Text

5_RBS-2022-12 Draft Operating Test
	ML22354A253
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	12/14/2022
From:	Heather Gepford; NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/OB
To:	; Entergy Operations
References
	Download: ML22354A253 (1)
	v • d • e

Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility: ____________RBS________________

Date of Examination: _____________

Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: __________

Administrative Topic (Step 1)

Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)

Type Code (Step 3)

A1 Conduct of Operations Determine RCIC flow rate based on the minimum Decay Heat Removal Injection Rate.

K/A 2.1.7-Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.4 N

R A2 Conduct of Operations Determine Suppression Pool level utilizing Enclosure 23.

K/A 2.1.19-Ability to use available indications to evaluate system or component status.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 D

R A3 Equipment Control Creation of a tagout for the fire jockey pump.

K/A 2.2.13-Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.1 M

R A4 Radiation Control Determine expected dose and maximum stay time for a locked high rad entry.

K/A 2.3.12-Knowledge of radiological safety principles and procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, or alignment of filters.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 N

R Emergency Plan N/A

Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Topic Number of JPMs RO*

SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4

5

2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.

3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room[0], (S)imulator[0], or Class(R)oom [4]

Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)[0]

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)[1]

(N)ew or Significantly[2] (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)[1]

Reactor operator (RO) applicants do not need to be evaluated on every topic (i.e., Equipment Control, Radiation Control, or Emergency Plan can be omitted by doubling up on Conduct of Operations), unless the applicant is taking only the administrative topics portion of the operating test (with a waiver or excusal of the other portions).

Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility: ____________RBS________________

Date of Examination: _____________

Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: __________

Administrative Topic (Step 1)

Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)

Type Code (Step 3)

A5 Conduct of Operations Compare a Core Monitoring Predictor Case to a resultant Monitor Case to verify all predicted vs actual parameters are within acceptable range.

K/A 2.1.7-Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

IMPORTANCE SRO 4.7 N

R A6 Conduct of Operations Determine Suppression Pool level utilizing Enclosure 23 and direct EOP actions based on data.

K/A 2.1.19-Ability to use available indications to evaluate system or component status.

IMPORTANCE SRO 3.8 M

R A7 Equipment Control Verify APRM/LPRM operability from a test procedure.

K/A 2.2.37-Ability to determine operability or availability of safety-related equipment.

IMPORTANCE SRO 4.6 M

R A8 Radiation Control Determine expected dose and maximum stay time for a locked high rad entry and fill out appropriate forms based on the data.

K/A 2.3.12-Knowledge of radiological safety principles and procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, or alignment of filters.

IMPORTANCE SRO 3.7 N

R A9 Emergency Plan Determine EAL classification and PAR recommendations.

K/A 2.4.44-Knowledge of emergency plan implementing procedures protective action Recommendations.

IMPORTANCE SRO 4.4 M

R

Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Topic Number of JPMs RO*

SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4

5

2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.

3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room[0], (S)imulator[0], or Class(R)oom [5]

Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)[0]

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)[1]

(N)ew or Significantly[2] (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)[3]

Reactor operator (RO) applicants do not need to be evaluated on every topic (i.e., Equipment Control, Radiation Control, or Emergency Plan can be omitted by doubling up on Conduct of Operations), unless the applicant is taking only the administrative topics portion of the operating test (with a waiver or excusal of the other portions).

A1 Page 1 of 6 DETERMINE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL INJECTION RATE Operator:

License: RO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

A1 Page 2 of 6 Facility: RBS JPM No: A1 Task

Title:

DETERMINE DHRIR-A Task No.: 200098005001 System: 217000 K/A Reference and Rating: G 2.1.25/3.9 Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has determined the required Decay Heat Removal Injection Rate was 250-300 gpm and the required current to maintain the required injection flow was 5.5-6.5 ma.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

EOP-1C1 Figure 7, Decay Heat Removal Injection Rate - A (DHRIR-A) curve OSP-66, Attachment 9 Simulator Requirements:

N/A

A1 Page 3 of 6 Initial Conditions:

The reactor scrammed due to a loss of offsite power and station blackout, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ago.

All Control Rods are inserted.

RCIC is only injection source.

Reactor pressure is being maintained between 150-300 psig.

RCIC has been aligned per OSP-66, Attachment 9.

Initiating Cues:

Given Attachment 9 of OSP-66 and EOP-1C1 Figure 7, determine the required Decay Heat Removal Injection Rate and corresponding RCIC current reading in ma that will ensure safe operation per the Decay Heat Removal Injection Rate - A (DHRIR-A) curve.

START TIME:________

A1 Page 4 of 6 NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: Using EOP-1C1 Figure 7, determine the required injection flow.

STANDARD: The applicant determined DHRIR for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (60 minutes) somewhere between 250 gpm and 300 gpm.

Per EOP-1C1 Figure 7, 60 minutes = 275 gpm (250-300 gpm)

CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

A1 Page 5 of 6 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: Using Attachment 9 OSP-66, determine the corresponding current reading for the required injection flow.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that a flow of 275 to 300 gpm falls within the current range of 5.5-6.5 ma.

Per Attachment 9, (See next page)

Flow=200*sqrt(i-4)

Solving for I, rearrange the formula:

I=

200 2 + 4 I=

275 2002 + 4 I=5.89 ma 250 = 5.5-6 ma 300 = 6-6.5 ma 5.5-6.5 ma acceptable per graph/table CUE: None NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant determines a current range of 5.5-6.5 ma.

STOP TIME:________

A1 Page 6 of 6

A2 Page 1 of 6 DETERMINATION OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL Operator:

License: RO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

A2 Page 2 of 6 Facility: RBS JPM No: A2 Task

Title:

DETERMINE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL USING EOP ENCL. 23 Task No.: 200063005001 System: 223001 K/A Reference and Rating: A1.08/4.0 Time-Critical STEP: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has successfully determined RPV water level is less than -211 inches, and that Adequate core cooling DOES NOT exist when RPV level is less than -211 inches with Spray Cooling (HPCS flow greater than 5000 gpm).

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

EOP-5, Enclosure 23, CONTAINMENT PRESSURE AND WATER LEVEL DETERMINATION EOP-1, RPV Control Calculator Simulator Requirements:

N/A

A2 Page 3 of 6 Initial Conditions:

Containment pressure from CMS-PI17A on CMS-PNL10A (Aux Bldg EL 141 ft ) reads 5 psig.

E51-PIR002, RCIC SUCTION PRESS (RCIC pump room EL 74 ft.) reads 27.5 psig.

Only HPCS is injecting in the RPV with a flowrate of 5050 gpm.

Initiating Cues:

You have been directed to correlate RPV water level to Containment water level IAW Enclosure 5 of EOP-5 and determine if adequate core cooling exists.

START TIME:________

A2 Page 4 of 6 NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE:

Using Enclosure 23 graph 8, determine Containment water level and correlate it to RPV water level.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that Containment water level is 55.8 ft which correlates to somewhere between -246 inches and -222 inches.

Referring to "Primary Containment Water Level Determination" graph Figure 8.

PCWL = [(ECCS Suction Press - CTMT Press) 2.3] + 4 PCWL = [(27.5 - 5) 2.3] + 4 = 55.8 ft = -236.4 inches OR using the graph:

A2 Page 5 of 6 Correlate Containment water level to RPV water level with table 1:

PCWL is 55 to 57 feet RPV water level is less than -211 inches.

CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

A2 Page 6 of 6 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: Per EOP-1-RPV Control, determine if adequate core cooling exists.

STANDARD: The applicant has determined that adequate core cooling DOES NOT exist based on the definition in EOP-1 because RPV water level is below -211 inches.

Adequate core cooling DOES NOT exist when RPV level is less than -211 inches regardless of HPCS flow > 5000 gpm CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant determines RPV water level is less than -211 inches and adequate core cooling does not exist.

This completes the JPM STOP TIME:________

A3 Page 1 of 4 TAGOUT OF FPW-P3 PUMP Operator:

License (Circle one):RO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

A3 Page 2 of 4 Facility: RBS JPM No: A3 Task

Title:

Tagout FPW-P3 Pump for oil change Task No.: 300095003001 System: 286000 K/A Reference and Rating: G 2.2.13 Time-Critical STEP: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has determined hazardous energy sources and isolations necessary to provide a safe work boundary for FPW-P3 and prepared a tagout using attachment 9.3 of EN-OP-102-01, Tagout Tags Sheet.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging Forms and Checklist, Attachment 9.3 EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging PID-15-01A, System 251 SOP-0037, Fire Protection Water System Operating Procedure Simulator Requirements:

N/A

A3 Page 3 of 4 Initial Conditions:

The plant is Mode 1, 100%

Maintenance is scheduled to lubricate FPW-P3, PRESSURE MAINTENANCE PUMP NO breach of the system is required for lubrication The eSOMS Clearance Module is unavailable due to problems with the network.

Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to perform a manual tagout on FPW-P3, PRESSURE MAINTENANCE PUMP, using attachment 9.3 of EN-OP-102-01, Tagout Tags Sheet.

Identify the following on the manual Tagout Tags Sheet:

Indicate type of tag.

Indicate component number and name.

List required hang positions.

Specify Tagout hang sequence.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: Using plant drawings and procedures, determine the hazardous energy sources and isolations necessary to provide a safe work boundary for FPW-P3.

STANDARD: The applicant determined the following components need to be isolated to provide a safe work boundary:

NHS-MCC7A, Breaker 2D FPW-V112, FPW-P3 DISCHARGE ISO VALVE FPW-V110, FPW-P3 SUCTION ISO VALVE FPW-P3, FIRE PROTECTION PRESSURE MAINTENANCE PUMP (P3) CONTROL SWITCH CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

A3 Page 4 of 4 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: Using attachment 9.3 of EN-OP-102-01, Tagout Tags Sheet, Prepare the Tagout using the isolation boundaries as follows:

Indicate type of tag.

Indicate component number and name.

List required hang positions.

Specify Tagout hang sequence.

STANDARD: The applicant prepared the Tagout using attachment 9.3 of EN-OP-102-01, Tagout Tags Sheet as follows:

Tag Type Equipment Place Seq.

Placement Configuration EQUIPMENT PROTECTION FPW-P3, FIRE PROTECTION PRESSURE MAINTENANCE PUMP (P3)

CONTROL SWITCH 1

OFF DANGER NHS-MCC7A, Breaker 2D 2

OFF DANGER FPW-V112, FPW-P3 DISCHARGE ISO VALVE 3

CLOSED DANGER FPW-V110, FPW-P3 SUCTION ISO VALVE 4

CLOSED CUE: N/A NOTES: FPW-P3, Fire Protection Pressure Maintenance Pump Control Switch may or may NOT be tagged by applicant and is not required IAW EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging.

CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant has completed form EN-OP-102-01.3 for tagout of FPW-P3.

STOP TIME:________

A4 Page 1 of 4 DETERMINE DOSE AND ENTRY REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH DOSE EVOLUTION Operator:

License: RO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

A4 Page 2 of 4 Facility: RBS JPM No: A4 Task

Title:

Determine Dose and Entry Requirements for High Dose Evolution Task No.: 301023005003 System: 295038 K/A Reference and Rating: G 2.3.12 / 3.2 Time-Critical STEP: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has successfully determined expected dose from the evolution was 1000 mrem and the maximum stay time allowed IAW 10CFR20.1201, Occupational Dose Limits of 5000 rem is not exceeded.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

EN-RP-201, Dosimetry Administration, Rev4 EP-4-ALL, Exposure Authorization Form Calculator Simulator Requirements:

N/A

A4 Page 3 of 4 Initial Conditions:

Site Area Emergency has been declared due to steam leak in the Main Steam Tunnel.

Dose rates in the vicinity of the steam leak isolation are 2000 mr/hr.

Expected time to complete the task is 30 minutes.

Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to determine the following:

1. Expected dose to be received by operator entering MST to isolate the leak

2. Determine the maximum stay time allowed to ensure 10CFR20.1201, Occupational Dose Limits for TEDE are NOT exceeded.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: Determine the expected dose the operator will receive by isolating the steam leak in MST.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that the operator would receive 1000 mrem while isolating the steam leak.

Main Steam Tunnel area dose rates are 2000 mrem/hr Stay time is 30 minutes/0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

Cumulative Dose = 2000 mrem/hr X 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months = 1000 mrem CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

A4 Page 4 of 4 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: Determine the maximum stay time based on initial conditions to ensure 10CFR20.1201, Occupational Dose Limits for TEDE of 5 rem are not exceeded.

STANDARD: The applicant determined maximum stay time based on initial conditions to ensure 10CFR20.1201, Occupational Dose Limits for TEDE of 5 rem are not exceeded 10CFR20.1201 TEDE limit = 5000 mrem Dose available to 10CFR20.1201 TEDE limit = 5000 mrem Max Stay Time = 5000 mrem / (2000 mrem / hr)

Max stay time = 2.5 hrs or 150 minutes CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant determines expected dose and maximum stay time IAW 10CFR20.1201, Occupational Dose Limits for TEDE.

STOP TIME:________

A5 Page 1 of 4 VERIFICATION OF CORE PARAMETERS FOLLOWING REACTIVITY MANIPULATION Operator:

License: SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

A5 Page 2 of 4 Facility: RBS JPM No: A5 Task

Title:

Verify Monitor Case Accurate Task No.:

System:

K/A Reference and Rating:

Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time:

Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has successfully completed EN-RE-215, Reactivity Maneuver Plan, Predictor to Case Comparison Form and verified all predicted vs actual parameters are within acceptable range.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

EN-RE-215, Reactivity Maneuver Plan Attachment 7, Predictor to Case Comparison Form Predictor Case Monitor Case Simulator Requirements:

N/A

A5 Page 3 of 4 Initial Conditions:

Mode 1 with startup in progress with average APRM readings at 75% Power.

Step 135 of Reactivity Maneuvering Plan RMP-RBS-22-010 was just completed to pull Group 10D rods from position 28 to 34.

Reactor Engineering is ready to perform Step 136 to raise core flow to 65.0% Core Flow.

You have predictor case for pulling Group 10D rods to position 34 and Core Monitor case following control rod movement for step 135.

Initiating Cues:

The Shift Manager has directed you as CRS to complete EN-RE-215, Reactivity Maneuver Plan Attachment 7, Predictor to Case Comparison Form and verify all predicted vs actual parameters are within acceptable range.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: Using the Predictor Case and the Core Monitor Case, fill out EN-RE-215, Reactivity Maneuver Plan Attachment 7, Predictor to Case Comparison Form.

STANDARD: The applicant completed EN-RE-215, Reactivity Maneuver Plan, Predictor to Case Comparison Form using given Predictor Case and Core Monitor Case.

CUE: Present applicant with Predictor Case, Core Monitor Case, and EN-RE-215, Reactivity Maneuver Plan Attachment 7, Predictor to Case Comparison Form NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

A5 Page 4 of 4 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: Verify all predicted values are within acceptable range of predicted vs actual parameters are within acceptable range of EN-RE-215, Reactivity Maneuver Plan Attachment 7, Predictor to Case Comparison Form as compared to the monitor case following the control rod withdrawal movement.

STANDARD: The applicant verified all values on comparison form are within acceptable range IAW EN-RE-215, Reactivity Maneuver Plan, Predictor to Case Comparison Form.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant has reviewed and completed the comparison form and determined that the predicted vs monitor control rod pattern following rod withdrawal does not match and is out of tolerance.

STOP TIME:________

A6 Page 1 of 7 DETERMINATION OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL Operator:

License (Circle one):SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

A6 Page 2 of 7 Facility: RBS JPM No: A6 Task

Title:

DETERMINE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL USING EOP ENCL. 23 Task No.: 200063005001 System: 223001 K/A Reference and Rating: 2.1.25/3.9 Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The applicant determined RPV water level is less than -211 inches and the EOPs should be exited because adequate core cooling does not exist.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

EOP-5, Enclosure 23, CONTAINMENT PRESSURE AND WATER LEVEL DETERMINATION EOP-1, RPV Control Calculator Simulator Requirements:

N/A

A6 Page 3 of 7 Initial Conditions:

Containment pressure from CMS-PI17A on CMS-PNL10A (Aux Bldg EL 141 ft) reads 5 psig and stable.

E51-PIR002, RCIC SUCTION PRESS (RCIC pump room EL 74 ft.) reads 27.5 psig and stable.

Only HPCS is injecting in the RPV with a flowrate of 5050 gpm and stable.

NO OTHER injection source available Initiating Cues:

You have been directed to correlate RPV water level to Containment water level IAW Enclosure 5 of EOP-5 and determine if adequate core cooling exists. After determining RPV water level, determine which action to direct IAW EOP-1, RPV Control.

START TIME:________

A6 Page 4 of 7 NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE:

Using Enclosure 23 graph 8, determine Containment water level and correlate it to RPV water level.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that Containment water level is 55.8 ft which correlates to somewhere between 55 feet and and 57 feet.

Referring to "Primary Containment Water Level Determination" graph Figure 8.

PCWL = [(ECCS Suction Press - CTMT Press) 2.3] + 4 PCWL = [(27.5 - 5) 2.3] + 4 = 55.8 ft = -236.4 inches.

Acceptable RWL = -246 to -222 inches OR using the graph:

A6 Page 5 of 7 Correlate Containment water level to RPV water level with table 1:

PCWL is 55 to 56 feet RWL is -246 to -222 inches RPV water level is less than -211 inches.

CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL TASK: YES GRADE: U/S

A6 Page 6 of 7 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: Per EOP-1, RPV Control, determine the next appropriate action based on determination of RPV water level.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that the next action required IAW EOP-1 is to exit the EOPs and enter the SAPs.

Adequate core cooling DOES NOT exist when RPV level is less than -

211 inches regardless of HPCS flow > 5000 gpm.

With RPV level < -211 inches with no L1 or L2 systems available then EOPs must be exited and Entry into the SAPs is required IAW RL-11.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL TASK: YES GRADE: U/S

A6 Page 7 of 7 TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant has determined RPV water level and the appropriate action to take IAW EOP-1.

This completes the JPM STOP TIME:________

A7 Page 1 of 5 LPRM OPERABILITY Operator:

License: SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

A7 Page 2 of 5 Facility: RBS JPM No: A7 Task

Title:

DETERMINE OPERABILITY OF DEGRADED OR NON-CONFORMING EQUIPMENT Task No.: 300002003002 System: 215005 K/A Reference and Rating: G 2.2.37/4.6 Time-Critical STEP: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has successfully performed Steps 4.1.9 through 4.1.13 of REP-0037, LPRM Operability, and correctly filled out Attachment 2.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

REP-0037, LPRM Operability General

References:

Student Handout #1 Student Handout #2 Simulator Requirements:

N/A

A7 Page 3 of 5 Initial Conditions:

LPRM 2C-22-39 has failed downscale on APRM A.

Steps 4.1.1 through 4.1.8 of REP-0037, LPRM OPERABILITY, have been completed.

LPRMs highlighted in handout #1 are bypassed.

Initiating Cues:

As CRS you are tasked to perform Steps 4.1.9 through 4.1.12 of REP-0037, LPRM Operability, and record that information on Attachment 2. Steps 4.1.1 through 4.1.7 have been completed.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.1.9) Verify that no more than 33 LPRM signals are bypassed.

1. Record the number of bypassed LPRMs on Attachment 2.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that 19 LPRMs are currently bypassed and recorded that information on Attachment 2.

CUE: Hand applicant a copy of REP-0037, LPRM Operability, and Student Handout #1 NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

A7 Page 4 of 5 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.1.10) Determine the number of LPRMs that are in OPERATE by placing the METER FUNCTION SWITCH for the selected APRM on the panel meter in the COUNT position.

1. There is one LPRM for every 5% division.

2. Divide the meter value by 5.

3. Record the number on Attachment 2.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that 13 LPRMs are in OPERATE and recorded that information on Attachment 2.

65%/5 = 13 LPRMs.

CUE: Hand applicant Student Handout #2.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.1.11) Operations will determine if bypassing the LPRM will render its APRM inoperable per Step 3.2.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that APRM A is inoperable per Step 3.2 and recorded that information on Attachment 2.

CUE: N/A NOTES: (Step 3.2) Each APRM must have 2 operable LPRM inputs per level and a minimum of 11 operable LPRMs to be operable as required by Technical Specification Bases B3.3.1.1.2a-d.

CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

A7 Page 5 of 5 STEP NO: 4 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.1.12) Operations will determine if bypassing the LPRM will render PBDS channel A or B inoperable per Step 3.3.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that bypassing the LPRM will NOT render PBDS channel A inoperable per Step 3.3.

CUE: N/A NOTES: (Step 3.3) Each PBDS channel (APRM A & B only) must have 8 valid LPRM inputs as required by Technical Specification Bases B3.3.1.3.

CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When Applicant has completed Steps 4.1.9 through 4.1.12 of REP-0037, LPRM Operability, successfully and recorded that information on Attachment 2.

STOP TIME:________

A8 Page 1 of 4 DETERMINE DOSE AND ENTRY REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH DOSE EVOLUTION Operator:

License:SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

A8 Page 2 of 4 Facility: RBS JPM No: A8 Task

Title:

Determine Dose and Entry Requirements for High Dose Evolution Task No.: 301023005003 System: N/A K/A Reference and Rating: G 2.3.12 / 3.2 Time-Critical task: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has successfully determined expected dose from the evolution is 22 rem, the authorized dose during the emergency is 25 rem, and completed the EP-4-ALL form.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

EN-RP-201, Dosimetry Administration, Rev4 EP-4-ALL, Exposure Authorization Form 10CFR20.1201, Occupational Dose Limits Calculator Simulator Requirements:

N/A

A8 Page 3 of 4 Initial Conditions:

Site Area Emergency has been declared due to steam leak in the Main Steam Tunnel. The leak needs to be isolated to protect the health and safety of the public.

Dose rates in the vicinity of the steam leak isolation are 11 rem per hour.

Expected time to complete the task is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Individual has NOT volunteered to complete the task.

Initiating Cues:

As Emergency Director you must determine / complete the following IAW :

1. What is the Estimated Planned Dose for isolating the MST steam leak?

2. What is the Authorized Emergency Dose for the worker isolating the steam leak?

3. As Emergency Director complete the EP-4-ALL authorization form.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: Determine the Estimated Planned Dose the operator will receive by isolating the steam leak in MST.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that the operator would receive 22 rem while isolating the steam leak.

Main Steam Tunnel area dose rates are 11,000 mrem/hr Stay time is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Cumulative Dose = 11,000 mrem/hr X 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months = 22,000 mrem, 22 rem CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

A8 Page 4 of 4 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: Determine the Authorized Emergency Dose for the worker to isolate the MST steam leak.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that the Authorized Emergency Dose is 25 Rem.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: Complete the EP-4-ALL complete the EP-4-ALL authorization form.

STANDARD: The applicant completed the EP-4-ALL authorization form.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant determines expected dose and maximum stay time IAW 10CFR20.1201, Occupational Dose Limits for TEDE.

STOP TIME:________

A9 Page 1 of 4 EMERGENCY DECLARATION Operator:

License: SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

A9 Page 2 of 4 Facility: RBS JPM No: A9 Task

Title:

IMPLEMENT EMERGENCY PLANS Task No.: 301039005003 System: N/A K/A Reference and Rating: 2.4.38/4.4 Time-Critical Task: YES Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has successfully determined the appropriate EAL classification for the provided plant conditions was an ALERT and completed the short form within 15 minutes of reading the cue.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies EIP-2-001, Emergency Action Level EAL Chart Simulator Requirements:

N/A

A9 Page 3 of 4 Initial Conditions:

The Plant is in MODE 4 preparing for a Refueling outage Wind speed is 5 mph from 180 degrees Containment Closure is Established At 1000 an Earthquake occurred bringing in the following alarms and causing multiple transients:

o Annunciator P680-02A-C06, SEISMIC EVENT HIGH o Annunciator P680-02A-B06, SEISMIC EVENT o Spent Fuel Pool water level has lowered to 110 ft and is stable.

o Preferred station transformers RTX-XSR1C and RTX-XSR1D are completely damaged and only DIV 2 4160 AC bus has powered. DIV 1 Diesel Generator has lost all starting capability.

o RPV water level is -150 inches and stable.

Initiating Cues:

This is a time critical JPM. Your time starts when the initiating cue is completed.

Determine the correct emergency classification and fill out the associated short form for the event.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: Determine the correct emergency classification.

STANDARD: The applicant determines ALERT is highest level of EAL classification.

CUE: N/A NOTES:

The 15 minute time limit after the applicant has read and understood the initial conditions and initiating cue.

CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

A9 Page 4 of 4 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: Complete Alert Short Form within 15 minutes time frame STANDARD: The applicant completed the Alert Short form within 15 minutes.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant has completed the short form.

STOP TIME:________

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: ________RBS _______________ Date of Examination: _____________

Operating Test Number: _2022_____

Exam Level:

RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems

a. S1. Alternating CRD Pumps S1 A-N-S 1

b. S2. Alternating CCS Pumps A-N-S 8

c. S3. HPCS CST to CST flow test A-EN-N-S 2

d. S4. CMS Hydrogen Analyzer Ctmt sample N-EN-S 5

e. S5. Supplying Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger(s) from NSW N-E-S 4

f. S6.Control Rod Withdrawal Limiter test A-N-S 7

g. S7. Paralleling the DIV 1 Diesel Generator D-S 6

h. S8. Overriding high rad signal for Fuel Building Ventilation L-N-S 9

In-Plant Systems

i. P1. Enclosure 5-Defeating MSR interlocks D-E-L-R 3

j. P2. Reduce RCIC flow on RSS A-E--N-L 4

k. P3. Restoration of Fuel Building Dampers N-E-L-R 9

Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U Req Actual Req Actual Req Actual (A)lternate path 4-6 5

4-6 5

2-3 5

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

2 8

1 4

1 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

3 1

3 (EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 2

1 2

(L)ow power/shutdown 1

3 1

3 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 9

2 9

1 9

(P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 0

3 0

2 0

(R)adiologically controlled area 1

2 1

2 (S)imulator

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.

One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

8 4

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

1 1

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1

1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1

1 1

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2

1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3

2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1

1 1

(S)imulator

Control Room Systems S1. ALTERNATING CRD PUMPS:

K/A: 201001 A2.14 Low drive header pressure Rating: 3.9 Section 6.1 of SOP-2. The Applicant will start the standby pump and secure the other pump.

Alternate Path-The procedure prompts the operator to check drive water D/P is 250 PSID and if not adjust it per section 6.16. D/P will be 230 PSID.

S2. ALTERNATING CCS PUMPS:

K/A: 400000 A4.01 CCW indications and control Rating: 3.8 Section 5.1 of SOP-12. The Applicant will start the standby pump.

Alternate Path-The procedure prompts the operator to check motor amps. The motor overload alarm will come in. The Applicant will stop the pump.

S3. HPCS MANUAL STARTUP CST TO CST:

K/A: 209002 A2.01 Automatic system initiation Rating: 4.5 Section 4.5 of SOP-30. The Applicant will start the pump.

Alternate Path-An auto initiation signal will come in after the pumps is started. The Applicant will secure the system IAW AOP-34.

S4. MANUAL CMS SYSTEM STARTUP AND OPERATION:

K/A: 223001 A1.05 Hydrogen concentration Rating: 3.7 Section 4.2 of SOP-84. The Applicant will start the system and sample the RWCU valve nest room.

S5. SUPPLYING FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER(S) FROM SERVICE WATER:

K/A: 510000 A4.02 Valve operations Rating: 3.6 Section 5.9 of SOP-16. The Applicant will manipulate a total of 10 valves.

Control Room Systems S6. ROD WITHDRAWAL LIMITER FUNCTIONAL TEST:

K/A: 201005 A2.13 Rod drift Rating: 4.4 STP-500-0704. The Applicant will start on step 8.

Alternate Path-The control rod will drift out when the applicant tests the rod block signal.

The applicant should fully insert the control rod.

S7. PARALLELING THE DIV 1 DIESEL GENERATOR:

K/A: 264000 A4.01 Voltage/Frequency: 4.1 Section 4.5 of SOP-53. The Applicant will start on step 13. The Applicant will adjust voltage and frequency and then close the diesel output breaker.

S8. OVERRIDING HIGH RAD SIGNAL FOR FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION:

K/A: 288000 A2.04 High Radiation Rating: 3.6 Section 5.4 of SOP-62. The Applicant will start on step 4. The Applicant will manipulate two override switches, open 2 dampers, start a supply fan, and close two dampers.

In-Plant Systems P1. ENCLOSURE 5:

K/A: 288000 AA1.05 Reactor/turbine pressure regulating system Rating: 3.9 of EOP-5. The applicant will simulate performing actions to defeat the Main Turbine cross-around pressure closure signals for MSR steam supply valves.

Note-The JPM takes place in the RCA/Turbine Bldg.

P2. REDUCE RCIC FLOW IAW AOP-31:

K/A: 288000 AA1.11 RCIC Rating: 4.2 2 of AOP-31. The Applicant will attempt to throttle two valves to establish desired flow rate. One of the valves will not open.

Alternate Path-The Applicant will have to make flow adjustments with the flow controller instead.

P3. RESTORATION OF FUEL BUILDING DAMPERS :

K/A: 295035 EK2.01 Secondary containment ventilation Rating: 3.8

.2 of AOP-31. The Applicant will simulate manipulating two manual valves.

Note-The JPM takes place in the RCA/Fuel Bldg.

P1 Page 1 of 4 DEFEATING MSR INTERLOCKS Operator:

License (Circle one):RO / SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

P1 Page 2 of 4 Facility: RBS JPM No: P1 Task

Title:

BYPASS MSR STEAM SUPPLY VALVES INTERLOCK PER EOP ENCL. 5 Task No.: 200037005001 System: 239001 K/A Reference and Rating: EA1.01/3.1 Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has placed MSS-H/S30A and 30B in the MANUAL position, HRS-H/A108 in OFF, and manually adjusting pressure to 15 psig using MSS-H/S30A(B). The applicants actions did not degrade the condition of the plant beyond that introduced by the JPM as developed.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

ENCLOSURE 5 - DEFEATING MSR STEAM SUPPLY VALVES INTERLOCK.

Simulator Requirements:

N/A

P1 Page 3 of 4 Initial Conditions:

A Plant transient has occurred, and the CRS has entered EOP-1, RPV Control RPV Pressure cannot be stabilized from the MCR and requires actions in the field Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to perform Steps 3.1.1 through 3.1.3 of Enclosure 5, DEFEATING MSR STEAM SUPPLY VALVES INTERLOCK.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 3.1) At TB 123 el, north at MSS-PNL104, MSR Steam Feed Control Panel, PERFORM the following:

(Step 3.1.1) PLACE HRS-H/A108 in OFF STANDARD: The applicant placed HRS-H/A108 in OFF by turning the clockwise direction.

CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

P1 Page 4 of 4 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: (Step 3.1.2) PLACE MSS-H/S30A and 30B in the MANUAL position STANDARD: The applicant placed MSS-H/S30A and 30B in the MANUAL position.

CUE: MSS-H/S30A and 30B are in the MANUAL position.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 3.1.3) ADJUST the output of MSS-H/S30A(B) to 15 psig as indicated on REHEAT INLETMANUAL LOADING PRESSURE indicator to fully open MSS-PVRSLLV1(V2),MSR1(2) LOW LOAD VALVE AND MSS-PVRSHLV1(V2), MSR1(2) HIGH LOAD VALVE.

STANDARD: The applicant adjusted the output of MSS-H/S30A(B) to 15 psig as indicated on REHEAT INLETMANUAL LOADING PRESSURE indicator by turning the knobs in the clockwise direction.

CUE: Show applicant cue card #1 denoting pressure gauge reading 15 psig.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant adjusts MSS-H/S30B to 15 psig.

STOP TIME:________

P2 Page 1 of 5 REDUCING RCIC FLOW AT THE RSS PANEL Operator:

License (Circle one):RO / SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

P2 Page 2 of 5 Facility: RBS JPM No: P1 Task

Title:

MAINTAIN RPV PRESSURE FROM RSS PANEL Task No.: 400053004001 System: 239001 K/A Reference and Rating: EA1.01/3.1 Time-Critical STEP: NO Alternate Path: YES Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has attempted to adjust RCIC flow with the flow controller with no success and then proceeded to open E51-F059 and throttle E51-F022. The applicants actions did not degrade the condition of the plant beyond that introduced by the JPM as developed.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

AOP-0031, SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM Attachment 12 Simulator Requirements:

N/A

P2 Page 3 of 5 Initial Conditions:

A fire in the MCR has occurred and the MCR has been evacuated IAW AOP-31.

RCIC is injecting 600 gpm with flow controller in AUTO RCIC turbine speed is 3500 rpm.

Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to perform Step 1.1.3.2.2 of AOP-31 Attachment 12 to reduce RCIC flow to 400 gpm by preferably using C61-FICR001, RCIC TURBINE FLOW CONTROLLER.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 1.1.3.2.2) IF RPV level control requires RCIC flow to be reduced, THEN perform one of the following:

Adjust C61-FICR001, RCIC TURBINE FLOW CONTROLLER to obtain the desired flow.

STANDARD: The applicant adjusted C61-FICR001, RCIC TURBINE FLOW CONTROLLER to 400 gpm.

CUE: Show applicant cue card #1 depicting flow controller setpoint at 400 gpm and flow at still at 600 gpm.

NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S

P2 Page 4 of 5 ALTERNATE PATH STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: (Step 1.1.3.2.2) Establish an alternate flow path to the CST as follows:

Open E51-F059, RCIC TEST RETURN VLV TO CST STANDARD: The applicant opened E51-F059, RCIC TEST RETURN VLV TO CST, by placing the hand switch in the open position and verifying the RED light is ON and the GREEN light is OFF.

CUE: Show applicant light indication cue card with lights indicating RED light is ON and the GREEN light is OFF.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

P2 Page 5 of 5 STEP NO:3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 1.1.3.2.2) Throttle E51-F022, RCIC TEST BYPASS VLV TO CST to control injection flow rate, maintaining RCIC Turbine speed greater than 1700 rpm and less than 4600 rpm.

STANDARD: The applicant throttled opened E51-F022, RCIC TEST BYPASS VLV TO CST to control injection flow rate while maintaining RCIC Turbine speed greater than 1700 rpm and less than 4600 rpm.

CUE: Show applicant light indication cue card with lights indicating RED light is ON and the GREEN light is ON. Next, show applicant cue #2 depicting RCIC turbine speed at 3200 rpm.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant throttles open E51-F022, RCIC TEST BYPASS VLV TO CST.

