ML23229A120
| ML23229A120 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nuclear Energy Institute |
| Issue date: | 08/17/2023 |
| From: | Joseph Sebrosky NRC/NRR/DANU |
| To: | Steven Lynch NRC/NRR/DANU |
| References | |
| NRC-2022-0074, NRC-2022-0073 | |
| Download: ML23229A120 (93) | |
Text
From: Joseph Sebrosky Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2023 6:41 AM To: Steven Lynch Cc: Michael Orenak
Subject:
information: email capture of advanced reactor content of application project and technology inclusive content of application project guidance document comments Attachments: NEI ARCAP-TICAP Comments.pdf; Holtec comments NRC-2022-0074-DRAFT-0007-A1.pdf; X-energy Comments on ARCAP ISGs.pdf
- Steve,
The purpose of this email is to capture the attached three sets of comments that were received on August 10, 2023, on the advanced reactor content of application project (ARCAP) and technology inclusive content of application project (TICAP) guidance documents. These documents are in the process of being placed in the appropriate regulations.gov dockets. Unfortunately, this process will not be completed by the time of an August 22, 2023, public meeting on the ARCAP and TICAP guidance documents. This email will be captured in ADAMS and made publicly available to support the August 22, 2023, public meeting. Once the documents are processed in regulations.gov, the number assigned to the comments in the applicable regulations.gov dockets will be used to respond to the comments.
The bottom line is that this email is an intermediate short-term step for capturing the documents in ADAMS until the regulations.gov process is completed.
Let me know if you have any questions.
Sincerely, Joe Sebrosky Senior Project Manager Advanced Reactor Policy Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Hearing Identifier: NRR_DRMA Email Number: 2204
Mail Envelope Properties (PH0PR09MB74367B3E7FE9FFC1E7F0F2BDF81AA)
Subject:
information email capture of advanced reactor content of application project and technology inclusive content of application project guidance document comments Sent Date: 8/17/2023 6:41:06 AM Received Date: 8/17/2023 6:41:00 AM From: Joseph Sebrosky
Created By: Joseph.Sebrosky@nrc.gov
Recipients:
"Michael Orenak" <Michael.Orenak@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None "Steven Lynch" <Steven.Lynch@nrc.gov>
Tracking Status: None
Post Office: PH0PR09MB7436.namprd09.prod.outlook.com
Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 1160 8/17/2023 6:41:00 AM NEI ARCAP-TICAP Comments.pdf 991029 Holtec comments NRC-2022-0074-DRAFT-0007-A1.pdf 521518 X-energy Comments on ARCAP ISGs.pdf 287164
Options Priority: Normal Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date:
BENJAMIN HOLTZMAN Director, New Nuclear
1201 F Street, NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004 M: 202.230.1740 bah@nei.org nei.org
August 10, 2023
Mr. Mohamed Shams Director, Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities (DANU)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Comments on Draft Interim Staff Guidance: Review of Risk-Informed, Technology Inclusive Advanced Reactor Applications - Roadmap, Docket ID NRC -2022-0074
Submitted via Regulations.gov
Project Number: 689
Dear Mr. Shams:
On behalf of the nuclear energy industry, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 1 is pleased to submit comments to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on the draft interim staff guidance (ISG) documents making up the Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project (ARCAP) as well as the draft regulatory guide DG-1404.
The sum of these documents makes up Docket ID NRC-2022-0074 and are detailed below.
- DANU-ISG-2022- 01, Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project, Review of Risk-Informed, Technology Inclusive Advanced Reactor ApplicationsRoadmap
- DANU-ISG-2022- 02, Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project Chapter 2, Site Information
- DANU-ISG-2022- 03, Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project Chapter 9, Control of Routine Plant Radioactive Effluents, Plant Contamination and Solid Waste
- DANU-ISG-2022- 04, Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project Chapter 10, Control of Occupational Dose
- DANU-ISG-2022- 05, Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project Chapter 11, Organization and Human-System Considerations
1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is responsible for establishing unified policy on behalf of its members relating to matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEIs members include entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect and engineerin g firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations involved in the nuclear energy industry.
Mr. Shams August 10, 2023 Page 2
- DANU-ISG-2022- 06, Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project Chapter 12, Post-Construction Inspection, Testing, and Analysis Program
- DANU-ISG-2022- 07, Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project, Risk-informed Inservice Inspection/Inservice Testing
- DANU-ISG-2022- 08, Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications
- DANU-ISG-2022- 09, Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project, Risk-informed Performance-based Fire Protection Program (for Operations)
- Regulatory Analysis for ARCAP ISGs
- DG-1404, Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive Content of Application Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light-Water Reactors
Specific comments and suggested changes are provided in the attachment for the noted documents. NEI also provides below some general comments that help explain and inform the specific comments.
Throughout all the documents of the package, there are statements that this guidance is applicable to non Light Water Reactors (LWRs). However, all the guidance is technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to both LWR and non-LWR designs. The applicability of the guidance to LWR designs could benefit from this explicit clarification. For the ARCAP guidance, industry specifically requested the NRC develop guidance applicable to both non-LWRs and LWR designs, and we were informed in various meetings that this would be the NRCs approach. While NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 were developed specifically for advanced non-LWRs, applicants with LWR designs should also be able to use the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) methodology if they elect to do so (e.g., NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07). It would be up to the applicants to justify the use of the guidance documents and associated regulatory guides.
A lot of the existing LWR regulatory guidance is referenced throughout the various documents. While in some instances, these LWR guidance documents may be applicable to both LWR and non-LWR designs, there should not be a presumption that such guidance applies generally unless shown otherwise. The focus of the guidance package should be on demonstrating compliance with regulatory requirements, and an applicant should be afforded the opportunity to choose which existing regulatory guidance it elects to apply (if any) in order to accomplish that goal.
ARCAP Documents
The roadmap (DANU-ISG-2022-01) has a section carved out for a Facility Safety Program to be incorporated into Part 50 and Part 52 after being developed in Part 53. We disagree with including guidance based upon Part 53 requirements that have not been approved by the Commission for inclusion in the Final Rule.
Instead, specific draft guidance should be used. Furthermore, we are concerned about the NRCs expressed intention to backfit Part 53 requirements into Parts 50 and 52, which would make the optional voluntary Part 53 requirements mandatory regardless of whether an applicant would use Part 53, or Parts 50 or 52.
Furthermore, as we have expressed in our comments to the Part 53 rulemaking, a facility safety program, Mr. Shams August 10, 2023 Page 3
as described in Part 53, would create an unjustified additional burden by requiring licensees to self-impose backfits subject to inspection and potential criminal penalties for their failure to do so, and is in direct conflict with the NRCs existing backfit rule.
DG-1404
The draft regulatory guide DG-1404 endorses (with clarifications and additions) NEI 21-07, Revision 1, Technology-Inclusive Guidance for Light Water Reactors - Safety Analysis Report Content for Applicants Using the NEI 18- 04 Methodology. The draft ISG documents provide additional guidance for an advanced reactor application under 10 CFR Part 50 or Part 52. These comments and suggested changes were assembled by NEI and industry members including the Southern Company-led team that developed NEI 21-07, with support from the U.S. Department of Energy, and worked with NEI to submit the guidance for endorsement.
The establishment of technology-inclusive guidance for applicants using the risk informed methodology will help to provide increased regulatory certainty and predictability. The process of developing NEI 21-07 and DG-1404 has been ongoing since 2019, and it has been characterized by extensive interaction between industry and the NRC. The process has included sharing white papers, providing draft documents for review and discussion, numerous presentations during NRC stakeholder meetings and at dedicated public meetings, industry-NRC workshops, and tabletop exercises with reactor developers that were observed by NRC staff.
NEI believes that this approach has contributed significantly to the effectiveness and value of the guidance in NEI 21-07, and NEI appreciates the resources that NRC has devoted to the interactions and the frankness and openness that have characterized the discussions related to NEI 21 -07. It is in that spirit that these comments on the package are provided.We are confident that the guidance documents will be valuable resources for applicants seeking regulatory approval for advanced reactors.
It is important that the guidance package avoid duplicating information in multiple documents as this creates an error-likely situation where information is either updated in one place but not another, or a user finds information in one place but not the other, mistakenly believing that they have found all applicable guidance. Additionally, repeating information from NEI 21-07 into the regulatory guide (DG-1404), or elsewhere, is unnecessary, counterproductive, and detracts from the overall quality and utility of the guidance. The unnecessary information requires users to sift through and interpret the new content and it distracts attention from those items in the NRC regulatory guide that are actual clarifications and additions.
As such, the attachment denotes several NRC additions and clarifications where the information added is already provided in NEI 21-07.
There is a discrepancy between NEI 21-07 Rev. 1 and DG-1404 with respect to the coverage of certain licensing pathways. NEI 21-07 explicitly addresses several licensing pathways: a combined license (COL) under 10 CFR Part 52 Subpart C; a design certification (DC) under 10 CFR Part 52 Subpart B; and a two-step license (CP/OL) under 10 CFR Part 50. NEI 21-07 did not address manufacturing licenses (MLs) or standard design approvals (SDAs). DG-1404 states in several places that the guidance covers MLs and SDAs as well as COLs, DCs, and CP/OL, but the NRC document provides no additional guidance for MLs and SDAs.
Mr. Shams August 10, 2023 Page 4
Rather, the text often is not practical for these other applications as written and should be revised. For example, ML applicants should only be required to include information relevant to design, fabrication, performance, and the manufacturing process itself. The other activities would take place beyond the scope of an ML and should be addressed in a COLA. Similarly, the information associated with post-construction, inspection, testing, and analysis (PITAP) is clearly denoted as applicable to MLs but its not clear how an ML would address them. Clarification is needed to distinguish between activities at the ML facility and activities at the site.
NEI 18-04 has a systematic process of identifying safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) based on the approach taken to satisfy Required Safety Functions. Placing special emphasis on certain SSCs is not technology inclusive. Whether this is fuel qualification or instrumentation and control systems, special requirements are unnecessary and inappropriate.
Thank you for your time and attention to this important matter. Please contact me if you have any questions or require additional information.
Sincerely,
Ben Holtzman
Attachments
c: Robert Taylor, NRR, NRC John Segala, NRR, NRC Joseph Sebrosky, NRR, NRC Michael Orenak, NRR, NRC William Reckley, NRR, NRC ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 1
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Throughout all the documents of the package, there are statements that this guidance is applicable to nonLight Water Reactors (LWRs). However, all the guidance is technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to LWRs. ARCAP is supposed to be applicable for any technology (non-LWR and LWR), any licensing approach (LMP, classical, etc.), and any licensing path (CP, COL, DC etc.).
For the ARCAP guidance, industry specifically requested the Please rephrase to indicate the guidance is 1 GeneralNRC develop guidance applicable to both non-LWRs and LWR technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to SMRs, and we were informed in various meetings that this both LWR and non-LWR designs.
would be the NRCs approach. While NEI 18- 04 and NEI 21-07 were developed specifically for advanced non-LWRs, applicants with LWR designs should also be able to use the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) methodology if they elect to do so (e.g., NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07). It would be up to the applicants to justify the use of the guidance documents and associated regulatory guides.
The roadmap denotes the lists of guidance documents referenced in different documents of this package (e.g., DG-Please only list the guidance documents in one 2 General1404 [the TICAP Reg Guide], DANU-ISG-2022-02 [ARCAP location. Recommended to remove from the Chapter 2], DANU-ISG-2022-08 [Tech Specs]). Duplicating roadmap.
this information in multiple documents creates an error likely situation and is not recommended.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 2
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Are there any programs an applicant using LMP methodology If there are any programs or information that 3 Generalis expected to develop that are not noted in the roadmap or NRC expects an applicant to provide, using LMP relevant TICAP/ARCAP chapters? methodology, that are not noted in the roadmap please add them.
TICAP is described as an industry-led activity that is focused Please revise the text as noted below:
on providing guidance on the appropriate scope and depth of "TICAP is an industry-led guidance activity information related to the specific portions of the SAR that focused on the scope and depth of information 4 p. 3 describe the fundamental safety functions of the design and to include in the portions of the SAR that
- p. 9 the safety analysis. However, TICAP (NEI 21-07 Rev 1) is address the implementation of the LMP more than just addressing portions of the SAR that describe methodology as described in NEI 18- 04, Revision fundamental safety functions of the design. It is important to 1, and endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide explicitly tie NEI 21-07 back to NEI 18-04. 1.233."
It is noted that Appendix B of the ISG describes the regulations that are generally applicable to non-LWR applications for CPs and OLs under 10 CFR Part 50 as well as
- p. 5, last DCs, COLs, and SDAs under 10 CFR 52. The overall scope of Either the text describing Appendix B should be 5 sentence of this ISG includes MLs so the scope of Appendix B should revised to include MLs or Appendix B should be 1st full include regulations applicable to non-LWR MLs. If this is revised to include all regulations applicable to paragraph simply an editorial oversight in preparing the ISG, it should be non-LWR applications for MLs.
corrected. If, however, Appendix B does not address all of the regulations applicable to a non-LWR ML application, the Appendix should be revised accordingly.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 3
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
As of the date of this ISG, the NRC is developing a rule to amend 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 (RIN 3150-Al66). The NRC staff notes this guidance may need to be updated to conform to changes to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52, if any, adopted through that rulemaking. Further, as of the date of this ISG, the NRC is developing an optional performance-based, technology-inclusive regulatory framework for licensing nuclear power plants designated as 10 CFR Part 53, Licensing and Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Reactors, (RIN 3150-AK31). After promulgation of those regulations, the NRC staff
- p. 6 and anticipates that this guidance will be updated and 6 p. 38 incorporated into the NRCs Regulatory Guide (RG) series or a Please remove the references to a Facility Safety (footnote) NUREG series document to address content of application Program.
considerations specific to the licensing processes in this document. The proposed Facility Safety Program in Part 53 (and reserved for incorporation into Part 50 and Part 52 as noted in the roadmap ISG) would create an unjustified additional burden by requiring licensees to self-impose backfits subject to inspection and potential criminal penalties for their failure to do so. Industry is strongly opposed to this in Part 53 and this guidance. The proposed program is in direct conflict with the NRCs backfit rule that limits changes to regulatory requirements to those that are safety significant and cost beneficial.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 4
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
- p. 9, Guidance 7 Documents RG 1.81 is for 50.71(e) not 50711. This typo should be Please correct the 2nd bullet to refer to Referenced corrected. 50.71(e).
in DG-1404, 2nd bullet
Most of the discussion under this heading is applicable to On page 14, add the following text after the LWRs that operate well above atmospheric pressure. The bullet on Section 3.6.3:
- p. 12-14, guidance is not relevant to non-LWRs that may operate at or Applicants for designs that operate at or near Design of near atmospheric pressure. Although the draft guidance atmospheric pressure need not address Sections Structures, specifically identifies that certain sections of NUREG- 0800 3.6.1, 3.6.2 or 3.6.3. If the reactor design does 8 Components Chapter 3 may not be applicable based on the reactor design not include SSCs that could generate missiles
, Equipment, and the outcome of the LMP process and uses introductory inside the containment or confinement then and Systems phrases such as as applicable it would be helpful to provide Section 3.5.1.2 need not be addressed in the additional clarification if NRC has expectations for non-LWR application. However, internally generated applicants with system operating pressures at or near missiles outside containment and turbine missiles atmospheric to address piping failures. would still be addressed in the COLA.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 5
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The last paragraph states "The TICAP guidance (i.e., NEI 21-07 and DG 1404) for the design of structures, components, and equipment and systems would generally place this Please revise the text as noted below."The information in SAR Chapters 5 and 6, following the LMP TICAP guidance (i.e., NEI 21-07 and DG 1404) 9 p. 12 process. The SAR (Chapters 5 and 6) should describe..." for the design of structures, components, and However, this information should be included in SAR Chapters equipment and systems would generally place 5, 6, and 7. Chapter 5 identifies safety-related (SR) and non-this information in SAR Chapters 5, 6, and 7; safety-related with special treatment (NSRST) SSCs but the following the LMP process. The SAR (Chapters 5, details are in Chapters 6 and 7. 6, and 7) should describe..."
