ML22326A113
| ML22326A113 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/2022 |
| From: | Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22326A145 | List:
|
| References | |
| NL-22-0810 | |
| Download: ML22326A113 (1) | |
Text
REV 14 10/07 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM RECIRCULATION SUMP AND RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES FIGURE 7.6.5-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
REV 14 10/07 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM RECIRCULATION SUMP AND RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES FIGURE 7.6.5-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
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VEGP-FSAR-7 REV 17 4/12 TABLE 7.7.1-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
PLANT CONTROL SYSTEM INTERLOCKS Designation Derivation Function C-1 1/2 neutron flux (intermediate Blocks control rod range) above setpoint withdrawal C-2 1/4 neutron flux (power range)
Blocks control rod above setpoint withdrawal C-3 2/4 overtemperature T above Blocks control rod setpoint withdrawal Actuates turbine runback via load reference C-4 2/4 overpower T above Blocks control rod setpoint withdrawal Actuates turbine runback via load reference C-5 1/1 turbine impulse chamber Indication only pressure below setpoint
VEGP-FSAR-7 REV 17 4/12 TABLE 7.7.1-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Designation Derivation Function C-7 1/1 time derivative (absolute Makes steam dump value) of turbine impulse valves available for chamber pressure (decrease either tripping or only) above setpoint modulation C-9 Any condenser pressure above Blocks steam dump to setpoint or no circulating condenser water pumps running C-11 Not used.
Not used.
C-16 Reduce limit in coolant Stops automatic temperature above normal turbine loading until setpoint condition clears C-20(a)
Two-of-two turbine Arms AMSAC; below impulse chamber pressure setpoint blocks AMSAC above setpoint (generated in AMSAC; see section 7.7)
P-4 Reactor trip Blocks steam dump control via load Tavg controller Makes steam dump valves available for either tripping or modulation Absence of P-4 Blocks steam dump control via plant trip Tavg controller
- a. Not part of control system (non-Class 1E).
REV 13 4/06 SIMPLIFIED BLOCK DIAGRAM OF REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM FIGURE 7.7.1-1
REV 13 4/06 ROD DEVIATION COMPARATOR FIGURE 7.7.1-3
REV 13 4/06 BLOCK DIAGRAM OF PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM FIGURE 7.7.1-4
REV 13 4/06 BLOCK DIAGRAM OF PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM FIGURE 7.7.1-5
REV 13 4/06 BLOCK DIAGRAM OF STEAM DUMP CONTROL SYSTEM FIGURE 7.7.1-8
REV 13 4/06 BASIC FLUX-MAPPING SYSTEM FIGURE 7.7.1-9
REV 13 4/06 ACTUATION LOGIC SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE FIGURE 7.7.1-10
REV 13 4/06 SIMPLIFIED BLOCK DIAGRAM ROD CONTROL SYSTEM FIGURE 7.7.2-1
REV 13 4/06 CONTROL BANK D PARTIAL SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM POWER CABINETS 1BD AND 2BD FIGURE 7.7.2-2
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.1-1 REV 23 3/21 8.0 ELECTRIC POWER
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1.1 UTILITY GRID DESCRIPTION Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is a member of Southern Company's grid system, whose other members are Alabama Power Company, Georgia Power Company, Gulf Power Company, Mississippi Power Company, Savannah Electric and Power Company, and the Southern Electric Generating Company. The Southern Company is interconnected with Duke Power Company, Florida Peninsula Systems, Middle South Utilities, South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Southern Company's grid system consists of interconnected hydro plants, fossil-fueled plants, and nuclear plants supplying electric energy over a transmission system consisting of various voltages up to 500 kV, as shown on drawing AX6DD402. The figure includes the planned transmission lines for VEGP.
8.1.2 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The plant is supplied with ac power from a 230-kV switchyard. The Unit 1 generator is connected to the 230-kV switchyard and the Unit 2 generator is connected to the 500-kV switchyard via step-up transformers. Two 230- to 500-kV autotransformers are provided for the interconnection of the two switchyards. The 230-kV switchyard supplies power through two 230/13.8/4.16-kV reserve auxiliary transformers per unit (preferred power source) to the engineered safety features (ESF) buses and the balance of plant (BOP) buses. There is also a "swing" 13.8/4.16-kV, 10/12.5 MVA standby auxiliary transformer (SAT) which may be manually connected to supply power to the ESF buses and to a portion of the BOP loads. The "swing" terminology when used to describe the SAT means that the SAT alignment to the onsite electrical distribution system is selected, with the use of administrative controls and key interlocked disconnect switches, to supply power to any one of the safety-related buses. The standby power source for each ESF bus is its associated emergency diesel generator set. The preferred power source of each unit BOP load is from the 25-kV generator buses through two 25/13.8/4.16-kV unit auxiliary transformers per unit.
The Class 1E ac power system is divided into two independent divisions to provide ac power to the two divisions of ESF loads. The onsite power systems are shown in drawings 1X3D-AA-A01A, 2X3D-AA-A01A, AX3D-AA-A01A, and AX3D-AA-A03A.
Four independent 125-V dc systems supply power to the four independent reactor protection channels and both independent Class 1E ac power systems.
8.1.3 SAFETY-RELATED LOADS Safety loads are defined as those systems and devices that require electric power in order to perform their safety functions. The ac safety loads are shown in drawings 1X3D-AA-K02A, 2X3D-AA-K02A, 1X3D-AA-K02B, and 2X3D-AA-K02B. Tables 8.3.2-1, 8.3.2-2, 8.3.2-3, and 8.3.2-4 list the loads on the Class 1E 125-V dc batteries. Power supplies for the reactor protection system have sufficient stored energy to remain available through any anticipated
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.1-2 REV 23 3/21 switching transients. The power supplies are shown on drawings 1X3D-AA-G02A, 1X3D-AA-G02C, and 1X3D-AA-G01B.
8.1.4 DESIGN BASES 8.1.4.1 Offsite Power System A.
Electrical power from the power grid to the plant site is supplied by two physically independent circuits designed and located to minimize the likelihood of simultaneous failure.
B.
Based on the grid analysis, two physically independent reserve auxiliary transformers are provided to supply the onsite electrical distribution system.
There is also a physically independent standby auxiliary transformer to supply power to the onsite electrical distribution system.
C.
The loss of one of the nuclear units at VEGP or the most critical unit on the grid will not result in the loss of offsite power to the Class 1E buses.
D.
The switchyard is designed with duplicate and redundant systems; i.e., two independent battery systems, two trip coils per breaker, and protective relay schemes.
E.
The impact of open phase conditions on the capability of the reserve auxiliary transformers (RAT 1NXRA, RAT 2NXRA, RAT 1NXRB, and RAT 2NXRB) and the swing standby auxiliary transformer (SAT ANXRA) were evaluated. The conditions analyzed consisted of single (i.e., one of three) and double (i.e., two of three) open phase conductors on the high voltage side (230 kV) of the reserve auxiliary and standby (13.8 kV) transformers. The analysis considered open phase conditions with and without ground. Open phase detection systems for the transformers were installed in accordance with the NEI Open Phase Condition Initiative. Upon detection of an open phase condition, the system will provide operator indication of the open phase condition.
A risk-informed assessment utilizing the Vogtle specific electrical design configuration was performed in accordance with the guidance in NEI 19-02, Guidance for Assessing Open Phase Condition Implementation Using Risk Insights. The assessment demonstrated that in the event of an open phase condition, the risk associated with an open phase detection system that is reliant on manual operator action versus the automatic actuation of an open phase isolation system was below the threshold of what is generally considered a small change in ¨ CDF (1.0E-6) and ¨ LERF (1.0E-7). Based on the results of the risk-informed assessment, Vogtle has opted to utilize the open phase detection system and operator manual actions to address open phase conditions.
8.1.4.2 Onsite Power System A.
The onsite power system includes a separate and independent Class 1E electric power system for each unit [General Design Criterion (GDC) 17].
B.
The onsite Class 1E ac electric power systems for each unit are divided into two independent load groups referred to as trains, each with its own power supply,
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.1-3 REV 23 3/21 buses, transformers, loads, and associated 125-V dc control power. Each train is independently capable of maintaining one unit in a safe shutdown condition (GDC 17).
C.
One independent diesel generator is provided for each Class 1E ac train in each unit.
The diesel generator unit provides power to the appropriate ventilation equipment to maintain an acceptable environment within the diesel generator buildings.
The diesel generator unit is capable of starting, accelerating, being loaded, and carrying the design load described in paragraph 8.3.1.1.3. The unit energizes its cooling equipment within an acceptable time.
A discussion on conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.9 concerning frequency and voltage limits and basis of the continuous rating is contained in section 1.9.
Mechanical and electric systems are designed so that a single failure affects the operation of only a single diesel generator.
Design conditions such as vibration, torsional vibration, and overspeed are considered in accordance with the requirements of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 387.
Each diesel governor can operate in the droop mode, and the voltage regulator can operate in the paralleled mode during diesel generator testing. If an underfrequency condition occurs while the diesel generator is paralleled with the preferred (offsite) power supply, the diesel generator breaker is tripped and the governor and voltage regulator are automatically restored to the isochronous and nonparalleled modes, respectively.
Each diesel generator is provided with control systems permitting automatic and manual control. The automatic start signal is functional except when the diesel generator is in the maintenance mode. Also, the automatic start signal will not override the rampup time when the governor is in the slow start mode. The details of the affects during the slow start mode are described in paragraph 8.3.1.1.3.k. Provision is made for controlling each diesel generator from the control room or from the diesel generator room. Paragraph 8.3.1.1.3 provides further description of the control systems.
Voltage, current, frequency, var, and watt metering is provided in the control room to permit assessment of the operating condition of each diesel generator.
Surveillance instrumentation is provided in accordance with IEEE 387, as described in subsections 9.5.4 through 9.5.8.
Tests are conducted on each diesel generator unit in accordance with IEEE 387, as listed in paragraph 8.3.1.1.3.
D.
No provisions are made for automatic transfer of trains between redundant power sources.
E.
No portion (ac or dc) of the onsite standby power systems is shared between units (GDC 5).
F.
The Class 1E electric systems are designed to satisfy the single failure criterion (GDC 17).
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.1-4 REV 23 3/21 G.
For each of the four protection channels, one independent 125-V dc and at least one 120-V vital ac power source are provided. Batteries are sized for 165 min of operation for LOSP/LOCA and 240 min for SBO without the support of battery chargers.
H.
Separate non-Class 1E dc systems are provided for non-Class 1E controls and dc motors.
I.
Raceways are not shared by Class 1E and non-Class 1E cables.
J.
Special identification criteria are applied for Class 1E equipment, including cabling and raceways. Refer to paragraph 8.3.1.3.
K.
Separation criteria are applied which establish requirements for preserving the independence of redundant Class 1E electric systems. Refer to paragraph 8.3.1.4.1.
L.
Class 1E equipment is designed with the capability of being tested periodically (GDC 18).
8.1.4.3 Design Criteria, Regulatory Guides, and IEEE Standards Compliance to GDC 17, 18, and 50 is discussed in section 3.1 and paragraphs 8.3.1.2, 8.3.2.2, and 8.3.1.1.12. The design of the offsite power and onsite Class 1E electric systems generally conforms with the regulatory guides and standards listed below as clarified in section 1.9. Refer to table 8.1-1 for acceptance criteria and guidelines and their applicability to chapter 8.
A.
General Design Criteria
- 1.
GDC 2, Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena.
- 2.
GDC 4, Environmental and Missile Design Bases.
- 3.
GDC 5, Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components.
- 4.
GDC 17, Electric Power Systems.
- 5.
GDC 18, Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems.
- 6.
GDC 50, Containment Design Basis.
See section 3.1 for a discussion of conformance with each of the general design criteria.
B.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guides See section 1.9 for a discussion of conformance to the regulatory guides listed below.
- 1.
Regulatory Guide 1.6, Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems.
- 2.
Regulatory Guide 1.9, Selection, Design, and Qualification of Units Used as Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants.
- 3.
Regulatory Guide 1.22, Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions.
- 4.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.1-5 REV 23 3/21
- 5.
Regulatory Guide 1.30, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Instrumentation and Electric Equipment.
- 6.
Regulatory Guide 1.32, Criteria for Safety-Related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants.
- 7.
Regulatory Guide 1.40, Qualification Tests of Continuous-Duty Motors Installed Inside the Containment of Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants.
- 8.
Regulatory Guide 1.41, Preoperational Testing of Redundant Onsite Electrical Power Systems to Verify Proper Load Group Assignments.
- 9.
Regulatory Guide 1.47, Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems.
- 10.
Regulatory Guide 1.53, Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems.
- 11.
Regulatory Guide 1.62, Manual Initiation of Protective Actions.
- 12.
Regulatory Guide 1.63, Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants.
- 13.
Regulatory Guide 1.68, Preoperational and Initial Startup Test Programs for Water-Cooled Power Reactors.
- 14.
Regulatory Guide 1.73, Qualification Tests of Electric Valve Operators Installed Inside the Containment of Nuclear Power Plants.
- 15.
Regulatory Guide 1.75, Physical Independence of Electric Systems.
- 16.
Regulatory Guide 1.81, Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants.
- 17.
Regulatory Guide 1.89, Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants.
- 18.
Regulatory Guide 1.93, Availability of Electric Power Sources.
- 19.
Regulatory Guide 1.100, Seismic Qualification of Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants.
- 20.
Regulatory Guide 1.106, Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves.
- 21.
Regulatory Guide 1.108, Periodic Testing of Diesel Generators Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants.
- 22.
Regulatory Guide 1.118, Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems.
- 23.
Regulatory Guide 1.128, Installation Design and Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants.
- 24.
Regulatory Guide 1.129, Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants.
- 25.
Regulatory Guide 1.131, Qualification Tests of Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants.
C.
IEEE Standards
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.1-6 REV 23 3/21 The onsite power system is generally designed in accordance with IEEE Standards 279, 308, 317, 323, 334, 336, 338, 344, 379, 382, 383, 384, 387, 450, and 484.
- 1.
IEEE 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.22.
- 2.
IEEE 308-1974, Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.32.
- 3.
IEEE 317-1976, Electrical Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.63.
- 4.
IEEE 323-1974, Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.89.
- 5.
IEEE 334-1974, Type Tests of Continuous Duty Class IE Motors for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.40.
- 6.
IEEE 336-1971, Installation, Inspection, and Testing Requirements for Instrumentation and Electric Equipment During the Construction of Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.30.
- 7.
IEEE 338-1977, Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Class 1E Power and Protection Systems. For application of this standard to various systems, refer to paragraph 7.1.2.7 and to Regulatory Guide 1.118.
- 8.
IEEE 344-1975, Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Seismic qualification of Class 1E electric equipment and the extent of compliance with IEEE 344-1975 are discussed in section 3.10. Also refer to Regulatory Guide 1.100.
- 9.
IEEE 379-1972, Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Class 1E Systems. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.53.
- 10.
IEEE 382-1972, Type Test of Class 1 Electric Valve Operators for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.73.
- 11.
IEEE 383-1974, Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.131.
- 12.
IEEE 384-1981, Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.75.
- 13.
IEEE 387-1977, Criteria for Diesel-Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Conformance with the design criteria of IEEE 387-1977 is discussed in paragraph 8.3.1.1.3, which addresses the details of the standby power supply. Also refer to Regulatory Guide 1.9.
- 14.
IEEE 450-1995, Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.129. The safety-related batteries will be tested periodically in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.1-7 REV 23 3/21 version of IEEE 450 as described in the Bases for the Technical Specifications.
- 15.
IEEE 484-1975, Installation Design and Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations. Refer to Regulatory Guide 1.128.
- 16.
IEEE 628-1987, Standard Criteria for the Design, Installation, and Qualification of Raceway Systems for Class 1E Circuits for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
- 17.
IEEE 485-1983, Recommended Practice for Sizing Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 14 10/07 TABLE 8.1-1 (SHEET 1 OF 3)
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AND GUIDELINES FOR ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS Applicability (FSAR (a)
Criteria Title Section/Subsection)
Remarks 8.2 8.3.1 8.3.2
- 1.
GDC Appendix A to10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50
- a. GDC 2 Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena A
A
- b. GDC 4 Environmental and Missile Design Bases A
A
- c.
GDC 5 Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components A
A A
- d. GDC 17 Electric Power Systems A
A A
- e. GDC 18 Inspection and Testing of Electrical Power Systems A
A A
- f.
GDC 50 Containment Design Bases A
A
- 2.
Regulatory Guide (RG)
- a. RG 1.6 Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems G
G
- b. RG 1.9 Selection, Design, and Qualification of Diesel-Generator Units Used as Standby (Onsite)
Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants G
- c.
RG 1.32 Use of IEEE Standard 308, Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations G
G G
- d. RG 1.47 Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems G
G G
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 14 10/07 TABLE 8.1-1 (SHEET 2 of 3)
Criteria Title Applicability (FSAR (a)
Section/Subsection)
Remarks 8.2 8.3.1 8.3.2
- e. RG 1.63 Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants G
G
- f.
RG 1.75 Physical Independence of Electric Systems G
G
- g. RG 1.81 Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants G
G G
- h. RG 1.106 Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves G
G
- i.
RG 1.108 Periodic Testing of Diesel Generators Used as Onsite Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants G
- j.
RG 1.118 Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems G
G
- k. RG 1.128 Installation Design and Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plant G
- l.
RG 1.129 Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants G
- 3.
Branch Technical Position (BTP)
- a. BTP ICSB 4 Requirements on Motor-Operated Valves in the ECCS Accumulator Lines G
See also FSAR subsection 7.6.4 G
- b. BTP ICSB 8 (PSB)
Use of Diesel-Generator Sets for Peaking
- c. BTP ICSB 11 (PSB)
Stability of Offsite Power Systems G
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 14 10/07 TABLE 8.1-1 (SHEET 3 of 3)
Applicability (FSAR (a)
Criteria Title Section/Subsection)
Remarks 8.2 8.3.1 8.3.2
- d.
BTP ICSB 18 (PSB)
Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves G
- e.
BTP ICSB 21 Guidance for Application of RG 1.47 G
G G
See also FSAR section 7.5
- f.
BTP PSB-1 Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages G
- h.
BTP PSB-2 Criteria for Alarms and Indications Associated with Diesel-Generator Unit Bypassed and Inoperable Status G
NUREG Reports
- a.
NUREG/CR 0660 Enhancement of Onsite Diesel Generator Reliability G
- a. A denotes acceptance criteria. G denotes guidance.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.2-1 REV 23 3/21 8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.2.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The Southern Company transmission system supplies the offsite ac energy for operating the safety-related buses as well as startup and shutdown of Units 1 and 2.
Each unit represents about 6 percent of the total installed capacity of the Georgia Power Company system in 1990 and about 3.4 percent of the total installed capacity of the Southern Company system in 1990.
Units 1 and 3 are connected to the 230-kV switchyard and Unit 2 is connected to the 500-kV switchyard through step-up transformers. Two 500/230-kV autotransformers connect each switchyard together. Unit 4 500-kV switchyard is connected to the 500-kV switchyard by overhead tie lines. The Unit 1 and 2 offsite sources are connected via the switchyard to the 230-kV and 500-kV transmission system.
8.2.1.1 Offsite Sources Drawing AX6DD402 shows the Southern Company transmission system plan for 1990.
Construction of the 230-kV and 500-kV lines is summarized in table 8.2.1-1. The transmission lines are not considered to have any unusual features, and the occasional crossings of transmission lines as listed in table 8.2.1-1 are normal design practice for the Georgia Power Company system.
The 230-kV and 500-kV transmission systems are designed to deliver power to the various portions of the Georgia Power Company service area safely, efficiently, and dependably. As a result, the system offers a very dependable power source for the required offsite loads and is the preferred power source for the safety-related loads of the plant.
An additional "swing" preferred offsite power source, the standby auxiliary transformer (SAT), is also available for plant loads in response to emergency conditions or for use during reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) maintenance. The SAT receives power from the Georgia Power Company Plant Wilson switchyard (see drawing AX3D-AA-A03A). Plant Wilson is a six-unit combustion turbine electric generating facility located approximately 1 mile east of the Vogtle plant site. The SAT is supplied power through a direct buried cable from either the Southern Company 230-kV grid or Plant Wilson's onsite combustion turbine electrical generation, both methods via the Plant Wilson switchyard 13.8-kV power system.
There are five 230-kV lines, one of which is the connection to the Plant Wilson switchyard, and two 230-kV and 500-kV autotransformers that connect the 230-kV and 500-kV switchyards.
These transmission elements at the 230-kV bus comprise the power sources to the 230-kV switchyard. The lines approach the plant site on five rights-of-way, from the north-west and south. System load studies indicate that this arrangement has the capacity and capability to supply the power necessary for the safety loads of one unit while placing the other unit in cold shutdown.
The transmission line structures of both the 230-kV and 500-kV systems are designed to withstand standard light and medium loading conditions as specified in National Institute of Standards and Technology Handbook No. 8 (ANSI, C2.2-1960, National Electric Safety Code).
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.2-2 REV 23 3/21 8.2.1.2 Switchyard The Units 1 and 2 230-kV and 500-kV switchyards are arranged as shown in drawings AX3D-AA-L50A and AX3DL060. The 230-kV breaker-and-a-half arrangement is used to incorporate the redundancy offered by having two energized buses with three breakers to service each pair of connections. The 500-kV breaker-and-a-half bus arrangement allows two breakers to service each terminal connection.
The switchhouse, located in the switchyard, contains two independent 125-V batteries, the primary and secondary relaying for the transmission lines, and the breaker failure relaying. It also contains the 480-V metal-clad switchgear and motor control centers for the substation.
Two trip coils per pole are provided in each 230-kV and 500-kV circuit breaker for independent tripping from the primary and secondary relaying systems. Redundant closing coils are not provided in each circuit breaker. However, the 125-V dc supplies are arranged to ensure that at least one offsite source is available upon the loss of either substation battery. Tables 8.2.1-2 and 8.2.1-3 respectively show the 230-kV and 500-kV circuit breaker control circuits supplied by each battery.
Each of the offsite sources from the 230-kV switchyard can be energized through either or both of the two switchyard circuit breakers. The high voltage switchyard raceway network consists of a system of concrete trenches with concrete lids. Control cables to the four circuit breakers are routed through the trenches in such a way that lengthy trench sections do not include circuits to all four offsite source breakers. Control cables to the plant control room for these breakers are routed outdoors in conduit within a reinforced concrete duct run and within the plant in cable tray. These cables are arranged within these raceways in such a manner that no two breakers from different offsite sources are in a common raceway. Areas in which circuits to all four breakers are common in this duct run are limited to the three pull boxes. Areas in which circuits to all four breakers are routed in a common trench are limited to some areas of the switch house interior and a small area of the trench adjacent to the switch house.
In these areas, the trench is protected by location or adjacent structure (i.e., switch house), and additional separation is not practical. All cable is fire retardant (in accordance with IEEE 383-1974), and no oil containment equipment is located in the vicinity of the cable trench.
Two feeders emerge from the 230-kV substation to supply power to the RATs for both Units 1 and 2. (The arrangement is shown in drawings 1X3D-AA-A01A and 2X3D-AA-A01A.) Offsite source No. 1 supplies Unit 1 RAT 1NXRA and Unit 2 RAT 2NXRB. Offsite source No. 2 supplies Unit 1 reserve auxiliary transformer 1NXRB and Unit 2 RAT 2NXRA. These two offsite sources are separated physically as they leave the 230-kV substation and are arranged so that no one event such as a falling line, tower, or other structure will damage both lines.
