ML21125A319
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FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7A Revision 35 Page 1 of 10 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD TESTING 7A.1 TESTING DESCRIPTION 7A.1.1 TESTING PROGRAM 7A.1.1.1 Overall Testing Procedure QO-1, "Safety Injection" demonstrates the operability of the Safety Injection System (SIS) initiation circuitry by using the internal testing capability of the system. This procedure tests the performance of the SIS circuits during a simulated SI, both with and without offsite power available. This test is run quarterly with the Primary Coolant System pressure greater than 1,400 psia. Other specific procedures that provide quarterly testing of the Engineering Safeguards are performed at power:
QO-16, "Inservice Test Procedure - Containment Spray Pumps" QO-19, "Inservice Test Procedure - HPSI Pumps and ESS Check Valves Operability Test" QO-20, "Inservice Test Procedure - Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps" QO-32, "Inservice Test Procedure - Closure Verification of HPSI Train 2 and LPSI Injection Check Valves" QI-4, "Pressurizer Low Pressure SIS Initiation Functional Check" QI-5, "Containment High Pressure Test" Specific monthly and shiftly test procedures performed during power operations:
DWO-1, "Operators Daily/Weekly/Bi-weekly Items Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4" MI-6, "Area Monitor Operational Check" SHO-1, "Operators' Shift Items Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4" Specific procedures are provided for testing with the reactor shut down.
These procedures are listed below:
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7A Revision 35 Page 2 of 10 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD TESTING QO-2, "Recirculation Actuation System" QO-8B, "LPSI Check Valve Operability Test and LPSI Motor Operated Valve Open Stop Verification Test" QO-43, "SIRW Tank Outlet Check Valves (Includes Boron Equalization) and Shutdown Cooling Bypass and Loop Isolation Valves Inservice Test RI-3A, "High Pressurizer Pressure Channel A Calibration" RI-3B, "High Pressurizer Pressure Channel B Calibration" RI-3C, "High Pressurizer Pressure Channel C Calibration" RI-3D, "High Pressurizer Pressure Channel D Calibration" RI-3E, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter Calibrations RI-7, "Low Pressure SIS Initiation Logic" RI-14, "SIRW Tank Level Switch Interlocks Test" RI-86F, "Containment Isolation Monitor Calibration" RO-11, "Containment High Radiation Test" RO-12, "Containment High Pressure (CHP) and Spray System Tests" RO-65, "High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Trains 1 and 2, and Hot Leg Injection (HLI) Check Valve Test and Cold Leg/Hot Leg Flow Balance Test" RO-98, "LPSI and Containment Spray Comprehensive Pump Test and Check Valves Test" RO-105, "Full Flow Test for SIT Check Valves and PCS Loop Check Valves" RO-141, Containment Sump Check Valves Inservice Test RO-147, Comprehensive Pump Test - High Pressure Safety Injection Pump P-66A and P-66B
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7A Revision 35 Page 3 of 10 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD TESTING RT-8C, "Engineered Safeguards System - Left Channel" RT-8D, "Engineered Safeguards System - Right Channel" RT-116, "Miscellaneous Systems Safety Valve Setpoint Testing" SO-9, Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation Check Valves Procedures RT-8C+D are conducted to determine the operability of the Emergency Power System, engineered safeguards system and the manual safety injection feature of the engineered safeguards controls. This is determined by verifying correct sequencing and loading of safeguards equipment (including all ECCS pumps) when an SIS actuation is simulated (by manually initiating a simulated SIS) coincident with a simulated loss of offsite power. The manual SIS feature is verified by alarm indication after the SIS push button is depressed. This test duplicates, as close as practical, the integrated performance required from the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS), the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) and their auxiliary support systems as defined in the design criteria of Subsection 7.3.5.1. SIS circuit design is such that each redundant circuit (or channel) is tested separately, so that the correct operation of each circuit can be identified.
Left channel procedure RT-8C and right channel procedure RT-8D are performed during refueling outages, with one test performed each refueling outage on a staggered frequency, to demonstrate the operability of the normal shutdown sequence through testing the equipment starting circuits and contact closure times. Resetting SIS while bus 1C or 1D is being fed exclusively by the diesel generator, initiates the NSD Sequencer. Sequencer timing is verified. Loads may or may not be started. NSD and DBA Sequencer testing provides an adequate overlap to ensure proper equipment operation and meet Technical Specification testing requirements.