Typo on the second bullet of the page: Correct the typo:
10 p. 14 - Section 3.6.3, Leak-Before-Brea Evaluation Procedures, - Section 3.6.3, Leak-Before-Break Evaluation (Ref. 24) Procedures, (Ref. 24)
An ML applicant must provide PDCs in the application. At the end of the first sentence, include the However, the statement in the first sentence of the referenced following:
paragraph that the full scope of PDC include "design, fabrication, construction, testing and performance ML applicants need only propose PDC to 11 p. 14, last requirements" is not practical for ML applicants. establish necessary design, fabrication and paragraph performance requirements. PDC relevant to Additionally, it would be helpful to provide a distinction testing as part of the manufacturing process between fabrication and construction, as 'fabrication' is should also be included. However, a COL included in the definition of "Construction or constructing" applicant should include all of the PDC in their provided in 10 CFR 50.2. SAR.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 6
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The guidance on PDCs for those aspects of the facility design not informed by the LMP process lists Normal Operations as Please clarify the guidance for PDCs for those the only example. More specifically, the guidance only refers aspects of the facility design not informed by the to guidance in DANU-ISG-2022- 03, Chapter 9, Control of LMP process to indicate the comprehensive list 12 p. 15 Routine Plant Radioactive Effluents, Plant Contamination and of topics beyond the scope of NEI 21- 07 (as Solid Waste, as guidance for PDCs beyond those derived endorsed in DG-1404) that are expected by the from the process outlined in NEI 21-07 (as endorsed in DG-NRC to be within the scope of PDC.
1404). It is unclear if other PDC are expected from an applicant.
It appears from the following sentence that an applicant could have SSCs that are classified as SR and NSRST that are not Please revise this text to remove an implication informed by NEI 18- 04. that SSCs could be SR and NSRST that are not
"The NRC also considers this approach to be appropriate for informed by NEI 18- 04.
developing proposed PDCs for those design functions and "The NRC also considers this approach to be 13 p. 15features of the facility that are SR and NSRST and not appropriate for developing proposed PDCs for informed by the LMP process (e.g., normal operations)." those design functions and features of the
It is not clear that SR and NSRST classifications have specific facility that are SR and NSRST and not informed meaning outside the context of NEI 18-04. A system can have classified as NST by the LMP process (e.g.,
requirements driven by regulations without being SR or normal operations)."
NSRST (e.g., security systems).
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 7
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The wording on ALARA in Chapter 10 indicates that the guidance will continue the well-established operational 14 p. 16-17program for ALARA but not extend ALARA into the design, as No change requested.
a regulatory requirement. Industry agrees with this position as it provides a predictable regulatory framework.
Guidance for Aircraft Impact Assessment is provided in both Please place the aircraft impact assessment DG-1404 (addressing SAR Chapter 3) and the ARCAP guidance from the ARCAP Roadmap into one 15 p. 39 Roadmap (DANU-ISG-2022-01). The ARCAP Roadmap location - either the ARCAP Roadmap or DG-guidance is more thorough and should be used, but DG-1404 1404. Delete the aircraft impact assessment may be the more appropriate location. Cross-referencing is guidance from the other location so the guidance appropriate, but guidance should be provided in one location. is not spread among multiple documents.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 8
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
On page 16, at the end of the second full paragraph, add the following text:
"For ML applications, the Chapter 9 discussion need only include information to identify the kinds and quantities of radioactive materials expected to be produced in the operation and The ML application should only be required to include the means for controlling and limiting radioactive information to identify the kinds and quantities of radioactive effluents and radiation exposures within the 16 Chapter 9 materials expected to be produced during operation and the limits set forth in part 20 (per 52.157(e)); the means for controlling / limiting effluents. Other information information required by 20.1406 (per identified in Chapter 9 should be addressed in a COLA. 52.157(f)(9)); and the information with respect to the design of equipment to maintain control over radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluents produced during normal reactor operations as described in 50.34a(e) (per 52.157(f)(11). Other information identified in Chapter 9 should be addressed in a COL application."
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 9
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
On page 17, at the end of the first full paragraph, add the following:
The ML application should only be required to address the "of Occupational Dose (Ref. 30). An ML facility and equipment design, and radiation sources. application only needs to address the facility and 17 Chapter 10 Operational programs and descriptions of management, policy equipment design, and radiation sources.
and organizational structure necessary to ensure occupational Operational programs and descriptions of radiation exposure are ALARA should be addressed in a COLA. management, policy and organizational structure necessary to ensure occupational radiation exposure are ALARA should be addressed in a COLA."
On page 17, at the end of the second paragraph, An ML application would only require a description of the add the following text:
management plan for design and manufacturing activities "An ML application only needs to address a 18 Chapter 11 (52.157)(f)(26). Operational programs including human-description of the management plan for design systems considerations and other Chapter 11 SAR content and manufacturing activities, per 52.157(f)(26).
should be addressed in a COLA. All other aspects of Chapter 11 SAR content
should be addressed in a COLA."
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 10
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The language regarding ITAAC is correct for CP, OL, COL and DCs. However, 52.158(a)(1) requires ITAAC "that the licensee who will be operating the reactor shall perform, and the On page 39, at the beginning of the section acceptance criteria that are necessary and sufficient to "Overview -- Application guidance" add the provide reasonable assurance that...(i) the reactor has been following text: "An ML application should address 19 p. 39, ITAAC manufactured in conformity with the manufacturing license; the provisions in 10 CFR 52.158 regarding ITAAC the provisions of the Act, and the Commissionsrules and for MLs. The other ITAAC requirements should regulations; and (ii) the manufactured reactor will be operated be addressed by applicants for CPs, OLs, COLs, in conformity with the approved design and any license or DCs."
authorizing operation of the manufactured reactor." As such additional information is needed to address ML applications.
Please clarify under what circumstances novel The text states that "a prospective applicant should identify design features should and should not be any novel design features through white papers or meetings identified in advance of an application.
during the pre-application reviewinterdependent effects 20 Appendix A, p. 8 among the safety features of the design is acceptable." While If a prospective applicant should identify any some examples are given in the text, does the NRC want to safety-related or safety significant novel design review in advance novel design features that are not SR or features through white papers or meetings NSRST? during the pre-application review that should be stated.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 11
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The text states that during pre-application interactions, a prospective applicant should use a white paper to identify any 21 Appendix A, consensus codes and standards, or code cases it intends to Please specify how the consensus codes and
- p. 8 use. However DG-1404 states that this listing should be standards should be identified.
included in SAR. It's an error -likely situation to include the same information in multiple places in the licensing basis.
Regulation 10 CFR 50.155 is noted as applicable to non-LWRs Please provide clarification on what applications 22 Appendix B, p. 15but there is no specification on whether this is applicable to should address 10 CFR 50.155 in the table.
23 Appendix B, p. 22 Bookmark not defined Please correct bookmark
The design features of some new reactor designs may remove 24 Appendix B, the applicability of 50.34(f)(2)(i) when there is not a viable Please consider noting that 50.34(f)(2)(i) may
- p. 23 LOCA pathway. As such, there would not be a need for the only be applicable to some designs in Table 4.
control room to simulate a small-break LOCA.
Appendix B, 25 Attachment Typo, need space between 'against' and 'NUREG- 0800' Please correct the text as noted.
1, p. 3 ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 12
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 01, ARCAP Roadmap
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The Emergency Planning section only references regulations that are applicable to LWRs, there is no mention of using 10 CFR 50.160 and its accompanying RG 1.242, which is written specifically for advanced reactors. Is the NRC staff expecting 26 Appendix C advanced reactor PSARs and FSARs to follow the current LWR Please add clarification or additional information
- p. 12 regulations for EP? Will the staff consider the new rulemaking to address EP for advanced reactors.
effort for advanced reactor EP in order to minimize the regulatory burden of reviewing exemptions for EPZs, EROs, and EALs? The use of LWR guidance for non-LWR applicants will result in unnecessary and costly exemptions.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 13
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 02, ARCAP Chapter 2
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Throughout all the documents of the package, there are statements that this guidance is applicable to nonLight Water Reactors (LWRs). However, all the guidance is technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to LWRs. ARCAP is supposed to be applicable for any technology (non-LWR and LWR), any licensing approach (LMP, classical, etc.), and any licensing path (CP, COL, DC etc.).
For the ARCAP guidance, industry specifically requested the Please rephrase to indicate the guidance is 1 GeneralNRC develop guidance applicable to both non-LWRs and LWR technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to SMRs, and we were informed in various meetings that this both LWR and non-LWR designs.
would be the NRCs approach. While NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 were developed specifically for advanced non-LWRs, applicants with LWR designs should also be able to use the Lice nsing Modernization Project (LMP) methodology if they elect to do so (e.g., NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07). It would be up to the applicants to justify the use of the guidance documents and associated regulatory guides.
Please add text similar to the following:
The guidance should be reviewed with a specific focus to For an ML application the site description should eliminate review of external hazards that are not possible for describe the site characteristics as they affect the 2 GeneralML applicants, but remain applicable to CP, OL, and COL design, e.g., a site parameter envelope. Other applicants (e.g., stability of slopes). Site related information site characteristics are left to the COL applicant can only be provided in terms of postulated site parameters for to provide as well the site-specific information ML applicants. necessary to demonstrate that site characteristics
fit within the plant parameter envelope.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 14
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 02, ARCAP Chapter 2
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
3 First Line of p. 2 Typo, need space between 'a' and 'non-LWR' Please fix typographical error.
The last sentence of the third full paragraph indicates that Please revise the text to indicate that external 4 p. 5 external hazards not supported by PRA will be covered hazards not supported by PRA will be covered deterministically. The guidance should not preclude a potential using traditional deterministic or hybrid methods.
combination of PRA and deterministic techniques.
Reg Guide 1.111 is specifically noted for LWRs. A statement indicating whether NRC staff have previously made 5 p. 13 determinations for its applicability to non-LWR designs or add Please revise as noted.
a statement on the appropriateness of its application to non-LWR designs.
The last sentences of 2.6.5.1 and 2.6.5.2.c denote the need Please revise the text to remove this excess 6 p. 22for analysis and operating experience. This is excessive and conservatism and align with the rest of the conflicts with other text in this section denoting 'current section text.
practice' and 'state-of-the-art' practices.
- p. 24 Additional guidance (or a more standardized approach) for 7 Section screening external hazards via the screening flow chart Please consider developing a standardized 2.7.2 diagram could help streamline the process and minimize the approach.
number/extent of pre-engagement discussions.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 15
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 03, ARCAP Chapter 9
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Throughout all the documents of the package, there are statements that this guidance is applicable to nonLight Water Reactors (LWRs). However, all the guidance is technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to LWRs. ARCAP is supposed to be applicable for any technology (non-LWR and LWR), any licensing approach (LMP, classical, etc.), and any licensing path (CP, COL, DC etc.).
For the ARCAP guidance, industry specifically requested the Please rephrase to indicate the guidance is 1 GeneralNRC develop guidance applicable to both non-LWRs and LWR technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to SMRs, and we were informed in various meetings that this both LWR and non-LWR designs.
would be the NRCs approach. While NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 were developed specifically for advanced non-LWRs, applicants with LWR designs should also be able to use the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) methodology if they elect to do so (e.g., NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07). It would be up to the applicants to justify the use of the guidance documents and associated regulatory guides.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 16
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 04, ARCAP Chapter 10
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Throughout all the documents of the package, there are statements that this guidance is applicable to nonLight Water Reactors (LWRs). However, all the guidance is technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to LWRs. ARCAP is supposed to be applicable for any technology (non-LWR and LWR), any licensing approach (LMP, classical, etc.), and any licensing path (CP, COL, DC etc.).
For the ARCAP guidance, industry specifically requested the Please rephrase to indicate the guidance is 1 GeneralNRC develop guidance applicable to both non-LWRs and LWR technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to SMRs, and we were informed in various meetings that this both LWR and non-LWR designs.
would be the NRCs approach. While NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 were developed specifically for advanced non-L WRs, applicants with LWR designs should also be able to use the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) methodology if they elect to do so (e.g., NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07). It would be up to the applicants to justify the use of the guidance documents and associated regulatory guides.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 17
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 05, ARCAP Chapter 11
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Throughout all the documents of the package, there are statements that this guidance is applicable to nonLight Water Reactors (LWRs). However, all the guidance is technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to LWRs. ARCAP is supposed to be applicable for any technology (non-LWR and LWR), any licensing approach (LMP, classical, etc.), and any licensing path (CP, COL, DC etc.).
For the ARCAP guidance, industry specifically requested the Please rephrase to indicate the guidance is 1 GeneralNRC develop guidance applicable to both non-LWRs and LWR technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to SMRs, and we were informed in various meetings that this both LWR and non-LWR designs.
would be the NRCs approach. While NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 were developed specifically for advanced non-LWRs, applicants with LWR designs should also be able to use the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) methodology if they elect to do so (e.g., NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07). It would be up to the applicants to justify the use of the guidance documents and associated regulatory guides.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 18
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 05, ARCAP Chapter 11
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The ISG denotes that NRC staff expects to see general staffing plans for the construction pre-op testing, fuel load, and startup and power ascension testing. There is also text denoting CPAs include preliminary plans for the operating organization. What Reg Guide or NUREG will NRC staff use to verify staffing methodology for new reactor designs with advanced safety features and technologies that vendors believe will warrant 2 p. 4 fewer staff than current LWRs? Please add clarification on the level of detail expected as noted.