The 13.8-kV power circuit to the SAT is above grade only at the Plant Wilson switchyard connection point and in the Vogtle low voltage switchyard at the 13.8-kV switchgear circuit breaker and at the SAT. Between these two points, the power circuit is either direct buried or pulled in conduit through a concrete encased electrical duct run. The 13.8-kV power circuit is therefore physically separated from the other offsite power source lines. No one event, such as a falling line, tower, or other structure will damage the 13.8-kV power circuit and one of the 230-kV power feeders. The 13.8-kV circuit breaker has a single trip coil which, along with the protective relaying, is supplied 125-V-dc power from the turbine building batteries.
The secondary windings of the RATs are connected to the various groups of metal-clad switchgear by Calvert cable busses. The Calvert cable busses from transformers 1NXRB and 2NXRA are carried in underground trenches from the transformers to the turbine building wall.
The other Calvert cable busses are run overhead to the turbine building.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.2-3 REV 23 3/21 The secondary winding of the SAT is connected to the various groups of metal-clad switchgear by a 4.16-kV switchgear circuit breaker, Husky cable bus, and cable bus disconnect switches.
The 4.16-kV circuit breaker has a single trip coil which, along with the protective relaying, is supplied 125-V-dc power from the turbine building batteries. The Husky cable bus from the SAT switchgear runs overhead to the vicinity of each RAT. At that point, the Husky cable bus is connected to a switch that may be closed to connect the SAT to the Calvert cable bus between the RAT and the Class 1E switchgear. Another switch in the Calvert cable bus between the Class 1E switchgear and the RAT is opened before the SAT cable bus switch is closed. The two cable bus switches allow the Class 1E switchgear to be connected to either a RAT or the SAT. The manual cable bus switches are key interlocked to prevent having both the RAT and the SAT connected to the same Class 1E bus. The switching arrangement is shown on drawings 1X3D-AA-A01A, 2X3D-AA-A01A, and AX3D-AA-A03A.
The Calvert cable busses enter the turbine building and proceed to the non-Class 1E metal-clad switchgear installed in the turbine building. The Calvert cable busses continue through the cable tunnel between the turbine building and the control building to the Class 1E metal-clad switchgear busses located in the control building. As these busses traverse the buildings, adequate spacing and arrangement to the extent practical are provided to minimize the chances that both offsite sources will be eliminated by one occurrence.
8.2.2 ANALYSIS 8.2.2.1 Loss of VEGP Unit 1 or 2 or the Largest Unit A study simulating 1990 peak conditions has been made to determine the effect of the loss of either VEGP Unit 1 or 2 on the Georgia Power Company transmission system and its ability to maintain continuity of service to the loads. This study reveals that the transmission system is adequate to maintain continuity of service to the load areas and the offsite power to the safety-related loads at the plant site.
A study simulating 1990 peak conditions has been made to determine the effect of the loss of both Units 1 and 2 and the ability of the offsite source to supply emergency and safety-related loads at VEGP. It was found that the offsite transmission is adequate. The voltage at the VEGP 230-kV bus is above 100 percent under any normal planning criteria.
The largest unit of the Georgia Power Company system is VEGP Unit 1 or Unit 2 and loss of these units as explained above does not result in the loss of the offsite power to the safety-related buses at the plant site. The loss of the next largest unit (Bowen No. 3 or No. 4) likewise does not result in the loss of offsite power to the safety-related buses at the plant site.
8.2.2.2 VEGP Voltage Operating Range The 230-kV bus voltage will not be less than 230 kV (100 percent) or greater than 242 kV (105 percent) for all system loading conditions and under severe contingencies such as loss of any large generating plant, including VEGP itself (Unit 1 and Unit 2 shutdown and/or loss-of-coolant accident loads), or loss of any single transmission element. (See GPC letters SL-2110 dated March 9, 1987, and GN-1525 dated December 13, 1988, for a detailed description of the effect of switchyard voltages on in-plant loads.)
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.2-4 REV 23 3/21 8.2.2.3 VEGP Transient Stability Based on the offsite power system described in subsection 8.2.1, a transient stability study simulating 1990 summer peak and spring valley loading conditions has been made to determine the transmission line, bus arrangement, and/or special equipment requirements to ensure stable operation of the grid for VEGP Units 1 and 2. These extreme system loading conditions ensure that the stability performances of VEGP are analyzed under all reactive loading conditions or power factor conditions. The following contingencies are simulated for which the grid is required to remain stable:
A.
Three-phase fault with breaker failure anywhere in the system.
B.
Sudden loss of any large generating plant.
C.
Sudden loss of all lines on any common right-of-way.
D.
Sudden loss of any large aggregation of load or load center anywhere in the system.
Of these contingencies, it was found that a three-phase fault with breaker failure results in the largest transient swing. For this severe contingency, grid stability is maintained. Specific stability performance issues of VEGP are discussed below.
A.
Frequency Decay Rate The maximum frequency decay rate possible from theoretical considerations for the 230-kV and 500-kV systems is 5 Hz/s and 5.4 Hz/s, respectively. These frequency decay rates are the theoretical maximums that occur with the simultaneous tripping of many 500-kV, 230-kV and 115-kV lines such that a large island is formed in which all generation, other than one VEGP unit, is off line.
The probability for such a scenario is immeasurably small. If for the improbable scenario just described, one additional major generating unit is in operation, the expected frequency decay rate is reduced to approximately 2 Hz/s for VEGP.
However, the probability for this system condition is also immeasurably small.
B.
Load Dispatch System Automatic load dispatch is not used at the plant; therefore, the load dispatch system will not interfere with safety actions required of the reactor protection system.
In addition to the transient stability study described above, the stability of the grid is also assessed whenever a major electrical element, such as a bulk power transmission line or a 500/230-kV autotransformer in the vicinity of VEGP, is temporarily out of service. The assessment, although not specifically required, is to verify that preferred power will be available in the event another major transmission system element is lost while the offsite power system is in this temporary configuration. This assessment is based upon the guidelines of the Southeastern Electric Reliability Council (SERC) planning criteria to ensure that preferred power will be available. The assessment considers the actual and projected system power requirements, actual transmission elements in service, intercompany transactions, and other information, as applicable. If the grid is found to be potentially unstable, then appropriate actions will be taken in a timely manner.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.2-5 REV 23 3/21 8.2.2.4 Conformance to Criteria The preferred power sources; i.e., the offsite sources, are not Class 1E and are not manufactured and purchased under a quality assurance program as described in chapter 17.
However, all material is the highest grade of commercial equipment manufactured to the industrial standards listed below. The design is similar to the Class 1E systems and subjected to the same type of reviews, checks, and calculation methods. As a result, the design is considered to meet General Design Criterion 1 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
To comply with General Design Criterion 3, the offsite power systems have spatial separation and/or totally enclosed raceways over their entire length. Fire protection and detection are provided as discussed in subsection 9.5.1.
To comply with General Design Criterion 4, two of the offsite power sources are either direct buried or routed in duct banks and trenches below grade in exterior areas, and the other offsite source is routed overhead in cable trays.
Thus, all features of the offsite (preferred) power supply are designed to provide maximum practical reliability and redundancy in servicing the station safety load groups. Compliance with General Design Criterion 17, Electric Power System, is demonstrated by supplying the switchyard with ac power by two or more physically independent 230-kV circuits. Furthermore, the offsite power sources to the engineered safety features buses are either brought in by two physically independent circuits from the switchyard through the reserve auxiliary transformers (RAT) or another method of providing offsite power to either one of the engineered safety features buses is available with a 13.8-kV underground circuit emanating from the Georgia Power Company Plant Wilson switchyard through the standby auxiliary transformer (SAT) located in the Vogtle low voltage switchyard. Physical separation, the breaker-and-a-half switching configuration, redundant switchyard protection systems, and the transmission system are designed on load flow and stability studies to minimize simultaneous failure of all offsite power sources.
Compliance with General Design Criterion 18 is achieved by designing testability and inspection capability into the system and then implementing a comprehensive testing and surveillance program. The inspection and testing of the 230-kV and 500-kV breakers or disconnects, and the transmission line protective relaying can be done on a routine basis, without removing either the RATs, the SAT, or most transmission lines from service.
8.2.2.5 Standards and Guides In addition to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission General Design Criteria, the industry guides and standards listed below, and references thereto, are used in the design and procurement of the offsite power system.
A.
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 450-1995, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Stationary Type Power Plant and Substation Lead Storage Batteries. The safety-related batteries will be tested periodically in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the version of IEEE 450 as described in the Bases for the Technical Specifications.
B.
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) C37.010-1972, Application Guide for ac High Voltage Circuit Breakers.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.2-6 REV 23 3/21 C.
ANSI C37.90-1971, IEEE Standard for Relays and Relay Systems Associated with Electric Power Apparatus.
D.
ANSI C57.12.00-1973, General Requirements for Distribution, Power, Regulating Transformers, and Shunt Reactors.
E.
Insulated Cable Engineers Association (ICEA) S-19-81 (5th Edition), Rubber-Insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy, Revision 5, 1976.
F.
ICEA S-66-524, Cross-Linked-Thermosetting-Polyethylene-Insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy, Revision 5, 1976.
G.
ICEA S-68-516, Ethylene-Propylene-Rubber-Insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy, Revision 1, 1977.
H.
IEEE Standard 383, Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, February 28, 1974.
I.
American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM) B8, Standard Specification for Concentric-Lay-Stranded Copper Conductors, Hard, Medium-Hard, or Soft, 1971.
J.
ASTM-B33, Standard Specification for Tinned Annealed Copper Wire for Electrical Purposes, 1971.
K.
ASTM-B189, Specification for Lead-Coated and Lead-Alloy-Coated Soft Copper Wire for Electrical Purposes, 1981.
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VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 14 10/07 TABLE 8.2.1-2 THE ASSIGNMENT OF 230-kV CIRCUIT BREAKER SUPPLIES TO SUBSTATION BATTERIES Battery No. 1 Battery No.2 230-kV CB Line Relaying(a)
Close Trip No.
Line Relaying(a)
Close Trip No.
161760 P
X 1
S 2
161860 P
X 1
S 2
161960 P
2 S
X 1
161750(b)
P X
1 S
2 161850(b)
P X
1 S
2 161950(b)
P 2
S X
1 161710 P
X 1
S 2
161810 P
X 1
S 2
161910 P
2 S
X 1
161730 S
X 1
P 2
161830 S
2 P
X 1
161930 S
2 P
X 1
161720 P
X 1
S 2
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VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 14 10/07 TABLE 8.2.2-1 46-, 69-, 115-, 230-, AND 500-kV LINE INTERRUPTIONS CAUSED BY LIGHTNING INTERRUPTIONS FOR 100 MILES FOR YEAR 1979 Type of Lines and Voltage Miles No. of Lightning Outages Outages per 100 Miles 500-kV steel towers 766.83 3.0 0.39 230-kV steel H-frame 3,289.03 23.0 0.70 and wood H-frame 115-kV wood H-frame, 5,408.72 305.00 5.64 wood SP, steel SP 69-kV wood H-frame 464.41 68.00 14.64 wood single pole 46-kV wood single pole 4,006.69 848.00 21.16 Duration of Outage 230-kV Lines Month Day Time (h)
(min)
(s)
Austin Dr.-Klondike 230 kV(a) 07 21 1510 000 00 00 Austin Dr.-Scottdale 230 kV((a) 07 20 1629 000 00 00 Bio-Center 230 kV((a) 06 30 0520 000 00 00 Bonaire-Butler 230 kV(a) 04 09 0138 000 00 00 Boulevard-Peachtree 230 kV(a) 08 26 1646 000 00 00 Bowen-Hammond No. 1 230 kV 04 12 0720 001 15 00 Bowen-Pinson 230 kV(a) 06 30 0442 000 00 00 Branch-Klondike 230 kV(a) 08 10 0004 000 00 00 Bremen-Villa Rica 230 kV 06 02 1413 000 00 15 Dum Jon-Evans 230 kV(a) 07 18 1403 000 00 00 Dum Jon-Evans 230 kV(a) 08 01 1423 000 00 00 E. Dalton-Widows Creek 230 kV(a) 05 13 0755 000 00 00 E. Dalton-Widows Creek 230 kV(a) 07 21 0929 000 00 00 Farley-S. Bainbridge 230 kV(a) 09 01 1936 000 00 00 Gaston AL-Yates 230 kV 08 10 1305 000 00 03 McDonough-Northwest 1 230 kV(a) 04 13 0914 000 00 00 McDonough-Northwest 1 230 kV(a) 04 13 0915 000 00 00 McDonough-Northwest 1 230 kV(a) 09 28 1928 000 00 00 McDonough-Northwest 1 230 kV(a) 09 28 1935 000 00 00 McDonough-Peachtree 230 kV(a) 05 01 0006 000 00 00 McDonough-Peachtree 230 kV(a) 08 31 2000 000 00 00 Nelson-Norcross 230 kV(a) 04 13 0834 000 00 00 Nelson-Norcross 230 kV(a) 08 11 1200 000 00 00
- a. Instantaneous; time was not recorded.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 14 10/07 TABLE 8.2.2-2
SUMMARY
OF TRANSMISSION LINE FAILURES - 1979 Type of Failure Number Cause of Failure Number Pole 9
Lightning 1247 Line insulator 66 Trees 61 Switch 31 High winds 6
Cold weather 22 Conductors 33 Others(b) 532 Crossarm 14 Shield wire contact 13 Others(a) 146 Total failures 312 1868 Voltage Structure Number of Failure per Class Miles Failures 100 Miles of Line 500 kV 766.83 6
0.78 230 kV 3,289.03 43 1.31 115 kV 5,408.72 495 9.15 69 kV 464.41 109 23.47 46 kV 4,006.69 1527 38.11 Total 13,935.68 2180 15.64
- a. Other types of failure include conductor shorted together, foreign matter on lines, line switch failures, prearranged outages, and unknown causes.
- b. Other causes of failure include vandals, automobiles, trucks, airplanes, and unknown causes.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-1 REV 24 10/22 8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.1 AC POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.1.1 Description The onsite ac power system includes a Class 1E system and a non-Class 1E system.
8.3.1.1.1 Non-Class 1E System Onsite ac power is supplied from the 230-kV switchyard through reserve auxiliary transformers which feed non-Class 1E and Class 1E buses. Onsite ac power may also be supplied from the SAT, which receives its power from the 13.8-kV system at the Georgia Power Company Plant Wilson switchyard. Non-Class 1E ac power is distributed at 13.8 kV, 4.16 kV, 480 V, 277 V, 240 V, 208 V, and 120 V. Bus arrangements are shown in drawings 1X3D-AA-A01A, 2X3D-AA-A01A, and AX3D-AA-A01A.
The unit auxiliary transformers and the reserve auxiliary transformers each have one secondary winding rated at 13.8 kV and one secondary winding rated at 4.16 kV. Two 13.8-kV busses and three 4.16-kV busses supply power to nonsafety-related loads. Each 13.8-kV bus can be connected to a secondary winding of one of the reserve auxiliary transformers and also to a secondary winding of one of the unit auxiliary transformers.
The SAT has a single secondary 4.16-kV winding. When required for emergencies or RAT maintenance, the secondary winding may be connected to a Class 1E bus. While the SAT is in service some non-Class 1E loads, up to the SAT load limit, may also be supplied. The SAT loading is administratively controlled.
Two of the 4.16-kV busses can be connected to the secondary winding of one of the reserve auxiliary transformers and also to a secondary winding of the unit auxiliary transformer. The third 4.16-kV bus can be connected to the secondary winding of the second reserve auxiliary and unit auxiliary transformers. During starting of a unit, both 13.8-kV busses and the three 4.16-kV busses are supplied power from the reserve auxiliary transformers. Normally, these busses are then transferred to the unit auxiliary transformers during power generation by a manually initiated transfer.
Automatic fast bus transfer of the 13.8-kV busses with an automatic residual voltage transfer as a backup, from the unit auxiliary transformer to the reserve auxiliary transformers, is provided.
For the 4.16-kV bus transfer from the unit auxiliary transformers to the reserve auxiliary transformers, only automatic residual voltage bus transfer is provided.
When the SAT is replacing a RAT, neither the automatic, fast, or residual voltage bus transfer from the affected UAT 13.8-kV bus to the SAT is possible because the SAT does not have a 13.8-kV secondary winding. Therefore, the affected UAT 13.8-kV automatic bus transfer schemes are disabled. Automatic residual voltage transfer of the non-Class 1E 4.16-kV busses are also disabled during this time. The SAT may provide power to some non-Class 1E loads in addition to the connected Class 1E loads, but cannot supply the load of an entire non-Class 1E bus.
Each unit auxiliary transformer has the capacity to supply the connected non-Class 1E load.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-2 REV 24 10/22 8.3.1.1.2 Class 1E System The Class 1E ac power system is the power source used in or associated with shutting down the reactor and preventing or limiting the release of radioactive material following a design basis event. The system is divided into two independent ac power trains, train A and train B, each fed from an independent Class 1E bus with immediate access to offsite power sources. Drawings 1X3D-AA-A01A and 2X3D-AA-A01A show a schematic of the Class 1E ac power system, for Units 1 and 2.
Each train of Unit 1 and 2 is independent, except the following Class 1E loads are common to Unit 1 and 2. They are powered from Class 1E sources associated with Unit 1 only and have no provision for connection to Unit 2 power supplies.
Load Source Fuel Handling Building Post-Accident Unit Heater A-1542-NM-001-H01 1ABA10 A-1542-N7-002-H01 1BBA10 Fuel Handling Building Post-Accident Exhaust Fan A-1542-N7-001-M01 1ABA08 A-1542-N7-002-M01 1BBA08 Fuel Handling Building Radiation Monitor ARX-2532 1AY2A06 ARX-2533 1BY2B06 All safety-related equipment is housed in Seismic Category 1 structures.
The Class 1E ac system distributes power at 4.16 kV, 480 V, and 120 V ac to all safety-related loads. Also, the Class 1E ac system supplies through isolation devices certain selected loads which are not safety related but are important to the plant operation. Drawings 1X3D-AA-K02A, 2X3D-AA-K02A, 1X3D-AA-K02B, and 2X3D-AA-K02B indicate the major safety-related and isolated nonsafety-related loads supplied by the Class 1E ac system.
The non-Class 1E ac system supplies preferred (offsite) power to the Class 1E ac system through the reserve auxiliary transformer 4.16-kV windings. Each reserve auxiliary transformer has the capacity to supply all connected non-Class 1E running loads and to start and run the loads of one Class 1E train, or to start and run the loads of both Class 1E trains. During modes 1 through 4, to ensure that one RAT has adequate capacity and capability to start and run both trains of LOCA loads, the following conditions shall be met:
- 1. Grid voltage shall be maintained at or above the minimum expected 100% grid voltage while the busses are interconnected to one RAT;
- 2. No additional non-Class 1E 4.16-kV loads, other than those normally fed from the Class 1E safety busses, shall be manually connected to the one RAT feeding both Class 1E busses; and
- 3. The automatic bus transfer schemes for the non-Class 1E 4.16-kV busses shall be disabled during the interconnection of both trains to one RAT.
The non-Class 1E ac system may also supply preferred offsite power to the Class 1E ac system from the SAT 4.16-kV winding. During modes 1 through 4, the SAT has adequate capacity and
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-3 REV 24 10/22 capability to start and run the loads of one Class 1E train. The SAT does not have the capacity or capability to simultaneously start and run both trains of LOCA loads. However, in modes 5 and 6, the SAT has adequate capacity and capability to provide power to the safety-related loads on two Class 1E 4.16-kV electrical busses provided one train of the safety injection (SI) signal from the sequencer is blocked. If only one Class 1E bus is supplied by the SAT, additional non-Class 1E loads may be manually added until the SAT capacity is reached. See paragraph 8.3.1.1.2.D for further discussion.
In addition to the above power distribution, the Class 1E ac system contains standby power sources which provide the power required for safe shutdown in the event of a loss of the preferred power sources. The power, control, and instrumentation cables essential for safe shutdown are routed with adequate separation from their redundant counterparts.
The following describes various features of the Class 1E systems:
A.
Power Supply Feeders Each 4.16-kV load group can be supplied by one of two preferred power supply feeders or one diesel generator (standby) supply feeder. The preferred power supply feeders may be connected to either a RAT or the SAT. The SAT shall be connected to only one preferred power supply feeder at a time. Each 4.16-kV bus supplies motor loads and 4.16-kV/480-V load center transformers with their associated 480-V busses.
B.
Bus Arrangements The Class 1E ac system is divided into two redundant trains per unit (trains A and B). For each unit, either one of the trains is capable of providing power to safely reach shutdown for that unit. Each ac train consists of a 4.16-kV bus, 480-V load centers, 480-V motor control centers, and lower voltage ac supplies. The dc control power to each train is provided from dc power supplies of the same train.
C.
Loads Supplied from Each Bus Refer to drawings 1X3D-AA-K02A, 2X3D-AA-K02A, 1X3D-AA-K02B, and 2X3D-AA-K02B for a listing of Class 1E system loads and their respective busses.
D.
Manual and Automatic Interconnections Between Busses, Busses and Loads, and Busses and Supplies No provisions exist for automatically connecting one Class 1E train to another redundant Class 1E train or for automatically transferring loads between trains.
Each Class 1E bus is provided with two (normal and alternate) offsite preferred power sources and one onsite standby power source. During normal operation with both offsite sources available, each Class 1E bus is supplied from a separate reserve auxiliary transformer. An additional preferred offsite power source, the SAT, is also available to supply the safety-related loads during an emergency or during RAT maintenance.
A circuit breaker is provided for both the normal and alternate offsite preferred power sources. Transfer to the alternate offsite source would be accomplished under administrative control by performing a manual, hot-bus transfer between the normal and alternate offsite power source. Electrical separation is maintained through the Class 1E circuit breakers on each bus which serve as Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation devices. See paragraph 8.3.1.4.3 and table 8.3.1-4 for further discussion of this subject.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-4 REV 24 10/22 During power operation (modes 1 through 4), and only for purposes of facilitating the transfer of preferred offsite power sources, both Class 1E 4.16-kV busses may be manually connected to the same RAT by administrative control provided:
- 1. Grid voltage is maintained at or above the minimum expected 100% grid voltage while the busses are interconnected to the one RAT;
- 2. No additional nonsafety-related 4.16-kV loads, other than those normally fed from the Class 1E 4.16-kV safety busses, shall be manually connected to the RAT while the busses are interconnected; and
- 3. The automatic bus transfer schemes for the nonsafety-related 4.16-kV busses shall be disabled during the connection of both trains to one RAT.
The 13.8-kV fast and residual voltage bus transfer schemes for the remaining RAT in service need not be disabled. This provides a transfer method and power source for the bus from which two of four reactor coolant pumps are normally fed should a reactor/turbine trip occur during the time the busses are interconnected to one RAT. The SAT should not be utilized as a single source of power for both trains of safety loads during power operation (modes 1 through 4).
