ML22230A208
| ML22230A208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/20/1978 |
| From: | NRC/OCM |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Tran-M780420 | |
| Download: ML22230A208 (1) | |
Text
~p,.R REG(/(
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!~~~i Transcript of Proceedings
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/ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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BRIEFING ON SAFEGUARDS UPGRADE RULE AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY Thursday, April 20, 1978 Pages /- 1, Prepared by:
C.H. Brown Office of the Secretary
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SECY-78-195 SECY-78-43 SAFEGUARDS UPGRADE RULE AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY (Open to Public Attendance)
Commissioner's Conference Room Rbom 1130 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
Thursday, April 20, 1978 1
The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m.,
Joseph Hendrie, Chairman, presiding.
PRESENT:
Chairman Hendrie corr:mis~ioner Gilisnky Commissioner Kennedy*
Commissioner Bradford ALSO PRESENT:
- s. Chilk J. Kelley L. Gossick H. Shapar C. Smith B. Snyder R. Burnett R. Jones R. Brightsen R. Dube E. Case F. Arsenault B. Evans
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 P R O C E E D I N G S CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
This is a discussion of the strength and physical protection requirements for fuel 2
cycle facilities anq their transportation involving significant amounts of strategic special nuclear material, henceforth, to be known as the up-grade rule.
This portion of the discussion this morning will necessarily involve classified materials.
This discussion focuses primarily on consideration of insider threat levels.
We will reserve that discussion to the closed to the latter portion of the meetings so;:that we don't have an open session, a closed session and then re-open.
With that notice as to the general course of events; I welcome the staff ;1atid~Lee, will ask you to go ahead with the staff briefing.
MR. GOSSICK:
Fine, this is a joint paper and it1*:
is prepared by the Standards and Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
That will be presented by Bob Burnett and his people, but Dr. Smith will lead off with sort of a background o~ the matter.
Bob?
MR. SMITH:
Thanks, Lee.
Could I have the first slide, please.
(Slide)
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I would just like to give you a brief outline of what we intend to cover today.
The first part will be basically an overview, a quick run-through of some of the events that have happened in the past that bring us up to where we are today.
- The status* of all the up-grade rules, which Bud Evans will give, then we will move on into the up-grade 3
rule content itself, whi6h b~~ically will be Ralph Jones from Standards.
Then the third part would be some of the major issues, government guards, the design and threat and coordinatio with other projects and implementation schedule.
At that point where you see we have "A.
Government Guards" we would present the staff's position and we would respond also to the questions that the Commission asked us to answer with respect to Mr. Brightsen's difference of opinion in terms of what the staff had proposed.
Then Mr. Brightsen would come up and he would discuss his points with the Commission and then we would move into closed session.
Could we have slide two, please?
(Slide)
I would just like to take a quick run-through, a little bit of a history here.
Back in January* of '76, Carl Builder, the"* *then Director of the Division of Safeguards sent a memorandum to the staff which, among other things, stimulated staff thinking on
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the adequacy of safeguards with respect to threats.
In Eebruary of 1976 we began our initia~ site assessments.
These were on-site evaluations of plant capabilities to protect SSNM.
In March.of '76 the ERDA/NRC Task Force was formed.
One of the purposes of that Task Force was to develop a proposed action plan for improving the control and the protection of SSNM at NRC licensed facilities.
About mid-1976, based on those initial site assessments in February we issued license conditions to many of our facilities to correct identified safeguard weaknesses.
Then in July of '76 the ERDA/NRC Task Force report was issued.
It had a lot of recommendations, one of them being the initiation of near-term measures for improved protection such as a clearance program with respect to weapons, the -number of guards, a guard-training program.
It also gave us some clues in terms of longer-term safeguards.
That is the direction that we ought to go.
The intent was to upgrade safeguards to defend against an up-graded threat and also, what capabilities we should have in order to do that.
About in September or October of '76 we went out again on another round of initial assessments, if you will.
We called those up there confirmation site assessments, but our purpose then was basically to check on whether or not the new license conditions that we had imposed back in mid-'76 had really resulted in a high level of protection.
In other words, were things better.
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Then in December of '76, as you know, we reported to the Commission on all of our site assessments, and we reported their weaknesses and fixes and what we considered to be, at that t+/-~e; what the level of eff~cti~eness or protection was.
A couple of other points:
In January of '77 the Commission answered the NRDC petition, and as you remember you stated that the threat was not eminent and that emergency measures were not required.
We also stated that the impending orderly up-grading of safeguards would continue to assure adequate protection to the public in a prudent manner.
Then that brings us up to December of '76 in which we initiated the up-grade project, the development of the up-grade rule.
The Commission deemed it important and prudent that we do this, and while this briefing will focus only on the physical protection up-grade rule, Mr. Evans, when he is up here will-show you how it relates to all of the up-grade rules that are not before the Commission or will be in a very short order.
The only other thing that is not mentioned on that chart, which I would like to mention, of course, is the comprehension evaluations which are going on right nowoat our licensed facilities.
You remember we have four teams going out evaluating
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 these. facilities with respect to physical security, material control, diversion~path analysis, and also external assault appraisal.,:U:i 6
, One of the purposes of those comprehensive evaluations, other than to bring a more systematic approach to looking at these facilities in terms of their capabilities, but was also to examine what their potential capability would be to protect against a higher:,:th111ea;bt:-J::ev.el.
And some of that infoa::;mat.irim we have used in developing t.he up-grade rule.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
There is an entry* up there saying: "NRDC Petition Answered)II when was the NRDC Petition filed?
MR. EVANS:
That was filed twice, sir.
The first one was filed in 1976 and denied by Mr.
Chapman in March, then the second 0ne was.filed after the denial by Mr. Chapman, wasn't it in the summer MR. SNYDER:
It's June, I think.
MR. EVANS:
In June.
Then it was answered by the Commission in January of 1977.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
So that in that chronology the first petition and the Chapman denial would both come after the Builder memorandum?
MR. EVANS:
Yes,::sir.
MR. SMITH:
Bud Evans, who is Chief of our Requirements and Technology Branch in the Di-vision of Safeguards is going to
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MR. EVANS:
What I'd like to do, if I could have slide No. 4, please.
(slide)
Now, while,--there _-are*-,:a lot of lines going every which way, this is designed to try to show you the up-grade rule in context with all of the other physical*~rotection up-grade rules that we have been working on.
7 Let me just sum up this chart by saying that there are nine rules that have been under development as part of the up-grading project as directed by the Commission.
Our of the nine rules, five have been to the Commission and have been published in either draft or effective form.
Three are presently at the Commission and we will be deliberating on them shortly in order to determine.whether they should be released in draft form.
A final one is due to the Commission in the form of an action plan next week.
So over the last year and a quarter, as you can see we have come quite a ways, I think, in terms of trying to develop the overall physical protection strategy for fuel cycle facilities and transportation of SSNM.
Now, what I would like to do is go into the status of all of these rules in just a little more detail and their general purpose which is what the next two slides show.
(Slide)
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The up-grade rule, you will probably know more than you want to know about by the enct of this briefing, so I will go over that one which is the first one and in to the second.
(Slide)
The guard-force response rule has already been issued in effective form and it states explicitly what licensee guards should do if there is an attempt at thieft of SSNM.
The guard qualification and training rule, I think, it~s title is fairly explanatory.
The status of that is that it has been published in draft form.
It is due back to the Commission in final form and we expect to get it here next week.
The general licensing for _ posses*sion of ssrM ~irt _
transient rule covers a technicality in the regulations.
The past regulations exempted carriers from any kind of licensing, and therefore, technically we could not inspect them.
In effect we were, but we just want to ciose that loop hole in the regulations and that is now before the Commission for consideration.
The transient shipments: __ a(t:tion.plan is the one I mentioned that has not been to the Commission,yet, but is due to the Commission next week and will be here then.
In addition to all of those which apply primarily to the Category I material, the strategic special nuclear material, we have a rulewwhich deals with moderate and low strategic material, and this is to make sure that the U.S.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 regulations are coordinated with a nuclear supplier's group and the IAEA and are consistent therewith.
This rule is presently before the Commission and being considered.
.('S.lide-)' ;:::~*cci,.::.r.11.* J.::J The safeguards contingency plan is published in final.form and will be effective in June.
The authority for access to SSNM, which you all probably know is the clearance rule, is due to go to hearings this coming June, I believe June 17th is the present schedule.
MR. JONES:
July.
MR. EVANS:
July 17th.
And finally the licensee access to 8iassified information rule is to allow licensees the abiiity to get classified information which would help them in protecting the special nuclear material they have in.their possession, and that is before the Commission.
9 Now, given that general background, I'd like to go into some of the specifics:.:;of the up-grade rule and talk about its content.
(slide)
In terms of Slide 7, I think we can ask four basic questions about the up-grade rule and its coverage.
The first is what does it cover, and it covers formula quantities of strategic nuclear material.
Now, by strategic we mean U-235 en~iched to greater than 20 percent,
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 U-233 and plutonium, and by formula quantities we mean 5,000 grams or more computed by the formu1ac-?.of grams of U-235, plus 2.5 times grams of U-233 and plutonium.
10 Now, given that that that is the material it covers, where does it cover it?
Both fixed site and in transit with very few exceptions which I will mention later.
Against what threat?
A determined violent assault in terms of the external threat which I will go into in more detail in a minute and also against a single insider and against a conspiracy of uncleared insiders:'or a single cleared insider, or depending on how the Commission decides to go in closed session, a conspiracy of cleared insiders.
Finally, why are we doing this?
By Commission directive the purpose of the rule is to prevent thieft and to protect agains sabotage.
Now, who does it apply to?
(Slide)
Slide 8 shows that in addition to fuel reprocessing plants, it applies to any licensee who posesses or uses, transports or delivers or takes delivery for transportation of SSNM, anybody who imports or exports SSNM in formula quantities.
So in other words, we have covered almost anybody within the geographic boundary.cof the United States.
- Now, there are two minor exceptions to that.
One are carriers, which
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 11 we are working on in the carrier rule, the other are transient shippers, namely, foreign shippers from one foreign country to another foreign country that have a stop-over in the U.S.
