ML22230A208
| ML22230A208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/20/1978 |
| From: | NRC/OCM |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Tran-M780420 | |
| Download: ML22230A208 (1) | |
Text
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!~~~i Transcript of Proceedings
\,,~ / NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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BRIEFING ON SAFEGUARDS UPGRADE RULE AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY Thursday, April 20, 1978 Pages /- 1, Prepared by:
C.H. Brown Office of the Secretary
r 1
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 SECY-78-195 SAFEGUARDS UPGRADE RULE AND 5
SECY-78-43 RESPONSIBILITY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY 6
7 (Open to Public Attendance) 8 9 Commissioner's Conference Room Rbom 1130 10 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
11 Thursday, April 20, 1978 12 13 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m.,
Joseph Hendrie, Chairman, presiding.
14 PRESENT:
15 Chairman Hendrie 16 corr:mis~ioner Gilisnky Commissioner Kennedy*
17 Commissioner Bradford 18 ALSO PRESENT:
19 s. Chilk J. Kelley 20 L. Gossick H. Shapar 21 C. Smith B. Snyder 22 R. Burnett R. Jones 23 R. Brightsen R. Dube 24 E. Case F. Arsenault B. Evans 25
r 2
'l P R O C E E D I N G S 2
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: This is a discussion of the 4
strength and physical protection requirements for fuel 5
cycle facilities anq their transportation involving significant amounts of strategic special nuclear material, henceforth, 6
to be known as the up-grade rule.
7 This portion of the discussion this morning will 8
necessarily involve classified materials. This discussion 9
focuses primarily on consideration of insider threat levels.
10 We will reserve that discussion to the closed to the latter 11 portion of the meetings so;:that we don't have an open session, 12 a closed session and then re-open.
13 With that notice as to the general course of 14 events; I welcome the staff ;1atid~Lee, will ask you to go 15 ahead with the staff briefing.
16 MR. GOSSICK: Fine, this is a joint paper and it1*:
17 is prepared by the Standards and Nuclear Material Safety 18 and Safeguards. That will be presented by Bob Burnett and 19 his people, but Dr. Smith will lead off with sort of a background 20 o~ the matter.
21 Bob?
22 MR. SMITH: Thanks, Lee.
23 Could I have the first slide, please.
24 (Slide) 25
3 1 I would just like to give you a brief outline of 2 what we intend to cover today.
3 The first part will be basically an overview, a 4 quick run-through of some of the events that have happened 5 in the past that bring us up to where we are today.
6 *The status* of all the up-grade rules, which Bud 7 Evans will give, then we will move on into the up-grade 8 rule content itself, whi6h b~~ically will be Ralph Jones from 9 Standards. Then the third part would be some of the major 10 issues, government guards, the design and threat and coordinatio 11 with other projects and implementation schedule.
12 At that point where you see we have "A. Government 13 Guards" we would present the staff's position and we would 14 respond also to the questions that the Commission asked us to 15 answer with respect to Mr. Brightsen's difference of opinion 16 in terms of what the staff had proposed. Then Mr. Brightsen 17 would come up and he would discuss his points with the Commission 18 and then we would move into closed session.
19 Could we have slide two, please?
20 (Slide) 21 I would just like to take a quick run-through, a little 22 bit of a history here.
23 Back in January* of '76, Carl Builder, the"* *then 24 Director of the Division of Safeguards sent a memorandum to the 25 staff which, among other things, stimulated staff thinking on
4 1 the adequacy of safeguards with respect to threats.
In Eebruary of 1976 we began our initia~ site 2
assessments. These were on-site evaluations of plant 3
capabilities to protect SSNM. In March.of '76 the ERDA/NRC 4
Task Force was formed. One of the purposes of that Task Force 5
was to develop a proposed action plan for improving the control 6
and the protection of SSNM at NRC licensed facilities.
7 About mid-1976, based on those initial site 8
assessments in February we issued license conditions to many 9
of our facilities to correct identified safeguard weaknesses.
10 Then in July of '76 the ERDA/NRC Task Force report 11 was issued. It had a lot of recommendations, one of them 12 being the initiation of near-term measures for improved 13 protection such as a clearance program with respect to weapons, 14 the -number of guards, a guard-training program. It also gave 15 us some clues in terms of longer-term safeguards. That is 16 the direction that we ought to go. The intent was to upgrade 17 safeguards to defend against an up-graded threat and also, 18 what capabilities we should have in order to do that.
19 About in September or October of '76 we went out 20 again on another round of initial assessments, if you will.
21 We called those up there confirmation site assessments, but 22 our purpose then was basically to check on whether or not the 23 new license conditions that we had imposed back in mid-'76 24 had really resulted in a high level of protection. In other 25 words, were things better.
5 1
Then in December of '76, as you know, we reported 2
to the Commission on all of our site assessments, and we 3
reported their weaknesses and fixes and what we considered to 4
be, at that t+/-~e; what the level of eff~cti~eness or protection 5
was.
6 A couple of other points: In January of '77 the 7
Commission answered the NRDC petition, and as you remember 8
you stated that the threat was not eminent and that emergency 9
measures were not required.
10 We also stated that the impending orderly up-grading 11 of safeguards would continue to assure adequate protection to 12 the public in a prudent manner.
13 Then that brings us up to December of '76 in which 14 we initiated the up-grade project, the development of the 15 up-grade rule. The Commission deemed it important and 16 prudent that we do this, and while this briefing will focus 17 only on the physical protection up-grade rule, Mr. Evans, 18 when he is up here will-show you how it relates to all of 19 the up-grade rules that are not before the Commission or will 20 be in a very short order.
21 The only other thing that is not mentioned on that 22 chart, which I would like to mention, of course, is the 23 comprehension evaluations which are going on right nowoat 24 our licensed facilities.
25 You remember we have four teams going out evaluating
6 1
these. facilities with respect to physical security, material 2
control, diversion~path analysis, and also external assault 3 appraisal. ,:U:i 4
, One of the purposes of those comprehensive evaluations, 5
other than to bring a more systematic approach to looking 6
at these facilities in terms of their capabilities, but 7 was also to examine what their potential capability would be 8 to protect against a higher:,:th111ea;bt:-J::ev.el. And some of that 9 infoa::;mat.irim we have used in developing t.he up-grade rule.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: There is an entry* up there 11 saying: "NRDC Petition Answered)II when was the NRDC Petition 12 filed?
13 MR. EVANS: That was filed twice, sir.
14 The first one was filed in 1976 and denied by Mr.
15 Chapman in March, then the second 0ne was.filed after the 16 denial by Mr. Chapman, wasn't it in the summer 17 MR. SNYDER: It's June, I think.
18 MR. EVANS: In June. Then i t was answered by the 19 Commission in January of 1977.
20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: So that in that chronology 21 the first petition and the Chapman denial would both come 22 after the Builder memorandum?
23 MR. EVANS: Yes,::sir.
24 MR. SMITH: Bud Evans, who is Chief of our Requirements 25 and Technology Branch in the Di-vision of Safeguards is going to
7 1
handle the next part for us.
2 MR. EVANS: What I'd like to do, if I could have 3
slide No. 4, please.
4 (slide) 5 Now, while,--there _-are*-,:a lot of lines going every 6
which way, this is designed to try to show you the up-grade 7
rule in context with all of the other physical*~rotection 8 up-grade rules that we have been working on.
9 Let me just sum up this chart by saying that there 10 are nine rules that have been under development as part of the 11 up-grading project as directed by the Commission.
12 Our of the nine rules, five have been to the 13 Commission and have been published in either draft or effective 14 form. Three are presently at the Commission and we will be 15 deliberating on them shortly in order to determine.whether they 16 should be released in draft form.
17 A final one is due to the Commission in the form of 18 an action plan next week. So over the last year and a quarter, 19 as you can see we have come quite a ways, I think, in terms 20 of trying to develop the overall physical protection strategy 21 for fuel cycle facilities and transportation of SSNM.
22 Now, what I would like to do is go into the status 23 of all of these rules in just a little more detail and their 24 general purpose which is what the next two slides show.
25 (Slide)
8 1 The up-grade rule, you will probably know more than 2 you want to know about by the enct of this briefing, so I will 3 go over that one which is the first one and in to the second.
4 (Slide) 5 The guard-force response rule has already been issued 6 in effective form and it states explicitly what licensee 7 guards should do if there is an attempt at thieft of SSNM.
8 The guard qualification and training rule, I think, 9 it~s title is fairly explanatory. The status of that is that 10 it has been published in draft form. It is due back to the 11 Commission in final form and we expect to get it here next week.
12 The general licensing for _posses*sion of ssrM ~irt _
13 transient rule covers a technicality in the regulations. The 14 past regulations exempted carriers from any kind of licensing, 15 and therefore, technically we could not inspect them. In 16 effect we were, but we just want to ciose that loop hole 17 in the regulations and that is now before the Commission for consideration.
18 The transient shipments:__ a(t:tion .plan is the one I 19 mentioned that has not been to the Commission,yet, but is 20 due to the Commission next week and will be here then.
21 In addition to all of those which apply primarily 22 to the Category I material, the strategic special nuclear 23 material, we have a rulewwhich deals with moderate and low 24 strategic material, and this is to make sure that the U.S.
25
9 1 regulations are coordinated with a nuclear supplier's group 2 and the IAEA and are consistent therewith. This rule is 3 presently before the Commission and being considered.
4 .('S.lide-)' ;:::~*cci ,.::.r.11.* J.::J 5 The safeguards contingency plan is published in 6 final .form and will be effective in June. The authority for 7 access to SSNM, which you all probably know is the clearance 8 rule, is due to go to hearings this coming June, I believe 9 June 17th is the present schedule.
10 MR. JONES: July.
11 MR. EVANS: July 17th.
12 And finally the licensee access to 8iassified 13 information rule is to allow licensees the abiiity to get 14 classified information which would help them in protecting 15 the special nuclear material they have in.their possession, 16 and that is before the Commission.
17 Now, given that general background, I'd like to go 18 into some of the specifics:.:;of the up-grade rule and talk 19 about its content.
20 (slide) 21 In terms of Slide 7, I think we can ask four basic 22 questions about the up-grade rule and its coverage.
23 The first is what does it cover, and it covers 24 formula quantities of strategic nuclear material. Now, by 25 strategic we mean U-235 en~iched to greater than 20 percent,
10 1
U-233 and plutonium, and by formula quantities we mean 5,000 2
grams or more computed by the formu1ac-?.of grams of U-235, 3
plus 2.5 times grams of U-233 and plutonium.
4 Now, given that that that is the material it covers, 5
where does it cover it? Both fixed site and in transit with 6
very few exceptions which I will mention later. Against what 7
threat? A determined violent assault in terms of the external 8
threat which I will go into in more detail in a minute and 9 also against a single insider and against a conspiracy of 10 uncleared insiders:'or a single cleared insider, or depending 11 on how the Commission decides to go in closed session, a 12 conspiracy of cleared insiders.
13 Finally, why are we doing this? By Commission 14 directive the purpose of the rule is to prevent thieft and 15 to protect agains sabotage.
16 Now, who does it apply to?
17 (Slide) 18 Slide 8 shows that in addition to fuel reprocessing 19 plants, it applies to any licensee who posesses or uses, 20 transports or delivers or takes delivery for transportation 21 of SSNM, anybody who imports or exports SSNM in formula 22 quantities.
23 So in other words, we have covered almost anybody 24 within the geographic boundary.cof the United States. Now, 25 there are two minor exceptions to that. One are carriers, which
11 1
we are working on in the carrier rule, the other are 2
transient shippers, namely, foreign shippers from one foreign 3
country to another foreign country that have a stop-over in 4
the U.S. And we have been asked by the Commission to develop 5
a plan to make sure that the protection is equivalent to 6 to domestic safeguards, and you will have that plan next ~eek.