During unit shutdown (modes 5 and 6), both Class 1E 4.16-kV busses may be manually connected to the same offsite power source (RAT or SAT) by administrative control provided that the total load on the 4.16-kV non-Class 1E busses powered by the RAT shall not exceed 7500 kVA, or when connected to the SAT, the SAT's 1,735-A secondary winding ampacity rating shall not be exceeded. During modes 5 and 6, the SAT has adequate capacity and capability to provide power to the safety-related loads for two Class 1E 4.16-kV electrical busses provided the safety injection signal from the sequencer for one train is blocked. When one 4.16-kV Class 1E bus is supplied from the SAT, additional non-Class 1E loads may be connected until the SATs load limit is reached.
In all cases, when the 4.16-kV non-Class 1E busses are powered through the backfeed arrangement, then the automatic bus transfer schemes shall be disabled. However, the bus transfer schemes for 13.8-kV busses need not be disabled.
E.
Interconnections Between Safety-Related and Nonsafety-Related Busses No interconnections are provided between the safety-and nonsafety-related busses at the same voltage level. The reserve auxiliary transformers supply power through the same 4.16-kV winding to both non-Class 1E and Class 1E busses.
There is one non-Class 1E 480-V switchgear bus powered through a transformer from each safety-related 4.16-kV bus. The 4.16-kV circuit breaker to which this load is connected is Class 1E qualified for the design life of the planta, in accordance with the requirements of Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standards 323 and 344. This circuit breaker is automatically tripped by the solid state protection system upon the receipt of a safety injection signal, but it can be manually reclosed under administrative control. Isolation is a The operating licenses for both VEGP units have been renewed and the original licensed operating terms have been extended by 20 years. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 54, appropriate aging management programs and activities have been initiated to manage the detrimental effects of aging to maintain functionality during the period of extended operation (see chapter 19).
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-5 REV 24 10/22 therefore provided in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75.
F.
Redundant Bus Separation The Class 1E switchgear, load centers, and motor control centers for the redundant trains are located in separate rooms of the control building, auxiliary building, and diesel generator building in such a way as to ensure physical separation. Refer to paragraphs 8.3.1.4.1 and 8.3.1.1.7 for the criteria governing redundant bus separation.
G.
Class 1E Equipment Capacities
- 1. 4.16-kV Switchgear Bus 2000 A continuous Incoming breakers 2000 A continuous, 350 MVA interrupting Feeder breakers 1200 A continuous, 350 MVA interrupting
- 2. 480-V Unit Load Centers Transformers 1000 kVA, 3 phase, 60 Hz, 4160/480 V Bus 1600 A continuous Incoming breakers 1600 A continuous, 50,000 A rms symmetrical interrupting Feeder breakers 800 A continuous, 30,000 A rms symmetrical interrupting
- 3. 480-V Motor Control Centers Horizontal bus 800 A continuous, 25,000 A rms symmetrical Vertical bus 600 A continuous, 25,000 A rms symmetrical Breaker (molded case) 25,000 A rms symmetrical minimum interrupting (singly for thermal-magnetic breakers and in combination with a starter for magnetic only breakers)
H.
Automatic Loading and Load Shedding The automatic loading sequence of the Class 1E busses is indicated in drawings 1X3D-AA-K02A, 2X3D-AA-K02A, 1X3D-AA-K02B, and 2X3D-AA-K02B.
If preferred power is available to the 4.16-kV Class 1E bus following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), the Class 1E loads will be started in programmed time increments by the load sequencer. The emergency standby diesel generator will be automatically started but not connected to the bus. In the event that preferred power is lost following a LOCA, the load sequencer will function to shed loads and connect the standby power source to the Class 1E bus. The load sequencer will then function to start the required Class 1E loads in programmed time increments.
Should a LOCA occur during sequencing after a loss of preferred power, the sequencer will automatically reset and begin sequencing all required loads.
Should a LOCA occur after sequencing has been completed, the sequencer will
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-6 REV 24 10/22 sequence those loads required for LOCA with no load shedding of previously connected loads.
A safety injection signal (SIS) will open the diesel generator breaker if it is paralleled with the offsite power system for testing as described in paragraph 8.3.1.1.3H. The diesel generator breaker will open, but the diesel will remain running as described above.
There are no permissive devices (e.g., lube oil pressure) incorporated into the final actuation control circuitry for large horsepower, safety-related motor-pump combinations.
Refer to paragraph 8.3.1.1.3 for additional information on load shedding and sequencing.
I.
Class 1E Equipment Identification Refer to paragraph 8.3.1.3 for details regarding the physical identification of Class 1E equipment.
J.
Instrumentation and Control Systems for the Applicable Power Systems with the Assigned Power Supply Identified The dc control supplies for switchgear breaker operation are separate and independent so that Class 1E dc train A normally supplies Class 1E train A switchgear. The battery chargers for dc train A are normally fed from the same train motor control centers. Class 1E dc train B supplies Class 1E train B switchgear. The battery chargers for dc trains C and D are normally fed from trains A and B motor control centers, respectively. For further information on the dc power system, refer to subsection 8.3.2.
Each 4.16-kV switchgear bus and 480-V load center bus is provided with common trouble alarm annunciation in the control room. This alarm summarizes bus undervoltage, overcurrent circuit breaker tripping and other miscellaneous improper switchgear conditions. In addition, the 4.16-kV switchgear is provided with bus negative sequence annunciation in the control room. The voltage of each 4.16-kV bus is monitored by instruments in the control room. Each 480-V motor control center is provided with common trouble annunciation in the control room. This annunciation is initiated by either an overload or a loss of control power at each load fed from the motor control center.
For a listing of the loads associated with these busses, see drawings 1X3D-AA-K02A, 2X3D-AA-K02A, 1X3D-AA-K02B, and 2X3D-AA-K02B.
K.
Electric Circuit Protection Systems Protective relay schemes or direct-acting trip devices on primary and backup circuit breakers are provided throughout the onsite power system to:
Isolate faulted equipment and/or circuits from unfaulted equipment and/or circuits.
Prevent damage to equipment.
Ensure personnel safety.
Minimize system disturbances.
The short circuit protective system is analyzed to ensure that the various adjustable devices are applied within their ratings and set to be coordinated with
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-7 REV 24 10/22 each other to attain selectivity in their operation. The combination of devices and settings applied affords the selectivity necessary to isolate a faulted area quickly with a minimum of disturbance to the rest of the system.
Major types of protection applications that are used consist of the following:
- 1. Overcurrent Relaying Each supply feeder breaker from the unit auxiliary transformers (nonsafety-related) and the reserve auxiliary transformer is provided with three very inverse time phase overcurrent relays with instantaneous trip attachment (one per phase) and two level timers for instantaneous trip for phase-to-phase fault protection. Phase-to-ground fault protection for each supply feeder is provided with one very inverse time residual overcurrent relay without instantaneous unit.
Each 4.16-kV motor circuit breaker has three overcurrent relays, each with one long time and one instantaneous element for overload, locked rotor, and short circuit protection. Each 4.16-kV motor circuit breaker is also equipped with a ground residual current relay with one long time and one instantaneous element.
The current for Class 1E motors is monitored by an ammeter at the Class 1E switchgear.
Each 4.16-kV supply circuit breaker connected to a load center transformer has three overcurrent relays with very inverse time elements with instantaneous attachments. A residual ground overcurrent relay with one time overcurrent element and one instantaneous element provides sensitive ground fault protection.
- 2. Undervoltage Relaying Each 4.16-kV Class 1E bus is equipped with undervoltage relays (located at the sequencer for each Class 1E train) for diesel generator start initiation and undervoltage annunciation. (See paragraph 8.3.1.1.3F for further details.)
Each 480-V Class 1E load center bus is equipped with undervoltage relays for undervoltage annunciation.
- 3. Differential Relaying The main (nonsafety-related), unit auxiliary (nonsafety-related), and reserve auxiliary transformers are equipped with differential relays. These relays provide high speed disconnection to prevent severe damage in the event of transformer internal faults.
Motors rated 4500 hp and above are equipped with differential protection.
The main generator (nonsafety-related) and the standby emergency generator are provided with differential protection.
- 4. 480-V Load Center Overcurrent Relaying
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-8 REV 24 10/22 Each 480-V load center circuit breaker is equipped with a solid-state device which has an adjustable phase overcurrent trip. Breakers feeding motors have an instantaneous trip.
- 5. 480-V Motor Control Center Overcurrent Relaying Molded case circuit breakers provide time overcurrent and/or instantaneous short circuit protection for all connected loads. The molded case circuit breakers (MCCB) for motor circuits are equipped with instantaneous trip only.
Motor overload protection is provided by thermal trip units in the motor controller. The MCCB for nonmotor feeder circuits provide thermal overcurrent protection as well as instantaneous short circuit protection, with the exception of the Class 1E battery chargers where thermal magnetic or instantaneous trip only MCCB may be utilized due to high inrush current and to coordinate with the thermal magnetic trip breaker furnished locally at the battery chargers.
During startup and periodic testing, all starters for motor-operated valves are equipped with thermal overload relays wired into the control circuitry. Prior to core loading and during plant operation, the thermal overload relay trip contacts for all of the Class 1E valves (ac and dc) are permanently bypassed with jumpers, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106.
The starters and the feeder circuit breakers located in the motor control center are coordinated with the motor control center incoming supply breakers so that, upon a fault, the protective device nearest the fault trips first.
L.
Testing of the ac Systems During Power Operation All Class 1E circuit breakers and motor controllers are testable during reactor operation, except for the electric equipment associated with those Class 1E loads identified in chapter 7. During periodic Class 1E system tests, subsystems of the engineered safety features actuation system, such as safety injection, containment spray, and containment isolation, are actuated, thereby causing appropriate circuit breaker or contactor operation. The 4.16-kV and 480-V switchgear circuit breakers and control circuits can also be tested independently while individual equipment is shut down. These circuit breakers can be placed in the test position and exercised without operation of the associated equipment.
The use of jumpers or other temporary test arrangements which would bypass protective functions is not required to verify system capability to operate except during startup testing or as noted in paragraph 1.9.118.2.
M.
Sharing of Systems and Equipment Between Units There is no sharing of Class 1E systems or equipment between units (with the exception of fuel handling building loads discussed in paragraph 8.3.1.1.2) in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.32 and 1.81.
N.
Class 1E Equipment Qualification The equipment identified as safety related has been qualified as Class 1E equipment and is designated as Seismic Category 1. It has been shown to be capable of withstanding the environmental conditions to which it will be exposed.
(See sections 3.10 and 3.11 for further details of the equipment qualification.)
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-9 REV 24 10/22 8.3.1.1.3 Standby Power Supply The standby power supply for each safety-related load group consists of one diesel generator complete with its accessories and fuel storage and transfer systems. It is capable of supplying essential loads necessary to reliably and safely shut down and isolate the reactor. Each diesel generator is rated at 7000 kW for continuous operation and 7700 kW for a short-term (2-h) period every 24 h. The voltage and frequency recovery characteristics meet or exceed the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9. One diesel generator is connected exclusively to a single 4.16-kV safety feature bus of a load group. Each unit has two 4.16-kV Class 1E trains, and the safety-related equipment on both trains is similar. The trains are redundant, and, for each unit, one train is adequate to satisfy minimum engineered safety features demand caused by a LOCA and a simultaneous loss of preferred power supply. The diesel generators are electrically isolated from each other. Physical separation for fire and missile protection is provided between the diesel generators, since they are housed in separate rooms of the Seismic Category 1 diesel generator building. Power and control cables for the diesel generators and associated switchgear are routed to maintain physical separation.
Ratings for diesel generator sets are determined on the basis of nameplate rating, pump pressure and flow conditions, or motor brake horsepower. The nameplate ratings for each load are noted in drawings 1X3D-AA-K02A, 2X3D-AA-K02A, 1X3D-AA-K02B, and 2X3D-AA-K02B.
The loading profile for the diesel is shown in table 8.3.1-2. The continuous rating of the diesel generator is based on the maximum total load required at any time. The diesel generator is capable of operation at less than full load for extended periods of time as described in subsection 9.5.5.
The functional aspects of the onsite power system are discussed below:
A.
Starting Initiating Circuits The diesel generators are started on the following:
Receipt of a safety injection signal.
Loss of voltage to the respective 4.16-kV Class 1E bus to which each diesel generator is connected.
Manual switch actuation (control room).
Manual switch actuation (diesel generator room).
Emergency manual switch actuation (diesel generator room).
Starting a diesel generator with a safety injection signal, a loss of 4.16-kV Class 1E bus voltage signal, or an emergency manual switch actuation will place that diesel generator in the accident operation mode.
Starting a diesel generator with a manual switch actuation from either the control room or the diesel generator room will place that diesel generator in the nonaccident operation mode.
Refer to the logic diagram provided in drawings 1X4AK01-30 and 1X4AK01-31.
B.
Diesel Starting Mechanism and System Refer to subsection 9.5.6.
C.
Tripping Devices The following protective functions are provided during operation of the diesel generator:
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-10 REV 24 10/22 High jacket coolant temperature.(1)(2)
High temperature lube oil.(1)(2)
Low jacket coolant pressure.(1)(2)
High temperature engine bearing.(1)(2)
Loss of field.(1)
Vibration.(1)(2)
Engine overspeed.
Low turbocharger oil pressure.(1)(2)
High crankcase pressure.(1)(2)
Low lube oil pressure.
Generator underfrequency.(1)(2)
Generator differential.
Generator reverse power.(1)(2)
Generator negative phase sequence.(1)(2)
Generator voltage controlled phase overcurrent.(1)
(1) Diesel engine/generator breaker trips blocked during safety injection initiated operation.
(2) Diesel engine and/or generator breaker trips blocked during emergency manual switch or LOSP initiated operation.
Reverse power, negative phase sequence, and underfrequency protection are permitted to trip only during operation of the diesel generator in parallel with the preferred power supply during manually initiated testing.
Underfrequency protection is provided to safely separate the diesel generators from the preferred source (when previously synchronized to it) without damage to or shutdown of the diesel generators. If the engine does not reach 200 rpm within a predetermined time following a start signal, the fail-to-start relay functions to restart the keep warm systems and alarm locally and in the control room.
The protective devices which function to shut down the diesel and which are also retained during an accident consist of the following:
Engine overspeed.
Generator differential.
Low lube oil pressure.
The low lube oil pressure trip is implemented by three independent measurements. Actuation of this trip is initiated by two-out-of-three coincident logic in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.9.
Although the diesel generators are vital to the safety of the plant, no automatic bypass is provided for the protective devices which function to shut down the
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-11 REV 24 10/22 diesel during an accident, since each train is provided with one diesel generator.
Should one diesel generator be tripped by a protective device, the redundant train will function as a backup. Since the malfunctioning diesel generator is isolated before being seriously damaged, repairs could be performed while the redundant diesel is in operation.
The diesel generator control and monitoring equipment which is not by its nature required to be mounted on the diesel generator skid is located in free-standing control panels for each diesel generator unit to minimize or eliminate mechanical fatigue caused by vibration of the diesel generator during operation.
The diesel generators are monitored from the control room, and each device, when actuated, initiates an annunciator in the control room. These functions are also provided with alarms in the diesel generator room. The alarms, where possible, are set so that they provide a warning of impending trouble prior to tripping of the diesels.
Alarm 46, as shown in table 8.3.1-1, summarizes conditions which cause tripping of the diesel generators, render the diesel generators incapable of responding to an automatic start signal, accepting load, or which will, over time, cause the shutdown of the diesel generators. This alarm is actuated by emergency stop, maintenance lockout, engine overspeed trip, low starting air pressure, generator dc control power failure, the local-remote generator control switch in the local position, generator circuit breaker inoperable, diesel fuel storage tank pumps inoperable, diesel generator building ventilation fan transfer control switch in the local position or the remote control switch in the pull-to-lock position, diesel generator building ventilation fan discharge damper operator power failure, diesel generator failed to start relay, starting air control power failure, or diesel generator barring device engaged. This alarm is located on the system status monitoring panel in the main control room. Capability is provided for a manual initiation of the alarm at the system status monitoring panel to indicate a deliberately induced bypassed condition.
D.
Interlocks Circuit breaker electrical interlocks are provided to prevent automatic closing of a diesel generator breaker to an energized or faulted bus.
If the preferred power has been lost, an undervoltage signal will trip the preferred offsite power incoming breakers as indicated in paragraph 8.3.1.1.3F.
Both 4.16-kV Class 1E busses have a circuit breaker installed in the normal and alternate preferred offsite power source cubicles. Either breaker is capable of connecting the bus to an offsite power source. Both Class 1E 4.16-kV busses may be manually connected and paralleled to the same offsite power source as discussed in paragraph 8.3.1.1.2.D. The connection would be accomplished under administrative control by performing a manual, hot-bus transfer between the normal and alternate offsite sources. Although the preferred offsite power sources are momentarily paralleled during a hot-bus transfer, electrical interlocks are provided to prevent the preferred offsite power sources from remaining paralleled.
E.
Permissives A single switch in the diesel generator room is provided for each diesel generator to block automatic start signals when the diesel is out for maintenance.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-12 REV 24 10/22 When in the local-manual position, an annunciator is initiated in the control room.
A pushbutton in the control room and a local pushbutton in the diesel generator room are provided to allow manual start capability.
An emergency start is provided in the diesel generator room which bypasses the automatic start signals to allow a manual start of the diesel. During periodic diesel generator tests, subsequent to diesel start and synchronization to the preferred system, a switch in the control room allows parallel operation with the preferred power source.
F.
Load Shedding Circuits Upon recognition of a loss of or degraded voltage on a 4.16-kV Class 1E bus, a logic signal is initiated to effect the following on each load group through the safety feature sequencer:
Shed all loads; load center transformers remain connected.
Send signal to start diesel generator.
Trip 4.16-kV preferred power supply breaker.
Two voltage sensing schemes for each Class 1E 4.16-kV bus are employed to initiate the logic signal. One scheme will recognize a loss of voltage, and the other will recognize degraded voltage conditions. Each scheme is provided voltage signals through four potential transformers located on each bus.
Logic is provided to allow load shedding and tripping of the incoming breaker on two-out-of-four undervoltage logic signals. These devices are set to operate with a time delay of 0.8 s at a minimum of 71% of nominal voltage which is below the minimum expected voltage during diesel generator sequencing. The undervoltage sensing device design meets the applicable requirements of IEEE 279.
Additional undervoltage logic circuits are provided for each bus to recognize degraded voltage conditions. These circuits are set to operate at a minimum of 89.6% of nominal voltage with a maximum time delay of 20 s. This setpoint is above the minimum motor starting voltage during normal operation; however, the time delay has been selected to prevent unwanted tripping and undervoltage-induced damage to the safety-related loads. Load shedding and tripping of the incoming breaker is provided by two-out-of-four undervoltage logic.
A two-out-of-four undervoltage logic set at 93.1% of nominal voltage with a time delay of 10 s is also provided to initiate an alarm in the control room to warn the operators of a degraded voltage condition. An SIS subsequent to the initiating of this alarm does not separate the auxiliary power system from the offsite power system. Studies have been performed which indicate that at the degraded voltage trip setpoint indicated above, based on the worst case motor thermal damage curve, the permanently connected Class 1E loads will not be damaged.
These studies also indicate that adequate voltage is provided to allow starting of the loads.
After a diesel generator has been started and reaches rated voltage and frequency, the generator circuit breaker connecting it to the corresponding 4.16-kV bus closes, energizing that bus and the associated load center transformers.
Each diesel generator is designed to accept loads within 9.5 s after receipt of a
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-13 REV 24 10/22 start signal, and all automatically sequenced loads are connected to the Class 1E bus within 30.5 s thereafter.
As discussed in subsection 15.0.8, the safety analysis postulates a 12 s diesel start time which includes the initial sequencer loading step. (Refer to drawings 1X3D-AA-K02A, 2X3D-AA-K02A, 1X3D-AA-K02B, and 2X3D-AA-02B.) Relays at the diesel generator detect generator-rated voltage and frequency conditions and provide a permissive interlock for the closing of the respective generator circuit breaker. Upon loss of the preferred source of power without a LOCA, the load sequencer system initiates the starting of the diesel generators, trips the 4.16-kV preferred power supply breaker, and sheds all loads. The load sequencer for each diesel then automatically initiates the starting of the safe shutdown loads. When an SIS is present, connection of the diesel generator to the 4.16-kV bus is not made unless the preferred source of power is lost (4.16-kV undervoltage).
Following diesel start and connection to the Class 1E bus, the loads are automatically sequenced onto the bus at programmed 5-s time intervals. The load shed feature is bypassed during sequencing of loads. The load shed signal is automatically or manually reset if the diesel generator breaker opens before all the loads are sequenced onto the bus. A fast responding exciter and voltage regulator ensure voltage recovery of the diesel generator after each load step, in accordance with requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9. Field flashing is utilized on the diesel generators for fast voltage buildup during the start sequence.
Should a LOCA occur during load sequencing or after sequencing is completed, the SIS will restart the sequencer, which will sequence those loads required for LOCA conditions. No load shedding other than the nonsafety-related loads identified in drawings 1X3D-AA-K02A, 2X3D-AA-K02A, 1X3D-AA-K02B, and 2X3D-AA-K02B will occur.
Once load sequencing has been completed, or if the diesel generator breaker opens before all the loads are sequenced onto the bus, the load shed and resequence capability is automatically reinstated for an undervoltage sensed at the 4.16-kV Class 1E bus. Logic has been provided that prevents more than three undervoltage conditions from being recognized within a 2-h period. The first and second undervoltage signal will initiate load shed and resequence of the required loads. The third undervoltage signal will initiate a load shed only.
Reinstatement of sequencing can be accomplished by manually resetting a timer located at the sequencer. This limitation is provided to prevent automatically exceeding the manufacturer's recommendations concerning motor start capability of two successive starts within a 2-h period.
The diesel generator sequencers were designed in compliance with the requirements in IEEE 603 (1991). Programmable digital components and devices within them additionally comply with IEEE Std 7-4.3.2 (1993).
A breaker in each 4.16-kV Class 1E bus supplies power through a nonsafety transformer (1/2NB01X and 1/2NB10X) to loads listed in drawings 1X3D-AA-K02A, 2X3D-AA-K02A, 1X3D-AA-K02B, and 2X3D-AA-K02B. An SI signal automatically trips the breaker previously closed. After it has been tripped, the operators can close it under administrative control to reenergize the selected nonsafety loads, should their operation be desired.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-14 REV 24 10/22 The voltage levels at safety-related busses are optimized for the expected load conditions throughout the anticipated range of voltages by the setting of no-load transformer taps. The tap setpoints are based upon the design voltage ranges available from the reserve auxiliary transformers. The Technical Specifications indicate the voltage setpoint parameters of the diesel generators to be compatible with the transformer tap setpoints. Verification of the proper tap selection will be accomplished by actual measurement in the field.
All time delays associated with sequencer trip conditions and sequence stepping include +/-50 ms tolerance.
G.
Loss of a Diesel Generator Should a diesel generator fail due to a mechanical or electrical malfunction or be tripped by one of the trip signals listed in paragraph 8.3.1.1.3C, the sequencer will shed all loads after the diesel generator breaker has opened. The diesel generator breaker will open on any one of the trip signals listed in paragraph 8.3.1.1.3C or following a diesel generator stop signal.