And we have been asked by the Commission to develop a plan to make sure that the protection is equivalent to to domestic safeguards, and you will have that plan next ~eek.
Now, in terms CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Would you amplify what you meant by "carriers" as ---
MR. EVANS:
Carriers are like railroads, the actual railroad companies.
They are like the airlines themselves.
What has happened in the past is we have had shippers' agents who have arranged for the shipments, but have not actually had done the carrying themselves.
And in the past, in the old AEC, they had been explicitly exempted and that carried over in to our regulations.
We have now decided that from a technical point of view, we would like to be able to inspect those carriers in their safeguards, even though they have been cooperative with us and they have allowed us to do this in the past.
If one wanted to tell us that we could nqt, we would not have any legal basis for doing it.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Is this consistent with the ICC and DOT regulations?
MR. EVANS:
Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Will it require them to file
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MR. EVANS:
It will be a general license.
So that the way it will be done is the shipper's agent will file.the actual security plan.
The carriers them-selves will have a minimum of inconvenience because of the problem associated with carriers not wanting to carry material that has a lot of inconvenience.
So we did work a way around that problem.
In terms of the general structure in ---
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
One further qu*estion on any licensee.
Let's see, there are some exceptions under the possessor used at any site, aren't there?
For instance, the core of a nuclear reactor which makes the fuel by the old plate-type fully enriched uranium fuel ---
MR. EVANS:
Yes, sir.
If it is irradiated above a certain level, and that is in the definition, then it would not come under the up-grade rule.
You are right.
In terms of the general structure and content of the up-grade rule itself, the rule breaks into three major parts.
The first is what has been called a general performance requirement.
That basically is the statement of the requirement for high assurance protection against a given adversary description and we will go into detail on those in
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(Slide)
In add+/-tilion, it requires some redundancy and diversity and some testing and maintenance by the licensees.
13 The second major part of the rule deals with system capability requirements which were recommended by the joint NRC/ERDA;)!':4'sk Force report and these requirements have been included for both fixed site and transportation.
And finally, there is a reference system of specific equipment,i'Ihardware and procedures which normally will satisfy those capability requirements and which give the first level of guidance to the licensees as to what is expected of them.
At the endoof the briefing we will go into more detail on the guidance.
Now, in terms of the requirements stated.in the rule, it is that the licensee establish a physical protection system which will prevent, with high assurance, the thieft of SSNM and will protect against radiological sabotage.
Tpis requirement is in conjunction with an adversa~y description,
~Hide 11.
(Slide)
Now, What this shows is they will do this prevention with high assurance against a determined violent assault by a small group that have the following attributes:
Theyyeanhbe well trained; they can inside assistance;
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 they can have suitable weapons; they can hand-carried equipment and they can have the ability to operate as two or more maneuverable teams.
In addition, this protection will be provided against an insider, including an employee in any position, as well as a conspiracy between insiders 14 in any position, and that should read: "who are not clear" or such insiders acting in concert with one cleared insider.
Again, this will be discussed in detail in the closed session.
Now, if I can go back to Slide 9 for just a minute.
(Slide)
I would like to just quickly go over the system capability requirements shown as the second major section of the rule, which is slide llA.
(Slide)
Now, what this shows is that we have given defense in depth to these facilities.
The licensee must have the capability of protecting against unauthorized access at an exterior boundary; they must prevent access ~o an interior boundary, namely any vital area or any material access area; they must be capable of determining the movement and placement of material w'i thin that boundary, and then they must be capable of preventing unauthorized removal of that material out of the inner and outer boundaries.
So we have put concentric circles of defense around
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15 the various facilities.
Now, given that background in terms of the first two sections of the rule, I'd like to let Ralph go in to some of:the specifics about the reference system section of the*
rule, and also some of the differences between the up-grade rule requirements and the existing regulatory requirements so you can see how we are changing today's environment.
Ralph.
MR. JONES:
The first two slides give you an over-view of what part,;73 will look like when and if the up-grade rule is approved~and published.
(Slide)
Just reading down the various sections, we will have exemptions, irradiated material, as you mentioned before will be exempted.
The low enriched uranium exemption, of course, would have to be changed if we include the moderate to low material for the international protection.
That would be another rule-making action.
The one item that we omitted from the exemptions there is material being transported by the DOE system, that also is exempted from these rules.
The general performance requirements in 73.20 would apply ---
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What is the significance of that 350 grams in laboratories.
I thought this applied to
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MR. JONES:
Well, there are ~equirements.
That's the agreement state,.limit.
There is a general requirement, but they have to have physical protection.
73.40, which isntt on there --
16 say you have to have protection of this material, but we don't specify what.
But if you have less than 350 grams, you are not covered at all under Part 73.
But 73~40~does cover this range in between, but we don't specify what it is.
Like the AGN reactors, for example.
That's below the 20s.
Incidentally, that item under 73.20 should read:
"power and non-power reactors," it is more than just test reactors.
COMMISSIONER. ':GI LINSKY:
Well, if you/.don' t specify where they ought to be, do we,... insp~c.:::t :against the regulations or anything?
It is an exhortation in effect?
MR. JONES:
Right.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
And we don't exhort below 350 grams?
MR. JONES:
That's right.
Now, the present 73.30 to 73736 which cover transportation would be deleted.
It would.be taken care of by 73.25 and 26.
(Slide)
On the next slide the remainder of Part 73 is shown
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 17 how all of these things will be covered and the Category II and III material, this is the low and moderate material that we cov.ered, the international protection a_nd recommendations would be added as a separate rule-making action which you have before you now.
The current 73.50 would be revised to cover only spent fuel storag~~ It 6urrently covers all facilities.
The current 73.60 which covers material protection would be deleted since it would be covered under 73.20;.40 and.45.
The Redords and Reports Sections and Advance Shipping Notices, those things are already there.
Appendix B, the Guard Training Criteria has been proposed.
This is a separate rule-making action which we will bring up to you next week.
To give you a brief outline of what the up-grade rule will covert the next slide ---
(Slide)
-- covers transportation protection and is an outline of the sections and the detailed specifications for transportati n protection.
These are the detailed areas that are covered in transportation protection.
(Slide)
The next slide gives you a similar break down for.
fixed site protection, 'the various areas on which there are detail requirements~
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- Llhave back-up slides which go into the details of each of these areas if you wish to go on to them some time.
(Slide) 18 The next slide shows the definitions that have been added to the up~grade rules over what is currently in Part 73.
These are in the staff *paper on pages 30 thru 32 of enclosure A.
These are words that we are using in the rule that we felt needed definition.
(Slide)
The next slide shows definitions that have been changed to clarify them or to better fit the up-grade rule.
These are enclosure A, pages 28 thru 30 of the staff paper.
(Slide)
The next slide begins to show the differences from present regulations.
Now you have seen these before when we discussed with you the proposed regulation, and we went through them in some detail there.
Some of these are already in effeqt through license conditions.
For example, the first one, more explicit armed escort training, some license conditions have been imposed to make that more stririgent.
The series "shipment limitation" is being done by license condition.
The movement control center, we are making more explicit, it is implied in present regulations.
The nine armed escorts under transfer and storage is now required by license conditions to be four.
We
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 are upgrading that to nine.
(Slide)
The next slide continues this comparison, the last three items, of upgrading that we are accomplishing by the up-grade rule.
(Slide)
The next slide shows in detail the differences 19 from present regulations for road shipments.
Again, some of these are imposed by license conditions.
I don't think we need to,:,discuss,:.:those unless anybody has a question on them.
(Slide)
The next slide shows the differences ---
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Could we go back to that last slide?
MR. JONES:
Certainly.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
The nine-armed escort versus two or none?
MR. JONES:
Yes, the present regulations require two or none, depending on the conditions of the shipment.
License conditions currently require five.
We are up-grading ft now to nine, depending on the conditions of transport whether you have armed vehicle, special trucks or whatever under the present regulations is to whether you have two or none.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And with the new r_egulations you must have~the armored vehicle, plus nine, is that r1ght2
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9 10 LL 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. JONES:
Plus nine, yes.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But in effect you are requiring five now?
MR. JONES:
License conditions, yes, require five.
now. That is correct.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
So you are still beyond the regulations?
MR. JONES:
Beyond the current regulations, and the up-grade rule goes beyond that.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What kind of comment have you had on the requirement for nine~armed guards?
MR. JONES:
In general they felt that it was too many.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
By how many?
MR. JONES:
They didn't say.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
How does::that compare with the esort for government shipments or can you tell us?
MR. JONES:
They currently have five, but we are told they are upgrading to nine.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
That would be DOE?
MR. JONES:
DOE, yes.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Of comparable materials.
MR. JONES:
Of comparable materials, yes, and weapons.
(Slide)
The next slide shows the same differences for comparison of air shipments ---
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Excuse me for just one second.
MR. JONES: Surely.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
You are saying that DOE would protect material on the one hand arid weapons on the other hand the same way?
MR. JONES: *For the transport, they have the same, yes, sir.
They use the same system.
These are the comparison of air shipments, and the next slide ---
(Slide)
COMMISSIONER*:.BRADFORD:
On the air shipments, this still contemplates normal civilian types of aircraft being used for only now.
MR. JONES:
No.
Cargo aircraft.
No passenger aircraf.
MR. EVANS: By license conditions, cargo aircraft COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
T-hen why wouldn't that be put in the regulations?
MR. JONES:
It is, it is in the current regulations.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Then why is it by license c*ondi tions?
MR. JONES: It is in the regulations, I believe, not license conditions.
MR. EVANS:
They can't use passenger aircraft right now.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 22 MR. JONES:
The regulation limits passenger shipments to 20 grams or 20 curies or something like that.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
And this is in the regulation?
MR. JONES:
It is in the regulation, yes.
That is not being changed.
COMMISSIONER:;BRADFORD:
This does still contemplate civilian air ports?
MR. JONES:
Yes, there is nothing addressing that in the regulation.
It addresses the pr.otection you have to have at the air port, but it doesn't specify the type of air port.
Like the armed escorts, it stops and transfers.
(Slide)
The next slide makes these comparisons for the rail shipment and the sea shipments.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's see, what does "common language" mean on there?