7 Now, in terms 8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Would you amplify what you 9 meant by "carriers" as ---
10 MR. EVANS: Carriers are like railroads, the actual 11 railroad companies. They are like the airlines themselves.
12 What has happened in the past is we have had shippers' 13 agents who have arranged for the shipments, but have not 14 actually had done the carrying themselves. And in the past, 15 in the old AEC, they had been explicitly exempted and that 16 carried over in to our regulations. We have now decided 17 that from a technical point of view, we would like to be able 18 to inspect those carriers in their safeguards, even though 19 they have been cooperative with us and they have allowed us 20 to do this in the past. If one wanted to tell us that we could 21 nqt, we would not have any legal basis for doing it.
22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Is this consistent with the 23 ICC and DOT regulations?
24 MR. EVANS: Yes, sir.
25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Will it require them to file
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applications to become licensees?
2 MR. EVANS: It will be a general license.
3 So that the way it will be done is the shipper's 4
agent will file.the actual security plan. The carriers them-5 selves will have a minimum of inconvenience because of the 6
problem associated with carriers not wanting to carry material 7 that has a lot of inconvenience. So we did work a way around 8 that problem.
9 In terms of the general structure in ---
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: One further qu*estion on any 11 licensee.
12 Let's see, there are some exceptions under the 13 possessor used at any site, aren't there? For instance, 14 the core of a nuclear reactor which makes the fuel by the 15 old plate-type fully enriched uranium fuel ---
16 MR. EVANS: Yes, sir. If it is irradiated above 17 a certain level, and that is in the definition, then it would 18 not come under the up-grade rule. You are right.
19 In terms of the general structure and content of 20 the up-grade rule itself, the rule breaks into three major 21 parts.
22 The first is what has been called a general 23 performance requirement. That basically is the statement of 24 the requirement for high assurance protection against a given 25 adversary description and we will go into detail on those in
13
- 1 a minute.
2 (Slide) 3 In add+/-tilion, it requires some redundancy and 4 diversity and some testing and maintenance by the licensees.
5 The second major part of the rule deals with system 6 capability requirements which were recommended by the joint 7 NRC/ERDA;)!':4'sk Force report and these requirements have been 8 included for both fixed site and transportation.
9 And finally, there is a reference system of specific 10 equipment,i'Ihardware and procedures which normally will satisfy 11 those capability requirements and which give the first level 12 of guidance to the licensees as to what is expected of them.
13 At the endoof the briefing we will go into more detail on 14 the guidance.
15 Now, in terms of the requirements stated.in the 16 rule, it is that the licensee establish a physical protection 17 system which will prevent, with high assurance, the thieft 18 of SSNM and will protect against radiological sabotage.
19 Tpis requirement is in conjunction with an adversa~y description, 20 ~Hide 11.
21 (Slide) 22 Now, What this shows is they will do this 23 prevention with high assurance against a determined violent 24 assault by a small group that have the following attributes:
25 Theyyeanhbe well trained; they can inside assistance;
14 1 they can have suitable weapons; they can hand-carried 2 equipment and they can have the ability to operate as two 3 or more maneuverable teams. In addition, this protection 4 will be provided against an insider, including an employee 5 in any position, as well as a conspiracy between insiders 6 in any position, and that should read: "who are not clear" or 7 such insiders acting in concert with one cleared insider.
8 Again, this will be discussed in detail in the 9 closed session.
10 Now, if I can go back to Slide 9 for just a minute.
11 (Slide) 12 I would like to just quickly go over the system 13 capability requirements shown as the second major section of 14 the rule, which is slide llA.
15 (Slide) 16 Now, what this shows is that we have given defense 17 in depth to these facilities. The licensee must have the 18 capability of protecting against unauthorized access at an 19 exterior boundary; they must prevent access ~o an interior 20 boundary, namely any vital area or any material access area; 21 they must be capable of determining the movement and placement 22 of material w'i thin that boundary, and then they must be 23 capable of preventing unauthorized removal of that material 24 out of the inner and outer boundaries.
25 So we have put concentric circles of defense around
15 1 the various facilities.
2 Now, given that background in terms of the first 3 two sections of the rule, I'd like to let Ralph go in to some 4 of:the specifics about the reference system section of the*
5 rule, and also some of the differences between the up-grade 6 rule requirements and the existing regulatory requirements 7 so you can see how we are changing today's environment.
8 Ralph.
9 MR. JONES: The first two slides give you an over-10 view of what part,;73 will look like when and if the up-grade 11 rule is approved~and published.
12 (Slide) 13 Just reading down the various sections, we will 14 have exemptions, irradiated material, as you mentioned before 15 will be exempted. The low enriched uranium exemption, of 16 course, would have to be changed if we include the moderate 17 to low material for the international protection. That would 18 be another rule-making action.
19 The one item that we omitted from the exemptions there 20 is material being transported by the DOE system, that also 21 is exempted from these rules.
22 The general performance requirements in 73.20 would 23 apply ---
24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: What is the significance 25 of that 350 grams in laboratories. I thought this applied to
16 1
5 kilograms and over?
2 MR. JONES: Well, there are ~equirements. That's 3
the agreement state ,.limit.
4 There is a general requirement, but they have to 5
have physical protection. 73.40, which isntt on there --
6 say you have to have protection of this material, but we don't 7 specify what. But if you have less than 350 grams, you are 8 not covered at all under Part 73. But 73~40~does cover this 9 range in between, but we don't specify what it is. Like the 10 AGN reactors, for example. That's below the 20s.
11 Incidentally, that item under 73.20 should read:
12 "power and non-power reactors," it is more than just test 13 reactors.
14 COMMISSIONER. ':GI LINSKY: Well, if you/.don' t specify 15 where they ought to be, do we,... insp~c.:::t :against the regulations 16 or anything? It is an exhortation in effect?
17 MR. JONES: Right.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: And we don't exhort below 19 350 grams?
20 MR. JONES: That's right.
21 Now, the present 73.30 to 73736 which cover 22 transportation would be deleted. It would.be taken care of 23 by 73.25 and 26.
24 (Slide) 25 On the next slide the remainder of Part 73 is shown
17 1
how all of these things will be covered and the Category II and 2
III material, this is the low and moderate material that we 3
cov.ered, the international protection a_nd recommendations would 4
be added as a separate rule-making action which you have before 5
you now.
6 The current 73.50 would be revised to cover only 7 spent fuel storag~~ It 6urrently covers all facilities. The 8 current 73.60 which covers material protection would be deleted 9 since it would be covered under 73.20; .40 and .45. The 10 Redords and Reports Sections and Advance Shipping Notices, those 11 things are already there.
12 Appendix B, the Guard Training Criteria has been 13 proposed. This is a separate rule-making action which we 14 will bring up to you next week.
15 To give you a brief outline of what the up-grade 16 rule will covert the next slide ---
17 (Slide) 18 -- covers transportation protection and is an outline 19 of the sections and the detailed specifications for transportati n 20 protection. These are the detailed areas that are covered 21 in transportation protection.
22 (Slide) 23 The next slide gives you a similar break down for.
24 fixed site protection, 'the various areas on which there are 25 detail requirements~
18 1 *Llhave back-up slides which go into the details of 2
each of these areas if you wish to go on to them some time.
3 (Slide) 4 The next slide shows the definitions that have been 5 added to the up~grade rules over what is currently in Part 73.
6 These are in the staff *paper on pages 30 thru 32 of enclosure A.
7 These are words that we are using in the rule that we felt 8 needed definition.
9 (Slide) 10 The next slide shows definitions that have been 11 changed to clarify them or to better fit the up-grade rule.
12 These are enclosure A, pages 28 thru 30 of the staff paper.
13 (Slide) 14 The next slide begins to show the differences 15 from present regulations. Now you have seen these before 16 when we discussed with you the proposed regulation, and we 17 went through them in some detail there. Some of these are 18 already in effeqt through license conditions.
19 For example, the first one, more explicit armed 20 escort training, some license conditions have been imposed 21 to make that more stririgent. The series "shipment limitation" 22 is being done by license condition. The movement control 23 center, we are making more explicit, it is implied in present 24 regulations. The nine armed escorts under transfer and 25 storage is now required by license conditions to be four. We
19 1 are upgrading that to nine.
2 (Slide) 3 The next slide continues this comparison, the last 4 three items, of upgrading that we are accomplishing by the 5 up-grade rule.
6 (Slide) 7 The next slide shows in detail the differences 8 from present regulations for road shipments. Again, some of 9 these are imposed by license conditions. I don't think we need 10 to,:,discuss,:.:those unless anybody has a question on them.
11 (Slide) 12 The next slide shows the differences ---
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Could we go back to that 14 last slide?
15 MR. JONES: Certainly.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: The nine-armed escort versus 17 two or none?
18 MR. JONES: Yes, the present regulations require 19 two or none, depending on the conditions of the shipment.
20 License conditions currently require five. We are up-grading 21 ft now to nine, depending on the conditions of transport whether 22 you have armed vehicle, special trucks or whatever under the 23 present regulations is to whether you have two or none.
24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: And with the new r_egulations 25 you must have~the armored vehicle, plus nine, is that r1ght2
20 1 MR. JONES: Plus nine, yes.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But in effect you are 3 requiring five now?
4 MR. JONES: License conditions, yes, require five.
5 now. That is correct.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: So you are still beyond the 7 regulations?
8 MR. JONES: Beyond the current regulations, and the 9 up-grade rule goes beyond that.
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: What kind of comment have you had LL on the requirement for nine~armed guards?
12 MR. JONES: In general they felt that it was too many.
13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: By how many?
14 MR. JONES: They didn't say.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: How does::that compare with 16 the esort for government shipments or can you tell us?
17 MR. JONES: They currently have five, but we are told 18 they are upgrading to nine.
19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That would be DOE?
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Of comparable materials.
21 MR. JONES: Of comparable materials, yes, and weapons.
22 (Slide) 23 The next slide shows the same differences for ,,_,_::,*
24 comparison of air shipments ---
25
21 1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Excuse me for just one second.
2 MR. JONES: Surely.
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You are saying that DOE would 4 protect material on the one hand arid weapons on the other hand 5 the same way?
6 MR. JONES: *For the transport, they have the same, 7 yes, sir. They use the same system.
8 These are the comparison of air shipments, and the 9 next slide ---
10 (Slide) 11 COMMISSIONER*:.BRADFORD: On the air shipments, this 12 still contemplates normal civilian types of aircraft being 13 used for 14 MR. JONES: No. Cargo aircraft. No passenger aircraf.
15 MR. EVANS: By license conditions, cargo aircraft 16 only now.
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: T-hen why wouldn't that be 18 put in the regulations?
19 MR. JONES: It is, it is in the current regulations.
20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Then why is it by license 21 c*ondi tions?
22 MR. JONES: It is in the regulations, I believe, not license conditions.
23 MR. EVANS: They can't use passenger aircraft right 24 now.
25
22 1 MR. JONES: The regulation limits passenger shipments 2 to 20 grams or 20 curies or something like that.
3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: And this is in the regulation?
4 MR. JONES: It is in the regulation, yes. That is 5 not being changed.
6 COMMISSIONER:;BRADFORD: This does still contemplate 7 civilian air ports?
8 MR. JONES: Yes, there is nothing addressing that 9 in the regulation. It addresses the pr.otection you have to 10 have at the air port, but it doesn't specify the type of 11 air port. Like the armed escorts, it stops and transfers.
12 (Slide) 13 The next slide makes these comparisons for the 14 rail shipment and the sea shipments.
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Let's see, what does "common 16 language" mean on there?