After the required repairs have been completed, the diesel generator can be started remotely from the main control room or locally from the engine control panel in the diesel generator building. Once the diesel has started and has reached rated voltage and frequency, it will be loaded as described in paragraph 8.3.1.1.3F.
H.
Testing Because the diesel generators are of the type and size that have been previously used as a standby emergency power source in other nuclear power plants, the following site tests are given during the plant preoperational test program and during the plant operation. The test procedures shall include a final equipment check prior to starting these tests.
- 1. During the plant preoperational test programs only, 35 consecutive start tests for each diesel generator with no failures are to be run to demonstrate the required reliability.
- 2. During the plant operation, a single start test on 31-day test intervals will be performed. The periodic testing of diesel generator units during the plant operation is to:
- a. Demonstrate that the diesel starts and gradually accelerates to at least 440 rpm, and verify that the required voltage and frequency are attained.
- b. Demonstrate maximum expected load-carrying capability for an interval of not less than 1 h. The maximum expected loading for VEGP is based on a loss of offsite power without a LOCA.
This test may be accomplished by synchronizing the generator with the offsite system, by connecting through either a RAT or the SAT, and assuming a load at the maximum practical rate.
- c. Demonstrate that the capability of the diesel generator unit to supply emergency power is not impaired.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-15 REV 24 10/22
- 3. Diesel generator failures will be addressed in accordance with plant procedures that implement the provisions of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants."
- 4. The Technical Specifications will include requirements such that during the preoperational period tests are run during shutdown (except for tests described by items f, g, h, and k) to verify the following. The test procedures shall include a final equipment check prior to starting these tests. Tests described by items f, g, h, and k may be performed during any mode of plant operation as required. Technical Specification frequencies shall be controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program using NEI 04-10 guidelines.
- a. Demonstrate that on loss of offsite power the emergency busses have been deenergized and that the loads have been shed from the emergency busses in accordance with design requirements.
- b. Demonstrate that on loss of offsite power the diesel generators start on the autostart signal, load shed occurs, the emergency busses are energized along with load center transformers, the autoconnected shutdown loads are energized through the load sequencer, and the system operates for 5 min while the generators are loaded with the shutdown loads.
- c. Demonstrate that on a safety features actuation signal (without loss of offsite power) the diesel generators start on the autostart signal and operate on standby for 5 min.
- d. Demonstrate that on loss of offsite power, in conjunction with a safety features actuation signal, the diesel generators start on the autostart signal, load shed occurs, the emergency busses are energized along with load center transformers, the autoconnected emergency (accident) loads are energized through the load sequencer, and the system operates for 5 min while the generators are loaded with the emergency loads.
- e. Deleted
- f.
Demonstrate maximum expected load-carrying capability for 24 h, of which 22 h are at a load equivalent to the maximum expected loading of the diesel generator and 2 h at a load equivalent to or greater than 105%
of the maximum expected loading of the diesel generator.
- g. Demonstrate functional capability at full load temperature conditions by verifying the diesel starts upon receipt of a manual or auto-start signal, and generator voltage and frequency are attained within the required time limits. This test will be performed within 5 min of shutting down the DG after the DG has operated a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at full load in accordance with Technical Specifications.
- h. Demonstrate proper operation during diesel generator load shedding, including a test of the loss of the largest single load and of complete loss
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-16 REV 24 10/22 of load. Verify that the overspeed limit is not exceeded.
- i.
Demonstrate the ability to:
Synchronize the diesel generator unit with the offsite system while the unit is connected to the emergency load.
Transfer the emergency load to the offsite system.
Restore the diesel generator unit to standby status.
- j.
Deleted
- k. Demonstrate that the fuel transfer pumps transfer fuel from each fuel storage tank to the day tank of each diesel generator via installed cross-connection lines.
- l.
Demonstrate that, with the diesel generator operating in a test mode, connected to its bus, a simulated safety injection signal overrides the test mode by: (1) returning the diesel generator to standby operation, and (2) automatically energizing the emergency loads with offsite power.
- 5. The test procedures will specifically state that the diesel generator unit is to be reset at the conclusion of the test to allow an automatic start when required.
I.
Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer Systems The diesel generator fuel oil system is described in subsection 9.5.4.
The diesel generator cooling water system is described in subsection 9.5.5.
J.
Diesel Generator Cooling and Heating Systems K.
Instrumentation and Control Systems for Standby Power Supply Equipment is provided in the control room for each diesel generator for the following operations:
Manual starting and stopping.
Manual and automatic synchronization.
Manual frequency and voltage setting.
Emergency stop.
Voltage regulator manually actuated droop and reset.
A transfer switch is provided in each diesel room for local remote control selection. The switch is normally in the remote position, whereby the engineered safety features system senses an accident or loss of preferred power and starts the diesel. The transfer switch is placed in the local position to allow manual operation of the diesel locally when it is out for maintenance. Equipment is provided locally at each diesel generator for manual starting in case of a control room evacuation. The local emergency start functions to start the diesel generator, regardless of the position of the transfer switch.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-17 REV 24 10/22 Equipment is provided at each local control panel for the following operations (when the transfer switch is in the local position):
Manual starting.
Manual stopping.
Manual frequency and voltage setting.
Manual exciter field removal and reset.
Voltage regulator manually actuated droop and reset.
The local control operation is annunciated in the control room. The dc power source for the safety-related diesel generator instrumentation and control system is of the same load group as the respective diesel generator.
Each diesel generator local control panel is equipped with the alarms listed in table 8.3.1-1. The alarms are duplicated in the control room.
Electrical instruments are provided in the control room for surveillance of generator voltage, current, frequency, power, and reactive volt amperes and at the diesel generator for surveillance of generator voltage, current, and frequency.
The breaker status of each 4.16-kV breaker of the engineered safety features system is displayed by red and green indicating lamps in the control room. Local indication is provided at the switchgear.
A light is provided on the system status monitor panel to determine the availability of the diesel generator. This light is activated by the conditions identified in paragraph 8.3.1.1.3C.
There will be a time delay initiated to prevent the starting of the diesel generator when the engine is intentionally shut down such as during periodic surveillance testing. This time delay is for approximately 90 seconds. If during the 90-s time delay period a manual start attempt is initiated, the engine will not start because fuel to the engine will be blocked. If the operator depresses the manual start pushbutton during the 90-s time delay period, the starting air valves will open for 5 s and automatically close after the 5 s have elapsed. This built-in 5-s time limit on the opening of the starting air valves is to prevent the depletion of the starting air.
However, if a diesel generator is being manually stopped and an emergency start signal (loss-of-coolant accident or loss of offsite power) is received at the control panel during the 90-s time delay period, the engine control system will automatically bypass the 90-s time delay and will allow fuel oil and starting air to be admitted to the engine. Also, the 5-s time limit will be automatically bypassed; i.e., the starting air valves remain open until the engine starts (starting air pressure above 150 psig), or until the starting air pressure drops to 150 psig. At this pressure, the automatic start attempt will stop because at 150 psig the starting air valves automatically close. At this point, the engine can only be started manually by pushing the manual start button. Pushing the manual start button will cause the starting air valves to open again. There is no built-in time delay between the conclusion of the automatic start sequence and the manual start attempt in a situation as described above. In other words, if the engine fails to start automatically, a manual start can be initiated immediately. The starting air sequence is designed in this manner so that the manual start attempt capability is available if an automatic start attempt fails. The engine can be
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-18 REV 24 10/22 manually started in this manner until the starting air pressure drops to 90 psig.
Generally, starting air pressure below 90 psig will not start the engine when an attempt is initiated.
There is an additional time delay associated with a diesel manual or emergency start that is received while the diesel is ramping up in speed from a slow start initiation. The engine ramp time is approximately 25 s and will not be affected by any subsequent start signal. An emergency start signal will deactivate the normal trips, but will not affect engine rate of acceleration.
For the diesel generator to be automatically started or started from the control room, the mode switch on the engine control panel must be in the "Operational" position, and the point of control (local/remote) switch on the generator control panel in the "Remote" position. If either of the switches is not in these positions, an alarm in the control room on the system status monitor panel and diesel annunciator panel will alert the operator that the diesel is disabled.
In order to maintain the emergency start capability of the diesel generator, operating procedures will specify that periodic surveillance testing is to be initiated only from the control room; i.e., control switch is in the "Remote" position. Also, the operator will be made aware of the built-in 90-s time delay and will be instructed not to initiate manual starting of the engine during this period.
To minimize the accumulation of dust in the diesel generator building, the floors and walls are coated with epoxy to prevent concrete abrasive dust from becoming airborne and interfering with operation of electrical equipment. Diesel engine control panels located in the diesel generator building are not dusttight; however, the generator control cabinet enclosures are NEMA 12 dusttight, and ventilated with filtered louvers. The generator control cabinets have openings at the bottom to receive conductors from trenches and conduits. After installation, these openings will be sealed to limit entry of dirt, moisture, and oil vapors.
General house cleaning and maintenance procedures require cleaning of the control panels as required in accordance with the preventative maintenance program. This will prevent accumulation of dust on electrical components and ensure that starting and operation of the diesel generator are not compromised.
Thermostatically controlled space heaters are provided in the generator control cabinets and the engine control cabinets to minimize moisture accumulation inside these cabinets. Combustion air and ventilation provisions associated with the diesel generators are described in subsections 9.5.8 and 9.4.7, respectively.
L.
Conformance to Branch Technical Position (BTP) ICSB-8 The emergency diesel generators will not be used for peaking service in accordance with BTP ICSB-8, Use of Diesel-Generator Sets for Peaking.
M.
Programs for training, maintenance, and operations will be implemented as discussed in chapter 13.
N.
The maintenance/surveillance program, developed by the Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse, has been implemented.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-19 REV 24 10/22 8.3.1.1.4 Control Rod Drive Power Supply Electric power to control rod drive mechanisms is supplied by two full-capacity, motor-generator sets. Each motor-generator set is powered from a separate non-Class 1E 480-V load center.
Each generator is of the synchronous type and is driven by a 200-hp induction motor. The ac power is distributed to the rod control power cabinets through two Class 1E series-connected reactor trip breakers.
8.3.1.1.5 Vital Instrument ac Power Supply Four independent Class 1E 120-V vital instrument ac power supplies are provided to supply the four channels of the protection systems and reactor control systems. Each vital instrument ac power supply consists of an inverter and a distribution panel. Trains A and B are provided with two inverters and two distribution panels.
Each distribution panel has two incoming breakers which are interlocked so that only one breaker can be closed at a time. The normally closed breaker is the inverter supply. The normally open breaker is the 120-V ac inverter backup supply from a 480/120-V regulated transformer.
Normally, the inverter is operating to supply the vital ac bus. Each inverter is supplied by a Class 1E 125-V dc system, as described in subsection 8.3.2. If an inverter is inoperable or is to be removed from service, the vital ac bus can be supplied from the 120-V ac inverter backup supply (480/120-V regulated transformer) associated with the same load group by repositioning the distribution panel input breakers. Administrative controls ensure that no more than one vital ac bus is powered from the regulated transformer backup power supply at any one time during routine preventive maintenance on the associated inverter. Refer to drawings 1X3D-AA-G01A, 1X3D-AA-G02A, 1X3D-AA-G02C, 2X3D-AA-G01A, 2X3D-AA-G02A, and 2X3D-AA-G02C for the arrangement of the vital instrument ac power supplies.
8.3.1.1.6 Non-Class 1E Instrument ac Power Supply The nonvital 120-V instrument ac power supply is designed to furnish reliable power to all nonsafety-related plant instruments. A schematic of this system is shown in drawings 1X3D-AA-G01B and 2X3D-AA-G01B.
The control building nonvital instrument ac system for each unit consists of six essential instrument panels and five (four on Unit 2) regulated instrument bus panels. Each panel has normal and alternate incoming breakers interlocked so that only one can be closed at a time.
The normal supply to essential instrument panel NY1N is from its associated inverter. The normal supply to regulated instrument bus panel NYR is from its associated regulated transformer. The alternate supply to the regulated instrument bus panel NYR is from the normal supply to regulated instrument bus NYS. The alternate supply to essential instrument panel NY1N is a feeder breaker in regulated instrument bus panel NYR. Regulated instrument bus panel NYS and essential instrument panel NY2N receive power similarly. Essential instrument panel NY4N normally receives power from its associated inverter. An alternate power supply is provided by a mechanically interlocked incoming circuit breaker which is powered from a regulated transformer. Each regulated transformer is sized to supply 120-V ac power to its associated normal essential instrument panels and regulated instrument panels.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-20 REV 24 10/22 A sixth regulated instrument bus panel (1NYJ) is located in the auxiliary building. (Panel 2NYJ is supplied from a nonregulated source.) Its two incoming breakers (interlocked so that only one is closed at a time) receive power from regulated transformers fed from separate normal 480-V ac motor control centers.
Regulated instrument bus panel NYRS has interlocked main incoming breakers which are powered from two separate regulating transformers. Inverter-powered panel NY3N (NY5N, NY01, and NY6N are supplied from NY3N) panel ANYT2 and panel ANYT3 powers the main plant computer and its peripherals. Panel NY3N also supplies panel NY01, which powers the radiation monitoring computer and its peripherals.
Panel NYC2 provides power for the rod position indication systems. It has interlocked main incoming breakers which are powered from two separate Class 1E regulating/isolation transformers.
Essential instrument panels common to both units have also been provided for the technical support center and the central and secondary alarm stations as shown in drawings AX3D-AA-G02B and AX3D-AA-G02C.
8.3.1.1.7 Electrical Equipment Layout The following are the general features of the electrical equipment layout:
A.
Class 1E switchgear, load centers, and motor control centers of redundant load groups are located in separate rooms within Seismic Category 1 buildings.
B.
Four Class 1E battery supplies are located in the control building. Each battery is located in a separate room. Battery ventilation considerations are addressed in subsection 9.4.5.
C.
The battery charger, inverter, manual transfer switch, and dc busses associated with each of the four subsystems are in separate rooms outside the battery rooms.
D.
Two cable spreading rooms are provided, one above and one below the control room. This enhances redundant cable separation.
E.
Redundant diesel generators and associated supporting equipment are located in separate rooms in the Seismic Category 1 diesel generator building.
Electrical equipment layout drawings showing the location of electrical equipment are listed in section 1.7.
8.3.1.1.8 Design Criteria for Class 1E Equipment Design criteria for the Class 1E equipment are discussed below:
A.
Motor Size For all motors rated above 480 V, the nameplate horsepower is generally equal to or greater than the maximum horsepower required by the driven load under normal running or runout conditions except for the centrifugal charging pumps, residual heat removal pumps, containment spray pumps, and auxiliary feedwater pumps which are all under the scope of the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) supplier.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-21 REV 24 10/22 The containment spray pump, and residual heat removal pump motors have a service factor of 1.15 and the required brake horsepower is within the capability of the motor service factor rating of 1.15. The centrifugal charging pump (CCP) motor is rated at 600 hp with a service factor of 1.15. An engineering study concluded that the Unit 1, Train A CCP motor is capable of a 715-hp rating with a service factor of 1.0. This bounds all normal and runout/transient operating conditions for the Unit 1, Train A CCP. The auxiliary feedwater pump motor is rated at 900 hp, and the maximum brake horsepower required is 962 hp during various plant transient conditions. An engineering study was performed by Westinghouse that concluded the auxiliary feedwater pump motors are acceptable for the overload condition.
B.
Minimum Motor Accelerating Voltage All Class 1E motors fed from the 4.16-kV busses are specified with accelerating capability at 75% of the motor nameplate rating (4000 V). Class 1E motors rated for use on lower voltage busses, which are required to start concurrently with large 4-kV motors, are specified with accelerating capability at 75% of the motor nameplate rating, with the exception of the boric acid transfer pump, which are specified at 80% of the motor nameplate rating.
Calculations have been made indicating that these motors will not be provided power at less than their specified capabilities.
Class 1E motor-operated valve (MOV) torque/thrust capability is based on the available voltage at the MOV's terminals. The MOV voltage analysis includes degraded grid cases with the starting of MOVs simultaneously with other loads as well as individual MOV starts. Some of the available voltages are below the 75 or 80% of the nameplate rating specified accelerating capability. MOV capability and limitations are documented in calculations.
The electrical system is designed so that the motor terminal voltage supplied to each Class 1E motor will permit acceleration of that motor.
C.
Motor Starting Torque The motor starting torque is capable of starting and accelerating the connected load to normal speed within sufficient time to perform its safety function for all expected operating conditions, including the design minimum bus voltage stated in paragraph 8.3.1.1.3.
D.
Minimum Motor Torque Margin over Pump Torque Through Accelerating Period The minimum torque margin (accelerating torque) is such that the pump motor assembly reaches nominal speed within sufficient time to perform its safety function at design minimum terminal voltage.
E.
Motor Insulation Insulation systems are selected on the basis of the particular ambient conditions to which insulation is exposed. For Class 1E motors located within the containment, the insulation system is selected to withstand the postulated accident environment.
F.
Temperature Monitoring Devices Provided in Large Horsepower Motors Each motor in excess of 1500 hp is provided with six resistance temperature detectors (RTD) embedded in the motor slots, two per phase. In normal
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-22 REV 24 10/22 operation, the RTD at the hottest location (selected by test) monitors the motor temperature and provides a computer alarm in the control room on high temperature. Each 4.16-kV motor bearing (except residual heat removal motor) is provided with one thermocouple which will provide an alarm on bearing high temperature.
G.
Interrupting Capacities The interrupting capacities of the protective equipment are determined as follows:
- 1. Switchgear Switchgear interrupting capacities are greater than the maximum short circuit current available at the point of application. The magnitude of the short circuit currents in the medium voltage systems is determined in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) C37.010-1972. The offsite power system, a single operating diesel generator, and running motor contributions are considered simultaneously in determining the fault level. All motors connected to the bus are considered to be running when the short circuit is postulated.
High voltage power circuit breaker interrupting capacity ratings are selected in accordance with ANSI C37.06-1971.
- 2. Load Centers, Motor Control Centers, and Distribution Panels Load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panel circuit breakers have a symmetrical rated interrupting current as great as the determined total available symmetrical current at the point of assumed fault. Symmetrical short-circuit current is determined in accordance with the procedures of ANSI C37.13-1973 for low voltage circuit breakers other than molded case breakers and of National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)
Standards Publication AB 1 for molded case circuit breakers.
H.
Electric Circuit Protection Refer to paragraph 8.3.1.1.2K for criteria regarding the electric circuit protection.
I.
Grounding Requirements Equipment and system grounding has been designed using IEEE 80-1971, Guide for Safety in ac Substation Grounding, and IEEE 142-1972, Recommended Practice for Grounding of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, as a guide.
J.
Safety-Related Cable The 5-kV safety-related power cable insulation and the 600-V power and control cable insulation utilized in balance-of-plant applications are type EPR/HYP with hypalon in the jacket. The balance of plant safety-related instrument and specialty cable insulation consists of moisture, radiation, and ozone-resistant thermosetting compounds. The jackets used on these cables consist of flame retardant, moisture, radiation, and ozone-resistant thermosetting compounds.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-23 REV 24 10/22 Safety-related cables are qualified for the design life of the planta as described in IEEE 323-1974 and 383-1974. The cable supplied under the NSSS scope is qualified in accordance with the methodology outlined in WCAP-8587 for the applicable system or component in which the cable is installed.
8.3.1.1.9 Heat Tracing Systems There are no Class 1E heat tracing systems required to ensure the safe operation of the plant.
The chemical and volume control system, safety injection system, and the waste processing system liquid are provided with temperature monitoring and alarms for annunciation to help ensure the boric acid is maintained at or above 65°F. The alarms are powered from non-Class 1E busses which are backed by the onsite emergency diesel generators. The heat traced portions of the auxiliary feedwater, vacuum degasifier systems for RMWST and CST, demineralizer water system, and nuclear service cooling water systems are provided with nonredundant heat tracing systems for freeze protection. The Heat Trace circuits associated with the Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System and Radiation Monitors required during a LOSP are powered from non-class 1E busses and backed up by onsite Diesel Generators. The heat tracing for the radwaste processing facility is supplied from the facility's normal power supply.
8.3.1.1.10 Electrical Equipment Subject to Submergence Due to Containment Flooding Electrical equipment located in the containment building that would be subject to submergence under a LOCA condition includes miscellaneous nonsafety-related and safety-related equipment.
Equipment faults due to submergence would not cause damage to containment building electrical penetrations because the associated power circuits are either disconnected, are protected by redundant overcurrent protective devices, or have fault currents at the penetration below the penetration damage level (see paragraph 8.3.1.1.12).
The nonsafety-related devices are not designed for operation under water; however, there would be no effect on the safety-related power systems, since this equipment is powered from nonsafety-related busses.
The safety-related equipment includes the nuclear instrumentation detectors (source, intermediate, and power range), and extended range excore neutron detectors, reactor vessel level instrumentation system (RVLIS) temperature compensation RTDs, containment reactor cavity sump level transmitter, accumulator isolation valves, one reactor coolant system hot leg wide range pressure transmitter, and the steam generator blowdown flow transmitters. The safety-related excore neutron detectors (source, intermediate, power, and extended range) could be subjected to submergence following a postulated design basis accident. However, the submergence period would allow time for the detectors to perform their intended function of detecting the reactor shutdown and to establish other means of long-term shutdown verification, such as post accident sample analysis. The safety-related reactor cavity sump narrow range level transmitter could also be subjected to submergence following a postulated design basis a The operating licenses for both VEGP units have been renewed and the original licensed operating terms have been extended by 20 years. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 54, appropriate aging management programs and activities have been initiated to manage the detrimental effects of aging to maintain functionality during the period of extended operation (see chapter 19).
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-24 REV 24 10/22 accident. However, the containment wide range level transmitters and narrow range level transmitters on the north and south normal drain sumps would be used to provide diverse and unambiguous indication of containment water level. The hot leg pressure transmitter and the blowdown flow transmitters are not required to be functional, should containment flooding occur.
In addition, accumulator discharge valves HV-8808A, B, C, and D could also be submerged following a LOCA. Refer to paragraph 6.3.2.2.16 for a discussion of the consequences of these valves becoming submerged. The submergence of the RVLIS RTDs has been evaluated, and it was concluded that the RVLIS accuracy requirements are within the allowable limits.
8.3.1.1.11 Motor-Operated Valves with Power Lockout The motor-operated valves that require power lockout to meet BTP ICSB 18 and that have the means to accomplish power lockout are listed and outlined as follows:
A.
The following motor-operated valves power lockout and restoration capability is accomplished at the main control board:
HV-8806 Safety injection pump suction from refueling water storage tank HV-8835 Safety injection pump cold leg injection HV-8802A, B Safety injection pump hot leg injection HV-8840 Residual heat removal pump hot leg injection HV-8809A, B Residual heat removal pump cold leg injection HV-8813 Safety injection pump miniflow isolation B.
The following motor-operated valve power lockout is accomplished by padlocking the circuit breaker at the motor control center during startup and maintained in the locked open position during reactor power operation:
HV-8808A, B, C, D Accumulator isolation valves In addition, the emergency core cooling system motor-operated valves (item A) are provided with valve position-indicating light boxes to provide a continuous indication of valve position.
The Technical Specifications list these valves and their required positions.