MR. JONES: It means that the escorts should be able to converse with the pilot of the plane.
If the pilot speaks Italian, the escort, should speak Italian, or in some way be able to converse with him.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Both of them or just one of them?
(Laughter)
MR. JONES:
We don't specify that.
They should be able to communicate in a common language and that could be one
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Do we hav.e a language school training program?
MR. JONES:
We looked into this as to whether this was going to present a problem, and most of the pilots who~.would be using U.S. territory speak English.
They have a little problem communicating with their air controllers if they don't.
This just gives you the comparison for rail shipments and sea shipments.
They are quite similar to the air and road shipments.
(Slide)
The next slide ---
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
These armed escorts, now is that consistent with DOT and FAA regulations?
MR. JONES:
Yes.
Yes, we have looked in to this and it is if you make the prior arrangements, I mean, you just can't walk on there with a gun.
You have got to let the pilot know this is going to happen and you have to let these people know that this is going to happen and that these people are going to be.armed.
So you have to make these prior arrange-ments and we have discussed this with the FAA and with the Pilots Association.
They see no problem with this provided you just don't walk on there with a gun in your hand, type thing.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
How does the guy get through
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MR. JONES:
There are prior arrangements.
MR. BURNETT:
There are mechanisms.
There is a card that you fill out when you are approacfuing the searching location.
(slide)
MR.-JONES:
Now, the next slide begins the comparisons for the fixed site areas with present regulations.
Non-power reactors are included, except for the 100 gram ---
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Could we go back for one second, I'm sorry.
In the sea shipment that was on a*1-*prev:.d:sus slidei "container ships only"?
MR. JONES:
That's correct.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
In other words, an ordinary cargo ship can carry it?
MR. JONES:
No.
It must be in the container ship so that the special nuclear material can be in pre-container packaged and loaded on the ship without havh1g _:;the individual SSNM containers being handled separately.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
But that is possible, jµst as for example, small shipments of miscellaneous material are agglomerated and put in to a single substantial container and put in the hole of sar~o ships.
MR. JONES:
We are specifying they are put in a container, a pre-packaged container.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: But a container_ship is a particular kind of ship.
25 MR. JONES:
That is correct. It gives you much better protection, much better assurance that the material is not removed from the ship one container at a time.
That is normally the way it is shipped any way.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That's 100 rems per what?
MR. JONES:
That is the exemption that is currently spelled out in the regulation at three feet.
One,hundred rem three feet from the surface per hour.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Per what, kilogram, fuel elements, reactor core?
MR. JONES:
Per item, whatever the item might be.
Per fuel element, per package, we don't specify.
That is the current wording in 73.06 for exemptions from transportation, and we are including this on the up-grade rule because that sort of thing will be covered under the
- current 73.50 which we are revising to cover only irradiated materials.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's see.
This is going to pose a certain amount of problem with regard to new fuel inventories at research reactors, isn't it?
MR. JONES:
It will present a problem to ---
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Now, this covers the core and it covers the stuff in the pool?
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. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 MR. JONES:
That's cbrrect -- well, some times.
There are six research reactors to which this presents a problem.
The people in NRR are working with these six to determine what can be done to reduce their inventory, to increase their irradiation, to store the material somewhere else that is better protected or whatever, so that they -- the research reactors will not have to hire all of these guards and have all of thsisL-protection.
So they are working with the research reactors to accommodate this regulation.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
How do you get the fuel to the reactor, assuming you;:have a site at which can be stored, you are going to have to tool up nine guards to take a reload in, I take it.
MR. JONES:
Most of the shipments are less than core-level quantity, so _'y,ou don't have to -- so it doesn't come under the rule.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: How did you pick the 100 rems per hour?
MR. JONES:
That -- I don't remember the history of that now.
It~has been in the regulation for some time.
I guess :
it is a number which isn't close to any threshhold.
Either you are a way above it or a way below it.
I don't remember the exact background for that, but it is using the exemption number that is currently in1.. ::hhe:cregulations.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, what's the rationale for
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MR. JONES:
Well, with that irradiation level it is self-protecting from thieft, and we are mainly tqlking about thieft here.
Now, of course, the 73.50 covers the protection of irradiated material, but not to the level that we are doing here. So it is not completely unprotected, but we don't believe well, it is self-protecting from the standpoint of thieft, so we don't need all of these controls on it.
(Slide)
The next slide continues the comparison for fixed site requirements.
Again, some of these are under licensed conditions.
The central alarm station interior is not visible from the perimeter.
We left out a word there in the fourth line up.
(Slide)
The next slide continues the fixed site comparison further.
Some of these are already in licensed condition, some of the changes are to make the requirements more explicit and more~-- we.hope more clearly understood by the licensees.
(Slide)
The next slide starts with a comparison of changes from the proposed regulations, now, not from current regulations but what we changed as the result of public comment and further staff study.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 28 And there are by,.,these,,five, substantive changes from the proposed amendments.
The first one, of course, we will be discussing later.
The second one, the licensees felt that~those phrases in there would leave the regulation open-ended and subject to ratcheting.
Staff looked at this and decided that what we had in the regulation was sufficient, we didn't need to ratchet them so we took those phrases out.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Where was that phrase now?
MR. JONES:
They were in several places in the regulation,:.in the performance requirement~, in the capability requirements.
So we took those out.
We felt that the requirements were adequately covered.
If we need more, we can proceed with additional rule-making.
The package search requirements were changed slightly to cover~the cleared person.
We feel that we needed a stronger storage for directly-useable strategic special materials, and we are now requiring it to be in vaults only.
Previously it could be stored in vault-type rooms.
Staff felt that this did not provide sufficient delay time in the protection of this directly usable, material.
Then we changed the implemen-tation times to provide more time for the licensees to prepare their plans,. to implement the plans and we added a time for construction which was not in the proposed regulation.
(Slide)
The next ~lide shows some of the other changes that
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 29 were made from the proposed regulation.
There was a problem of armed escorts.
It originally stated to or from foreign ports and there was a question of just exactly what that meant and whether we had jurisdication over that.
We changed it to specify that these escorts should be armed, when, within the geographic limits of the United States which is where the jurisdiction of the NRC is limited.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me just ask you, when you say that search of cleared persons would be random, what does that mean?
At some prescribed local.direction or MR. JONES:
That will be done on a random basis, not on a percentage basis, but on a random basis using a table of random numbers to select who gets searched.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
And what does that mean?
MR. JONES:
It doesn't mean that five percent of the people.will be searched, it means that *you will use a table of random numbers and it may be five percent, maybe some other number.
Whatever the table of random numbers shows.if you do it right.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Now you have really got me mystified.
MR. JONES:
One day you may search 10 people, the next day you may only search one.
Depending on what your random table shows.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I know, but you have got to
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 set some average level?
MR. JONES:
No.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You are not going to set an average level?
30 MR. JONES:
The table of random numbers sets the level by its randomness.
Some days you may not search anybody.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It is imprudent for any Chairman to admit ignorance, so let me ask questions in the hope of explaining it to you.
(Laughter)
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Could you elaborate a little on how the use of the table would work?
Suppose I'm the guard, you know, and here you come one-after-another to my gate.
Good, I've got the table now, what do I do?
MR. JONES:
This is one way* it could be done, I mean, there are a number of ways..,it could be done.
The guard would be given a list of numbers, like whatever the numbers were, 5, 15, 27, 38 or whatever.
That would mean that he would search every 5th, 15th, -- the 5th person, the 15th person, the 28th person at random as you went down the list.
And you pick these numbers off a table of random numbers.
If, for example, you know you are going to have 300 people come in the gate that day, you would have a table of
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 31 random numbers that goes up to 300 and then you would pick the numbers off that table as to which people you search out of that.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
No, wait a minute.
MR. JONES:
That's a statistical procedure.
You could do it by computer or whatever.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What's the basis for the selection of the numbers?
MR. JONES:
You take the table of random numbers, and you::randomly pick a column and a line, and there is a number.
You try to be completely random with this thing.
Each person the criteria is that each and every person has an equal chance of,*,being searched.
That's the criteria, however you want to do That's the randomness of it that each and every person has a chance of being searched.
MR. BURNETT:
I think there is one thing also to note, that this is at the perimeter.
This is not the vital area.
It 100 percent search at the vital area.
MR. JONES:
That's correct.
MR. BURNETT:
So we are talk+/-11g about the perimeter.
MR. JONES:
At the protected area, the boundary.
MR. BURNETT:
That doesn't change the problem, but it does isolate the outer area.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I suspect that Commissioner Gilinsky still doesn't understand it.
(Laughter)
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 32 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Why don't we try this, we've got 100 people.
(Laughter)
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Would you all line up ---
(Laughter)
It appears to me that on the basis of random number tables you can indeed use that mechanism to decide which one of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
-- which one of the 8 of you is going to get searched.
MR. JONES:
That's correct.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
But it appears to me that I have to pre-determine whether I have to search one in eight or one in 100 or. 4 in whatever.
MR. JONES:
It is a random selection of the total population that comes in through the gate.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But in that case you are going to search 50 percent over the course of a year.
MR. JONES:
No, not necessarily.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yes, you will, over a course of a year.
MR. JONES:
Not necessarily.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Or over any conside:uable: *-
period of time because the~:Tandom numbers can run up to the total.
MR. JONES:
If you take the time long enough, you
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 33 will search everybody.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
No, that's not what I mean.
What I mean is if you have 300 people coming in every day, your table contains the number 1 to 300.
Some days you are going to search 300, some days you are going to search 299, some days you are going to search O and some days you are going to_;searchi.l.
And the average over any considerable period of time is going to be 50 percent.
MR. JONES:
Not necessarily.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes, yes.
MR. JONES:
Another point is,if for example, you search the 15th person that is not always going to be the same person every day either.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
No, that's true, but it does mean that instead of a 5 percent a year, *you arce going to search half the people that come in to that plant.
MR. JONES:
Yes, it is going to be~a greater percentage, that's true over a period -- the longer period of time the higher percentage.
COMMISSIONER BRADFO_RD:
Not necessarily, you might get 300 the first day.
