ML21348A354

Draft Written Examination and Operating Test Outlines (Folder 2)

ML21348A354
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	08/06/2021
From:	Todd Fish Talen Energy
To:	Operations Branch I
Shared Package
ML20259A339	List: ML21252A188 ML21252A189 ML21252A190 ML21348A100 ML21348A101 ML21348A187 ML21348A266 ML21348A354 ML21348A610 ML21348A697
References
EPID L-2021-OLL-0003
Download: ML21348A354 (35)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Facility: SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.:

SSES-2021 NRC-S1 Op-Test No.: LOC 31 I

Examiners:

Operators:

I I

I I

I Initial Conditions: Unit 1 startup is in progress; currently at 30% power. APRM 13 is downscale and bypassed.

I I

Turnover: GO-100-002 (Rev. 115) is complete through step 5.75.4. 'C' Reactor Feed Pump is in warming alignment. Swap CRD Pumps, then continue startup beginning at GO-100-002 (Rev. 115)

I step 5.76.

I I

Critical Tasks: See Page 2 Event Malf. No.

Event Event No.

Type*

Description 1

NIA N-BOP I

Swap CRD Pumps I

NIA R-ATC, Continue Startup/ Raise power by withdrawing rods 2

SRO I

GO-100-002 I

MALF N I-SRO APRM 11 Self-Test Fails 1 3

M64A TS-SRO I

Technical Specifications :

MALF C C-BOP,

'B' Gire Water Pump Trip 1 4

W29 SRO I

AR-122-001 (A02), ON-VACUUM-101, OP-142-001 I

5/6 MALF T Main Turbine Trip/ All Bypass Valves Fail open C04 C-AII I

ON-SCRAM-101, ON-TU,RBINE-101, OP-AD-300 MALF E Small Steam Leak inside/ Drywell 7

HOS M-AII EO-100-102, EO-100-103 I

MALF E C-ATC, RHR F027A(B) failed closed 8

H06 SRO OP-149-004 i

MALF M C-ATC, B(A) RHRSW Pp fails to '.start 9

S32A SRO OP-116-001, OP-216-00~

I I (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Facility: SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.: SSES 2021-NRC-S1 Op-Test No.: LOC 31

1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)

I Event# 9, 10 2

I

2. Abnormal events (2-4) 3 I

Events # 4, 5, 6

3. Major transients (1-2)

I 1

I Event# 8

4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2 I

EO-000-102, EO-000-103 i

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) i 0

I

6. Preidentfied Critical tasks (:". 2) 2 I

CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

CRITICAL TASKJUSTIFICATION:

I APE.CT.17 - Close MSIVs to Prevent Excessive Cooldown Cooldown (and heatup) limits of:,;

100°F/hr. limit the thermal gradient through the vessel wall, which is used to calculate the thermal stresses in the vessel wall. Thus, the LCO for the rate of coolant temperature change limits the thermal stresses and ensures thevalidity of the PIT Curves. The vessel beltline fracture analysis assumes a 100°F/hr.

I coolant heatup or cooldown rate in the I

beltline area. Violation of the limits I

places the reactor vessel outside the I

bounds of the stress analyses and can I

increase stresses in other RCS components.

EPE.CT.12 -When suppression chamber pressure reaches 13 psig, then A suppression chamber pressure greater initiate drywell spray, before drywell temperature reaches 340°F.

than 13 psig could be indicative of a lower concentration of non condensables in the drywell, thereby meaning that chugging is more probable.

I Chugging occurs when a steam bubble collapses at the exit of the downcomers, the rush of water drawn into the downcomers to fill the void induces I

stresses at the junction of the downcomers and the drywell floor.

I Repeated occurrence of such stresses I

I could cause fatigue failure of these joints, i

thereby creating a direct path between the drywell and suppression chamber.

Appendix D Scenario Outline I SCENARIO

SUMMARY

(SSES 2021 NRC-S1)

The scenario begins with Unit 1 at 30% power and a startup in progress. APRM 13 is downscale and bypassed. Unit 2 is at 100%

f Once the crew takes the shift, they will swap CRD pumps in Jreparation for releasing 'A' CRD Pump for maintenance.

j

• After CRD Pumps are swa,pped, the crew will continue the st rtup in accordance with GO-100-002 and raise power by withdrawing control rods. While the drew is continuing the startup,

• APRM 11 Self-Testfails. The US will stop the power ascensipn, review Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 and its Bases, enter Condition A, and determine APRM 11 must be placed. in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Once Tech Specs are addressed and the Work Week Manager has been informed of the issue with ~~RM 11_, the ?rew will resume the startup.. When the l~ad e~aminer indicates a sufficient react1vIty manipulation. has been observed, 'B' C1rc Water Puf p trips and AR-122-001 (A02),

Circ Water Pump B Trip, annunciates.

• PCOP will dispatch field operators to check the pump and its breaker, then perform the alarm response procedure. I The crew will monitor Main Condenser Vacuum and the US will enter and direct performance of ON-VACUUM-101 for Conditions A and G. The US will also direct PCOP to start a ~econd Circ Water Pump and the PCO will do so in accordance with OP-142-001, Section 2.13]

Once a second Circ Water Pump is started and the Work webk Manager lias been notified of the pump trip, the Main Turbine Trips and 2 Bypass Valves f~il open. The US will enter ON-SCRAM-101 and E0-100-102 (if RPV Level> 13"), then assi~n one PCO to control RPV level and. pressure.

• When the crew determines the Bypass Valvesl are failed open, the US will direct closing the MS IVs prior to RPV temperature decreasing 100° F. With the MS IVs closed, the US will direct level control with RCIC and pressure control with the Main Steam Line Drains.

. I When the crew has stabilized the plant, a steam leak occurs in the drywell causing Drywell I

Temperature and Pressure to rise. The US will re-enter EO-100-102 (1.72 psig) and will enter EO-100-103 (150° F and 1.72 psig), then assign a PCO to address Containment by initiating Suppression Chamber Sprays. While aligning RHR for Supp[Chamber Sprays, per OP-149-004 hard card, the PCO will report that HV-151-F027A(B), Supp Ghamber Spray valve, will not open. The US will direct the PCO to use the other division arid assign a critical parameter of 13 psig Supp Chamber pressure.

I When the PCO attempts to start the B(A) RHRSW pump, it will not start and the US will direct.

using Unit 2 RHRSW per OP-116-001. When Suppression c/hamber pressure exceeds 13 psig, the US will evaluate the DWISL curve and direct Drywell Spnws. The PCO will initiate OW.

Sprays per OP-149-004 Hard Card, monitor Drywell tempera~ure and pressure response, and throttle spray flow as pressure lowers to prevent Containment pressure from going below O psig.

Once RPV levelis being maintained in band, Drywell Sprays lre 'in service, and at the direction of the lead examiner, the scenario may be terminated.

Appendix D Scenario Outline i Form ES-D-1 i

Facility: SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.:

SSES 2021-N~ C-S2 Op-Test No.: LOG 31 Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at approximately 100%1power. 'D' RWMU Pump is out of service.

I I

Turnover: Both Units are at rated power. 'D' RWMU Pump is o~t of service for motor replacement.

Place ESW in service for Unit 2 RCIC Surveillance.

I I

Critical Tasks: See Page 2 Event Malf. No.

Event 1

Event No.

Type*

Description 1

NIA N-BOP Place ESW in service for :unit 2 1D634 C I-SRO RCIC Leak Detection loss of power 2

B 72 01 TS-SRO AR, 108-001, Technical Specifications I

NIA GCC requests Marketing 'Driven Unit 1 Power Reduction of 100 3

R-ATC, MWe.

SRO GO-100-012, OP-AD-338 Att. E, OI-AD-029 I

SS0IUI P i

4 CV10726T C-BOP, Steam Seal Evaporator PCV failure VFAILSP SRO I

RD0IUI I

C-BOP, 5

IF172TVZ SRO

'A' CRD Pump trips (Low: Suction Pressure)

CLO I

RDBRRO C-ATC, 6

D 1803TF SRO Multiple Control Rods Drift DRIFT!

I RDBQRO 7

D 1811TF M-ALL Electrical ATWS I Hydraulic ATWS DRIFT!

I I

RDBLRO C-BOP, 8

D 3447TF SRO SLC Pump trips DRIFT!

I RPARUI i

K23/24A/

9 B/C/DTV C-ALL EHC pressure regulator output fails to zero I

SP i

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (IVl)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.: SSES 2021-NRC-S2 Op-Test No.: LOG 31

1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)

Event# 8, 9

2. Abnormal events (2-4)

Events # 4,5, 6

3. Major transients (1-2)

Event# 7

4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)

EO-000-102

5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)

EO-000-113

6. Preidentfied Critical tasks ~ 2)

CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

2 3

3 APE CT.03, Control Rod Drifting - Insert a manual reactor scram when 3 o1 more control rods are drifting EPE.CT.21 - Lower Reactor Water Level by Stop and Preventing injection I with reactor power> 5%.

EPE.CT.23 - During failure to scram conditions, insert control rods using,

one or more methods contained within EO-113 Table Q-2 to reduce power!

below the POAH.

I CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

The vulnerability to establishing an unanalyzed control rod pattern dictates inserting a manual reactor scram when multiple control rods are drifting. Failure to do so may result in fuel damage from an unanalyzed rod pattern and higher than normal release to the environment.

To prevent or mitigate the consequences of any large irregular neutron flux oscillations induced by neutronic/

thermal-hydraulic instabilities, RPV water level is lowered sufficiently below the elevation of the feedwater sparger nozzles. This places the feedwater spargers in the steam space providing effective heating of the relatively cold feedwater and eliminating the potential for high core inlet subcooling.

Reactor shutdown on control rod insertion alone is preferable to injecting boron since the reactor can be shutdown under all conditions. If control rods can be inserted sufficiently to shut down the reactor, boron injection may be terminated or avoided altogether.

Reducing power to below the POAH, essentially decay heat, will ensure the long term capability of the primary containment.

Appendix D Scenario Outline SCENARIO

SUMMARY

(SSES 2021 NRC-S2) i I

Form ES-D-1 The scenario begins with both units operating at rated power. 1 'D' RWMU Pump is out of service.

i Once the crew has the shift, they will place ESW in service to 1 support Unit 2 RCIC testing.

After an ESW pump is in service, a loss of RCIC Leak Detection Logic 'A' Power will occur due to a power supply circuit breaker failure. PCOP will perform AR-108-001 (F04 & H04) and dispatch a field operator to investigate. While awaiting status, the US will evaluate TS 3.3.6.1 and its Bases, then enter Condition A and determine that the 1channel must be placed in the trip condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, if not restored to operable.

When the crew has addressed the loss of RCIC Leak Detecti'on, the applicable Tech Spec, and contacted the Work Week Manager, the Generation Control (Center will request a 100 MWe reduction on Unit 1. The WWM manager will confirm Marketing and SL T approval. The US will perform a reactivity brief, enter GO-100-012, and direct PCOIVl to reduce electric output by 100 MWe in accordance with the CRC Book and OP-AD-338 Att.. E. PCOP will peer check the reactivity manipulation.

Following the power reduction, AR-106-A03, Turb Seal Stea~ Header Lo-Lo Pressures, and AR-119-001 (E01), Steam Seal Header Lo-Lo Press, will alarm. The crew will determine Turbine Seal Steam Pressure Regulator, PCV-10726, fail cldsed. PCOP will perform AR-119-001 (E01) and throttle open the SSE Pressure Control Bypass, HV-10705, to restore Steam Seal Header Pressure to approximately 4 psig. The US will inform the Work Week Manager.

I I

Once sealing steam pressure is reestablished, AR-107-001 (B01), CRD Pump A Suction Lo Press, and AR-107-001 (C01), CRD Pump Suction Filter High Diff Press, alarm then 'A' CRD Pump trips. The US will enter ON-CRD-101 and direct PCOP to perform the off-normal and restore CRD. PCOP will dispatch a field operator, direct bypassing the CRD Suction Filter, and either restart 'A' CRD Pump or start 'B' CRD Pump per ON-¢RD-101. As CRD is restored, PCOM will monitor for the CRD high temp alarm and dispat~h a field operator to monitor tern peratu res.