17 MR. JONES: It means that the escorts should be able 18 to converse with the pilot of the plane. If the pilot speaks 19 Italian, the escort, should speak Italian, or in some way be able to converse with him.
20 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Both of them or just one of them?
22 (Laughter) 23 24 MR. JONES: We don't specify that. They should be 25 able to communicate in a common language and that could be one
23 1
of them.
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Do we hav.e a language school 3
training program?
4 MR. JONES: We looked into this as to whether this 5*
was going to present a problem, and most of the pilots who~.would 6
be using U.S. territory speak English. They have a little 7 problem communicating with their air controllers if they don't.
8 This just gives you the comparison for rail shipments 9 and sea shipments. They are quite similar to the air and 10 road shipments.
11 (Slide) 12 The next slide ---
13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: These armed escorts, now is 14 that consistent with DOT and FAA regulations?
15 MR. JONES: Yes. Yes, we have looked in to this and 16 i t is if you make the prior arrangements, I mean, you just 17 can't walk on there with a gun. You have got to let the 18 pilot know this is going to happen and you have to let these 19 people know that this is going to happen and that these people 20 are going to be.armed. So you have to make these prior arrange-21 ments and we have discussed this with the FAA and with the 22 Pilots Association. They see no problem with this provided 23 you just don't walk on there with a gun in your hand, type 24 thing.
25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: How does the guy get through
24 1
the air port to get to the plane?
2 MR. JONES: There are prior arrangements.
3 MR. BURNETT: There are mechanisms. There is a 4
card that you fill out when you are approacfuing the searching 5 location.
6 (slide) 7 MR.-JONES: Now, the next slide begins the comparisons 8
for the fixed site areas with present regulations. Non-power 9 reactors are included, except for the 100 gram ---
10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Could we go back for one 11 second, I'm sorry. In the sea shipment that was on a*1-*prev:.d:sus 12 slidei "container ships only"?
13 MR. JONES: That's correct.
14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: In other words, an ordinary 15 cargo ship can carry it?
16 MR. JONES: No. It must be in the container ship 17 so that the special nuclear material can be in pre-container 18 packaged and loaded on the ship without havh1g _:;the individual 19 SSNM containers being handled separately.
20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: But that is possible, jµst as 21 for example, small shipments of miscellaneous material are 22 agglomerated and put in to a single substantial container and 23 put in the hole of sar~o ships.
24 MR. JONES: We are specifying they are put in a 25 container, a pre-packaged container.
25 1
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: But a container_ship is a 2
particular kind of ship.
3 MR. JONES: That is correct. It gives you much better 4
protection, much better assurance that the material is not 5
removed from the ship one container at a time. That is 6
normally the way it is shipped any way.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: That's 100 rems per what?
8 MR. JONES: That is the exemption that is currently 9 spelled out in the regulation at three feet. One,hundred rem 10 three feet from the surface per hour.
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Per what, kilogram, fuel elements, 12 reactor core?
13 MR. JONES: Per item, whatever the item might be.
14 Per fuel element, per package, we don't specify.
15 That is the current wording in 73.06 for exemptions 16 from transportation, and we are including this on the up-grade 17 rule because that sort of thing will be covered under the 18
- current 73.50 which we are revising to cover only irradiated 19 materials.
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Let's see. This is going to 21 pose a certain amount of problem with regard to new fuel 22 inventories at research reactors, isn't it?
23 MR. JONES: It will present a problem to ---
24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Now, this covers the core and it 25 covers the stuff in the pool?
26 1
MR. JONES: That's cbrrect -- well, some times.
2 There are six research reactors to which this presents a 3
problem. The people in NRR are working with these six to 4
determine what can be done to reduce their inventory, to increase 5 their irradiation, to store the material somewhere else that 6 is better protected or whatever, so that they -- the research 7 reactors will not have to hire all of these guards and have 8 all of thsisL-protection. So they are working with the 9 research reactors to accommodate this regulation .
. 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: How do you get the fuel to the 11 reactor, assuming you;:have a site at which can be stored, you 12 are going to have to tool up nine guards to take a reload in, 13 I take it.
14 MR. JONES: Most of the shipments are less than 15 core-level quantity, so _'y,ou don't have to -- so it doesn't 16 come under the rule.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: How did you pick the 100 rems 18 per hour?
19 MR. JONES: That -- I don't remember the history of 20 that now. It~has been in the regulation for some time. I guess :
21 it is a number which isn't close to any threshhold. Either you 22 are a way above it or a way below it. I don't remember the 23 exact background for that, but it is using the exemption number 24 that is currently in1.::hhe:cregulations.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, what's the rationale for
27 1
that number?
2 MR. JONES: Well, with that irradiation level it is 3
self-protecting from thieft, and we are mainly tqlking about 4
thieft here.
5 Now, of course, the 73.50 covers the protection of 6
irradiated material, but not to the level that we are doing 7
here. So it is not completely unprotected, but we don't believe 8
well, it is self-protecting from the standpoint of thieft, so 9 we don't need all of these controls on it.
10 (Slide) 11 The next slide continues the comparison for fixed 12 site requirements. Again, some of these are under licensed 13 conditions. The central alarm station interior is not visible 14 from the perimeter. We left out a word there in the fourth 15 line up.
16 (Slide) 17 The next slide continues the fixed site comparison 18 further. Some of these are already in licensed condition, 19 some of the changes are to make the requirements more explicit 20 and more~-- we.hope more clearly understood by the licensees.
21 (Slide) 22 The next slide starts with a comparison of changes 23 from the proposed regulations, now, not from current regulations 24 but what we changed as the result of public comment and further 25 staff study.
28 1
And there are by,.,these,,five, substantive changes 2
from the proposed amendments. The first one, of course, we 3
will be discussing later. The second one, the licensees felt 4
that~those phrases in there would leave the regulation open-5 ended and subject to ratcheting. Staff looked at this and 6
decided that what we had in the regulation was sufficient, 7 we didn't need to ratchet them so we took those phrases out.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Where was that phrase now?
9 MR. JONES: They were in several places in the 10 regulation,:.in the performance requirement~, in the capability 11 requirements. So we took those out. We felt that the 12 requirements were adequately covered. If we need more, we can 13 proceed with additional rule-making.
14 The package search requirements were changed slightly 15 to cover~the cleared person. We feel that we needed a stronger 16 storage for directly-useable strategic special materials, and 17 we are now requiring it to be in vaults only. Previously 18 it could be stored in vault-type rooms. Staff felt that this 19 did not provide sufficient delay time in the protection of 20 this directly usable, material. Then we changed the implemen-21 tation times to provide more time for the licensees to prepare 22 their plans,. to implement the plans and we added a time for 23 construction which was not in the proposed regulation.
24 (Slide) 25 The next ~lide shows some of the other changes that
29 1 were made from the proposed regulation. There was a problem 2 of armed escorts. It originally stated to or from foreign 3 ports and there was a question of just exactly what that meant 4 and whether we had jurisdication over that. We changed it 5 to specify that these escorts should be armed, when, within 6 the geographic limits of the United States which is where the 7 jurisdiction of the NRC is limited.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let me just ask you, when 9 you say that search of cleared persons would be random, what 10 does that mean? At some prescribed local .direction or 11 MR. JONES: That will be done on a random basis, 12 not on a percentage basis, but on a random basis using a table 13 of random numbers to select who gets searched.
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: And what does that mean?
15 MR. JONES: It doesn't mean that five percent of the people.will be searched, it means that *you will use a table of 16 random numbers and it may be five percent, maybe some other 17 number. Whatever the table of random numbers shows.if you do 18 it right.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Now you have really got me 20 mystified.
21 MR. JONES: One day you may search 10 people, the next 22 day you may only search one. Depending on what your random 23 table shows.
24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I know, but you have got to 25
30 1 set some average level?
2 MR. JONES: No.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You are not going to set 4 an average level?
5 MR. JONES: The table of random numbers sets the 6 level by its randomness. Some days you may not search anybody.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It is imprudent for any Chairman 8 to admit ignorance, so let me ask questions in the hope of 9 explaining it to you.
10 (Laughter) 11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Could you elaborate a little on how the use of the table would work?
12 Suppose I'm the guard, you know, and here you come 13 one-after-another to my gate. Good, I've got the table now, 14 what do I do?
15 MR. JONES: This is one way* it could be done, I mean, 16 there are a number of ways ..,it could be done.
17 The guard would be given a list of numbers, like 18 whatever the numbers were, 5, 15, 27, 38 or whatever. That 19 would mean that he would search every 5th, 15th, -- the 5th 20 person, the 15th person, the 28th person at random as you 21 went down the list. And you pick these numbers off a table of 22 random numbers.
23 If, for example, you know you are going to have 24 300 people come in the gate that day, you would have a table of 25
31 1
random numbers that goes up to 300 and then you would pick the 2
numbers off that table as to which people you search out of that.
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: No, wait a minute.
4 MR. JONES: That's a statistical procedure. You 5 could do it by computer or whatever.
6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What's the basis for the 7 selection of the numbers?
8 '
MR. JONES: You take the table of random numbers, and 9 you::randomly pick a column and a line, and there is a number.
10 You try to be completely random with this thing. Each person 11 the criteria is that each and every person has an equal chance 12 of,*,being searched. That's the criteria, however you want to do 13 That's the randomness of it that each and every person 14 has a chance of being searched.
15 MR. BURNETT: I think there is one thing also to 16 note, that this is at the perimeter. This is not the vital 17 area. It 100 percent search at the vital area.
18 MR. JONES: That's correct.
19 MR. BURNETT: So we are talk+/-11g about the perimeter.
20 MR. JONES: At the protected area, the boundary.
21 MR. BURNETT: That doesn't change the problem, but 22 it does isolate the outer area.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I suspect that Commissioner 24 Gilinsky still doesn't understand it.
25 (Laughter)
32 1
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Why don't we try this, we've 2
got 100 people.
3 (Laughter) 4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Would you all line up ---
5 (Laughter) 6 It appears to me that on the basis of random number 7
tables you can indeed use that mechanism to decide which one 8
of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 -- which one of the 8 of you is 9 going to get searched.
10 MR. JONES: That's correct.
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: But i t appears to me that I have 12 to pre-determine whether I have to search one in eight or one 13 in 100 or. 4 in whatever.
14 MR. JONES: It is a random selection of the total 15 population that comes in through the gate.
16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But in that case you are 17 going to search 50 percent over the course of a year.
18 MR. JONES: No, not necessarily.
19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Yes, you will, over a course 20 of a year.
21 MR. JONES: Not necessarily.
22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Or over any conside:uable: *-
23 period of time because the~:Tandom numbers can run up to the 24 total.
25 MR. JONES: If you take the time long enough, you
33 1
will search everybody.
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: No, that's not what I mean.
3 What I mean is if you have 300 people coming in every day, 4
your table contains the number 1 to 300. Some days you are 5
going to search 300, some days you are going to search 299, 6
some days you are going to search O and some days you are going 7
to_;searchi.l. And the average over any considerable period of 8
time is going to be 50 percent.
9 MR. JONES: Not necessarily.
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes, yes.
11 MR. JONES: Another point is,if for example, you 12 search the 15th person that is not always going to be the 13 same person every day either.
14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: No, that's true, but it does 15 mean that instead of a 5 percent a year, *you arce going to 16 search half the people that come in to that plant.
17 MR. JONES: Yes, it is going to be~a greater 18 percentage, that's true over a period -- the longer period of 19 time the higher percentage.
20 COMMISSIONER BRADFO_RD: Not necessarily, you might 21 get 300 the first day.
22 MR. JONES: That's right.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I still think it would be helpful 24 to understand. The aiming point of the rule in terms of the 25 fraction of those entering at the perimeter who are expected to
34 1
be searched.