8.3.1.1.12 Containment Building Electrical Penetrations The electrical penetrations, with the exception of fiber optic feedthroughs, are protected from damage resulting from overcurrent conditions through the use of redundant overcurrent protective devices as indicated in paragraph 1.9.63.2.
The use of series Class 1E fuses for backup protection on the 480-V switchgear power circuits is justified by the fact that fuses are passive devices which have proven coordination characteristics and reliability. Similarly, for motor control center power circuits, fuses in series with thermal-magnetic breakers is justified by the fact that fuses are passive devices which have proven coordination characteristics and reliability.
Figure 8.3.1-1 provides the overcurrent protection coordination curves for each type of power or control circuit connected to the electrical penetrations. These curves provide justification that, for those circuits having sufficient power to damage the penetration, the overcurrent protective devices will operate to disconnect power prior to such damage occurring, thus maintaining the
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-25 REV 24 10/22 integrity of the containment pressure boundary in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 50.
Spliced connections at the penetrations are accomplished using compression lugs with heat shrinkable tubing termination kits (such as manufactured by Raychem Corporation). The insulating materials used in these kits contain no epoxy. Splice kits qualified for the design life of the planta in accordance with IEEE 323 and 383 are used on safety-related circuits.
8.3.1.1.13 Residual Heat Removal Isolation Valve Power Supply Trains A and B residual heat removal isolation valves are powered from train A and B motor control centers, respectively. The train C and D valves are powered through 125-V dc/480-V ac, three-phase inverters and combination starter units from the train C and D Class 1E dc systems, respectively. The inverters and combination starter units are qualified for the design life of the plantb in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 323 and 344.
8.3.1.2 Analysis For discussion of regulatory guides in regard to Class 1E ac systems, refer to section 1.9 and subsection 8.1.4. Compliance with General Design Criteria 17 and 18 is discussed in section 3.1.
A failure modes and effects analysis for the onsite power supply systems is provided in table 8.3.1-3. The failure analysis of the 120-V vital ac system is included in table 8.3.2-5.
Qualification of electrical equipment is addressed in sections 3.10 and 3.11.
8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Safety-Related Equipment Each circuit and raceway is given a unique identification number. This number provides a means of distinguishing between circuits and raceways of different voltage level or separation groups. Each raceway is color coded with indelible ink, paint, or adhesive markers (adhesive markers are not used in the containment building) at intervals of 15 ft or less along the length of the raceway and on both sides of floor or wall penetrations. Each cable is color coded at a a The operating licenses for both VEGP units have been renewed and the original licensed operating terms have been extended by 20 years. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 54, appropriate aging management programs and activities have been initiated to manage the detrimental effects of aging to maintain functionality during the period of extended operation (see chapter 19).
b The operating licenses for both VEGP units have been renewed and the original licensed operating terms have been extended by 20 years. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 54, appropriate aging management programs and activities have been initiated to manage the detrimental effects of aging to maintain functionality during the period of extended operation (see chapter 19).
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-26 REV 24 10/22 maximum of 5-ft intervals along the length of the cable, and cable markers showing the cable identification number are applied at each end of the cable.
The following color coding is used for all identification purposes, except at the main control board:
Separation Group Safety Train Protection Channel Color Code A
A I
Brown B
B II Green C
C III Blue D
D IV Yellow N
None None Black For the color coding used on the main control board, see chapter 18.
In addition, raceway separation groups are clearly identified on design drawings for all equipment and raceways.
8.3.1.4 Independence of Redundant Systems 8.3.1.4.1 General The routing of cable and the design of raceways is such that no single credible event is capable of disabling redundant safety-related systems.
8.3.1.4.2 Cable Derating and Cable Tray Fill The ampacity rating of cables is established in accordance with Insulated Cable Engineers Association (ICEA) P-46-426 and P-54-440. Generally, power cables, feeding loads from switchgear, motor control centers, and distribution panels are sized based on 125% of the full load current at a 100% load factor.
Where cumulative effects of actual operation or installation conditions require encroachment into the 25% allowance, engineering analysis is performed to verify adequacy of cable ampacity for the actual operating or installation condition. In addition, cables are derated in accordance with ICEA P-46-426 where cable spacing in open top punched bottom tray is less than one diameter or the ambient temperature is greater than 40°C. The ampacity of maintained spacing 13.8-kV, 4.16-kV, and 480-V load center power cables in tray have been determined in accordance with ICEA Publication No. P-46-426 for punched bottom, open top trays, ICEA Publication No. P-54-440 for solid bottom open top tray, or punched bottom with solid cover trays. Six hundred-V power cables in trays have been sized in accordance with ICEA Publication No. P-54-440. Where covers in excess of 6 ft in length have been installed on random fill trays, engineering analysis has been performed to assess any ampacity derating effects of the cover. Where maintained spacing cables are routed in solid bottom tray fittings with solid covers in excess of 6 ft in length, the cables have been derated in accordance with ICEA P-46-426 for cables in enclosed raceway. Power cables penetrating fire stops have been derated by 10%.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-27 REV 24 10/22 The 13.8-and 4.16-kV power cables generally maintain a minimum spacing of one cable diameter between adjacent cables in a single layer. The 480-V load center power cables have a minimum spacing of 1/4 cable diameter. Where justified by analysis done on a case-by-case basis, minimum spacing of 1/4 diameter for 13.8-and 4.16-kV power cables and less than 1/4-diameter spacing for 480-V load center power cables have been permitted. Motor control center power cables and control and instrumentation cables are random fill. Control and instrument cable tray design fill is 40% of the area of the tray being used; 4-in. deep trays are used in all areas of the plant except where the 40% maximum fill of the 4-in. deep tray would be exceeded, in which case a 6-in. deep tray is used. Low voltage power trays are limited to a fill of 30% of the area of a 3-in. loading depth tray.
When greater than 40% fill for control tray or 30% for power tray is unavoidable, analysis is performed to ensure the cables' ampacities have been properly derated. Cable trays will not be filled above the siderails except at transitions (tees, elbows, cable entrances and exits, etc.).
The cables above the siderails are routed back below the siderails within 12 ft from the transition. Whenever trays are filled above the siderails, the required Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation is measured to the uppermost cable in the tray.
8.3.1.4.3 Cable Routing There are five separation groups for the cable and raceway system: groups A, B, C, D, and N.
Separation group A (4.16 kV, 480 V, 120 V ac, and 125 V dc) contains circuits from safety train A and protection channel I (120 V ac, 125 V dc, and instrumentation). Similarly, separation group B contains circuits from safety train B and protection channel II; group C, train C, and channel III; group D, train D, and channel IV; and group N, normal, nonsafety-related circuits.
Cables of one separation group are run in separate raceways and physically separated from cables of other separation groups. Group N raceways are separated from safety-related groups A, B, C, and D. However, raceways from group N are routed in the same areas as the safety-related groups per the spatial separation requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75.
In general, the minimum spatial separation requirements are as follows:
A.
Within the cable spreading rooms, control room, and shutdown rooms, the minimum vertical separation for open top cable tray is 3 ft, and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 ft. The minimum separation distance between enclosed raceways qualified as barriers is 1 in. The minimum separation distance between non-Class 1E conduit and Class 1E open top cable trays is 1 in.
Testing and analyses have been performed for circuits of voltage levels 480 volts or lower to determine alternate reduced separation distances where these general minimum separation distances have not been met. The testing and analyses have been performed as allowed by Section 6.1.1.3 of IEEE 384-1981 and by Regulatory Guide 1.75. Refer to table 8.3.1-4 for circuits where analysis has been used.
B.
Within general plant areas the minimum vertical separation is 5 ft, and the minimum horizontal separation is 3 ft for open top cable tray. The minimum separation distance between enclosed raceways qualified as barriers is 1 in. The minimum separation distance between non-Class 1E conduit and Class 1E open top cable trays is 1 in.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-28 REV 24 10/22 Testing and analyses have been performed for circuits of voltage levels 480 volts or lower to determine alternate reduced separation distances where these general minimum separation distances have not been met. Analyses have also been performed for reduced separation of Class 1E 4160-V cables from non-1E 480 V and lower voltage cables. The testing and analyses have been performed as allowed by Section 6.1.1.3 of IEEE 384-1981 and by Regulatory Guide 1.75.
Refer to table 8.3.1-4 for circuits where analysis has been used.
C.
Within panels and control boards,(a) the minimum spatial separation between components or cables of different separation groups (both field-routed and vendor-supplied internal wiring) is 6 in. Where it is not possible to maintain this separation, barriers are installed between components and wiring of different separation groups, or analysis has been performed to determine the minimum separation requirements. Refer to subsection 7.1.2 for separation requirements inside Westinghouse panels and control boards and to table 8.3.1-4 for circuits where analysis has been used.
Where barriers are required, one of the following methods of providing separation is used between any two separation groups within panels and control boards:
- 1. If both groups are redundant Class 1E circuits, separation is provided by routing the circuits in separate metallic conduit or enclosed wire duct, or by wrapping the wires of one or both of the separation groups in silicon dioxide cloth (siltemp 188 CH).
- 2. If one of the separation groups is non-Class 1E, only those circuits are required to be routed in metallic conduit or enclosed metallic wire duct.
Alternatively, the non-Class 1E cables may be wrapped in silicon dioxide cloth (siltemp 188 CH). See table 8.3.1-4 for further details.
- 3. A single barrier is provided with a 1-in. maintained air space between the components or cables of redundant separation groups and the barrier.
- a. The control board or panel is considered to extend to the bottom of the floor penetration fire barrier seal including any floor slots, penetrations, etc.
D.
Where spatial separation requirements between raceways of different separation groups are not met, fire barriers are installed as follows:
- 1. Where the minimum vertical separation is not maintained, a barrier is installed which extends at least 6 in. on each side of the tray system or to the wall, if a wall is within 6 in. when the trays are arranged in stacks.
Within the cable spreading area, where the trays cross each other, a barrier extending at least 1 ft on each side of the tray system is installed.
Within the general plant areas, however, the barrier extending at least 1 ft on each side of the top trays and 3 ft on each side of the bottom trays is installed. However, for trays containing circuits 480 V or lower voltage and cables 2/0 AWG or smaller, the barrier needs only extend 1 ft. on each side of the top and bottom trays.
(a) The control board or panel is considered to extend to the bottom of the floor penetration fire barrier seal including any floor slots, penetrations, etc.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-29 REV 24 10/22
- 2. Where the minimum horizontal separation is not maintained, a barrier is installed which extends from at least 1 ft above (or to the ceiling) to at least 1 ft below (or to the floor) the tray system.
E.
Where raceways of different separation groups are brought to a single enclosure, separation is accomplished by the use of conduit routed in opposite directions from the enclosure, using the enclosure as a barrier, or by wrapping the cabling of one of the separation groups in silicon dioxide cloth (siltemp 188 CH). Refer to table 8.3.1-4 for details of the use of silicon dioxide cloth as a barrier.
Non-Class 1E circuits are electrically isolated from Class 1E circuits, and Class 1E circuits from different separation groups are electrically isolated with the use of isolation devices, shielding and wiring techniques, physical separation (in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 for circuits in raceways), or an appropriate combination thereof.
When isolation devices are used to isolate Class 1E circuits from non-Class 1E circuits, the circuits within or from the Class 1E equipment or devices to the isolation device(s) are identified as Class 1E and are treated as such. Beyond the isolation device(s) these circuits are identified as non-Class 1E and are separated from Class 1E circuits in accordance with the separation criteria described above.
Certain applications use Class 1E circuit breakers, fuses, or other devices for isolation. Specific cases are described below:
- 1. The cables feeding the non-Class 1E pressurizer heaters use two non-Class 1E circuit breakers in series as protection for each Class 1E containment penetration. Cables from the nonsafety load centers (two of which are connected to the emergency busses) follow separate routes to the splice box under the pressurizer. The two circuit breakers in series for each circuit are qualified to seismic requirements and are coordinated with the load center supply and feeder breakers. Where the Class 1E distribution systems electrify certain pressurizer heaters, the Class 1E to non-Class 1E isolation is provided by the Class 1E 4.16-kV switchgear by a 4.16-kV qualified isolation device (as noted in paragraph 8.3.1.4.3.E.2.).
- 2. Class 1E 4.16-kV Circuit Breaker Trips on Safety Injection Actuation Signal.
The Class 1E 4.16-kV circuit breakers are tripped on receipt of an accident signal which will isolate the downstream non-Class 1E circuits and loads from their respective Class 1E power sources under accident conditions and therefore pose no threat to the Class 1E sources. The Class 1E 4.16-kV circuit breakers are therefore acceptable for use as isolation devices.
- 3. Circuit Breakers - Redundant, Molded Case Class 1E Two molded case circuit breakers are used in series (120-V-ac distribution panel branch breaker and the distribution panel main breaker) to provide isolation between Class 1E 480-V busses and non-Class 1E motor space heaters mounted in Class 1E motors.
The two breakers are coordinated such that protection is provided to the circuit in the event of failure of the primary protection device (branch circuit breaker).
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-30 REV 24 10/22
- 4. Class 1E 13.8-kV Circuit Breaker and Current Transformers The RCP motor Class 1E current transformers installed in the RCP motor non-Class 1E circuit, are not to provide isolation, but together with the Class 1E protective relaying, are used to ensure the tripping of the Class 1E circuit breaker when an abnormal overcurrent condition occurs. In any event, the assured tripping of Class 1E circuit breaker will prevent the current transformers and the protective relays from being damaged.
- 5. Class 1E Battery Charger Battery chargers are used as isolation devices between separation groups as shown in drawing 2X3D-AA-G01A.
A fault on the primary side of the battery charger (fault on 480-V-ac bus) will not affect the secondary side of the battery charger (125-V-dc side) because the fault current on the primary side of the battery charger will be cleared by the battery charger feeder breaker, which is upstream of the battery charger.
Postulated failures on the secondary side of a battery charger will not result in unacceptable effects on the primary side.
- 6. Fuses Fuses are used in control circuits to provide isolation as follows:
- a. Between Class 1E voltage transformer secondary circuits and non-Class 1E plant fault recorder and between Class 1E voltage transformer secondary circuits and non-Class 1E diesel generator auto synchronizer.
- b. Between the two Class 1E contacts in series (synchronizing switch contact and diesel generator break auxiliary contact) and non-Class 1E diesel generator auto synchronizer. The series contacts are used to give permissive signal to the auto synchronizer.
- c. Between Class 1E control power circuit in the electric hydrogen recombiner control panel and the non-Class 1E temperature controller (used for indication only).
- d. Between Class 1E control power circuits in the nuclear instrumentation system and non-Class 1E circuits used for high flux at shutdown, indication, and annunciation.
- 7. Isolation Relays Auxiliary relays are used in control circuits to provide isolation as follows:
- a. The majority of the auxiliary relays used as isolating relays are barrier-mounted. The barrier effectively isolates the coil and the contact wiring.
- b. Auxiliary relays are used for interfacing diesel generator Class 1E circuit with the nonsafety-related diesel generator autosynchronizer for paralleling the diesel generator with offsite power during testing.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-31 REV 24 10/22
- c. Relays are used for interfacing the safety features sequencer with nonsafety-related 480-V load centers to shed the nonsafety-related load centers from 4.16-kV emergency bus on a safety feature actuation signal.
- 8. Optical Isolator Optical isolators are furnished in the isolation device panels and diesel engine control panel.
- a. Optical isolators in the isolation device panels are the Reliance Electric Company IsoMate digital isolation system. Barrier panels built into the panels provide front-to-rear separation between Class 1E and non-Class 1E wiring compartments. A 5-in. air gap formed by the barriers separates the two compartments.
- b. Optical isolators in the diesel engine control panel are used solely to isolate the Class 1E diesel generator circuitry from a non-Class 1E annunciator mounted in the same panel.
The non-Class 1E wiring emanating from isolation devices and extending beyond the equipment panels is separated from high energy power cables by routing these cables through control level trays as described in paragraph 8.3.1.4.3.G.
- 9. Transformer Modulation Isolator Validyne Engineering Corporation transformer-modulated isolators are used to provide Class 1E to non-Class 1E isolation for low energy analog instrumentation signals. The analog input signals are modulated, transformed, and demodulated to provide the required isolation. This isolator is used for interfacing Class 1E circuit with nonsafety-related auxiliary feedwater turbine-driven pump speed indicator.
- 10. Ferro Resonant Transformers IEEE Standard 449-1990 covers the ferro resonant transformer voltage regulator of the type that is used as an isolation device. The overload characteristic with unsaturated series inductance, Figure 10 of this standard, describes the performance of the Solidstate Controls, Inc., regulating transformers, which are used at VEGP. This output voltage vs. output current characteristic indicates the constant output over the regulating range to full-rated current and then an overload current with reduced output voltage which proceeds to a limiting short-circuit current. Tests performed by Solidstate Controls, Inc., on a single unit of each transformer model verify this characteristic.
These transformers limit the input current for an output fault to a range within the limits set forth in IEEE 449 (1990). These transformers also meet the requirement for current limiting isolation devices as specified in Regulatory Guide 1.75 (IEEE 384, 1981).
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-32 REV 24 10/22 For additional information on isolation device application, see responses to NRC questions of April 30, 1984.
- 11. Current Transducer Isolator Scientific Columbus Company current transducers are used to provide Class 1E to non-Class 1E isolation for low energy analog instrumentation signals.
This isolator is used to interface Class 1E control circuits with the non-Class 1E plant computer system.
These isolators were qualified by Scientific Columbus to Reference Standard Number 1. The isolators were qualified by Brown-Boveri Electric, Inc. to Reference Standard Numbers 2 and 3. The isolators were evaluated by Georgia Power Company against the requirements of Reference Standard Number 4. In addition, these isolators passed a dielectric breakdown test rated at 1500 volts.
Reference Standards
- 2. IEEE 323, 1974 "Guide for Qualification Class 1E Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
- 3. IEEE 344, 1975 "Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment For Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
- 4. IEEE 384, 1981 "Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits."
F.
Power and control cables are installed in conduit or ventilated bottom trays (punched or ladder type). Solid tray covers are used in all outdoor locations and indoors where trays run in areas where falling debris is a problem.
Instrumentation cables are routed in conduit or solid bottom cable tray with solid tray covers. Communications (voice, data, video) cables not used for the control or monitoring of plant equipment may be routed without the use of conduits or trays and is qualified to IEEE 383-1974 flame test or better.
G.
Separate trays are provided for each voltage service level: 13.8 kV, 4.16 kV, 480 V, 120-V ac and 125-V dc, control, and instrument. Vertically stacked trays are arranged from top to bottom as follows:
13.8 kV.
480-V power from load centers.
480-V low voltage power and 120-V ac or 125-V dc with loads of 10 A or more.
Control.
Instrument.
In general a minimum of 10-in. vertical spacing is maintained between trays of different service levels within the same stack.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-33 REV 24 10/22 With the exception of lighting panel feeders, which are routed in trays, lighting circuits are routed in conduit or utilize aluminum sheath (ALS) cable. Lighting circuits inside containment utilize conduit or copper sheath (CUS) cable.
Raceways from safety-related groups A and C are located in the lower cable spreading room.
Raceways from safety-related groups B and D are located in the upper cable spreading room.
Group N raceway is routed into both upper and lower cable spreading rooms.
All raceways installed in Seismic Category 1 structures have seismically designed supports.
Trays and rigid conduit are not attached rigidly to Seismic Category 1 equipment.
Raceways running between Seismic Category 1 structures are designed in the following manner to prevent damage to the raceway or associated cabling during seismic events. Conduits running between structures are either connected with a minimum of 2 ft of flexible conduit or are provided with expansion/deflection fittings. Cable trays running between structures are supported independently in each Category 1 structure with no rigid mechanical connection of the tray at the interface. Those cables which require maintained spacing are not tied down to the tray for a distance of 5 ft on either side of the interface.
A high energy line break analysis and missile impact study is performed for all rooms or compartments containing large rotating machinery or high energy piping. Where hazards to safety-related raceways are identified, a predetermined minimum separation is maintained between the break and/or missile source and any safety-related raceway, or a reinforced concrete barrier designed to withstand the effects of each hazard is placed to prevent damage to raceway of redundant systems. The hazards analysis is further described in appendix 3F.
8.3.1.4.4 Hazard Protection Where redundant safety-related raceway systems traverse each other, separation in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 as a minimum is maintained. In areas where external hazards such as high energy pipe breaks, missiles and flooding exist, separation and/or barriers shall be as described below.
Where redundant circuits, devices, or equipment (different separation groups) are exposed to the same external hazard(s), predetermined spatial separation shall be provided. Where the spatial separation cannot be met, qualified barriers are installed. For details on fire protection, see subsection 9.5.1.
8.3.1.4.5 Control of Compliance with Separation Criteria During Design and Installation Compliance with design criteria to ensure the independence of redundant systems is a supervisory responsibility during both the design and installation phases. The responsibility is discharged by:
A.
Identifying applicable criteria.
B.
Issuing working procedures and construction specifications to implement these criteria.
C.
Modifying procedures to keep them current and workable.
D.
Checking manufacturing drawings, procedures, and specifications to ensure compliance with criteria and procedures.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-34 REV 24 10/22 E.
Controlling installation and procurement to ensure compliance with approved and issued drawings and specifications.
F.
Separation and hazard reviews conducted by a multidiscipline physical design review team.
8.3.1.4.6 Cable Splices - See paragraph 1.9.75.2.
8.3.1.5 Standard Review Plan Evaluation The diesel generator controls and monitoring instruments are not mounted on a vibration-free floor area, and vibration isolators have not been provided on the associated control cabinets.
The mounting requirement for the diesel generator control panels specified by the vendor is that the panels are to be floor mounted with anchor bolts without using vibration isolators. Also, the seismic qualification testing performed on the control panels by the vendor was conducted by bolting the panels to the shake table to simulate actual field mounting condition. The control panels are qualified in accordance with IEEE 323-1974 which addresses vibration aginga.
The diesel generator buildings for Units 1 and 2 are similar in design. The concrete foundation for each building is 114 ft x 94 ft x 9 ft thick. The diesel generator, control panels, and associated equipment are mounted on the building foundation, and the anticipated vibration is not considered detrimental to the operation of the controls and monitoring instruments.
8.3.2 DC POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.2.1 Description The dc systems provide a reliable source of continuous power for control, instrumentation, and dc motors. There are four 125-V-dc safety features systems per unit, four 125-V dc nonsafety systems per unit, and seven 125-V-dc nonsafety systems common to both units.
8.3.2.1.1 The 125-V dc Safety Features Systems There are four safety features 125-V-dc systems (identified A, B, C, and D) per unit. Each system has a 59-cell lead-calcium battery, switchgear (electrically operated drawout circuit breakers), two redundant battery chargers, one manual transfer switch, two inverters, and 125-V-dc distribution panels (molded case circuit breakers). Systems A, B, and C each have a 125-V-dc motor control center for motor-operated valves. An individual cell equalizer (ICE) may be connected across each battery cell. This device provides an alternate path for the electric charge current as a function of the individual battery cell voltage. Within the operation range of the ICE device, the energy input and storage capability of the individual cells are better matched. The operating range of the ICE device is within the normal voltage and float current a The operating licenses for both VEGP units have been renewed and the original licensed operating terms have been extended by 20 years. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 54, appropriate aging management programs and activities have been initiated to manage the detrimental effects of aging to maintain functionality during the period of extended operation (see chapter 19).