Once CRD controller is returned to Auto, three control rods yvill begin to drift in. PCOM will take the immediate operator action of placing the Mode Switch in Shutdown. When the Mode Switch does not cause a scram, PCOM and PCOP will perform thei'r immediate operator actions for a failure to scram by arming and depressing the Manual Scram Pushbuttons and initiating ARI.

The Manual Pushbuttons cause the scram, however, not all!control rods insert due to a hydraulic ATWS and Reactor power remains above 5%. Th:e US will enter EO-100-102 on the failure to scram, exit it, then enter and direct EO-100-113, L~vel / Power, Control The crew will take action to inject Standby Liquid Control, lower RPV level, maximize CRD, and manually insert control rods to further reduce power. The US will alsq request ES-158-002, RPS and ARI Trip Bypass, to permit resetting the scram, draining down th.e Scram Discharge Volumes, and inserting another scram. When the first SLC Pump is starte,d, it trips, and the US will direct the PCO to start the other SLC Pump.

As reactor power lowers to 10%, the EHC pressure regulat9r output will fail to zero, resulting in the closure of the Main Turbine Bypass Valves. The US wil,I direct using the Manual Jack to open the Bypass Valves or open SRVs and control pressur~ between 800 and 1,050 psig.

I

Appendix D Scenario Outline /

Form ES-D-1 Once pressure control has been re-established, the field opelator will contact the Control Room to inform them that ES-158-002 is complete and that they can reset the Scram. With the Scram reset and the SDV drained, the crew will insert a manual scra 1m and PCOM will report when all rods are in. The US will direct shutdown of SLC, exit EO-1 od-113, and re-enter EO-100-102, then direct RPV level and pressure control strategies.

The scenario may be terminated once all rods are inserted, actions are in progress to restore RPV level to the 13" to 54" band, and at the direction of the Lbad Examiner.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I

Facility: SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.:

SSES 2021-NRG-S3 Op-Test No.: LOG 31 Examiners:

Operators:

I I

I I

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 75% power with a shutdown in pro'gress.

I Unit 2 is at rated power.

Turnover: Swap Service Water Pumps, then continue Unit 1 shutdown from GO-100-004 (Rev. 81)

I Step 5.13.

Critical Tasks: See Page 2 I

I Event Malf. No.

Event I

Event No.

Type*

I Description NIA N-ATC, Continue shutdown, reducing power with Recirc.

1 I

SRO GO-100-004 I

I I

I 1D274 C-BOP, Loss of 1 D27 4 I

2 SRO i

TS-SRO ON-250VDC-101, Technical Specifications I

MALF T R-ATC, EHC Oscillations 3

COl C-ALL ON-PWR-101, ON-TURBINE-101 Technical Specifications REM NB C-BOP, Both RRP speeds increase rapidly

'4 I

43A SRO OP-AD-300 EO-100-1021 I

REM NB Fuel Failure I

5 43B C-ALL I

ON-OFFGASRAD-101 I

MALF R Unisolable RWCU leak I 6

R29 M-ALL EO-100-104 i

MALF C C-ATC, LV-10641 fails closed I

7 I

.U04 SRO ON-LVL-101, OP-145-006 8

N/A M-ALL Offsite release limits (Mllj)AS)

EO-100-105, EO-100-112 I

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Facility: SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.: SSES 2021-NRG-S3 Op-Test No.: LOG 31

1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) i Event# 7 1

I

2. Abnormal events (2-4) 3 i

Events # 3,4,5

3. Major transients (1-2) 2 I

Event 6,8

4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2 i

EO-000-102, EO-000-105 (EO-000-104)

I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)

EO-000-112 1

6. Preidentfied Critical tasks ~ 2) 2 I

CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

I I

APE.CT.18 - When MSL high-high radiation levels occur, close the MSIVs i Fuel damage causes increased radiation and MSL drains.

i into the Turbine Building and general i

areas. This will result in additional radiation dosage to the General Public I

and workers.

EPE.CT.18a - When a primary system is discharging outside the primary and An offsite radioactivity release rate above secondary containments and EPB dose rates CANNOT be maintained belciw the General Emergency action level General Emergency criteria, perform an Emergency Depressurization.

represents a substantial increase in the severity of the offsite radioactivity release, relative to the entry condition and accordingly presents a more immediate threat to the continued health and safety of the public.

I I

When the release rate cannot be I

maintained below the General I

Emergency level, emergency RPV depressurization is performed to reduce I

the radioactivity release rate.

Appendix D Scenario Outline SCENARIO

SUMMARY

(SSES 2021 NRC-S3) 1 Form ES-D-1 I

The scenario begins with Unit 1 at 75% power with a shutdown in progress and Unit 2 is at rated power.

When the crew takes the shift, they will continue the shutdolJ'.'.n from GO-100-004 (Rev. 81) Step 5.13., by lowering Recirc flow.

When the Lead Examiner determines the required reactivity manipulation is complete a loss of 1D274, HPCI Control Center, occurs when 1D662-014 trips. :PCOP will perform AR-106-001 (811), 250V DC Panel 1 L660 System Trouble, and AR-114-001 (805), HPCI Out of Service.

The US will enter ON-250VDC-101 and direct its performanc;e. The PCO will dispatch field operators to investigate the 1 L660 alarm and 1D274. While waiting for a status update, the US will evaluate Tech Spec 3.8.7 and its bases, enter Condition :s, and determine 1D274 must be I

restored to operable within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The US will also evaluate Tech Spec 3.5.1 and its bases, enter Condition D, and determine HPCI must be restored to operable within 14 days. The US will also direct the PCOs to identify all components impacted by the loss of 1D274. The field operators will report that the 1 L660 Trouble alarm is HPCI Cpntrol Center 1D274 Trouble, 1 D662-014 to HPCI Load Center is tripped, and that there is.a burnt smell at the breaker. The US will contact the Work Week Manager and request Electriyal and Engineering assistance.

1D274 will remain de-energized for the remainder of the scenario.

When the crew has addressed the loss of 1D274 and the as?ociated Tech Specs, the in-service EHC pressure regulator will begin to oscillate. Reactor powyr and pressure will oscillate. The crew will execute ON-TURBINE-101, Main Turbine Off-Normal Operation. The crew will reduce I

power by 5% and lower the load limit to transfer the oscillations to the Bypass Valves instead of the Control Valves and contact I & C to swap pressure regul6tors. (Note: The scenario will progress before the SRO has time to evaluate TS 3.7.8 for an inoperable Main Turbine Pressure Regulator.)

Once the oscillations are transferred to the Bypass Valves, both Reactor Recirc MG set speeds will rise rapidly. The PCO will perform the immediate operator action of placing the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. The US will enter EO-100-102, RPV Control and direct its performance. When the plant is stabilized, the effects of fuJ1 damage because of the reactivity excursion will be observed. Main Steam Line radiation levels and RB radiation levels will rise.

The crew will execute ON-MSLRAD-101, Increasing OffgasfMSL Rad Levels, and close the MS IVs. The US will enter EO-100-104, Secondary Containment Control, and direct its performance. SGTS automatic initiation will fail causing the US to direct performance of OP-AD-300, ES-070-001 and/or ON-CONTISOL-101 to initiate SGTS per EO-100-104 SCC-1 first override.

Shortly after the MS IVs are closed, a break occurs in the RWCU Pump Room causing area temperatures to rise. The US will re-enter EO-100-104, Se(wndary Containment Control, and direct its performance. When the crew attempts to close th~ RWCU Inlet 18 Isa, HV-144-F001,

Appendix D Scenario Outline I

• Form ES-D-1

• I its breaker trips when the valve is mid-position. HV-144-F004, RWCU Inlet OB lso, cannot be closed due to the previous loss of 1027 4. With the RWCU le 1ak unable to be isolated, the US will direct the PCOs to initiate a forced cooldown with SRVs Jt a rate not to exceed the 100° F /

I hr. limit. The US will contact Security to monitor for signs of steam from the RWCU blowout panel in the CST Berm area and will be told there is steam e*iting the Unit 1 Reactor Building.

The US will enter and direct performance of EO-100-105, Radioactivity Release Control, and requests off-site dose calculations to be performed.

When Suppression Pool temperatures reach 90° F., the US will enter EO-100-103, Primary Containment Control, and direct maximizing Suppression Pobl Cooling by placing the second loop of RHR in SPC.

When the RP Dose Calculator provides the US with the first MIDAS report, the US will *

• determine that the EPB projected dose rates exceed the Ge~eral Emergency Release Rate criteria, enter EO~100-112, Emergency Depressurization, an~ direct a PCO to initiate ADS.

As RPV pressure lowers, the US will direct PCOM to restore and maintain RPV level using Condensate. When Condensate injection begins, FW Startup Level Control Valve, LV-10641, it will not open; requiring the crew to use either the FW Startu1 1 Bypass, HV-10640, or Low.*

Pressure ECCS.

The scenario may be terminated once Emergency Depressurization is performed, RPV level is I

being restored to 13" to 54", and when directed by the Lead xaminer.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.:

SSES 2021-N~C-S4 Op-Test No.: LOC 31 Examiners: ____________ Operators:

i Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is operating at 90% power. HPCI is out of service. Unit 2 is in Mode 5.

Turnover: Unit 1 is at 90% following performance of SO-193-001, Quarterly Turbine Valve Testing.

HPCI is out of service to replace Aux Oil Pump motor. LCO 3.5.1 Condition D was entered 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ago. Swap Service Water Pumps. Following that per Reactor E'ngineering, restore power to 100% at:,;

I 1 % / minute using Reactor Recirc. Once at rated power, swap EHC Pumps. Unit 2 is in Mode 5 with I

2A RHR Pump in service for Shutdown Cooling.

Critical Tasks: See Page 2 Event No.

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 8

Malf. No.

N/A N/A RC02U1 HV15012

_ATVFAI LSP EEHQU0

_0X203_

CLCOPR TOR EE11U0 X0203TM VA ANCZP0 C653_AR 015007T VFAIL MALF_M G0?A EE96U1 52_10104

_50A1GT F_ACT Event Type*

N-BOP R-ATC, BOP C-BOP, SOR TS-SRO C-BOP, SRO TS-SRO C-ALL M-ALL C-BOP, SRO C-ALL I

Event iDescription Swap Service Water Pumps OP-111-001

i I

Raise power with Recirc j

GO-100-012, OP-AD-338:

RCIC Turbine Trip & Throttle Fails Closed AR-108-001 (H01)

I ESS-201 (0X203) Winding Temp increasing OP~04~01 i

I Generator Lockout Relay 86GA trips / Aux Buses will not transfer to Tie Bus EO-100-102 Recirc Suction Break EO-100-102, EO-100-103' Auto ADS initiation fails OP-183-001, EO-100-112

'A' & 'C' RHR Pumps trip ~hen they begin to inject I

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M?ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SSES Units 1 and 2 Scenario No.: SSES 2021-f"JRC-S4 Op-Test No.: LOG 31

1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 I

Event# 7, 8

2. Abnormal events (2-4)

I Events # 3, 4, 5 3

I

3. Major transients (1-2) 1 I

Event# 6

4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)

I EO-000-102, EO-000-103 2

I

5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)

I EO-000-112 1

I

• 6. Preidentfied Critical tasks ~ 2) 2 I

I CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:

I CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

I EPE.CT.01 - Manually initiate ADS or manually open all ADS SRVs when ADS A failure of ADS during certain small or logic has failed to auto initiate and reactor water level lowers < -179 inchel medium break LOCA conditions, would prevent an automatic reactor depressurization required for low pressure ECCS injections systems to inject and restore and maintain adequate core cooling.