STOP TIME:________

P3 Page 1 of 8 RESTORATION OF FUEL BUILDING DAMPERS Operator:

License (Circle one):RO / SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

P3 Page 2 of 8 Facility: RBS JPM No: P3 Task

Title:

PERFORM DUTIES OF REACTOR BUILDING OPERATOR DURING IMPLEMENTATION OF AOP-0031 Task No.: 400002004004 System: 288000 K/A Reference and Rating: AA2.09/3.1 Time-Critical STEP: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has completed Attachment 7.2 of AOP-0031. The applicants actions did not degrade the condition of the plant beyond that introduced by the JPM as developed.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

AOP-0031, SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM Attachment 7.2 Simulator Requirements:

N/A

P3 Page 3 of 8 Initial Conditions:

A fire in the MCR has occurred The MCR has been evacuated IAW AOP-31

.2 package from the RSS-1 file cabinet has been obtained Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to perform Attachment 7.2 of AOP-31 to restore the Fuel Building Dampers.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 1) Obtain the Attachment 7.2 package from RSS-1 file cabinet.

STANDARD: N/A CUE: The Attachment 7.2 package has been obtained.

NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S

P3 Page 4 of 8 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: (Step 2) At Fuel Building 148 ft el, perform the following for Div I HVF Dampers:

(Step 2.1) In the southwest corner near the stairwell, close IAS-V596, IAS SUPPLY ISOL TO A FUEL BUILDING DAMPERS.

STANDARD: The applicant closed IAS-V596, IAS SUPPLY ISOL TO A FUEL BUILDING DAMPERS by rotating the valve in the clockwise direction.

CUE: Resistance is felt in the clockwise direction NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 2.2) In Fuel Bldg Charcoal Filter Room A, remove the cap on HVF-AOD33A-V1, IAS DAMPER DRAIN VALVE.

STANDARD: The applicant removed the cap on HVF-AOD33A-V1, IAS DAMPER DRAIN VALVE.

CUE: Notify applicant that the cap is removed.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

P3 Page 5 of 8 STEP NO: 4 PERFORMANCE: (Step 2.3) Open HVF-AOD33A-V1, IAS DAMPER DRAIN VALVE to bleed air from the Div IHVF Damper air supply header.

STANDARD: The applicant opened HVF-AOD33A-V1, IAS DAMPER DRAIN VALVE air bled air from the Div I HVF Damper air supply header.

CUE: Air can be heard flowing out.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 5 PERFORMANCE: (Step 2.4) The following dampers will fail to their desired positions:

HVF-AOD31A, FAN 3A DISCH OPEN

HVF-AOD20A, FILTER 2A INLET OPEN

HVF-AOD37A, FUEL BLDG ALT AIR SUPPLY OPEN

HVF-AOD122, FUEL BLDG AIR SPLY ISOL CLOSED

HVF-AOD102, FUEL BLDG EXH FAN INLET CLOSED

HVF-AOD3A, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL INLET CLOSED

HVF-AOD33A, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DISCH CLOSED

HVF-AOD104 FUEL BLDG EXH ISOL CLOSED STANDARD: N/A CUE: Notify applicant that the dampers failed to their desired positions.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S

P3 Page 6 of 8 STEP NO: 6 PERFORMANCE: (Step 3) At Fuel Building 148 ft el, perform the following for Div II HVF Dampers:

(Step 3.1) At the southwest corner, west wall, close IAS-V597, IAS SUPPLY ISOL AB FUEL BLDG DAMPERS.

STANDARD: The applicant closed IAS-V596, IAS SUPPLY ISOL TO A FUEL BUILDING DAMPERS by rotating the valve in the clockwise direction.

CUE: Resistance is felt in the clockwise direction NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 7 PERFORMANCE: (Step 3.2) In Fuel Bldg Charcoal Filter Room B, remove the cap on HVF-AOD33A-V1, IAS DAMPER DRAIN VALVE.

STANDARD: The applicant removed the cap on HVF-AOD33B-V1, IAS DAMPER DRAIN VALVE.

CUE: Notify applicant that the cap is removed.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

P3 Page 7 of 8 STEP NO: 8 PERFORMANCE: (Step 3.3) Open HVF-AOD33B-V1, IAS DAMPER DRAIN VALVE to bleed air from the Div IHVF Damper air supply header.

STANDARD: The applicant opened HVF-AOD33B-V1, IAS DAMPER DRAIN VALVE air bled air from the Div II HVF Damper air supply header.

CUE: Air can be heard flowing out.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

P3 Page 8 of 8 STEP NO: 9 PERFORMANCE: (Step 2.4) The following dampers will fail to their desired positions:

HVF-AOD31B, FAN 3B DISCH OPEN

HVF-AOD20B, FILTER 2B INLET OPEN

HVF-AOD37B, FUEL BLDG ALT AIR SUPPLY OPEN

HVF-AOD101, FUEL BLDG AIR SPLY ISOL CLOSED

HVF-AOD112, FUEL BLDG EXH FAN INLET CLOSED

HVF-AOD3B, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL INLET CLOSED

HVF-AOD33B, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DISCH CLOSED

HVF-AOD137, FUEL BLDG EXH ISOL CLOSED STANDARD: N/A CUE: Notify applicant that the dampers failed to their desired positions.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant bleeds air out of the Div II HVF Damper air supply header.

STOP TIME:________

S1 Page 1 of 8 ALTERNATE CRD PUMPS Operator:

License (Circle one):RO / SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

S1 Page 2 of 8 Facility: RBS JPM No: S1 Task

Title:

Shift CRD Pumps Task No.: 201007001001 System: 201001 K/A Reference and Rating: A2.14/3.9 Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: YES Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has started CRD Pump A, secured Pump B, and raised CRD drive water D/P to 250 psid. The applicants actions did not degrade the condition of the plant beyond that introduced by the JPM as developed.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

SOP-2, Control Rod Drive Hydraulics Simulator Requirements:

IC #100

S1 Page 3 of 8 Initial Conditions:

CRD Pump B is running and CRD Pump A is in standby.

Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to alternate CRD pumps per SOP-2, Control Rod Drive Hydraulics, Section 6.1 starting on Step 1d. Steps 1a-c are completed. The Reactor Building Operator is standing by to assist as necessary.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 1d) START C11-C001AP, CRD AUX OIL PUMP A.

STANDARD: The applicant started CRD Pump A.

CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL TASK: YES GRADE: U/S

S1 Page 4 of 8 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: (Step 1e) ENSURE white light comes on for C11-C001A, CRD PUMP A.

STANDARD: The applicant verified the white light comes on for C11-C001A, CRD PUMP A.

CUE: N/A NOTES:

The white light is an indication that the oil pressure start permissive for the CRD Pump is met.

CRITICAL TASK: NO GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 1f) START C11-C001A, CRD PUMP A and IMMEDIATELY PERFORM the following:

SLOWLY OPEN C11-VF014A, CRD PMP A DISCH STOP CHECK VLV STANDARD: The applicant started CRD Pump A and directed the Reactor Building operator to open C11-VF014A, CRD PMP A DISCH STOP CHECK VLV.

CUE: When requested, immediately report C11-VF014A, CRD PMP A DISCH STOP CHECK VLV is fully open.

NOTES: None CRITICAL TASK: YES GRADE: U/S

S1 Page 5 of 8 STEP NO: 4 PERFORMANCE: (Step 1g) ENSURE CRD Pump A is operating properly.

STANDARD: The applicant ensured that CRD Pump A was operating properly.

CUE: When requested, immediately report post start checks on CRD Pump A are completed SATISFACTORY.

NOTES: The applicant should observe indications like system flow, pressure, and motor amperage.

CRITICAL TASK: NO GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 5 PERFORMANCE: (Step 2) CHECK CRD System flow has stabilized.

STANDARD: The applicant verified CRD system flow has stabilized.

CUE: N/A NOTES: The applicant should observe flow indications.

CRITICAL TASK: NO GRADE: U/S

S1 Page 6 of 8 STEP NO: 6 PERFORMANCE: (Step 3a) PERFORM the following steps for the CRD Pump to be stopped:

a. CLOSE C11-VF014A, CRD PMP A DISCH STOP CHECK VLV.

STANDARD: The applicant directed Reactor Building Operator to close C11-VF014B, CRD PMP B DISCH STOP CHECK VLV.

CUE: When requested, immediately report C11-VF014B, CRD PMP B DISCH STOP CHECK VLV fully closed.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL TASK: NO GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 7 PERFORMANCE: (Step 3b) STOP C11-C001A(B), CRD PUMP B.

STANDARD: The applicant stopped C11-C001B, CRD PUMP B.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL TASK: YES GRADE: U/S

S1 Page 7 of 8 ALTERNATE PATH STEP NO: 8 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4) CHECK pressure and flow of the CRD system are normal.

a. IF pressure and flow of the CRD system are NOT normal, THEN:

1) ADJUST C11-R600, CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW FLOW CONTROLLER C11-F002A/B per Section 6.17 to obtain a system flow rate of 41 to 49 gpm.

2) ADJUST C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VALVE per Section 6.16 to obtain an indicated value for Drive Water Differential Pressure of 250 psid.

STANDARD: The applicant determined that system flow was satisfactory, but drive water pressure was below 250 psid.

CUE: N/A NOTES: Drive Water D/P will be approximately 230 psid requiring adjustment.

CRITICAL TASK: YES GRADE: U/S

S1 Page 8 of 8 STEP NO: 9 PERFORMANCE:

(Step 6.16) Adjusting CRD Drive Water Differential Pressure NOTE CRD drive water differential pressure is indicated on C11-R602, DRIVE WTR DIFF PRESS located at H13-P601.

1.

IF drive water differential pressure is high, THEN THROTTLE OPEN C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VALVE, to the desired pressure as indicated on C11-R602, DRIVE WTR DIFF PRESS.

2.

IF drive water differential pressure is low, THEN THROTTLE CLOSED C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VALVE, to the desired pressure as indicated on C11-R602, DRIVE WTR DIFF PRESS.

STANDARD: The applicant raised drive water differential pressure by throttling closed on C11-F003, CRD DRIVE WATER PRESS CONTROL VALVE.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL TASK: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant adjusts drive water differential pressure to 250 psid.

STOP TIME:________

S2 Page 1 of 6 ALTERNATE CCS PUMPS Operator:

License (Circle one):RO / SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

S2 Page 2 of 6 Facility: RBS JPM No:S2 Task

Title:

ALTERNATE CCS PUMPS Task No.: 274009001001 System: 400000 K/A Reference and Rating: A4.01/3.8 Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: YES Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has started and then secured CCS-P1C for excessive motor amperage. The applicants actions did not degrade the condition of the plant beyond that introduced by the JPM as developed.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment)

SOP-0017, TURBINE PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER ARP-870-55, ALARM RESPONSE Simulator Requirements:

IC #100

S2 Page 3 of 6 Initial Conditions:

TPCCW Pumps CCS-P1A and CCS-P1B are running.

CCS-P1C in standby.

Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to alternate Turbine Plant Component Cooling Water Pumps from CCS-P1A to CCS-P1C IAW SOP-0017, Section 5.1 steps 5.1.1 through 5.1.5. The Reactor Building Operator is in the field to assist as necessary.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.1.1) Verify TPCCW pump C in standby by depressing RESET pushbutton on the CCS-P1C, TPCCW PUMP Control Switch.

STANDARD: The applicant verified CCS-P1C is in standby by depressing RESET pushbutton for CCS-P1C, TPCCW PUMP Control Switch CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL TASK: NO GRADE: U/S

S2 Page 4 of 6 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.1.2) Verify white light above the CCS-P1C Handswitch is on.

STANDARD: The applicant verified the white light above CCS-P1C handswtich is lit.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL TASK: NO GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.1.3) Vent the TPCCW Pump to be started via the associated vent valves:

CCS-V27, PUMP CCS-P1C VENT VALVE CCS-V45, PUMP CCS-P1C VENT VALVE CCS-V46, PUMP CCS-P1C VENT VALVE STANDARD: The applicant directed the Reactor Building operator to perform step 5.1.3.

CUE: When applicant calls the Reactor Building Operator to perform step 5.1.3 inform the applicant that step 5.1.3 is complete.

NOTES: N/A CRITICAL TASK: NO GRADE: U/S

S2 Page 5 of 6 STEP NO: 4 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.1.4) Start the standby CCS-P1C, TPCCW PUMP and verify the following:

1. CCS-P1C, TPCCW PUMP starts.

2. CCS-MOV15C, TPCCW PUMP DISCH VLV opens.

3. CCS-P1C, TPCCW PUMP MOTOR AMPS are normal.

STANDARD: The applicant started CCS-P1C and verified CCS-MOV15C.

CUE: N/A NOTES: When applicant is verifying CCS-P1C amps they will be abnormally high and annunciator H13-P870/55A/F02, TURB CMPNT CLG WATER PUMP 1C OVERLOAD will alarm on H13-P870 CRITICAL TASK: YES GRADE: U/S

S2 Page 6 of 6 ALTERNATE PATH STEP NO: 5 PERFORMANCE: ARP-870-55 OPERATOR ACTION IF not able to immediately determine cause of alarm, THEN stop CCS-P1C, TPCCW PUMP 1C.

STANDARD: The applicant referenced ARP-870-55 and stopped CCS-P1C, TPCCW PUMP 1C.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL TASK: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant secures CCS-P1C for high motor amps IAW ARP.

STOP TIME:________

S3 Page 1 of 7 HPCS CST TO CST WITH INITIATION SIGNAL Operator:

License (Circle one):RO / SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

S3 Page 2 of 7 Facility: RBS JPM No: S3 Task

Title:

HPCS startup CST to CST Task No.: 206008001001 System: 209002 K/A Reference and Rating: A2.01/4.5 Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: YES Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has swapped RCIC suction path, started the HPCS pump, throttled open the CST test return valves, and then overridden the injection valve after an initiation signal is received. The applicants actions did not degrade the condition of the plant beyond that introduced by the JPM as developed.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

SOP-0030, High Pressure Core Spray AOP-0034, INADVERTENT INITIATION OF AN ECCS OR RCIC Simulator Requirements:

IC #101

S3 Page 3 of 7 Initial Conditions:

HPCS system is in a normal standby lineup Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to start the HPCS Pump in CST to CST flow configuration IAW SOP-30, Section 4.5 and adjust HPCS flow to 5000 gpm START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.5.1) Verify RCIC suction path is aligned to the Suppression Pool as follows:

1. Close E51-F010, RCIC PUMP CST SUCTION VALVE.

2. WHEN E51-F010 indicates dual indication, THEN open E51-F031, RCIC PUMP SUP PL SUCTION VALVE.

3. Verify both valves fully stoke to prevent adding excessive amounts of water to the Suppression Pool.

STANDARD: The applicant closed E51-F010, RCIC Pump CST Suction Valve and once valve indicates dual indication (red and green lights lit) then applicant opened E51-F031, RCIC PUMP SUP PL SUCTION VALVE.

CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S3 Page 4 of 7 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.5.2) Verify E22-F001, HPCS PUMP CST SUCTION VALVE is open.

STANDARD: The applicant verified E22-F001, HPCS PUMP CST SUCTION VALVE is open.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S

S3 Page 5 of 7 STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.5.3) Start the HPCS Pump and verify the following:

1.HPCS Pump motor current is less than or equal to 350 amps on E22 R616, HPCS PUMP MOTOR AMPS.

2. WHEN HPCS Pump discharge pressure rises above 300 psig on E22 R601, HPCS PUMP DISCH PRESSURE, THEN E22 F012, HPCS MIN FLOW VALVE TO SUPPRESSION POOL opens.

STANDARD: The applicant started HPCS Pump and verified motor amps are less than or equal to 350 amps and verified E22 F012, HPCS MIN FLOW VALVE TO SUPPRESSION POOL opened when pressure is above 300 psig.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S3 Page 6 of 7 CAUTION Operating E22-F010, HPCS TEST BYPASS VLV TO CST, and E22-F011, HPCS TEST RETURN VALVE TO CST in unequal amounts results in excessive seat erosion. Do not operate E22-F010 and E22-F011 in unequal amounts.

STEP NO: 4 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.5.4) Simultaneously open the following valves until flow rises above 750 gpm on E22-R603, HPCS FLOW and E22-F012, HPCS MIN FLOW VALVE TO SUPPRESSION POOL closes:

E22-F010, HPCS TEST BYPASS VLV TO CST E22-F011, HPCS TEST RETURN VLV TO CST STANDARD:

Applicant simultaneously opened E22-F010, HPCS TEST BYPASS VLV TO CST and E22-F011, HPCS TEST RETURN VLV TO CST.

CUE: N/A NOTES: When HPCS flow is greater than 1000 gpm, an auto initiation signal will be received.

HPCS INITIATION LOW RX WATER LEVEL H13-P601/16A/A04 CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S3 Page 7 of 7 ALTERNATE PATH STEP NO: 5 PERFORMANCE: AOP-0034 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION:

IF HPCS initiated, THEN override E22-F004, HPCS Injection valve.

STANDARD: The applicant closed the E22-F004, HPCS Injection valve.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant has overridden and closed E22-F004, HPCS Injection valve.