2 MR. JONES: The aiming point of the rule is that 3
each and every person entering the rule_ has an equal 4
opportunity to be searched. ~He may or he may not be searched, 5
but he doesn't know that.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: No, no. I could institute a 7
system in which the chance of any person entering would be 8
1 in 10 million of being searched, okay?
9 MR. JONES: Uh-hum.
10 CHAIRMAN:!.HENDRIE: And everybody would have precisely 11 the same chanqe, or one in two of being searched and everybody 12 w.buld have precisely the same change. That is, I can assure 13 the randomness -- the avoiding of particular people at any 14 level of overall fraction search of the difference, and I have 15 to decide, and what I'm trying to find out is, is the thrust 16 here to end up with a 50 percent search, 5 percent or 2 17 percent or what?
18 MR. JONES: If yu decided, for example, that you 19 wanted a 20 percent search as they do in the reactors, .:*you 20 would select your table of numbers 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes, I know how to do it, I want 22 to know what y:ouiare aiming for, please?
23 MR. JONES: and then you would take 20 percent of 24 those numbers -- no, 100 percent. One hundred percent of those 25 random people selec~ed.
35 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I'm sorry. Would the staff 2
retread at some point and come back.
3 MR. JONES: All right, we will give you a better 4
explanation for the procedures for the randomness.
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Onward.
6 MR. JONES: Where are we?
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Why did you ask that question?
8 (Laughter) 9 MR. JONES: The next slide continues the changes 10 from the proposed amendments, and shows the definitions that 11 we added or were the proposed amendments.
12 (Slide) 13 This was noted before, but we added some after 14 comment from the public. We had some additional definitions.
15 (Slide) 16 The next slide shows some of the other issues that 17 were raised during the comment period which did not result 18 in changes in the regulations either because they had been 19 taken care of in some other way, or there was no need to make 20 a11y* changes .
21 The first one, we felt there was no need to make any 22 changes, we felt the studies that we~have supported it. The 23 use of deadly force had been taken care of in other ways, the 24 use of government guards is~-presently at issue. The conflict 25 of state and local gun laws, we felt, was appropriately taken
36 1 care of and that there was not the conflict that some people 2 had indicated.
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: We are confident of that 4 with:r,espect to state laws. That is a broad factual matter.
5 MR. JONES: Yes, that's true, that this has been 6
taken care of and is being taken care of by the transporters themselves.
7 8
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: What sort of prov is ions are ,1.there, for instance, in the Massachusetts law where they have this 9
splendid compulsory "end of the slammer" if you are caught 10 with hardware proposition?
11 MR. JONES: People transporting into states like 12 that should be assured that they have the proper license to 13 do it.
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It's a matter of licensing?
15 MR. JONES: It.!s a matter of-licensing. And what 16 happens if you are moving through several states, the transporter 17 should assure himself that he has got licenses in all of these 18 states so that he ---
19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: The transporter or the 20 individual carrying the weapon?
21 MR. JONES: Well, probably the individual carrying 22 the weapon, but the transporter.*, If.--=he, is an employer of 23 the transporter, the transporter would take care of that for 24 his employees. I don't know how they do that. That would be 25
37 1
whatever is necessary for these people who actually have the 2
weapon to be properly licensed in the jurisdiction that they 3
are moving through, unless they want to_ get caught and put 4
in the slammer, like in Massachusetts.
5 We have discussed this with a number of guarded 6
companies and they do this, they take care of it themselves.
7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: There is no difficulty that 8
you can foresee where in some states where they may not wish 9
to license persons who are not residents?
10 MR. JONES: We don't foresee anything like that, 11 no.
12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Have we checked?
13 MR. JONES: We didn't check that specific point, 14 but in discussing i t with people like Brinks and people who 15 do this transporting, they apparently have no problem in this 16 respect.
17 The~status of research reactors, we just mentioned 18 that and NRR is working on that one. The performance oriented 19 flexibility was raised by the licensees and we are providing 20 guidance as to what we mean in these areas.
21 Some of the commenters*, felt that they needed 22 flexibility in designing their systems, and our response to 23 that, of course, is that the performance oriented regulation 24 provides that flexibility. It is designed to provide that.
25 No definitive comments were received on cost ---
38 1
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I take it they did not 2
perceive that, however, in reviewing the regulation?
3 MR. JONES: They didn't.
4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Were you able to convince them?
5 MR. JONES: I hope we have. We have discussed this 6
with some of the people, and they said, "Oh, is that the way 7 it works?" that sort of approach. And we have provided 8 a more definitive analysis of cost.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Let's see, but it is true that as 10 you -- you do have general performance fo~ requirements 11 system capability requirements, but the rule also goes forward 12 with reference systems specifications ---
13 MR. JONES: That is correct.
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: -- which, to have any meaning 15 inevitably have a particular set of provisions in mind so 16 you can spell them out.
17 MR. JONES: Yes, sir.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Then I presume there would be 19 an underlying tier of regulatory guides and other staff 20 guidance documents, many of which I presume would amplify the 21 reference system and detail it in the various ways, then it 22 could be helpful. It does move the reviewing staff, however, 23 I must say, toward a particular set of hardware methods and so 24 on.
25 MR. EVANS: On a generic basis, yes, sir. Of course,
39 1
the sites are so different that you really have to look at 2
the site's specific conditions and that is where you get 3
in to the guidance and where the licensees start getting the 4 flexibility giving their existing system's enviornment at their 5 facilities and the structure of their facility on-site, those 6 kinds of things.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, I hope the Safeguards staff 8 down the years will keep in mind the need for that ---
9 MR. EVANS: Flexibility?
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, the need to take those 11 site's specific items into account and get the medicine to the 12 disease.
13 (Slide) 14 MR. JONES: The last slide I have shows the effects 15 on other sections in Part 73. This is one of the questions 16 that were raised by a lot of licensees: "What's going to 17 happen to these other things? Are they still going to be 18 in effect" and here's what's going to happen.
19 As I mentioned earlier 73.30 thru 73.36 is going to 20 be deleted. Those are the present transportation requirements.
21 Those requirements that are presently in ~30~thru .36 that 22 we want to keep, are being added into 73.26. 73.60 will be 23* deleted. The requirements that we want to keep out of that 24 are being added into 73.46. 73.50 is being revised to cover 25 spent fuel and 73.40 is being retained as a general requirement
40 1
for fixed-site protection at licensed facilities.
2 Now, I will turn it back to Bud or somebody.
3 MR. SMITH: Bob's going to talk about the guard.
4 MR. BURNETT: Okay, we have to shift a couple of 5
personnel,~if you could wait just a minute.
6 The two people joining us at the table, of course 7
is Mr. Ron Brightsen and Mr. Bob Dube, both from the Division 8
of Safeguards.
9 Okay, could we go to Slide 30, please.
10 (Slide) 11 What we are here to discuss today is a memorandum 12 which Mr. Brightsen sent to me on November 15th resulting from 13 my assignment asking him to review public comment.
14 My dissertation today will deal with the paper 15 that resulted from that, the excersing the open-door policy.
16 I understand that he has a further expansion of that paper which 17 he.will present today. We have not had the opportunity to 18 review that paper. So I invisi6n, at the end of this meeting, 19 I doubt if any conclusive decision will be able to be made 20 because the final jump in all of this is somewhat subjective 21 and judgmental. So I assume that we would get a chance to 22 look, at that paper as presented.
23 Generally there were two issues which Ron identified 24 in his.paper which is shown before. One, should.we restudy 25 the distribution of nuclear security responsibility?
41 1
Translated, that means should we consider guard 2
forces *sponsored or manned by the* Federal Government.
3 Issue two,_ should we delay or_ postpone safeguard 4
upgrade rule until such study is compl~t~d?
5 (Slide) 6 In the paper, as he presented it, which I'm sure 7
he has improved upon a great deal at this presentation today, 8.
there a~e certain statements that he has made that the 9 safeguards staff do not ~gree with.
10 The first, I *think, that sho~ld be known: if we 11 go with a restudy is that the s~feguard staff se~s this as 12 a very long, tedious effort. Probably in the multi-year 13 area.
14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Why .would this be when the 15 security-study before took ---
16 MR. BURNETT: Eighteen months.
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Eighteen months, yes, okay.
18 MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir. And then if you come out 19 with a point that you will want to move to federal guards 20 you will have to move toward legislation.
21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: But that's implementation, 22 not study.
23 MR. BURNETT: That's correct.
24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Now, how long will the study 25 take?
42 1
MR. BURNETT: I have estimated at least one year.
2 I'm sure that Ron will hit that in his speech.
3 I think also it should be noted that I do not believe 4
that is totally dependent upon the priority placed upon it, 5
in other words, just staffing it. There are some very deep 6
questions that must be studied, and I don't think that just 7
manpower in itself will move it quicker.
8 In his paper, we saw no new issues, the is billet two, 9 that had been raised at the security study did not either 10 directly address or indirectly address. By this, L:mean in 11 billet three that no technical questions, in the staff opinion, 12 was unanswered by the security agency study.
13 Also, I would like to brin_g to your attention, in 0 1 14 a recent testimony of DOE on March 23rd in front of Mr. Glenn 15 they stated that they used both private and federal guards 16 and have found no difference in the effe9tiveness of the two 17 guards when employed.
18 Also, I think that it is fair to point out that when 19 we consider the use of federal guard forces for nuclear 20 material, I am not sure that we will be able to stop at that 21 point.
22 Mr. Gilinsky, in a recent testimony on the Hill, 23 the same one dated March 23rd stated that he was afraid that 24 this might erode to other hazardous material and that same 25 premise has also been discussed by th? .,Department of Defense
43 1 and the Department of Energy.
2 This is a minor point here, the 6th billet is that 3 if we de~ide to do this, that it will be a study a whole lot 4 like the firstcone which took 12 dedicated staff and 18 months 5 to complete and contractural support. That is minor, I just 6 would like to bring it to your attention.
7 If the study is deemed necessary, and in my original 8 paper that I answered Mr. Brightsen's contention, I stated to 9 him that I thought it was premature to study it because the 10 up-grade rule was not in final format. And unil:.it was, we 11 didn't know the total impact to industry.
12 Also, I think that the study will have to look at 13 the possible federal ownership of the SSNM. I don't see how 14 we can stop at just the guard force utilization problem.
15 In addition to that, we will have to address the problems of 16 the~entire security force needs. That is the equipment made 17 available to them, training and other support items.
18 It was also my contention in my answer at that 19 time that the restudy, if required, should be independent of 20 the up-grade rule because we feel that _the up~grade rule is 21 needed, not on an emergency basis, but is needed within a 22 reasonable time.
23 :t;ex:L,slide,_,' please?
24 (Slide) 25 In his second issue: "Should we delay the up-:-:grade
44 1 to restudy distribution of security responsibilities?" We 2 believe that the Commission has made it clear that the 3 up-grade rule is necessary. We believe that the up-grade rule 4 does not constitute a reassignment of responsiblities. That is, 5 for some period of time, industry has been performing like 6 tasks. We do not see anything in the up-grade rule that affects 7 the previous conclusion of the security agency study. I will 8 elaborate that as I further go through this paper.
9 That study was dictated and required by the Energy 10 Reorganization Act. It was presented to Congress, we did 11 not get anything back from Congress that illuminated that\they 12 we~e unhappy with the results of that study.
13 The final billet, I'm trying to say, that the 14 outstanding subjects that could be discussed are clearly 15 philosophical in the staff's opinion that_ the technical 16 answers have been provided. And in that vein, we do not 17 believe that we should hold up the implementation of the 18 up-grade rule pending the philosophical discussion.
