 - Supplemental Inspection Response to Action Matrix Column 2 (Regulatory Response)

Inputs The inspectors reviewed and selectively challenged aspects of the licensees problem identification, causal analysis, and corrective actions in response to a White finding and associated Notice of Violation (NOV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for the licensee's failure to prescribe documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for the installation of the 2J emergency diesel generator (EDG) K1 relay. Notification of the NRC's updated assessment was documented in inspection report 05000339/2024090 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML24330A016).

Supplemental Inspection Response to Action Matrix Column 2 (Regulatory Response) Inputs (1 Sample)

(1) From December 17-19, 2024, the inspectors conducted an onsite review to verify all aspects of IP 95001 were met.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment 95001 95001 assessment of failure to provide documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for foreign material control of the assembly and installation of the 2J EDG K1 relay Objective: Ensure that the root and contributing causes of significant individual and collective white performance issues are understood.

Under this objective, the inspectors reviewed the root cause evaluation (RCE) the licensee conducted for the stations failure to prescribe documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for the installation of the 2J emergency diesel generator (EDG) K1 relay which resulted in foreign material (FM) obstructing relay operation and rendered the 2J EDG inoperable. This review consisted of an evaluation of the following: the licensee's identification of the issue(s), when and how long the issue(s) existed, prior opportunities for identification, documentation of significant plant-specific consequences and compliance concerns, use of systematic methodology to identify causes with a sufficient level of supporting detail, consideration of prior occurrences, identification of extent-of-condition and extent-of-cause, and identification of any potential programmatic weaknesses in performance.

NRC Assessment: The team concluded that this objective was met. The licensees RCE determined that the 2008 legacy design change process failed to address FM as a design consideration which caused the selected and installed 2J EDG K1 relay design to be susceptible to FM intrusion (RC). Additionally, the maintenance procedure, 0-EPM-0702-04, Inspection of EDG K Relays and Contacts, did not contain detailed special instructions for FM exclusion to support the 2J EDG K1 relay assembly, testing, inspection, and installation (CC1). Storage of components in the warehouse did not meet the standard of MS-AA-WHS-136, Supply Chain Management Foreign Material Inspection and Intrusion Prevention, for being in a plastic bag or closed box (CC2). There was less than adequate management oversight in the supply chain organization to document FM related observations and that sufficient oversight concerning FM was applied to the vendor surveillance for the K1 relay supplier (CC3).

a. Identification. The RCE specifically identified the issue as self-revealed on April 18, 2024, during the performance of a surveillance test when the 2J EDG failed to flash the field.

b. Exposure Time. The RCE determined that the exposure time was from the last successful test of the 2J EDG to the day of the failure which was 92 days. The inspectors determined that the licensee appropriately assessed the exposure time.

c. Identification Opportunities. In general, the licensee appropriately identified prior occurrences and identification opportunities. The licensee was unable to determine when the FM was introduced and took a broad look across their organization to determine where they had opportunities to identify the FM. The Licensee determined that they had an opportunity to identify the FM at the time of manufacturing, receipt, and installation.

d. Risk and Compliance. The inspectors determined the licensee appropriately understood the risk and compliance. The RCE documented that an assessment of safety consequences was performed in accordance with PI-AA-300-3001, Attachment 3, Safety Consequences Evaluation. NRC/Dominion investigated the risk consequence using detailed probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) tools and concluded that the significance of the event was White (low-to-moderate) through the Reactor Oversight Process significance determination process. The assessment also determined that the root and contributing causes had an impact on the Mitigating Systems Regulatory Cornerstone due to the impact on nuclear safety defense in depth since one of the Unit 2 EDGs was inoperable for a period greater than allowed by Tech Spec 3.8.1.

e. Methodology. The inspectors determined the RCE employed a systematic evidence-based methodology to determine the root cause and contributing causes of the White finding and the 2J EDG inoperability. The methodology included Barrier Analysis, Why Staircase, Equipment Checklist, Support and Refute Matrix, and a Culpability