This completes the JPM STOP TIME:________

S4 Page 1 of 6 SAMPLE CONTAINMENT THROUGH CMS Operator:

License (Circle one):RO / SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

S4 Page 2 of 6 Facility: RBS JPM No: S4 Task

Title:

OPERATE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERIC MONITORING MANUALLY Task No.: 223009001001 System: 223001 K/A Reference and Rating: K3.04/3.5 Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has started Div I H2 Analyzer, selected CMS-SOV33G, and deselected CMS-SOV33E. The applicants actions did not degrade the condition of the plant beyond that introduced by the JPM as developed.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

SOP-84, CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING SYSTEM Simulator Requirements:

IC #101

S4 Page 3 of 6 Initial Conditions:

Instrumentation and Controls is testing the Div I Hydrogen Analyzer and the CMS-SOV33G, RWCU Valve Nest Sample Inlet valve.

Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you manually startup the Div I hydrogen analyzer and sample the RWCU Valve Nest Room via CMS-SOV33G IAW SOP-84, CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING SYSTEM, section 4.2, steps 4.2.1 through 4.2.5. I&C and another operator will monitor the analyzer per 4.2.6 - 4.2.7.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted

S4 Page 4 of 6 STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.2) Manual System Startup and Operation (Step 4.2.1) Place the H2 ANALYZER (OFF/AUTO/ON) Switch to ON and verify the following:

1. H2 ANALYZER (OFF/AUTO/ON) starts.

2. CMS-P7A(B), H2 SAMPLE PUMP starts.

3. The H2 ANALYZER INLET SAMPLE Switch illuminates to indicate area selected (CONTMT/DRYWELL).

4. The selected sample valve opens (RED and WHITE lights on).

STANDARD: The applicant placed Div I H2 Analyzer switch to ON and verified:

1. H2 ANALYZER (OFF/AUTO/ON) started.

2. CMS-P7A(B), H2 SAMPLE PUMP started.

3. The H2 ANALYZER INLET SAMPLE Switch illuminated to indicate area selected (CONTMT/DRYWELL).

4. The selected sample valve opened (RED and WHITE lights on).

CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S4 Page 5 of 6 STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.2.2) Place H2 ANALYZER MANUAL/AUTO SELECTOR Switch to MANUAL and observe illumination of the corresponding White Light.

STANDARD: The applicant placed H2 Analyzer Manual/Auto selector switch to MANUAL.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 4 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.2.3) Verify the H2 Analyzer Inlet Sample Selector Switch is aligned to the desired area (i.e. CONTMT or DRYWELL).

STANDARD: The Applicant verified that H2 Analyzer Inlet sample selector switch is aligned to CONTMT.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S

S4 Page 6 of 6 STEP NO: 5 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.2.4) Select appropriate sample valve (CMS-SOV33...) by depressing the SELECT pushbutton.

STANDARD: The applicant selects CMS-SOV33G for the RWCU VALVE NEST ROOM.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 6 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.2.5) IF only one area is to be monitored, THEN depress the OFF pushbutton for the other sample valves that may be open.

STANDARD: The applicant depressed OFF pushbutton for CMS-SOV33E, CONTAINMENT DOME AREA.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant has successfully started Div I H2 Analyzer and selected CMS-SOV33G and deselected CMS-SOV33E.

This completes the JPM STOP TIME:________

S5 Page 1 of 7 SUPPLYING FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER(S) FROM SERVICE WATER Operator:

License (Circle one):RO / SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

S5 Page 2 of 7 Facility: RBS JPM No: S5 Task

Title:

PLACE THE FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER(S) ON SSW Task No.: 208010001001 System: 233000 K/A Reference and Rating: A4.01/3.8 Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: YES Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is completed satisfactorily when the applicant has successfully supplied Service Water cooling to the DIV I Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers via the CCP Safety Loop. The applicants actions did not degrade the condition of the plant beyond that introduced by the JPM as developed.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

SOP-16, Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System Simulator Requirements:

IC #102

S5 Page 3 of 7 Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 100% Power

All Service Water Systems and Component Cooling Water System is in their normal 100% Power lineup Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to perform section 5.9 steps 5.9.1 through 5.9.9 of SOP-16, Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System to supply Div I SFC HX from Normal Service Water. Step 5.9.10 will be completed by engineering.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted

S5 Page 4 of 7 STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.9) Supplying Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger(s) from Service Water (Step 5.9.1) IF an RPCCW isolation has occurred due to extreme low discharge pressure, THEN exit this procedure and take actions per AOP-0011, Loss of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water.

(Step 5.9.2) Verify Division I(II) Standby Service Water is in service per SOP-0042, Standby Service Water System (Step 5.9.3) IF shutting down RPCCW for maintenance while in Mode 4 or 5, AND it is desirable to use Normal Service Water to supply the Fuel Pool Coolers, THEN verify Normal Service Water is in service per SOP-0018, Normal Service Water System.

STANDARD:

N/A CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S

S5 Page 5 of 7 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.9.4) Place the RPCCW DIV I TEST Switch in TEST.

STANDARD: The applicant placed the RPCCW DIV I TEST Switch in TEST..

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.9.5) Close CCP-MOV335(336), LOOP A(B) UP STREAM RETURN.

STANDARD: The applicant closed CCP-MOV335, LOOP A UP STREAM RETURN.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S5 Page 6 of 7 STEP NO: 4 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.9.6) Close CCP-MOV130, LOOP A DN STREAM RETURN.

STANDARD: The applicant closed CCP-MOV130, LOOP A DN STREAM RETURN.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 5 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.9.7) Close CCP-MOV16A, RPCCW LOOP A SUPPLY.

STANDARD: The applicant closed CCP-MOV16A, RPCCW LOOP A SUPPLY.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S5 Page 7 of 7 STEP NO: 6 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.9.8) Open SWP-MOV510A, RPCCW LOOP A SUPPLY.

STANDARD: The applicant opened SWP-MOV510A, RPCCW LOOP A SUPPLY.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 7 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.9.9) Open SWP-MOV504A, RPCCW LOOP A RETURN.

STANDARD: The applicant opened SWP-MOV504A, RPCCW LOOP A RETURN.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant opens SWP-504A, SWP-MOV504A, RPCCW LOOP A RETURN.

This completes the JPM STOP TIME:________

S6 Page 1 of 6 ROD WITHDRAWAL LIMITER FUNCTIONAL TEST Operator:

License (Circle one):RO / SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

S6 Page 2 of 6 Facility: RBS JPM No: S6 Task

Title:

Perform Rod Withdrawal Limiter Functional Test Task No.: 214001002001 System: 201005 K/A Reference and Rating: A2.13/4.4 Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: YES Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is completed satisfactorily when the applicant has successfully withdrawn the correct control rod two notches and then responded to the Control Rod Drift by inserting the Control Rod. The applicants actions did not degrade the condition of the plant beyond that introduced by the JPM as developed.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

STP-500-0704, Rod Withdrawal Limiter Functional Test Simulator Requirements:

IC #102

S6 Page 3 of 6 Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 100% Power.

Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to complete STP-500-0704, Rod Withdrawal Limiter Functional Test, starting on Section 5.0 Reactor Power Above RPCS High Power Set Point. Section 4 has been completed.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.1.1) ENSURE the selected rod is in the start position recorded in Step 4.6. RECORD rod position.

Position___________

STANDARD: The applicant ensured the selected rod is in the start position recorded in Step 4.6. RECORD rod position.

CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S

S6 Page 4 of 6 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.1.2) On the ROD SELECT module, PERFORM the following:

a. DESELECT the rod

b. SELECT the rod that corresponds to the rod coordinate position recorded in Step 4.6.

STANDARD: The applicant deselected the rod and the selected the rod that corresponds to the rod coordinate position recorded in Step 4.6.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.1.3) WITHDRAW the rod two notches in notch withdrawal mode STANDARD: The applicant withdrew the rod two notches in notch withdrawal mode.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S6 Page 5 of 6 STEP NO: 4 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.1.4) CHECK Annunciator P680-07A-C01, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK alarms.

STANDARD: The applicant checked Annunciator P680-07A-C01, CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK alarms and references ARP-680-07.

CUE: N/A NOTES: The Control Rod will begin drifting out after the alarm is acknowledged.

CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S ALTERNATE PATH STEP NO: 5 PERFORMANCE: On H13-P680, determine which rod(s) is drifting/drifted by depressing the ROD DRIFT pushbutton and observing red lights on ROD POSITION DISPLAY.

STANDARD: The applicant determined which control rod drifted by depressing the ROD DRIFT pushbutton and observing red lights on ROD POSITION DISPLAY.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S6 Page 6 of 6 STEP NO: 6 PERFORMANCE: Select the drifting/drifted rod(s) and apply a continuous insert signal.

STANDARD: The applicant selected the drifted rod and applied a continuous insert signal.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant applies a continuous insert signal to the drifting control rod.

STOP TIME:________

S7 Page 1 of 7 PARALLEL DIV 1 DIESEL FROM THE CONTROL ROOM Operator:

License (Circle one):RO / SRO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

S7 Page 2 of 7 Facility: RBS JPM No: S7 Task

Title:

PARALLEL DIV 1 DIESEL FROM THE CONTROL ROOM Task No.264007001001 System: 264000 K/A Reference and Rating: A4.04/4.1 Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time:

Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has adjusted frequency and voltage, synchronized the DG to the grid and loaded it to 175 kilowatts. The applicants actions did not degrade the condition of the plant beyond that introduced by the JPM as developed.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

SOP-53, Standby Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries.

Simulator Requirements:

IC #103

S7 Page 3 of 7 Initial Conditions:

DIV 1 Diesel Generator has been started IAW SOP-53.

Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to Parallel DIV 1 Diesel from the MCR IAW SOP-53 Section 4.5 by performing steps 4.5.13 through 4.5.19.

Steps 4.5.1 through 4.5.12 have been completed.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.5.13) Verify the blue REMOTE SYNC SW OFF status light is on.

STANDARD: The applicant verified the blue REMOTE SYNC SW OFF status light is on.

CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S

S7 Page 4 of 7 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.5.14) Place the SYNCHRONIZING Control Switch to GEN.

STANDARD: The applicant placed the SYNCHRONIZING Control Switch to GEN.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.5.15) Adjust Standby Diesel 1A INCOMING VOLTAGE V-1IN-1SYDA01 to about 1-2 volts above RUNNING VOLTAGE V-1RUN-1SYDA01 using the STBY DIESEL GENERATOR A VOLTAGE REGULATOR CONT.

STANDARD: The applicant adjusted Standby Diesel 1A INCOMING VOLTAGE V-1IN-1SYDA01 to about 1-2 volts above RUNNING VOLTAGE V-1RUN-1SYDA01 using the STBY DIESEL GENERATOR A VOLTAGE REGULATOR CONT.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S7 Page 5 of 7 STEP NO: 4 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.5.16) Adjust the STANDBY DIESEL EG1A speed, using the STBY DIESEL GENERATOR A GOVERNOR CONTROL, so that the synchroscope is rotating slowly in the FAST, or clockwise, direction at a rate of one revolution in greater than or equal to 4 seconds and less than or equal to 6 seconds.

STANDARD: The applicant adjusted the STANDBY DIESEL EG1A speed, using the STBY DIESEL GENERATOR A GOVERNOR CONTROL, so that the synchroscope is rotating slowly in the FAST, or clockwise, direction at a rate of one revolution in greater than or equal to 4 seconds and less than or equal to 6 seconds.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S7 Page 6 of 7 STEP NO: 5 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.5.17) WHEN the synchroscope indicator is moving slowly in the FAST direction AND the synchroscope indicator is 5 minutes to 2 minutes before the 12 o'clock position, THEN close ENS-ACB07, STBY D/G A OUTPUT BRKR.

Verify the red breaker closed light is on.

STANDARD: The applicant closed ENS-ACB07, STBY D/G A OUTPUT BRKR while the synchroscope indicator was moving slowly in the FAST direction AND the synchroscope indicator was 5 minutes to 2 minutes before the 12 o'clock position, and verified the RED breaker closed light is on.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S7 Page 7 of 7 STEP NO: 6 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.5.18) Raise generator load to approximately 175 KW using the STBY DIESEL GENERATOR A GOVERNOR CONTROL.

STANDARD: The applicant raised generator load to approximately 175 KW using the STBY DIESEL GENERATOR A GOVERNOR CONTROL.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 7 PERFORMANCE: (Step 4.5.19) As soon as diesel generator minimum load has stabilized, place the SYNCHRONIZING Control Switch to OFF.

STANDARD: The applicant placed the SYNCHRONIZING Control Switch to OFF when diesel generator minimum load stabilized, CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant has loaded the Diesel Generator to 175 KW and placed the SYNCHRONIZING Control Switch to OFF.

STOP TIME:________

S8 Page 1 of 7 OPERATE THE FB VENT SYSTEM FOLLOWING HIGH-HIGH RADIATION Operator:

License (Circle one):RO Evaluator:

Time to complete JPM:

minutes Follow-up Questions:

Follow-up Question Response:

Comments / Feedback:

RESULT:

Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Note: An "Unsatisfactory" requires comments.

Evaluator's Signature:

Date:

S8 Page 2 of 7 Facility: RBS JPM No: S8 Task

Title:

OPERATE THE FB VENT SYSTEM FOLLOWING HIGH-HIGH RADIATION Task No. 289008001001 System: 288000 K/A Reference and Rating: A2.04/3.6 Time-Critical Task: NO Alternate Path: NO Validated Time: 10 Minutes Source: New Method of Testing: Simulated Performance Actual Performance Location: Classroom Simulator Plant Rca Task Standard:

The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has overridden the Fuel Bldg High-High Radiation signals, started Fuel Bldg Supply A, and closed the alternate air dampers. The applicants actions did not degrade the condition of the plant beyond that introduced by the JPM as developed.

Required Materials (procedures, equipment):

SOP-62, Fuel Building Ventilation System Simulator Requirements:

IC #103

S8 Page 3 of 7 Initial Conditions:

Mode 5 Fuel Bldg Filter Train A was operating in Refuel Mode when a High-High Radiation signal was received.

Initiating Cues:

The CRS has directed you to start Fuel Bldg Supply Fan A to supply fresh outside air to the Fuel Building a with High-High Radiation signal present IAW SOP-62 Section 5.4.4.

START TIME:________

NOTE: Critical steps are shaded and denoted STEP NO: 1 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.4.4.1) Place the DIVISION 1 RADIATION OVERRIDE to OVRD.

STANDARD: The applicant placed DIVISION 1 RADIATION OVERRIDE switch to OVRD.

CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S8 Page 4 of 7 STEP NO: 2 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.4.4.2) Place the DIVISION 2 RADIATION OVERRIDE to OVRD.

STANDARD: The applicant placed DIVISION 2 RADIATION OVERRIDE switch to OVRD.

CUE: N/A NOTES:

N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 3 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.4.4.3) Verify HVF-AOD122, FUEL BLDG AIR SPLY ISOL is open.

STANDARD: The applicant verified HVF-AOD122, FUEL BLDG AIR SPLY ISOL was open.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S

S8 Page 5 of 7 STEP NO: 4 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.4.4.4) Verify HVF-AOD101, FUEL BLDG AIR SPLY ISOL is open.

STANDARD: The applicant verified HVF-AOD101, FUEL BLDG AIR SPLY ISOL was open.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 5 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.4.4.5) Start HVF-ACU1 FN1A, FUEL BLDG SPLY FAN A.

STANDARD: Applicant started HVF-ACU1 FN1A, FUEL BLDG SPLY FAN A and observed RED light on and GREEN light off.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S8 Page 6 of 7 STEP NO: 6 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.4.4.6) Check associated HVF-AOD13A, FUEL BLDG SPLY FAN A DISCH opens..

STANDARD: The applicant checked that HVF-AOD13A, FUEL BLDG SPLY FAN A DISCH was open.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: NO GRADE: U/S STEP NO: 7 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.4.4.7) Close HVF-AOD37A, FUEL BLDG ALT AIR SPLY.

STANDARD: The applicant closed HVF-AOD37A, FUEL BLDG ALT AIR SPLY.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S

S8 Page 7 of 7 STEP NO: 7 PERFORMANCE: (Step 5.4.4.8) Close HVF-AOD37B, FUEL BLDG ALT AIR SPLY.

STANDARD: The applicant closed HVF-AOD37B, FUEL BLDG ALT AIR SPLY.

CUE: N/A NOTES: N/A CRITICAL STEP: YES GRADE: U/S TERMINATING CUE:

When the applicant has closed HVF-AOD37B, FUEL BLDG ALT AIR SPLY, STOP TIME:________

Facility: __RBS_________

Scenario #: ______1___________

Scenario Source:

Op. Test #: __________________

Examiners: __________________

Applicants/

Operators: __________________

Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% Power Turnover: STP-256-0203, Division I Standby Cooling Tower Fans Operability Test.

Critical Tasks:

1. Manually Scram the Reactor before RPV water level reaches Level 2.

2. Emergency Depressurize before RPV water level reaches -187 inches.

Event Event Description

Attribute type

- CRS **ATC

- BOP 1

Start Standby Cooling Tower #1 Fans IAW STP-256-0203.

N 2

Degraded CCP pump, standby fails to auto-start.

A C

C, MC 3

Low Feedpump suction pressure from High Condensate Demin D/P.

A C

C 4

Spurious Pressure perturbation causes a RCIC isolation, DIV 2 valve fails to close.

A TS C, MC 5

Failed Condensate Makeup Valves resulting in a low Hotwell level.

A I

I, MC 6

Control Power fuses for SSW Pump A blow.

TS 7

Loss of the Feedpumps from High Condensate Demin D/P. RPS fails to actuate.