19 Slide 33 please.
20 (Slide) 21 Yes, and of course, with the direction that came 22 down from the Commission and Mr. Smith just reminded me, that 23 I am answering in this format those that were directed to us.
I did not repeat them.
24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I notice, Bob, that there are a 25
45 1
fair number of slides in this section of the presentation, and 2
I wonder if in the interest of time you would both move 3
briskly through them, and also consider.whether all of them 4
are in fact necessary. We have the handouts on all of them, 5
and I believe it isn't necessary to go in detail across all 6
of them.
7 MR. BURNETT: Okay, I willi.highlight them.
8 Okay, basically in his six contentions as presented 9
to me in November, the staff does not agree to the complete 10 existence of these contentions. We believe that there are 11 some subjective judgment in each, and in some cases we believe 12 that there is no basis for his conclusion.
13 Slide 34.
14 (Slide) 15 Having to do with his first contention, that is 16 that a significant number of licensees deem that the federal 17 force should be required. In all of the comments that we 18 reviewed, we do not believe that it was a significant portion.
19 On this slide it shows 6 out of the 31.
20 Also, *some of the commenters were commenting on 21 something other than the up-grade rule.
22 Slide 35, please.
23 (Slide) 24 To continue with the first contention. Mr. Brightsen 25 contends that no evidence to support the design threat level.
46 1
It should be noted that out of the Conran Task Force 2
my division was directed to study the characteristics of the 3
threat. That has been going on since that time. That report 4
the draft of that report has recently been distributed, and it 5
is in concert with the threat as defined.
6 I won't go down through some of the others, I would 7 like to hit particularly "C", "Thieft of SSNM by itself does not 8 constitute an immediate threat to the general public." I 9 don't think that the staff wants to go that far. We have 10 assumed that a weapon production is possible on the outside, 11 therefore, once they got ahold of the material the time to 12 convert it into a usable weapon is minimal.
13 Slide 36,please.
14 (Slide) 15 In Mr. Brightsen's contention he repeatedly uses 16 theoToner and Feiverson report, and he also reiterates the 17 fact that they had established six relevant criteria ~r issues 18 that in his opinion were not discussed in the security agency 19 study.
20 We do-not agree with this contention. First of all, 21 this is one of 21 reports. I think all of the relevant issues 22 in all 21 reports were looked at in some form or another 23 indirect or direct. So it would be hard to say that every 24 issue raised by every contractor was quoted and related to in 25 the report, but in this case, I think all were.
47 1
I would like to drop down to billet five which 2
says: "All six issues which were discussed by Toner were 3
addressed directly or indirectly."
4 I will not read the quotes. I have gone to the 5
six issues identified by this report, and I have found direct 6
quotations from the study related to this report. In about 7
half of them there exists indirect. I have that for back-up 8
material should you want it. To expedite the presentation I 9 will just refer to it.
10 In the last billet I want~d to c~ll your attention 11 that thesstudy looked at actually a broader interest base 12 than those identified by the Toner and Feiverson report.
13 Again, I have supporting documentation on th.ills and 14 can provide it to the Commission.
15 Slide 37, please?
16 (Slide) 17 Mr. Brightsen contends that the threat as studied 18 at that time is not the up-grade threat, therefore, reopening 19 of the issue is germane. We againt*.do:i.not~d+/-sagree -- we do 20 not agree rather.
21 This time I have pulled a quote, the final sentence 22 is underlined in which they have emphasized that the evaluation 23 was done over a broad range.
24 In addition to that, the ERDA and NRC report that 25 was actually developed after the SAS,::c~eport even went further
48 1
and looked at a six and two threat which is very much in concert 2
with the threat as established by the up~grade rule.
3 Slide 38,~please?
4 (Slide) 5 I would just like to hit three billets on this, and 6
that would be two -- one is his contention is that the threat 7
will escalate. Well, I'm not sure where that comes from, but 8
basically two thinks -- my second billet thinks that the 9 industry -- it is already too high, publish interest groups 10 which is billet three already thinks it's too low. And in his 11 paper he relates to people he has polled who support his 12 position. I can only say that the polling of the personnel that 13 he must have done did not include the people working on the 14 characteristic's study, because it is not in concert with what 15 they believe.
16 Slide 39.
17 (Slide) 18 He contends that the up-grade rule as presented will 19 require private enterprise to use paramilitary forces. Again, 20 the staff does not agree with this. We had made it clear in 21 the rule that the guard force on.station or at the facility 22 are designed to impede, not to defeat the adversary forces.
23 We have in conjunction with that required law enforcement local 24 support to help on defeat. Their job is to impede them, keep 25 them from getting to the material and also to impede their exit.
49 1
More guards is just one way to satisfy the up-grade 2
rule. We have given the licensee a great deal of latitude 3
to-_*use equipment or procedures.
4 Slide 40.
5 (Slide) 6 He contends that this will force a significant 7
reduction in the nuclear power activities. I must admit that 8
we don't totally understand his contention here, and we will 9
look forward to him explaining this because the,.,up-grade rule 10 does not apply to the nuclear power industry except for the 11 six power reactors that was mentioned previously. The research 12 reactors and the Fort St. Vrain totaling:six all together.
13 Also, the fuel that supports the nuclear power 14 industry, with exception of those same six, is not included in 15 the up-grade rule.
16 Slide 41.
17 (Slide) 18 Mr. Brightsens contention here is the rule would 19 impose the licensee a significant new assignment and respon-20 sibilities. Again, we do not agree. As you will notice in 21 billet one we have been requiring of the industry in the past 22 five years varying degrees of physical protection, and in 23 truth following this train to the last one, this last hop in 24 establishing the *up-grade requirements is not all together that 25 much bigger than the previous one,. and-:, in truth, many of the
so 1
precautions that will be required are already in place by 2
license condition.
3 If 1 could just expound on those for a minute:
4 Improved off-site communications is already under 5
licensing condition. Improved storage and containment.
6 Require vehicle searches. Incorporate speficic instructions 7
to their guards. Have an acceptable number of off-sit.e guards; 8
are people available. Improve your procedures.
9 I think what I'm trying to say is that much of 10 what this will require is already out there, including *:-_
11 redundancy for alarm stations which is your primary and 12 secondary alarm stations.
13 Slide 42.
14 (Slide) 15 He excerpts from the ERDA/NRC Task Force 16 recommendations that it should be implemented as rapidly as 17 possible, consistent with sound technical policy-making 18 decision. From this I conclude that: one, we should get 19 it out there quickly; and two, it should not be so quickly 20 as t.o overlook/any management decisions that should be 21 employed.
22 I think it is fair to notice the next sentence 23 that follows that quotation which is billet one: "Emergency 24 measures such as shut-down for*i:.the industry or immediate 25 use of federal forc"es is not warranted /_- 1 However, upgrading
51 1 should be accomplished on a more quickly than normal, than 2 routine basis. And I believe, gentlemen, that is what we 3 are moving :towards.
4 Also, in this same joint task force they actually 5 go further than the upgrade rule in several areas.
6 Slide 43.
7 (Slide) 8 This is my last slide on the subject so that we 9 can move briskly into the next subject.
10 In our opinion, there has been no basis established 11 for delaying the up-grade rule. No technical basis has been 12 established for re-studying the guard issue, however, if the 13 Commission deems that because of public interest that a re-14 study is necessary, then we believe that it should not delay 15 the publishing of the up-grade rule.
16 I complete on that. I will turn it over to Mr.
17 Ron Brightsen at this point and which he has more information 18 on the subject, I believe.
19 MR. BRIGHTSEN: Thank you, Bob.
20 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, NRC Staff and guests.
21 r appreciate the opportunity you have provided by requesting me to explain and amplify my views and my recomendations 22 on the basic public policy issue of nuclear security 23 responsibility, summarized in SECY 78-43 which was transmitted 24 to the Commission on January 23, 1978.
25
52 1
Inasmuch as the issue of nuclear security responsibilit 2
has had, in my view a suttle yet nonetheless controlling 3
impact on the safeguards design threat level'.and therefore 4
on the presently proposed up-graded safeguards system.
5 It is essential that the2issue of nuclear responsibility be 6 placed in perspective.
7 Consequently, I will (A) briefly summarize the 8 safeguards approach that the ~Office of Nuclear Material 9 Safety and Safeguards, NMSS has used over the past three 10 years and ~B) identify the three unanswered fundamental 11 safeguards questions, the most basic of which is the nuclear 12 security responsibility issue, suggesting for your 13 consideration new approaches that are focused on producing 14 answers to these three fundamental safeguards questions.
15 In discussing complex and potentially controversal 16 issues of this sort experience teaches us that it is essential 17 to avoid the misunderstandings that can result from injudicious 18 selection of words or phrases which can be taken out of 19 context.
20 I have, therefore, decided to read my verbatim 21 statement on the subject rather than adopt the more informal 22 and customary vu~graph approach. When my statement is concluded, 23 I will distribute copies along with supporting documents to the 24 Commissioners and to all others who may be interested.
25 (A) the MNSS safeguards approach, 1975- 1978:
53
- 1 One, within NMSS we have for more than . :three years 2
developed a safeguards program on the unsubstantiated premise 3
that the private sector should continue to bear the 4
responsibility for the protection of the public independent 5
of the NRC perception of the threat level.
6 Two, the office has based that premise largely 7
on inherd:ted,AEC policy and practice as well as on an NRC 8 security ,: _.agency study which its elf assumed that a manpower 9 intensive militarily oriented guard solution to attacks on 10 nuclear facilities was the most effective solution available.
11 It concluded that no shift in responsibility was necessary, 12 because federal guards would be no more effective than private 13 guards.
14 Three, without ever consciously examining that 15 underlying premise,ii.e., that the responsibility for nuclear 16 security properly belongs in theoprivate sector, NMSS has 17 repeatedly tried, since its inception to define a quote ,,
18 "reasonable" design threat level.
19 Realistically speaking, that means NMSS has tried 20 to, define a threat which would: One, require industry to 21 increase its capability to protect the public while still 22 being acceptable to and implementable by the industry. And 23 two, satisfy the intent of the Congress and the demands of 24 the intervenors for:. increased or even maximum security for 25 the public.
54
- 1 The efforts that have been made by the Division 2
of Safeguards to resolve the threat level question, and in 3
turn, the required protection level hav_e, therefore been 4
- artificially, if unwittingly, constrained by the assumption 5
with respect to private sector responsibility for nuclear 6
security.
7 Four, that we have not succeeded in our approach 8
will come as no surprise. The controversy with respect to the 9 adequacy of safeguards has continued unabated, and in some 10 respects has escalated. The industry is n6w reacting ~sdwasa~
11 prefect~y predicted to the proposed up-grading of safeguards 12 physical security requirements by saying: one, we don't 13 believe the NRC has convincing evidence to support the 14 design threat levels stated by the NRC to be necessary; and 15 two, if you, the NRC really believe that-such high 16 protection levels are necessary, then the Federal Government 17 should take over resporisfubility for protecting the public.
18 We do not wish to create private paramilitary forces.
19 In stark contrast, the Congress and the intervenors 20 continue to question via hearings and communications, whether 21 or not the American public is being or will be adequately 22 protected by the regulatory safeguards actions of the NRC.
23 The frustration continues to build in all quarters 24 and at all levels. Hea~+/-ng conducted by Senator Glenn on 25 March 22 and 23 of* this year, Commissioner Gilinsky pointed
55 1
that quote: "Even our proposals for strengthening physical 2
security have been met in some quarters by anguished complaints.
3 It is said that we are turning private facilities handling 4
highly enriched uranium and plutonium into armed camps.