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-35 REV 24 10/22 operation of the batteries. There is no capability to connect the dc systems between themselves, between Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems, or between the safety features systems and the nonsafety features systems.
The 125-V-dc systems A, B, C, and D supply dc power to channels 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, and are designated as Class 1E equipment in accordance with the applicable sections of Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 308. They are designed so that no single failure in any 125-V-dc system will result in conditions that will prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant. The plant design and circuit layout from these dc systems provide physical separation of equipment, cabling, and instrumentation essential to plant safety.
Each system is located in an area separated physically from other systems. All the components of the 125-V-dc Class 1E systems are housed in Category 1 structures.
Each 125-V-dc battery is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its chargers and distribution equipment. Batteries are sized in accordance with IEEE 485 to have sufficient capacity to supply the required loads for a LOCA/LOSP duration of 2 3/4 h and a station blackout (SBO) duration of 4 h. For LOSP/LOCA, they are sized at a minimum temperature of 70°F; their initial capacity was increased by 10% for load growth and 25% for aging. For SBO, 10% design growth was not considered for battery size verification, as other conservatism was applied to the SBO analysis. The required final (end of duty cycle and end of life) battery cell voltages for each load group have been analyzed to demonstrate that adequate voltage is provided to the loads. Batteries are sized to ensure that all battery voltages at the last minute of the 2 3/4-hour LOCA/LOSP discharge cycle or at the last minute of the 4-hour SBO duty profile at a battery room minimum temperature of 70°F are:
Train A 109.7 V/battery Train B 109.7 V/battery Train C 108.3 V/battery Train D 106.2 V/battery Battery sizes (based on 77°F and 1.80V/cell final voltage) are:
Unit 1 A and B: 1719 Ah at 2.75-h rate; 2365 A for 1 min.
Unit 2 A and B: 1629 Ah at 2.75-h rate; 2241 A for 1 min.
C: 880 Ah at 2.75-h rate; 915 A for 1 min.
D: 564 Ah at 2.75-h rate; 775 A for 1 min.
Each 125-V-dc battery is provided with two battery chargers, each of which is sized to supply the continuous (long term) demand on its associated dc system while providing sufficient power to replace 110% of the equivalent ampere-hours removed from the battery during a design basis battery discharge cycle (as indicated by the load requirements in tables 8.3.2-1 through 8.3.2-4 and 8.3.2-6 through 8.3.2-9) within a 12-h period after charger input power is restored. A battery fully charged condition is defined as the condition where there is sufficient charge to allow a complete battery discharge cycle upon loss of charger power. The batteries are normally float charged at 2.20- to 2.25-V/cell. The sizing of each battery charger meets the requirements of IEEE 308 and Regulatory Guide 1.32. Load sharing circuitry is provided to ensure that the dc load is properly shared between the two chargers, if it is desired to operate with both battery chargers online. The battery chargers are each provided with an equalizing timer and a manual bypass toggle switch permitting periodic equalizing charges at 2.33 to 2.38
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-36 REV 24 10/22 V/cell or 137.5 to 140 V/battery. Equalizing battery charges are performed as required after a deep discharge or as needed based upon cell voltage and/or specific gravity readings. Each charger is provided with automatic current-limiting control which can be adjusted over the range of 100 to 115% of rated current. The battery chargers are specified to maintain an output voltage regulation of +/-1% from no load to full load output over the entire input voltage range expected on the 480-V-ac system. The output is filtered to limit the ripple voltage to a maximum of 3% rms with the battery disconnected.
If a dc overvoltage condition is sensed by a battery charger, the battery charger input circuit breaker is automatically tripped and a battery charger trouble alarm is annunciated in the main control room. All equipment connected to the dc power system has been specified to operate continuously at 140 V-dc which exists during the period that the batteries are being equalized.
All equipment is also specified to operate at 100 V-dc with the exception of the vital ac buses inverter systems, the reactor trip switchgear, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump controls, inverters for the residual heat removal (RHR) isolation valves which are capable of operation at 105-V-dc minimum. The dc feeder cables are sized to maintain a minimum of 105 V-dc at the vital ac bus inverter inputs and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump control panel over the entire battery load profile. The reactor trip switchgear is required to operate only in the first minute of the battery discharge load profile when the battery voltage is such that the voltage provided to the switchgear will not be lower than 105 V-dc. In certain instances where equipment is capable of operation at a voltage less than 100 V-dc, dc feeder cables are sized on that basis.
Testing of the overvoltage protective functions is addressed as a part of the qualification of the safety-related battery chargers and will be periodically verified in the course of equipment testing during plant operation.
The bus and feeder arrangement of each switchgear, including the description of loads being supplied, is indicated in drawing 1/2X3D-AA-G01A. The main bus bar ratings are shown on the single-line diagrams listed in this figure. The switchgear is of metal clad construction and is equipped with two-pole drawout type locally controlled air circuit breakers. The continuous current ratings and trip ratings are given on the single-line diagrams. The specific loads connected to the various systems can be identified by reference to the single-line diagrams indicated in drawing 1/2X3D-AA-G01A.
The dc distribution panels connected to each dc switchgear bus supply safety-related loads as indicated on the single-line diagrams. The breakers are of molded case construction. The main bus and breaker ratings are given on the single-line diagrams referenced in drawing 1/2X3D-AA-G01A.
Systems A and C receive power from train A 480-V-ac engineered safety features (ESF) buses, and systems B and D receive power from train B 480-V-ac ESF buses. System A is described here; systems B, C, and D are identical with the exception that system D does not include a motor control center. The equipment numbering used is identical for all four systems, with the first letter indicating the system.
Drawing 1X3D-AA-G01A shows the overall 125-V-dc safety features systems to be provided for Unit 1. The Unit 2 systems are essentially identical. Battery 1AD1B feeds into dc switchgear designated 1AD1. Normal and backup battery chargers designated 1AD1CA and 1AD1CB are normally fed from ESF motor control centers 1ABA and 1ABE. If normal AC power is lost and will not be available in a suitable timeframe following a Beyond Design Basis External Event, one of the battery chargers will be fed by a 480-V FLEX diesel generator. The 125-V-dc system A is formed at the switchgear 1AD1, and power is fed to motor control center 1AD1M, inverters 1AD1I1 and 1AD1I11, and dc distribution panels 1AD11 and 1AD12. Note that systems C and D have only one dc distribution panel per system.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-37 REV 24 10/22 Each 125-V-dc motor control center supplies power to safety features motor-operated valves.
The 125-V-dc distribution panels supply power for safety features control, switching, and field flashing for the emergency diesel generators. See tables 8.3.2-1 through 8.3.2-4 for load lists.
System C provides all power required for successful operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, with the exception of the steam generator-to-auxiliary feedwater turbine motor-operated valves (redundant valves) which are provided power from the system A and B dc motor control centers. The specific associated loads can be identified by reference to the single-line diagrams as shown in drawing 1/2X3D-AA-G01A for the system A, B, and C dc distribution equipment.
8.3.2.1.2 The Unitized 125-V-dc Nonsafety Features Systems Each of the four utilized 125-V-dc nonsafety features systems for each unit include 59-cell lead-calcium battery, two redundant battery chargers, and are similar in design to the safety features systems, except for the number of distribution panels and inverters on each system and the absence of motor control centers. Drawing 1X3D-AA-G01B shows the 125-V-dc nonsafety features systems. The Unit 2 systems are essentially identical. Batteries are sized in accordance with IEEE 485 to have sufficient capacity to supply the required loads for 2 h with the exception of switchyard batteries, which have sufficient capacity to supply the required loads for 4 h. They are sized at a minimum temperature of 70°F. All other sizing criteria are the same as for the 125-V-dc safety features systems. The only interface with safety features systems is that one battery charger in each system receives power from non-ESF 480-V-ac buses, which in turn are powered from ESF ac buses. However, these buses are shed on a safety injection signal. The battery charger design is similar to that of the safety features battery chargers. Each pair of battery chargers is capable of load sharing but is normally operated with one charger inservice and the other charger aligned for standby. The same criteria as outlined in paragraph 8.3.2.1.1 apply to the nonsafety vital ac buses inverter systems. The plant annunciator, auxiliary relay rack 1, rod control motor generator set controller, and boron recycle waste gas processing panel are also specified to operate over a 105-to 140-V-dc input range.
Battery sizes (based on 77°F and 1.80V/cell final voltage) are:
1176 Ah at 2-h rate; 1400 A for 1 min.
1386 Ah at 2-h rate; 2116 A for 1 min.
1330 Ah at 2-h rate; 1548 A for 1 min (two batteries of this size).
The 125-V-dc nonsafety features systems supply dc power to nonsafety motors, control, switching, and instrumentation as shown on the single-line diagrams identified in drawing 1/2X3D-AA-G01B.
8.3.2.1.3 Common 125-V-dc Nonsafety Features Systems There are seven common 125-V-dc nonsafety systems: the river intake structure, the service building, the switchyard (two systems), the technical support center, and the security system (two systems). With the exception of the switchyard, each system has a 59-cell lead-calcium battery, distribution equipment, and two redundant battery chargers. These systems receive 480-V-ac power from normal busses. The technical support center system will receive 480-V-ac power from a 480-V-ac FLEX diesel generator following a Beyond Design Basis External Event.
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-38 REV 24 10/22 The battery charger design is similar to that of the safety features battery chargers. Each pair of battery chargers is capable of load sharing but is normally operated with one charger inservice and the other charger aligned for standby.
The switchyard system has two batteries (each having 59 cells), six distribution panels, and three battery chargers. A further description is provided in paragraph 8.2.1.2. Each switchyard battery has a normal battery charger with a backup charger shared between both batteries.
Battery charger load sharing is not provided for the switchyard battery chargers. Note that Unit 1 will supply power to all three battery chargers.
These batteries are sized as discussed in paragraph 8.3.2.1.2, with the exception of the technical support center battery and the river intake structure battery which have been sized to supply required loads at a minimum temperature of 65°F and 25°F, respectively. Georgia Power Company is responsible for maintaining the switchyard battery and battery charger sizing calculation.
Battery sizes (based on 77°F and 1.80 V/cell final voltage) are:
River intake structure - 46 Ah at 2-h rate; 96 A for 1 min.
Service building - 416 Ah at 2-h rate; 654 A for 1 min.
Technical support center - 1176 Ah at 2-h rate; 1400 A for 1 min.
Security central alarm station - 1426 Ah at 2-h rate; 1643 A for 1 min.
Security secondary alarm station - 784 Ah at 2-h rate; 915 A for 1 min.
The 125-V-dc common nonsafety features systems supply dc power for control, switching, vital security and technical support center loads, and the plant telephone/page communication system as shown in the single-line diagrams identified in drawings AX3D-AA-G02A, AX3D-AA-G02B, and AX3D-AA-G02C.
8.3.2.1.4 Ventilation Battery rooms are ventilated to remove the hydrogen gases that may be produced during charging of the batteries. The ventilation system for the ESF batteries is safety related. See subsection 9.4.5 for a further discussion of the associated ventilation systems.
8.3.2.1.5 Maintenance and Testing All components of the 125-V-dc systems will undergo periodic maintenance tests to determine the condition of each individual subsystem. Batteries are checked for liquid level, float current, and cell voltage and are visually inspected following the manufacturer's recommended guidelines for procedures. An initial composite test of onsite ac and dc power systems will be performed as a prerequisite to initial fuel loading. This test will establish that the capacity of each battery is sufficient to satisfy a real-time safety load demand profile under the conditions of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and simultaneous loss of offsite power. Thereafter, periodic capacity tests will be conducted in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the version of IEEE 450 as described in the Bases for the Technical Specifications, Regulatory Guide 1.129, and the manufacturer's schedule recommended for cyclic test discharge/equalizing charge rates. These tests will ensure that the battery has the capacity to continue to meet
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-39 REV 24 10/22 safety load demands. Battery chargers are periodically checked by visual inspection and performance tests.
Testing for safety-related batteries will be done in accordance with Technical Specifications.
Testing for nonsafety-related batteries is in accordance with plant procedures as governed by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. Testing includes the following:
A.
The battery float current, electrolyte temperature and level, and voltage of the pilot cell of each battery will be measured and logged.
B.
Battery service test: The voltage of each cell will be measured at the lowest battery terminal voltage during the discharge and logged.
C.
Performance discharge test: The voltage of each cell will be measured at the end of the discharge while the load is still applied and logged.
8.3.2.2 Analysis The regulatory guides regarding dc power systems are discussed in section 1.9 and subsection 8.1.4. Compliance with the general design criteria is discussed in section 3.1.
Table 8.3.2-5 is the failure modes and effects analysis.
The 125-V-dc systems A and C form the train A safety features dc system. Their normal and backup chargers normally receive power from two Class 1E train A motor control centers.
Following a Beyond Design Basis External Event, one of the battery chargers per dc train will be powered by a 480-V FLEX diesel generator. The 125-V-dc systems B and D form the train B safety features dc system. Their normal and backup chargers normally receive power from two Class 1E train B motor control centers. Following a Beyond Design Basis External Event, one of the battery chargers per dc train will be powered by a 480-V FLEX diesel generator. The train C and D battery chargers are qualified as isolation devices in accordance with IEEE 384 and Regulatory Guide 1.75. The train A safety features dc system supplies power to train A loads, and the train B safety features dc system supplies power to train B loads. Each individual system (A, B, C, and D) supplies power to a separate instrument channel (1, 2, 3, or 4). In this way, separation between the independent systems is maintained, and the power provided to the chargers can be from either offsite or onsite sources (General Design Criterion 17). The dc system is so arranged that the probability of an internal system failure resulting in loss of dc power is extremely low. Important system components are either self-alarming locally and/or in the control room upon failure or capable of being tested during service to detect faults. Each battery set is located in its own ventilated room. All abnormal conditions of important system parameters are annunciated in the main control room. The safety features battery circuit breakers have dedicated annunciation in the main control room which alarm on a circuit breaker open condition. There is no cross-connection between the independent 125-V-dc systems.
The design of the 125-V-dc safety features systems provided for VEGP is based on the criteria described in IEEE 308 and 450. The safety-related batteries will be tested periodically in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the version of IEEE 450 as described in the Bases for the Technical Specifications. Each battery consists of 59 lead-calcium storage cells, designed for the specific service in which they are to be used. Ample capacity is available to serve the loads connected to the system for the duration of the time that alternating current is not available at the station site. Each division of Class 1E equipment is provided with a separate 125-V-dc system to avoid a single failure involving more than one system. Batteries are located in well-ventilated rooms which limit hydrogen concentration to less than 2% by volume. A hydrogen survey was performed during preoperational checkout to verify that the
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-40 REV 24 10/22 ventilation system limits hydrogen concentration to this level in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.128. For battery replacements, hydrogen evolution for the new battery will be calculated and compared to the battery being replaced, at which time an engineering evaluation will be performed to determine if a hydrogen survey is necessary in accordance with subsection 1.9.128. Additionally, a new survey may be required if the battery room configuration or battery room ventilation system is modified in a manner that reduces air flow or creates a new dead air space in the battery room. Adequate aisle space and space above cells are provided.
Eyewash facilities are provided in all battery rooms. They are designed to preclude spilling of water from these facilities on the battery installation.
Seismic Category 1 battery racks provide for the mounting of battery cells in a two-step configuration.
The same criteria as that indicated in paragraph 8.3.1.1.12 applies to dc circuits that are connected to containment penetrations. See figure 8.3.1-1 for the overcurrent protection coordination curve for the dc feeders (General Design Criterion 50).
Fire detection sensors and alarms are provided as described in subsection 9.5.1.
Before installation, cells are stored in a clean, level, dry, and cool location. Extremely low ambient temperatures and localized sources of heat are avoided. During installation, any cell with electrolyte level 1/2 in. or more below the top of the plates is replaced.
Each battery charger has enough capacity for the steady-state operation of connected loads required during normal operation while maintaining its battery in a fully charged condition.
Each battery charger and battery charger supply has sufficient capacity to restore a battery from the design basis discharged state to a fully charged state while supplying the normal steady-state loads. The battery chargers normal supply is from an engineered safety features system motor control center within its division. Following a Beyond Design Basis External Event, one battery charger per train will be powered by a 480-V FLEX diesel generator. Battery chargers are provided with disconnecting means and feedback protection. The chargers are specified to limit dc current feedback during loss of ac input power to 0.200 A under any condition. An individual cell equalizer (ICE) may be connected across each battery cell. This device provides an alternate path for the electric charge current as a function of the individual battery cell voltage. The operating range of the ICE device is within the normal voltage and float current operation of the batteries and has no effect on the operation or capability of the battery chargers to restore a battery from the design basis discharged state to a fully charged state. Periodic tests will be performed to ensure the readiness of the system to deliver the required power (General Design Criterion 18). A qualified ground detector system provides indication of any grounds which may occur in the system.
Battery current and system voltage indications are provided in the main control room for each dc system.
The following common annunciator windows are provided in the main control room for safety-related dc systems:
A.
Switchgear trouble.
B.
Battery charger trouble.
C.
Inverter trouble.
D.
125-V-dc panel trouble.
E.
125-V-dc motor control center trouble.
F.
Battery circuit breaker open alarm (dedicated alarm).
VEGP-FSAR-8 8.3-41 REV 24 10/22 Quality assurance requirements are described in chapter 17.
8.3.3 FIRE PROTECTION FOR CABLE SYSTEMS Refer to paragraph 8.3.1.4.4, subsection 9.5.1, and appendix 9A.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 14 10/07 TABLE 8.3.1-1 (SHEET 1 OF 3)
DIESEL GENERATOR ANNUNCIATOR POINTS
- 1.
Low temperature lube oil - in
- 2.
Low temperature lube oil - out
- 3.
High temperature lube oil - in
- 4.
High temperature lube oil - out
- 5.
Trip - high temperature lube oil
- 6.
Low level lube oil
- 7.
Trip - high temperature engine bearing
- 8.
Trip - high crankcase pressure
- 9.
Trip - vibration
- 10.
Trip - overspeed
- 11.
Low temperature jacket water - in
- 12.
Low temperature jacket water - out
- 13.
High temperature jacket water - in
- 14.
High temperature jacket water - out
- 15.
Trip - high temperature jacket water
- 16.
Low pressure jacket water
- 17.
Trip - low pressure jacket water
- 18.
Low level jacket water
- 19.
Deleted
- 20.
Generator trouble
- 21.
High generator bearing temperature
- 22.
High generator control panel temperature
- 23.
Deleted
- 24.
Generator fault
- 25.
Trip - generator differential
- 26.
Maintenance lock out
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 14 10/07 TABLE 8.3.1-1 (SHEET 2 OF 3)
- 27.
Low pressure lube oil
- 28.
Trip - low pressure lube oil
- 29.
Low pressure turbo oil - right
- 30.
Low pressure turbo oil - left
- 31.
Trip - low pressure turbo oil
- 32.
High P fuel oil filter
- 33.
Low pressure fuel oil
- 34.
High level diesel fuel oil storage tank
- 35.
Low level diesel fuel oil storage tank
- 36.
High/low level diesel fuel oil day tank
- 37.
Low pressure control air
- 38.
Low pressure starting air
- 39.
High pressure starting air
- 40.
Failed to start
- 41.
Switch not in auto
- 42.
Barring device engaged
- 43.
Panel intrusion
- 44.
High engine control panel temperature
- 45.
Emergency start
- 46.
Diesel generator bypassed(a)
- 47.
High P lube oil filter
- 48.
Low oil pressure sensor malfunction
- 49.
Low voltage
- 50.
Engine control in local
- 51.
Diesel generator emergency trip not reset
- 52.
Generator underfrequency
- 53.
Diesel generator circuit breaker inoperable
- 54.
Loss of generator dc control power
- 55.
Loss of starting air dc control power
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 14 10/07 TABLE 8.3.1-1 (SHEET 3 OF 3)
- 56.
High level fuel injection burst protection tank
- 57.
Diesel generator engine panel annunciator power failure (b)
- 58.
Engine control panel power A failure
- 59.
Engine control panel power B failure
- a. This alarm is displayed on the system status monitoring panel in the control room only.
- b. This alarm is displayed on the control room annunciator only.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 16 10/10 TABLE 8.3.1-2 DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING PROFILE FOR LOCA AND LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER Inrush Running (Cumulative)
(b)
Step kW kVAr kVA kW kVAr kVA 0
2384 (a) 23881 (a) 24000 (a) 0 0
0 0.5 2471 4912 5499 1041 597 1200 5.5 1795 3509 3995 1399 747 1586 10.5 2021 2802 3455 1767 921 1993 15.5 2745 3683 4593 2278 1108 2533 20.5 4414 9255 10254 3527 1672 3903 25.5 5922 10257 11844 4675 2261 5193 30.5 5275 3889 6553 4900 2571 5334 36.0(RESET)
(c) 6791 8093 10564 5716 3062 6485 For Loss of Offsite Power (No LOCA) 0 3178 (a) 31842 (a) 32000 (a) 0 0
0 0.5 2292 4828 5344 993 571 1146 5.5 0
0 0
993 571 1146 10.5 2558 2271 3421 2212 1074 2459 15.5 3376 4563 5676 2837 1306 3123 20.5 4923 9457 10662 4085 1870 4493 25.5 6453 10448 12280 5233 2458 5781 30.5 5938 4475 7435 5440 2613 6035 31.5(RESET)
(c) 7284 8147 10929 6444 (d) 3102 7152 (a)
The 4160/480V SWGR transformer inrush contribution during energization. This transformer inrush is present for approximately six cycles.
(b)
Running load includes; running load of previous steps plus the equivalent running load of the loads which are started during that step.
(c)
Loads added after RESET step are connected manually and randomly up to the diesel generator capacity.
(d)
EDG surveillance testing per Technical Specification 3.8.1 is performed at a load 6500 kW, though the actual maximum load is < 6500 kW.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 14 10/07 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 1 OF 12)
ONSITE POWER SYSTEM FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks
- 1.
1AA02, control Receive and A
- Grounded, Switchgear trouble None; loss of train During a LOSP when building 4160-V distribute bus fault alarm in control A; train B available the bus is fed from 1E switchgear, electric power room the diesel generator, train A via breakers a single ground fault will not cause a trip of train A
- 2.
Breaker 05, (c)
Open on loss of A
Fail to open Failure to open None; loss of train This breaker preferred power to preferred power alarm in control A; train B available electrically interlocked item 1, 1E and remain open room from item 5 with item 3 and switchgear, train item 77 breakers A, normally closed Inadvertent None None; loss of train closure A; train B available
- 3.
Breaker 19, (c)
Close on loss of A
Fail to close Alarm in control None; loss of train This breaker diesel generator offsite power room; safety A; train B available electrically interlocked 1A power to item and remain equipment failed with item 2 and 1, 1E switchgear, closed to start from item 77 breakers train A, open item 5 sequencer Inadvertent Switchgear trouble None; loss of train opening alarm in control A; train B available room
- 4.
Diesel generator Provide onsite A
Fail to start Diesel generator None; loss of train Diesel generator 1A, train A ac power upon failed to start A; train B available started by item 5 loss of preferred alarm in control sequencer upon power room loss of preferred power or receipt of a safety injection signal Fail to run Various specific None; loss of train alarms provided A; train B available in control room and at local diesel generator control panels
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 2 OF 12)
REV 14 10/07 Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks
- 5.