EPE.CT.03 - Manually start and align required injection systems to restore Submergence is the preferred method for and maintain reactor water level above TAF (-161 inches).

cooling the core. All fuel nodes are then assumed to be covered with water and heat is removed by boiling heat transfer.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

(SSES 2021 NRC-S4) :

The scenario begins with Unit 1 at 90% power to support the just completed SO-193-001, Quarterly Turbine Valve exercising. HPCI is out of service to:replace the Aux Oil Pump's motor and LCO 3.5.1 Condition D was entered 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ago. Unit 2 is in Mode 5 with 2A RHR Pump and 2A RHRSW Pump in service for Shutdown Cooling. As part of the turnover, the crew will be instructed to swap Service Water Pumps and then restore: power to rated.

I Once the crew takes the shift, they will swap Service Water pumps in preparation for releasing

'A' Service Water Pump for maintenance.

i After the Service Water Pumps are swapped, the US will direct PCOM to raise power with Recirc at less than or equal to 1% per minute per GO-100-012 and OP-AD-338. PCOP will be directed to peer check.

Once power is raised to 95%, AR-108-001 (805), RCIC OUT;OF SERVICE, alarms. The crew will perform the alarm respon~e procedure, determine that the Turbine Trip and Throttle valve, I

HV-15012, has failed closed. The US will evaluate Technical Specifications TS 3.5.3 for RCIC and TS 3.5.1 for HPCI, as well as their bases. Upon review, the US will enter TS 3.5.3 Condition A due to RCIC inoperability and Condition B due to HPCI being inoperable and determine that the unit must be in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

I Once Tech Specs are addressed and the US notifies the Work Week Manager, AR-015-001 (D07), ESS XFMR 201 (0X203) Trouble, alarms. The crew Will perform the alarm response procedure and dispatch a field operator to investigate and perform LA-0X203-001. When the crew receives the report concerning high winding temperatur~s, the US will direct PCOP to transfer ESS Buses 1 D and 2D to their alternate power supply and remove 0X203 from service in accordance with OP-004-001. The US will evaluate Tech Specs 3.8.1, enter Condition A, and determine SO-024-013 must be performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

After 0X203 is removed from service, Generator Lockout Relay 86GA trips, causing a turbine trip and reactor scram. Aux Buses 11A and B fail to transfer causing a loss of Condensate and Feedwater. The US will enter and direct EO-100-102, RPV control.

When the ROs have addressed their scram actions and the US updates the crew on level and pressure control strategy (Maximizing CRD and injecting SLC due to no other high pressure feed and SRVs for pressure control) a Recirc Suction Break occurs causing Drywell Temperature and Pressure to rise quickly. The US will re-enter EO-100-102 (1. 72 psig) and enter EO-100-103 (1.72 psig and 150° F.). With RPV level lowering quickly, the US will direct the ROs to manually initiate all Low Pressure ECCS (Core Spray and RHR). When RPV level reaches -129", the crew will monitor for ADS initiation. When the crew determines ADS failed to initiate, the US will direct an RO to manually initiate ADS. The US will also enter EO-100-112, Emergency Depressurization.

As RPV pressure continues to lower, the US will assign a critical parameter of-161", update the crew on the level recovery strategy with Low Pressure ECCS, and assign one of the ROs as the lead on level control. ROs will report lowering RPV levels add when level is< TAF. The ROs will monitor for low pressure injection and subsequent RPV level response. When Division 1 RHR begins to inject, both 'A' and 'C' RHR Pumps trip. The,US may direct an RO to prepare to I

Appendix D Scenario Outline I

Form ES-0-1 inject with Division 1 RHRSW, if necessary. The ROs will cottinue to monitorRPV level recovery and report once level is restored above TAF.

When level is restored above TAF, the US will direct the ROs to throttle injection, as necessary, beginning with Division 2 RHR, with the intent to use it for cohtainment Sprays if RPV level can be maintained.

• l The scenario may be terminated when the RPV is depressuri* ed, RPV water level is restored and being maintained above -161 ", the US has discussed th I Containment Cooling strategy, and at the direction of the lead examiner.

ES-201 Examination Qutliri~ Quality Ghecklist Facility:

Date of.Examination

Jc.if-JOJ--l

• Ta_sk Descdption Initials Item w

R I

T*

T" E

N

2.

s I

M u

L A

T 0

.. R 3:

w A

L K

T H

R 0 u G

H

4.

G E

N E

R A

L i

r

• a, Verify that the outline(s) frt(s) the appropriate _n:iodel in accordance ~ith ES-401 _ or ES~01 N._

b.. Assess whether the outline was systematicaliy and randomly prep~red in accordance with Section o: 1 ofES~qf or E$~401 N and whether all KIA categories are appropriately sampled.

. c. Assess whether. the outline o~eremphasizes any systems, evolutio~s; or ge~eric topics.

'd. 'Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KIA stafemeJJtii'are appropriate; '

• a.

Using Forni ESc301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover;the.tequired number of

• normal evolutions, instrument and component failures; technical specifications, and major..

. transients. *

. b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares)-to te~t the projected number and

• mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule..

without corrip.romising exam integrity, and eris_u.re that each *applicai1t can be tested'Lisirig at

• least one new or significantly modified-scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated.from t_he

• applicants' audit_test(s), 1ind that scenarios.will notbe repeated on subsequentdays.

c. To the extent possible, assess_ whether the outline(s).conforms with ttie qualitative and.

tiuantitat_ive criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D and in

• Section D.5, "Specific Instructions for the 'Simµlator Operating Tes\\,"' of ES-301 (including overlap).

. I i

. a: Verify that the systems walkthrough outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES:301~2:..

(.1)

• The outlirie(s) contains the requfred number of control room and in-plant *tasks distributed among the safetyJuricticiris as specified on the'form;.

• _.. i.* *.... _....

(2). Task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the,limits specified on the form.

(3) No tasks ar('.l dupllcated_from the applicant's audit test(s).

1

• *(4)

The number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the foirn.

(5}: The number of alternate~path, low-p9wer; emergency, and radiologically controlled area tasks meets the criteria on the form.

' '. I-. ' * ' '

I*

b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specifi_ed on Form ESa301°1; (1} :The tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on thEi form.

(2). At least one task is new or significaritlymodified..

(3). No rnore than one.task is repeated from the la~t two NRC licebsing examinatior:is:

I c.. Determine whether there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and. mix of

. applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated oh subsequent days..

a.

Assess whether plant-specific priorities (Including probabilistic risk ~ssesliment and individual plant examination insights} are. covered in the appropriate exam seplions..

. **:.*I.*...

• b. Assess whether the 1 O CFR 55.41, 55:43, and. 55:45 sampling is appropriate.

• c. En~ure that KIA i~port~hce ratings (except for plant-specific pri~riti~s) are at least 2.5;

d. Check.for duplication and overlap among exam sections and the last two NRC exams.

e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.

f.

• Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO cir-SRO).

a.

Author*

b.

• Facility Reviewer (*) *

c.

NRC ChiefExaminer (#)

d.

NRC _Superv_lsor

~

• Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines..

i

1. The irideperident NRG reviewer initials iiems in column "c"; the chief examiner*;s concurrence is required.

I a

n j,1/.

b*

c**

<$/,71;;'

. Date L//Jh.. 1-.

!j/JF.Z.

..21/4~1

ES-301 Adm.inistrative Topics Outline*

• Form ES-301-1 Facility:

Susquehanna Date of Examination:

7/26/2021 Examination Level: RO IZJ SRO D Operating Test Number:

LOC 31 I

Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type DeJcribe activity to be performed I

Code*

Conduct of Operations R,D Conduct of Operations R,D Equipment Control R,M Radiation Control R,M Emergency Plan coJpleted.Aborted Evolution Log I

Perforr, LPRM Upscale Alarm Tracking Perfo~m Jet Pump Operability Check Determine !Radiological Requirements - Steam Leak in RCIC Room i

NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicantJ require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would r,quire all five items).

• Type Codes and Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator; or c11ss(R)oom I

(D)1rect from bank (:,; 3 for ROs; :,; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (~ 11)

(P)revious 2 exams (:,; 1, randomly selected)

I

ES-301 Administrative Topics Out0ne Form ES-301-1 Facility:

Susguehanna Date of Examination:

7/26/2021 Examination Level: RO SRO lZl Ope1 ating Test Number:

LOG 31 Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type DeJcribe activity to be performed Code*

I Perf~rm Validation of Heat Balance Conduct of Operations R,M Perform LPRM Upscale Alarm Operability Conduct of Operations R,D

. Tracking and Determine Required Actions I I I

I Deter~ine Operability of MSIV Isolation Equipment Control R,D Actuation I

Determihe LCO Applicability and Ability to I

Radiation Control R,D Bypass Secondary Containment Zone 2 Isolation I I Classify an Emergency Condition and Complete Emergency Plan R,N an Emergency Notification Report I

I NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicantJ require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would rJquire all five items).

I I

I I

• Type Codes and Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (:=, 3 for ROs; ~ 4 for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (;;::11)

(P)revious 2 exams (:=, 1, randomly selected)

I

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems :outline Facility:

_S_us_q~u_e_h_a_n_n_a ______ _

Exam Level: RO

~ SRO-I SRO-U Datejof Examination:

Operating Test Number:

I I

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRG-U I

System/JPM Title

a. Reset Recirc Lim 2 Runback

b. Reactor Feed Pump Post Scram Recovery

c. Open MSIVs During Reactor S/U (All rods in)

d. Shutdown Cooling Temperature Control

e. Reset Drywell Cooling Isolation

f. Synchronize the B Diesel Generator

g. APRM Gain Adjust

h. Place Alternate TBCCW Pump 1/S I

In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U I I

i. Hydraulically Remove HCU From Service

j. Start RPS MG Set 2S237 A Locally

k. Manually Burst Rupture Disc I

Type Code*

M,S,A L,M,S,A D,EN,L,S,P A,M,L,S.

D,EN,S D,S D,S A,D,S D,R D,R D,E Form ES-301-2 7/26/2021 LOC 31 Safety Function 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 1

7 5

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must b~ different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety fynctions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A)

(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator I

Criteria for R /SR0-1/SRO-U I

r-6/4-6 /2-3

!5 9/'5. 8/'5. 4

11;::11;::1 k: 1/;:: 1/;:: 1 (control room system)

~1/;::1/;::1

~ 2/;:: 2/;:: 1

~ 3/-5. 3/-5. 2 (randomly selected)

~1/;::1/;::1

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems jOutline Form ES-301-2 Facility:

Susguehanna Date;of Examination:

7/26/2021

~

i Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number:

LOC 31

' I Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRG-U I

System/JPM Title i

Type Code*

Safety Function

a. Reset Recirc Lim 2 Runback M,S,A 1

b. Reactor Feed Pump Post Scram Recovery L,M,S,A 2

c. Open MSIVs During Reactor S/U (All rods in)

D,EN,L,S,P 3

d. Shutdown Cooling Temperature Control I

A,M,L,S.