5 This raises a question of whether activities of this sort should 6
in fact be in private hands. I do not have the answer, but it 7
is. a question you need to think about. Whatever the answer, 8
the ultimate question we face is not unlike that which 9
confronts the national defense establishment, how much 10 protection is enough? It is a vexing question and the 11 Commission can only provide *,its, best judgment.
12 "The consequences of providing too much protection 13 are painful, but:*the consequences of- ,providing. too little are 14 all too obvious." End quote.
15 Commissioner Gilinsky correctly-concludes that these 16 basic safeguards questions do not now have simple answers.
17 Like him, I have no simplistic and pat answers to offer to you 18 today. On the other hand, I believe the deficiencies of our 19 past approach to domestic nuclear safeguards are apparent to 20 many. Much more importantly, I believe there is an approach 21 to the problem that will provide the answers that are 22 acceptable to all parties, the Congress, the industry, the 23 intervenors and the public.
24 B. Resolving the fundamental safeguards questions, 25 an approach to solutions:
56 1
In my own view there are three unanswered 2
fundamental questions in domestic nuclear safeguards.
3 they are as follows:
4 One, what is the required level of nuclear security 5
that is necessary to protect the public from malevolent 6
utilization of SSNM and nuclear sabotage?
7 Two, what alternative safeguards sytems can be 8
devised that will provide the required level of security?
9 Three, what is the appropriate distribution of 10 of nuclear security responsibility between the private and 11 public sectors, and how does that distribution depend on 12 the level and capabilities.of the perceived threat and the 13 consequences of malevolent acts?
14 As indic~ted earlier, before addressing the nuclear 15 responsibility question, I would like to comment briefly on 16 the first two.
17 Question one: the required level of nuclear 18 security. It is absolutely clear to all who have been,. in 19 the past several years concerned with domestic nuclear safeguard 20 that the level ot public protection that is necessary is 21 directly related to the threat level, i.e., the capabilities 22 of the adversary as defined by such parameters as numbers of 23 people, armament, training, motivation, technical skill, 24 tactics, et cetera.
25 . It is, however, equally true that the required
57 1
public protection level is also directly dependent on the 2,
degree of confidence as required ascto the effectiveness of 3
the safeguard system.
4 Since one could postulate threat levels and confidence 5 levels that are virtually boundless, it is quite clear that 6 to resolve the matter, the NRC must be guided by the original 7 as well as the present intent of the Congress. The legislative 8 history of the Energy Regrganization Act does,iin~fatt, provide 9 giliidance as to the original intent of the congress.
10 In Senate report 93-980 issued on June 27, 1974 to 11 accompany the Energy Reorganization Act the Committee on 12 Government Operations provided this guidance to the director 13 of what is now the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 14 Safeguards:
15 Quote: "His recommendations on regulations should 16 reflect a careful appraisal of what the industry and state 17 and local authorities can be reasonably expected to provide in 18 the way of protection, and what the Federal Government must 19 provide in order to ensure maximum security for the nation 20 at large."
21 In addition, in his remarks on the Senate floor on 22 April 30 and May 28, 1974 Senator Ribicoff noted that diversion 23 or sabotage must .be prevented, quote " at all costs" and that 24 therefore, the NRC safeguards system must be, quote "airtight 25 and foolproof."
58 1
Now, while this Congressional guidance is, to say 2
the lease, hardly quantitative for a maximum security and 3
airtight and foolproof are unattainable_ conditions, the guidence 4 should nonetheless be taken seriously, for it does provide 5 insight as to Congressional intent. IIt clearly indicates that 6 the NRC safeguards system was established by the Congress in 7 order to protect the public, not only against quote, "reasonable".
8 threat levels, but also against large if improbable threat 9 levels. But the question quickly becomes: how large? AJ::.e the 10 only those threats that are no larger than the maximum that is 11 acceptable to and implementable by the private sector?
12 Such a constraint cannot be~£ound in the Congressional 13 mandate to the NRC on safeguards. Nevertheless, that constraint 14 has, in my opinion, been a dominant factor in the development 15 of our safeguards program, for we have never critically 16 examined our assumption.:.:;that the private sector should be 17 responsible for the safeguards protection of the public.
18 Therefore, in deriving our design threat levels, 19 we have been unconsciously been trying to establi~h a quote, 20 "reasonable" end quote, threat level, i.e., one we believe 21 to be acceptable to and implementab1e2by the industry while 22 satisfying Congressional and intervenor demands for more 23 protection.
24 Can we ever resolve this fundamental question? I 25 think we can. I personally believe we must set an upper
59 1 boundary on the threat level, and establish a confidence level 2 that is required of the safeguards system. In my view, the 3 Division of Safeguards should utilize its available information, 4 including the recently completed appraisal of adversary 5 capabilities, and, completely independent of any institutional 6 constraints, should recommend to the Commission and through 7 i t to the appropriate commit~ees of the Congress and upper 8 threat boundary and confidence level to be used for safeguard 9 system design. A decision by the Commission with the consent of 10 the Congress will resolve the fundamental question and provide 11 us with the- essential design criterion necessary for solving 12 question two, to which I now turn.
13 Question Two: Alternative Safeguards Systems to 14 Provide the Required Level of Security.
15 It is elementary to note that ar:i,y safeguards system 16 that can be devised will have as its components men, machines 17 and equipment, and structures. There are, however, many trade-18 offs possible between the safeguards components that can be 19 utiliz~d to achieve the required level of safeguards system 20 effectiveness within the necessary societal constraints.
Such alternative safeguards systems can, of course, be 21 developed by competent teams of systems analysts. Let me 22 now*turn to the safeguards system that has been proposed in 23 the1_,upgrade rule*~.,:,
24 In effect, the security agency study assumed, 25
60 1
without any benefit of systems analysis; that a military 2
solution, one that relies on guards and is therefore manpower 3
intensive was the most effective security system that could 4
be devised. That assumption continues to.this day and it 5
clearly has had a profound ~ffect. In the minds=of almost 6
all who have been concerned with safeguards, this assumption 7 has falsely equated the concept of federal responsibility with 8 federal guards.
9 The mental association between federal responsibility 10 and federal guards is, at this point, so strong that the mere 11 use of the term, quote "federal responsibility" conjures up 12 visions of massive *on-site and on-route deployment of crack 13 troops armed to the :teeth. But to quote from "Porgy & Bess 14 it ain't necessarily so."
15 Responsibility for nuclear security does not 16 necessarily mean massive deployment of federal troops, or 17 for that matter, private guards. That is only the unanalyzed 18 solution that has been proposed. While I agree that it is 19 difficult at this stage for most of us to decouple the concepts 20 of federal responsibility a~d federal guards, it is, I submit, 21 essential to do so because it is probable and perhaps even 22 likely that careful systems an~lysis will identify equally 23 or even more effective alternative safeguards systems that 24 are much less manpower dependent,. manpower in.tensive, and much 25 more dependent on machines and equipment and structures.
61
- 1 The desirability of examining alternative safeguards 2
syJstems is recognized by many professionals and groups 3
concerned with safeguards issues. For .example, the Congressional, 4
office of Technology Assessment in its June 1977 report on 5
nuclear proliferation and safeguards made the following 6 observation, quote:
7 "For example, it should be recognized that there 8 could be an alternative to relying on on-site guard forces to 9 overcome armed adversary attack. A crucial question which 10 deserves serious review is the extent to which safeguards 11 systems can be designed to delay attacking adversaries 12 sufficiently so that the burden of engagement in arrest falls 13 on off-site response forces iristead on-site guards." end quote.
14 Unfortunately, so far therei*,has been no program 15 conducted within or sponsored by the Division of Safeguards 16 to apply analytical and systems analysis techniques to define 17 and develop alternative safeguards systems, examine the 18 trade-offs for the possible while still providing the required 19 level of security.
20 Such a programmatic effort should be instituted at I
21 the earliest possible time. While it would not be a simple 22 task, and it might require considerable resources, there is 23 a substantial likelihood it will provide an answer to a 24 fundamental safeguards question that has ~emained unanswered 25 for much too long.
62 1 To the extent that such a program defines alternative 2 safeguards systems that utilize guards, a~d certainly within 3
our present technology, any system will to some degree. It 4 should be carefully noted that the security agency study has already concluded that guard0~f~e~tiveness is independent of 5
whether guards are federal or private. Inexorably it must 6
follow that the relative effectiveness of private versus 7
federal guards is clearly not a basis for.resolving the issue 8
9 Thus, it appears very clear to me that the basic public policy decision on nuclear responsibility must be decided on criteria derived from American traditions governing 12 propriety and equity.
13 Question 3: Nuclear Security Responsibility.
14 The chronology of events surrounding the issue.of 15 responsibility for nuclear security is *co~plex and goes back 16 many years. Appendix A presents such a chronology covering 17
.the past four years. While it is not intended to be compre-18 hensive, I believe it does include the most sigmificant events 19 that have occurred in that times~pan, pre~enting the intent 20 of the.Congress, the views of industry, as well as the 21 views expressed by groups outside NRC such as the* Rosenbaum i
22 Report, the Ford-Mitre Report and the report prepared by 23 the Office of Technology Assessment.
24 It also naturally includes specific NRC events 25 related to nuclear security responsibility. I urge you to
1 read it. It certainly demonstrates that the ~ssue has been 2
repeatedly identified over a long time period.
3 In my November 15, 1977 memor~ndum entitled: "The 4
Proposed Upgrade Rule: Responsibility for Nuclear Security,"
5 a copy of which is attached as Appendix B the following 6
conclusions were presented:
7 One, the fundamental issue raised by the public 8
comments on the proposed up-grade rule is:the question of whether 9
the private sector should continue to be held responsible 10 for protecting the public, at the level of protection now 11 deemed neeessary by the NRC.
12 Two, the basic public policy issue of responsibility 13 for nuclear security was not resolved by the security agency 14 study, but rather it simply resolved the issue of the relative 15 effectiveness of private versus federal guards.
16 These conclusions and related considerations lead 17 me to recommend the following course of action:
18 One, that an NRC Task Force on nuclear secu~ity 19 responsibility be created to reexamine this basic public 20 policy issue, and present its recommendations to the 21 Commission.
22 Two, that pending the review of ,such recommendations 23 by the Commission, no new rule be implemented which places on I
24 licensees significant new responsibility for the safeguards I
25 protection of the public.
. 64 1 My conclusions and recommendations were forwarded 2 to the Commission, along with related documents, on 3 January 23, 1978 as SECY 78-43. In responding, the Commission 4 in its March 15, 1978 memorandum to the Executive Director 5
for Operations requested that the Division of Safeguards address the question of, and I quote: "Whether or not SECY 78-43 is 6
raising issues about the distribution of responsibility for 7
nuclear security that have not already been satisfactorily 8
addressed by other studies, e.g., the security agency study 9
and the Builder task force."
10 Since I believe that this question is the key one-11 that the Commission has,:specifically raised, I would also 12 like to respond by briefly commenting on; One, the security 13 agency study; two, the Builder task force report; and three, 14 a joint NRC-ERDA letter and report on domestic nuclear 15 safeguards sent in mid-1976 to the White House.
16 I now wish to reiterate my earlier point. There is 17 and has been no question in my mind that the issue of the 18 appropriate distribution of nuclear security responsibility 19 between the federal and private sector has been very clearly 20 and repeatedly identified during the past four years, including 21 the reports for the security agency study and the Builder 22 task force, but there is a wide gulf between identifying 23 an issue and satisfactorily addressing or resovling it.
24 I believe_ the facts, as I will relate them speak 25 convincingly on the matter and clearly demonstrate that the
65
- 1 issue of appropriate distribution of nuclear security 2
responsibility has never been resolved, more than three 3
years after the Division of .Safeguards Was established.