MR. JONES:
That's right.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I still think it would be helpful to understand.
The aiming point of the rule in terms of the fraction of those entering at the perimeter who are expected to
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 34 be searched.
MR. JONES:
The aiming point of the rule is that each and every person entering the rule_ has an equal opportunity to be searched. ~He may or he may not be searched, but he doesn't know that.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
No, no.
I could institute a system in which the chance of any person entering would be 1 in 10 million of being searched, okay?
MR. JONES:
Uh-hum.
CHAIRMAN:!.HENDRIE:
And everybody would have precisely the same chanqe, or one in two of being searched and everybody w.buld have precisely the same change.
That is, I can assure the randomness -- the avoiding of particular people at any level of overall fraction search of the difference, and I have to decide, and what I'm trying to find out is, is the thrust here to end up with a 50 percent search, 5 percent or 2 percent or what?
MR. JONES:
If yu decided, for example, that you wanted a 20 percent search as they do in the reactors,.:*you would select your table of numbers CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, I know how to do it, I want to know what y:ouiare aiming for, please?
MR. JONES:
and then you would take 20 percent of those numbers -- no, 100 percent.
One hundred percent of those random people selec~ed.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I'm sorry.
Would the staff retread at some point and come back.
MR. JONES:
All right, we will give you a better explanation for the procedures for the randomness.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Onward.
MR. JONES:
Where are we?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Why did you ask that question?
(Laughter)
MR. JONES:
The next slide continues the changes from the proposed amendments, and shows the definitions that we added or were the proposed amendments.
(Slide) 35 This was noted before, but we added some after comment from the public.
We had some additional definitions.
(Slide)
The next slide shows some of the other issues that were raised during the comment period which did not result in changes in the regulations either because they had been taken care of in some other way, or there was no need to make a11y* changes.
The first one, we felt there was no need to make any changes, we felt the studies that we~have supported it.
The use of deadly force had been taken care of in other ways, the use of government guards is~-presently at issue.
The conflict of state and local gun laws, we felt, was appropriately taken
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 care of and that there was not the conflict that some people had indicated.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
We are confident of that with:r,espect to state laws.
That is a broad factual matter.
MR. JONES:
Yes, that's true, that this has been taken care of and is being taken care of by the transporters themselves.
36 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What sort of prov is ions are,1.there, for instance, in the Massachusetts law where they have this splendid compulsory "end of the slammer" if you are caught with hardware proposition?
MR. JONES:
People transporting into states like that should be assured that they have the proper license to do it.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It's a matter of licensing?
MR. JONES:
It.!s a matter of-licensing.
And what happens if you are moving through several states, the transporter should assure himself that he has got licenses in all of these states so that he ---
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The transporter or the individual carrying the weapon?
MR. JONES:
Well, probably the individual carrying the weapon, but the transporter.*, If.--=he, is an employer of the transporter, the transporter would take care of that for his employees.
I don't know how they do that.
That would be
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 37 whatever is necessary for these people who actually have the weapon to be properly licensed in the jurisdiction that they are moving through, unless they want to_ get caught and put in the slammer, like in Massachusetts.
We have discussed this with a number of guarded companies and they do this, they take care of it themselves.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
There is no difficulty that you can foresee where in some states where they may not wish to license persons who are not residents?
MR. JONES:
We don't foresee anything like that, no.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Have we checked?
MR. JONES:
We didn't check that specific point, but in discussing it with people like Brinks and people who do this transporting, they apparently have no problem in this respect.
The~status of research reactors, we just mentioned that and NRR is working on that one.
The performance oriented flexibility was raised by the licensees and we are providing guidance as to what we mean in these areas.
Some of the commenters*, felt that they needed flexibility in designing their systems, and our response to that, of course, is that the performance oriented regulation provides that flexibility.
It is designed to provide that.
No definitive comments were received on cost ---
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 38 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I take it they did not perceive that, however, in reviewing the regulation?
MR. JONES:
They didn't.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Were you able to convince them?
MR. JONES:
I hope we have.
We have discussed this with some of the people, and they said, "Oh, is that the way it works?" that sort of approach.
And we have provided a more definitive analysis of cost.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's see, but it is true that as you -- you do have general performance fo~ requirements system capability requirements, but the rule also goes forward with reference systems specifications ---
MR. JONES:
That is correct.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- which, to have any meaning inevitably have a particular set of provisions in mind so you can spell them out.
MR. JONES:
Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Then I presume there would be an underlying tier of regulatory guides and other staff guidance documents, many of which I presume would amplify the reference system and detail it in the various ways, then it could be helpful.
It does move the reviewing staff, however, I must say, toward a particular set of hardware methods and so on.
MR. EVANS:
On a generic basis, yes, sir.
Of course,
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24 25 the sites are so different that you really have to look at the site's specific conditions and that is where you get 39 in to the guidance and where the licensees start getting the flexibility giving their existing system's enviornment at their facilities and the structure of their facility on-site, those kinds of things.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, I hope the Safeguards staff down the years will keep in mind the need for that ---
MR. EVANS:
Flexibility?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, the need to take those site's specific items into account and get the medicine to the disease.
(Slide)
MR. JONES:
The last slide I have shows the effects on other sections in Part 73.
This is one of the questions that were raised by a lot of licensees:
"What's going to happen to these other things?
Are they still going to be in effect" and here's what's going to happen.
As I mentioned earlier 73.30 thru 73.36 is going to be deleted.
Those are the present transportation requirements.
Those requirements that are presently in ~30~thru.36 that we want to keep, are being added into 73.26.
73.60 will be deleted.
The requirements that we want to keep out of that are being added into 73.46.
73.50 is being revised to cover spent fuel and 73.40 is being retained as a general requirement
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 for fixed-site protection at licensed facilities.
Now, I will turn it back to Bud or somebody.
MR. SMITH:
Bob's going to talk about the guard.
MR. BURNETT:
Okay, we have to shift a couple of personnel,~if you could wait just a minute.
40 The two people joining us at the table, of course is Mr. Ron Brightsen and Mr. Bob Dube, both from the Division of Safeguards.
Okay, could we go to Slide 30, please.
(Slide)
What we are here to discuss today is a memorandum which Mr. Brightsen sent to me on November 15th resulting from my assignment asking him to review public comment.
My dissertation today will deal with the paper that resulted from that, the excersing the open-door policy.
I understand that he has a further expansion of that paper which he.will present today.
We have not had the opportunity to review that paper.
So I invisi6n, at the end of this meeting, I doubt if any conclusive decision will be able to be made because the final jump in all of this is somewhat subjective and judgmental.
So I assume that we would get a chance to look, at that paper as presented.
Generally there were two issues which Ron identified in his.paper which is shown before.
One, should.we restudy the distribution of nuclear security responsibility?
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Translated, that means should we consider guard forces *sponsored or manned by the* Federal Government.
Issue two,_ should we delay or_ postpone safeguard upgrade rule until such study is compl~t~d?
(Slide) 41 In the paper, as he presented it, which I'm sure he has improved upon a great deal at this presentation today, there a~e certain statements that he has made that the safeguards staff do not ~gree with.
The first, I *think, that sho~ld be known:
if we go with a restudy is that the s~feguard staff se~s this as a very long, tedious effort.
Probably in the multi-year area.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Why.would this be when the security-study before took ---
MR. BURNETT:
Eighteen months.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Eighteen months, yes, okay.
MR. BURNETT:
Yes, sir.
And then if you come out with a point that you will want to move to federal guards you will have to move toward legislation.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
But that's implementation, not study.
MR. BURNETT:
That's correct.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Now, how long will the study take?
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 42 MR. BURNETT:
I have estimated at least one year.
I'm sure that Ron will hit that in his speech.
I think also it should be noted that I do not believe that is totally dependent upon the priority placed upon it, in other words, just staffing it.
There are some very deep questions that must be studied, and I don't think that just manpower in itself will move it quicker.
In his paper, we saw no new issues, the is billet two, that had been raised at the security study did not either directly address or indirectly address.
By this, L:mean in billet three that no technical questions, in the staff opinion, was unanswered by the security agency study.
Also, I 0, 1would like to brin_g to your attention, in a recent testimony of DOE on March 23rd in front of Mr. Glenn they stated that they used both private and federal guards and have found no difference in the effe9tiveness of the two guards when employed.
Also, I think that it is fair to point out that when we consider the use of federal guard forces for nuclear material, I am not sure that we will be able to stop at that point.
Mr. Gilinsky, in a recent testimony on the Hill, the same one dated March 23rd stated that he was afraid that this might erode to other hazardous material and that same premise has also been discussed by th?.,Department of Defense
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 43 and the Department of Energy.
This is a minor point here, the 6th billet is that if we de~ide to do this, that it will be a study a whole lot like the firstcone which took 12 dedicated staff and 18 months to complete and contractural support.
That is minor, I just would like to bring it to your attention.
If the study is deemed necessary, and in my original paper that I answered Mr. Brightsen's contention, I stated to him that I thought it was premature to study it because the up-grade rule was not in final format.
And unil:.it was, we didn't know the total impact to industry.
Also, I think that the study will have to look at the possible federal ownership of the SSNM.
I don't see how we can stop at just the guard force utilization problem.
In addition to that, we will have to address the problems of the~entire security force needs.
That is the equipment made available to them, training and other support items.
It was also my contention in my answer at that time that the restudy, if required, should be independent of the up-grade rule because we feel that _the up~grade rule is needed, not on an emergency basis, but is needed within a reasonable time.
- t;ex:L,slide,_,' please?
(Slide)
In his second issue: "Should we delay the up-:-:grade
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We believe that the Commission has made it clear that the 44 up-grade rule is necessary.
We believe that the up-grade rule does not constitute a reassignment of responsiblities.
That is, for some period of time, industry has been performing like tasks.
We do not see anything in the up-grade rule that affects the previous conclusion of the security agency study.
I will elaborate that as I further go through this paper.
That study was dictated and required by the Energy Reorganization Act.
It was presented to Congress, we did not get anything back from Congress that illuminated that\\they we~e unhappy with the results of that study.
The final billet, I'm trying to say, that the outstanding subjects that could be discussed are clearly philosophical in the staff's opinion that_ the technical answers have been provided.