Sequencer, train A Shed all loads from train A Class 1E power system upon loss of preferred power and reconnect all required safe shutdown loads to diesel generator, item 4, via item 1 switchgear in a programmed manner A
Fail to operate (d)
Sequencer trouble alarm, audio and visual, in control room None; loss of train A; train B available
- 6.
Breaker 10, (c) item 1, 1E 4160-V switchgear, to item 7, 1AB15X transformer, train A, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 7.
1AB15X transformer, item 1, 4160-V switchgear, to item 9, 480-V switchgear, train A Reduce 4160 V to 480 V A
Fail to operate Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 8.
Breaker 01, (c) item 7 transformer to item 9, 480-V switchgear, train A, normally closed Open on load shedding and reclose on sequencer program A
Fail to open None None Slightly heavier load on initial sequencer step Fail to reclose Alarm in control room; safety equipment failed to start from item 5 sequencer None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 9.
1AB15, 1E, 480-V switchgear, auxiliary building, train A Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Switchgear trouble alarm in control room Partial loss of train A; train B available System can operate with a single grounded phase
- 10.
Breaker 10, (c) item 9, 480-V switchgear, to item 11 MCC, train A, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 11.
1ABD, 1E MCC, auxiliary building, train A Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Item 9 switchgear trouble alarm Partial loss of train A; train B available Ground would be sensed and alarmed in control room from item 9 switchgear (see item 1 method of failure detection); system can
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 3 OF 12)
REV 14 10/07 Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks operate with a single grounded phase
- 12.
Breaker 9, (c) item 9, 480-V switchgear, to item 13 MCC, train A, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 13.
1ABB, 1E MCC, auxiliary building, train A Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Same as 11 Same as 11 Ground would be sensed and alarmed in control room from item 9 switchgear (see item 1 method of failure detection); system can operate with a single grounded phase
- 14.
Breaker 21, (c) item 1, 1E 4160-V switchgear, to item 15, 1AB05X transformer, train A, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 15.
1AB05X transformer, item 1, 4160-V switchgear, to item 17 480-V switchgear, train A Reduce 4160 V to 480 V Fail to operate Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 16.
Breaker 01, (c) item 15 transformer to item 17, 480-V switchgear, train A, normally closed Open on load shedding and reclose on sequencer program A
Fail to open None None Slightly heavier load on initial sequencer step Fail to reclose Alarm in control room; safety equipment failed to start from item 5 sequencer None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 17.
1AB05, 1E 480-V switchgear, control building, train A Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Switchgear trouble alarm in control room Same as 9 System can operate with a single grounded phase
- 18.
Breaker 14,(c) item 17, 480-V switchgear, to item 19 MCC, train A, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 19.
1ABF, 1E MCC, diesel Receive and distribute A
- Grounded, Item 17 switchgear Same as 9 Ground would be
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 4 OF 12)
REV 14 10/07 Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks generator building, train A electric power via breakers bus fault trouble alarm sensed and alarmed in control room from item 17 switchgear; system can operate with a single grounded phase
- 20.
Breaker 5, (c) item 17, 480-V switchgear, to item 21 MCC, train A, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 21.
1ABC, 1E MCC, control building, train A Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Same as 19 Same as 9 Ground would be sensed and alarmed from item 17 switchgear; system can operate with a single grounded phase
- 22.
Breaker 2, (c) item 17, 480-V switchgear, to item 23 MCC, train A, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 23.
1ABA, 1E MCC, control building, train A Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Same as 19 Same as 9 Ground would be sensed and alarmed from item 17 switchgear; system can operate with a single grounded phase
- 24.
Breaker 20, (c) item 1, 1E 4160-V switchgear, to item 25, 1AB04 transformer, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 25.
1AB04X transformer, item 1, 4160-V switchgear, to item 27, 480-V switchgear, train A Reduce 4160 V to 480 V A
Fail to operate Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 26.
Breaker 01, (c) item 25 transformer to item 27, 480-V switchgear, train A, normally closed Open on load shedding and reclose on sequencer program Fail to open None None Slightly heavier load on initial sequencer step Fail to reclose Alarm in control room; safety equipment failed to start from item 5 sequencer None; partial loss of train A; train B available
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 5 OF 12)
REV 14 10/07 Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks
- 27.
1AB04, 1E 480-V switchgear, control building, train A Receive and distribute electric power via breakers
- Grounded, bus fault Switchgear trouble alarm in control room Same as 9 System can operate with a single grounded phase
- 28.
Breaker 02, (c) item 27, 480-V switchgear, to item 29 MCC, train A, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available
- 29.
1ABE, 1E MCC, control building, train A Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Item 27 switchgear trouble alarm Same as 9 Ground would be sensed and alarmed in control room from item 27 switchgear; system can operate with a single grounded phase
- 30.
Breaker 22, (c) item 1, 1E 4160-V switchgear, to item 31, 1NB01X non-1E transformer, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; loss of train A oriented non-1E power; train B oriented non-1E power available The sequencer does not automatically reclose this breaker under safety injection conditions; it can be closed manually under administrative control
- 31.
1NB01X transformer, item 1, 1E 4160-V switchgear, to item 33, 480-V switchgear, train A oriented Reduce 4160 V to 480 V A
Fail to operate Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; loss of train A oriented non-1E power; train B oriented non-1E power available
- 32.
Breaker 01,(c) item 31 transformer to item 33, 480-V switchgear, train A oriented, normally closed Open on load shedding and reclose on sequencer program A
Fail to open None None Slightly heavier load on initial sequencer step Fail to reclose Alarm in control room; safety equipment failed to start from item 5 sequencer None; partial loss of train A; train B available, but power is train A and B oriented non-1E The sequencer does not automatically reclose this breaker under safety injection conditions; it can be closed manually under administrative control
- 33.
1NB01, non-1E 480-V switchgear, control building, train A oriented Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Switchgear trouble alarm in control room Same as 30 System can operate with a single grounded phase
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 6 OF 12)
REV 14 10/07 Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks
- 34.
Breaker 02, (c) item 33, 480-V switchgear, to item 35 MCC, train A oriented, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A oriented power; train B oriented power available
- 35.
1NBS, non-1E MCC, control building, train A oriented Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Item 33 switchgear trouble alarm Same as 30 Ground would be sensed and alarmed in control room from item 33 switchgear; system can operate with a single grounded phase
- 36.
Breaker 08,(c) item 33, 480-V switchgear, to item 37 MCC, train A oriented, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train A; train B available, but power is train A and B oriented non-1E
- 37.
1NBI, non-1E MCC, diesel generator building, train A oriented Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Same as 35 Same as 30 Ground would be sensed and alarmed in control room from item 33 switchgear; system can operate with a single grounded phase
- 38.
1BA03, control building, 4160-V 1E switchgear, train B Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; loss of train B; train A available During a LOSP when the bus is fed from the diesel generator, a single ground fault will not cause a trip of train B
- 39.
Breaker 19,(c) diesel generator 1B power to item 38, 1E switchgear, train B, normally open Close on loss of offsite power and remain closed A
Fail to close Alarm in control room; safety equipment failed to start from item 42 sequencer None; loss of train B; train A available This breaker electrically interlocked with item 40 and item 78 breakers Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; loss of train B; train A available
- 40.
Breaker 01, (c) preferred power to item 38, 1E switchgear, train B, normally closed Open on loss of preferred power and remain open A
Fail to open Failure to open alarm in control room from item 42 sequencer None; loss of train B; train A available This breaker electrically interlocked with item 39 and item 78 breakers Inadvertent closure None None; loss of train B; train A available
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 7 OF 12)
REV 14 10/07 Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks
- 41.
Diesel generator 1B, train B Provide onsite ac power upon loss of preferred power A
Fail to start Diesel generator failed to start alarm in control room None; loss of train B; train A available Diesel generator started by item 42 sequencer upon loss of preferred power or receipt of a safety injection signal Fail to run Various specific alarms provided in control room and at local diesel generator control panels None; loss of train B; train A available
- 42.
Sequencer, train B Shed all loads from train B Class 1E power system upon loss of preferred power and reconnect all required safe shutdown loads to diesel generator, item 4, via item 1 switchgear in a programmed manner A
Fail to operate(d)
Switchgear trouble alarm, audio and visual, in control room None; loss of train B; train A available
- 43.
Breaker 09, (c) item 38, 1E 4160-V switchgear, to item 44, 1BB16X transformer, train B, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 44.
1BB16X transformer, item 38, 4160-V switchgear, to item 46, 480-V switchgear, train B Reduce 4160 V to 480 V A
Fail to operate Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 45.
Breaker 01, (c) item 44 transformer to item 46, 480-V switchgear, train B, normally closed Open on load shedding and reclose on sequencer program A
Fail to open None None Slightly heavier load on initial sequencer step Fail to reclose Alarm in control room; safety equipment failed to start from item 42 sequencer None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 46.
1BB16, 1E 480-V switchgear, auxiliary building, train B Receive and distribute electrical power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Switchgear trouble alarm in control room Same as 38 System can operate with a single grounded phase
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 8 OF 12)
REV 14 10/07 Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks
- 47.
Breaker 10, (c) item 46, 480-V switchgear, to item 48 MCC, train B, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 48.
1BBD, 1E MCC, auxiliary building, train B Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Item 46 switchgear trouble alarm Same as 47 None; would be sensed and alarmed in control room from item 46 switchgear
- 49.
Breaker 9, (c) item 46, 480-V switchgear, to item 50 MCC, train B, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 50.
1BBB, 1E MCC, auxiliary building, train B Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
Grounded Same as 48 Same as 47 None; would be sensed and alarmed in control room from item 46 switchgear
- 51.
Breaker 04, (c) item 38, 1E 4160-V switchgear, to item 52, IBB07X transformer, train B, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 52.
1BB07X transformer, item 38, 4160-V switchgear, to item 54, 480-V switchgear, train B Reduce 4160 V to 480 V A
Fail to operate Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 53.
Breaker 01, (c) item 52 transformer to item 54, 480-V switchgear, train B, normally closed Open on load shedding and reclose on sequencer program A
Fail to open None None Slightly heavier load on initial sequencer step Fail to reclose Alarm in control room; safety equipment failed to start from item 42 sequencer None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 54.
1BB07, 1E 480-V switchgear, control building, train B Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Switchgear trouble alarm in control room Same as 47 System can operate with a single grounded phase
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 9 OF 12)
REV 14 10/07 Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks
- 55.
Breaker 14, (c) item 54, 480-V switchgear, to item 56 MCC, train B, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 56.
1BBF, 1E MCC, diesel generator building, train B Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Item 54 switchgear trouble alarm Same as 47 Ground would be sensed and alarmed in control room from item 54 switchgear
- 57.
Breaker 5, (c) item 54, 480-V switchgear, to item 58 MCC, train B, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 58.
1BBC, 1E MCC, control building, train B Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Same as 56 Same as 47 Ground would be sensed and alarmed in control room from item 54 switchgear
- 59.
Breaker 2, (c) item 54, 480-V switchgear, to item 60 MCC, train B, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 60.
1BBA, 1E MCC, control building, train B Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Same as 56 Same as 47 Ground would be sensed and alarmed in control room from item 54 switchgear
- 61.
Breaker 06, (c) item 38, 1E 4160-V switchgear, to item 62, 1BB06X transformer, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 62.
1BB06X transformer, item 38, 4160-V switchgear, to item 64, 480-V switchgear, train B Reduce 4160 V to 480 V A
Fail to operate Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 63.
Breaker 01, (c) item 62 transformer to item 64, 480-V switchgear, train B, normally closed Open on load shedding and reclose on sequencer program A
Fail to open None None Slightly heavier load on initial sequencer step
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 10 OF 12)
REV 14 10/07 Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks Fail to reclose Alarm in control room; safety equipment failed to start from item 42 sequencer None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 64.
1BB06, 1E 480-V switchgear, control building, train B Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Switchgear trouble alarm in control room Same as 47 System can operate with a single grounded phase
- 65.
Breaker 02, (c) item 64, 480-V switchgear, to item 66 MCC, train B, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available
- 66.
1BBE, 1E MCC, control building, train B Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Item 64 switchgear trouble alarm Same as 47 Ground would be sensed and alarmed in control room from item 64 switchgear
- 67.
Breaker 18, (c) item 38, 1E 4160-V switchgear, to item 68, 1NB10X non-1E transformer, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; loss of train B oriented non-1E power; train A oriente non-1E power available The sequencer does not automatically recluse this breaker under SI conditions; it can be closed manually under administrative control
- 68.
1NB10X transformer, item 38, 1E 4160-V switchgear, to item 70, 480-V switchgear, train B oriented Reduce 4160 V to 480 V A
Fail to operate Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B oriented non-IE power; Train A oriented non-IE power available
- 69.
Breaker 01, (c) item 68 transformer to item 70, 480-V switchgear, train B oriented, normally closed Open on load shedding and reclose on sequencer program A
Fail to open None None Slightly heavier load on initial sequencer step Fail to reclose Alarm in control room; safety equipment failed to start from item 42 sequencer None; loss of train B; train A available, but power is train A and B oriented non-1E The sequencer does not automatically reclose this breaker under safety injection conditions; it can be closed manually under administrative control
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 11 OF 12)
REV 14 10/07 Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks
- 70.
1NB10, non-1E 480-V switchgear, control building, train B oriented Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Switchgear trouble alarm in control room Loss of train B oriented non-1E power; train A oriented non-1E power available System can operate with a single grounded phase
- 71.
Breaker 02, (c) item 70, 480-V switchgear, to item 72 MCC, train B oriented, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available, but power is train A and B oriented non-1E
- 72.
1NBR, non-1E MCC, control building, train B oriented Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault trouble alarm Item 70 switchgear trouble alarm Same as 70 Ground would be sensed and alarmed from item 70 switchgear
- 73.
Breaker 12,(c) item 70, 480-V switchgear, to item 74 MCC, train B oriented, normally closed Provide continuity and protect circuit A
Inadvertent opening Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; partial loss of train B; train A available, but power is train A and B oriented non-1E
- 74.
1NBO, non-1E MCC, diesel generator building, train B oriented Receive and distribute electric power via breakers A
- Grounded, bus fault Same as 72 Same as 70 Ground would be sensed and alarmed from item 70 switchgear.
System can operate with a single grounded phase line; train B
- 75.
Preferred power from offsite power supply via reserve auxiliary transformer 1NXRA (train A), 1NXRB (train B), or standby auxiliary transformer ANXRA to item 1 switchgear via item 2 or item 77 breaker (non-1E power)
Provide preferred power to train A safety-related buses A
Loss of power Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; momentary loss of power until item 4 diesel generator comes on available
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-3 (SHEET 12 OF 12)
REV 14 10/07 Plant Method of Failure Effect Item Description Safety Operating Failure Failure on System Safety No.
of Component Function Mode Mode(s)
Detection Function Capability General Remarks
- 76.
Preferred power from offsite power supply via auxiliary transformer 1NXRB (train B), 1NXRA (train A), or standby auxiliary transformer ANXRA to item 38 switchgear via item 40 or item 78 breaker (non-1E power)
Provide preferred power to train B safety-related buses A
Loss of power Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; momentary loss of power until item 41 diesel generator comes on line; train A available
- 77.
Breaker 01, (c) alternate preferred power to item 1, 1E switchgear, train A, normally open When closed, opens on loss of preferred power and remains open A
Failure to open Failure to open alarm in control room from item 5, sequencer None; loss of train A; train B available This breaker electrically interlocked with item 2 and 3 breakers Inadvertent closure Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; loss of train A; train B available
- 78.
Breaker 05, (c) alternate preferred power to item 38, 1E switchgear, train B, normally open When closed, opens on loss of preferred power and remains open A
Failure to open Failure to open alarm in control room from item 5, sequencer None; loss of train B; train A available This breaker electrically interlocked with item 39 and 40 breakers Inadvertent closure Switchgear trouble alarm in control room None; loss of train B; train A available
- a.
Plant operating mode A represents a loss of offsite power and/or safety injection; offsite power is the preferred power source. The only postulated failures of interconnecting power cable are a short circuit and/or a ground on the 4-kV system cabling, which would result in inadvertent opening of the associated circuit breaker. All power is reestablished to Class 1E buses following loss of preferred power automatically and requires no operator action.
- b.
Unit 1 shown; Unit 2 essentially identical.
- c.
It is to be understood that the failure of any one circuit breaker to open when required to under fault conditions will result in the loss or partial loss of the associated train with the redundant train still available.
- d.
A Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Analysis addressed software common-mode failure effects.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 14 10/07 TABLE 8.3.1-4 (SHEET 1 OF 6)
CIRCUITS ANALYZED FOR SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS A.(a) 1.
7300 Process Control System
- 2.
Nuclear Instrumentation System
- 3.
Solid State Protection System B.
An analysis was performed for selected Unit 1 cables larger than 8 AWG and terminating in multitrain panels. The analysis determined which cables could not ignite under fault conditions (i.e. where there is insufficient available energy or where the backup protection was fast enough to open the faulted circuit before the cables could ignite). Those cables which could not ignite under fault conditions were exempted from separation verification.
C.
VEGP generally complies with the separation requirements of IEEE 384-1981. A series of tests and analyses has been performed for circuits of 480-V or lower voltage to establish alternate reduced minimum separation distances where separation distances specified in IEEE 384 are not met. Analyses have also been performed to justify separation of Class 1E 4160-V cables from non-1E 480 V and lower cables. These tests and analyses have been performed as allowed by Sections 6.1.1.3 and 6.6.2 of IEEE 384-1981 and Regulatory Guide 1.75. The test results are documented in Wyle Laboratories Test Report No. 48141-02 and Wyle Laboratories Test Report No. 17959-02, which have been submitted for review by the NRC under separate cover.
Based on the Wyle Laboratories test results,(b) the following minimum separation distances were established:
The separation distances are applied between raceways and cables of any separation group for both vertical (above and below) and horizontal (side by side) physical configurations or as noted.
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-4 (SHEET 2 OF 6)
REV 14 10/07 Minimum Spatial Configuration/Service Level Separation Distance
- 1.
Between trays carrying cables of 480 V or lower voltage of sizes 2/0 AWG or smaller.
12 in.
- 2.
Cables in tray with cover on the bottom from non-class 1E cables in tray or free air (the non-Class 1E cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller and located below or along side Class-1E tray).
3/4 in.
- 3.
Cables in tray or free air running either vertically, or horizontally (side-by-side) from horizontal non-Class 1E cable in tray (the non-Class 1E cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
1 in.
3a.
Cables in tray or free air running either vertically, or horizontally (side-by-side) from horizontal non-Class 1E cable in free-air (the non-Class 1E cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
1-3/4 in.
- 4.
Tray (a) or free-air cables to a non-Class 1E rigid steel conduit carrying cables of 480 V or lower voltage and sizes 2/0 AWG or smaller.
Contact 4a.
Tray or free-air cables to a non-Class 1E rigid steel conduit carrying cables of 480 V or lower voltage and sizes 3/0 AWG through 500MCM.
3/4 in.
- 5.
Tray or free-air cables to a rigid steel conduit (the free-air cables, cables in the tray, and in the conduit are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
1/2 in.
5a. Cables in tray to a rigid steel conduit routed below or beside the tray (the cables in the tray, and in the conduit are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
Contact
- 6.
Tray or free-air cables to a non-Class 1E flexible conduit (the non-Class 1E cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
1 in.
6a. Tray or free-air cables to a non-Class 1E stripped flexible conduit (the non-Class 1E cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
Contact
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-4 (SHEET 3 OF 6)
REV 14 10/07 Minimum Spatial Configuration/Service Level Separation Distance
- 7.
Tray or free-air cables to a flexible conduit (the free-air cables, cables in the tray and in the conduit are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
1 in.
- 8.
Tray or free-air cables to a non-Class 1E aluminum sheathed cable of size 8 AWG or smaller or non-Class 1E electrical metallic tubing (EMT) carrying cables of sizes 8 AWG or smaller. (Limited to lighting, communications, and fire detection cables) 1 in.
- 9.
Tray or free-air cables to a non-Class 1E metal-clad cable (type MC) of size 8 AWG or smaller.
3/4 in.
- 10.
Tray or free-air cables to a non-Class 1E steel-armored 480-V cable (500 MCM or smaller).
3/4 in.
10a. Tray or free-air cables (480V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller) to steel-armored 480-V cable (500 MCM or smaller).
3/4 in.
- 11.
Cables in flexible conduit to cables in flexible conduit (the cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 500 MCM or smaller).
1 in.
11a. Cables in stripped flexible conduit to non-Class 1E cables in stripped flexible conduit (the non-Class 1E cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
Contact 11b. Cables in stripped flexible conduit to cables in stripped flexible conduit (the cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
Contact
- 12.
Cables in flexible conduit to non-Class 1E cables in rigid steel conduit (the non-Class 1E cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
Contact
- 13.
Between two rigid steel conduits (the cables in the conduits are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
Contact 13a. Cables in rigid steel conduit to non-Class 1E cables in rigid steel conduit (the non-Class 1E cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller).
Contact
- 14.
Between perpendicular rigid steel conduits carrying cables of 480 V or lower voltage and sizes 3/0 AWG 1/8 in.
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-4 (SHEET 4 OF 6)
REV 14 10/07 Minimum Spatial Configuration/Service Level Separation Distance through 500 MCM.
- 15.
Cables in rigid steel conduit crossing non-Class 1E cables in tray or free air (the non-Class 1E cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage and size 2/0 AWG or smaller). The angle of crossing shall be 30 or greater.
Contact
- 16.
Free-air cables to free-air cables, where one of the groups is wrapped in three layers (200 percent overlap) of silicon dioxide cloth (Siltemp 188 CH). Service voltage is limited to 480 V or lower voltage and sizes of 500 MCM or smaller.
6 in.
16a. From non-Class 1E free air cables 480 V or lower voltage and size of 500 MCM or smaller, wrapped with three layers (200 percent overlap) of silicon dioxide cloth (Siltemp 188 CH) to Class 1E free-air cables.
6 in.
- 17. Free-air cables 480 V or lower voltage and size of 500 MCM or smaller, to free air control or instrumentation cables (8 AWG or smaller). The control or instrumentation cables are wrapped in two layers (100 percent overlap) of silicon dioxide cloth (Siltemp 188 CH).
1 in.
- 18. Between free air instrumentation or control cables of 125 V-dc or 120 V-ac or lower, sizes number 8 AWG or smaller.
1 in.
- 19. Between free air instrumentation or control cables (125 V-dc or 120 V-ac or lower sizes number 8 AWG or smaller) with either group of cables wrapped in two layers (100 percent overlap) of silicon dioxide cloth (Siltemp 188 CH).
Contact
- 20. Free-air, class 1E cable(s) to free-air non-class 1E cables with the class 1E cables wrapped in two layers (100 percent overlap) of silicon dioxide cloth. The non-class 1E cables are limited to 480 V or lower voltage of sizes 500 MCM or smaller.
1 in.
- 21.
Within panels and control boards:
- a.
Between instrumentation or control cables of 125 V-dc or 120 V-ac of sizes number 8 AWG or smaller.
1 in.
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-4 (SHEET 5 OF 6)
REV 14 10/07 Minimum Spatial Configuration/Service Level Separation Distance
- b.