4 Let me first turn to the security agency study 5
and its significant role in this matter. In September 1975 6
a report entitled*, quote: "Responsibility for Nuclear Security,"
7 I pepared for the security agency study by Ton~r and 8
Feiverson of Princeton University was submitted. It identified 9
six criteria for the determination of the responsibility 10 for nuclear security. It analyzed five of those six criteria 11 and concluded, based on these five criteria the federal 12 government should assume responsibility for the safeguards 13 protection of the public.
14 A summary of these criteria in the Toner-Feiverson 15 arguments can be found in Appendix C. The one criteria that 16 Toner and Feiverson did not address was that of the relative 17 effectiveness of federal versus private security systems, 18 .since it was to be the focus of the in-house portion of the 19 security ggency study.
20 The security agency study concluded that using the 21 criteria of relative effectiveness they were un~ble to make 22 a c1ear choice between federal and private security forces 23 since federal guards would be no more effective than private 24 guards, but curiously, rather than considering and rebutting 25 if possible the five other criteria established by Toner and
66 1 Feiverson which lead to an entirely different conclusion, 2
the security.Jagency study did not substantively address 3 the Toner-Feiverson criteria. They simply drew the conclusion 4 that since federal and private guards would be equally effective 5 there was therefore no basis for changing the division of 6 responsibility between the private and public sector. But 7 the traditional issues of equity and propriety developed by 8 Toner and Feiverson did provide a basis for a choice. The 9 security agency study did not adopt the conclusion of the 10 Toner-Feiverson report, and did not refute their logic. Thus, 11 the public policy issue remains unresolved by the security 12 agency study.
13 I turn now briefly to the Builder task force report.
14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Who was the Toner-Feiverson 15 report done f<:>r?
16 MR. BRIGHTSEN: It was done for the security agengy 17 study.
18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: So that they in effect 19 were addressing the report of their own consultants?
20 MR. BRIGHTSEN: It was prepared by Princeton 21 University for the security agency study which is run by 22 NMSS.
- 23. I turn now briefly to the Builder task force report.
24 In the final report several observations were made on the 25 issue of nuclear seeµrit:y responsibility:
67 1
"A fundamental issu~ is whether the industry safeguards 2
posture should be extended to encompass the threat of 3
determined violent assault. There is considerably reluctance
- 4. . expressed by some in industry,,. to ,accept this responsibility, 5 since it is beyond the scope of normal industry security."
6 Again, quote: "This reluctance to protect SSNM 7 against determined violent assault stems from industry 8 beliefs that: one, this level of threat should be a federal 9 responsibility; two, the necessary levels of defense would 10 be damaging to company images."
11 It is apparent from these comentaries that the issue 12 was identified by the Builder task force report. It is 13 equally apparent that it was not resolved.
14 I am drawn, therefore, to what appear.s**.to.i:)be*.1.,,
15 the inescapable conclusion, i.e., neither. the security agency 16 study nor the Builder task force resolved the basid public 17 policy issue.
18 Should this analysis and conclusion not be fully 19 persuasive, I submit for your consideration the following 20 facts:
21 The security agency study was submitted to the 22 Commission on May 5, 1976 and the final report of the*:,;j0int 23 ERDA/NRC Task Force on safeguards is dated July 12, 1976.
24 On July 30, 1976 with full knowledge of the content offthose 25 reports, Ken Chapman, then Director of NMSS and General
68 1
Alfred Starbird, then Assistant Administrator for National 2
Security at ERDA, sent a letter and a report to Lieutenant 3
General Brent Scowcroft, then White House Assistant to the 4
President for National Security Affairs. In that letter, 5
addressing the safeguards upgrades proposed by the Builder 6
task force, Mr. Chapman had this to say and I quote:
7 "Several significant issues would have to be resolved 8
before such proposed safeguards objectives could be achieved.
9 Typical matters of great concern to licensees, as well as 10 ERDA and NRC involve:
11 rone, division of responsibility between the 12 federal government and the private sector for safeguards."*
13 Thus, as of July 30, 1976 the key safeguards official 14 of the NRC draws two conclusions:
15 One, the issue of appropriate distribution of nuclear 16 security responsibility has not yet been resolved. That can 17 only mean that the issue had not been resolved by the security 18 agency study, the Builder task force report or any other NRC 19 study completed as of that date.
20 Two, the issue of appropriate distribution of nuclear 21 security responsibility quote: "would have to be resolved 22 before such proposed safeguards objectives could be 23 achieved." Clearly, what Mr. Chapman was saying that bef>cire the 24 proposed upgrades could be achieved the issue must be resolved.
25 I believe the Commission's question has been
69 1
answered, but it is important to note that not only was the 2
issue unresolved as of July 30, 1976, it remains unresolved 3
today, almost two years later, for no study of this basic 4
public policy issue has been conducted by NMSS during this 5
period. Rather, the staff has proceeded to develop the 6
proposed up-grade rule publishing it for public comment on 7
July 5, 1977.
8 In its March 15,Il978 memorandum, the Commission also 9
expressed interest in the question of, quote: "How strong 10 and widespread the concerns of industry and/or the general 11 public are on this issue." While I have no frirther information 12 to offer regarding the concerns of the indust~y and general 13 public, I do believe the Commission should be aware of the 14 views of professionals within NMSS. A substantial number oL,_
15 present and former NMSS professionals have expressed their 16 support for a reexamination of the basic public policy issue 17 of nuclear security responsibility.
18 This group includes the late Sy Smiley, who was 19 Deputy Director to Technical Programs in NMSS, Gerry Page, 20 Deputy Director-of the Division of Safeguards, Maurice 21 Eisenstein, former Assistant Director in the Division of 22 Safeguards, and Carl Builder, former Director of the Division 23 of Safeguards.
24 However, it should be noted that Dr. Smiley, Mr. Page 25 and Mr. Builder did not support the recommendation that the
70 1
upgrade rule be deferred pending completion of that study.
2 While much time has been lost, it is not too late 3
to initiate a reexamination of this fundamental safeguards 4
question. On related matters, the Commission has asked me to 5
address the scope and plan for conducting a study of nuclear 6
security responsibility, as well as my views on whether or 7
not NRC is the appropriate entity to conduct such a study.
8 My suggestions and views on these questions can be 9 found in Appendix D.
10 My personal conviction is that a lasting solution 11 to the domestic nuclear safeguards issue, one that is both 12 effective and equitabie can only be achieved by a vigorous 13 and high-priority program carefully designed and managed, 14 conducted by the best minds available to us and aimed at 15 providing answers to the three fundamental questions.
16 I believe this approach, which I recommend for your 17 consideration, will lead to a much improved domestic safeguards 18 program that will provide a much higher degree of nuclear 19 security to the American public, thus delaying Congressional, 20 intervenor, public and staff concerns regarding safeguards 21 adequacy. Simultaneously, it may permit industry to expand 22 the contribution nuclear power can make to alleviate the 23 energy crisis that lies immediately ahead. If all of this 24 can be achieved, and we cannot know until we try, the 25 adversaries in the great debate over nuclear power may
71 1
become less adversarial; and certainly the higher public 2
interest to which we are all committed would be served.
3 In addition, the results of such a program may 4
possibly provide a model approach to nuclear safeguards that 5
can be utilized by other nations,~th~s~contributing to 6 international efforts, reduce the prospects of proliferation 7 of nuclear weapons capabilities.
8 However, implementation of the program I have 9 recommended will take not only substantial resources, but may 10 require considerable time, perhaps several years. A 11 related question must therefore be resolved. What can be done 12 to provide,in the interim, the level of protection to which the 13 American public is entitled?
14 As a conclusion to my presentation, I would like 15 to briefly discuss this matter and recommend for your consider-16 ation a proposed solution to this problem. One that would 17 not only provide timely and high-assurance protection*,to the 18 American public, but would do so in the best American 19 traditions of propriety and equity.
20 C. Interim Public Protection: An NRC-Industry-21 Congressional Partnership:
22 In my November 15, 1977 memorandum, I recommended 23 quote: "That neither the performance-oriented safeguards 24 requirements rule, the up-graded guard qualification, training 25 and equipment rule, nor any other rule which imposes on L_ __ _
72
- 1 licensees a significant new assignment of responsibility for 2
the safeguards protection of the public be issued in effective 3
form until the Commission has reviewed .the recommendations of 4
the NRC Safeguards Task Force on nuclear security responsibility."*
5 While this recommendation is straightforward and 6
derives from several considerations which I will briefly 7
discuss,, I feel compelled to state quite clearly that I did 8
not recommend or infer that no additional safeguards protection 9
to the public be provided. I had quit~2the opposite in mind.
10 There are three reasons for my recommendation that 11 the up-grade rule be deferred, which are as follows:
12 One, there is.unquestionably substantial doubt as 13 to the propriety and equity of imposing on the private sector 14 additional responsibility for the safeguards protection of the 15 public. Until this basic public policy issue can be resolved, 16 and in view of the substantial doubt, I believe i t is neither 17 proper nor equitable to force the private sector py promulgating 18 the proposed up-grade rule to develop private paramilitary 19 forces and to shoulder by itself the additional economic 20 burden requiring industry to approximately double its present 21 safeguards costs.
22 Two, the implementation of the proposed up-grade 23 rule. can probably not become fully effective until 1980.
24 My own view is that this is :!5ar;__ too long a time to keep the 25 public at risk if more timely alternatives are avai1able.
73 1 Three, it is possible that even prior to the 2 full implementation of the up-grade rule the Commission and/or 3 the Congress will decide that the upper boundary threat level 4 and the required confidence level are such that more protection 5 than that provided by the proposed up-grade~rule is necessary 6 to adequately protect the public. Thus, the up-gradr rule may 7 turn out to be inadequate requiring further ratcheting of 8 the indust;i::-y.
9 There is a long-t~rm solution to the domestic 10 nuclear safeguards issue and I have proposed an approach that 11 I believe will solve the fundamental safeguards questions, 12 but the pressing question is as follows:
13 Is there an interim regulatory solution that will 14 promptly and adequately protect the public and still be 15 consistent with the American traditions of propriety and 16 equity?
17 I personally don't believe a regulatory approach 18 will work, because of the very nature of ..:the rule-making 19 process, the debated engenders, and the immense time i t 20 consumes. However, I believe there is an alternative interim s*01utd:on that would satisfy the intent of the Congress, would 21 be acceptable to the private sector and allay some of the 22 concerns of the intervenors. The details of this alternative 23 solution will require some analysis. I can today only outline 24 for you the basic policy approach.
25
74 1
The NRC, with the sripport of the Congress and the 2
Aaministration and with the cooperation of the industry, has 3
an opportunity to provide the leadership necessary for a 4 successful, prompt and cooperative program to provide the 5 necessary interim public protection equal to, or +/-f required, 6 better than that provided by the up-grade rule. Two basic 7 steps are necessary to initiate such an interim cooperative 8 program.
9 Step One: as indicated earlier, the NRC in 10 cooperation with the Congress must decide the upper-boundary 11 threat level using specific adversary capabilities. It must 12 also reach a decision on the level of confidence that is 13 required for the effectiveness of the safeguards system, or 14 put another way, the probability of the safeguards system 15 will defeat an attempt by an adversary, characterized by 16 the upper-boundary capabilities to perpetrate a malevolent 17 act of diversion or sabotage.
18 Based on these considerations the required interim 19 protection level must be defined. That protection level may 20 be consistent with theilevel provided in the up-grade rule, 21 but it is possible that it may be greater. In either event, 22 additional safeguards resources would still be necessary 23 over.**,and ~:bove the protection now in place.