And in that vein, we do not believe that we should hold up the implementation of the up-grade rule pending the philosophical discussion.
Slide 33 please.
(Slide)
Yes, and of course, with the direction that came down from the Commission and Mr. Smith just reminded me, that I am answering in this format those that were directed to us.
I did not repeat them.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I notice, Bob, that there are a
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 45 fair number of slides in this section of the presentation, and I wonder if in the interest of time you would both move briskly through them, and also consider.whether all of them are in fact necessary.
We have the handouts on all of them, and I believe it isn't necessary to go in detail across all of them.
MR. BURNETT:
Okay, I willi.highlight them.
Okay, basically in his six contentions as presented to me in November, the staff does not agree to the complete existence of these contentions.
We believe that there are some subjective judgment in each, and in some cases we believe that there is no basis for his conclusion.
Slide 34.
(Slide)
Having to do with his first contention, that is that a significant number of licensees deem that the federal force should be required.
In all of the comments that we reviewed, we do not believe that it was a significant portion.
On this slide it shows 6 out of the 31.
Also, *some of the commenters were commenting on something other than the up-grade rule.
Slide 35, please.
(Slide)
To continue with the first contention.
Mr. Brightsen contends that no evidence to support the design threat level.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 46 It should be noted that out of the Conran Task Force my division was directed to study the characteristics of the threat.
That has been going on since that time.
That report the draft of that report has recently been distributed, and it is in concert with the threat as defined.
I won't go down through some of the others, I would like to hit particularly "C", "Thieft of SSNM by itself does not constitute an immediate threat to the general public."
I don't think that the staff wants to go that far.
We have assumed that a weapon production is possible on the outside, therefore, once they got ahold of the material the time to convert it into a usable weapon is minimal.
Slide 36,please.
(Slide)
In Mr. Brightsen's contention he repeatedly uses theoToner and Feiverson report, and he also reiterates the fact that they had established six relevant criteria ~r issues that in his opinion were not discussed in the security agency study.
We do-not agree with this contention.
First of all, this is one of 21 reports.
I think all of the relevant issues in all 21 reports were looked at in some form or another indirect or direct.
So it would be hard to say that every issue raised by every contractor was quoted and related to in the report, but in this case, I think all were.
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I would like to drop down to billet five which "All six issues which were discussed by Toner were addressed directly or indirectly."
I will not read the quotes.
I have gone to the 47 six issues identified by this report, and I have found direct quotations from the study related to this report.
In about half of them there exists indirect.
I have that for back-up material should you want it.
To expedite the presentation I will just refer to it.
In the last billet I want~d to c~ll your attention that thesstudy looked at actually a broader interest base than those identified by the Toner and Feiverson report.
Again, I have supporting documentation on th.ills and can provide it to the Commission.
Slide 37, please?
(Slide)
Mr. Brightsen contends that the threat as studied at that time is not the up-grade threat, therefore, reopening of the issue is germane.
We againt*.do:i.not~d+/-sagree -- we do not agree rather.
This time I have pulled a quote, the final sentence is underlined in which they have emphasized that the evaluation was done over a broad range.
In addition to that, the ERDA and NRC report that was actually developed after the SAS,::c~eport even went further
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 48 and looked at a six and two threat which is very much in concert with the threat as established by the up~grade rule.
Slide 38,~please?
(Slide)
I would just like to hit three billets on this, and that would be two -- one is his contention is that the threat will escalate.
Well, I'm not sure where that comes from, but basically two thinks -- my second billet thinks that the industry -- it is already too high, publish interest groups which is billet three already thinks it's too low.
And in his paper he relates to people he has polled who support his position.
I can only say that the polling of the personnel that he must have done did not include the people working on the characteristic's study, because it is not in concert with what they believe.
Slide 39.
(Slide)
He contends that the up-grade rule as presented will require private enterprise to use paramilitary forces.
- Again, the staff does not agree with this.
We had made it clear in the rule that the guard force on.station or at the facility are designed to impede, not to defeat the adversary forces.
We have in conjunction with that required law enforcement local support to help on defeat.
Their job is to impede them, keep them from getting to the material and also to impede their exit.
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--- ----- ----------------------------------i-49 More guards is just one way to satisfy the up-grade rule.
We have given the licensee a great deal of latitude to-_*use equipment or procedures.
Slide 40.
(Slide)
He contends that this will force a significant reduction in the nuclear power activities.
I must admit that we don't totally understand his contention here, and we will look forward to him explaining this because the,.,up-grade rule does not apply to the nuclear power industry except for the six power reactors that was mentioned previously.
The research reactors and the Fort St. Vrain totaling:six all together.
Also, the fuel that supports the nuclear power industry, with exception of those same six, is not included in the up-grade rule.
Slide 41.
(Slide)
Mr. Brightsens contention here is the rule would impose the licensee a significant new assignment and respon-sibilities.
Again, we do not agree.
As you will notice in billet one we have been requiring of the industry in the past five years varying degrees of physical protection, and in truth following this train to the last one, this last hop in establishing the *up-grade requirements is not all together that much bigger than the previous one,. and-:, in truth, many of the
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 precautions that will be required are already in place by license condition.
If 1 could just expound on those for a minute:
so Improved off-site communications is already under licensing condition.
Improved storage and containment.
Require vehicle searches.
Incorporate speficic instructions to their guards.
Have an acceptable number of off-sit.e guards; are people available.
Improve your procedures.
I think what I'm trying to say is that much of what this will require is already out there, including *:-_
redundancy for alarm stations which is your primary and secondary alarm stations.
Slide 42.
(Slide)
He excerpts from the ERDA/NRC Task Force recommendations that it should be implemented as rapidly as possible, consistent with sound technical policy-making decision.
From this I conclude that:
one, we should get it out there quickly; and two, it should not be so quickly as t.o overlook/any management decisions that should be employed.
I think it is fair to notice the next sentence that follows that quotation which is billet one: "Emergency measures such as shut-down for*i:.the industry or immediate use of federal forc"es is not warranted /_-
- 1However, upgrading
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 should be accomplished on a more quickly than normal, than routine basis.
And I believe, gentlemen, that is what we are moving :towards.
Also, in this same joint task force they actually go further than the upgrade rule in several areas.
Slide 43.
(Slide)
This is my last slide on the subject so that we can move briskly into the next subject.
51 In our opinion, there has been no basis established for delaying the up-grade rule.
No technical basis has been established for re-studying the guard issue, however, if the Commission deems that because of public interest that a re-study is necessary, then we believe that it should not delay the publishing of the up-grade rule.
I complete on that.
I will turn it over to Mr.
Ron Brightsen at this point and which he has more information on the subject, I believe.
MR. BRIGHTSEN:
Thank you, Bob.
Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, NRC Staff and guests.
r appreciate the opportunity you have provided by requesting me to explain and amplify my views and my recomendations on the basic public policy issue of nuclear security responsibility, summarized in SECY 78-43 which was transmitted to the Commission on January 23, 1978.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 52 Inasmuch as the issue of nuclear security responsibilit has had, in my view a suttle yet nonetheless controlling impact on the safeguards design threat level'.and therefore on the presently proposed up-graded safeguards system.
It is essential that the2issue of nuclear responsibility be placed in perspective.
Consequently, I will (A) briefly summarize the safeguards approach that the ~Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, NMSS has used over the past three years and ~B) identify the three unanswered fundamental safeguards questions, the most basic of which is the nuclear security responsibility issue, suggesting for your consideration new approaches that are focused on producing answers to these three fundamental safeguards questions.
In discussing complex and potentially controversal issues of this sort experience teaches us that it is essential to avoid the misunderstandings that can result from injudicious selection of words or phrases which can be taken out of context.
I have, therefore, decided to read my verbatim statement on the subject rather than adopt the more informal and customary vu~graph approach.
When my statement is concluded, I will distribute copies along with supporting documents to the Commissioners and to all others who may be interested.
(A) the MNSS safeguards approach, 1975-1978:
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 53 One, within NMSS we have for more than.. :three years developed a safeguards program on the unsubstantiated premise that the private sector should continue to bear the responsibility for the protection of the public independent of the NRC perception of the threat level.
Two, the office has based that premise largely on inherd:ted,AEC policy and practice as well as on an NRC security,: _.agency study which its elf assumed that a manpower intensive militarily oriented guard solution to attacks on nuclear facilities was the most effective solution available.
It concluded that no shift in responsibility was necessary, because federal guards would be no more effective than private guards.
Three, without ever consciously examining that underlying premise,ii.e., that the responsibility for nuclear security properly belongs in theoprivate sector, NMSS has repeatedly tried, since its inception to define a quote,,
"reasonable" design threat level.
Realistically speaking, that means NMSS has tried to, define a threat which would: One, require industry to increase its capability to protect the public while still being acceptable to and implementable by the industry.
And two, satisfy the intent of the Congress and the demands of the intervenors for:. increased or even maximum security for the public.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The efforts that have been made by the Division of Safeguards to resolve the threat level question, and in turn, the required protection level hav_e, therefore been
- artificially, if unwittingly, constrained by the assumption with respect to private sector responsibility for nuclear security.
54 Four, that we have not succeeded in our approach will come as no surprise.
The controversy with respect to the adequacy of safeguards has continued unabated, and in some respects has escalated.
The industry is n6w reacting ~sdwasa~
prefect~y predicted to the proposed up-grading of safeguards physical security requirements by saying:
one, we don't believe the NRC has convincing evidence to support the design threat levels stated by the NRC to be necessary; and
- two, if you, the NRC really believe that-such high protection levels are necessary, then the Federal Government should take over resporisfubility for protecting the public.
We do not wish to create private paramilitary forces.
In stark contrast, the Congress and the intervenors continue to question via hearings and communications, whether or not the American public is being or will be adequately protected by the regulatory safeguards actions of the NRC.
The frustration continues to build in all quarters and at all levels.
Hea~+/-ng conducted by Senator Glenn on March 22 and 23 of* this year, Commissioner Gilinsky pointed
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 55 that quote: "Even our proposals for strengthening physical security have been met in some quarters by anguished complaints.