Additional information on the level of detail expected in the CP and OL applications would be helpful to remove subjectivity from applicant reviews. For example, does the technical basis need to be provided in the CPA? Does the NRC just w ant a list of proposed staff, or does the eligibility requirements with justification need to be provided?
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 19
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 05, ARCAP Chapter 11
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Please add clarifying basis for the criteria similar to 11.2.g " adequate number of licensed operators will be available at all required times to The ISG acceptance criteria in sections 11.2 c, d, i, l, and m satisfy the minimum staffing requirements of 10 lack clear criteria with a basis to ensure both the reviewer and CFR 50.54(m), or the applicant has provided 3 p. 15 and applicant will reach the same conclusion on whether the justification for an exemption. (10 CFR 50.54(i)-
16 criteria is met. This could lead to rework by both applicant and (m)..." This provides clear criteria with a basis reviewer. If no clear criteria can be identified, then these that both applicant and reviewer can agree on.
should not be part of the acceptance review.
Alternatively, the criteria could be removed from the ISG if no clear acceptance criteria and basis can be identified.
The requirement for engineering expertise on shift based on LWR operating experience from TMI comes from a Commission Policy statement rather than regulation, and may not be Please add clarification on technology neutral relevant to advanced reactor technologies. More relevant approaches for a site can meet the requirement engineering expertise will be from the technology specific for engineering expertise.Additionally, please training programsthat will teach engineering fundamentals provide clarification on what information and 4 p. 16and principles required to operate that specific technology. features would need to be demonstrated to Information should be provided regarding how applicants can enable engineering expertise to be on-call, part credit the technology-specific training program and design of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO),
features that reduce the need for traditional engineering or remote.
expertise (LWR technology scope not applicable to all designs) while identifying other activities more relevant to the applicant's design.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 20
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 06, ARCAP Chapter 12
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Throughout all the documents of the package, there are statements that this guidance is applicable to nonLight Water Reactors (LWRs). However, all the guidance is technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to LWRs. ARCAP is supposed to be applicable for any technology (non-LWR and LWR), any licensing approach (LMP, classical, etc.), and any licensing path (CP, COL, DC etc.).
For the ARCAP guidance, industry specifically requested the Please rephrase to indicate the guidance is 1 GeneralNRC develop guidance applicable to both non-LWRs and LWR technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to SMRs, and we were informed in various meetings that this both LWR and non-LWR designs.
would be the NRCs approach. While NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 were developed specifically for advanced non-L WRs, applicants with LWR designs should also be able to use the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) methodology if they elect to do so (e.g., NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07). It would be up to the applicants to justify the use of the guidance documents and associated regulatory guides.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 21
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 06, ARCAP Chapter 12
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
10 CFR 52.1 defines a manufacturing license as a license issued under subpart F, authorizing the manufacture of nuclear power reactors but not their construction, installation, or operation at the sites on which the reactors are to be The purpose and descripting discussion of the Purpose of operated. On page 2 of DANU-ISG-2022-06 it is noted that the ISG should be revised to be clear how this ISG 2 ISG and guidance in the ISG is limited to the portion of non-LWR applies to an ML application since by definition language application associated with the development of a risk-informed the ML does not authorize construction, on p. 2 post-construction inspection, testing, and analysis program installation or operation.
(PITAP) and the staff review of that portion of the application.
The applicability of the ISG clearly includes applications for MLs. Given the definition of an ML it is not clear how guidance on a PITAP is applicable to an ML.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 22
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 06, ARCAP Chapter 12
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The ISG should be revised regarding MLs to The first sentence notes the PITAP is generally divided into two clearly distinguish between post-manufacturing phases: Phase 1 is the preoperational phase (prior to initial inspection and testing that would be expected to fuel loading) and Phase 2 is initial startup testing (initial fuel be addressed in the factory and post-construction loading and initial power ascension). The application should inspection and testing. One example of language describe how all tests identified in the Phase 1 program can be that addresses post-manufacturing inspection performed prior to loading fuel. The expected content for an comes from the draft proposed Part 53,
- p. 5, ML application to address Phase 1 is not clear. As background, specifically 53.620(b)(3):
Application 52.157 does not explicitly address post-manufacture inspection "post-manufacturing inspection and acceptance 3 Guidance, or testing although 52.158 includes a requirement for ITAAC to process must be established and implemented 1st demonstrate the reactor has been manufactured in conformity before transporting a manufactured reactor or sentence with the manufacturing license, the provisions of the Act, and portions of a manufactured reactor for the Commission's rules and regulations. 52.157(f)(21) does installation at a commercial nuclear plant. The require justification that compliance with the interface process must consider the results of inspections, requirements of paragraph (f)(20) is verifiable through tests, and analyses that have been performed inspections testing, or analysis. The method to be used for this and the acceptance criteria that are necessary verification must be included as part of the proposed ITAAC and sufficient to conclude that manufacturing required by 52.158. activities have been completed in accordance
with the ML."
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 23
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 06, ARCAP Chapter 12
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
There are two proposed changes: (1) revise the title and structure of the ISG to address post -
The language in the last paragraph on Page 6 states, "For MLs, manufacturing and post-construction; (2) much of the post-construction inspection and testing to resolve restructure the guidance to make clear ITAAC may be performed at the manufacturers facility and not expectations for post-construction activities that 4 Bottom of at the final site." The text goes on to address the ML ITAAC are appropriate for CP, OL, and COLs versus the
- p. 6 requirements in 52.158(a). This language continues to confuse expectations for MLs. The discussion of the post-
"manufacturing" and "construction" and is an unnecessary construction activities for sites that will utilize a complication in the guidance. reactor manufactured under an ML, the inspection activities should address construction and installation activities for the manufactured reactor.
The last sentence of the first paragraph on page 6 states: If the application is for a CP, the PITAP description can be limited to the Phase 1 (described below) inspection, testing, and verification that would be required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, along with a description of the scope, objectives, Please confirm that this ISG is not adding and programmatic controls associated with the pre-operational additional requirements beyond what is required 5 p. 6 test program (prior to initial fuel loading). to be provided in a CPA per 10 CFR 50.34(a)(7)
This implies requirements that go beyond the quality by removing or rewording the last sentence from assurance program descriptions required in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(7) the first paragraph of page 6.
and does not appear to be consistent with the first sentence of the second paragraph of the application guidance on page 5:
program elements required by the quality assurance program under § 50.34(a)(7).
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 24
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 07, ARCAP Inservice Inspection and Inservice Testing
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Throughout all the documents of the package, there are statements that this guidance is applicable to nonLight Water Reactors (LWRs). However, all the guidance is technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to LWRs. ARCAP is supposed to be applicable for any technology (non-LWR and LWR), any licensing approach (LMP, classical, etc.), and any licensing path (CP, COL, DC etc.).
For the ARCAP guidance, industry specifically requested the Please rephrase to indicate the guidance is 1 GeneralNRC develop guidance applicable to both non-LWRs and LWR technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to SMRs, and we were informed in various meetings that this both LWR and non-LWR designs.
would be the NRCs approach. While NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 were developed specifically for advanced non-LWRs, applicants with LWR designs should also be able to use the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) methodology if they elect to do so (e.g., NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07). It would be up to the applicants to justify the use of the guidance documents and associated regulatory guides.
There are a few references to design considerations of the facility to allow ISI/IST activities to be performed when Recommend that design specifics be placed in 2 Generaloperating. Why wouldnt those discussions be in the specific the applicable GDCs and not an inservice GDCs instead of this section? It creates uncertainty as to what testing/inspection document.
governing document the designers should use.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 25
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 07, ARCAP Inservice Inspection and Inservice Testing
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
It is not clear why manufacturing licenses are in the scope of this ISG on ISI/IST. ISI/IST are operating reactor programs and therefore not directly applicable to MLs which, by definition in 52.1, do not address operation. The full description of the ISI and IST programs goes beyond what would be reasonable for an ML applicant. However, the IS G Include descriptions in the ISG of the design and could provide guidance on using the PRA to identify the SSCs manufacture considerations that would affect the that would be part of the ISI program (for a reactor assembled conduct of ISI and IST. This should include a 3 Generalusing an ML) and this information would then be used in the discussion of using the PRA results to identify design and manufacture of the reactor to ensure adequate SSCs and locations to be included in the risk-accessibility of the component or region (e.g., accessibility to informed ISI, and the components and locations welds) to be inspected once deployed. Similarly, as part of the to be included in the IST program.
SSC classification and determination of special treatment for NSRST SSCs, the components that would require qualification prior to installation could be identified and the design and manufacture of the reactor modified to ensure adequate accessibility to permit conducting the tests.
The ISG acknowledges the development of the ASME OM-2 code but states that applicants following the ISG will implement IST programs utilizing previously endorsed codes.
On page 6, the ISG denotes that construction permit Please add guidance stating that applicants may 4 p. 3 applications include what standards are going to be followed at provide plans to follow codes not yet endorsed the operating license stage. What are the requirements are for "at risk" in the construction permit application.
applicants who expect to follow an endorsed OM-2 code at the time of operating license issuance when submitting construction permits prior to OM-2 code endorsement?
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 26
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 07, ARCAP Inservice Inspection and Inservice Testing
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
For plants that are factory built and scalable, it would be beneficial to only have a single IST program that is also scalable - e.g., not having to create a new update interval, Recommend to revise text to indicate 5 p. 4 and 5 testing etc... If the PRA is generic to the design, then a plant monitoring/corrective action should be done in specific program doesnt make sense as well. This would be accordance with code requirements and additional burden to licensees and NRC staff with no increase corrective action program.
in the margin of safety. They should be the same and only needed one time for those type of reactors.
The text indicates that ISI should describe the process to be followed when degradation is identified. However, the code or Recommend to revise text to indicate 6 p. 7 facility corrective action process would describe the relevant monitoring/corrective action should be done in next steps. If this information is also included here, it will accordance with code requirements and result in a satellite corrective action program with duplicative corrective action program.
information creating an error-likely situation.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 27
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 08, ARCAP Tech Specs
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Throughout all the documents of the package, there are statements that this guidance is applicable to nonLight Water Reactors (LWRs). However, all the guidance is technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to LWRs. ARCAP is supposed to be applicable for any technology (non-LWR and LWR), any licensing approach (LMP, classical, etc.), and any licensing path (CP, COL, DC etc.).
For the ARCAP guidance, industry specifically requested the Please rephrase to indicate the guidance is 1 GeneralNRC develop guidance applicable to both non-LWRs and LWR technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to SMRs, and we were informed in various meetings that this both LWR and non-LWR designs.
would be the NRCs approach. While NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 were developed specifically for advanced non-L WRs, applicants with LWR designs should also be able to use the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) methodology if they elect to do so (e.g., NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07). It would be up to the applicants to justify the use of the guidance documents and associated regulatory guides.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 28
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 08, ARCAP Tech Specs
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The text states: "RG 1.177, position 2.3.4, references the risk metrics of core damage frequency and large early release frequency based on LWRs as factors in determining completion times. Advanced reactor applicants should use other risk NRC should consider providing additional metrics, such as those described in NEI 18-04, for determining clarification about how the acceptance criteria for completion times." CDF and LERF metrics in RG 1.177 should be interpreted with respect to the NEI 18- 04 2 p. 13The NEI 18-04 approach involves direct quantification of risk integrated risk metrics. For example, should a metrics for comparison to the Quantitative Health Objectives licensee interpret the incremental conditional (QHOs): latent cancer fatalities and early fatalities. RG 1.177, core damage probability (ICCDP) metric in RG Section 2.4, "Acceptance Guidelines for Technical Specification 1.177 as directly interchangeable with an Changes," provides quantitative acceptance criteria for incremental conditional latent cancer fatality risk technical specification changes in terms of CDF and LERF. metric?
There is interest in NRC development of similar acceptance criteria for the NEI 18-04 latent cancer fatality and early fatality integrated risk metrics.
10 CFR 50.34(a)(5) requires An identification and justification for the selection of those variables, conditions, or other items which are determined as the result of preliminary safety Please provide clarification on the level of detail analysis and evaluation to be probable subjects of technical expected, based on the discussion in this draft 3 p. 13-16specifications for the facility, with special attention given to guidance, for the surveillance requirements, those items which may significantly influence the final design. design features, and administrative controls
For the surveillance requirements, design features, and sections of the PSAR TS.
administrative controls sections of the PSAR TS; what level of detail does the NRC staff expect to see in the PSAR?
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 29
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 08, ARCAP Tech Specs
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Item (8) mentions that TS are to meet 50.36, which were Please clarify whether there is a plan to minimize developed for LWRs. The draft ARCAP Roadmap DANUISG the need for lengthy and costly exemptions for all 4 p. 17202201 denotes that this regulation is applicable for non-non-LWR applicants. Either by revising 50.36 or LWRs but that in some cases, exemptions are expected to be otherwise.
taken.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 30
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 09, ARCAP Fire Protection
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Throughout all the documents of the package, there are statements that this guidance is applicable to nonLight Water Reactors (LWRs). However, all the guidance is technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to LWRs. ARCAP is supposed to be applicable for any technology (non-LWR and LWR), any licensing approach (LMP, classical, etc.), and any licensing path (CP, COL, DC etc.).
For the ARCAP guidance, industry specifically requested the Please rephrase to indicate the guidance is 1 GeneralNRC develop guidance applicable to both non-LWRs and LWR technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to SMRs, and we were informed in various meetings that this both LWR and non-LWR designs.
would be the NRCs approach. While NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 were developed specifically for advanced non-LWRs, applicants with LWR designs should also be able to use the Lice nsing Modernization Project (LMP) methodology if they elect to do so (e.g., NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07). It would be up to the applicants to justify the use of the guidance documents and associated regulatory guides.
This guidance describes the advanced reactor fire protection 2 Generalprogram as an operational program. What is the NRC Please provide a statement of what is expected expecting to see, if anything, in regards to plant fire protection for the CPA.
for the Construction Permit Application (CPA)?
No change required, just further engagements to 3 p. 5 Is the NRC willing to consider endorsing NFPA 804? explore the possibility of endorsing NFPA 804 for advanced reactors ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 31
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 09, ARCAP Fire Protection
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The guidance that a plant should have a five-man fire brigade is based on the design basis fire causing a radioactive release to the public, and the manual suppression from the fire brigade mitigates the consequences of the design basis fire.
The new ARCAP guidance continues to mention fire brigade should be addressed in the fire protection program.
Advanced reactors following the NEI 18- 04 process may Provide updated guidance or relaxation for fire 4 p. 6-11 demonstrate the fire design basis hazard levels (DBHLs) do not brigades at advanced reactors that demonstrate cause a radiation release to the public and environment that a fire cannot impact safe shutdown and cannot exceed the limits of 50.34. Therefore, is the NRC staff violate offsite dose releases in 50.34.
considering relaxing or rewording fire brigade requirements if manual suppression is not required for nuclear safety, in order to prevent exemption requests? Is the NRC considering adding to the guidance in RG 1.189 or revising the guidance in RG 1.189 to relax fire brigade requirements for advanced reactor technologies that do not require manual suppression?