Procedure RI-14 requires that the RAS be tested by simulating actuation of the safety-related SIRW tank level switches to effect an auto RAS actuation.
Upon actuation, the control room recirculation initiation alarm is verified. This alarm is wired to a contact on one of the SIRW tank low-level relays. Upon RAS initiation, these relays energize, and among other things, cause the alarm. This procedure tests all possible one-out-of-two (taken twice) level switch combinations.
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7A Revision 35 Page 4 of 10 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD TESTING Quarterly Procedure QO-2, "Recirculation Actuation System" (which, like RI-14, is conducted during shutdown) also tests the RAS. In this test, however, a test switch is used to simulate the RAS initiation condition (low SIRW tank level). Upon placing this switch in the "test" position, the SIRW tank low-level relays are energized to effect RAS initiation. Actual component response verifications are made in this procedure. All required component response verifications are made except for the closure of the low-pressure safety-injection pump minimum recirculation valves, which is done at shutdown. The component response verifications include:
- 1. Low-pressure safety injection pumps trip
- 2. SIRW tank isolation valves close
- 3. Containment sump valves open
- 4. Component cooling water heat exchanger main service water valves open while the heat exchanger bypass service water valves close
- 5. Component cooling water heat exchanger cooling water valves open
- 7. Enable closing of spray valve CV-3001, if sump valve CV-3030 does not open 7A.1.1.2 Pump Testing Pump head and flow, are tested for the ECCS pumps during the quarterly inservice inspection pump tests. These tests are:
QO-16 for the containment spray pumps, QO-19 for the high-pressure injection pumps, and QO-20 for the low-pressure safety injection pumps.
The high-pressure safety-injection pumps, low-pressure safety-injection pumps (shutdown cooling pumps) and the containment spray pumps are tested quarterly. According to Test Procedures QO-16, QO-19 and QO-20, the method of starting each pump is alternated between the control room and the local breaker every quarter.
Also, pump head and flow, are tested for the ECCS pumps at intervals not exceeding 24 months during comprehensive pump tests. During these tests, it is required that the pumps operate for at least 2 minutes. These tests are:
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7A Revision 35 Page 5 of 10 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD TESTING RO-98, "LPSI and Containment Spray Comprehensive Pump Test and Check Valves Test" RO-147, "Comprehensive Pump Test - High Pressure Safety Injection Pump P-66A and P-66B" 7A.1.1.3 Instrumentation Testing In accordance with Procedures DWO-1 "Operators Daily/Week/Biweekly Items Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4," and SHO-1 "Operators' Shift Items Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4," all of the safety-injection and containment spray initiation instrumentation that features control room indication (such as pressurizer-pressure channels and containment high-radiation channels), are checked either daily or each shift. The safety-related containment high-pressure circuits do not feature control room indication and are, therefore, tested monthly or quarterly along with the other SIS and containment spray initiation circuitry. The procedures listed below are used to perform these tests.
QI-4, "Pressurizer Low Pressure SIS Initiation Functional Check" QI-5, "Containment High Pressure Initiation Test" MI-6, "Area Monitors, Operational Check" As previously mentioned, Procedure QO-1 (which is performed quarterly) tests the operation of the starting circuits and verifies that the active components (ie, pumps and valves) operate satisfactorily upon receipt of the SIS signal.
7A.1.1.4 Engineered Safeguards Passive Devices Testing Procedure SHO-1 requires that the safety injection tank level and pressure be checked each shift during power operation.
Procedure QO-8B is used during cold shutdown to full flow test the LPSI check valves.
Procedure RO-98 is used each Refueling Outage to verify full open and closure capability of the Containment Spray Header Check Valves.
Procedures QO-19 and RO-217 are used to periodically part stroke the SIRW Tank Discharge Check Valves.
Procedure RO-98 is used each refueling to verify full open and closure capability of the Containment Spray Pump Discharge Check Valves, and part stroke the Containment Spray Header Check Valves.
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7A Revision 35 Page 6 of 10 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD TESTING Procedure QO-32 quarterly verifies closure of the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Train 2 and Low Pressure Safety Injection check valves by opening the associated motor operated valve and measuring and recording a differential pressure across the check valve.
Procedure RO-141 is used during Mode 5 or 6 and once per 18 months to verify full stroke of the Containment Sump Check Valves.