4

e. Reset Drywell Cooling Isolation D,EN,S 5

f.

g. APRM Gain Adjust D,S 7

h. Place Alternate TBCCW Pump 1/S A,D,S 8

I In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U I

i. Hydraulically Remove HCU From Service I

D,R 1

I

j. Start RPS MG Set 2S237 A Locally I

D,R 7

k. Manually Burst Rupture Disc I

D,E 5

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must b~ different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety fimctions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

I

• Type Codes Critbria for R /SRO-1/SRO-U I

I (A)lternate path

~-6/4-6 /2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank

~ 9/S 8/S 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 2 1/2 1/2 1 (EN)gineered safety feature

,2 1/;:,; 1/;:,; 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power/Shutdown

11;:-;1/;:-;1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A) 2 2/2 2/2 1 (P)revious 2 exams 1s 3/S 3/i,,. 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 12 1/;:,; 1/2 1 (S)imulator I

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems 'outline Form ES-301-2 Facility:

Susquehanna Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U

~

Date 1of Examination:

Oper~ting Test Number:

i Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRQ-U I

System/JPM Title Type Code*

a.

b. Reactor Feed Pump Post Scram Recovery L,M,S,A

c. Open MSIVs During Reactor S/U (All rods in)

D,EN,L,S,P

d. Shutdown Cooling Temperature Control A,M,L,S.

e.

f.

g.

h. Place Alternate TBCCW Pump 1/S i

In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U I

i. Hydraulically Remove HCU From Service D,R

j.

k. Manually Burst Rupture Disc D,E 7/26/2021 LOG 31 Safety Function 2

3 4

5 All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must beidifferent and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

i

• Type Codes (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A)

(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator Crityria for R /SRO-1/SRO-U 1-6/4-6 /2-3 I

~ 9/S 8/S 4

~ 1/;:;: 1/;:;: 1

~ 1/;:;: 1/.:: 1 (control room system)

1/.

1/.::1

.:: 2/.:: 2/.:: 1

~ 3/S 3/S 2 (randomly selected)

?;1/;:;:1/21

• . Facility: Susquehariria*.1&2 :.

• Group 1,

3 3

.. *. Em.ergency and.

• Abnormal Plant:

1,.. 1

• 4 4

Evqlutlons.

• 4, 5 6

2.

• • Plant**

Systems :.

2

• . Tier totals

.4 4

4

• 3.

. *1.

.. 2'.

.. 3:

1 *..

4' '.

. 1. : 2 : 3:

.4 i-----,--,--+--,---,.,.----,-..,....;,-..,.....-,.,.- * *. 10 *.* *,----t-,---t--,-,-t--,t

• .3

3.

• -*~: I.-.

• 2

• 2. 2.

.1

2.

• E.nsure that.at least tw.o topiC$.from.* every *applic.able K/A category are i;;arnpled. within each tier of the RO and.

SRO~orily outline sections."(L~.; ex9ept for orie categ:ory in Tie'r.'3: of the *SRO~only section; the ~Tier. Tqtals" in..*

• each KIA category shall not-be Jess tlian twq). (One Tiei"3 radiatlion cont~o.I KIA ii; allpwed ifit.is replaced by a' KIA from another Tier 3 category.)

.. :*. The point total for Ei~ch group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final'.. * ** :

. *, point totai:for'each group an*d tier niay deviate.by +/-1 from that specified in ttie table bas.ad.on i\\lRCrevisicins. The I

. *.final RO*~xam rnusttotal 75 points; anc:lthe*SRQ~only-e~am mllsttqtal-25 points;

• .*... ****:*.--.. **.* *** _*.*._. ** ::.*.**.. **.* __ **.. _* ****:*.** __.*... *. *. ***:: I.*.. * *** _*_.. ***-*.....*... :-.....*...

• * *. ~ystems/evolutioh_s within each group ate-identified on the outline. Systems :or evolutiorjs ~h.at do not.apply at _the

• . fa~ility should. be deietec:i' with justification. *operat_ionallfin,iporta 1n( ~ite~specific systems/evolutions that are* not :*

.... included qri.the putline should be added. Refe_r.'to* SE;icticm D'.1 ;b of E*s-:-41'.!'1 *for. guiqance regarding the elim_ination..

. ofinappropriate KIA statements. *

. **. 4;.

.. Selecttop_ics 'from as many systems and evolutions l;IS posi;;ible. Sample' everY: system or evolutiori in the group.*

• *.befor~ selecting ~- sec_orid top_ic for ahy system 9r'evoh.iticin_:.* :.

... : 5,. :.. *** Ab~ent a p.l~rit~~pecific priority; ~niy th~s~ K/As h~ving an i1Tipo7anc~ :rating (IR) of 2.5.or higher $ha Ii 'be. : *.

.. ~~lected. Use the RO arid SRO ratings for the-RO and SRO~only portion~. respectively'.. *: * *. * * >..* * *. :.*

• ~-. s.~m ~RO Wplcs to, i1e,s 1 *nd 2,om th~ shaded s~refOs +

~A c~gones; 7;. *

. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2:shallbe selected from $ection 2 of the KIA catalog, but the*tc;>pics must be

.* 'relevant-to the applicable evolution or sy$tem-. Refer.to S~ction b.{b ofES-:401 for'the aj:>plici;tble Kl.As.::....

8;

. *. * :?n_.the.foUowing :pages,*;nter'the ~A n-u~ber~*.**~ brief.de~~riptiin of.earih tqp;~,:th~-to:p;~; :IR~ for:th'e.appUcabl~*

• .* license level, and the point to.tals (#).for each system and category.:Enter. the group*and*t1er totals for each... *..

• I

• category in the table above. lffuel-handling: equipment is salt!pled.in *a category :other than. Category_A2 or G* on.

• I the SRO.0only exam, enter it on t.he left side. of.Coh.imn.A2 tor Tier 2; Group 2; (Note 1

• ooes not apply);.U.se *.*.:

.. (juplicate.*~ages _fo.r RO and SRO-on)y e_x~ms.:: :- * * :.* : :..

• f :**:- : *. ***.* ** * : * * **: : :. : _* * * : **:: : * ** :...... :. : *.

9; *

• . Fo~ Ti~,r-3;s~lect t~pics from Section i Oi tb~ Kl~ catalog anq ept~!' tt.ie_.KIA number~.,description,s, iR~. and.point.. *.. :*. *...

• . totals_(#).on Form ES-401~3.-Lin,it S~O se!e.ctions to K/As th.at are li_nked to 10 CFR 55.13.. _:.. * *.* **. * :_. *.. * :.

• G*. ~iimeric Ki~s.. *

.. ttie~~ ~yst~ms/elioluti<>n~ m~st b~:rricilu~~d as. part of ttie :sarhpl~ (as ~ppiicabl~ tci tiie fadlify) iNlie~ ~evision 3 *

• of the KIA catalog i~ used to develop the.sample:plan. They are not requited Jo be included :when using earliet

. revisjohs'ofttie K/A catalog. *..,

. **. *.. *.. **,the~e sys\\emsiev6luU9rism~y be ~limin~ted f~c;>tn the sample (a~ appllcable tt>' the f~cilityj wheri Revision 3 of *.. *

.... the i<IA. cata_log l~ use~ to develop the *sample pla~.:.

-: *. I>' :.:.. **... * : : ***:::. : *.*._.. * *.. *. * :. *.'.: :. **:.. *.*

P~se *1 or 12 *.

llt;:~-4UJ.

E/APE #-J Naine /

. Item #

• Safety.Function -.

• 1

• 295001 (APE 1)

Pa"rti~I or"Corriplete.

Loss _of For~ed Core

. flow Circuia~ion-/ 1 _

&4_.*

.2 * *. : 295001 (AP,E 1) *.

Partial or.. : -..

. * ~onjpiete-Loss of

• F9.i'ced Core-Flow:

.

• Ci~ctilati9ri / 1 ~-4*

. :a 295003 (APE:3) --__

.. : Partial or Compiete Loss of AC *Power / -

5'

• ..4 *. 295004 (APE 4)*. : -_*

• _ _ Partial_ or l_otal Lo~s. :

• of oc Power,$..

• . 5 _.. 295004 (APE 4)

. Pa_rtlal or total __

loss *of *cc.Power*

.. :, s*..

e_.

295005 (APE-5).

• * -- : Main. Turbine Gen~rat~r Tripl *:J

• 7.*

295005 (APE 5).-.* - -

_*

• Mairi Turbjrie:...

• . Gener!1tor Tiip i_3..

• 8 *

• 2950Q(?(APE 6) -

• . - Sctam 11 *

• 9 2950:16 (AF'E 16).*

ControlRoom :

.

• Aban~:onment /7 rn-_* : 2~5018 (APE 18)

-_. Parti~I or Col)1ple~e. : * -

• Los~ !)f CCW_/8.

• 11. *. 29501~ (APE'18) _*

. P~rtlal or :.

- - Complete Lriss_ 9f- -*

ccw*,_s

• 12 29501~-(APE 19).

. partial or Compiete..

Loss of l_nstrument -

Air/8:

• 13. - 296019 (APE 19)

Part.la! or

Complete Loss of *

. fi.-strument Alt; ii

• 14 295021_ (APE 21)*:

Loss of Shutdown :

CoQling/4

_- * : BWRExc1mination Out!ine ~Si,Jsqu~h.anna r ~) _* :*. --_ _ _.

- Emeraencl/ and Abnormal Plant Evolut1ons;.,...T1er 1/Gr,oui> 1 /RO/SRO) *

.. Form ES-401-1 *

• X

. X

..Q#

--X-(295001M 1.05) Ability to operate and/or monitor"the following.

as they appiy to.PARTIAL o~* corin_PLETE LOSS Oi=:

f=ORCED CORE FLOW CIRfUl,ATl()I\\I (CFR: 4L7/ 45.6):

Re.circ4lati~n fl_ow _control system:

• 3.3.

10 X

i

• x

- I..

(295001AA2.06)* Ability to :determine and/or Interpret the.. * *: :3.~

• fo*110V:.1ng as they app_ly t~.-~A_RllAL OR c*oMPlETE: L~~~ _

9F F_ORCED:CORE_FLOW _flRC:ULATION (CFR:"4~.10.f._43_.5 - _

/ 45;13): Nuclear. boiler. instrumentation

- - - - *r --,

(295003A_K3,0_6) Kn<iwlEldge pf _the_ reasons _fo_r the_ foll~wing. *

• :3.7- *

... : responses as _they apply to ~ARTIAL OR COMPLETE :LOSS

• OF A.C. _POWER_ (CFR: 41,5 /A5:6t Contc1inmenf isolation -.

.*. -1.. :-

62 -

(295004~.02) Abili1¥ to _deiermirie and/oririterpretthe *

• _ _ 3.? *_.

• 58. *

• follo~ng as_ they apply t~ _P~RTIAL OR COM_PL,ETE LOSS ()F

• _ D.:c. P~W~~ (CFR: 4.1.1_0 / 4 1

3._S, I 45.13): _Extent of partjal or* :.

• complete _IQss ~f p.c. *P,ower _. _

• X. (295004G2.1.23).PART1AL OR TOTAL LOSS.OF.DC POWER.. 4.liJ.

• .*. 85

. t

/.6: G2.1.:Z3 -Conduct of.Op!!riltlon~:-Ability to perfo~ *

• _

specific system and integrated plant procl!dµ*res* dl!ring.alf I *

• modes of_ pl_allt oi,.eration (f ~R:_:41_:1~ :t43:5 / 45:2I4S:6).: *

~~9!i005AA2;07)" Abllity"to d~termlrieandtor inte*rpret ~he._ :

• .. 3._s_* *

• * *99 foH_oiNln!:J as they.apply.to ft'AIN-~~~BINE GEN,ERAT~R. -

TRIP (CFR: 41.10}43:~l 4,.13): React!>r:~~te~-l~vel (295005AK3.06) KnoWledge :of the reasons f(?r the following

responses as they a*pply to M~IN TU_RBINE GENERATO~.

TRIP XCFR: 41.5 I 45_.6): "Re~ligr:,rrient *of !!iectrical di_s~ributirin

---

--_ -_--. :.* --- - -I. - _.- --_: -: -. _.. :

• 69.

x_....

• _(295006AA2,06) A_bi_lity to de 1termine and_tor interpret 1he*. -: _

• 3.5 folloiNing*i,is they apply lo SCRAM (CFR: 41.10' "~-5 / 45: 13):

• Cause.of reactor SCRAIVI l. : :... _.... :.

.. 30.

_ X. (29!)016~2.1.28)_ CONTRC)Y:ROOM *f\\BAN[?O_NMENT/-7:. - *. : :4.1 *.

• *_25

-_*. G2.1.28 K~6v./ledg~ ofthe p~rpcise and functi_on of major. _

system components and I *controls. (CFR: 41. 7) *

.. -*.... :-..... **I... :-..... _.*.