The document calls for identification of Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). The term AHJ is specific to NFPA codes, 5 p. 6 in and should not be used in this document as alternative codes Replace as noted B.2.iii and standards could be used, meaning that this term would not be relevant. A generic term such as parties with responsibilities should be used instead.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 32
File: DANU-ISG-2022- 09, ARCAP Fire Protection
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
There are several fire protection related regulatory requirements that may be less relevant and/or less important to smaller SMRs or microreactors.Such requirements include:
(1) Fire protection staff training and qualification requirements Please consider including guidance related to (2) Manual fire fighting capabilities that do not rely on having a these regulatory requirements, including the kind 6 p. 8-9 fire brigade. Having some generic guidance related to how of information NRC would be looking for to meet smaller SMRs or microreactors can meet the intent of these the intent of the regulations or in exemption regulations, or the type of information NRC would be looking requests.
for in an exemption request to these requirements, would be helpful to industry. Especially as demonstrating why some of these things may not be needed would require a developer/potential licensee to prove a negative.
The document describes a monitoring program similar to that performed for NFPA 805 and for maintenance rule. The 7 p. 9 in B.11 purpose of such a program is to ensure that the risk-informed Section should be removed inputs to the fire protection program remain valid; such a monitoring program is not applicable to a non-NFPA 805 plant.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 33
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
There are statements in the draft regulatory guide that this guidance is applicable to non-Light Water Reactors (LWRs).
However, the guidance is technology-inclusive and is equally applicable to both LWRs and non-LWRs. While NEI 18- 04 and Please rephrase to indicate the guidance is 1 GeneralNEI 21-07 were developed specifically for advanced non-LWRs, technology-inclusive and is equally applicable applicants with LWR designs should also be able to use the to both LWR and non-LWR designs.
Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) methodology if they elect to do so (e.g., NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07). It would be up to the applicants to justify the use of the regulatory guide.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 34
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Delete mention of ML and SDA as a covered approach in DG-1404 p. 1, paragraph 1; p. 6, paragraph 1; and p. 11, paragraph 1.
The NRC states on page 6 that it endorses the methodology In DG-1404 Section C on p. 11, add the described in NEI 21-07, Revision 1 as one acceptable method following paragraph:
for use in developing certain portions of the SAR for an NEI 21-07 explicitly addresses several licensing application for a non-LWR CP or OL under 10 CFR Part 50, or pathways: a combined license (COL) under COL, ML, SDA, or DC under 10 CFR Part 52, with clarifications 10 CFR Part 52 Subpart C; a design and additions described below. However, NEI 21- 07, Rev. 1 certification (DC) under 10 CFR Part 52 Subpart Section A.3 does not include an ML or an SDA in its scope. B; and a two-step license (CP/OL) under 10 2 GeneralAlso, the NRC provides no additional guidance for how an CFR Part 50. Applicants using licensing applicant would address an ML or an SDA. It is noted that pathways other than those explicitly covered in industry expects ML or SDA guidance to be very similar to that NEI 21-07 should base the SAR content on the of a DC. licensing pathway covered by NEI 21-07 and
NRC should provide guidance on how the additional licensing most similar to the approach they are using.
pathways should be covered, i.e., the ML and SDA which are Applicants seeking a manufacturing license not explicitly addressed by NEI 21 -07, Rev. 1. (ML) under 10 CFR Part 52 Subpart F or standard design approval (SDA) under 10 CFR Part 52 Subpart E should start with the guidance for a DC and make appropriate modifications. It will be up to the applicant to justify the guidance as applied.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 35
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Please add text similar to the following:
As noted in NEI 21- 07 and DG-1404, the application should For an ML application the site description address the site description. However, for an ML, this is not should describe the site characteristics as they 3 Section 2 possible. Rather, site related information can only be provided affect the design, e.g., a site parameter in terms of postulated site parameters. Text should be added envelope. Other site characteristics are left to to this effect. the COL applicant to provide as well the site-specific information necessary to demonstrate that site characteristics fit within the plant parameter envelope.
Please add text similar to the following:
For an ML application, only those items For an ML application, only those items specified in C.2.e that identified in C.2.e (1) and (3) that are relevant 4 Section 2, C.2.ewould impact the design or its manufacture should be included. to the design or manufacture of the reactor The other items should be included in the COLA. need to be included. However, the RGs applicable to the design as noted in (2) should be included in the ML application. All other information identified in (1) and (3) is left to the COL applicant to provide.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 36
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Please add text similar to the following:
The site discussion in Section 3 is relevant to an OL or COL, ML applicants should address methodologies but the ML applicant cannot address site-specific information. A and analyses specific to the design and 5 Section 3 caveat should be added that makes clear the ML applicant manufacture of the reactor. All other need only address information directly related to the design, information, including site evaluations that leaving site-related information and analyses to the COL cannot reasonably be addressed through a applicant. plant parameter approach, are left to the COL
applicant.
Although ML applicants may identify and provide relevant information on design features that may be useful to applicants Please add text similar to the following to to address the requirements for aircraft impact assessments or C.4.c:
mitigation of beyonddesignbasis events, ML applicants do not 6 Section 4, need to address these requirements. Instead, a COL or CP/OL ML applicants do not need to address aircraft C.4.c applicant referencing an ML should address these topics. impact assessments or mitigation of beyond-
For an ML applicant, the additional material noted in C.4.c (1) design-basis events. A COL applicant Aircraft impact assessments and (2) Mitigation of beyond referencing an ML should address these topics.
design-basis events should be left to the COLA.
It is generally not possible for an ML applicant to perform the Please add text similar to the following to Integrated Evaluations. The evaluations of Chapter 5 should be Chapter 5:
7 Section 5 left to the COL applicant. The exception is evaluation of An ML applicant need only address DID defense-in-depth adequacy that is specific to design attributes adequacy in terms of plant capability. All other for the manufactured reactor. Other aspects of the DID information required under Chapter 5 is left to adequacy should be left to the COL applicant. the COL applicant.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 37
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Please add text to C.6.a (1), after the first sentence:
The PDC relevant to an ML do not include construction nor all ML applicants need only propose PDC to 8 Section 6, aspects of testing since some of the testing is relevant to the establish necessary design, fabrication and C.6.a (1) installed manufactured reactor. performance requirements. PDC relevant to testing as part of the manufacturing process should also be included. However, a COL applicant should include all of the PDC in their SAR.
ML applicants, similar to CP applicants, can only address Plant Please revise the penultimate sentence in the 9 Section 9 Programs to the extent that they are needed to implement first paragraph under Section 9 to read:
special treatments and meet reliability and performance targets "Construction permit and Manufacturing for SR SSCs and NSRST SSCs. License applications."
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 38
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
On p. 6, change the penultimate sentence of the first paragraph to read The technology inclusive methodology of NEI 21- 07, Revision 1, provides a common approach to the The penultimate sentence of the first paragraph on p. 6 does development of those portions of the SAR that not appropriately capture the scope of NEI 21-07. TICAP is address the implementation of the Licensing much broader than describing the scope and level of detail Modernization Plan (LMP) methodology as for the fundamental safety functions of a design necessary for described in NEI 18- 04, Revision 1, and 10 p. 6-7 developing the safety analysis for the design. Similarly, the endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide first sentence of the fifth full paragraph of p. 7 is too narrow in 1.233. On p. 7, change the first two sentences its description of TICAP; NEI 21-07 goes well beyond of the fifth full paragraph to the following addressing "the portions of the SAR that describe the single sentence: "TICAP is an industry-led fundamental safety functions of the design." It is important to guidance activity focused on the scope and explicitly tie NEI 21-07 back to NEI 18-04. depth of information to include in the portions of the SAR that address the implementation of the LMP methodology as described in NEI 18-04, Revision 1, and endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.233."
11 p. 7 Typo in 4th full paragraph. "...an SAR that includes..." should be " a SAR that included..." Please change as noted.
The last sentence in the 4th full paragraph is confusing. It Please change to " a complete non-LWR mentions " a SAR that includes technical specifications, an application should include, among other things, 12 p. 7 emergency plan, and other information such as physical a SAR, proposed technical specifications, an security plans." Technical specifications are technically part of emergency plan, and other information such as the license, not the SAR. The other documents a re typically physical security plans."
submitted separately, not as part of the SAR.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 39
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Addition C.2.b is unnecessary. NEI 21-07, Sections A.1 and A.3, make it amply clear that the information addressed in NEI 21 -
13 p. 12-1307, Rev 1, is not the totality of the information required of the Please delete Addition C.2.b.
applicant. Moreover, the ARCAP Roadmap ISG reinforces the point. It is simply not credible that an applicant would be unclear on this point.
Addition C.2.c is unnecessary. It provides guidance to " non-LWR applicants pursuing a CP under 10 CFR Part 50 using a risk-informed, performance-based approach other than the LMP " Such an applicant is clearly beyond the scope of NEI 14 p. 13 21-07, which was developed for applicants using LMP (see NEI Please delete Addition C.2.c.
21-07 Section A). It does not make sense for a regulatory guide endorsing NEI 21-07 to also attempt to address all possible deviations from NEI 21-07. NEI 21-07 Section C.1.3.1 places the onus on the applicant which deviates from NEI 18 -
04 to address and justify those deviations.
Addition C.2.d is unnecessarily prescriptive. Industry does not Please add the following to C.2.d: "
15 p. 13 contest the requirement for providing the information, but radioactive materials either along with the would like the flexibility of putting it in Chapter 2 if more intended use of the reactor in Chapter 1 or in appropriate for a particular applicant. Chapter 2."
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 40
Industry has concerns with both the letter and the spirit of Addition C.2.e, which would levy substantial documentation requirements that are largely not applicable to non-LWRs, thereby complicating the development of an application and the subsequent staff review. With respect to Item (1), generic safety issues, unresolved safety issues, and TMI action items are largely LWR-centric and not applicable to advanced non-LWRs; there should be no presumption to the contrary. There is no regulatory requirement that applicants address LWR GSIs and USIs in the SAR. The regulatory requirement to address Please delete Addition C.2.e. However, if the TMI requirements in 10 CFR 50.34(f) is applicable only to addition is retained, to the extent the NRC uses LWRs. 10 CFR 52.47(a)(8) invokes most of the TMI terms like technically relevant and directly requirements in 10 CFR 50.34(f) to the extent they are applicable to the design, clarify that the NRC technically relevant. This term, as well as the terms does not presume applicability of LWR "technically applicable to the design" and directly applicable to regulatory guidance to non-LWRs following the 16 p. 13 the design used in DG-1404 Addition C.2.3, are undefined and NEI 18-04 methodology.Furthermore, if the subjective, and will be fertile ground for interpretation NRC insists that applicants provide lists of disagreements between applicant and regulator. At most, the documents in Chapter 1 (e.g., regulatory TMI requirements should be applied only to Part 52 applicants. guides and/or codes and standards), make it NRC expectations from LWR licensing experience should not be clear that those lists are simply catalogs of applied blindly to advanced reactors following NEI 18-04 material addressed elsewhere in the SAR.
guidance. In fact, applying LWR GSIs, USIs, and TMI action requirements to non-LWR advanced reactors stands the concept of risk-informed, performance-based regulation on its head. It adds an unnecessary backward-looking deterministic framework on top of the systematic evaluation of safety provided by NEI 18-04.With respect to Item (2), regulatory guides are not regulatory requirements and most were developed for light water reactors. There should be no presumption that regulatory guides are to be applied to non-LWRs, and the NRC should be clear on that point in its ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 41
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
guidance. The NEI 18-04 approach to demonstrating safety is not centered around a deterministic checklist approach of following prescriptive guidance. If the NRC insists on including a requirement that the applicant catalog items like reg guides in Chapter 1 of the SAR, that guidance should make it clear that the Chapter 1 material is simply a list of items included by the applicant in subsequent sections of the SAR. The discussion relative to Item 3 (codes and standards) is similar. Codes and standards will be addressed in appropriate sections of the SAR.
If the NRC insists on including lists of codes and standards in Chapter 1 of the SAR, it should be with the understanding that any substantive information is reserved for later chapters.
Paragraph 5 states The NRC staff notes that additional guidance is being considered for development that would supplement the guidance in RG 1.247. Appendix A of this document identifies guidance that is being considered for development that could result in a revision of this Draft RG.
17 p. 14 These sentences are speculative and do not provide useful Please delete sentences 2 and 3 of paragraph guidance to an applicant. Appendix A stands on its own and 5.
does not need specific mention with respect to the PRA. In the interest of removing superfluous and unnecessary material, these sentences should be deleted. If additional guidance is promulgated and deserves mention in a particular reg guide, that reg guide may be revised at the appropriate time.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 42
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Clarification C.3.a is not necessary. It addresses separate licensing documents that are incorporated by reference in the SAR, and states that NEI 21- 07, Rev. 1, does not address them. In fact, NEI 21-07 does address them thoroughly in Section B.3, which includes a reference to NEI 98- 03, Rev. 1, 18 p. 15 for additional information. Please delete Clarification C.3.a.
Moreover, this clarification should not be specific to Section C.2 of NEI 21-07. If the clarification was actually needed, it should be applied generically to the entire SAR. However, as noted above, it is not needed because NEI 21-07 Section B.3 already addresses the issue generically for the entire SAR.
Clarification C.3.c(2) (i.e., Option 2) uses undefined terms "bounding DBA" and "bounding BDBE." It also refers to the Please provide additional clarity on the 19 p. 15-16bounding DBA (presumably there is one bounding DBA) and meaning and use of the terms.
a bounding BDBE, which implies there are more than one bounding BDBE.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 43
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
In Addition C.3.c the staff provides two options for demonstrating the facility meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1)(ii)(D) or 10 CFR 52.79(a)(1)(vi) and the PDC for the control room (if applicable); however, it does not appear that these two options are the totality of options with respect to the staffs expectations for an assumed major accident.
Given the design of the plant and its safety features, when using the NEI 18-04 approach there may be no DBA or BDBE that would be considered a major accident due to lack of fuel Please revise the text to allow for Option 3 and 20 p. 15-16damage or release. In this case, is it the NRC's expectation that clarify that applicants are free to propose the applicant must request an exemption in accordance with approaches other than the stated options.
Option 1? Could an alternate approach (Option 3) be pursued by postulating a specific event only for the purposes of satisfying the major accident definition? It would appear this approach would satisfy regulations, but this is not provided as an option in DG-1404.