Analysis.

f. Level of Detail. The inspectors determined the RCE was performed commensurate with the safety significance and complexity of the performance issue and was sufficiently detailed to identify the root and contributing causes, extent of conditions, and extent of causes. The RCE team utilized a formal cause analysis process to identify the problems and determine corrective actions.

g. Operating Experience. The inspectors determined that the licensee appropriately considered prior occurrences and operating experience during the RCE. The RCE reviewed similar events that occurred in the nuclear industry, as well as some internal events and determined that this was not a repeat event, nor was it preventable by reviewing operating experience.

h. Extent of Condition and

Cause.

The licensee used the same object - same application, same object - other application, similar object - same application, and similar object - other application methodologies to evaluate the extent of condition and the extent of cause. The inspectors reviewed the safety culture traits in NUREG-2165, Safety Culture Common Language, referenced in IMC 0310-06, to determine if these were appropriately considered during the licensees evaluations of the root causes, extent of conditions, and extent of causes.

i. Common

Cause.

No common causes were identified by either the licensee or the inspectors.

Objective: Ensure that the extent-of-condition and extent-of-cause of individual and collective white performance issues are identified.

Under this objective, the inspectors independently assessed the Organizational/Programmatic Effectiveness Checklist and the Barrier Analysis, documented in the RCE, to assess the licensee's extent-of-condition and extent-of-cause.

NRC Assessment: The team concluded that this objective was met. Pertaining to the extent of condition, the RCE determined that the same K1 relay design is used in the 1H, 1J, and 2H EDGs with the same application of flashing the generator field. The RCE also determined that the extent of condition was limited to safety-related or risk significant relays with critical moving parts that are exposed prior to assembly. The licensee has not identified any other relays at North Anna Power Station that exhibit the same susceptibility to FM. Pertaining to the extent of cause, the RCE determined that the review of design considerations and controls was bounded to the legacy design change process, as well as other processes that modify relays in the plant (i.e. item equivalent evaluation (IEE), temporary modifications (TM))

which could have failed to consider FM and other controls or precautions. The inspectors determined that the licensee had sufficiently addressed the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone during the extent of cause review since the design change process had already been revised to include considerations for FM intrusion and by planning to evaluate a sample of five design change packages which used the 2008 legacy design change process to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the EDGs to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Extent of Condition and

Cause.

The licensee used the same object - same application (Tier 1), same object - other application (Tier 2), similar object - same application (Tier 3), and similar object - other application (Tier 4) methodologies to evaluate the extent of condition and the extent of cause. For the extent of condition, Tier 1, the RCE determined that all four EDGs share the same latching K1 relay design. EDGs 1H, 1J, and 2H were deliberately inspected for foreign material and no issues were identified. The 2J EDG K1 relay was replaced but not initially inspected for foreign material (CR1269625 submitted). The 2J EDG K1 relay was subsequently inspected on 10/14/2024 with no issues identified. For the extent of condition, Tier 2, the RCE determined that the object of the condition, being the K1 relay is a component unique to the EDGs. It is used nowhere else on the EDGs or other safety-related plant components in other MSPI or PRA Risk significant Systems. For the extent of condition, Tier 3, the RCE determined that there were no other safety-related or risk significant relays with critical moving parts exposed that experienced malfunction due to foreign material. For the extent of condition, Tier 4, the RCE determined that there are 19 safety-related or risk significant relays with critical moving parts that experienced malfunctions due to other causes. Eleven of which were associated with Part 21 notification P21-03302021. Paragon identified instances where Size 1 and 2 starters failed to function as expected. The mechanical interlock exhibited binding that prevented the contactor to close when energized. All mechanical interlocks for applicable starters were removed. For component 1-EE-BKR-1H1-2S-G1-CKTBRK, CR1210157 and CA11304054 document the bound / chattering starter. Corrective actions concluded that the issue was related to spring misalignment and the starter was subsequently replaced under DC NA-19-00002. Lastly, for several of the solid state protection relays the K22 latching mechanism failed testing by electrical maintenance. CR516161 and CR516158 were submitted to replace all applicable Unit 1 and 2 solid state protection system relays. For the extent of cause, Tier 1, the RCE determined that there was inadequate rigor for Foreign Material (FM) controls in the Legacy Design Change Process in 2008 (Superseded). For the extent of cause, Tier 2, the RCE determined that other modification controls or precautions may not have been addressed. For the extent of cause, Tier 3, the RCE determined that other design change process may exist that do not consider FM controls. For the extent of cause, Tier 4, the RCE determined that there may be other design changes or processes that do not consider other modification controls or precautions. Using IP 95001, Supplemental Inspection Response to Action Matrix Column 2 (Regulatory Response) Inputs, the inspectors determined that the licensee appropriately identified the extent of condition and extent of cause in the RCE.