It is said that we are turning private facilities handling highly enriched uranium and plutonium into armed camps.
This raises a question of whether activities of this sort should in fact be in private hands.
I do not have the answer, but it is. a question you need to think about.
Whatever the answer, the ultimate question we face is not unlike that which confronts the national defense establishment, how much protection is enough?
It is a vexing question and the Commission can only provide *,its, best judgment.
"The consequences of providing too much protection are painful, but:*the consequences of-,providing. too little are all too obvious." End quote.
Commissioner Gilinsky correctly-concludes that these basic safeguards questions do not now have simple answers.
Like him, I have no simplistic and pat answers to offer to you today.
On the other hand, I believe the deficiencies of our past approach to domestic nuclear safeguards are apparent to many.
Much more importantly, I believe there is an approach to the problem that will provide the answers that are acceptable to all parties, the Congress, the industry, the intervenors and the public.
B.
Resolving the fundamental safeguards questions, an approach to solutions:
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 In my own view there are three unanswered fundamental questions in domestic nuclear safeguards.
they are as follows:
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- One, what is the required level of nuclear security that is necessary to protect the public from malevolent utilization of SSNM and nuclear sabotage?
Two, what alternative safeguards sytems can be devised that will provide the required level of security?
Three, what is the appropriate distribution of of nuclear security responsibility between the private and public sectors, and how does that distribution depend on the level and capabilities.of the perceived threat and the consequences of malevolent acts?
As indic~ted earlier, before addressing the nuclear responsibility question, I would like to comment briefly on the first two.
Question one:
the required level of nuclear security.
It is absolutely clear to all who have been,. in the past several years concerned with domestic nuclear safeguard that the level ot public protection that is necessary is directly related to the threat level, i.e., the capabilities of the adversary as defined by such parameters as numbers of people, armament, training, motivation, technical skill, tactics, et cetera.
. It is, however, equally true that the required
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 public protection level is also directly dependent on the degree of confidence as required ascto the effectiveness of the safeguard system.
57 Since one could postulate threat levels and confidence levels that are virtually boundless, it is quite clear that to resolve the matter, the NRC must be guided by the original as well as the present intent of the Congress.
The legislative history of the Energy Regrganization Act does,iin~fatt, provide giliidance as to the original intent of the congress.
In Senate report 93-980 issued on June 27, 1974 to accompany the Energy Reorganization Act the Committee on Government Operations provided this guidance to the director of what is now the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards:
Quote: "His recommendations on regulations should reflect a careful appraisal of what the industry and state and local authorities can be reasonably expected to provide in the way of protection, and what the Federal Government must provide in order to ensure maximum security for the nation at large."
In addition, in his remarks on the Senate floor on April 30 and May 28, 1974 Senator Ribicoff noted that diversion or sabotage must.be prevented, quote " at all costs" and that therefore, the NRC safeguards system must be, quote "airtight and foolproof."
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 58 Now, while this Congressional guidance is, to say the lease, hardly quantitative for a maximum security and airtight and foolproof are unattainable_ conditions, the guidence should nonetheless be taken seriously, for it does provide insight as to Congressional intent. IIt clearly indicates that the NRC safeguards system was established by the Congress in order to protect the public, not only against quote, "reasonable".
threat levels, but also against large if improbable threat levels.
But the question quickly becomes: how large?
AJ::.e the only those threats that are no larger than the maximum that is acceptable to and implementable by the private sector?
Such a constraint cannot be~£ound in the Congressional mandate to the NRC on safeguards.
Nevertheless, that constraint has, in my opinion, been a dominant factor in the development of our safeguards program, for we have never critically examined our assumption.:.:;that the private sector should be responsible for the safeguards protection of the public.
Therefore, in deriving our design threat levels, we have been unconsciously been trying to establi~h a quote, "reasonable" end quote, threat level, i.e., one we believe to be acceptable to and implementab1e2by the industry while satisfying Congressional and intervenor demands for more protection.
Can we ever resolve this fundamental question?
I think we can.
I personally believe we must set an upper
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 59 boundary on the threat level, and establish a confidence level that is required of the safeguards system.
In my view, the Division of Safeguards should utilize its available information, including the recently completed appraisal of adversary capabilities, and, completely independent of any institutional constraints, should recommend to the Commission and through it to the appropriate commit~ees of the Congress and upper threat boundary and confidence level to be used for safeguard system design.
A decision by the Commission with the consent of the Congress will resolve the fundamental question and provide us with the-essential design criterion necessary for solving question two, to which I now turn.
Question Two:
Alternative Safeguards Systems to Provide the Required Level of Security.
It is elementary to note that ar:i,y safeguards system that can be devised will have as its components men, machines and equipment, and structures.
There are, however, many trade-offs possible between the safeguards components that can be utiliz~d to achieve the required level of safeguards system effectiveness within the necessary societal constraints.
Such alternative safeguards systems can, of course, be developed by competent teams of systems analysts.
Let me now*turn to the safeguards system that has been proposed in the1_,upgrade rule*~.,:,
In effect, the security agency study assumed,
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 60 without any benefit of systems analysis; that a military solution, one that relies on guards and is therefore manpower intensive was the most effective security system that could be devised.
That assumption continues to.this day and it clearly has had a profound ~ffect.
In the minds=of almost all who have been concerned with safeguards, this assumption has falsely equated the concept of federal responsibility with federal guards.
The mental association between federal responsibility and federal guards is, at this point, so strong that the mere use of the term, quote "federal responsibility" conjures up visions of massive *on-site and on-route deployment of crack troops armed to the :teeth.
But to quote from "Porgy & Bess it ain't necessarily so."
Responsibility for nuclear security does not necessarily mean massive deployment of federal troops, or for that matter, private guards.
That is only the unanalyzed solution that has been proposed.
While I agree that it is difficult at this stage for most of us to decouple the concepts of federal responsibility a~d federal guards, it is, I submit, essential to do so because it is probable and perhaps even likely that careful systems an~lysis will identify equally or even more effective alternative safeguards systems that are much less manpower dependent,. manpower in.tensive, and much more dependent on machines and equipment and structures.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 61 The desirability of examining alternative safeguards syJstems is recognized by many professionals and groups concerned with safeguards issues.
For.example, the Congressional, office of Technology Assessment in its June 1977 report on nuclear proliferation and safeguards made the following observation, quote:
"For example, it should be recognized that there could be an alternative to relying on on-site guard forces to overcome armed adversary attack.
A crucial question which deserves serious review is the extent to which safeguards systems can be designed to delay attacking adversaries sufficiently so that the burden of engagement in arrest falls on off-site response forces iristead on-site guards." end quote.
Unfortunately, so far therei*,has been no program conducted within or sponsored by the Division of Safeguards to apply analytical and systems analysis techniques to define and develop alternative safeguards systems, examine the trade-offs for the possible while still providing the required level of security.
Such a programmatic effort should be instituted at I
the earliest possible time.
While it would not be a simple task, and it might require considerable resources, there is a substantial likelihood it will provide an answer to a fundamental safeguards question that has ~emained unanswered for much too long.
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9 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 62 To the extent that such a program defines alternative safeguards systems that utilize guards, a~d certainly within our present technology, any system will to some degree.
It should be carefully noted that the security agency study has already concluded that guard0~f~e~tiveness is independent of whether guards are federal or private.
Inexorably it must follow that the relative effectiveness of private versus federal guards is clearly not a basis for.resolving the issue Thus, it appears very clear to me that the basic public policy decision on nuclear responsibility must be decided on criteria derived from American traditions governing propriety and equity.
Question 3:
Nuclear Security Responsibility.
The chronology of events surrounding the issue.of responsibility for nuclear security is *co~plex and goes back many years.
Appendix A presents such a chronology covering
.the past four years.
While it is not intended to be compre-hensive, I believe it does include the most sigmificant events that have occurred in that times~pan, pre~enting the intent of the.Congress, the views of industry, as well as the views expressed by groups outside NRC such as the* Rosenbaum i
Report, the Ford-Mitre Report and the report prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment.
It also naturally includes specific NRC events related to nuclear security responsibility.
I urge you to
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 read it. It certainly demonstrates that the ~ssue has been repeatedly identified over a long time period.
In my November 15, 1977 memor~ndum entitled: "The Proposed Upgrade Rule:
Responsibility for Nuclear Security,"
a copy of which is attached as Appendix B the following conclusions were presented:
One, the fundamental issue raised by the public comments on the proposed up-grade rule is:the question of whether the private sector should continue to be held responsible for protecting the public, at the level of protection now deemed neeessary by the NRC.
Two, the basic public policy issue of responsibility for nuclear security was not resolved by the security agency study, but rather it simply resolved the issue of the relative effectiveness of private versus federal guards.
These conclusions and related considerations lead me to recommend the following course of action:
One, that an NRC Task Force on nuclear secu~ity responsibility be created to reexamine this basic public policy issue, and present its recommendations to the Commission.
Two, that pending the review of,such recommendations by the Commission, no new rule be implemented which places on I
licensees significant new responsibility for the safeguards I
protection of the public.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 My conclusions and recommendations were forwarded to the Commission, along with related documents, on 64 January 23, 1978 as SECY 78-43.
In responding, the Commission in its March 15, 1978 memorandum to the Executive Director for Operations requested that the Division of Safeguards address the question of, and I quote: "Whether or not SECY 78-43 is raising issues about the distribution of responsibility for nuclear security that have not already been satisfactorily addressed by other studies, e.g., the security agency study and the Builder task force."
Since I believe that this question is the key one-that the Commission has,:specifically raised, I would also like to respond by briefly commenting on; One, the security agency study; two, the Builder task force report; and three, a joint NRC-ERDA letter and report on domestic nuclear safeguards sent in mid-1976 to the White House.
I now wish to reiterate my earlier point.
There is and has been no question in my mind that the issue of the appropriate distribution of nuclear security responsibility between the federal and private sector has been very clearly and repeatedly identified during the past four years, including the reports for the security agency study and the Builder task force, but there is a wide gulf between identifying an issue and satisfactorily addressing or resovling it.