• * * (29l>0~8~K2.01_)_Knowli;idge [~f the inti;irrelations between_*.. -_ *

• 3.3 *. * * * *.48 -

• PAR:TIAL OR_C0Mf>LETE tps$ OF cqMPQ_NENT G00UNG WATERahd the following (C,FR: 41:7 / 4!).8): Systen1 loads

X (295018G2.4.21) PARTIAL OR COMPLE:rE !-_OSS-O~ CCW/

8: G2:4.~1 ~-Emergen:cy Prdce"ciures*; Plan: l<n~wledge* of :

th~_paramEiters_i!ndl~gii: ~s~d to ~~sess_ Jhe status o( '. _

- *

• safety fi.mctlons, such ~s r'eactiVity coritrot, !:ore co_oling : -

... I-*.

. -* ~ild heat rer,ioval; reactor_foola!lt system integrity;.

containment-conditions, radloactlitlty f'elease control, etc

• __ * (CFR:41.7-i:43,5"/45.12):l *. *

- -89 (2~5019AA1.01)_Abilityto op,erate and/or monitor th_e following:

__ 3.5*

. *

• 50 as they 1:1pply to PARTIAL OR GOMPLETE LOSS Of

. INSTRUMENT !1,IR (CF.R: 41.7145.6): *sackup air supply.

I:

X 295019G2,4.35*.Partial.or CQmpiete _Loss. Qt-Instrument Air..

• 4;0..

_.. Knowledge of:l~cai a_uxlli~ry oper~tor:tai;ks:ci~r_irig ~11. : -- _.

• .. *

• emergency and the resultant operational effects. (CFR:

41.10,43.5/45.13)

. I *

.* * * (295021AK2,0_7) Knciwledgefof the interrelations betWeen

• 3.1

• _.. LOSS OF SHUTDOWN CO<f>Lil'JG ti(id the following (CFR:

• _-: 41,7.145:8): Reapfqr r~circLil,ati1m. _ *_* i:: :.

. Page2 of12

.92 7l

- 15 29!,023 (APE-2~).

Refueling,I\\C1/iderits

-18**.

• 16 295024 (EPE:1)

_ x- :

High Drywell Pressure/ 5 :

. 17

• _ 295025 (EPE 2)

High React_o_r

.

• Pr~_ssure /. 3 18 -. 295026(EPE3)-_

x*.

-. - Suppressi9ri PoC>I -..

. High Water __.-

.

• Teniper~tµreif

. 19 __ - 295028 (EPE 5).

)_( _ -

_ Higti Or:yv.,ell

- Temperature*(Mark I -

ari~ Mark II only) I 5:

- - 20.

• 295030 (EPE 7) -

Low _Sµppression.

• pool Water L~vel / 5 -

.

• 21 -- 29$030*(E.PE 7)

. Lov,,Suppression.

• Pool Water_Level/ 5 22. - 2!;15031 (EPE*8)

X

__ - : R~actcir L,ow Wat~(

• . Leve)/ 2

. -* 23 - * : 29503(' (EPE 14)

• s_cram Goncim:on --*.

PresenUnd *

. : Reactor:P~wer:.

Above APRM : -

• Downscale *or.*

u!'~rio~nf 1 : -

• -- 24.. 295Q37 (EPE 1:4)

. Scram: Co~ditjon * *

• Present and.. : *

R¢,ictoi-_Power Above.APRM

• Downscale or :

• Unknown/ 1

• 25 295038 (EPE 15)

. High Offsite.. *..

R~qi<iaclivity

. : Release Rate i. 2!f.

• 600000 (APE 24)

Pl~ritFir~ _On Sit~/ _

8

• * ?7 700000 (AP"' 25)* -

X- :

• : G¢rieratp(Volt~ge *:

and Electric Grid

• Disturbanc~s / 6

~95027 (EPE 4)

. High Containment.

Temperature (Mark_

• Ill Containment -

- _ QriJy)/5 -_

• X X

(295023AJ\\1 :03) Ability to op~rate al')dfor-m_qriiforth_e*fo11owing

• 3.3 * - _ 24 * - *

~s they apply to _REl"UELINGI ACCIDENJS (CFR: 41". 7 / 4_~.6):

Fuel handling equipment _ _

(295024EK1:01) Knowledge*i>fthe operational implications of * - 4.. 1 *

• 54:.*.

• the_folio\\1/irig c~ri~epts as they apply to. i-i°IGH'DR'(WELL.. _*

• . PRESSURE (CFR:.41.8 to 41.10): Drywell integrity: Plant-Specifi_c I _

. X. (2950~5G2,2.39)H_IC3H REA9TO.RPR_E:SSURE / 3: C32.2,39* ~. * *: :3.9 *

• 70"

• .*. - Equipment Control: Knowledge of less than or equal to one

_ hoi,J(Technical ~p-ecifi~ation ~ct1on s~~te*m~r:its for.sys.terns. I

• (CFR:41.7f4~.10143.2J45.13)

I. -

(2!l5026EK2,06) Knowledge of the interrelatioris between*_*..

• 3.5

• . _*55 SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE arid the.following (CFR:.4f7/ 45.18): Suppression pool level:...

,. -..

• 1*.. *.*-.... -_-

(2!l5028EK2.01) Kno~edge ofthe interrelati.ons between"HIGH.

• 3:7'.-.

• _ 16. -*

ORYVVE.L_LTEMf:'ERAT_L!RE.larid th~ following (C~FF41;7 r *

• 45.8): DryweH spray:Mark~l&II

-- l. --

X. (295_030G2.1_.2p)LOWSUP!fRE~SION POOLWATER_LEVEL *.: 4.6.

"27 -

• *. / 5: 2.1.20Ability to.interpret and execute procedure:steps.. : - *.

(CFR:Atto:t:43~5/45J3).:

• 1-*

• .X* (2~5030(3~.4'.6) LOWSU_P~RESSION:~OOLVI.IATER~EVEL

--_ 4,1 -

. 96

/ 5:_G2.4~6 Knowledge,-e>f EOP-mltlgatlon*~trategleis. t (CFR; 41;10/ 4~.5./ 45;13).

.. _ (295~~1 l;:_K1.03) Knowledge pUtie Qperational implicatiqns of

• 3._7.

13 * *

• _- *. the folloW!ng con\\:epts !i!I they apply _tp. REA<;;TOR _LOW WATERLEVEL (CFR: 41.8 to-4~:10): W~ter levei effects ori _ :.

reactor power : -.. * *.

• 1

• X (295037EA2,Q7) Ability to dete,mine and/ot interpret.the *.

. : -4;2 *

.. 94.. -

foOowing,as-they'appiy-to"scRAM*cor,n;>ltlO~ PRESENT.

• .. AND.REACTOR P.OWER -ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR

~.

UNKNOWN_-(CF~: 4*1 '.1,0 / 41_.5./ 45.13): Cont~inment conditlons/isolations

• . (295037EK3,07) Knowledge pt.the reasons.for thefollowing.

_

• 4.2.

• _- 53

_ responses_cis they apply to ~CRAM C_ON.DITION P_RESE~T _

• AND REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE-OR*.

UNKNO\\IVN (CFR: 41.5145.6): Various alternate methqds of

°'"°' RXi ;,,,i"'"°"' Plom-rflo

• X.. *, : (295q38EA~!:94)_Abilit}' tc;, de~err:rii_ile and/or 1merpre_t the *

• _ _

• _ 4.1 *.

.1 following 8!! \\hey apply to HIGH. QFF-SITE RELEASE RA TE _ -

• (CFR: 41.10143:5 t 45.13>': source of6ff-sit1fre1ease. -- * *

. 1--.

(600000AK3:04) Kriov./fedge ;of.the r¢asons.for the folloWiilg

• _ :* _ - 2:5*

.63

- response$.as*thl;!y *apply toPi_LANT ~IRE 0~ SITE(CFR: 41.51

45.6): Actions con\\airied iri the abriorin~I_ procedµre for' plarit :

fire on site

_ -_-. - :.* --_ : I *_*_ : *.- - *-* * *_.. * -. * *..

(700000AK1 :02) Klll9WLEDf3E RO:-Kn0Wled9e of the. :. * *_ : -

• 3.3 *

• 28; -

opei'atiorial implicatioris of the follo~~g co~cepts as they apply to GENERATORVOLTAGE ~ND ELECTR_IC GRID. -.. _ *

• _: _.-

DISTURBANCES: O_verexcitation (CFR: 41 A, 41.5;.41. 7,- 41.10

, 45.8)

_ 1

• i>11ge 3 0112

l!KJA Category Totals:

ES-401 *

• E/APE#/.Name/

item#. Safety. Function 28

• 295002 (APE 2)

Loss of Mairi

• Condenser Vacuum

/3 29

• 295009 (APE 9).

• Low Reactor Water Level/ 2 30 *

• 295012 (APE 12)

• High Drywel!.

TempE;!rature / 5

.31

• 295013 (APE 13)

High Suppression Po.ol Tempei"atcire.1 5..

32 *

• 29~014 (AP.E 14) inadvei1erif *.

Reactivity A<!dltlon If

• 33 295017 (APE:1"7) *

• Abnorrnai.Offsite Release_ Rate / 9.

34 295022 (APE 22)*..

Loss of Conirol Rod*

Dri.v.e Pumps / 1.

I....

I.3 4 j 4 J 3 L 6 7 !Group PoihtTotal: *

• BWR Examination Outline (Susquehanna ~ &2) *. * :

I..

Emeroencv-and Abnormal Plant E.volutiohs-Ti.er.1/Group:2 (RO/SRO)

I K1 K2 1<3.* A1.A2

• G*

KIP! T.opic(s)

• X X

X (295002AK2.03) Knowledge bf the interrelations between

• LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM.and the following (CFR: 41,:7 i-45.8): PCIS/NSSSS i

X (295009G2.4.2)LOWREACTOR WATER LEVEU 2: G2.4.2 -*

Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of system set points, Jriterlocks 'and autom~tic action's associated with EOP enfry co11ditions (CFR: 4.1.71145.7 / '45.8);

(295012AA2.01) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as itiey apply to HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE

• . (CFR:' ~1.10 ( 43.5 I 45: 13): ~rywell temperat1,ire.

(295013AK:3.01} Kriciwledge bf the*reasoris for the following responses.as !_hey ~pply to HiGH SUP.PRESSiON POOL TEMPERATURE (Ci=R: 41.51145.6): Suppression pool cooling*

operation *

• I *

• X. (2~~014~2:4.41).I_NADV.ERTfl;!",IT REACTl\\fl:rY ADDmOIII:/ :1:

G2_.4.41 -. Knowledge:of the 1 e_m~rgency ac:tion IElVel.. *.

• thresholds and cla$sifications.1 (CFR:: 41.10 / 43:5/ 45.11) f..

I Form ES-401-1

• iR 3.5.

4.6 35

• 3.. 8 64

.*. 3.6

• 8 81 X (295017G2:4;47) ABNORMAL OFFSITE RELEASE RATE/. 9:

• 4.2 80 G2.4:47 ~ Emergency Proi:Jdures/Plan: Abiiity° to.diagnose.

and recognize,trends, iil an.I accurate *a*nd timelyinann*er.. *.

utilizing the appropi"lat~ control room reference material.

(CFR: 41,1() /43,5 / 45.12); I *....*.. *... * * *.. *.

_295022AK3_.01 Knowled!;le ~f ther.ea~ons for the following*. :

3.7

• 38 re~ponses as they apply to LOSS O.F CRO P.lJMPS (CFR:. 41,5

/ 45.6): Reactor qi::i"am

• I

• i.**

• 35 295033 (EPE.10).

• X..

{2Q5033_E.K1 :02) Knowl~dge pt the operational implicatiori$ of

. *. 3:9.*

• 36..

• High Secondary.

