ML21263A010

Proposed Rule: Advanced Reactor Security - Email from NEI (D. Young) ML 'S for Previous Comments on Topics Discussed and 2 Comments from Public Meeting on 9/17/2021

ML21263A010
Person / Time
Site:	Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date:	09/17/2021
From:	Young D Nuclear Energy Institute
To:	Reed E, Nanette Valliere Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Andrukat, Dennis
References
NRC-2017-0227, RIN 3150-AK19
Download: ML21263A010 (2)

Text

From: YOUNG, David To: Valliere, Nanette; Reed, Beth Cc: Atack, Sabrina; Prasad, Stacy; Cubellis, Louis; Andrukat, Dennis; NICHOL, Marcus; Lee, Pete

Subject:

[External_Sender] ML#"s for previous comments on topics discussed yesterday + 2 comments Date: Friday, September 17, 2021 2:10:39 PM Nan and Beth, Good afternoon.

As I mentioned in my closing remark during yesterdays meeting, here are the links to our previous comments on proposed Criterion A:

https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?

AccessionNumber=ML21175A043 https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?

AccessionNumber=ML21175A036 Also, here are the two overarching comments we made during yesterdays meeting:

1. We intended the eligibility criteria to be performance-based facility design criteria and not criteria for applying a graded approach to security. The goal was to provide criteria that advanced reactor vendors could use to guide their design decisions, particularly with respect to features that could obviate the need for a dedicated onsite armed response force. As we said in our 2016 white paper:

In light of the above, the industry is proposing new physical security requirements for advanced reactor technologies. It is recognized that no design has yet been submitted to the NRC for review; therefore, the proposed requirements are grounded in a set of performance capabilities that serve as criteria for identifying facilities with designs that can prevent radiological sabotage primarily through engineered safety and security features. This approach allows new regulations to be established generically in advance of a design- or site-specific application. By demonstrating that a proposed facility can meet a performance capability, an applicant could obtain a license through compliance with a set of physical security requirements developed specifically for advanced reactor technologies. These same requirements would continue to apply to the licensee during operation of the facility.

Note: The term performance capabilities evolved into eligibility criteria.

Also, we previously responded to NRC staff questions about developing a graded approach - see here (ML17263B142), the responses to staff questions #5 and #7.

Our responses indicate that we were not supportive of that approach.

2. We believe it is critically important for technical/consequence analysis guidelines to allow realistic credit for all engineered safety and security features described in the facility licensing basis. Tangential guideline goals expressed by the staff such as ease of analysis and analysis flexibility should not preclude the first-order goal of driving realistic security assessments. The staffs presentation yesterday, which described an approach that would, in some cases, not provide realistic credit for

certain features in order to achieve benefits in analysis space, is concerning because the resulting eligibility criteria could lead to outcomes that are unnecessarily burdensome and exceed the reasonable assurance of adequate protection threshold. For example, its unclear why some features required by regulations (e.g.,

delay requirements) cannot be credited in an analysis for Criterion A. Advanced reactor vendors are expending significant resources to incorporate enhanced safety and security features with a reasonable expectation that those features will provide a rationale for a commensurate reduction in regulatory burden for a facility operator.

David Young l Senior Technical Advisor Nuclear Security and Incident Preparedness Nuclear Energy Institute (202) 739-8127 This electronic message transmission contains information from the Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. The information is intended solely for the use of the addressee and its use by any other person is not authorized. If you are not the intended recipient, you have received this communication in error, and any review, use, disclosure, copying or distribution of the contents of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this electronic transmission in error, please notify the sender immediately by telephone or by electronic mail and permanently delete the original message. IRS Circular 230 disclosure: To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS and other taxing authorities, we inform you that any tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties that may be imposed on any taxpayer or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.