I believe_ the facts, as I will relate them speak convincingly on the matter and clearly demonstrate that the
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issue of appropriate distribution of nuclear security responsibility has never been resolved, more than three years after the Division of.Safeguards Was established.
Let me first turn to the security agency study and its significant role in this matter.
In September 1975 65 a report entitled*, quote: "Responsibility for Nuclear Security,"
I pepared for the security agency study by Ton~r and Feiverson of Princeton University was submitted.
It identified six criteria for the determination of the responsibility for nuclear security.
It analyzed five of those six criteria and concluded, based on these five criteria the federal government should assume responsibility for the safeguards protection of the public.
A summary of these criteria in the Toner-Feiverson arguments can be found in Appendix C.
The one criteria that Toner and Feiverson did not address was that of the relative effectiveness of federal versus private security systems,
.since it was to be the focus of the in-house portion of the security ggency study.
The security agency study concluded that using the criteria of relative effectiveness they were un~ble to make a c1ear choice between federal and private security forces since federal guards would be no more effective than private guards, but curiously, rather than considering and rebutting if possible the five other criteria established by Toner and
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24 25 Feiverson which lead to an entirely different conclusion, the security.Jagency study did not substantively address 66 the Toner-Feiverson criteria.
They simply drew the conclusion that since federal and private guards would be equally effective there was therefore no basis for changing the division of responsibility between the private and public sector. But the traditional issues of equity and propriety developed by Toner and Feiverson did provide a basis for a choice.
The security agency study did not adopt the conclusion of the Toner-Feiverson report, and did not refute their logic.
- Thus, the public policy issue remains unresolved by the security agency study.
I turn now briefly to the Builder task force report.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Who was the Toner-Feiverson report done f<:>r?
MR. BRIGHTSEN:
It was done for the security agengy study.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
So that they in effect were addressing the report of their own consultants?
MR. BRIGHTSEN:
It was prepared by Princeton University for the security agency study which is run by NMSS.
I turn now briefly to the Builder task force report.
In the final report several observations were made on the issue of nuclear seeµrit:y responsibility:
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 67 "A fundamental issu~ is whether the industry safeguards posture should be extended to encompass the threat of determined violent assault.
There is considerably reluctance
. expressed by some in industry,,. to,accept this responsibility, since it is beyond the scope of normal industry security."
Again, quote: "This reluctance to protect SSNM against determined violent assault stems from industry beliefs that: one, this level of threat should be a federal responsibility; two, the necessary levels of defense would be damaging to company images."
It is apparent from these comentaries that the issue was identified by the Builder task force report.
It is equally apparent that it was not resolved.
I am drawn, therefore, to what appear.s**.to.i:)be*.1.,,
the inescapable conclusion, i.e., neither. the security agency study nor the Builder task force resolved the basid public policy issue.
Should this analysis and conclusion not be fully persuasive, I submit for your consideration the following facts:
The security agency study was submitted to the Commission on May 5, 1976 and the final report of the*:,;j0int ERDA/NRC Task Force on safeguards is dated July 12, 1976.
On July 30, 1976 with full knowledge of the content offthose reports, Ken Chapman, then Director of NMSS and General
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Alfred Starbird, then Assistant Administrator for National Security at ERDA, sent a letter and a report to Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, then White House Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
In that letter, addressing the safeguards upgrades proposed by the Builder task force, Mr. Chapman had this to say and I quote:
68 "Several significant issues would have to be resolved before such proposed safeguards objectives could be achieved.
Typical matters of great concern to licensees, as well as ERDA and NRC involve:
rone, division of responsibility between the federal government and the private sector for safeguards."*
Thus, as of July 30, 1976 the key safeguards official of the NRC draws two conclusions:
One, the issue of appropriate distribution of nuclear security responsibility has not yet been resolved.
That can only mean that the issue had not been resolved by the security agency study, the Builder task force report or any other NRC study completed as of that date.
Two, the issue of appropriate distribution of nuclear security responsibility quote: "would have to be resolved before such proposed safeguards objectives could be achieved."
Clearly, what Mr. Chapman was saying that bef>cire the proposed upgrades could be achieved the issue must be resolved.
I believe the Commission's question has been
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 answered, but it is important to note that not only was the issue unresolved as of July 30, 1976, it remains unresolved today, almost two years later, for no study of this basic public policy issue has been conducted by NMSS during this period.
Rather, the staff has proceeded to develop the proposed up-grade rule publishing it for public comment on July 5, 1977.
69 In its March 15,Il978 memorandum, the Commission also expressed interest in the question of, quote:
"How strong and widespread the concerns of industry and/or the general public are on this issue."
While I have no frirther information to offer regarding the concerns of the indust~y and general public, I do believe the Commission should be aware of the views of professionals within NMSS.
A substantial number oL,_
present and former NMSS professionals have expressed their support for a reexamination of the basic public policy issue of nuclear security responsibility.
This group includes the late Sy Smiley, who was Deputy Director to Technical Programs in NMSS, Gerry Page, Deputy Director-of the Division of Safeguards, Maurice Eisenstein, former Assistant Director in the Division of Safeguards, and Carl Builder, former Director of the Division of Safeguards.
However, it should be noted that Dr. Smiley, Mr. Page and Mr. Builder did not support the recommendation that the
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 70 upgrade rule be deferred pending completion of that study.
While much time has been lost, it is not too late to initiate a reexamination of this fundamental safeguards question.
On related matters, the Commission has asked me to address the scope and plan for conducting a study of nuclear security responsibility, as well as my views on whether or not NRC is the appropriate entity to conduct such a study.
My suggestions and views on these questions can be found in Appendix D.
My personal conviction is that a lasting solution to the domestic nuclear safeguards issue, one that is both effective and equitabie can only be achieved by a vigorous and high-priority program carefully designed and managed, conducted by the best minds available to us and aimed at providing answers to the three fundamental questions.
I believe this approach, which I recommend for your consideration, will lead to a much improved domestic safeguards program that will provide a much higher degree of nuclear security to the American public, thus delaying Congressional, intervenor, public and staff concerns regarding safeguards adequacy.
Simultaneously, it may permit industry to expand the contribution nuclear power can make to alleviate the energy crisis that lies immediately ahead.
If all of this can be achieved, and we cannot know until we try, the adversaries in the great debate over nuclear power may
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In addition, the results of such a program may possibly provide a model approach to nuclear safeguards that can be utilized by other nations,~th~s~contributing to international efforts, reduce the prospects of proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.
71 However, implementation of the program I have recommended will take not only substantial resources, but may require considerable time, perhaps several years.
A related question must therefore be resolved.
What can be done to provide,in the interim, the level of protection to which the American public is entitled?
As a conclusion to my presentation, I would like to briefly discuss this matter and recommend for your consider-ation a proposed solution to this problem.
One that would not only provide timely and high-assurance protection*,to the American public, but would do so in the best American traditions of propriety and equity.
C.
Interim Public Protection:
An NRC-Industry-Congressional Partnership:
In my November 15, 1977 memorandum, I recommended quote: "That neither the performance-oriented safeguards requirements rule, the up-graded guard qualification, training and equipment rule, nor any other rule which imposes on
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 72 licensees a significant new assignment of responsibility for the safeguards protection of the public be issued in effective form until the Commission has reviewed.the recommendations of the NRC Safeguards Task Force on nuclear security responsibility."*
While this recommendation is straightforward and derives from several considerations which I will briefly discuss,, I feel compelled to state quite clearly that I did not recommend or infer that no additional safeguards protection to the public be provided.
I had quit~2the opposite in mind.
There are three reasons for my recommendation that the up-grade rule be deferred, which are as follows:
One, there is.unquestionably substantial doubt as to the propriety and equity of imposing on the private sector additional responsibility for the safeguards protection of the public.
Until this basic public policy issue can be resolved, and in view of the substantial doubt, I believe it is neither proper nor equitable to force the private sector py promulgating the proposed up-grade rule to develop private paramilitary forces and to shoulder by itself the additional economic burden requiring industry to approximately double its present safeguards costs.
Two, the implementation of the proposed up-grade rule. can probably not become fully effective until 1980.
My own view is that this is :!5ar; __ too long a time to keep the public at risk if more timely alternatives are avai1able.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 73 Three, it is possible that even prior to the full implementation of the up-grade rule the Commission and/or the Congress will decide that the upper boundary threat level and the required confidence level are such that more protection than that provided by the proposed up-grade~rule is necessary to adequately protect the public. Thus, the up-gradr rule may turn out to be inadequate requiring further ratcheting of the indust;i::-y.
There is a long-t~rm solution to the domestic nuclear safeguards issue and I have proposed an approach that I believe will solve the fundamental safeguards questions, but the pressing question is as follows:
Is there an interim regulatory solution that will promptly and adequately protect the public and still be consistent with the American traditions of propriety and equity?
I personally don't believe a regulatory approach will work, because of the very nature of.. :the rule-making process, the debated engenders, and the immense time it consumes.
However, I believe there is an alternative interim s*01utd:on that would satisfy the intent of the Congress, would be acceptable to the private sector and allay some of the concerns of the intervenors.
The details of this alternative solution will require some analysis.
I can today only outline for you the basic policy approach.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 74 The NRC, with the sripport of the Congress and the Aaministration and with the cooperation of the industry, has an opportunity to provide the leadership necessary for a successful, prompt and cooperative program to provide the necessary interim public protection equal to, or +/-f required, better than that provided by the up-grade rule.
Two basic steps are necessary to initiate such an interim cooperative program.
Step One:
as indicated earlier, the NRC in cooperation with the Congress must decide the upper-boundary threat level using specific adversary capabilities.
It must also reach a decision on the level of confidence that is required for the effectiveness of the safeguards system, or put another way, the probability of the safeguards system will defeat an attempt by an adversary, characterized by the upper-boundary capabilities to perpetrate a malevolent act of diversion or sabotage.
Based on these considerations the required interim protection level must be defined.
That protection level may be consistent with theilevel provided in the up-grade rule, but it is possible that it may be greater.
In either event, additional safeguards resources would still be necessary over.**,and ~:bove the protection now in place.
Step Two:
The Federal Government, principally the NRC with the active* support of the Congress and the Administrati n
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 75 can, and in my opinion, should act expeditiously to provide the.. :.licensees during this interim period with the funds necessary for these additional safeguards resources.