• Containment Area Radiation.Levels l 9 36 *.*

295035 (EPE 12)

• Secondary Containment High

• Differential Pressure

/5

• 37 295035 (EPE 12r

. Secondary.. * * *.

. Containment High.

Differeritial

• Pressure/ 5 295007 (APE 7)

l;ii!;Jh Reac:tor.

. pressure/ 3 295008 (APE 8)

• High Reactor Water Level(2 295010 (APE 10)

. H1ghDrywen *.

Pressure/5.

• 295015 (APE 15) lm;omplete Scrar:n /

1 295020 (APE 20)

• lnadverteni

. Cciritairinient Isolation / 5 & 7

• x X

the folli:>wing c_oncepts as they apply to HIGH _SECONClARY CONTAINMENT AREA RAD:IATIQN LEVELS (CFR: 41.8 to 41.10): Personnel protectioril I...

(2Q5035EA1:02)Abilityto op~r,;1te afld/ormohitodhe following*

3.8 as ttiey apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT.HIGH

• 01FF~~ENT1AL.PRESSU_~E (CFR:.41.1,:45J;l): SBGTJFRvs I....

l...

(295035EA2.02)Ability to dptermine and/or interpret the*

2.8*.

• . following as :they apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

_HiGH DIFFl:RENTIAL PRE~SURE:(CFR: 41;1_0 i 4:J:5 i 45.13): Off-site release rate:.Plant-Specific

.. I....

• • 1 I I I* J 31 81

295029 (E:PE 6) *

• High Suppression pool Water Le\\iel/5

• 2~5032 (E;PE 9).

High Secori~ary Contaimne11t Area Temperature /_5 *

~95034 "(EPE f1)

• Secondary *.

containment. - _*

• Ventil_ation High * *

. ~adiation/9

• 295036 (EPE 13) *

secondary.. *..

• Containment High.

• Suinp/Area Water Leveli 5...

5ooooo_"(EPE 16)

High Containment Hydrogen_*..

• Concentration/. 5 KJA Category Totals:

• Item#. System / Name *

• 38

• 203000 (SF2; SF4

• RHR/LPC.I)

RI-JR/LP(;(:

lnj~c:ticin iv1Qde *

• : 3~ *

• 20!5000 (SF4 SGS)

Shotqown cooling * *

• 40.

. 205000 (~f 4 SCS).

.. 42.

Shutdown Cooling

• 406000 (SF2, *SF4

• HPCIS)

• Higli~Pressure..

Coolant Injection 209001 (SF2, SF4

. : LPC.S) 1-ow-Pressu~e Core.

Spra}'

1

• 1 * * *2 *

• 1-2. 3 Group Point Total:

_*. * * *. *

• BWR Examinat_ion Outline (Susquehanna/1&2) _*. * * *.. :

Emergency and. Abnormal Plant-Evolutioris-,-Tier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO).

• K1. K2 K3 K4 K5 K6.. *A1 A'2

.A3 A4 G*

X X

X X

(203000K4.09) Knowledge of *

.. RHRiLPCi:INJECTION l'viooE*.

.. <Pi.LANT ~PECIFIC) desigti...

f~ature(s)_ and/or interlo_cks which*

p~ovi~e for the_ following (CFR:

_ 4p): Sl,\\rveillance for all operable.

i::?_!TIPOrients.. *

(~Ci5000~5.03) Knovlledge of the operational.implications *ot the *.

f9ilo1Mng cori~epts a~ they apply to.

SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM

(~HR SHUTDOWN cooUN~..

r..,oOE) (l:FR: 41,l~ '* 4~;3): H~at" removal mechanisms * * * *.

• I.,..

.. (205000K6.02) Knowledge ofthe*

. eftett that a loss* or malfliriction**of I

t~e foHoWing will have on the.

• *. SHUTDOWN.COOLING SYSTEM

.. (~HR SHUJ.DOW_N COOLI_NG *..

f.?ODE) (CFR: 41.7_/45.7): D.C.

electncal power

. I'.... *.

(206000K3;02) Knowledge of.the.

effect that a

• 1oss. or malfuriction *of the HIGH PREssuRE cooLANr

• I..

l~JECTION SYSTEM wiH have cm.*

f?Uowing (CFR: 41,7 / 45:4): Reactor

• pressure control:BWR-2,3,4 1 *

(209001A4'.02) LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY. SYSTEM; Abi,lity to

• rilanually operate and/or monitor _in the control r<ioni (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 f

t~ 4!?.8): s~ction_valites. *.... *

• 10..

• Form ES:'401-1 3.1 *

• 3,1. *

. 44 11 3.4.

. 43

• 21Hl00 ($F1 SL,CS)

• ~tandby Liquid

. Control..

. ~ *.*. 211000 (SF1_SLCS)

. ~tandby L!quid

.

• Control

.

• 45.. : 212000 ($F7RPS)>

Reacicir _~r<itect/on

.. 4q. *: 215003.($F71~M).

.. lntermediat~~R~nge.

Monitor:.*

47 *

• 215004 (SF7:

$~MS)...

Source-Range

• *.*. Monitor**

48. *

• 21500!;i (SF7- *

.. PRMS) Average.

.. Power Range

.. *... Mon_itor/Local Power :

. R~nge Monitor.

49. 217000 (SF2, SF4 X

• RGIC) Reactor Core lsol_ath;,li Cool(ng. *...

. 50 * *. 218000 (SF3 ADS) :

. Automatic

• i:>epressurizatiori -.

\\.

51.

218000 (SF3 ADS).

• Automatic Depres~urization.

X X

X Page 6 or 12

. (21100'0A\\09)_Abilify tc;i _predicf.

• _. :4. 1'

. ~~d/or morn_tpr changes _1n

• parameters* associated with op:erating the STANDBY LIQUID C<DNTROL SYSTEM controls including (Gf:R::41.5 / 45.5): SBL_C I

syftelll line~i>...

. )C. (2110_00G2.:4._2o)_ST,A~DBY Ll~UID.. *a.a.

.. C<:>NTRPL;-!32;4.20_-Emergel'!<<;Y :

I

. Pr 1oi:edures *,_Plan: Kno1Nledge of

the operaffonal Implications of.

' EOP warn.ings, *cautio~-s~ and..

.. ~dies (CFR::41:.10/43.5/45:13);

I..

49 * *

(212000K!;i.02) Knowledge oftne 3._3....74 *.

ci~eralional implications of the. :.

fol,lowing concepts as. they apply to.

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM cc;i=ft 41./$ i _45;3): Spe_c;ific logic :.

arrangements 1 *

(2f50~3!<5-?3) ~no~edge oftne : *. * : 3._o *..

66

• o~eratlom1I 1r_nphcat1ons c;>f the *... _..

fol,lowing c~ncepts_as.they apply to.

• IN~ERMEDIATERANGE _. :

MQNITOR._'(IRM) SYSTEM (CfR:.

41).~ ! ~5;3): Changirig detect~r * : * **

p9s1t1on_... :.. :. *. _ :.,... :.

(2~_5004KEl:02)Knowledge.of-th_e

• effect that a loss or.malfunction *of 1.** '.

. th\\!followmg_wi,1 t,ave pnthe :... :

• S©URCE RANGEMONITORING..

SYSTEM(CFR 41.7/45'.7):*24/48 voli *

• . Dfiiower.

3.1. *

• 3 (2~50()5K2.02).AVERAGE: POWER *: 2.8 *

.. 20

• RJt,NGE l\\llONIT_OR/LOGAL POWER

• *_

• Rf-NGE MONITOR SYSTEM:.. -* * *

• .* Kf/_owledge Of electrical power *...

supplies_ to the (oll~wirig (CFR: _*

4\\7):_APRM channels.**

(2~7000K1.03) Knowledge of the p~ysical conne~tions and/or ca_use-effect relationships between. *.

. REACToR*coR*E ISQLATiotil

• 3.6.

C00LING SYSTEM (RCIC) aiid ttie..

. followir:ig_(CFR:41.2to41:si45.7' :

. tql4$;!3):Su1>p~ession P<iql : :. _.*.* :* *

72.

• * (2tso_00A2:02).A_bll.lfy.to_ (a) imtd_ict *.*. 3.6 *

. *

• 82.*

the Impacts oOhe following:on thb AUTOMATIC...

• I Df PRESS.URl.2-"TION -~YS.TE_M;.

• a~~ (b) bas_ed o_n thos_e * :.. : : *

• p~edictions,: use pr-;,ced_ures.to *.

. c~rrect, ~cin_trol;_.or.mitigat~_the..

• i:onseq*uences ofthose. abnormal 1*

cc:rnd.itfons:or operation~ (CFR~ *

., __ 41.5.1,45:&): Larg~ b~ea~ ~OCA.

.- I..

(2r 8000K4._0_2) Knowledge of..

• Alj.lTOMAJJC

• DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM.:.

dJsigr:i feature(s) and/or int~rlocks *

1. ich provide* fqr the ~ol_lowing*...

(9FR:}i1,7):Allows manual in.itiati<i~

• 3.8.

. *.26

.. 52 * *. 223002 (SF5 POIS)

primary.

• Containment Isolation/Nuclear.

. Steam.Supply.

~hutoff

• 53

. 22300~ (Si=!i PC1$)

• . Prim~l'.Y**

.. Contai~m~i:it....

• lso!ationfl'.,hicle.c!r Steam s~pply. * *

• Shutoff

54.

• 239002 (Sf3.SIW)

Safety ReUefValves.

55 " 259002'(SF2*

• R\\IVLCS) Re.a.ctor *

. : Water Level Control

. 5{!.

• 259002 (SF2 X

RWLCS)* Reactor.

.. Water Leve.I Control

. 57

• 261000 (SF9 SGTS) * *.

standby Oas * *

.. Treatment

• 58 261000 (SF9 SGTS)

• *. standby Gas *.'.*

Treatment'.

. 59

• . 262001. (SF6 AC)

AC.Electrical

• Disfributioi:i

)(.

.. X.

X

• : (2poo2A\\02) Ability:to; predict*.

• . 3.7 a~d/or morn~~r changes 1n.

parameters associat~d with operating the PRIMARY..

I

. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

• SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM.

.. SWPPLY SHLJTcOFF coriirol~.

. I

, * : in?!uding{CFR: 41;5 / 41?.5): \\f~lve

• Closures. * * '. * *. * *

• i I... '

• ,56

• X. (2~300.2G2,~.12)P~IMARY * *

• ... 3.7.

• 1!10

• CONTAINMENT.' * * : *

• ispu~oN,.rilucLEA!'{ sTEAM SUPPLY SHUTOFF: G2.2.12 ~

E~~lpme~t coii'trol:: 'K~oWledg*e :ot sJrvejlJance procedures (~l=R:

41.10 t 4s.'faj. :.*. *. *.. *... :. :

.* 1

• X (2~9002G2'.1.32) SAFETY RELJEF * >3-.8.

.* 55 Vf-LVES: G2.1.32 -Ability to explain a~d apply system limi~s and

• precautions. CFR:41.10/45.12).

.. r

• (259002A3.06) Ability to monitor * *.* *

• 3.0 *

• 45 *

• *. aJtomatic operations Qtttie : *. * *

• *.: R\\;ACTOR WATER LEVEL.*

• .. Cpf\\!Ti=~OL SYSTEM incll,1qing.* *.

(9FR: 41.7 '* 45:7):. R~actor wate.r.

.. level setp'oint setdown following a * *

.. * *. re~ctor.scraili: Plant~Specific* *..

1."

(259002K1.08.REACTORWATER *.

• 3:2.

• . 45. *

. : LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM:'

I..

. K?owledg~ of the j:)hysi<:al :..

• connections and/or cause effect *

• r~latio.rishiPs.bet\\Veen REACTOR.

WATER LEVEL.

I

• cpNTRc:>L.~YSTEM and the following:.Recirculation system:.

• Pl'ant-Specific:

• I...