Objective: Ensure that completed corrective actions to address and preclude repetition of white performance issues are timely and effective.

Under this objective, the inspectors assessed the appropriateness and timeliness of the licensee's corrective actions.

NRC Assessment: The team concluded that this objective was met. The inspectors determined that these corrective actions were both timely and adequate to prevent recurrence.

a. Completed Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence

(1) Corrective Action to Preclude Repetition (CAPR)-1: Revise the Design Attributes Review Checklist (DNES-AA-GN-1003, Attachment 1) to identify step 1.8 (which was modified in 2021 as Revision 22) as a part of the CAPR and include the following general design considerations including: Special modification considerations concerning foreign material susceptibility (current Step 1.8) considering:

• Manufacturing, shipping, storage, installation, and operation

• Ability to inspect design for foreign material

• Develop actions to mitigate identified FM susceptibility concerns

• Documentation of identified special modification considerations

• Functionality testing alone is not a sufficient method to determine foreign material has been precluded.

The inspectors determined that this corrective action was both appropriate and timely in addressing the licensees failure to prescribe documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for the installation of the 2J emergency diesel generator (EDG) K1 relay because step 1.8 of DNES-AA-GN-1003, Attachment 1 had already been implemented and includes the guidance for considering FM.

(2) CAPR-2: Identify and implement special modification considerations and controls concerning foreign material susceptibility for the current K1 relay design. These considerations and controls include:

• When performing K1 relay testing and installation activities, use the enhanced inspections delineated below during the installation and testing process to ensure that foreign material is not present within the relay.

• Inspect relay from multiple angles while it is in multiple states: latched, unlatched, manipulated so the underlying spring is visible

• Using a flashlight

• Using magnification (as necessary)

• A second independent inspection is also performed The inspectors determined that this corrective action was both appropriate and timely in addressing the licensees failure to prescribe documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for the installation of the 2J emergency diesel generator (EDG) K1 relay because the electrical maintenance procedure, 0-EPM-0702-04, Inspection of EDG K Relays and Contacts, has been revised to include the enhanced inspections listed above.

(3) CAPR-3: Identify and implement special modification considerations and controls concerning foreign material susceptibility for the current K1 relay design. These considerations and controls include:

• Revise warehouse instructions for handling and opening the packaging of the K1 relays to require the use of a cutting tool to prevent the generation of foreign material fragments. When repackaging K1 relays, ensure the relays are sealed in a non-clear (colored) plastic material.

• Revise Warehouse receipt inspection instructions for the K1 relay to use the enhanced inspections delineated below when performing receipt inspection of the K1 relays to ensure that foreign material is not present within the relay.