EP, CT C

C, MC 8

B21-F051D will fail open after the scram.

E C

C, MC 9

RWCU Pumps will fail trip on Level 2 signal.

E C

C, MC 10 A coolant leak occurs on the A Recirc Loop EC, CT M

M M

- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control

(E)vents after EOP entry, (A)bnormal events, (EP)EOP entry, (EC)Contingency EOP entry (CT)Critical Task

Attribute Target Actual Malfunctions after EOP entry 1-2 2

Abnormal Events 2-4 4

Major Transients 1-2 1

EOP entries requiring substantive action 1-2 1

EOP contingencies requiring substantive action 1 per set 1

Preidentified critical tasks 2 or more 2

CT-1 CT-2 Critical Task Manually Scram the Reactor before RPV water level reaches Level 2.

Commence Emergency Depressurize before RPV water level reaches -187 inches.

CT Criteria EOP-directed action that is essential to an events overall mitigative strategy.

EOP-directed action that is essential to an events overall mitigative strategy.

Safety Significance Low RPV water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result.

The Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level (MSCRWL) is the lowest RPV water level at which the covered portion of the reactor core will generate sufficient steam to prevent any clad temperature in the uncovered part of the core from exceeding 1500°F.

Initiating Cue Lowering RPV water level indication resulting from a loss of the Feedwater System.

When RPV water level has lowered below -162 inches.

Performance Feedback All Control rods inserted and Reactor Power indicating 0%.

Lowering RPV pressure and a rise in steam line flow.

Success Path Positioning the Mode Switch to the Shutdown position.

Open 1st ADS/SRV Measurable Performance Standard Prior to RPV water level reaching Level 2.

Prior to RPV water level reaching -187 inches.

SUMMARY

Event 1: Start Standby Cooling Tower #1 Fans IAW STP-256-0203.

The BOP operator starts the Standby Cooling Tower #1 Fans IAW STP-256-0203.

Event 2: Manual Trigger CCP Pump B begins degrading resulting CCP discharge header lowering to 87 psig. The standby CCP Pump will fail to auto start at 95 psig. The BOP operator should take manual action and start the standby CCP. The CRS should enter AOP-11, LOSS OF REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER.

Event 3: Manual Trigger Condensate Demineralizer D/P begins to elevate causing Feed pump suction header pressure to lower to 275 psig. The ATC will reduce Reactor Power to restore Feed pump suction pressure back to normal. The CRS should enter AOP-6, CONDENSATE/

FEEDWATER FAILURES and AOP-24, THERMAL HYDRAULIC STABILITY CONTROLS.

The Feed pump suction pressure alarm will clear when Reactor Power is below 95%.

Event 4: Manual Trigger Spurious Steam Pressure perturbation causes a RCIC System isolation. E51-F063, RCIC STEAM SUPPLY INBD ISOL VALVE, fails to automatically close. The BOP operator will take manual action IAW ARP-601-21 to close the PCIV.

The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.5.3 Condition A for the RCIC being inoperable, and TS LCO 3.6.1.3 Condition A for the PCIV being inoperable.

Event 5: Manual Trigger Failure of CNS-LCV103 CNDS NORMAL MAKEUP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE and CNS-LCV104 CNDS EMERGENCY MAKEUP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE causes Condenser Hotwell level to lower. The ATC operator should manually restore Hotwell level by adjusting the tapeset for either makeup valve IAW the ARP.

Event 6: Manual Trigger Control Power fuses for SSW-P2A, SSW Pump A, blow causing a loss of control to the pump.

The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.7.1 Condition E for SSW-P2A being inoperable.

Event 7: Manual Trigger Condensate Demineralizer D/P begins to elevate again causing the Feedpumps to ultimately trip on low suction header pressure. RPS will fail to actuate automatically when RPV level reaches 9.7 inches. The ATC will insert a manual scram prior to RPV level reaching -43 inches. The CRS will enter EOP-1, RPV Control on Level 3 and direct actions from that procedure. A loss of E22-S002 occurs after the scram resulting in a loss of all high-pressure feed sources.

Event 8:

SRV B21-F051D fails open after Lo-Lo set initiates. The BOP operator will take manual action and close the SRV.

Event 9:

The RWCU System will fail to isolate on a Level 2 signal. The ATC operator will manually trip the RWCU pumps.

Event 10:

5 minutes after the Reactor Scram, an unisolable coolant leak on Recirc Loop A causing a rise in Drywell D/P and loss of RPV inventory. The CRS will direct the BOP operator to perform an emergency depressurization when RPV lowers below -162 inches to allow low pressure injection sources to recover RPV level.

Event:

1 Attribute:

N/A Event Type:

Normal Evolution Position:

BOP Event

Description:

The BOP operator starts the Standby Cooling Tower #1 Fans IAW STP-256-0203.

All controls and indications are located at H13-P870-55B.

Symptoms/Cues:

Red lights status will illuminate for the operating fans.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP

1. CHECK the following Standby Cooling Tower #1 Fans green status lights are on:

SWP-FN1A SWP-FN1C SWP-FN1E SWP-FN1G SWP-FN1J

2. PLACE SWP-FN1A, 1C, 1E, 1G, 1J STBY CLG TOWER #1 Fans bank hand switch to START and RECORD time last fan starts

_______ Time

3. CHECK Standby Cooling Tower #1 Fans are operating by observing the following red status lights are on:

SWP-FN1A SWP-FN1C SWP-FN1E SWP-FN1G SWP-FN1J AFTER SWP-FANJ IS OPERATING AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 1 FOR EVENT 2.

Event:

2 Attribute:

Abnormal Event Event Type:

IC Failure Position:

BOP/CRS Event

Description:

CCP Pump B begins degrading resulting CCP discharge header lowering to 87 psig. The standby CCP Pump will fail to auto start at 95 psig. The BOP operator should take manual action and start the standby CCP. The CRS should enter AOP-11, LOSS OF REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13/P870/55A/F04 RPCCW SYSTEM LOW HEADER PRESSURE CCP-PI127, RPCCW HDR PRESSURE, indicating 87 psig.

Standby CCP Pump failed to start.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledge alarm on H13-P870 and Reference ARP-870-55.

Perform operator actions IAW ARP-870-55.

1. Verify standby pump has auto started and pressure returns to normal. (BOP starts the standby CCP pump)

2. Refer to AOP-0011, Loss of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water.

Other Actions:

1. Dispatch the Reactor Building operator to investigate the CCP pumps, Surge Tank level/Pressure, and look for leaks locally.

2. May check for back panel indications of CCP-ES127, RPCCW HDR PRESSURE SWITCH.

CRS Enter AOP-11, LOSS OF REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER.

ROLE PLAY as RB NLO If sent to investigate, wait 2 minutes and call the control room with the following information:

No evidence of any leaks.

CCP-LG121, CCP Surge Tank level gauge is at the centerline.

CCP-PI56B for CCP Pump B is indicating 25 psig, the other CCP Pumps are indicating 110 psig.

ROLE PLAY as Back panel.

Report the value from the insight file for variable swpcpin.

CRS After receiving the report from the RB NLO, will direct the BOP operator to secure CCP Pump B and lock it out.

BOP Secures and locks out CCP Pump B.

AFTER CCP PUMP B IS SECURED AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 2 FOR EVENT 3.

Event:

3 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure Position:

ATC/CRS Event

Description:

Condensate Demineralizer D/P begins to elevate causing Feed pump suction header pressure to lower to 275 psig. The ATC will reduce Reactor Power to restore Feed pump suction pressure back to normal. The CRS should reference AOP-6, CONDENSATE/FEEDWATER FAILURES and AOP-24, THERMAL HYDRAULIC STABILITY CONTROLS. The Feed pump suction pressure alarm will clear when Reactor Power is below 95%.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P680/03A/B03 RX FW PUMPS LOW SUCTION PRESS CNM-PDI-138 on H13-P680 indicating full scale high.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledge alarm on H13-P680 and Reference ARP-680-03.

Perform operator actions IAW ARP-680-03.

1. Verify proper operation of CNM-FV114, CNDS MIN RECIRC is closed.

IF necessary, THEN place the CNM-H/A114, MAIN CONDENSER RECIRC in MANUAL and adjust flow per SOP-0007 Condensate System.

2. Verify the FWS-MOV109, RX FWP BYP V FROM is closed.

3. IF necessary to reduce feedwater flow requirements, THEN reduce reactor power with Recirc Flow Control.

Other Actions:

1. Contact the Auxiliary Control Room operator for Condensate Demin indications.

CRS Actions:

1. Direct the ATC operator to lower Reactor Power with Recirc Flow Control to 85% or until the Feed pump low suction pressure alarm clears per OSP-53.

2. Enter AOP-6 and AOP-24 and delegate ownership to the ATC operator.

3. Enter GOP-5, POWER MANEUVERING.

4. Notify System Operator and the General Dispatch of power change.

ATC Lowers Reactor Power with Recirc Flow Control to 85% or until the Feed pump low suction pressure alarm clears.

ROLE PLAY as ACR NLO If contacted, report that alarm CND-PNL212/1AN/C03 CONDENSATE POLISHER SYSTEM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE HIGH is in on CND-PNL212, and CND-PDT138 is indicating 100 psid.

AFTER REACTOR POWER IS LOWERED TO RESTORE SUCTION PRESSURE AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 3 FOR EVENT 4.

Event:

4 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure/TS Eval Position:

BOP/CRS Event

Description:

Spurious Steam Pressure perturbation causes a RCIC System isolation. E51-F063, RCIC STEAM SUPPLY INBD ISOL VALVE, fails to automatically close. The BOP operator will take manual action IAW ARP-601-21 to close the PCIV. The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.5.3 Condition A for the RCIC being inoperable, and TS LCO 3.6.1.3 Condition A for the PCIV being inoperable.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P601/21A/C01 DIV I RCIC ISOL MN STM SPLY LINE DIFF PRESS HIGH H13-P601/21A/D01 DIV II RCIC ISOL MN STM SPLY LINE DIFF PRESS HIGH H13-P601/21A/G03 RCIC SYSTEM INOPERATIVE E51-F063, RCIC STEAM SUPPLY INBD ISOL VALVE, still open.

INOP RCIC Indication Windows lit on H13-P601-21B.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledge alarms on H13-P601 and Reference ARP-601-21.

The following valves should be closed.

1. RCIC Turbine trips, E51-C002, RCIC TURBINE TRIP &THROTTLE VALVE OPERATOR closes.

2. E51-F063, RCIC STEAM SUPPLY INBD ISOL VALVE closes.

3. E51-F064, RCIC STEAM SUPPLY OUTBD ISOL VALVE closes.

4. E51-F076, RCIC WARMUP LINE SHUT OFF VALVE closes.

5. E51-F013, RCIC INJECT ISOL VALVE closes.

6. E51-F019, RCIC MIN FLOW VLV TO SUPPRESSION POOL closes.

Perform operator actions IAW ARP-601-21.

1. Verify Automatic Actions occur and Refer To AOP-0003, Automatic Isolations. (Manually closes E51-F063)

2. Verify reactor water level is being maintained by an alternate source.

Other Actions:

1. Contact work management to troubleshoot the issue and protect the HPCS System.

2. Inform the CRS that E51-F063 failed to close.

CRS Reference and enter the following TS LCOs:

3.5.3 RCIC System 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

ROLE PLAY as WMC If contacted, report that all RCIC instrumentation is operating properly. The isolation signal was valid and caused by a steam perturbation.

ROLE PLAY as Back panel.

Report that all RCIC instrumentation is operating satisfactory.

AFTER E51-F063 ISOLATED WITH TS EVALS AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 4 FOR EVENT 5.

Event:

5 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC Failure Position:

ATC Event

Description:

Failure of CNS-LCV103 CNDS NORMAL MAKEUP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE and CNS-LCV104 CNDS EMERGENCY MAKEUP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE causes Condenser Hotwell level to lower. The ATC operator should manually restore Hotwell level by adjusting the tapeset for either makeup valve IAW the ARP.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P680 / 02A / B02 CONDENSER HOTWELL LEVEL HIGH/LOW CNS-LI-102 indicating 51.6%.

CNS-LCV103 and CNS-LCV104 not responding.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledge alarm on H13-P680 and Reference ARP-680-02.

Perform operator actions IAW ARP-680-02.

1. On CNS-LI-102, determine if hotwell level is high or low.

2. IF Hotwell level is high, THEN verify the following:

a. CNS-LCV103 CNDS NORMAL MAKEUP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE is closed.

b. CNS-LCV105, CNDS HOTWELL REJECT LEVEL CONTROL VALVE is open.

3. IF Hotwell level is low, THEN verify the following valves are open:

a. CNS-LCV103 CNDS NORMAL MAKEUP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE

b. CNS-LCV104 CNDS EMERGENCY MAKEUP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE.

Other Actions:

1. Contact the Turbine Building operator to look for leaks and/or check the CNS-LCV103,104, and 105.

2. Contact WMC to troubleshoot the issue with the Hotwell makeup system.

CRS Direct the ATC operator to take the appropriate actions IAW ARP-680-02.

ATC Restores Condenser Hotwell Level with by manually opening CNS-LCV103 or CNS-LCV104 ROLE PLAY as TB NLO If contacted, after 3 minutes report that air can be heard coming from CNS-LCV104. CNS-LCV103 is closed with no visible issues.

ROLE PLAY as WMC If contacted, report after 3 minutes that CNS-LT103 level transmitter has failed upscale.

AFTER HOTWELL LEVEL IS RESTORED AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 5 FOR EVENT 6.

Event:

6 Attribute:

N/A Event Type:

TS Eval Position:

CRS Event

Description:

Control Power fuses for SSW-P2A, SSW Pump A, blow causing a loss of control to the pump.

The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.7.1 Condition E for SSW-P2A being inoperable.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P870/55A/H07 DIVISION 1 STBY SERVICE WTR INOPERATIVE Loss of all light indication for SSW-P2A INOP SSW-P2A Indication Window lit on H13-P870-55B.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledge alarm on H13-P870 and Reference ARP-870-55.

Other Actions:

1. Contact WMC to troubleshoot the issue.

ROLE PLAY as WMC If contacted, after 3 minutes report that the control power fuses for SSW-P2A are blown.

CRS Reference and enter the following TS LCO:

3.7.1 Standby Service Water (SSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

AFTER TS LCO ENTRY IS MADE AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 6 FOR THE MAJOR EVENT.

Event:

7 Attribute:

EOP Entry and Critical Task Event Type:

IC failure Position:

ATC/CRS/BOP Event

Description:

Condensate Demineralizer D/P begins to elevate again causing the Feed pumps to ultimately trip on low suction header pressure. RPS will fail to actuate automatically when RPV level reaches 9.7 inches. The ATC will insert a manual scram prior to RPV level reaching -43 inches. The CRS will enter EOP-1, RPV Control on Level 3 and direct actions from that procedure. A loss of E22-S002 occurs after the scram resulting in a loss of all high-pressure feed sources.

Critical Task:

Manually scram the Reactor prior to RPV level reaching -43 inches.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P680/03A/B03 RX FW PUMPS LOW SUCTION PRESS Lowering RPV level.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledge alarm on H13-P680 and report:

1. Rising Cond Demin D/P

2. Lowering RPV level CRS Direct the ATC to place the Reactor Mode Switch in the shutdown position.

ATC Manually scram the Reactor prior to RPV level reaching -43 inches.

ATC Update the crew on the Scram Report as follows:

1. Mode Switch is in shutdown

2. All Rods are in

3. EOP-1 Entry Condition on Level 3

CRS Enter and provide direction IAW EOP-1, RPV Control:

LEVEL PRESSURE Initiate each of the following that should have happened:

Isolations ECCS Diesel Generators RPV nominal pressure band:

500 to 1090 psig with Bypass valves RPV level band:

-20 to 51 inches Defeat Interlocks Encl 12 for RPS Encl 16 for IAS Recognize and enter the following AOPs:

1. AOP-1, Reactor Scram

2. AOP-2, Main Turbine and Generator Trips

3. AOP-3, Automatic Isolations ATC Perform actions IAW AOP-1 to reset the Reactor Scram.

BOP Performs the following actions:

Recognize and report Div 3 480 Vac bus, E22-S002, has faulted resulting in a loss of all high pressure feed.

Install Encl 12 and 16 Verifies isolations IAW AOP-3

Event:

8 Attribute:

Event after the EOP entry Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

BOP Event

Description:

SRV B21-F051D fails open after Lo-Lo set initiates. The BOP operator will take manual action and close the SRV.

Symptoms/Cues:

SRV B21-F051D remains open after pressure lowers below 956 psig Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognize and report that SRV B21-F051D has failed open.

CRS Recognize and enter AOP-35, Safety Relief Valve Stuck Open.

BOP Closes SRV B21-F051D with Div 1 hand switch on H13-P601.

Event:

9 Attribute:

Event after the EOP entry Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

ATC The RWCU System will fail to isolate on a Level 2 signal. The ATC operator will manually trip the RWCU pumps.

Symptoms/Cues:

RWCU System still operating after RPV level lowers below -43 inches.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognize and report that the RWCU System fails to isolate on Level 2 per AOP-3, Automatic Isolations.

ATC Manually trips both RWCU Pumps on H13-P680.