(CFR: 41.2 to 4L9 / 45.7to45.8)

• 1,.

(261000.A.1.02) Ability to predict *. :*

• 3: 1'.

2. **

..

• a1c,11.or m(li:iitoi-c~.ange.~'in:

• *

• parameters associated with:

.. o~erating 'the stANDB'(.GAS

....... J~EATMl=NT SYSTEM cQntrols

.. * : jnf,luqing <.Cf~: 4UH 45,!i):,....

. Ppmary.cor:it~inment pre~sure.

(~61090K3:.02) Knowledge :oHhe

.3.6* *

• *51

• effect that a IO!!*s*or.malfunction of.*

itle si'ANtiBY GAS *TREATMENT

.. S'tf~TEM wili hay¢ on fo!li:>wing :

. *. * (1FR: 41. 7 / 45.4~: Qff-si.te r~le.ase r~te

. * (26200.1A2.05) Ability to (a) j:)redfct * *

• 2.9 * *

• 68

.' *:

• the* impacts of the following on the*

. *.. * *. Ale. ELECTRiCAL 01sTR1EiuT1ON; *.

I.

• . : * *. a?~ (b) base~ on those predictions,. *

• .. u,e procedu.res to correct, control,.

• :.'. on:ilitigate the consequences of * * *

.. those abnormal cciriditioris or '. * :.

operations (CFR: 41.5 i45.6): Bl.is :.

...

• ground's..

.... I..

. 60 * *. 26~po1 ($F8 AO)

. AC Electric13I.

. Dislribulion. *

. *. 61 i *. 262001 ($F6 AC) :

.

• AC _Electr!c;aJ.

• . Distribution *

• 262002 (SF6:UPS).

. µriin~e_rruptable.

Power Sµpply. * * *

. * (AQ/DC) *.*.

• 63 *

• 262002 (SF6 UPS)_ :.*

Unihie"rruptable.

• . Power Suppiy

. (AC/DC)..

• 64.. *. 26~000 (SF6 DG)

DC Electrical :.

• *

• rnsfri1;>~uon

.. 65 *. 263Q00.(SF6 DC).

• oc Elect~ical*..

Dlstribuilon

... 66.. W4000 (SF6 EGE)

• . Emergency * *

~enerators.

. (Diesel/~et) ED~.

.. f37 300Q00.(SF8 IA) *

• lristru_merit Air :.

X

)C x*

X

.. r.

x*

. X*

(2~~001A?."06) At;ility to :(a) p_redict *

• 2.9 *.

• 7 *

• the impacts :of the fol!owmg.on the AJc: ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION;.

"_. a~d (b) based ori those predictions,

. t

• µ~e prot:ed_ures t~ correct, c*ontrol, ori mitigate the consequence~ of. *.

those abnormal conditions or.*.

. I i>~e~ations. (CFR: _41 :5 I 45.6):

• Deenergizing *a plant bus

r~-

• (~620li~A2-1-1) Ab_miyto (aJ predict *:. 3.2.

the impact$ of the*following oh:

• t~e "-c; ei..:EctR1cAi:. *.. * *

..

• DISTRIBUTION;.and (b) based on.

. : those predictions, use....... _..

ptoce*dures to correct, control,. or:

I.*

. ~lt!ga~e th~ cons~(jue_nces of

• those abnormal"conditions:or *

. I op*eratlons (CF_R: 41.5.145.6):.

Degraded systeni *voltage:S

• t.** :* **:*. *:**

2?,2002K1*._06 Knowledge of the: *.. 2.6

• p~ysi_cal connections: and/or *cause~. *

.. e1:(ect relationships between :....

.. UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER.

SUPPLY (A:C.tb.c\\a~d the*

• I following; (CFR; 41.2 to41,9 /45.7

• to: 45:B): Uriit computer:.Piant~.. *..

Si>ec1fic-(262002K4.01) KnoVJledge of..

UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER.*

SUPPL y (A.CjiJ~C.) design.

I

~e 1ature(s) anµ/or interlocks which p~ovid~ f9dhe f~llowing (CFR:

4 p): Tra11sfer frqr'n preferred power to,:alternate powersupplies:.... : *.

• (~6~000A3;o1) ~biiity to monitor**

• automatic operations of the D,C.

. ELECTRICAL: DiSTRIBUTIO/'{...

in 1cludlng (Ci=R: 41. 7 i 45.7): Meie"rs;

. ~i:als, recorders; al,irms; arid : * *..

in 1dicating li!jhJ1:1 *.

X. 263000G2;4,4 DC.ELECTRICAL D!STRIBUTION: 2,4;4 Ability-to*. :* *

. I.

r,c:ogn_iie abnoi"mill indi_catlons..

f~r systeni. operating :I parameter~

t~a~*are ~~tryal~vel co11ditio_ns few.

!3inei'gency and abnornial * * *.

I.* -

opera.ting. proc.edures. *. :..

. I..

• * * - (i64000J!i2:06) A_bility to* (a) p_redict *

• _-. t~e impacts of th~ fo)lowing on tne EMERGENCY GENERATORS* *..

(!DIESEL/JET); ~nci(b) based on.......

t~os~ prediction!!, use procedures to *:

correct; control,.or mitigate the

• 1..

• cvnsequences_ of those _abnormal *.*

c?ndition~ or ope(ations (CFR.: 4.1.5

.. I f5.6):.Opening normal and/or..

*** allternate.power:to emergency bu~

(3000001<2.01) INSTRUMENT AIR *

. S~STEM: Knowiedge ofe!ectrical

. power supplies to. the following.

. (<I:FR: 41.7); lhstrument air I. * *

• compressor.

I.. *.

4.-7 2.8.

• _88 *

. 14 :

• 29.

97.

. -_ 68 _* *. 400000 (SF8 CC$).

Component Cooling

. ES-401 -

• . Water *.

207000 (SF4 IC) -

..

• Isolation _-... -*

(Emergency)

Condenser*

• 209002 (SF2; _SF4 HPGS) High~. *.

Pressure *core

.. Spray..

.

• X. (4;oo_OOOGt1.31)_COMPONENT 4.6

• *.. COOLINGWATER:G2.1:3f-17-.

'. C6nduct of Operations*: Ability to.

lobate control ro6i:n switches,.

. cdntrols, and fndications; arid. to

<;1Jtermirje tti;it they correctly reflect.

I 1hr desired plant lineup (CFR:'41.10*.

/ 45.12).. *..

J,'.. _..

I,'.

• _._. BWRExa:mination Ou_tline (Slisquetia~nal1&2)*

Emen:1encv and Abnormal Plant *Evolutions-Tier 2/Grouo 2 (RO/SRO)

- >I _. a1 I -

Form ES-401-1..

• - _*item.# : systerri, Name *

• 69

• . 201006 (SFT. __

.-.1**.

K1

-lq_ K3_ 1<4 KS Kl> *A1. 'A2_ A3 A;,f G*

.. *:KiAJopic(s)

• IR

.. _ 2,9-*

_Q#.

• 39.

• _ RWMS) Rod Worth_

.. * : Mjnlmizer *_ -

70 --. ~04QOO (SF2.. -

RWCU) _Reactor

. : Water Cleanup

• : 71 214000 (SF7*RPIS) __

• RO!l Position -* * *

• *. Information_

72.. 215001 (SF7TIP).

Trave(sing ln~Core..

Probe

.. 73... 216000 (SF7 NBI),. X* :

• ... Nu cl.eat Boil~r 1n*s1rumeritatiori -

• 74 - *

• 2190QQ (SF5-RHR: *

.. S_PC) RHRiLPGI: -

• Torus/Suppression *

• . Pool_ Cooling _Mode

_x X

X X.

. (201006A4.02) ROD WORTH M

1INIMIZER SYSTEM (RWMj.

<1LANT.SPEClrlC)i Ability _t~ _ : __

.. mlan_ually_ operate *and/or momt_or in

. lt\\e cof)trol rc;,om (9FR: 4'.L7 l4!?,5."

..

• 19 45._8): Pushbutton iridicatirig. _

• _* _

s~tches:P.~_Spec(N61-BWR6) _* ___.

X (204000G2.1.19) REACTOR. - -

,. WATER CLEANUP: G2.1i19 ~'

Cpn_di.Jct of Operaiions:: Ability_ to

. _ u~e _ plant computers _to eva_luate :

• system or component status (CFR:.

41:,10_/45:12)~ _.

(~f4000K5.01) Krio\\'Jleqge of the: -

operational.implic;itions of the.. -

foiloVtling coricepts*as they apply to Rbo POSITION.INFORMATION -.

• I

_ sr_st ThEM (CFR:41.5 / 45.3): Reed *.

SWI C es-*

I *,

37 (215001A3:03) Ability 10 monitor..

• 2.5_

• 59 afoomatlc operations' of the.

. TRAVERSiNG IN-COR'i~: PROBE _*. *.....

. I

• i~9ILidi~g (CFR: 41. 7 / 45. 7)_: Valve *

. _. *., operat1on:!')otaBWR1 _* *_*... _ _:. :.

• .. (216000K1: 14) Knowledge of the - *

• 4.1 --

18

... i>~ysical co_nnectloh$ and/or causes..

_. 1irectrelationship~ _between. -.

NUCLEARBOILER

. l~STRUMENTATIONandthe __

f9Howing (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / ~5.7'

• t_9A5,8): High pressure coo_lant * :

. injectipn: Plant-SP.ecific * :

. I *

(219000K3.01) Knowledge 9fthe - *

• *4.1

_*. 15

• effect that a* loss or malfunctiriri of

. r.

.* ~8R/LPCl:TORUS/SLJPPRESSION

_ P100L COOUNG fv'.IODE wiU have or fpllowir:ig (CFR: 41:7/ 45.4):

• Suppression pool te(Tiperalljre dirifrol * * *

• I...

.. 75 226001 (SF5 RHR CSS} RHR/)..PCI:

Containment Spray Mode 76

• 230000 (SF5 RHR SPS) RHR/LPCI:

. Torus/Suppression Pool Spray Mode 77

• 233000 (SF9 *

FPCCU) Fuel Pooi Cooling/Cleanup

• 78 234000 (SF8.FH)

Ff,iel-H~ridling *.*

Eq4ipmer'lt.*

79 *

• 201003 Control Rod arid Drive M.echani~m (SF1) 80

. 241000 (SF3

• RTPRS)

.. Reactor/Turbine Pressure Regu(ating

.81.. 26~000 (S_F9 RW) >

Radwaste*

82 286000 (SF8 FPS)

• Fi.re Protection *

. 83 290002 (SF4 RVI)

Reactor:Vessel.

• lntifrnals X

X X...

X X

X X

X Page 10 of 12 (226001 KZ.02) 2.9

5.

RHR/LPCl:CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM MODE: Knowledge of el.ectrical power supplies to the foUowing (CFR: 41:7): Pumps (230000A 1.04) Ability to predict

.. a~d/or monjtor chariges in p~rameters associated with 0Perati1'\\g.the.

RHR/LPCl:tbRUS/SUPPRESSlbN POOL SPRAY MODE controls including (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5): System fl?W 3.2 (233000A2.02) Ability to (a) predict.*

3.1 the impacts of the following Ori the.

FµELPOOL COOLING ~ND...

• CLEAN-UP; and (b) b.ased on those.

pt~dictioris, use proce~ures to cbrr¢c( control, or mitigate the.

consequences of those abnormal cbrictitions or operations' (CFR: 41.5 I

I r5.6): LcilN pool level (234000K4.0.2).Knowledge of

• 4.1

• i=~EL_ H~NDLl~<3 EQUIP NI ENT design feature(s).arid/~r.

. f.

iryterlocks which p~ovide for the following (CF~: 41;7): Pre:vention of *control rod moven:ient during cbre alterations...

... I.

I (201003K4;04) *Knowledg*e of * *

• 3.6 CONTROL ROO AND DRIVE MECHANISM design feature(s) ahdtor interlocks which provide for t~e following: (CFR: 41. 7) The.use of either accumulator or reactor....