24 Step Two: The Federal Government, principally the 25 NRC with the active* support of the Congress and the Administrati n
75 1
can, and in my opinion, should act expeditiously to provide 2
the . :.licensees during this interim period with the funds 3
necessary for these additional safeguards resources. It may 4
even be desirable for the-<F:ederal Government to provide 5
direct resources, such as manpower and specialized equipment.
6 Such direct resources would probably have to remain under the 7 control of the licensees during this interim period.
8 In view of A, the sub$tantial doubt as to the 9 propriety and equity of continuing to require the private 10 sector~to protect the public, and B, the fact that industry 11 has so f arc:borne the economic safeguards burden alone, I believe 12 the federal funding approach that is* outline is an2eq~it~ble 13 one.
14 What is more, I believe that industry would accept 15 i t and the improved safeguards system would be in place at 16 an earlier time than would be possible if the NRC were to 17 proceed to implement the up-grade rule. Thus, the public would 18 benefit.
19 I fully recognize that the interim public protection 20 approach that I*have recommended as an alternative to the 21 rule-making now under way is most unconventional for i t 22 replaces a traditional regulatory action with a proposed 23 government-industry partnership to protect the public. There 24 is no doubt that objections can and will be raised, but there 25 are men of reason and good will on the teams of all of the
76 1
players in the safeguards theater, who recognize the present 2
and increasing contribution of nuclear power to the nation's 3
energy needs, and recognize equally as well the public's 4
right to be fully protected against nuclear terrorism. This 5
may be an opportunity for all of them to work together for 6
the benefit of the public.
7 In conclusion I would summarize my messages as 8
follows:
9 One, let us systematically resolve the fundamental 10 safeguards questions by promptly initiating the necessary 11 programmatic effort.
12 Two, while we are doing so let us cooperatively and 13 as promptly as is feasible, provide the public with the 14 safeguards protection to which it is entitled.
15 I hope that these recommendations will prove 16 useful, thank you for your time and attention.
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Thank you, Ron.
18 Questions, comments, discussions?
19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You are going to provide 20 us with a copy of your 21 MR. BRIGHTSEN: Copies are available at the back of 22 the room.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Vic?
24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Mr. Brightsen, what -- I 25 take it the Toner-Feiverson paper is just the beginBing which
77 1
addresses the question of the availability of forces?
2 MR. BRIGHTSEN: Well, IL.have no assurance that this 3
criteria of Toner-Feiverson is the only criteria that ought 4
to be looked at. It is a very complex public policy issue 5
and there are a lot of considerations that have to go into 6
it. There is a copy of the Toner and Feiverson paper in *the 7 document I will give to you. There is also a summary in the 8
paper of the points or the criteria that Toner and Feiverson 9
- used, they are all there and I have also got a recommendation 10 in their as to how it might be done.
11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: You don't yourself though 12 have strong feelings about inadeq~ac~es in that paper? You 13 are not prepared to rely on that as being the justification 14 for taking the step you have?
15 MR. BRIGHTSEN: No, no. What I'm advocating is that 16 the issue be reexamined, and I have got a suggestion on the 17 proposed approach in the Appendix.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Do I understand you correctly 19 that in the meantime you would,:have the government see to it 20 that this added*protection was available, either by providing 21 funds or equipment or individuals or.*whatever?
22 MR. BRIGHTSEN: I would. Long before 1980.
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: For a private facility?
24 MR. BRIGHTSEN: Yes,s~ir.
25 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Would your proposed study
78 1
encompass the question of whether the facilities themselves 2
w0uld remain private or are you publishing only on the 3
security aspect of ---
4 MR. BRIGHTSEN: Well, I think the issue of private 5
ownership of material would almost certainly come to that 6
concept, and the question of private ownership of facilities, 7 that's a separate question of course. The issue is focused 8 on the material, not the facilities.
9 CHAillRMAN:_,HENDRIE: I expect the federal funding 10 for the facilities, to bring them up would.be a very difficult 11 proposition. I have a notion that the Congress would take a 12 pretty dim view of that.
13 I might also comment that it is my impression that 14 the implementation times that were mentioned in the up-grade 15 had more to do with the practicalities or.ordering .and getting 16 possession of equipment of training people, of organizing the 17 plant to do things than it did with shortage of money. So that 18 it seems to me that an interim protection plan which says, 19 well, we will move federal funds in, would be subject to 20 precisely the same difficulties as implementation as the 21 private sector would be in implementing simi;1a:t.:;,measures.
22 So I don't see any time advantage there.
23 Well, an interesting set of thoughts, and the 24 Commission will want to look at the paper you have provided.
25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: May I ask a question?
79 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes.
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I have one question which 3
your comment raised, Ron,; you said something about there being 4
no real organized research effort, for example, or study effort 5
to determine what alternatives to a manpower intensive 6 safeguards effort be; now, my impression has been that one of 7 the,::st.u9y efforts, when accomplished, I think, under RES' s 8 jurisdiction that Sandia was aimed at precisely this. Am 9 I wrong?
10 MR.BRIGHTSEN: No, you are correct. Mr. Arsenault 11 is here, he might wish to address that. But that is true, 12 we have several studies on-going, have been for some time.
13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I was down there and talked 14 to these people and they were describing the methodology 15 that they were employing, and my impression was precisely 16 MR. BRIGHTSEN: I'm really addressing the point, 17 Commissioner Kennedy that in looking at the fundamental 18 alternatives in terms of manpower intensive versus machine 19 and equipment structures, I don't believe any major study 20 of that sorh*is. under way, al though I may be incorrect.
21 But in terms of looking a structural changes in 22 facilities and what that can do and all of these sorts of 23 things and trade-offs of the various safeguards systems.
24 I know that there were some thoughts given to it during the 25 GESMO here.
80
- 1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Frank, did you want to say 2
something?
3 MR. ARSENAULT: Commissioner .Kennedy to clarify, the 4
project that you are speaking~of is one that would permit 5
an evaluation of alternative safeguards configurations. It 6
isn't aimed precisely at reducing the guard intensive of 7
the system, but it would allow one to make trade-offs and 8
reduce it.
9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, that's that I thought 10 the thrust of Ron's comment was. Okay, thank you.
11 MR. BURNETT: If we could move to the closed 12 session.
13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes.
14 MR. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, we have about another 15 half hour 16 MR.:--BURNETT: Well,. we could probably cover it 17 quicker than that, depending on the questions.
18 MR. SMITH: I'm not sure how you would want to handle 19 it, but we would like to finish.
20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: While we are here, I guess 21 we shoulg..
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I would prefer to go ahead and 23 try to hear it.
24 I'm not sure that the Commission will be prepared 25 to move to~~de6i~ioris today. There is a lot of material here
81 1
and a lot of discussion referring to a paper which I have 2
not se~n yet. I'm sure we will want to read Mr. Brightsen's 3
paper. So I don ~-t look for any sort of Commission action, 4
but I think i t might be helpful for,;.us*.*to.,try ;tckget the 5
rest of the material which you have prepared for the 6 presentation before us.
7 I will therefore thank all of you who have come 8
to this session, and the Commission will take about a two-minute 9 break while we close the session for the last part.
10 (The Commission was recessed at 12: 15 noon_~-)
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
82 1
12:20 Noon 2
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:* I have just discovered we 4 ar::e going to do Tarapur at 1:00 o'clock, which is very 5
dismaying to me, so I will look for a really expeditious move through this section of the presentation.
6 MR. CASE: There are varying points of view, I don't 7
know how you a~e going to get them all in.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, I may no,t-::g~ttthem in, but 9
I'm not going to let this session go:.>much mor::e,-athan another 10 10 minutes. So we will get 10-minutes worth and we will 11 pick i~ up from there and later if possible. I have got to 12 give the Commissioners a change to get back and get straightened 13 aw~y if we are going to make this 1:00 o'clock. It may 14 take the rest of the afternoon, I don't know. But you have 15 got 10 minutes.
16 MR. BURNETT: Okay, the first thing is we are 17 discussing the threat.
18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Some of them will be here 19 for the discussion of the Tarapur matter any way.
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, what do you ~ant to do7 21 Do you want to continue this afternoon?
22 MR. CASE: We could continue later this afternoon.
23 MR. SMITH: Well, in 10 minutes, Bob probably could 24 not present his position. I know Ernie* .Y_olgenau has some 25 things he wants to say, and I know Ed Case has some things he
83
- 1 wants to say in terms of the internal threat. Then we still 2
need that last little part about whether we go interim final 3
effective now, and where we are with respect to the guidance.
4 So I think that another time might be better.
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Anothe~ 10 minutes just isn't 6
going to cut it. It just won't be useful.
7 MR. SMITH: No.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It would probably be better to 9
go to lunch. I think we will have to reschedule, and on the 10 rescheduling, what we will do is start out picking up the 11 classified section of this meeting or presentation which ;,we 12 won' tc.have enough',, room for this afternoon, and then move 13 in to such open session as appropriate.
14 MR. CASE: Did you say perhaps this afternoon on this?
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: A question which is going to come 16 up about scheduling is -- you are going to want to hear this?
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yes, I am.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I suspect some of the other 19 Commissioners will want to hear it too.
20 We are now going in to a two-week period in which 21 there are people who are going to be away. So I don't thini 22 we are going to get back together for two weeks.
23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What about tomorrow?
24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I would have to look at 25 a calendar to,.)be::~sure about tomorrow.
84
- 1 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, you were trying to leave 2
the morning open.
3 This afternoon we have ---
4 MR. CHILK: Tarapur and then an agenda session.
5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: If you want to set this 6
for 2:00 tomorrow, thatts okay.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: No, I think that is going to 8 be too pressing.
9 I guess we could come back and pick it up this 10 afternoon, but I still don't think that we are going to settle 11 i t this afternoon, do you?
12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I don't think we are, but we 13 can get all of this out of the way and then ~e can kind of I
14 mull i t over. For my own part, I think there are some I
15 *
- I questions that I have and there are some th1Rgs we haven I t I
16 discussed yet, which I think are going to belthings we are 17 I going to want to talk about. We probably will want to get I
I 18 together again and discuss them-at some point. So I think I
19 we should get this out of the way. 1 I
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Let's see, we w~ll have to vote I
21 a short nbtice'if it is this afternoon? I I
22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: It is a closed meeting and it i
23 is a continuation of this one. '
I 24 MR. KELLEY: It's open and closed, lyes.
I I
25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: This is a c]osed meeting we
85 1
are going to have this afternoon.
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I am also tied up at 4:00 3
this afternoon. If we get lucky on Tarapu~ that ---
4 '
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Tarapur is so simple we ought 5
to take care of that in.about 20 or 30 minutes I would think.
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I agree. *I 7
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I don't know *what's going to 8
take so long.
9 MR. KELLEY: I think you can just call it a continuati n.
10 If you are going to meet again later on today, I'~ouldn~t 11 I think you would have to go through further Sunshine again.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: - --L~t_'*s *see,; you have to leave at 13 4:00?
14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: 4:00 at the latest, yes.
I 15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: And we are meeting at 1:00 on 16 Tarapur.
17 MR;? BURNETT: Would 1: 30 be legally accentable?
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: For*what?
19 MR. BURNETT: Suppose we ran over, ,suppose we covered I
20 i t now and you didn!t get to Tarapur until 1:30.
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think we are going to have i
22 a considerable interest in Tarapur, and if t~e schedule says 23 1:00 o'clock, I want to come in and sit down at 1:00 o':elock.
24 If we don't that would leave an awful lot of 1people out there 25 and they will .clog the lobby and the fire laJs will be violated.
86 1
All right, I declare this meeting recessed, to 2
continue, and let us target for 2:30, with our fingers crossed 3
then on the expor,t license matter. Okay, 2:30.
4 (Whereupon, the meeting was recessed at 12:25 until 5 2:30.)
6 7
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