It may even be desirable for the-<F:ederal Government to provide direct resources, such as manpower and specialized equipment.
Such direct resources would probably have to remain under the control of the licensees during this interim period.
In view of A, the sub$tantial doubt as to the propriety and equity of continuing to require the private sector~to protect the public, and B, the fact that industry has so f arc:borne the economic safeguards burden alone, I believe the federal funding approach that is* outline is an2eq~it~ble one.
What is more, I believe that industry would accept it and the improved safeguards system would be in place at an earlier time than would be possible if the NRC were to proceed to implement the up-grade rule.
Thus, the public would benefit.
I fully recognize that the interim public protection approach that I*have recommended as an alternative to the rule-making now under way is most unconventional for it replaces a traditional regulatory action with a proposed government-industry partnership to protect the public.
There is no doubt that objections can and will be raised, but there are men of reason and good will on the teams of all of the
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 76 players in the safeguards theater, who recognize the present and increasing contribution of nuclear power to the nation's energy needs, and recognize equally as well the public's right to be fully protected against nuclear terrorism.
This may be an opportunity for all of them to work together for the benefit of the public.
In conclusion I would summarize my messages as follows:
One, let us systematically resolve the fundamental safeguards questions by promptly initiating the necessary programmatic effort.
Two, while we are doing so let us cooperatively and as promptly as is feasible, provide the public with the safeguards protection to which it is entitled.
I hope that these recommendations will prove useful, thank you for your time and attention.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Thank you, Ron.
Questions, comments, discussions?
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
You are going to provide us with a copy of your MR. BRIGHTSEN:
Copies are available at the back of the room.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Vic?
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Mr. Brightsen, what -- I take it the Toner-Feiverson paper is just the beginBing which
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 77 addresses the question of the availability of forces?
MR. BRIGHTSEN:
Well, IL.have no assurance that this criteria of Toner-Feiverson is the only criteria that ought to be looked at.
It is a very complex public policy issue and there are a lot of considerations that have to go into it.
There is a copy of the Toner and Feiverson paper in *the document I will give to you.
There is also a summary in the paper of the points or the criteria that Toner and Feiverson
- used, they are all there and I have also got a recommendation in their as to how it might be done.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
You don't yourself though have strong feelings about inadeq~ac~es in that paper?
You are not prepared to rely on that as being the justification for taking the step you have?
MR. BRIGHTSEN:
No, no.
What I'm advocating is that the issue be reexamined, and I have got a suggestion on the proposed approach in the Appendix.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Do I understand you correctly that in the meantime you would,:have the government see to it that this added*protection was available, either by providing funds or equipment or individuals or.*whatever?
MR. BRIGHTSEN:
I would.
Long before 1980.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
For a private facility?
MR. BRIGHTSEN:
Yes,s~ir.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Would your proposed study
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78 MR. BRIGHTSEN:
Well, I think the issue of private ownership of material would almost certainly come to that concept, and the question of private ownership of facilities, that's a separate question of course.
The issue is focused on the material, not the facilities.
CHAillRMAN:_,HENDRIE:
I expect the federal funding for the facilities, to bring them up would.be a very difficult proposition.
I have a notion that the Congress would take a pretty dim view of that.
I might also comment that it is my impression that the implementation times that were mentioned in the up-grade had more to do with the practicalities or.ordering.and getting possession of equipment of training people, of organizing the plant to do things than it did with shortage of money. So that it seems to me that an interim protection plan which says, well, we will move federal funds in, would be subject to precisely the same difficulties as implementation as the private sector would be in implementing simi;1a:t.:;,measures.
So I don't see any time advantage there.
Well, an interesting set of thoughts, and the Commission will want to look at the paper you have provided.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
May I ask a question?
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I have one question which 79 your comment raised, Ron,; you said something about there being no real organized research effort, for example, or study effort to determine what alternatives to a manpower intensive safeguards effort be; now, my impression has been that one of the,::st.u9y efforts, when accomplished, I think, under RES' s jurisdiction that Sandia was aimed at precisely this.
Am I wrong?
MR.BRIGHTSEN:
No, you are correct.
Mr. Arsenault is here, he might wish to address that.
But that is true, we have several studies on-going, have been for some time.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I was down there and talked to these people and they were describing the methodology that they were employing, and my impression was precisely MR. BRIGHTSEN:
I'm really addressing the point, Commissioner Kennedy that in looking at the fundamental alternatives in terms of manpower intensive versus machine and equipment structures, I don't believe any major study of that sorh*is. under way, al though I may be incorrect.
But in terms of looking a structural changes in facilities and what that can do and all of these sorts of things and trade-offs of the various safeguards systems.
I know that there were some thoughts given to it during the GESMO here.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 80 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Frank, did you want to say something?
MR. ARSENAULT:
Commissioner.Kennedy to clarify, the project that you are speaking~of is one that would permit an evaluation of alternative safeguards configurations.
It isn't aimed precisely at reducing the guard intensive of the system, but it would allow one to make trade-offs and reduce it.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Well, that's that I thought the thrust of Ron's comment was.
Okay, thank you.
MR. BURNETT:
If we could move to the closed session.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
MR. SMITH:
Mr. Chairman, we have about another half hour MR.:--BURNETT:
Well,. we could probably cover it quicker than that, depending on the questions.
MR. SMITH:
I'm not sure how you would want to handle it, but we would like to finish.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
While we are here, I guess we shoulg..
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I would prefer to go ahead and try to hear it.
I'm not sure that the Commission will be prepared to move to~~de6i~ioris today.
There is a lot of material here
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 and a lot of discussion referring to a paper which I have not se~n yet.
I'm sure we will want to read Mr. Brightsen's paper.
So I don ~-t look for any sort of Commission action, but I think it might be helpful for,;.us*.*to.,try ;tckget the rest of the material which you have prepared for the presentation before us.
I will therefore thank all of you who have come 81 to this session, and the Commission will take about a two-minute break while we close the session for the last part.
(The Commission was recessed at 12: 15 noon_~-)
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 82 12:20 Noon CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:* I have just discovered we ar::e going to do Tarapur at 1:00 o'clock, which is very dismaying to me, so I will look for a really expeditious move through this section of the presentation.
MR. CASE:
There are varying points of view, I don't know how you a~e going to get them all in.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, I may no,t-::g~ttthem in, but I'm not going to let this session go:.>much mor::e,-athan another 10 minutes.
So we will get 10-minutes worth and we will pick i~ up from there and later if possible.
I have got to give the Commissioners a change to get back and get straightened aw~y if we are going to make this 1:00 o'clock.
It may take the rest of the afternoon, I don't know.
But you have got 10 minutes.
MR. BURNETT:
Okay, the first thing is we are discussing the threat.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Some of them will be here for the discussion of the Tarapur matter any way.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, what do you ~ant to do7 Do you want to continue this afternoon?
MR. CASE:
We could continue later this afternoon.
MR. SMITH:
Well, in 10 minutes, Bob probably could not present his position.
I know Ernie*.Y_olgenau has some things he wants to say, and I know Ed Case has some things he
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 83 wants to say in terms of the internal threat.
Then we still need that last little part about whether we go interim final effective now, and where we are with respect to the guidance.
So I think that another time might be better.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Anothe~ 10 minutes just isn't going to cut it. It just won't be useful.
MR. SMITH:
No.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It would probably be better to go to lunch.
I think we will have to reschedule, and on the rescheduling, what we will do is start out picking up the classified section of this meeting or presentation which ;,we won' tc.have enough',, room for this afternoon, and then move in to such open session as appropriate.
MR. CASE:
Did you say perhaps this afternoon on this?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
A question which is going to come up about scheduling is -- you are going to want to hear this?
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Yes, I am.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I suspect some of the other Commissioners will want to hear it too.
We are now going in to a two-week period in which there are people who are going to be away.
So I don't thini we are going to get back together for two weeks.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What about tomorrow?
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I would have to look at a calendar to,.)be::~sure about tomorrow.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, you were trying to leave the morning open.
This afternoon we have ---
MR. CHILK:
Tarapur and then an agenda session.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
If you want to set this for 2:00 tomorrow, thatts okay.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
No, I think that is going to be too pressing.
84 I guess we could come back and pick it up this afternoon, but I still don't think that we are going to settle it this afternoon, do you?
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I don't think we are, but we can get all of this out of the way and then ~e can kind of I
mull it over.
For my own part, I think there are some I
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questions that I have and there are some th1Rgs we haven t I
discussed yet, which I think are going to belthings we are I
going to want to talk about.
We probably will want to get I I together again and discuss them-at some point.
So I think I
we should get this out of the way.
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's see, we w~ll have to vote I
a short nbtice'if it is this afternoon?
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It is a closed meeting and it i
is a continuation of this one.
I MR. KELLEY:
It's open and closed, lyes.
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
This is a c]osed meeting we
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I am also tied up at 4:00 this afternoon. If we get lucky on Tarapu~ that ---
85 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Tarapur is so simple we ought to take care of that in.about 20 or 30 minutes I would think.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I agree.
- I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I don't know *what's going to take so long.
MR. KELLEY:
I think you can just call it a continuati n.
If you are going to meet again later on today, I'~ouldn~t I
think you would have to go through further Sunshine again.
4:00?
Tarapur.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: - --L~t_'*s *see,; you have to leave at COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
4:00 at the latest, yes.
I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
And we are meeting at 1:00 on MR;? BURNETT:
Would 1: 30 be legally accentable?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
For*what?
MR. BURNETT:
Suppose we ran over,,suppose we covered I
it now and you didn!t get to Tarapur until 1:30.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think we are going to have i
a considerable interest in Tarapur, and if t~e schedule says 1:00 o'clock, I want to come in and sit down at 1:00 o':elock.
If we don't that would leave an awful lot of 1people out there and they will.clog the lobby and the fire laJs will be violated.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 86 All right, I declare this meeting recessed, to continue, and let us target for 2:30, with our fingers crossed then on the expor,t license matter.
Okay, 2:30.
(Whereupon, the meeting was recessed at 12:25 until 2:30.)