There may be other alternatives as well, and the guidance should not foreclose them. The current wording ( the applicant has two options ) seems to indicate the applicant must choose either Option 1 or Option 2.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 44
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
There is a nuance associated with Addition C.3.d. Industry Please insert the new penultimate sentence in agrees with the addition of "Identification of the sources of the addition as shown below."It is noted that radionuclides addressed and the sources of radionuclides that sources outside the scope of the CP PRA and 21 p. 16 were screened out" to the items from the Section C.2.1.1 list therefore not listed in the PSAR may then that should be addressed in a CP application. The nuance is become part of the PRA scope, and at that that excluding items from the scope of the CP PRA is not the point they may or may not be screened out for same as screening them out. Some sources may be excluded the purposes of the OL PRA description. As at the CP stage but included later. noted above..."
Clarification C.3.e is unnecessary. The NEI 21-07 guidance makes it clear that the description of the PRA in the PSAR goes beyond the "simple statement." NEI 21- 07 states the "simple statement" applies only to the eventual qualification of the PRA at the OL stage, and not to the totality of PRA -related documentation for the PSAR. NEI 21- 07 goes on to address 22 p. 17 clearly what documentation is needed (beyond the simple Please delete Clarification C.3.e.
statement) for the CP. The NEI 21-07 guidance states "In either case, the applicant should..." so there is no ambiguity.
In fact, the NRC states in its clarification "As noted in NEI 21 -
07..." The existing guidance in NEI 21-07 already addresses peer review and CP documentation - no further clarification is needed related to the simple statement.
Clarification C.3.f is unnecessary. The "Note" is clearly part of, and applies to, the main section of NEI 21-07 C.2.1.1, which is 23 p. 17 the baseline guidance for a Part 50 operating license and a Part Please delete Clarification C.3.f.
52 combined license. Obviously, the note does not apply to the section below it, which addresses CP content.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 45
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The information in numbered items (1), (2), and (3) under Addition C.3.g is a restatement of material in NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 and it is not clear why it needs to be restated in the regulatory guide.
Please address the issues raised in the 24 p. 17 Similarly, the first sentence of the last paragraph is a comment as noted, i.e., remove the numbered restatement of NEI 18-04 information and is not needed in the items and delete the first sentence of the last regulatory guide. Moreover, the statement in the sentence that paragraph.
special treatments will be determined by an integrated design process panel (IDPP) is not an accurate depiction of the NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 text. NEI 18-04 allows for IDPPs but does not mandate them.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 46
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Addition C.3.h is unnecessary and overreaching. First, the term analysis and calculation methodologies is not clearly defined.
It could refer to anything that involves a calculation. The SAR is not the compendium of all analyses and calculations related to a nuclear power plant, but this additional guidance in DG-1404 could be interpreted that way. It should be noted that NEI 21-07 already contemplates SAR Chapter 2 as a home for analyses such as site related information and analyses used to develop the design basis hazards levels (DBHLs) (see last paragraph of C.2 introduction on NEI 21- 07). Moreover, the NRC addition was not discussed during the extensive 25 p. 17 interactions preceding the submittal of NEI 21- 07. It defeats Please delete Addition C.3.h.
the purpose of SAR Chapter 2 as intended in NEI 21 -07. SAR Chapter 2 was never intended to be the mandatory home of all analyses and calculation methodologies. Industry intended Chapter 2 primarily as a repository of convenience for cross-cutting information or evaluations (see first paragraph of the C.2 introduction on NEI 21-07). This concept was clearly communicated to the NRC, and the NRC raised no objection at the time. If retained and followed, Addition C.3.h would prevent applicants from describing analyses for a particular design basis accident (not repeated elsewhere) where it most logically belongs - i.e., in SAR Chapter 3, with the DBA description.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 47
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The introductory section of addition and clarification C.4.a is confusing and does not provide clear guidance. It is counter to the discussions in 2021 and 2022 about documenting dose calculations performed in the PRA. NEI 21-07 contained modifications to Section C.2.1.1 intended to address the NRC's desire to see documentation of the PRA methodology for 26 p. 18 calculating doses associated with anticipated operational Please delete Addition and Clarification C.4.a.
occurrences (AOOs), design basis events (DBEs), and beyond design basis events (BDBEs). In fact, Clarification C.4.b states that the guidance in C.2.1.1 is adequate for the purpose - so why is Clarification C.4.a needed at all? If the applicant's information provided in SAR Chapter 2 on this aspect of the PRA is not adequate, it should be addressed in the review of that applicants application, not in this guidance.
C.4.a(1) is not clear. What "supporting data" is desired here?
It's not clear what information is being requested and whether that information would already be reviewed during a PRA audit.
Can the NRC provide any specific examples of what is sought or provide the analogous information for a LWR SAR? The 27 p. 18 intent of the modifications provided in NEI 21- 07, Rev. 1 to Please delete Addition and Clarification C.2.1.1 was to spell out the necessary and sufficient C.4.a(1).
information. Clarification C.4.b indicates that NEI 21-07 subsection C.2.1.1 is adequate which conflicts with this Addition and Clarification C.4.a(1). Moreover, SAR Chapter 3 is not the appropriate place to address quantitative health objectives (QHOs). They are covered in SAR Chapter 4.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 48
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Clarifications C.4.a(2), C.4.a(3), and C.4.a(4) are all unnecessary.
With respect to AOOs, the guidance in Section C.3.3.1 states The following information should be provided for any AOO with a release. A bulleted list follows. There is no possible interpretation that the information is not required. However, the NRC clarification is that all of the information be provided.
The clarification is completely unnecessary. Delete Clarifications C.4.a(2), C.4.a(3), and 28 p. 19 C.4.a(4).
With respect to DBEs and BDBEs, the same logic applies. The words in Section C.3.4.1 states for DBEs: For the most limiting DBE that was used to map into each DBA... the following information should be provided. The NRC clarification that...
all of the information... should be provided is superfluous and unnecessary. Similarly, the words in Section C.3.5.1 for BDBEs are The information below should be provided for any high consequence BDBEs... The NRCs admonishment that all of the information... should be provided is again unnecessary.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 49
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Regarding Clarification C.4.b, industry does not agree that the second-to-last paragraph in each of NEI 21- 07 Sections C.3.3.1, C.3.4.1, and C.3.5.1 conflicts with the guidance in NEI 21-07 Section C.2.1.1 on the level of detail in the SAR for AOOs, DBEs, and BDBEs respectively. Industry agrees with the NRC statement in Clarification C.4.b Section C.2.1.1 contains adequate guidance on the level of detail in the SAR to describe non-DBA LBEs. However, industry does not agree that the statement is needed as a clarification in the reg guide.
29 p. 19 By definition, the guidance is adequate and there is no need to Please delete Clarification C.4.b.
add such statements on the validity of NEI 21-07 SAR Chapter 2 guidance, particularly in NEI 21- 07 guidance for SAR Chapter
- 3. Regarding the remainder of the clarification, it is essentially equivalent to the guidance that is already in NEI 21- 07 Section C.3.3.1 paragraph 3 on event-specific information, so it is not needed. Note: The industry assumes that the NRCs reference to the second-to-last paragraph in NEI 21 -07 Section C.3.1.1 was actually intended to be to the 4th from last paragraph which begins For AOOs that involve a 30-day EAB dose ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 50
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Modify C.4.c to read:
Industry understands that NRC wishes to include certain information related to deterministic events and requirements in Addition: In addition to the material identified SAR Chapter 3. Industry is amenable to that approach but in NEI 21-07, Revision 1, Section C.3 Chapter 3 30 p. 19 would like to ensure the events are clearly delineated as of the SAR should also discuss the following separate from licensing basis events (AOO, DBEs, BDBEs, and that is derived by following the methodology of DBAs) as defined in NEI 18-04. Therefore, it would be most NEI 18-04, the applicant should address certain appropriate to put that information in a new Section 3.7, deterministic events and requirements in a new Special Event Analyses, in SAR Chapter 3. SAR Section 3.7, Special Event Analyses, as described below:
The guidance provided for aircraft impact assessments Please place the aircraft impact assessment
[C.4.c(1)] is somewhat redundant to guidance provided in the guidance from the ARCAP Roadmap into one draft ARCAP Roadmap DANUISG202201 (p. 39 of 56). The location - either the ARCAP Roadmap or 31 p. 19ARCAP Roadmap guidance is more thorough and should be DG-1404. Delete the aircraft impact used, but DG-1404 may be the more appropriate location. assessment guidance from the other location Guidance should be provided in one document, not in multiple so the guidance is not spread among multiple documents with different content in each. documents.
Addition C.4.c(2) addresses mitigation of specific beyond After the last bullet, please add words to the design basis events per 10 CFR 50.155. Industry requests NRC effect of Applicants that are not requesting 32 p. 19-20include in this addition a note that the information is not design finality for mitigation of beyond design required at the CP stage unless the applicant is requesting basis events are not required to provide any design finality. information on the topic at the CP stage.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 51
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
NRC Addition C.5.a pertaining to defense-in-depth (DID) is not clear and it does not appear to be necessary, as discussed below. (1) The first two sentences are essentially quotes from NEI 21-07 and are therefore not needed. (2) The next two sentences state The CP application should provide a discussion in the SAR to establish DID adequacy. A discussion in the SAR to implement the DID adequacy assessment processes in RG 1.233 is considered acceptable for this purpose. Regarding the first of the two sentences, a discussion cannot establish DID adequacy, so industry believes the NRC may have intended to say should provide a discussion of the approach to establishing DID adequacy.
Moreover, the approach to establishing DID adequacy is 33 p. 21 already documented in NEI 18-04 and does not need to be Please delete Addition C.5.a.
repeated. Regarding the second of the two sentences, it appears the NRC is soliciting a commitment on the part of the applicant to follow the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.233 for DID. This is not necessary, because NEI 21-07 subsection C.1.3.1 already requires the applicant to identify departures from NEI 18-04 and RG 1.233, and describe them in more detail in the appropriate section, which for DID is SAR Section 4.2.c) The remaining sentences address the situation in which the applicant does not intend to follow RG 1.233, and would then require an explanation of how the applicant intends to address DID. As noted above, this is already a requirement of NEI 21-07, and it does not need restatement in the regulatory guide.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 52
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Addition C.5.b requests detailed information underpinning the PRA calculations addressing QHOs in SAR Section 4.1. Industry believes the guidance goes well beyond what is needed for a SAR. The PRA methods would be addressed in the PRA peer review, and the detailed information would be available for NRC to inspect in an audit.Furthermore, it is not clear NRC appreciates the scope of this requirement. The requests are quite broad - e.g., (5) key modeling assumptions. Because these are integrated analyses, the requirements pertain to each and every PRA realization that involves an offsite dose.
Another specific concern is (8) uncertainty/sensitivity analysis 34 p. 21-22performed. No definition is provided as to what is intended. Please delete Addition C.5.b.
Depending on the interpretation, the amount of information required to satisfy this desire for each and every part of the integrated analyses could be huge. The approach prescribed in NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 is to rely on conformance with the non-LWR PRA Standard, provide general descriptive PRA information in the SAR, and encourage regulatory audits to address details of the analyses if necessary. Literal compliance with the expectations laid out by the NRC in Addition C.5.b could result in levels of detail on the order of those seen in SAR Chapter 19 of advanced light water reactors licensed under Part 52 - a level of detail which, it was thought, all parties agreed was excessive and inappropriate.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 53
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Addition C.5.c is unnecessary and, at the very least, inappropriate for SAR Chapter 4. Per discussions between industry and the NRC, human factors are to be addressed in SAR Chapters 6 and 7, in conjunction with the associated SSCs, and in SAR Chapter 11 per ARCAP. Appropriate guidance is already provided for HFE in other SAR chapters.
35 p. 22 Please delete Addition C.5.c.
Moreover, this proposed addition does not provide clear and actionable guidance for an applicant. It is more of a "kitchen sink" approach of "tell me everything about human factors."
Such guidance is not consistent with the goal of focused, transparent, risk-informed guidance; it is more in line with a business as usual LWR approach.
Addition C.5.d would require that the applicant provide a change control process for DID in the SAR. This requirement is Please delete Addition C.5.d.
inappropriate for a SAR, and there is no precedent for it.
36 p. 22 Change control is an operational issue. Moreover, industry is Additionally, consider adding NEI 22-05 to the working with the NRC on change control for licensees who list of guidance being developed in Appendix A followed NEI 18-04. Specifically, the Technology Inclusive Risk of the NRC Reg Guide.
Informed Change Evaluation (TIRICE) Project and draft NEI Guidance Document NEI 22-05 should address the issue.
Addition C.6.a(1) provides a discussion of PDC. However, it is Please delete Addition C.6.a(1) or clarify what 37 p. 22-23not clear that the discussion includes any new guidance that is is actually new guidance.
not already provided in NEI 21-07.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 54
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Clarification C.6.a(2) discusses the "two-tiered" approach to 38 p. 23 PDC provided in NEI 21-07. However, it is not clear what part Please delete Clarification C.6.a(2) or clarify of the discussion is actually clarifying; it seems instead to be an what is actually being clarified.
endorsement of the approach.
Addition C.6.a(3) addresses alternative approaches to PDC and Please delete Addition C.6.a(3) or clarify what 39 p. 23 potential exemption requests. The material seems largely to be is actually new guidance.
covered by NEI 21-07 Section C.5.3.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 55
Addition C.6.b addresses fuel qualification. Industry considers this additional guidance to be unnecessary and, as propo sed, inappropriate, and counter-productive. Industry also notes that this addition raises an issue that was never discussed at any significant level of detail during industry-NRC interactions prior to submittal for endorsement. The issue was essentially absent from the NRCs draft additions, clarifications, and exceptions that formed the basis for detailed interactions during the fall and winter of 2021, prior to submittal of NEI 21- 07, Rev. 1 for endorsement.
First, fuel qualification should essentially be done at the time of a license application, with the possible exception of some confirmatory items. The emphasis for fuel qualification should be during pre-application interactions as is discussed in DANU-40 p. 23 ISG-2022-01, Appendix A. The NRC proposal to address fuel Please delete Addition C.6.b.
qualification expectations in the SAR, as reflected in this proposed addition, is wholly out of sequence and unnecessary, and it detracts from the guidance overall.
Second, the document states The reactor core and its fuel are generally classified as SR as if that point justifies this special deterministic carve out of SAR documentation requirements for fuel. It does not. NEI 18-04 provides a systematic means of identifying safety related structures, systems, and components, based on the approach taken to satisfy Required Safety Functions. Provisions are already in place to address safety-related SSCs in SAR Chapter 6. It is certainly expected that fuel performance will be particularly important to some advanced reactor designs, and if so the SAR documentation related to fuel will be more extensive than other SSCs, but there is no ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 56
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Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
need to arbitrarily address fuel in a special way as proposed in the text.