Between instrumentation or control cables with either group of cables wrapped in two layers (100 percent overlap) of silicon dioxide cloth (Siltemp 188 CH). The cables are limited to 120 V-ac, 125 V-dc, or lower voltage of sizes number 8 AWG or smaller.
Contact
- c.
Separation distances shown for general plant areas in items 4, 5, 6, 10, 13, and 14 have been applied to separation requirements within panels.
- d.
Separation distances for cable installed in rigid steel or flexible conduit inside panels are the same as those tested in items 11, 11a, 11b, 12, 13, 13a, and 14.
Where:
Tray -
Ventilated (punched bottom) tray or tray fittings, solid bottom tray, or tray fittings Conduit -
Hot dipped galvanized rigid steel conduit Flexible Conduit -
Flexible steel conduit, sealtite, type UA Steel-Armored -Cable EPR insulation/hypalon jacket with galvanized steel armor. Used for 480-V switchgear loads in tray only.
Aluminum Sheathed -
Cable (ALS)
A factory assembly of insulated conductors enclosed in a smooth continuous aluminum sheath. Used for lighting system application.
Metal-Clad Cable -
(MC)
A factory assembly of one or more conductors each individually insulated, covered with an overall insulating jacket, and all enclosed in a metallic sheath of interlocking galvanized steel. Used in non-1E circuit only.
Electrical - Metallic Tubing (EMT)
Thinwall, steel conduit which conforms to ANSI standard C80.3-1977.
This material provides a barrier equal to, or better than, the aluminum sheathing on ALS because it is manufactured from steel which has higher strength and a higher melting temperature than aluminum.
Free-air cables may consist of steel armored or nonarmored cables, ALS, or type MC cables of any size or voltage level unless otherwise limited in the specific configuration description.
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.1-4 (SHEET 6 OF 6)
REV 14 10/07 D.
Non-class 1E fire detection Protectowire has been used in safety related cable tray within containment to detect cable tray fires. This wiring is installed in a zig-zig fashion along the length of the tray in close proximity to the cables. It consists of two conductors individually encased in heat sensitive material. The encased conductors are twisted together to impose a spring pressure between them. When heated to the critical for operating temperature the heat sensitive material yields to the pressure on it, permitting the conductors to move into contact with each other. A supervisory current of 2.5 mA at a maximum of 26.4 V dc normally flows through the Protectowire. During an alarm condition this current rises to a maximum of 20 mA. Therefore, Protectowire is considered a low energy circuit, which is designed to short during an alarm condition, and cannot cause degradation of any Class 1E cables in the vicinity. A separate Protectowire panel is provided for each train thereby providing electrically independent monitoring of the cable tray temperatures in each train. Based on the discussion above, no separation is required between the non-class 1E fire protection Protectowires and any class 1E cables.
- a. The analyses/tests performed for the above equipment are further described in paragraph 7.1.2.2.1.
- b. The test configuration of target cables above the fault cable represents the worst case, since heat/flame has tendency to flare vertically upwards.
- c. For the purpose of testing, the cables in the punched bottom tray are considered the same as cables in free air since the cables in the tray are directly exposed to the heat generated by the faulted cable in the areas of the tray that have been punched.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 24 10/22 TABLE 8.3.2-1 125-V-dc BATTERY A LOAD REQUIREMENTS (LOCA/LOSP)
Current Required per Time Interval after ac Power Loss (A)
Load Description Unit(b) 0-1 min 1-165 min Random Load Total load includes inverters, MOV(a), dc distribution panels,(a,c) dc switchgear, MCC indication and relaying.
1 590 255 202 2
593 273 150
- a.
The field flash current has not been added to the first period or random load and the MOV current has not been added to the random load since the peak load occurring during the period has been considered. The peak load is due to the breakers closing, which does not occur coincidentally with the field flash or MOV currents.
- b.
Differences between switchgear and control load design configurations cause amperages to vary between Units 1 and 2.
- c.
The dc distribution panels include the following loads: Class 1E ac switchgear circuit breaker operation, safety features status indication relays and lights, diesel generator field flashing, diesel generator control, reactor trip switchgear, solenoid valves, and Class 1E control cabinet circuit indicators.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 23 3/21 TABLE 8.3.2-2 125-V-dc BATTERY B LOAD REQUIREMENTS (LOCA/LOSP)
Current Required per Time Interval after ac Power Loss (A)
Load Description Unit(b) 0-1 min 1-165 min Random Load Total load includes inverters, MOV(a), dc distribution panels,(a,c) dc switchgear, MCC indication and relaying.
1 590 257 162 2
590 255 130
- a.
The field flash current has not been added to the first period or random load and the MOV current has not been added to the random load since the peak load occurring during the period has been considered. The peak load is due to the breakers closing, which does not occur coincidentally with the field flash or MOV currents.
- b.
Differences between switchgear and control load design configurations cause amperages to vary between Units 1 and 2.
- c.
The dc distribution panels include the following loads: Class 1E ac switchgear circuit breaker operation, safety features status indication relays and lights, diesel generator field flashing, diesel generator control, reactor trip switchgear, solenoid valves, and Class 1E control cabinet circuit indicators.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 13 4/06 TABLE 8.3.2-3 125-V-dc BATTERY C LOAD REQUIREMENTS (LOCA/LOSP)
Current Required per Time Interval after ac Power Loss (A)
Load Description Unit(b) 0-1 min 1-165 min Random Load 1
224 92 82.3 2
217 84 82.3 Total load includes inverters, MOV(a), dc distribution panels,(c) dc switchgear, MCC indication and relaying.
- a.
The RHR isolation valve is not required to operate when ac power is not available to the RHR system.
- b.
Differences between switchgear and control load design configurations cause amperages to vary between Units 1 and 2.
- c.
The dc distribution panel includes the following loads: turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump control panel, safety features status indication relays and lights, miscellaneous control, and dc switchgear space heaters.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 13 4/06 TABLE 8.3.2-4 125-V-dc BATTERY D LOAD REQUIREMENTS (LOCA/LOSP)
Current Required per Time Interval after ac Power Loss (A)
Load Description Unit(b) 0-165 min 1
77 Total load includes inverters, MOV(a),
dc distribution panels,(c) dc switchgear, MCC indication and relaying.
2 70
- a.
The RHR isolation valve is not required to operate when ac power is not available to the RHR system.
- b.
Differences between switchgear and control load design configurations cause amperages to vary between Units 1 and 2.
- c.
The dc distribution panel includes the following loads: miscellaneous control and train D switchgear space heaters.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 13 4/06 TABLE 8.3.2-5 (SHEET 1 OF 10)
CLASS 1E 125-V dc AND 120-V VITAL ac SYSTEM FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS Item No.
Description of Component Safety Function Plant Operating ode Failure Mode(s)
Method of Failure Detection Failure Effect on System Safety Function Capability General Remarks
- 1.
Redundant Provide dc A, B No output Annunciator in None; item 2 charger For single failure battery charger; power when ac main control room; available; battery analysis; since train A 1AD1CA, power available one battery can provide 2 3/4 h these components train B 1BD1CA and maintain charger trouble without charger; are redundant train C 1CD1CA, battery in a alarm for input train B available to item 2, failure train D 1DD1CA charged undervoltage, of items 1 and 2 condition; either output overvoltage, components would item 1 and/or and loss of require two single item 2 in output failures; thus, service at this would not be any time considered.
C No input Annunciator in None; battery This component main control room; available for 4 h cannot function one battery during blackout charger trouble alarm for input undervoltage, output overvoltage, and loss of output
- 2.
Redundant Provide dc A, B No output Annunciator in None; item 2 charger For single failure battery charger; power when ac main control available; battery analysis; since train A 1AD1CB, power available room; one battery can provide 2 3/4 h these components train B 1BD1CB, and maintain charger trouble without charger; are redundant to train C 1CD1CB, battery in a alarm for input train B available item 1, failure of train D 1DD1CB charged undervoltage, out-items 1 and 2 condition, either put overvoltage, components would item 1 and/or and loss of require two single item 2 in output failures; thus service at any this would not be time considered C
No input Annunciator in None; battery This component motor control available for cannot function room; one battery 4 h during blackout charger trouble alarm for input undervoltage, output overvoltage, and loss of output
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.2-5 (SHEET 2 OF 10)
REV 13 4/06 Item No.
Description of Component Safety Function Plant Operating Mode Failure Mode(s)
Method of Failure Detection Failure Effect on System Safety Function Capability General Remarks
- 3.
Battery; train A Backup to battery A, B No output One switchgear None; battery 1AD1B, train B charger trouble alarm in chargers (items 1 1BD1B, train C during load main control room and 2) available; 1CD1B, train D cycling (in for bus train B available 1DD1B rush current) undervoltage, and provide dc ground detection, power for and improper 2 3/4 h without breaker position battery charger output for LOCA/
C No output Control room None; train B LOSP conditions, voltmeter, available and 4 h for SBO annunciator conditions.
isolation device panel trouble alarm, loss of related control room equipment indicating lights.
- 4.
125-V dc switch-Distribute A, B,
- Grounded, One switchgear None; train B Power still available with gear; train A power via C
bus fault trouble alarm in available a single ground.
1AD1, train B breakers to main control room 1BD1, train C loads from for bus Power not available with 1CD1, train D chargers and undervoltage, bus fault.
1DD1 battery ground detection, and improper breaker position; for bus fault, no switchgear alarm. Annunciator isolation device panel trouble alarm for bus fault.
- 5.
Breaker (b)
Provide circuit A, B Inadvertent One switchgear None; item 2 charger train A 1AD106, continuity and opening trouble alarm in available; battery train B 1BD107, protection main control room can provide 2 3/4 h train C 1CD106, between item 1 for bus without charger; train D 1DD106 battery charger undervoltage, train B available and item 4 ground detection, switchgear and improper breaker position C
Inadvertent One switchgear None; battery This component opening trouble alarm in available for cannot function main control room 4 h during blackout for bus undervoltage, ground detection, and improper breaker position
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.2-5 (SHEET 3 OF 10)
REV 13 4/06 Item No.
Description of Component Safety Function Plant Operating Mode Failure Mode(s)
Method of Failure Detection Failure Effect on System Safety Function Capability General Remarks
- 6.
Breaker (b)
Provide circuit A, B Inadvertent One switchgear None; item 1 charger train A 1AD107, continuity and opening trouble alarm in available; battery train B 1BD106, protection main control room can provide 2 3/4 h train C 1CD107, between item 2 for bus without charger; train D 1DD107 battery charger undervoltage, train B available and item 4 ground detection, switchgear and improper breaker position C
Inadvertent One switchgear None; battery This component opening trouble alarm in available for cannot function main control room 4 h during blackout for bus undervoltage, ground detection, and improper breaker position
- 7.
Breaker (b)
Provide circuit A, B Inadvertent One switchgear None; battery (normally closed);
continuity and opening trouble alarm in chargers (items 1 train A 1AD101, protection main control room and 2) available; train B 1BD101, between battery for bus train B available train C 1CD101, and item 4 under voltage, train D 1DD101 switchgear ground detection, and improper breaker position; plus breaker open alarm in main control room C
Inadvertent Control room None; train B opening voltmeter, available annunciator isolation device panel trouble alarm, loss of related control room equipment indicating lights.
- 8.
Breaker (b)
Provide circuit A, B, Inadvertent Annunciator None; train B (normally closed);
continuity and C
opening isolation device available train A 1AD109, protection panel trouble train B 1BD109 between item 4 alarm.
switchgear and 125-V dc panel 1 (A, B) D12
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.2-5 (SHEET 4 OF 10)
REV 13 4/06 Item No.
Description of Component Safety Function Plant Operating Mode Failure Mode(s)
Method of Failure Detection Failure Effect on System Safety Function Capability General Remarks
- 9.
Breaker (b)
Provide circuit A, B Inadvertent One switchgear None; train B (normally closed);
continuity and opening trouble alarm in available train A 1AD105, protection main control room train B 1BD105, between item 4 for bus train C 1CD104, switchgear and under voltage, train D 1DD104 125-V dc panel ground detection, 1 (A,B, C, D) and improper D11 breaker position; plus one panel trouble alarm per panel in main control room for bus undervoltage, ground detection, and branch breaker overload. For 1CD104 and 1DD104, failure detection is control room annunciator isolation device panel trouble alarm.
C Inadvertent One switchgear Single failure on For 1CD104 opening trouble alarm in auxiliary feedwater breaker auxiliary main control room turbine-driven pump feedwater for bus control panel function only; undervoltage, functions; blackout for other function ground detection, does not require train D available and improper single failure criteria breaker position; plus one panel trouble alarm per panel in main control room for bus under voltage, ground detection, and branch breaker overload. For 1CD104 and 1DD104, failure detection is control room annunciator isolation device panel trouble alarm.
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.2-5 (SHEET 5 OF 10)
REV 13 4/06 Item No.
Description of Component Safety Function Plant Operating Mode Failure Mode(s)
Method of Failure Detection Failure Effect on System Safety Function Capability General Remarks
- 10.
BreakerLhM Provide circuit A, B, Inadvertent One switchgear None; system safety (normally closed);
continuity and C
opening trouble alarm in function can be met train A 1AD110, protection main control room with loss of one and 1AD104 between item 4 for bus undervoltage, channel train B 1BD110, switchgear and ground detection, and 1BD104 inverter 1AD1I1, and improper train C 1CD109 1BD1I2, 1CD1I3, breaker position; and 1CD108, 1CD1I5, 1DD1I4, plus inverter trouble train D 1DD109 1DD1I6, 1AD1I11, alarm in main and 1DD108 1BD1I12 control room.
- 11.
BreakerLhM Provide circuit A, B Inadvertent One switchgear None; train B For breaker 1AD111 (normally closed);
continuity and opening trouble alarm in available and 1BD111 train A 1AD111, protection main control room train B 1BD111, between item 4 for bus undervoltage, train C 1CD111 and 125-V dc ground detection, MCC 1 (A, B, C) and improper D1M breaker position; plus one MCC trouble alarm in main control room for bus undervoltage C
Inadvertent One switchgear Single failure on For breaker 1CD111 opening trouble alarm in auxiliary feedwater main control room turbine-driven pump for bus motor-operated undervoltage, valves and ground detection, associated controls; and improper blackout does not breaker position; require single plus one MCC failure criteria trouble alarm in main control room None; train B For breakers for bus undervoltage available 1AD111 and 1BD111.
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.2-5 (SHEET 6 OF 10)
REV 13 4/06 Item No.
Description of Component Safety Function Plant Operating Mode Failure Mode(s)
Method of Failure Detection Failure Effect on System Safety Function Capability General Remarks
- 12.
Inverter; train Convert 125-V A, B,C, No output, Common None; system safety No high ac output for A 1AD1I1, 1AD1I11 dc to 120-V high output annunciator in main function can be met Westinghouse inverters, no train B 1BD1I2, ac and pro-voltage, high control room for with loss of one high dc voltage for Elgar 1BD1I12 train C vide voltage output
- Low dc voltage channel inverters, inverter failure for 1CD1I3, train D to vital frequency
- High dc voltage solid-state controls inverters 1DD1I4 instrument
- Low ac output only.
panels 1AY1A, voltage 1BY1B, 1CY1A,
- High ac output 1DY1B, 1AY2A, voltage 1BY2B
- Inverter trouble.
- 13.
Regulated trans-(c)
Backup to inverter A, B No output None None; train B For single failure former; (item 12) when available analysis: since train A 1ABB40RX it is isolated these components and 1ABC09RX for maintenance are redundant to train B 1BBB40RX or malfunction item 1, failure of and 1BBA07RX (requires local item 1 and 2 train C 1ABA07RX manual switching components would train D 1BBC09RX at item 14 panel) require two single failures; thus this should not be considered; however, these components are redundant to item 12 C
No input None None; train B This component available cannot function during blackout
- 14.
120-V ac vital Distribute A, B, Ground and Panel trouble None; system safety Power still instrument panel; power via C
bus fault alarm in main function can be met available with a train A 1AY1A, breakers to control room with loss of one single ground.
1AY2A, train B loads for ground channel 1BY1B, 1BY2B, detection and bus train C 1CY1A, undervoltage train D 1DY1B
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.2-5 (SHEET 7 OF 10)
REV 13 4/06 Item No.
Description of Component Safety Function Plant Operating Mode Failure Mode(s)
Method of Failure Detection Failure Effect on System Safety Function Capability General Remarks
- 15.
Interlock Provide local A, B, Inadvertent Panel trouble None; momentary breaker (b) one manual switching transfer alarm in main loss of power to per train between inverter control room item 14 panels; (located at (item 12) and for ground train B available item 14 panel) regulated transformer detection and bus (item 13) and undervoltage preclude both being connected A, B Inadvertent Panel trouble None; train B together; also opening alarm in main available provide incoming control room overload protection for ground detection and bus undervoltage C
Inadvertent Panel trouble None; panels are opening alarm in main normally fed from control room inverters which for ground are backed by detection and bus batteries that are undervoltage available for 4 h
- 16.
125-V dc panel; Distribute A, B,
- Ground, One panel trouble None; train B Power still train A 1AD12, power via C
bus fault alarm per panel available available with a train B 1BD12 breakers to in main control single ground loads room for branch breaker overload.
Power not available Bus fault will with bus fault.
provide an annunciator isolation device panel trouble alarm. Ground detection provided by control room alarm for the panel supply switchgear.
- 17.
125-V dc panel; Distribute A, B,
- Ground, One panel trouble Same as 16 Power still train A 1AD11 power via C
bus fault alarm per panel available with a train B 1BD11 breakers to in main control single ground loads room for bus undervoltage and branch breaker overload. Ground detection provided by control room alarm for the panel supply switchgear.
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.2-5 (SHEET 8 OF 10)
REV 13 4/06 Item No.
Description of Component Safety Function Plant Operating Mode Failure Mode(s)
Method of Failure Detection Failure Effect on System Safety Function Capability General Remarks
- 18.
125-V dc MCC; Distribute A, B,
- Ground, MCC trouble None; train B Power still train A 1AD1M, power via C
bus fault alarm in main available available with a train B 1BD1M breakers to control room single ground loads for bus undervoltage, and branch breaker overload.
Ground will provide a control room alarm for the MCC supply switchgear.
- 19.
125-V dc panel; Distribute A, B,
- Ground, One panel trouble None; train D Power still train C 1CD11, power via C
bus fault alarm per panel available available with a train D 1DD11 breakers to in main control single ground loads room for branch breaker overload.
Power not available Bus fault will for bus fault.
provide control room annunciator isolation device panel trouble alarm. Ground detection provided by control room alarm for the panel supply switchgear.
C
- Ground, One panel trouble Single failure; For 1CD104 bus fault alarm per panel in single failure on breaker auxiliary main control room auxiliary feedwater feedwater function for branch breaker turbine-driven pump only; for other overload. Bus space heater and function train D fault will provide control panel available control room functions; blackout annunciator isolation does not require device panel single failure trouble alarm.
criteria Ground detection provided by control room alarm for the panel supply switchgear.
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.2-5 (SHEET 9 OF 10)
REV 13 4/06 Item No.
Description of Component Safety Function Plant Operating Mode Failure Mode(s)
Method of Failure Detection Failure Effect on System Safety Function Capability General Remarks
- 20.
125-V dc MCC; Distribute A, B
- Ground, MCC trouble alarm None; ac drive train C 1CD1M power via bus fault in main control auxiliary feedwater breakers to room for bus available loads undervoltage, and branch breaker overload. Ground will provide a control room alarm for the MCC supply switchgear.
C
- Ground, MCC trouble alarm Single failure; bus fault in main control single failure on room for bus auxiliary feedwater undervoltage, turbine-driven pump and branch breaker motor-operated overload. Ground valves and associated will provide a controls; blackout control room alarm does not require for the MCC supply single failure criteria switchgear
- 21.
Inverter; Convert 125-V A, B, No output One inverter None; trains A and train C 1CD1I5, dc to 480 V, C
trouble alarm per B and train C or D train D 1DD1I6 3 to provide inverter in main available power to operate control room residual heat removal isolation valves
- 22.
Motor starter; Controller for A, B, Inadvertent One starter None; trains A and train C 1CD1I5N, residual heat C
opening of trouble alarm per B and train C or D train D 1DD1I6N removal isolation input breaker starter in main available valves control room for loss of voltage and motor overload Motor overload One starter None; trains A and trouble alarm per B and train C or D starter in main available control room for loss of voltage and motor overload No operation No change in None; trains A and status of B and train C or D indicating lights in available main control room
VEGP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3.2-5 (SHEET 10 OF 10)
REV 13 4/06 Item No.
Description of Component Safety Function Plant Operating Mode Failure Mode(s)
Method of Failure Detection Failure Effect on System Safety Function Capability General Remarks
- 23.
Individual Cell Equalizer None A, B, C Open A. Cell voltage None; the battery cell A short in the reading will be effectively ICE device will B. Measure ICE returned to its fail to an open current.
original configuration state.
- a. Plant operating modes are represented as follows:
A - normal (offsite power available).
C - blackout (loss of all ac systems, except 120-V ac vital system).
System success criteria are as follows:
125-V dc system - one of two (train A or B and train C or D) channels required. 120-V ac vital system - three of four channels required.
- b. It is to be understood that the failure of any one circuit breaker to open when required to under fault conditions will result in the loss of the associated train with redundant train still available.
- c. Unit 2 transformer numbers are suffixed by RX in lieu of X.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 24 10/22 TABLE 8.3.2-6 125-V-dc BATTERY A LOAD REQUIREMENTS (SBO)
Current Required per Time Interval after ac Power Loss (A)
Load Description Unit(b) 0-1 min 1-240 min Random Load Total load includes inverters, MOV(a), dc distribution panels,(a,c) dc switchgear, MCC indication and relaying.
1 2
441 375 255 273 62 31
- a.
The field flash current has not been added to the first period or random load and the MOV current has not been added to the random load since the peak load occurring during the period has been considered. The peak load is due to the breakers closing, which does not occur coincidentally with the field flash or MOV currents.
- b.
Differences between switchgear and control load design configurations cause amperages to vary between Units 1 and 2.
- c.
The dc distribution panels include the following loads: Class 1E ac switchgear circuit breaker operation, safety features status indication relays and lights, diesel generator field flashing, diesel generator control, reactor trip switchgear, solenoid valves, and Class 1E control cabinet circuit indicators.
VEGP-FSAR-8 REV 23 3/21 TABLE 8.3.2-7 125-V-dc BATTERY B LOAD REQUIREMENTS (SBO)
Current Required per Time Interval after ac Power Loss (A)
Load Description Unit(b) 0-1 min 1-240 min Random Load Total load includes inverters, MOV(a), dc distribution panels,(a,c) dc switchgear, MCC indication and relaying.
1 2
444 429 257 255 82 50
- a.
The field flash current has not been added to the first period or random load and the MOV current has not been added to the random load since the peak load occurring during the period has been considered. The peak load is due to the breakers closing, which does not occur coincidentally with the field flash or MOV currents.
- b.
Differences between switchgear and control load design configurations cause amperages to vary between Units 1 and 2.
- c.
The dc distribution panels include the following loads: Class 1E ac switchgear circuit breaker operation, safety features status indication relays and lights, diesel generator field flashing, diesel generator control, reactor trip switchgear, solenoid valves, and Class 1E control cabinet circuit indicators.
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