Event:

10 Attribute:

Contingency EOP entry and Critical Task Event Type:

Major Position:

ATC/CRS/BOP Event

Description:

5 minutes after the Reactor Scram, an unisolable coolant leak on Recirc Loop A causing a rise in Drywell D/P and loss of RPV inventory. The CRS will direct the BOP operator to perform an emergency depressurization when RPV lowers below -162 inches to allow low pressure injection sources to recover RPV level.

Critical Task:

Commence Emergency Depressurize before RPV water level reaches -187 inches.

Symptoms/Cues:

Rising Drywell D/P, temperature, and rad levels Lowering RPV inventory LOCA isolations/initiations when Drywell D/P exceeds 1.68 psid Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC/BOP Recognize and report the symptoms of the coolant leak.

CRS Re-enter EOP-1 when Drywell D/P reaches 1.68 psid and direct the following:

Trip Recirc Pumps Verify ECCS initiations and isolations Override Low Pressure injection ECCS If temperature permits install Enclosure 20 for drywell cooling.

Inhibit ADS Maximize CRD Inject SLC BOP Perform the following:

Dispatch the Control Building operator to monitor the Diesel Generators.

Override Low Pressure injection ECCS Inhibits ADS If temperature permits install Enclosure 20 for drywell cooling.

CRS Directs the BOP operator to Open 7 ADS/SRVS prior to RPV level reaching -

187 inches and restore RPV water above -162 inches.

BOP Opens 7 ADS/SRVS prior to RPV level reaching -187 inches.

BOP Injects with Low Pressure ECCS systems to restore RPV level.

AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR. TAKE SIMULATOR TO FREEZE.

ENCLOSURES

CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR RELIEF TURNOVER CHECKSHEET FOR TRAINING ONLY ATTACHMENT 1 T/OD/AY Offgoing OSM: Nights OSM, 1234 Oncoming OSM: Days OSM, 2345 Offgoing Team:

Offgoing CRS: Nights CRS, 1235 Oncoming CRS: Days CRS, 2346 Nights Offgoing STA: Nights STA, 1236 Oncoming STA: Days STA, 2347 PART I - TO BE REVIEWED PRIOR TO ASSUMING THE SHIFT UNIT STATUS:

MODE: 1 Reactor Power: 100%

EQUIPMENT STATUS - SEE ELECTRONIC OPERATOR ROUNDS LCO STATUS - SEE LCO LOG RADWASTE STATUS Discharge in Progress:

No Blowdown:

Yes Flume Level:

106' 04" CND Demins in Service 10 CFFF Filters in Service:

5 CND Demins Available:

0 CFFF Filters Available:

0 EVOLUTIONS (COMPLETED/IN PROGRESS/PLANNED), GENERAL INFORMATION Additional Monitoring EN-OP-115-03

Facility: __RBS____________

Scenario #: ______2___________

Scenario Source: __________________

Op. Test #: __________________

Examiners: __________________

Applicants/

Operators: __________________

Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% Power Turnover: Place RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling mode IAW SOP-31.

Critical Tasks:

1. Manually Scram the Reactor before vacuum reaches 22.3 Hg Vac.

2. Manually initiate HCPS to restore RPV water level prior to water level reaching -162 inches.

Event Event Description

Attribute type

- CRS

- ATC

- BOP 1

Place RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling mode.

N 2

Main Condenser vacuum degradation.

A C

C 3

Blown Fuse on SLC Pump A TS 4

RHR A experiences a sheared shaft A

TS C

5 Main Turbine Bearing Header pressure degradation.

A I

I,MC 6

Main Condenser vacuum begins to degrade more requiring a Reactor Scram.

EP,CT M

M M

7 Motoring of the generator will occur after the Scram/Turbine trip.

E I

I,MC 8

RCIC trips on overspeed and HPCS fails to auto start.

E,CT C,MC

- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control

(E)vents after EOP entry, (A)bnormal events, (EP)EOP entry, (EC)Contingency EOP entry, (CT)Critical Task

Attribute Target Actual Malfunctions after EOP entry 1-2 2

Abnormal Events 2-4 3

Major Transients 1-2 1

EOP entries requiring substantive action 1-2 1

EOP contingencies requiring substantive action 1 per set 0

Preidentified critical tasks 2 or more 2

CT-1 CT-2 Critical Task Manually Scram the Reactor prior to Main Condenser Vacuum reaching 22.3 Hg Vac.(Main Turbine trip setpoint)

Manually initiate HCPS to restore RPV water level prior to water level reaching -162 inches.

CT Criteria This action would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

This action that would prevent a challenge to plant safety by preventing a condition that warrants the initiation of emergency depressurization.

Safety Significance A reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and ensures that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during Main Turbine trip transient.

Submergence is the preferred method for cooling the core. The core is adequately cooled by submergence when it can be determined that RPV water level is at or above the top of the active fuel(-162 inches).

All fuel nodes are then assumed to be covered with water and heat is removed by boiling heat transfer.

Initiating Cue Lowering Main Condenser Vacuum.

Lowering RPV water level.

Performance Feedback All Control rods inserted and Reactor Power indicating 0%.

Rising RPV water level.

Success Path Positioning the Mode Switch to the Shutdown position.

Manual initiation of the HPCS System.

Measurable Performance Standard Prior to Main Condenser Vacuum reaching 22.3 Hg Vac(Main Turbine trip setpoint).

Prior to RPV water level reaching -162 inches (TS Safety Limit).

EVENT

SUMMARY

Event 1:

Place RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling mode IAW SOP-31, Residual Heat Removal.

Event 2:

Main Condenser inleakage begins to degrade vacuum. The CRS will direct the ATC to lower Reactor Power to stabilize vacuum and reference and assign AOP-5, Loss of Condenser Vacuum to the ATC operator.

Event 3:

Fuse C41-F3 for Standby Liquid Control Pump A blows causing a loss of continuity for the squib valve. The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.1.7 Condition B for SLC A being inoperable.

Event 4:

RHR Pump A experiences sheared shaft while operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode.

The BOP operator will close the test return valve restoring injection line pressure. The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition A and 3.6.2.3 Condition A for RHR A being inoperable.

Event 5:

Main Turbine Lube Pump degrades causing bearing header to lower to 14 psig and the TGOP will fail to autostart. The ATC will manually start the TGOP to restore bearing header pressure.

Event 6:

Main Condenser inleakage begins to increase degrading vacuum. The ATC will report the lowering vacuum trend to the CRS. The CRS will direct the ATC operator to place the Mode Switch in shutdown prior to Main Condenser Vacuum reaching 23.0 inches vacuum. The CRS will enter EOP-1, RPV Control on Level 3 and direct actions from that procedure. A loss of NPS-SWG1A and the trip of Condensate Pump B will result in a loss of Feed/Condensate.

RPS/ARI will fail to initiate automatically.

Event 7:

Motoring of the generator will occur after the Scram/Turbine trip. The ATC operator will force a reverse power trip by lowering VARS IAW AOP-2.

Event 8:

RCIC trips on overspeed and HPCS fails to auto start and Level 2. The BOP operator will take manual action to start the HPCS pump.

ENCLOSURES Event:

1 Attribute:

N/A Event Type:

Normal Evolution Position:

BOP Event

Description:

Place RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling mode IAW SOP-31, Residual Heat Removal.

Symptoms/Cues:

RHR A System operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP AFTER RHR A IS OPERATING AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 1 FOR EVENT 2.

ENCLOSURES Event:

2 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure Position:

ATC Event

Description:

Main Condenser inleakage begins to degrade vacuum. The CRS will direct the ATC to lower Reactor Power to stabilize vacuum and reference and assign AOP-5, Loss of Condenser Vacuum to the ATC operator.

Symptoms/Cues:

Turbine Load begins to lower Offgas Flow begins to elevate Lowering Main Condenser vacuum indications Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognize and report that Main Condenser vacuum is lowering.

CRS Directs the ATC operator to lower Reactor Power using Recirc Flow to maintain vacuum in the acceptable region IAW AOP-5.

Establishes Main Condenser vacuum as a critical parameter.

ATC Lowers Reactor Power with Recirc Flow Control to maintain vacuum in the acceptable region IAW AOP-5 AFTER REACTOR POWER IS LOWERED TO RESTORE VACUUM AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 2 FOR EVENT 3.

ENCLOSURES Event:

3 Attribute:

N/A Event Type:

TS Eval Position:

CRS Event

Description:

Fuse C41-F3 for Standby Liquid Control Pump A blows causing a loss of continuity for the squib valve.

The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.1.7 for SLC A being inoperable.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P601/19A/F05 STANDBY LIQUID SYSTEM "A" INOPERATIVE Squib valve continuity lit extinguishes Inop SLC A Indication Window lit on H13-P601-19B.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledge alarm on H13-P601 and Reference ARP-601-19.

Other Actions:

1. Contact WMC to troubleshoot the issue.

2. Check squib valve continuity on Meter C41-M600A in H13-P632.

3. Dispatch Reactor Building operator to check EHS-MCC2A, Breaker 2A.

ROLE PLAY as Backpanel.

Report that squib valve continuity on Meter C41-M600A reads 0 ma.

ROLE PLAY as RB NLO If contacted, after 3 minutes report that EHS-MCC2A, Breaker 2A is closed ROLE PLAY as WMC If contacted, after 3 minutes report that fuse C41-F3 has blown.

CRS Reference and enter the following TS LCO:

3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System AFTER TS LCO ENTRY IS MADE AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 3 FOR EVENT 4.

ENCLOSURES Event:

4 Attribute:

Abnormal Event Event Type:

IC Failure/TS Eval Position:

BOP/CRS Event

Description:

RHR Pump A experiences a sheared shaft while operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode. The BOP operator will close the test return valve restoring injection line pressure. The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.5.1 and 3.6.2.3 for RHR A being inoperable.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13/P601/20A/C04 RHR PUMP A DISCH PRESSURE HI/LOW Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledge alarm on H13-P601 and Reference ARP-601-20.

Perform operator actions IAW ARP-601-20.

1. IF an Emergency exists AND the RHR Pump A is required, THEN start or restart the RHR Pump A.

2. At H13-P629, check the trip units to determine if pressure is high or low.

3. IF pressure is low, THEN perform the following:

a. Verify E21-C002, LPCS/RHR DIV I LINE FILL PUMP, is operating.

b. Verify E12-F024A, RHR PUMP A TEST RTN TO SUP PL, is fully closed (Manually closes the valve)

Other Actions:

1. Contact WMC to investigate the issue.

CRS Direct the ATC operator to take the appropriate actions IAW ARP-601-20.

BOP Manually close E12-F024A, RHR PUMP A TEST RTN TO SUP PL.

ROLE PLAY as Back panel.

Report the value from E12-N654A, RHR A PUMP DISCH PRESS TRIP UNIT, reads 15 psig and slowly decreasing.

ROLE PLAY as RB NLO If sent to investigate, wait 2 minutes and call the control room with the following information:

RHR Pump A has a sheared shaft.

ENCLOSURES CRS Reference and enter the following TS LCOs:

3.5.1 ECCS-Operating 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling AFTER TS LCO ENTRY IS MADE AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 4 FOR EVENT 5.

ENCLOSURES Event:

5 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

ATC Event

Description:

Main Turbine Lube Pump degrades causing bearing header to lower to 14 psig and the TGOP will fail to start automatically. The ATC will manually start the TGOP to restore bearing header pressure.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P680/15A /B03 BEARING HEADER LOW PRESSURE Ovation HMI Screen 5539 indicating 14 psig for bearing header pressure Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledge alarm on H13-P680 and Reference ARP-680-15.

Perform operator actions IAW ARP-680-15.

1. Check bearing oil pressure on TML-PI-EPR2, TURB BRG HDR LUBE OIL PRESS OR Ovation HMI Screen 5539, Analog Trip Monitoring.

a. IF pressure is less than 15 psig, THEN verify TML-TGOP, TURNING GEAR OIL PMP is running.

b. IF pressure is less than 10 psig, THEN verify TML-MSP, MOTOR SUCTION OIL PMP is running.

c.

Other Actions:

1. Contact the Turbine Building operator to look for leaks

2. Contact WMC to troubleshoot the issue CRS Direct the ATC operator to take the appropriate actions IAW ARP-680-15.

ATC Manually start the TML-TGOP, TURNING GEAR OIL PMP ROLE PLAY as TB NLO If contacted, after 3 minutes report that no oil leaks exist.

AFTER THE TGOP IS STARTED AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 5 FOR EVENT 6.

ENCLOSURES Event:

6 Attribute:

EOP Entry and Critical Task Event Type:

Major Position:

ATC/CRS/BOP Event

Description:

Main Condenser inleakage begins to increase degrading vacuum. The ATC will report the lowering vacuum trend to the CRS. The CRS will direct the ATC operator to place the Mode Switch in shutdown prior to Main Condenser Vacuum reaching 23.0 inches vacuum. The CRS will enter EOP-1, RPV Control on Level 3 and direct actions from that procedure. A loss of NPS-SWG1A and the trip of Condensate Pump B will result in a loss of Feed/Condensate.

RPS/ARI will fail to initiate automatically.

Critical Task:

Manually scram the Reactor prior to Main Condenser vacuum reaching 22.3 inches.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P680/02A/B01 CONDENSER VACUUM LOW.

Lowering Main Condenser vacuum indications.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledge alarm on H13-P680 and report:

1. Lowering Main Condenser Vacuum CRS Direct the ATC to place the Reactor Mode Switch in the shutdown position prior to reaching 23 inches vacuum and brief the crew with the following:

Remind the crew that the MSIVs go closed on 8.5 inches.

Pressure control will switch to SRVs if the MSIVs go closed.

ATC Manually scram the Reactor prior to Main Condenser vacuum reaching 22.3 inches.

ATC Update the crew on the Scram Report as follows:

1. Mode Switch is in shutdown

2. All Rods are in

3. EOP-1 Entry Condition on Level 3

ENCLOSURES CRS Enter and provide direction IAW EOP-1, RPV Control:

LEVEL PRESSURE Initiate each of the following that should have happened:

Isolations ECCS Diesel Generators RPV nominal pressure band:

500 to 1090 psig with Bypass valves RPV level band:

-20 to 51 inches Defeat Interlocks Encl 12 for RPS Encl 16 for IAS Recognize and enter the following AOPs:

1. AOP-1, Reactor Scram

2. AOP-2, Main Turbine and Generator Trips

3. AOP-3, Automatic Isolations ATC Perform actions IAW AOP-1 to reset the Reactor Scram.

BOP Performs the following actions:

Recognize and report the loss of Feed/Condensate.

Install Encl 12 and 16 Verifies isolations IAW AOP-3

ENCLOSURES Event:

7 Attribute:

Event after the EOP entry Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

ATC Event

Description:

Motoring of the generator will occur after the Scram/Turbine trip. The ATC operator will force a reverse power trip by lowering VARS IAW AOP-2.

Symptoms/Cues:

Main Turbine Generator still rotating 1800 rpm with negative megawatts.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognize and report that the Main Output breakers failed to trip.

Attempt to initiate a Generator Reverse Power Trip as follows:

1. Depress VOLTAGE REGULATOR MODE SELECT MAN Pushbutton.

2. Using the VOLTAGE REGULATOR MANUAL ADJUST Pushbuttons, adjust VARs to 0 as indicated on VAR-1SPGN05 (H13-P680).

Event:

8 Attribute:

Event after the EOP entry and Critical Task Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

BOP RCIC trips on overspeed and HPCS fails to auto start and Level 2. The BOP operator will take manual action to start the HPCS pump.

Critical Task:

Manually initiate HCPS to restore RPV water level prior to water level reaching -162 inches.

Symptoms/Cues:

RCIC in a trip condition after starting.

HPCS not starting when RPV reaches Level 2.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognize and report that the RCIC has tripped and HPCS failed to autostart.

BOP Manually initiate HCPS to restore RPV water level prior to water level reaching -162 inches.

AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR. TAKE SIMULATOR TO FREEZE.

ENCLOSURES

CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR RELIEF TURNOVER CHECKSHEET FOR TRAINING ONLY ATTACHMENT 1 T/OD/AY Offgoing OSM: Nights OSM, 1234 Oncoming OSM: Days OSM, 2345 Offgoing Team:

Offgoing CRS: Nights CRS, 1235 Oncoming CRS: Days CRS, 2346 Nights Offgoing STA: Nights STA, 1236 Oncoming STA: Days STA, 2347 PART I - TO BE REVIEWED PRIOR TO ASSUMING THE SHIFT UNIT STATUS:

MODE: 1 Reactor Power: 100%

EQUIPMENT STATUS - SEE ELECTRONIC OPERATOR ROUNDS LCO STATUS - SEE LCO LOG RADWASTE STATUS Discharge in Progress:

No Blowdown:

Yes Flume Level:

106' 04" CND Demins in Service 10 CFFF Filters in Service:

5 CND Demins Available:

0 CFFF Filters Available:

0 EVOLUTIONS (COMPLETED/IN PROGRESS/PLANNED); GENERAL INFORMATION Additional Monitoring EN-OP-115-03

Facility: __RBS____________

Scenario #: ______3___________

Scenario Source: __________________

Op. Test #: __________________

Examiners: __________________

Applicants/

Operators: __________________

Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% Power Turnover:

Critical Tasks:

1. Manually Scram the Reactor prior to radiation levels reaching 9500 mr/hr in the RCIC room.

2. Emergency Depressurization is required when the RCIC room and RHR A room exceeds 9500 mr/hr.

Event Event Description

Attribute type

- CRS

- ATC

- BOP 1

Recirc FCV A will slowly start to drift close.