Water to SCRAM the control. rcid..

I..

2lt1000K6.12 Kriowledge of the

• 3.

effect that a loss or m~lfuhction of the following will tiave on the REACTORiTURBINE PRESSURE REGULATING SYSTEM: (CFR:.. *.

I..

4,1. 7 /45. 7) Control/goverrio.r valves X

(268000G2.2.37) RAPWASTE:

• 4.6 d2::,t31. Equipment controi:

• Abiiity tci determine Qperability a

1nif/or availability,ofsafety..

I.

related equipment (CFR: 41.7 /

d~.s'14s:12) *. *

(286000A3.04) Ability to mQnitor

• 3.2

• abioniatic ciper!ltioris of the FIRE

~RQTECTION SYSTEM including lFR: 4 U / 45: 7): System initiation 290002A2,05 Ability to (a) predict 4.2

• the impacts oUtie following. on the REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS; and. (b) based on 1 **

• those. predictions; use.

~rocedure~*to co~rect, conti-oi, or rilitigate the cori~~qu_eric~s of..

those abnormal conditions or

~pa.ratio~~ (CFR: :41:Si 45,6):

Exceeding thermal limits J......

• • 75 4_7 98

• 52 73 79 21 91

201001 (SF1 I

CRDH) CRD Hydraulic I

201002 (SF1

• I RMCS) Re.actor I

.. Manual Control 201003 (SF1.

CRDM) Control Rod and Drive*

Mechanis_m :

201004 (SF7

. : RSCS) Rod

• . Sequence Control 201005 (SF1, SF7 I

RCIS) Rod Control and Information 202001 (SF1, SF4 I

. RS) RE!circulation 202002 (SF1 RSCTL)*

Recirculation Flow

• Control.

215002 (SF7 I

-1

• RBMS) Rod. Block Monitor 223001 (SF5 PCS)

Primary Containment ahd

• Auxiliaries 239001 (SF3, SF4 * *

• I MRSS) Main and I.

• Reheat Steam I

245000(SF4 MTGEN) Main Turbine Generator/AtJxiliary 256000 (SF2CDS).

I Condensate *

~

259001 (SF2 F\\NS)

• t.*

Feedwater**

• 271000 (SF9 OG)

• I

. Offgas I

272000 (SF7, SF9 I

• RMS) Radiation I:

. Monitoring I

288000 (SF9 PVS)

I Plant Ventilation*

290001 (SF5 SC)

I Secondary Containment

• 290003 (SF9 CRV)

I Control Rootn ve*ntilatioh

!KIA Category Totals:.

I 1 I 1 I 1 I 2 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 2 I 2 I 1 I 2* l~roup_ Point Total: :

• I 15 I Page 11 of 12

l;S-401.

.*. *

• _ BVV~ Ex11mination Outline (Susquehanna I 1 &2) _. :*. _ - - *

. Generic Knowledae and Abilities Outline (Tier 3~ (RO/SRO).

Facility:* SLisquehanna:1&2 *

. I....

Category tqA #.

Topic

• 1 Conduct of * *

• c.ond_.Lict ofOpe_ralio_ ns_: Knowledge. ofcon~u_.c_ t o_f. opera.lions [ _.

-o*.pe* *r*at*1ons* *

• G2; 1..1 t (CFR 41 1 o / 45 13)

• requIrernen s.

. 2. Equipment :.

Control** *

• 3:Radiation

• Coniroi Ccin?u~t,'of ?pe'ratior:,s:_ Knowledge* of conservati~e dec;ision /..

G2* 1*39. m11kmg pra.cll~es.(CFR_.41.10 f:43,51.45.12)..

C!)ri~uct of Operations: Ability to *use proced1,1res to. dete~miner *.

the. effects on reactivity of plant changes, such as reactor :.

G2* 1.43*. coolant system*teinp:erature, secot,daiy piant, fuei depletion; etc (C:FR: 41.10 /43.ij./45.6). '

C.onduct of Operatlo.ns:

• Kl)9wledge of conduct of

• 1 * *

.G2*1*1.

• operation$:requi~meiits (Cf'.R:.41:10./45;13).

. G2:1.40

• Ki:,owie~ge_of, refuell!19 administrative requireijlents,.. I

• .... -*:. (CFR: 41.. 10/43;5/45.13).

Subtotal**

G2 2 21 : Equiprheri!Control: Kriowledge*of pres and, P.O.st-lTlain~en_ance

• *.-. *.. *

• operability requirements (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2).: *. *

...

• I.

t;ciuipment Coritrol: ~ilowledge of Jjmiting condiJii;ins for.

.

• 132*2*22. operations and safety limits (CFR: 41.5 / 4~.2/45.2)'.

. Equipment Control: Knci~edge ofth~ process for making G2*2*6 :

changes to procedures (CFR, 41.10 l 43.3 / 45.13)... **

1 *....

Equipment Control: (multi-unit license) Ability to expla.ln.

the variatlons*_in coritroi boardicontrol.tooin layouts,. [. *_* *

• . G2*2-4 :. : systeins; lnstruinentatioil; and procedural actions-between

... *. tmlts'ata:facillty(CFR:41.6/~1-! /41.10_f45:i*,~si3),: 1 *.

: E_qul1>rilent ~~ntrol: _Knowledge*of~he proces_stor _.: : i -

G2.~.7.

• c;on~~~tlng s~ecial*or l_nfre_quenUests:(CFR;*4_1'.1_0 ! 43;3 (.

. -45,13). _.. _.. -

.. I Subtotal..

• I

• Radiation Control: Ability to comply. with radiation work permit..

G2.3.? : : r¢quii"en:i¢nts d. unrig 11~ima1 e>r' abnormai ~o.nditions (CFR:., *..

• , 41.12/45;10),. *... *. : * * *. *.. :.. *

Kr:iowiedge of. radiatJ!)ri *exp~s*ure.liml~:uncle!' ~o'mi.111 *ot G2:3.4 * : ein'erge11cy l c_oncUtlons; J {CF.R: '41;12*, 43;4./45:10)

:I

• Subtotal. : - * * *

. I * * *.

• *4: Emerg*ency

• _

• : Emergency Procedures/ Plan:*Ability to'idehtify post~accid~rit

. Pnicedures/Plan* G2.4*3 *

• instrumentation (CFR: 41.6}45.4),.

• i

• G2.4.'17

• Knowledge of EOP terins arid defiriilions;L(CFR: 4U 0145/13}

Kno:wl~dge:of events reiated.to _system operatlon/statu~ *... *.

that must.b.e repcirted.to*1ntemal*org*anlzatlons.or external *.

G2,4,3o. ageni:ies,*such as*the State;the:NRC; orthe'ti-ansmissli>ri sy~tenioperator; (CF~i41:11i't43.5/~5.11)

.. : ** 1.*..

• Emergency*Proc~dures / Pla_n: KnoVJIEidge of SRO *.. I G2.4.. 4.0 responslbillUes In.emergency pl_an lmplementation:(CF~::..

. 41;10/43.5/45:11). *::.*

.*.. **.1*

• Subtotal *

• :*1

• *.. Form ES-'401-3 *

.. Date of Exam: 07/26/2021 *

• _* RO **

SROaO11ly *

• IR Q#

IR Q# *

• 41 3.6 34 4.t 12 42..

4.7

• 22

40.

3.8*

23

• 3.5.*.

-* 19 3.7

. *.. 3,9.

9 51:,

.95 *

',2.*

77,'

1 *..

• ES-401 Record of Rejected K/~s Form ES-401-4 Tier/

Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA I

I I

1/1 (1) 295038 EA2.02 Unable to develop an operation~lly valid test item for 295038EA2.02.

295038 EA2.04 randomly rese1¢cted as a replacement.

2/1 (3) 215004 K6.01 Unable to develop an operation~lly valid test item for 215004 K6.01.

215004 K6.02 randomly resele6ted as a replacement.

1/1 (25) 295016.G2.l.19 G2.l.19 is oversampled (Quest~ons 55, 60, 78) Randomly reselected G2. l.28 as a replacement.

i I

2/1 (33) 262002A4.01 262002A4.01 is too similar to already sampled 262002.K4.0l. Since there are no other A4 items to sampl~, randomly reselected 262002.Kl.06 as replacement.

1/2 (38) 295022AK3.02 Unable to develop an appropriately challenging test item to 295022AK3.02. Selected only pthei AK3 item, 295022AK3.01 as a replacement.

3 (51) 2.4.47 2.4.47 is oversampled (Questioi;i 80). Randomly reselected 2.4.17 as a replacement.

I 2/2 (52) 239003K4.01 239003 MSIV Leakage Control; Systems not installed at Susquehanna.

Randomly reselected 201003 as replacement system and randomly selected K4.04.

1 2/1 (55) 239002G2.2.4 No significant variations exist between unit 1 and 2 SRVs. Randomly reselected 239002.G2. l.32 as r¢placement.

I I

2/1 (56) 223002Al.03 Unable to develop a test question for 223002Al.03. Randomly reselected 223002 Al.02 as replacement. :

1/1 (65) 295026EK2.01 Double Jeopardy with closely rllated KA 295013AK3.0I which is sampled on Q8. Randomly reselected 295026.EK2.06 as replacement.

1/1 (70) 295025G2.2.40 Unable to develop a RO level t9st item to 295025G2.2.40. Randomly reselected 295025G2.2.39 as a replacement.

2/1 (72) 217000Kl.04 Not applicable to the station. R~domly reselected 217000.Kl.03 as a replacement.

i 2/2 (73) 241000K6.16 Not applicable to the station. Randomly reselected 241000.K6.12 as a replacement.

I I

I 2/1 (74) 212000K5.0l Unable to develop a test item to!212000K5.0l. Selected the only remaining knowledge in KS, 212000.K.5.02 as a replacement.

3 (77)

G2.3.ll G2.3.11 is oversampled (Q23). :Randomly reselected G2.3.4.

3 (78)

G2.l.19 G2.1.19 is oversampled (Questions 25, 55, 60), randomly reselected G2.1.40 from G2.1 items.

3 (84)

G2.4.32 There is no procedure for Loss 9f All Annunciators. Randomly reselected G2.4.30 as a replacement.

I I

1/2 (87) 295014G2.4.2 G2.4.2 is oversampled. (Question 29). Randomly selected G2.4.41 as a replacement.

I 2/2 (91) 290002A2.06 Safety Limits already tested on Q22. Randomly reselected 290002.A2.05 as a replacement.

I

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 1/1 (92) 295019G2.4.9 Unable to develop a question td 295019.G2.4.9. Randomly reselected 295019.G2.4.35 as a replacemJnt.

1/1 (96) 295030G2.4.3 G2.4.3 is oversampled (Sampldd on Q9). Randomly reselected G2.4.6 as a replacement.

I 2/1 (97) 263000G2.4.6 Unable to develop a test item td 263000G2.4.6. Randomly reselected 2.4.4 as a replacement.

I 1/1 (10) 295001AA1.08 I

Unable to develop a test item to 295001AA1.08. Randomly reselected 295001AA1.05 as a replaceme~t.

I 1/1 (27) 295030G2.2.12 G2.2.12 is oversampled (Sampled on Ql00). Randomly reselected G2.1.20 as a replacement.

I 1/2 (36) 295033EK1.03 Unable to develop a test item td 295033EK1.03. Reselected 295033EK1.02 as a replacement.

2/1 (45) 259002A3.07 Not applicable to the station. Jandomly reselected 259002A3.06 as a replacement.

I 2/1 (46) 259002K2.02 Not applicable to the station. Since no other K2 with greater than 2.5 importance, randomly reselected 259002Kl.08 as a replacement.

2/1 (2) 261000Al.07 Unable to develop an appropria~ely challenging test item to 261000Al.07.

Randomly reselected 261 000Al.02 as replacement.

'