Third, there is no rationale for addressing fuel qualification in SAR Chapter 5, as proposed herein. SAR Chapter 5 covers safety functions, design criteria, and SSC classification, but the document proposes to use it as a repository for additional information on one particular SSC (fuel).
Fourth, the last two paragraphs of the "addition" are written like guidance for the staff, not for an applicant. If such staff guidance were needed, NRC should place such guidance in an ISG, not in a regulatory guide with the stated primary purpose of providing guidance to applicants.
In summary, the approach taken by the NRC to fuel qualification is quite troubling to industry. Placing unnecessary special emphasis on certain SSCs is not technology-inclusive, and it detracts from the logical and systematic sequencing of NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 to do so. SAR Chapter 5 progresses in a step-wise, logical manner until it hits the rock of unnecessary and inappropriate fuel qualification guidance. This approach should be reconsidered.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 57
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The last two sentences of the first paragraph of DG-1404 Section 7 are confusing and do not convey appropriate guidance to the applicant. The penultimate sentence requests a discussion of how the applicant intends to confirm, at the OL stage, that the reliability and capability performance targets assumed in the PRA have been met. NEI 21- 07, Section C.6.2 already addresses reliability and capability targets, including Please delete the last two sentences of the first 41 p. 24 plant programs used to maintain them. Moreover, Section paragraph of DG-1404 Section 7.
C.6.2 makes it clear that reliability and capability targets are not "assumed in the PRA" as stated by DG-1404, but instead informed by PRA information. The last sentence of the first paragraph in DG-1404 Section 7 is confusing because it convolves inappropriately special treatments with testing and validation. Testing and validation are types of special treatments.
The second paragraph of DG-1404 Section 7 is not necessary and it conveys inaccurate information. The LBE selection process is addressed in SAR Chapter 3, not SAR Chapter 2. The LBE selection process does not determine the Required Safety Please delete the second paragraph of DG-42 p. 24 Functions. Footnote 10 also contains the inaccuracy 1404 Section 7 and the associated footnote 10.
"determined in the LBE selection process" and it is mostly a rehash of some elements of the NEI 18- 04 methodology. In total, the paragraph and the footnote provide no useful guidance to an applicant.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 58
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Paragraphs 3-5 of DG-1404 Section 7 repeat information from Please delete paragraphs 3-5 of DG-1404 43 p. 25NEI 21-07 and NEI 18-04. It is not clear what purpose the Section 7.
information serves in DG-1404.
The first sentence of the sixth (last) paragraph of DG-1404 Section 7 states "Chapter 6 also establishes the DBHLs associated with NSRST SSCs and SSCs that are non-safety related with no special treatment (NST)." The sentence could be taken to imply there are different DBHLs associated with safety-related SSCs, which is not the case. A DBHL is a DBHL.
The second sentence states "The design requirements for 44 p. 25 NSRST and NST SSCs are determined by the need to protect Please delete the sixth (i.e., last) paragraph of SR SSCs in the performance of their RSFs from adverse effects DG-1404 Section 7.
from the failure of NSRST or NST SSCs during and after DBEs."
In fact, that is only one source of design requirements for NSRST and NST SSCs. Moreover, NSRST SSCs could have special treatments associated with DBHLs but not connected with a need to protect SR SSCs. The discussion in NEI 21-07 is already adequate in this area, and the additions in this paragraph in DG-1404 are confusing.
45 p. 25 Clarification and Addition C.7.a is unnecessary. The guidance is already provided in NEI 21- 07 Section C.6.1.1. Please delete Clarification and Addition C.7.a.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 59
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Related to Clarification and Addition C.7.a, there appears to be an inconsistency between the guidance in NEI 21- 07 and DG-1404, compared to DANU-ISG-2022-01 (ARCAP Roadmap).
Pages 12-13 of the ARCAP roadmap indicate that the 46 p. 25 information related to translation of DBHLs to loads (and Please review and resolve the discrepancy.
evaluation of those loads) would be placed in SAR Chapters 5 and 6, while NEI 21- 07 and DG-1404 would put that information in Chapter 2 or in external reports referenced in the SAR.
There is an inconsistency between Footnote 12 in C.7.b(1) and 47 p. 26 the actual footnote at the bottom of the page, which is labeled Please fix the footnote numbering.
Footnote 11.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 60
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Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Addition C.7.b(1) is unnecessary and inappropriate. The addition would put special requirements on certain safety-related SSCs based on what is apparently an arbitrary factor -
they are safety-related instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. The additional requirements are not appropriate as the NEI 21-07 guidance already requires that special treatments be listed for all safety-related SSCs. The proposed text would include a special requirement to "describe the 48 p. 26 special treatments" and "analyze their capability to perform Please delete Addition C.7.b(1) their credited safety functions" (presumably "their" refers to the I&C systems, not the special treatments). No justification is provided for this additional and burdensome SAR documentation requirement, nor why it is being applied to I&C.
This type of information would be available in the design records and available for audit, if needed.This requirement is entirely new and was never discussed as part of the extensive discussions that took place between industry and NRC prior to the submittal of NEI 21- 07 Revision 1 for endorsement.
Addition C.7.b(2) is unnecessary and inappropriate. The addition imposes an additional SAR documentation requirement to justify the use of codes and standards. This r equirement 49 p. 26 goes beyond standard practice for light water reactors. Please delete Addition C.7.b(2)
Moreover, it was never proposed by the NRC during the extensive discussions that took place between industry and NRC concerning NEI 21- 07.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 61
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The last two sentences of the first paragraph of DG-1404 Section 8 are confusing and do not convey appropriate guidance to the applicant.
The penultimate sentence requests a discussion of how the applicant intends to confirm, at the OL stage, that the reliability and capability performance targets have been met. NEI 21-07 Section C.6.2 already addresses reliability and capability targets, including plant programs used to maintain them. It is Please delete the last two sentences of the first 50 p. 26 not envisioned that all targets be fully confirmed at the CP paragraph of DG-1404 Section 8.
stage, or even provided on a preliminary basis. The penultimate sentence could be interpreted as meaning that the applicant must provide an SSC by SSC discussion of each target at the CP stage, which we hope was not the intention.
The last sentence of the first paragraph in DG-1404 Section 8 is confusing because it convolves inappropriately special treatments with testing and validation. Testing and validation are types of special treatments.
51 p. 26 The second paragraph of DG-1404 Section 8 is not necessary Please delete the second paragraph of DG-and does not relate to the rest of Section 8. 1404 Section 8.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 62
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
Addition C.8.a(1) is unnecessary and inappropriate. The addition would put special requirements on certain NSRST SSCs based on what is apparently an arbitrary factor - they are I&C systems. The additional requirements are not appropriate as the NEI 21-07 guidance already requires that special treatments be identified for all NSRST SSCs. The text would include a special requirement to describe the special 52 p. 27 treatments and analyze their capability to perform their Please delete Addition C.8.a(1) credited safety functions (presumably their refers to the I&C systems, not the special treatments). No justification is provided for this additional SAR documentation requirement, nor why it is being applied to I&C. This NRC requirement is entirely new and was never discussed as part of the extensive discussions that took place between industry and NRC prior to the submittal of NEI 21- 07 Revision 1 for endorsement.
ARCAP/TICAP Comment Table Page 63
File: DG-1404, TICAP Reg Guide
Comment # Location Comment Proposed Change
The last two sentences of paragraph 1 of DG-1404 Section 9 are not necessary. Guidance for CP applications for Plant Programs is provided on NEI 21-07 and is adequate for the purpose.
The penultimate sentence of the DG-1404 Section 9 paragraph 1 is unclear. Is the NRC seeking some kind of commitment at the CP stage to develop certain programs? If so, it should state Please delete the last two sentences of 53 p. 27 that point directly, not ask for a "discussion." There seems to paragraph 1 of DG-1404 Section 9 or clarify the be no basis for the need for a commitment of that type. NEI intent.
21-07 Section C.8 already provides ample guidance on what is needed in the SAR associated with the operating license application.
If the NRC considers that an addition to the guidance is necessary (a position with which industry does not agree), NRC should call it out specifically as an addition and justify it.
54 p. 31 The ADAMS accession number for Reference 14 should be ML102510405 not ML1025210405. Please correct the ADAMS accession number.
SMR, LLC. A Holtec International Company Krishna P. Singh Technology Campus,1 Holtec Blvd., Camden, NJ 08104 Telephone (856) 797-0900 Fax (856) 797-0909
August 10, 2023
Steven T. Lynch, Chief, Advanced Reactor Policy Branch, Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
SMR, LLC Comment on DANU-ISG-2022-01; Docket ID NRC-2022-0074
SMR, LLC (SMR), a wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec International, appreciates the opportunity to publicly comment on the DANU-ISG-2022-01 draft interim staff guidance Review of Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Advanced Reactors Applications-Roadmap issued in May 2023. This comment focuses on the extent of transient and accident analysis methodologies and the underpinning code validation and verification required in a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) for a construction permit application (CPA). The relevant regulations within 10 CFR 50 appear to be as follows:
10 CFR 50.34(a), which states, in part [emphasis added]:
(a) Preliminary safety analysis report. Each application for a construction permit shall include a preliminary safety analysis report. The minimum information to be included shall consist of the following:
(4) A preliminary analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components of the facility with the objective of assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility and including determination of the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the facility, and the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the prevention of accidents and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents.
Analysis and evaluation of ECCS cooling performance and the need for high point vents following postulated loss-of-coolant accidents must be performed in accordance with the requirements of § 50.46 and § 50.46a of this part for facilities for which construction permits may be issued after December 28, 1974.
10 CFR 50.46(a)(1), which states [emphasis added]:
(a)(1)(i) Each boiling or pressurized light-water nuclear power reactor fueled with uranium oxide pellets within cylindrical zircaloy or ZIRLO cladding must be provided with an emergency core cooling system (ECCS) that must be designed so that its calculated cooling performance following postulated loss-of-coolant accidents conforms to the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of this section. ECCS cooling performance must be calculated in accordance with an acceptable evaluation model and must be calculated for a number of postulated loss-of-coolant accidents of different sizes, locations, and other properties sufficient to provide assurance that the most severe postulated loss-of-coolant accidents are calculated. Except as provided in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, the
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SMR, LLC. A Holtec International Company Krishna P. Singh Technology Campus,1 Holtec Blvd., Camden, NJ 08104 Telephone (856) 797-0900 Fax (856) 797-0909
evaluation model must include sufficient supporting justification to show that the analytical technique realistically describes the behavior of the reactor system during a loss-of-coolant accident. Comparisons to applicable experimental data must be made and uncertainties in the analysis method and inputs must be identified and assessed so that the uncertainty in the calculated results can be estimated. This uncertainty must be accounted for, so that, when the calculated ECCS cooling performance is compared to the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of this section, there is a high level of probability that the criteria would not be exceeded. Appendix K, Part II Required Documentation, sets forth the documentation requirements for each evaluation model. This section does not apply to a nuclear power reactor facility for which the certifications required under
§ 50.82(a)(1) have been submitted.
(ii) Alternatively, an ECCS evaluation model may be developed in conformance with the required and acceptable features of appendix K ECCS Evaluation Models.
10 CFR Appendix K, II. Required Documentation, which states, in part:
- 5. General Standards for AcceptabilityElements of evaluation models reviewed will include technical adequacy of the calculational methods, including: For models covered by § 50.46(a)(1)(ii), compliance with required features of section I of this Appendix K; and, for models covered by § 50.46(a)(1)(i), assurance of a high level of probability that the performance criteria of § 50.46(b) would not be exceeded.
DANU-ISG-2022-01 was developed as part of the Advanced Reactor Content of Applications Project (ARCAP). Per the NRC ARCAP webpage, The purpose of the
[ARCAP] is to develop technology-inclusive, risk-informed and performance-based guidance. SMR understands this effort was initiated to develop guidance for non-light water reactor (non-LWR) applications. However, SMR believes that technology-inclusive guidance is also intended to apply to LWRs.
Appendix C of DANU-ISG-2022-01, which provides construction permit (CP) guidance, provides two portions of guidance. The first, which is stated as applicable to both LWRs and non-LWRs, directly incorporates portions of DRNL-ISG-2022-01 Safety Review of Light-Water Power-Reactor Construction Permit Applications issued in October 2022. The second, which is stated as only applicable to non-LWRs, details new guidance. Of particular interest in the second section of DANU-ISG-2022-01 Appendix C is the discussion on Safety and Accident Analysis Methodologies and Associated Validation, which states:
Construction permit applicants should develop and execute plans to perform safety and accident analyses that include testing of safety features to support validation and verification of associated engineering computer programs. The approval of these analysis plans needs to include development of associated methodologies and applications of those methods, which include but are not limited to event-specific
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analysis methodologies, scaling methodology, setpoint methodology, reactor coolant analysis methodology, core design methodology, and reactivity control methods. The analysis plans need to include a test plan and test program to ensure appropriate verification and validation of the engineering computer programs, including consideration of appropriate quality assurance requirements. The test program should satisfy 10 CFR 50.43(e), which requires applicants to demonstrate that sufficient data exist on the safety features of the design to assess the analytical tools used for safety analyses over a sufficient range of normal operating conditions, transient conditions, and specified accident sequences, including equilibrium core conditions.
This is in contrast with specific portions of DRNL-ISG-2022-01 that discuss evaluation methodologies, which are not incorporated into DANU-ISG-2022-01 Appendix C.
Specifically, DRNL-ISG-2022-01 states, in part:
At a minimum, the NRC staff should ensure the preliminary safety analysis report includes all the information required by 10 CFR 50.34, with a focus on the following:
Verification that the LOCA evaluation methods used are approved and applicable to the design.
Verification that non-LOCA evaluation methods are at a minimum under active NRC staff review and any open items can reasonably be left for later consideration in the final safety analysis report, and that there is reasonable assurance that the proposed facility can be constructed and operated without undue risk to public health and safety.
SMR believes that the DANU-ISG-2022-01 Appendix C guidance specific to evaluation models for non-LWRs differs from the DNRL-ISG-2022-01 guidance specific to evaluation models for LWRs due to the assumption that 10 CFR 50.46 does not apply to non-LWRs, and therefore the expectation that code V&V and evaluation models be approved in the PSAR does not extend to non-LWRs. This is further evidenced by the following NRC discussion in the Safety Evaluation for Hermes Construction Permit Application (ML23158A268):
Section 4.5.3.1: While the staff reviewed uncertainties in [nuclear design]
models, the staff did not make any findings on Kaiross validation and verification plan of codes or derivations of uncertainties because it is not required or necessary for the issuance of a CP. Kaiross validation and verification of codes and derivations of uncertainties will be reviewed during the OL application.