• Inspect relay from multiple angles while it is in multiple states: latched, unlatched, manipulated so the underlying spring is visible

• Using a flashlight

• Using magnification (as necessary)

• A second independent inspection is also performed The inspectors determined that this corrective action was both appropriate and timely in addressing the licensees failure to prescribe documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for the installation of the 2J emergency diesel generator (EDG) K1 relay because the warehouse receipt inspection procedure, MS-AA-WHS-136, Supply Chain Foreign Material Inspection and Intrusion Prevention, has been revised to include the enhanced inspections listed above.

b. Other Completed Corrective Actions

(1) In addition to the CAPRs, the following corrective action (CA) was implemented by the licensee to address the RC (the 2008 legacy design change process failed to address FM as a design consideration):

a. CA-EOC7 (CA13033457): Supply Chain Management to perform a sampling of safety related (SR) relays in storage to ensure storage requirements are being met.

The inspectors determined that the corrective action was both appropriate and timely in addressing the licensees failure to prescribe documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for the installation of the 2J emergency diesel generator (EDG) K1 relay because the above corrective action has been implemented to assist plant personnel in identifying FM vulnerabilities.

(2) The following corrective actions (CAs) were implemented by the licensee to address CC1 (North Anna failed to provide detailed special instructions in the electrical maintenance procedure (Inspection of EDG K relays and contacts, 0-EPM-0702-04) for foreign material exclusion (FME) to support the 2J EDG K1 relay assembly, testing, inspection and installation):

a. CA-CC1 (CA13033403): Revise electrical maintenance procedure, 0-EPM-0702-04 to include special foreign material inspection instructions sufficient for the K1 relay with the following attributes:

1. Inspect relay from multiple angles while it is in multiple states: latched, unlatched,

manipulated so the underlying spring is visible

5. Ensure the FM inspection occurs in both the Relay Installation and Relay Inspection

procedure sections. Ensure instructions dont conflict with other procedural guidance.

b. CA-EOC2 (CA13033451): Revise 0-ECM-2813-01 for the Cutler Hammer AR, ARD, and D26 Relays to include Foreign Material Inspection Criteria.

c. CA-EOC3 (CA13033452): Revise 0-ECM-2813-02 for the Eaton Type M Latching Relays to include Foreign Material Inspection Criteria.

d. CA-EOC4 (CA13033453): Perform benchmarking of the best practices (behaviors) by maintenance technicians regarding FME controls for relays to identify potential gaps.

The inspectors determined that these corrective actions were both appropriate and timely in addressing the licensees failure to prescribe documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for the installation of the 2J emergency diesel generator (EDG) K1 relay in that all the above corrective actions have been implemented to assist plant personnel in identifying FM during relay assembly, testing, inspection and installation.

(3) The following corrective actions (CAs) were implemented by the licensee to address CC2 (Storage of components in the warehouse did not meet the standard of MS-AA-WHS-136 for components being in a plastic bag or closed box. The boxes for the components were damaged and partially open.):

a. CA-CC2-1 (CA13033406): Following revision of MS-AAWHS-136 (CA-CC2-2) Supply Chain Management reinforce to warehouse personnel the importance of meeting the storage requirement to preclude introduction of FM through a department briefing or required reading.

Include lessons learned from this event as an example of the potential consequences if storage of components in the warehouse did not meet the standard of MS-AA-WHS-136 for components being in a plastic bag or closed box.

b. CA-CC2-2 (CA13033420): Revise MSAA-WHS-136, Supply Chain Management Foreign Material Inspection and Intrusion Prevention, to include an appropriate reference to 4, Supply Chain Management Storage Exceptions The inspectors determined that these corrective actions were both appropriate and timely in addressing the licensees failure to prescribe documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for the installation of the 2J emergency diesel generator (EDG) K1 relay in that all the above corrective actions have been implemented to verify that components are properly stored to prevent FM intrusion.