A TS C

2 DIV 1 and DIV 2 fuses blow for ADS SRV B21-F047C.

TS 3

Trip of an Isophase Bus duct cooling fan.

A C

C 4

CNS makeup valve for the Seal Steam Generator will fail closed.

A C

C,MC 5

APRM F will fail upscale.

I I

6 Spurious initiation of the RCIC system.

A I,TS I

7 Unisolable steam leak will develop in the RCIC room. A Manual Reactor Scram is required prior to radiation levels reaching Max Safe levels in the RCIC room.

EP,CT M

M M

8 Recirc Pump A fails to downshift on Level 3.

E C

C 9

RHS-AOV63 will fail to isolate on Level 3.

E C

C,MC C

10 Emergency Depressurization is required when the RCIC room and RHR A room exceeds Max Safe area radiation levels.

EC,CT

- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control

(E)vents after EOP entry, (A)bnormal events, (EP)EOP entry, (EC)Contingency EOP entry, (CT)Critical Task

Attribute Target Actual Malfunctions after EOP entry 1-2 1

Abnormal Events 2-4 4

Major Transients 1-2 1

EOP entries requiring substantive action 1-2 2

EOP contingencies requiring substantive action 1 per set 1

Preidentified critical tasks 2 or more 2

CT-1 CT-2 Critical Task Manually Scram the Reactor prior to Radiation Levels in the RCIC room reaching Max Safe level.

Emergency Depressurize the RPV before a third Secondary Containment Area exceeds Max Safe Radiation levels.

CT Criteria EOP-directed action that is essential to an events overall mitigative strategy.

EOP-directed action that is essential to an events overall mitigative strategy.

Safety Significance If a discharge from a primary system is the source of radioactivity, a Reactor Scram should be adequate to terminate any further increase in secondary containment radiation levels.

RPV depressurization places the primary system in its lowest possible energy state, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and reduces the driving head and flow of primary systems that are unisolated and discharging into the secondary containment or MSL tunnel.

Initiating Cue An unisolable steam leak causing radiation levels in the RCIC room to rise above Max Safe levels.

An unisolable steam leak causing radiation levels to exceed their Max Safe value in two separate areas of Secondary Containment.

Performance Feedback All Control rods inserted and Reactor Power indicating 0%.

Lowering RPV pressure and lowering Secondary Containment radiation levels.

Success Path Positioning the Mode Switch to the Shutdown position.

Opening 7 ADS/SRVs Measurable Performance Standard Prior to RCIC room radiation levels exceeding 9505 mR/Hr.

Prior to a third Secondary Containment Area exceeding Max Safe Radiation levels.

Event 1:MANUAL TRIGGER Recirc FCV A will slowly start to drift close. The ATC will take manual action to lock up the FCV. The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.4.1 Recirc Loop Flow mismatch.

Event 2: MANUAL TRIGGER Isophase Bus duct cooling fan 1, GML-FN1 DUCT FAN 1, trips causing a rise bus duct temperature. The BOP operator will reference ARP-870-54 and start GML-FN1 DUCT FAN 2 IAW SOP-67, Isolated Phase Bus Duct Cooling System.

Event 3: MANUAL TRIGGER CNA-MOVS9 has fails closed causing a lowering level in the Steam Seal Evaporator. The BOP operator will manually open the bypass valve to restore level IAW ARP-870-52.

Event 4: MANUAL TRIGGER APRM F fails upscale causing a Rod Block and a Half Scram. The ATC will bypass APRM F and reset the Half Scram signal.

Event 5: MANUAL TRIGGER Spurious initiation of the RCIC system. The BOP operator will manually trip RCIC IAW AOP-34, INADVERTENT INITIATION OF AN ECCS OR RCIC. The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC being inoperable.

Event 6: MANUAL TRIGGER An unisolable leak develops in the RCIC room causing rising room temperature and radiation levels. The CRS will enter EOP-3, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE -

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AND RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL. The CRS will direct the ATC to place the Mode Switch in shutdown prior to exceeding any RCIC Max Safe Operating Value.

Event 7: MANUAL TRIGGER Recirc Pump A fails to downshift to slow speed on Level 3. The ATC operator will manually downshift Recirc Pump A.

Event 8:

RHS-AOV63, SPC SUCTION VALVE, fails to isolate on Level 3 signal.

Event 9:

Radiation Levels in the RHR A room will begin approaching Max Safe Levels. The CRS will direct an Emergency Depressurization IAW EOP-3 when the RCIC room and RHR A room have exceeded Max Safe Rad Levels. The CRS will direct the BOP to open 7 ADS/SRVs IAW EOP-1.

Event:

1 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure/TS Eval Position:

ATC/CRS Event

Description:

Recirc FCV A will slowly start to drift close. The ATC will take manual action to lock up the FCV. The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.4.1 Recirc Loop Flow mismatch.

Symptoms/Cues:

Lowering Reactor Power, Core Flow, and Loop A Flow Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognize and report Recirc FCV A is drifting close.

CRS Directs the ATC operator to manually lock up the FCV.

ATC Locks up FCV A by arming and depressing the HPU A shutdown pushbutton.

CRS Reference and enter the following TS LCO:

3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating AFTER FCV A IS LOCKED UP AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 2 FOR EVENT 2.

Event:

2 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure Position:

BOP Event

Description:

Isophase Bus duct cooling fan 1, GML-FN1 DUCT FAN 1, trips causing a rise bus duct temperature. The BOP will start GML-FN1 DUCT FAN 2 IAW SOP-67, Isolated Phase Bus Duct Cooling System.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P870/54A /B01 ISOL PHASE BUS DUCT COOLING SYS FAILURE Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledge alarm on H13-P870 and Reference ARP-870-54.

Perform operator actions IAW ARP-870-54.

1. Check computer alarm typer Points GMLFC01 and GMLFC02 to determine which device is causing alarm.

2. If needed, swap to the standby fan per SOP-0067, Isolated Phase Bus Duct Cooling System.

3. Check temperature at GML-TI101, ISOL PH BUS DUCT RTN AIR TEMP and verify return air duct temperature is not high. Set VARs to 0, then reduce generator load to maintain less than 175°F.

Other Actions:

1. Contact the Turbine Building operator to check temperature at GML-TI101

2. Contact WMC to troubleshoot the issue.

CRS Direct the BOP operator to swap to the standby fan per SOP-67, Isolated Phase Bus Duct Cooling System.

BOP Manually starts GML-FN2 DUCT FAN 2.

ROLE PLAY as TB NLO If contacted, after 3 minutes report that temperature at GML-TI101 is 163°F and slowly rising.

AFTER GML-FN1 DUCT FAN 1 IS STARTED AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 3 FOR EVENT 3.

Event:

3 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

BOP Event

Description:

CNA-MOVS9 has fails closed causing a lowering level in the Steam Seal Evaporator. The BOP operator will manually open the bypass valve to restore level.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P870/52A /F02 STEAM SEAL EVAPORATOR WATER LEVEL H/L Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledge alarm on H13-P870 and Reference ARP-870-54.

Perform operator actions IAW ARP-870-54.

1. IF level is low, THEN perform the following:

a. Verify CNA-MOVS9, SSE LVL CONT ISOL VLV is fully opened.

b. Dispatch an operator to verify that CNA-LVEWFV, SSE LEVEL CONTROL VALVE is operating properly.

2. IF the level control valve or controller is malfunctioning, THEN manually control level by closing CNA-MOVS9, SSE LVL CONT ISOL VLV and throttling open/closed CNA-MOVS10, SSE LVL CONT BYP VLV as necessary to maintain SSE level.

Other Actions:

1. Contact the Turbine Building operator to verify that CNA-LVEWFV, SSE LEVEL CONTROL VALVE is operating properly.

2. Contact WMC to troubleshoot the issue.

CRS Direct the BOP operator to swap to the standby fan per SOP-67, Isolated Phase Bus Duct Cooling System.

BOP Manually controls water level by closing CNA-MOVS9, SSE LVL CONT ISOL VLV and throttling open/closed CNA-MOVS10, SSE LVL CONT BYP VLV.

ROLE PLAY as TB NLO If contacted, after 3 minutes report that CNA-LVEWFV, SSE LEVEL CONTROL VALVE is operating properly ROLE PLAY as TB NLO If contacted, after 3 minutes report that level switch CNA-ESELLA has failed high causing CNA-MOVS9 to close.

AFTER LEVEL IS RESTORED AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 4 FOR EVENT 4.

Event:

4 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure Position:

ATC Event

Description:

APRM F fails upscale causing a Rod Block and a Half Scram. The ATC will bypass APRM F and reset the Half Scram signal.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P680/06A/A03 APRM B OR F UPSCALE TRIP OR INOP H13-P680/06A/C01 APRM UPSCALE H13-P680/05A/A10 RPS TRIP LOGIC B OR D ACTIVATED Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledge alarm on H13-P680 and Reference ARP-680-06.

Other Actions:

1. Contact the Turbine Building operator to look for leaks

2. Contact WMC to troubleshoot the issue CRS Direct the ATC operator to bypass APRM F and clear the Half scram signal.

ATC Bypass APRM F and clear the Rod Block and Half scram signal.

ROLE PLAY as back panel If contacted, after 3 minutes report that voltage regulator card Z425 has failed.

AFTER RESETTING THE HALF SCRAM AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 5 FOR EVENT 5.

Event:

5 Attribute:

Abnormal Event Event Type:

IC Failure/TS Eval Position:

BOP/CRS Event

Description:

Spurious initiation of the RCIC system. The BOP operator will manually trip RCIC IAW AOP-34, INADVERTENT INITIATION OF AN ECCS OR RCIC. The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC being inoperable.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13/P601/21A/E02 RCIC GLAND SEAL COMPRESSOR AUTO START Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognize and report that RCIC has initiated.

Perform immediate operator actions AOP-34.

IF RCIC initiated, THEN depress E51A-S17, RCIC TURBINE TRIP pushbutton.

Other Actions:

1. Contact WMC to investigate the issue.

2. Check back panel indications.

ROLE PLAY as Backpanel.

Report that RCIC level switches LSN692A and F have failed low/downscale.

CRS Reference and enter the following TS LCOs:

3.5.3 RCIC System 3.3.5.3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation AFTER TS LCO ENTRY IS MADE AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 6 FOR THE MAJOR EVENT.

Event:

6 Attribute:

EOP Entry and Critical Task Event Type:

Major Position:

ATC/CRS/BOP Event

Description:

An unisolable leak develops in the RCIC room causing rising room temperature and radiation levels. The CRS will enter EOP-3, EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE -

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AND RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL. The CRS will direct the ATC to place the Mode Switch in shutdown prior to exceeding any RCIC Max Safe Operating Value.

Critical Task:

Manually Scram the Reactor prior to radiation levels reaching 9500 mr/hr in the RCIC room.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P601/21A/H02 AIR TEMP MON R608 RCIC RM TEMP HIGH H13-P601/21A/B06 RCIC ISOLATION RCIC RM HI AMBIENT TEMP RMS-DSPL230/1AA219 RCIC EQUIP ROOM E51-F063 and E51-F064 fail to close.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledge alarm on H13-P601 and DSPL230 and report:

1. Rising temperature in the RCIC room

2. Rising radiation levels in the RCIC room

3. RCIC valves failed to isolate CRS Enter EOP-3 on RCIC room exceeding Max Normal rad and temperature.

Transitions to EOP-1 prior to the RCIC room exceeding Max Safe Rad level of 9500 mr/hr.

CRS Direct the ATC to place the Reactor Mode Switch in the shutdown position.

ATC Manually Scram the Reactor prior to radiation levels reaching 9500 mr/hr in the RCIC room.

ATC Update the crew on the Scram Report as follows:

1. Mode Switch is in shutdown

2. All Rods are in CRS Enter and provide direction IAW EOP-1, RPV Control:

LEVEL PRESSURE Initiate each of the following that should have happened:

Isolations ECCS Diesel Generators RPV nominal pressure band:

500 to 1090 psig with Bypass valves RPV level band:

10 to 51 inches Defeat Interlocks Encl 12 for RPS Encl 16 for IAS Recognize and enter the following AOPs:

1. AOP-1, Reactor Scram

2. AOP-2, Main Turbine and Generator Trips

3. AOP-3, Automatic Isolations ATC Perform actions IAW AOP-1 to reset the Reactor Scram.

BOP Performs the following actions:

Install Encl 12 and 16 Verifies isolations IAW AOP-3

Event:

7 Attribute:

Event after the EOP entry Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

ATC Event

Description:

Recirc Pump A fails to downshift to slow speed on Level 3. The ATC operator will manually downshift Recirc Pump A.

Symptoms/Cues:

CB-5A and 3A still closed for Recirc Pump A.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognize and report that the Recirc Pump A failed to downshift.

Depress STOP, RECIRC PUMP BREAKER 5A Event:

8 Attribute:

Event after the EOP entry Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

BOP Event

Description:

RHS-AOV63, SPC SUCTION VALVE, fails to isolate on Level 3 signal.

Symptoms/Cues:

RHS-AOV63, SPC SUCTION VALVE still open after Level 3 is reached.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognize and report that the RHS-AOV63, SPC SUCTION VALVE failed to close.

Manually close RHS-AOV63, SPC SUCTION VALVE IAW AOP-3.

Event:

9 Attribute:

Contingency EOP entry and Critical Task Event Type:

N/A Position:

BOP Event

Description:

Radiation Levels in the RHR A room will begin approaching Max Safe Levels. The CRS will direct an Emergency Depressurization IAW EOP-3 when the RCIC room and RHR A room have exceeded Max Safe Rad Levels. The CRS will direct the BOP to open 7 ADS/SRVs IAW EOP-1.

Critical Task:

Emergency Depressurize when the RCIC room and RHR A room have exceeded 9500 mr/hr.

Symptoms/Cues:

RCIC and RHR A radiation levels above 9505 mr/hr.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Report that RHR A room has exceeded Max Safe Radiation level.

CRS Per EOP-3:

CRS Directs the BOP operator to Open 7 ADS/SRVS.

BOP Opens 7 ADS/SRVS AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR. TAKE SIMULATOR TO FREEZE.

ENCLOSURES

CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR RELIEF TURNOVER CHECKSHEET FOR TRAINING ONLY ATTACHMENT 1 T/OD/AY Offgoing OSM: Nights OSM, 1234 Oncoming OSM: Days OSM, 2345 Offgoing Team:

Offgoing CRS: Nights CRS, 1235 Oncoming CRS: Days CRS, 2346 Nights Offgoing STA: Nights STA, 1236 Oncoming STA: Days STA, 2347 PART I - TO BE REVIEWED PRIOR TO ASSUMING THE SHIFT UNIT STATUS:

MODE: 1 Reactor Power: 100%

EQUIPMENT STATUS - SEE ELECTRONIC OPERATOR ROUNDS LCO STATUS - SEE LCO LOG RADWASTE STATUS Discharge in Progress:

No Blowdown:

Yes Flume Level:

106' 04" CND Demins in Service 10 CFFF Filters in Service:

5 CND Demins Available:

0 CFFF Filters Available:

0 EVOLUTIONS (COMPLETED/IN PROGRESS/PLANNED); GENERAL INFORMATION Additional Monitoring EN-OP-115-03

Facility: __RBS____________

Scenario #: ______4___________

Scenario Source: __________________

Op. Test #: __________________

Examiners: __________________

Applicants/

Operators: __________________

Initial Conditions: Mode 2, 5% Power Turnover: Plant Startup IAW GOP-1 Critical Tasks:

1. Manually raise frequency on DIV 1 diesel to close the output breaker within 15 minutes of the station blackout.

2. Manually control RCIC prior to RPV water level reaching -187 inches.

Event Event Description

Attribute type

- CRS

- ATC

- BOP 1

ATC Operator will withdraw one control rod IAW the RMP.

R 2

The second Control Rod selected will begin to drift out and will stick when the ATC begins to insert the Control Rod.

A TS C

3 Trip of DIV 1 battery room fan and failure of the standby fan to auto start.

A C,MC 4

Startup Feedwater level controller fails low.

A C

C,MC 5

Bus fault occurs on EJS-SWG2A.The BOP will need to start Containment Unit Cooler C.

A C,TS C

6 The Main Turbine Bypass Valves will fail closed.

A C

C 7

A loss of Offsite Power/Station Blackout.

EP M

M M

8 DIV 1 diesel needs to operator action to power bus.

E,CT C

C C,MC 9

RCIC flow controller fails low.

E,CT C

C,MC

- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control

(E)vents after EOP entry, (A)bnormal events, (EP)EOP entry, (EC)Contingency EOP entry, (CT)Critical Task

Attribute Target Actual Malfunctions after EOP entry 1-2 2

Abnormal Events 2-4 5

Major Transients 1-2 1

EOP entries requiring substantive action 1-2 1

EOP contingencies requiring substantive action 1 per set 1

Preidentified critical tasks 2 or more 2

CT-1 CT-2 Critical Task Manually raise frequency on DIV 1 diesel to close the output breaker within 15 minutes of the station blackout.

Manually initiate RCIC to restore RPV water level prior to water level reaching -187 inches.

CT Criteria This action directly leads to the restoration of multiple safety functions.

EOP-directed action that is essential to an events overall mitigative strategy.

Safety Significance A loss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink.

The Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level (MSCRWL) is the lowest RPV water level at which the covered portion of the reactor core will generate sufficient steam to prevent any clad temperature in the uncovered part of the core from exceeding 1500°F.

Initiating Cue Loss of power to all AC sources. DIV 1 DG running but the output breaker has failed to close.

RCIC operating with a flow well below 600 gpm.

Performance Feedback Power is restored to the DIV 1 bus.

RCIC operating with flow at or above 600 gpm.

Success Path Raising frequency on the DIV 1 diesel generator.

Taking manual control of the RCIC flow controller.

Measurable Performance Standard Within 15 minutes of the Loss of Offsite Power to prevent an EAL escalation from Alert to Site Area Emergency.

Prior to RPV water level reaching -187 inches.

SUMMARY

Event 1:

ATC Operator will withdraw one control rod IAW the RMP.

Event 2: AUTOMATIC TRIGGER The ATC will select the first Control Rod IAW RMP. When the second Control Rod is selected, another Control Rod will begin to drift out and it will stick when the ATC begins to insert the Control Rod IAW ARP-680-07/AOP-61, Control Rod(s) Mispositioned/

Malfunctioned. The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.1.3 Condition C for the Control Rod being inoperable.

Event 3: MANUAL TRIGGER HVC-FN3A, BATT RM 1A EXH FAN, for the Div 1 Battery Fan will trip and HVC-FN3D, BATT RM 1A EXH FAN will fail to start automatically. The BOP operator will manually start the standby fan IAW ARP-863-74.

Event 4: MANUAL TRIGGER Level Transmitter B21-N004A fails upscale causes a rise in RPV water level. The ATC operator will take immediate action IAW AOP-6 Condensate/Feedwater Failures and place the Feedwater Master Controller in manual.

Event 5: MANUAL TRIGGER A Bus fault occurs on EJS-SWG2A, Div 1 480 Vac Load Center tripping EJS-SWG2A/ACB38, EJS-SWGR2A SPLY BRKR. The BOP will need to start Containment Unit Cooler C and a Drywell Unit Cooler IAW AOP-13, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL. The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.8.9 Condition A for the being EJS-SWG2A inoperable.

Event 6: MANUAL TRIGGER The Operating Bypass EHC Pump will trip, and the standby pump will fail to start automatically. The Bypass Valves will fail closed causing Reactor Pressure to rise. The BOP operator will manually open MSL drains to stabilize RPV pressure.

Event 7: MANUAL TRIGGER A loss of Offsite Power/Station Blackout occurs with small steam leak in the Drywell resulting in Drywell D/P reaching above 1.68 psid.

Event 8:

RCIC flow controller fails low. The BOP operator will take manual control of RCIC flow.

Event 9:

DIV 2 Diesel Generator fails to start (will not start manually either) and DIV 1 Diesel Generator starts but its output breaker fails to close due to a low frequency. The BOP operator will manually raise frequency to close the output breaker.

Event:

1 Attribute:

N/A Event Type:

Reactivity Position:

ATC Event

Description:

ATC Operator will withdraw one control rod IAW the RMP.

Symptoms/Cues:

N/A Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC ATC Operator will withdraw one control rod IAW the RMP.

AFTER CONTROL ROD IS WITHDRAWN AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 1 FOR EVENT 2.

Event:

2 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure/TS Eval Position:

ATC/CRS Event

Description:

The ATC will select the Control Rod IAW RMP. When the Control Rod selected, another Control Rod will begin to drift out and it will stick when the ATC begins to insert the Control Rod IAW ARP-680-07/AOP-61, Control Rod(s) Mispositioned/Malfunctioned.

The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.1.3 Condition C for the Control Rod being inoperable Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P680/07A/B02 CONTROL ROD DRIFT No Rod Movement after Insert Signal is given.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledge alarm on H13-P680 and Reference ARP-680-07.

Perform operator actions IAW ARP-680-07.

1. On H13-P680, determine which rod(s) is drifting/drifted by depressing the ROD DRIFT pushbutton and observing red lights on ROD POSITION DISPLAY.

2. IF the rod has mispositioned due to a single rod scram, THEN Refer To AOP-0061, Control Rod(s) Mispositioned/Malfunctioned for guidance.

3. Select the drifting/drifted rod(s) and apply a continuous insert signal.

CRS Direct the ATC operator to take the appropriate actions IAW ARP-680-07 and reference AOP-61, Control Rod(s) Mispositioned/Malfunctioned.

ATC The ATC operator will apply a continuous insert signal, but the control rod will stick after inserting two notches. The ATC will reference AOP-61.

BOP The BOP operator will raise Drive Water D/P to 275 psid IAW AOP-61.

ATC The ATC operator will apply a continuous insert signal and the control rod will insert to position 00.

ATC/BOP Dispatch the Reactor Building operator to isolate the HCU by closing Drive water (V103) and Exhaust water (V105) isolation valves.

CRS Reference and enter the following TS LCO:

3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY AFTER CONTROL ROD IS DIARMED AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 2 FOR EVENT 3.

Event:

3 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

BOP Event

Description:

HVC-FN3A, BATT RM 1A EXH FAN, for the Div 1 Battery Fan will trip and HVC-FN3D, BATT RM 1A EXH FAN will fail to start automatically. The BOP operator will manually start the standby fan IAW ARP-863-74.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P863/74A/G09 BATTERY ROOM 1A EXHAUST FANS LOW FLOW H13-P863/74A/D02 DIV 1 CONTROL BLDG VENT SYS INOP INOP HVC-FN3A Indication Window lit on H13-P863-74B.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledge alarm on H13-P863 and Reference ARP-863-74.

Perform operator actions IAW ARP-863-74.

1. Restore battery room ventilation as soon as possible

2. Verify the standby fan has started.

Other Actions:

1. Contact WMC to troubleshoot the issue CRS Direct the ATC operator to take the appropriate actions IAW ARP-863-74.

BOP Manually start HVC-FN3A, BATT RM 1A EXH FAN.

ROLE PLAY as WMC If contacted, after 3 minutes report HVC-FS65A Battery Room 1A Exhaust Low Flow Switch failed to start the fan.

AFTER HVC-FN3A IS STARTED AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 3 FOR EVENT 4.

Event:

4 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure Position:

ATC Event

Description:

Level Transmitter B21-N004A fails upscale causes a rise in RPV water level. The ATC operator will take immediate action IAW AOP-6 Condensate/Feedwater Failures and place the Feedwater Master Controller in manual.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P680/03A/B08 REACTOR HIGH/LOW WATER LEVEL H13-P680/03A/B08 RX FW LEVEL CONTROL SIGNAL FAILURE Narrow range level gauge B21-R606A is pegged high and B21-606B and C are lowering.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Recognize and report that RPV water level is lowering and immediately places Feedwater Master Controller in manual.

Other Actions:

1. Contact WMC to troubleshoot the issue CRS Directs ownership of AOP-6 to the ATC operator.

ROLE PLAY as WMC If contacted, after 3 minutes report that Level Transmitter B21-N004A has failed upscale.

AFTER RPV WATER LEVEL IS STABLIZIED AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 4 FOR EVENT 5.

Event:

5 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure/TS Eval Position:

BOP/CRS Event

Description:

A Bus fault occurs on EJS-SWG2A, Div 1 480 Vac Load Center tripping EJS-SWG2A/ACB38, EJS-SWGR2A SPLY BRKR. The BOP will need to start Containment Unit Cooler C and a Drywell Unit Cooler IAW AOP-13, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL. The CRS should reference and enter TS LCO 3.8.9 Condition A for the being EJS-SWG2A inoperable.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P877/31A/C04 EJS-SWG1A/2A SPLY OR DIST BRKR OVERCURRENT H13-P877/31A/D04 EJS-SWG1A/2A SPLY OR DIST BRKR AUTO TRIP Fault indications on EJS-ACB38 EJS-SWG2A SPLY BRKR Multiple Control Alarms Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledge the Multiple Control Room Alarms and report that a Bus fault has occurred on EJS-SWG2A.

Other Actions:

1. Contact WMC to troubleshoot the issue

2. Dispatch Control Building operator to check supply breaker.

CRS Direct the ownership of AOP-6 and direct the BOP operator to start Containment Unit Cooler C and a Drywell Unit Cooler.

BOP Manually starts Containment Unit Cooler C and a Drywell Unit Cooler.

ROLE PLAY as CB NLO If contacted, after 3 minutes report that EJS-SWG2A/ACB38, EJS-SWGR2A SPLY BRKR has tripped on overcurrent.

CRS Reference and enter the following TS LCO:

3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating AFTER TS EVAL IS MADE AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 5 FOR EVENT 6.

Event:

6 Attribute:

Abnormal event Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

BOP Event

Description:

The Operating Bypass EHC Pump will trip, and the standby pump will fail to start automatically. The Bypass Valves will fail closed causing Reactor Pressure to rise. The BOP operator will manually open MSL drains to stabilize RPV pressure.

Symptoms/Cues:

H13-P680/08A/D06 EHC MINOR TROUBLE Rising RPV pressure Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledge alarm on H13-P680 and Report a rising RPV pressure.

CRS Direct the BOP operator to open MSL drains to control RPV pressure.

BOP Manually opens as many MSL drains needed to stabilize RPV pressure.

AFTER RPV PRESSURE IS STABILIZED AND/OR AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR, MANUALLY INSERT TRIGGER 6 FOR THE MAJOR EVENT.

Event:

7 Attribute:

EOP Entry and Critical Task Event Type:

Major Position:

ATC/CRS/BOP Event

Description:

A loss of Offsite Power/Station Blackout occurs with small steam leak in the Drywell resulting in Drywell D/P reaching above 1.68 psid.

Symptoms/Cues:

No Offsite Power and No Diesel Generators operating Lights out in the Main Control Room Drywell D/P above 1.68 psid Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Update the crew on the Scram Report as follows:

1. Mode Switch is in shutdown

2. All Rods are in

3. EOP-1 Entry Condition on DW Pressure above 1.68 psid CRS Enters EOP-1, RPV Control and Transitions to EOP-1C1, Alternate Level Control.

Recognize and enter the following AOPs:

1. AOP-1, Reactor Scram

2. AOP-50, Station Blackout BOP Manually initiates RCIC IAW immediate Operator Action of AOP-50.

ATC Protects RCIC IAW immediate Operator Action of AOP-50.

At H13-P632, perform the following:

Place E31A-S2A, RCIC ISOLATION BYPASS Switch to BYPASS.

Place E31A-S4A, RHR ISOLATION BYPASS Switch to BYPASS At H13-P642, perform the following:

Place E31A-S2B, RCIC ISOLATION BYPASS Switch to BYPASS.

Place E31A-S4B, RHR ISOLATION BYPASS Switch to BYPASS

CRS Enter and provide direction IAW EOP-1C1, Alternate Level Control:

LEVEL PRESSURE Inhibit ADS Reduce RPV pressure and control 150 to 300 psig with SRVs.

RPV level band:

45 to 105 inches Event:

8 Attribute:

Event after the EOP entry and Critical Task Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

BOP RCIC flow controller fails low. The BOP operator will take manual control of RCIC flow.

Critical Task:

Manually control RCIC to restore RPV water level prior to water level reaching -187 inches.

Symptoms/Cues:

RCIC flow less than 600 gpm.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Recognize and report that the RCIC flow controller has failed low.

BOP Manually control RCIC to restore RPV water level prior to water level reaching -187 inches.

Event:

9 Attribute:

Event after the EOP entry and Critical Task Event Type:

IC failure/Manual Control Position:

BOP DIV 2 Diesel Generator fails to start (will not start manually either) and DIV 1 Diesel Generator starts but its output breaker fails to close due to a low frequency.

Critical Task:

Manually raise frequency on DIV 1 diesel to close the output breaker within 15 minutes of the station blackout.

Symptoms/Cues:

DIV 1 Diesel Generator operating with low frequency and the output breaker has not closed.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Manually raise frequency on DIV 1 diesel to close the output breaker within 15 minutes of the station blackout.

AT THE DIRECTION OF THE LEAD EVALUATOR. TAKE SIMULATOR TO FREEZE.

CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR RELIEF TURNOVER CHECKSHEET FOR TRAINING ONLY ATTACHMENT 1 T/OD/AY Offgoing OSM: Nights OSM, 1234 Oncoming OSM: Days OSM, 2345 Offgoing Team:

Offgoing CRS: Nights CRS, 1235 Oncoming CRS: Days CRS, 2346 Nights Offgoing STA: Nights STA, 1236 Oncoming STA: Days STA, 2347 PART I - TO BE REVIEWED PRIOR TO ASSUMING THE SHIFT UNIT STATUS:

MODE: 2 Reactor Power: 5%

EQUIPMENT STATUS - SEE ELECTRONIC OPERATOR ROUNDS LCO STATUS - SEE LCO LOG RADWASTE STATUS Discharge in Progress:

No Blowdown:

Yes Flume Level:

106' 04" CND Demins in Service 10 CFFF Filters in Service:

5 CND Demins Available:

0 CFFF Filters Available:

0 EVOLUTIONS (COMPLETED/IN PROGRESS/PLANNED); GENERAL INFORMATION Plant Startup IAW GOP-1 Additional Monitoring EN-OP-115-03

Crew A Facility:RBS Date of Exam:12/5/22 Operating Test No.:2022-12 A

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RO1 SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

0 0

1 1

0 NOR 0

0 0

1 1

1 I/C 4

4 8

4 4

2 MAJ 1

1 2

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 1

2 3

1 1

0 TS 0

0 0

0 2

2 RO2 SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

0 0

1 1

0 NOR 1

0 1

1 1

1 I/C 3

3 6

4 4

2 MAJ 1

1 2

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 3

2 5

1 1

0 TS 0

0 0

0 2

2 RO9 SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

0 0

1 1

0 NOR 1

0 1

1 1

1 I/C 2

3 5

4 4

2 MAJ 1

1 2

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 2

1 3

1 1

0 TS 0

0 0

0 2

2 RO SRO-I1 SRO-U RX 0

0 0

0 1

1 0

NOR 0

0 0

0 1

1 1

I/C 7

5 3

15 4

4 2

MAJ 1

1 1

3 2

2 1

Man. Ctrl 0

0 1

1 1

1 0

TS 2

2 0

4 0

2 2

Crew B Facility:RBS Date of Exam:12/5/22 Operating Test No.:2022-12 A

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RO3 SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

0 0

1 1

0 NOR 0

1 1

1 I/C 4

2 6

4 4

2 MAJ 1

1 2

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 1

2 3

1 1

0 TS 0

0 0

0 2

2 RO4 SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

0 0

1 1

0 NOR 1

0 1

1 1

1 I/C 3

3 6

4 4

2 MAJ 1

1 2

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 3

2 5

1 1

0 TS 0

0 0

0 2

2 RO SRO-I2 SRO-U RX 0

0 0

0 1

1 0

NOR 0

0 0

0 1

1 1

I/C 7

5 4

16 4

4 2

MAJ 1

1 1

3 2

2 1

Man. Ctrl 0

0 2

2 1

1 0

TS 2

2 0

4 0

2 2

Crew C Facility:RBS Date of Exam:12/5/22 Operating Test No.:2022-12 A

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RO5 SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

0 0

1 1

0 NOR 0

1 1

1 I/C 4

2 9

4 4

2 MAJ 1

1 3

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 1

2 4

1 1

0 TS 0

0 0

0 2

2 RO6 SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

0 0

1 1

0 NOR 1

0 1

1 1

1 I/C 3

3 10 4

4 2

MAJ 1

1 3

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 3

2 7

1 1

0 TS 0

0 0

0 2

2 RO SRO-I SRO-U1 RX 0

0 0

1 1

0 NOR 0

0 0

1 1

1 I/C 7

5 12 4

4 2

MAJ 1

1 2

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 0

0 0

1 1

0 TS 2

2 4

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2

Crew D Facility:RBS Date of Exam:12/5/22 Operating Test No.:2022-12 A

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RO7 SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

0 0

1 1

0 NOR 0

1 1

1 I/C 4

2 6

4 4

2 MAJ 1

1 2

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 1

2 3

1 1

0 TS 0

0 0

0 2

2 RO8 SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

0 0

1 1

0 NOR 1

0 1

1 1

1 I/C 3

3 6

4 4

2 MAJ 1

1 2

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 3

2 5

1 1

0 TS 0

0 0

0 2

2 RO SRO-I SRO-U2 RX 0

0 0

1 1

0 NOR 0

0 0

1 1

1 I/C 7

5 12 4

4 2

MAJ 1

1 2

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 0

0 0

1 1

0 TS 2

2 4

0 2

2

Facility:RBS Date of Exam:12/5/22 Operating Test No.:2022-12 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

0 1

1 1

0 NOR 0

0 0

1 1

1 I/C 3

5 5

4 4

2 MAJ 1

1 1

2 2

1 Man. Ctrl 1

2 2

1 1

0 TS 0

0 0

0 2

2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

1 0

1 1

1 0

NOR 0

0 0

0 1

1 1

I/C 8

3 5

8/5 4

4 2

MAJ 1

1 1

1 2

2 1

Man. Ctrl 0

1 2

2 1

1 0

TS 2

0 0

2 0

2 2

RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

0 1

1 0

NOR 0

0 1

1 1

I/C 8

8 4

4 2

MAJ 1

1 2

2 1

Man. Ctrl 0

0 1

1 0

TS 2

2 0

2 2

ML22354A253

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