Section 13.2.2.4: The staff finds that the level of detail provided on the postulated event evaluation methodology is consistent with the applicable guidance and acceptance criteria in NUREG 1537, Parts 1 and 2, Section 13, Accident Analysis and demonstrates an adequate design basis for a preliminary 13-43 design. Based on the technical evaluation discussed above, the staff finds that the methodology used to show that the radiological consequences of the postulated events are bounded by the MHA analysis is sufficient and that the Page 3 of 4
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methodology meets the applicable regulatory requirements and guidance identified in this section for the issuance of a CP in accordance with 10 CFR 50.35 and 50.40. Further technical or design information required to complete the safety analysis may reasonably be left for later consideration. The staff will confirm that the final design conforms to the design basis during the evaluation of the FSAR as part of the OL application review.
o Section 4.1.2 of technical report KP-TR-018-NP (ML21272A38), which is describes the postulated event evaluation methodology and is referenced in the Hermes PSAR, states, in part, [The postulated event evaluation methodology] will be verified and validated prior to the final safety analysis.
Though there appears to be a valid regulatory basis for not requiring approved evaluation methodologies in a non-LWR PSAR, SMR notes the juxtaposition of holding LWRs, with substantial operating experience in the US, to a more stringent standard compared to non-LWRs, which have limited operating experience in the US. SMR requests clarity if this understanding is consistent with the NRCs interpretation of the pertinent regulations and the intended message of the DANU-ISG-2022-01 and DRNL-2022-01 draft guidance. If SMR understands the current regulations and available interim staff guidance documents correctly, SMR encourages the NRC to consider pathways to similarly reduce the threshold of transient and accident analysis methodologies and the underpinning code validation and verification necessary to accept and approve a LWR construction permit application, consistent with that of a non-LWR.
Respectfully,
Andrew Brenner Director of Licensing, SMR, LLC
CC:
K. Trice (SMR, LLC, President)
J. Fleming (Holtec International, LLC, VP of Licensing, Regulatory Affairs & PSA)
J. Hawkins (SMR, LLC, Managing Director of SMR-160)
M. Hayes (USNRC, DNRL, NLIB, Branch Chief)
C. Lauron (USNRC, DNRL, NLIB, Senior Project Manager)
G. Cranston (USNRC, DNRL, NLIB, Senior Project Manager)
M. Sayoc (USNRC, DNRL, NLIB, Project Manager)
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9 August 2023 2023-XE-NRC -025
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 -0001
Submittal of X Energy, LLC (X -energy) Comments on the Advanced Reactor Content of Application (ARCAP) Interim Staff Guidance
REFERENCES:
- 1) NRC-2022-0073 Draft Regulatory Guide: Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive Content of Application Methodology To Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light-Water Reactors
- 2) NRC-2022-0074 through NRC -2022-0082 Draft Interim Staff Guidance: Various Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project guides
X Energy, LLC (X-energy) has prepared the enclosed set of comments related to the subject draft Regulatory Guide (DG-1404) and draft Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) documents provided by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under dockets NRC-2022- 0073 through NRC-2022- 0082. As early adopters of the risk-informed, performance-based, technology-inclusive guidance in Nuclear Energy Institutes NEI 18 -04 and NEI 21-07, X-energy has been actively following and implementing t he approaches and formats described in the industry-led guidance with full consideration of the NRC staffs draft versions of these interim staff guides (ISGs). The formation of our initial Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the Xe-100 reactor technology for a Construction Permit application under the Department of Energys Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program is based on this progressive guidance development activity. We appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback in this critical time for advanced reactor projects.
provides comments on key aspects of these ISGs that we believe are significant to address for those organizations choosing to development within the NEI 18-04 and 21-07 framework. We have also provided comment and feedback on responses for these ISGs from the Nuclear Energy Institute and Technology Inclusive Content of Application (TICAP) working groups, and while there is overlap, the comments in this enclosure provide our organizational perspectives. To support efficient collection, this enclosure provides all comments in table format with the associated guidance document identified; these comments apply to dockets NRC -2022-0073 through NRC-2022- 0082 inclusively.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Drew Nigh at anigh@x-energy.com.
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Travis Chapman Director, Reactor Licensing and Regulatory Affairs X Energy, LLC
cc:
X Energy, LLC David Bannister Steve Miller
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Michael Orenak, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Robert Roche-Rivera, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Enclosure:
- 1) X Energy, LLC Comments on the Advanced Reactor Content of Application Interim Staff Guidance
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Enclosure 1: X-energy Comments on ARCAP Guidance
Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision X-energy has concerns with both the letter and the spirit of Addition C.2.e, which would levy substantial documentation requirements that are largely not applicable to non-LWRs, thereby complicating the Please delete Addition C.2.e.
development of an application and the subsequent staff review. However, if the addition is retained, to With respect to Item (1), generic safety issues, unresolved the extent the NRC uses terms like safety issues, and TMI action items are largely LWR-centric technically relevant and directly DG-1404 (RG and not applicable to advanced non-LWRs; there should be applicable to the design, clarify that the 1.253 Rev 0) no presumption to the contrary. There is no regulatory NRC does not presume applicability of 1 Guidance on C.2.e requirement that applicants address LWR GSIs and USIs in LWR regulatory guidance to non-LWRs TICAP for Non-the SAR. The regulatory requirement to address TMI following the NEI 18-04 methodology.
LWRs requirements in 10 CFR 50.34(f) is applicable only to LWRs.
10 CFR 52.47(a)(8) invokes most of the TMI requirements in Furthermore, if the NRC insists that 10 CFR 50.34(f) to the extent they are technically applicants provide lists of documents in relevant. This term, as well as the terms "technically Chapter 1 (e.g., regulatory guides and/or applicable to the design" and directly applicable to the codes and standards), make it clear that design used in DG -1404 Addition C.2.3, are undefined and those lists are simply catalogs of material subjective, and will be fertile ground for interpretation addressed elsewhere in the SAR.
disagreements between applicant and regulator. At most, the TMI requirements should be applied only to Part 52
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision applicants. NRC expectations from LWR licensing experience should not be applied blindly to advanced reactors following NEI 18-04 guidance. In fact, applying LWR GSIs, USIs, and TMI action requirements to non-LWR advanced reactors stands the concept of risk-informed, performance-based regulation on its head. It adds an unnecessary backward-looking deterministic framework on top of the systematic evaluation of safety provided by NEI 18- 04.
With respect to Item (2), regulatory guides are not regulatory requirements and most were developed for light water reactors. There should be no presumption that regulatory guides are to be applied to non-LWRs, and the NRC should be clear on that point in its guidance. The NEI 18-04 approach to demonstrating safety is not centered around a deterministic checklist approach of following prescriptive guidance. If the NRC insists on including a requirement that the applicant catalog items like R eg Guides in Chapter 1 of the SAR, that guidance should make it clear that the Chapter 1 material is simply a list of items included by the applicant in subsequent sections of the SAR.
The discussion relative to Item 3 (codes and standards) is similar. Codes and standards will be addressed in
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision appropriate sections of the SAR. If the NRC insists on including lists of codes and standards in Chapter 1 of the SAR, it should be with the understanding that any substantive information is reserved for later chapters.
Chapter 8 of a SAR that uses the guidance in NEI 21-07 addresses plant programs, including Human Factors DG-1404 (RG Engineering. The NRC Staffs position (Staff Position C.9) Where there is duplicate guidance, such 1.253 Rev 0) C.9, Page states this an acceptable method for developing as HFE in Chapter 8 and HFE in Chapter 2 Guidance on 27 information related to Plant Programs. However, DANU - 11, provide clarification on where the TICAP for Non-ISG-2022-05 provides guidance for Human Factors and NRC staff prefers to see certain plant LWRs Human-System Considerations to be included in Chapter programs in the SAR.
11 of a SAR. Which chapter would the NRC prefer to have the HFE program addressed?
The last two sentences of the first paragraph of DG -1404 Section 8 are confusing and do not convey appropriate guidance to the applicant.
DG-1404 (RG The penultimate sentence requests a discussion of how 1.253 Rev 0) the applicant intends to confirm, at the OL stage, that Please delete the last two sentences of 3 Guidance on pg. 26 the reliability and capability performance targets have the first paragraph of DG-1404 Section 8.
TICAP for Non-been met. NEI 21-07 Section C.6.2 already addresses LWRs reliability and capability targets, including plant programs used to maintain them. It is not envisioned that all targets be fully confirmed at the CP stage, or even provided on a preliminary basis. The penultimate sentence could be interpreted as meaning that the www. x-energy.com Page 5 of 20
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision applicant must provide an SSC by SSC discussion of each target at the CP stage, which we hope was not the intention.
The last sentence of the first paragraph in DG-1404 Section 8 is confusing because it convolves inappropriately special treatments with testing and validation. Testing and validation are types of special treatments Addition C.5.b requests detailed information underpinning the PRA calculations addressing QHOs in Section 4.1. X-energy believes the guidance goes well beyond what is needed for a SAR. The PRA methods would be addressed in the PRA peer review, and the detailed information would be available for NRC to DG-1404 (RG inspect in an audit.
1.253 Rev 0) 4 Guidance on pg. 22 Furthermore, it is not clear NRC appreciates the scope of TICAP for Non-this requirement. The requests are quite broad - e.g.,
LWRs (5) ke y modelling assumptions. Because these are integrated analyses, the requirements pertain to each and every PRA realization that involves an offsite dose.
Another specific concern is (8) uncertainty/sensitivity analysis performed. No definition is provid ed as to what is intended. Depending on the interpretation, the Please delete Addition C.5.b.
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision each and every part of the integrated analyses could be huge. The approach prescribed in NEI 18-04 and NEI 21-07 is to rely on conform ance with the non-LWR PRA Standard, provide general descriptive PRA information in the SAR, and encourage regulatory audits to address details of the analyses if necessary. Literal compliance with the expectations laid out by the NRC in Addition C.5.b could result in levels of detail on the order of those seen in SAR Chapter 19 of advanced light water reactors licensed under Part 52 - a level of detail which, it was thought, all parties agreed was excessive and inappropriate.
Addition C.5.d would require that the applicant provide a change control process for DID in the SAR. This DG-1404 (RG requirement is inappropriate for a SAR, and there is no Please delete Addition C.5.d.
1.253 Rev 0) precedent for it. Change control is an operational is sue.
5 Guidance on pg. 22 Moreover, industry is working with the NRC on change Additionally, consider adding NEI 22-05 to TICAP for Non-control for licensees who followed NEI 18 -04. the list of guidance being developed in LWRs Specifically, the Technology Inclusive Risk Informed Appendix A of the NRC Reg Guide Change Evaluation (TIRICE) Project and draft NEI Guidance Document NEI 22 -05 should address the issue.
DG-1404 (RG "The applicant is also responsible for demonstrating 6 1.253 Rev 0) pg. 6 compliance with all applicable regulations and may request None Guidance on exemptions, as appropriate, to establish the licensing basis
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision TICAP for Non-for the design." Is NRC making a determination on the LWRs acceptability of the "affirmative safety case" concept?
Addition C.6.b addresses fuel qualification. X-energy considers this additional guidance to be unnecessary and, as proposed, inappropriate, and counter-productive. The issue was essentially absent from the NRCs draft additions, clarifications, and exceptions that formed the basis for detailed interactions during the fall and winter of 2021, prior to submittal of NEI 21-07 Rev. 1 for endorsement.
First, fuel qualification should essentially be done at the DG-1404 (RG time of a license application, with the possible exception of 1.253 Rev 0) some confirmatory items. The emphasis for fuel 7 Guidance on p. 23 qualification should be during pre-application interactions Please delete Addition C.6.b.
TICAP for Non-as is discussed in DANU-ISG-2022-01, Appendix A. The NRC LWRs proposal to address fuel qualification expectations in the SAR, as reflected in this proposed addition, is wholly out of sequence and unnecessary, and it detracts from the guidance overall.
Second, the document states The reactor core an d its fuel are generally classified as SR as if that point justifies this special deterministic carve out of SAR documentation requirements for fuel. It does not. NEI 18-04 provides a systematic means of identifying safety related structures, systems, and components, based on the approach taken to www. x-energy.com Page 8 of 20
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision satisfy Required Safety Functions. Provisions are already in place to address safety-related SSCs in Chapter 6. It is certainly expected that fuel performance will be particularly important to some advanced reactor designs, and if so the SAR documentation related to fuel will be more extensive than other SSCs, but there is no need to arbitrarily address fuel in a special way as proposed in the text.
Third, there is no rationale for addressing fuel qualification in SAR Chapter 5, as proposed herein. Chapter 5 covers safety functions, design criteria, and SSC classification, but the document proposes to use it as a repository for additional information on one particular SSC (fuel).
In summary, the fuel qualification guidance for SAR Chapter 5 should be reconsidered.
DG-1404 (RG 1.253 Rev 0) Please clarify if the requested 8 Guidance on 13 Chapter 1 should not list radionuclide inventories, it is more appropriately covered in Chapter 3 as alluded to in C.3 d. information should be included in TICAP for Non-Chapter 1 or Chapter 3.
LWRs DG-1404 (RG Addition C.7.b(2) is unnecessary and inappropriate. The 9 1.253 Rev 0) 13 addition imposes an additional SAR documentation Please delete Addition C.7.b(2)
Guidance on requirement to justify the use of codes and standards. This
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision TICAP for Non-requirement goes beyond standard practice for light water LWRs reactors.
DG-1404 (RG Some guidance should include clarification that it is not Please include clarification of which 1.253 Rev 0) required for Construction Permit applicants: NSRST SSC information is necessary for those 10 Guidance on Var. performance (C.8.a), NSRST I&C Special treatments, MBDBE requesting design finality versus those 10 TICAP for Non- (C.4.c.(2)), uncertainties and sensitivities for cumulative risk CFR 50 Construction Permit applicants LWRs metrics (C.5.b.(8)), change evaluation process (C.5.d). who are not requesting design finality.
Related to Clarification and Addition C.7.a, there appears to be an inconsistency between the guidance in NEI 21-07 and DG-1404 (RG DG-1404, compared to DANU-ISG-2022- 01 (ARCAP 1.253 Rev 0) Roadmap). Pages 12-13 of the ARCAP roadmap indicates Please review and resolve the 11 Guidance on 25 that the information related to translation of DBHLs to discrepancy.
TICAP for Non-loads (and evaluation of those loads) would be placed in LWRs SAR Chapters 5 and 6, while NEI 21-07 and DG-1404 would put that information in Chapter 2 or in external reports referenced in the SAR.
DG-1404 (RG 1.253 Rev 0) 12 Guidance on 35 X-energy is interested in the draft ISG on consequence uncertainty referenced in Appendix A. none TICAP for Non-LWRs DG-1404 (RG Sections C.7.b(1) and C.8.a(1) are identified as additions to 13 1.253 Rev 0) pg. 26 & 27 the associated Sections C.6 and C.7 of NEI 21-07, Rev. 1. Please provide additional clarification.