(4) The following corrective actions (CAs) were implemented by the licensee to address CC3 (Less than adequate oversight in supply chain organization to ensure proper documentation of foreign material related observations and that sufficient oversight concerning FM was applied to the vendor surveillance for the K1 relay supplier Paragon.):

a. CA-CC3-1 (CA13033427): SCM to work with the Fleet Performance Improvement (PI)group in developing and implementing a WOBS SCM observation card in WOBSMobile. This card will contain fundamental attributes for SCM personnel including behaviors fostering FME excellence.

b. CA-CC3-2 (CA13033429): Revise Step 3.7.7 in MS-AA-WHS-136, which requires warehouse supervision to perform observations on FM practices, to specify documentation of FM observations.

c. CA-CC3-3 (CA13033436): Initiate a Purchase Order for new K1r relay(s) to invoke vendor surveillance (Per MS-AA-VEN-101) during dedication of relay at Paragon to ensure adequate FME programs are in place and followed. Ensure Vendor Surveillance familiar with K1r OE described in the Root Cause Evaluation.

The inspectors determined that these corrective actions were both appropriate and timely in addressing the licensees failure to prescribe documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for the installation of the 2J emergency diesel generator (EDG) K1 relay in that all the above corrective actions have been implemented to ensure adequate oversight in the supply chain organization.

Objective: Ensure that planned corrective actions to preclude repetition direct timely and effective actions to address and preclude repetition of significant individual and collective performance issues.

Under this objective, the inspectors assessed the appropriateness and timeliness of the licensee's planned corrective actions.

NRC Assessment: The team concluded that this objective was met. The NRC recognized that some actions were not complete, but did not affect our determination that corrective actions were timely and adequate to prevent recurrence.

a. Planned Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence

(1) All CAPRs have been completed.

b. Other Planned Corrective Actions

(1) In addition to the completed CAPRs, the following corrective actions (CAs) have been planned to be implemented by the licensee to address the RC (the 2008 legacy design change process failed to address FM as a design consideration):

a. CA-EOC1 (CA13033448): Perform a Benchmarking of other fleets Design Change considerations to identify potential gaps b. CA-EOC6 (CA13033456): Perform a sampling of risk related relay design changes for potential foreign material concerns not identified by Step 1.8 of DNES-AA-GN-10

(2) The following corrective action (CA) has been planned to be implemented by the licensee to address CC1 (North Anna failed to provide detailed special instructions in the electrical maintenance procedure (Inspection of EDG K relays and contacts, 0-EPM-0702-04) for foreign material exclusion (FME) to support the 2J EDG K1 relay assembly, testing, inspection and installation):

a. CA-EOC5 (CA13033455): Perform benchmarking of the best practices (behaviors) by supply chain personnel regarding FME controls for relays to identify potential gaps.

The inspectors determined that the above planned corrective actions are both appropriate and timely in addressing the licensees failure to prescribe documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for the installation of the 2J emergency diesel generator (EDG) K1 relay in that all the above corrective actions are planned to be implemented by March 6, 2025.

Conclusion The inspectors concluded the corrective actions to preclude repetition of the root and contributing causes (causal factors) of the White performance issue were effective and adequately prioritized considering safety significance and regulatory compliance. In addition, the inspectors determined that evaluations were documented at a sufficient level of detail, included relevant operating experience, and identified the root causes, extent of conditions, and extent of causes of the performance issue. Based on the results of the inspections, the inspectors concluded that the objectives of the inspection procedure were met and that the finding will be closed.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On December 19, 2024, the inspectors presented the 95001 supplemental inspection results to Lisa Hilbert, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

CA12944602

2J EDG K1 Relay Failure

CA13033394

CAPR 1: CA to Eng to revise Design Attributes Checklist

(DNES-AA-GN-1003, Attachment 1)

2/05/2024

CA13033398

CAPR 2: CA to Maintenance to implement special FM

considerations for current K1 relays

2/05/2024

95001

Corrective Action

Documents

CA13033402

CAPR 3: CA to SCM to implement special FM considerations

for current K1 relays

2/05/2024