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision TICAP for No n-required by NEI 21-07, namely descriptions of special LWRs treatments for SR and NSRST I&C SSCs and analyses of capabilities of SR and NSRST I&C SSCs. If the intent is simply to identify the Design Review Guide (DRG),
Instrumentation and Controls for Non -Light-Water Reactor (non-LWR) Reviews, as providing additional guidance for content and review of this material, the addition should state this and cite the DRG; as written, it suggests the NRC is imposing additional requirements beyond what is required by NEI 21-07.
DG-1404 (RG 1.253 Rev 0) 14 Guidance on pg. 26 Footnote 11 on Page 26 should be Footnote 12. Please update the footnote.
TICAP for Non-LWRs Chapter 8 of a SAR following NEI 21-07 addresses plant programs, including Human Factors Engineering. The NRC DG-1404 (RG Staffs position (Staff Position C.9) states this an acceptable 1.253 Rev 0) method for developing information related to Plant 15 Guidance on 27 Programs. However, DANU-ISG-2022-05 provides guidance Please provide specific guidance.
TICAP for Non-for Human Factors and Human-System Considerations to LWRs be included in Chapter 11 of a SAR. Would the NRC prefer to have the HFE program addressed in a specific chapter, or left to the applicant to decide?
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision DANU-ISG-2022-07 acknowledges the development of the Please clarify the requirements for DG-1404 (RG ASME OM-2 code and states that the ISG assumes that applicants who expect to follow an 1.253 Rev 0) applicants following the ISG will implement IST programs endorsed OM-2 code at the point of 16 Guidance on utilizing previously endorsed codes. The ISG later requires Operating License issuance who will be TICAP for Non-that construction permit applications include what requesting Construction Permits prior LWRs standards are going to be followed at the operating license to OM-2 code endorsement.
stage.
DG-1404 (RG 1.253 Rev 0) 17 Guidance on pg. 31 Reference 14 cites ML1025210405, which should be ML102510405. Please update the reference.
TICAP for Non-LWRs "The NRC also considers this approach to be appropriate for developing proposed PDCs for those design functions DANU-ISG-2022-and features of the facility that are SR and NSRST and not Please modify the wording.
01 Review of Risk-informed by the LMP process (e.g., normal operations)."
Informed, Does this sentence imply that we could have SSCs classified Proposed wording: "The NRC also 18 Technology-page 15 of as SR and NSRST that are not informed by NEI 18-04? I considers this approach to be appropriate Inclusive 56 don't think the SR and NSRST classifications have specific for developing proposed PDCs for those Advanced Reactor meaning outside the context of NEI 18-04. We may have design functions and features of the Applications requirements for SSCs that are not classified as SR or NSRST facility that are classified as NST by the Roadmap with the purpose of meeting regulatory requirements (e.g., LMP process (e.g., normal operations)."
security systems). Just because a system has requirements driven by regulations doesn't make it SR or NSRST.
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision DANU-ISG-2022-The sentence "A prospective applicant should identify any 01 Review of Risk-novel design features through white papers or meetings A prospective applicant should identify Informed, during the pre-application review...Under 10 CFR 50.43(e), any novel safety design features. Please 19 Technology-Appendix the performance of each safety feature must be clarify if this sentence applies to novel Inclusive A, page 8 demonstrated" reads as if it applies to any novel design design features that are non-special Advanced Reactor feature, whether it is safety-significant of non-special treatment (NST).
Applications treatment (NST).
Roadmap DANU-ISG-2022-The ISG states, "During pre-application interactions, a 01 Review of Risk-prospective applicant should use a white paper to identify Informed, and consensus codes and standards or code cases it intends Please clarify if an applicant can provide Technology-Appendix to use and" This guidance suggests an applicant can use a the requested codes and standards 20 Inclusive A, page 8 white paper to identify codes and standards. On the other information in a white paper that is Advanced Reactor hand, DG-1404 states that a listing of codes and standards incorporated by reference rather than in Applications should be included in Chapter 1. X-energy would prefer to Chapter 1 of the SAR.
Roadmap list codes and standards in a white paper that is incorporated by reference into the SAR.
DANU-ISG-2022-01 Review of Risk-Informed, Appendix 21 Technology-B, page 22 The appendix contains a documentation error indicating Please clarify what the bookmark intends Inclusive of 28 "Bookmark not defined" to reference.
Advanced Reactor Applications Roadmap
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision DANU-ISG-2022-01 Review of Risk-Informed, Appendix 22 Technology-B, (Editorial s uggestio n) There is an erro r: need s pace Inclusive Attachmen between against and NUREG-0800 Incorporate the editorial suggestion Advanced Reactor t 1, page 3 Applications Roadmap Appendix C, pages 12 and 13 address Emergency Planning (EP) fo r a Co nstructio n Permit applicatio n for an adv anced DANU-ISG-2022-reacto r. The guidance o nly references regulatio ns that are 01 Review of Risk-applicable to light w ater reactors, there is no mention of Informed, using 10 CFR 50.160 and its accompanying RG 1.242, Add clarification or additional Technology-Pages 12-which is written specifically for advanced reactors. Is the information to address EP for advanced 23 Inclusive 13 NRC staff expecting advanced reactor PSARs and FSARs to reactors. Using only the current light Advanced Reactor follow the current light water reacto r regulatio ns for EP? water reactor guidance will result in Applications Will the staff consider the new rule making effo rt fo r unnecessary and costly exemptions.
Roadmap advanced reacto r EP in order to minimize the regulatory burden of reviewing exemptio ns fo r emergency planning zones, Emergency Respo nse Organizatio ns, and Emergency Action Levels?
DANU-ISG-2022-24 02 ARCAP Page 2 (Editorial suggestion) need space between a and non-Chapter 2 Site LWR Incorporate the editorial suggestion Information
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision DANU-ISG-2022-Additional guidance (or a more standardized approach) for Consider developing a standardized 25 02 ARCAP 2.7.2 screening external hazards could help streamline the approach detailing the elements that are Chapter 2 Site process and minimize the number/extent of pre-required for an external hazard screening Information engagement discussions necessary. flow chart acceptable to the NRC.
"Each hazard that could result in an event sequence with Please remove the quoted text. Current an estimated frequency of occurrence greater than 5 in Regulatory Guides already provide DANU-ISG-2022-10 million per year sh ould be evaluated for its potential approaches for complying with the 02 ARCAP to cause a radiological release exceeding the dose quoted regulations (e.g., RG 1.76). This 26 Chapter 2 Site 2.3.1 guidelines of 10 CFR 50.34(a) or 10 CFR 52.79(a)(1)(iv)." sentence implies requirements that Information This seems like a DBHL set at 5E -7, which might be OK exceed current requirements for for military and industrial hazards, but does not align evaluating external hazard events, such with NEI 18-04 generally. I know design basis wind also as the Appendix S requirements for goes down to about this level. evaluating the seismic hazard.
The NRC staff expects to see staffing plans for the construction pre-op testing, fuel load, and startup and DANU-ISG-2022-power ascension testing. The NRC staff also expects to see 05 ARCAP the preliminary plans for the operating organization, Please clarify the level of detail expected Chapter 11 including a staffing plan for operations for the CPA. The for the CPA. For example, would the NRC 27 Organization and Page 4 safety features and technologies of advanced reactors like a list of proposed staff or do the Human-System warrant fewer staffing levels than the current LWRs. What eligibility requirements with justification Considerations level of detail is the NRC expecting for these plans? Wha t need to be provided?
RG/NUREG will the NRC be using to verify staffing methodology, as the methodology should and will be different than the current LWR fleet? Since these are
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision supposed to be preliminary, does a technical basis need to be provided for the Construction Permit Application (CPA)?
Please clarify how a site can meet the requirement for engineering expertise.
Examples: can a site credit the training program if the safety features of the DANU-ISG-2022-The requirement for engineering expertise on shift is based plant do not warrant engineering 05 ARCAP on LWR operating experience (Three Mile Island), comes expertise? If transients are slow moving, 28 Chapter 11 Page 16 from a Commission Policy statement (not a regulation), and can the engineering expertise be on -call Organization and may not be relevant to advanced reactor technologies. Is or part of a licensee's Emergency Human-System the NRC staff considering crediting the training program Response Organization? Can the Considerations content, which is tailored to train plant staff to safely engineering expertise be remote? Please operate that specific technology, as required engineering provide flexibility for advancements in expertise? This should be especially considered if the nuclear safety instead of arbitrarily training program teaches engineering fundamentals and propagating requirements based on LWR principles required to operate that specific technology. technology.
The last sentence of the first paragraph on page 6 of DANU-DANU-ISG-2022-ISG-2022- 06 states, If the application is for a CP, the PITAP 06 ARCAP description can be limited to the Phase 1 (described below)
Chapter 12 Post-inspection, testing, and verification that would be required Please remove the last sentence from the 29 construction pg. 6 by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, along with a description of Inspection, the scope, objectives, and programmatic controls first paragraph of page 6.
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision consistent with the first sentence of the second paragraph of the application guidance on page 5 which specifically refers to program elements required by the quality assurance program under § 50.34(a)(7). Can the staff confirm that this ISG is not adding additional requirements beyond what is required to be provided in a construction permit application per 10 CFR 50.34(a)(7)?
DANU-ISG-2022-06 ARCAP It is unclear in sections A-E which portions are required to Chapter 12 Post-Sections A-be described in a construction permit application and Provide a list in the guidance of which 30 construction E which portions are required for an operating license items apply for construction permit Inspection, application, for those licensing under 10 CFR 50. applications.
Testing, and Analysis Program DANU-ISG-2022-06 ARCAP Some of the items in sections A-E imply that 10 CFR 52 Please clarify the items in A-E apply to Chapter 12 Post-Sections A-processes should be applied for 10 CFR 50 licenses, for different license application types.
31 construction E example D.6 requires establishing a plant review Specifically, please list which items apply Inspection, committee to review, evaluate, and disposition verification to 10 CFR 50 licenses.
Testing, and results.
Analysis Program DANU-ISG-2022-Sections A-Some of the items in sections A-E do not appear to be Please remove items from sections A-E 32 06 ARCAP regulatory requirements or aligned with RG 1.70 or RG which go beyond what is required in 10 Chapter 12 Post-E 1.206. CFR 50 and existing guidance.
construction
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision Inspection, Testing, and Analysis Program DANU-ISG-2022-07 acknowledges the development of the ASME OM-2 code and states that the ISG assumes that applicants following the ISG will implement IST programs DANU-ISG-2022-utilizing previously endorsed codes. The ISG later requires Please add guidance stating that 07 ARCAP Risk-that construction permit applications include what applicants may follow the ISG and 33 Informed ISI and pg. 3 standards are going to be followed at the operating license provide plans to follow codes not yet IST Programs for stage. Can the staff please clarify what the requirements endorsed "at risk" in the construction Non-LWRs are for applicants who expect to follow an endorsed OM-2 permit application.
code at the point of operating license issuance who will be requesting construction permits prior to OM-2 code endorsement?
DANU-ISG-2022-For the surveillance requirements, design features, and 08 ARCAP Risk-Pages 13-administrative controls sections of the Preliminary Safety Please provide clarification on the level of 34 Informed 16 of 20 Analysis Report (PSAR) technical specifications, what level detail expected for the PSAR technical Technical of detail does the NRC staff expect to see in the PSAR? specifications.
Specifications DANU-ISG-2022-Item (8) mentions that Technical Specifications (TS) are to Please clarify if exemptions will be 08 ARCAP Risk-Page 17 of meet the regulations in 10 CFR 50.36, which are the TS needed from 50.36 or provide a revision 35 Informed 20 requirements for LWRs. Is 50.36 going to be revised to to 50.36 to reflect this ISG and NEI 18 -04 Technical reflect NEI 18-04 methodology, or will every advanced to avoid lengthy and costly exemptions.
Specifications reactor applicant require exemptions from 50.36?
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision The guidance states, "RG 1.177, position 2.3.4, references the risk metrics of core damage frequency and large early release frequency based on LWRs as factors in determining Please provide additional clarification completion times. Advanced reactor applicants should use about how the acceptance criteria for other risk metrics, such as those described in NEI 18-04, for CDF and LERF metrics in RG 1.177 should DANU-ISG-2022-determining completion times." The NEI 18-04 approach be interpreted with respect to the NEI 18 -
08 ARCAP Risk-Page 13 of involves direct quantification of risk metrics for comparison 04 integrated risk metrics. For example, 36 Informed 20 to the Quantitative Health Objectives (QHOs): latent cancer should a licensee interpret the Technical fatalities and early fatalities. RG 1.177, Section 2.4, incremental conditional core damage Specifications "Acceptance Guidelines for Technical Specification probability (ICCDP) metric in RG 1.177 as Changes" provides quantitative acceptance criteria for directly interchangeable with an technical specification changes in terms of CDF and LERF. X-incremental conditional latent cancer energy is interested in NRC development of similar fatality risk metric?
acceptance criteria for the NEI 18-04 latent cancer fatality and early fatality integrated risk metrics.
DANU-ISG-2022-This guidance describes the advanced reactor fire 09 ARCAP RIPB protection program as an operational program. What is the Please provide guidance for 10 CFR 50 37 Fire Protection General NRC expecting to see, if anything, in regards to plant fire Construction Permit applicants who are Program for protection content for a 10 CFR 50 Construction Permit not requesting design finality.
Operations application versus and Operating License application?
DANU-ISG-2022-No change suggested, however, X -energy 09 ARCAP RIPB Page 5 of is interested in further engagem ents to 38 Fire Protection 13 Is the NRC considering endorsing NFPA 804? explore the possibility of endorsing NFPA Program for 804 for advanced reactors.
Operations
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Cmt Document Section Comment Proposed Revision The guidance that a plant should have a five man fire brigade is based on the design basis fire causing a radioactive release to the public, and the manual suppression from the fire brigade mitigates the consequences of the design basis fire. The new ARCAP guidance continues to mention fire brigade should be DANU-ISG-2022-addressed in the fire protection program. Advanced Please provide updated guidance or 09 ARCAP RIPB reactors following the NEI 18-04 process may demonstrate relaxation for fire brigades at advanced 39 Fire Protection Pages 6-11 the fire design basis hazard levels (DBHLs) do not cause a reactors that demonstrate a fire cannot Program for of 13 radiation release to the public and environment that impact safe shutdown and cannot violate Operations exceed the limits of 50.34. Therefore, is the NRC staff offsite dose releases in 50.34.
considering relaxing or rewording fire brigade requirements if manual suppression is not required for nuclear safety, in order to prevent exemption requests? Is the NRC considering adding to the guidance in RG 1.189 or revising the guidance in RG 1.189 to relax fire brigade requirements for advanced reactor technologies that do not require manual suppression?
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