Procedure RO-65 is used during Refueling Outages to full stroke the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Trains 1 and 2, and Hot Leg Injection (HLI) check valves. RO-65 also verifies the operability of the interlock between the HLI mode select and the HLI letdown valves.
Procedure RO-105 is used during Refueling Outages to verify full stroke capability of the Safety Injection Tank's Outlet Check Valves.
Procedure RO-147 is used once per 24-month period to verify full open and closure capability of the various ESS recirculation line check valves.
Procedure RT-116 administratively controls and documents the testing of various Class 2 and 3 safety valves located in the Engineering Safeguards System.
Procedure SO-9 is used to verify closure of the LPSI, HPSI and PCS loop check valves.
7A.1.2 TEST METHODS Since the engineered safeguards equipment being initiated varies according to whether power is available from the offsite source or the diesel generator, mode selector switches are provided so that either the normal SIS or the Design Basis Accident (DBA) portions of the circuit can be tested separately.
Individual momentary-type push buttons are provided to simulate the SIS in each of the redundant control circuits. The test is in progress only as long as the push button is depressed. Releasing this push button during a test will automatically reset the SIS or DBA sequence relays.
A momentary-type push button is provided to simulate the SIS in each of the redundant control channels. Procedure QO-1 calls for the use of this SIS test push button as a means of system initiation. QO-1 utilizes the left push button for left channel testing and the right push button for right channel testing. As described in QO-1, the test is terminated upon releasing the push button. The SIS relays or DBA sequencer will reset automatically.
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7A Revision 35 Page 7 of 10 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD TESTING Testing in the "without offsite power" mode does not initiate load shedding, since load shedding is purely a function of actual voltage on the emergency buses. Each component that features load shed input circuitry, utilizes a load shed "a" contact in its trip circuits. This "a" contact closes to provide component trip whenever the emergency bus de-energizes.
Procedure QO-1 simulates the SIS by requiring that the momentary test push buttons be depressed. Upon depressing the button, the test requires that the operation verifies proper load response. An alternate method of initiating the SIS is by tripping two-out-of-four pressurizer low-low pressure instruments in the SIS initiating circuit matrix. Procedures RT-8C+D actually call for this method of SIS initiation.
Procedure QO-1 simulates the loss of offsite power and sequences the loads.
Procedures RT-8C+D verify bus shedding and actual sequence loading of components by causing an actual loss of power to each of the Class 1E buses.
7A.1.3 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA As previously described, the procedures used to test the Safety Injection System are QO-1 and RT-8C+D. The acceptance criteria for each of these are stated in the procedures.
Acceptance criteria for pump shutoff head at minimum recirculation flow and pump operability is included in the quarterly inservice inspection pump tests as given earlier.
7A.2 TESTING OVERLAP EVALUATION 7A.2.1 SAFETY INJECTION The SIS is initiated by either pressurizer low-pressure or containment high-pressure conditions. Pressurizer pressure channel calibration procedures RI-3A, B, C, and D require that a test pressure be input to the safety-related pressurizer pressure sensors (transmitters). Upon reaching the proper set point by varying the pressure input, the appropriate pressurizer pressure indicator and alarm (PPIA) unit actuation is verified. Procedure RI-7, "Low-Pressure SIS Initiation Logic," overlaps with the RI-3 procedures, in that RI-7 requires that a signal generator, connected into the various pressurizer pressure current loops (upstream of the PPIAs) be used to activate various combinations of the four PPIA units (one per channel) to produce the two-out-of-four pressurizer low-pressure trip inputs to the SIS.
The SIS initiation logic is verified by the safety injection test indicating lamps, which are energized by safety injection auxiliary relays, and by verifying voltage which would energize the SIS output relays. Actual actuation of the
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7A Revision 35 Page 8 of 10 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD TESTING SIS output relays takes place during the performance of RT-8C, Engineered Safeguards System - Left Channel, and RT-8D, Engineered Safeguards System - Right Channel. During the performance of RO-12, Containment High Pressure (CHP) and Spray System Tests, only the SIS signal is verified. SIS is not initiated. RO-12 in conjunction with RT-8C and RT-8D provides proper testing overlap to ensure CHP will initiate safety injection.
Quarterly Procedure QI-4, "Pressurizer Low-Pressure SIS Initiation Functional Check," also tests these circuits in a method similar to Procedure RI-7. In QI-4, however, the 2/4 combinations are not verified. QI-4 simply verifies one channel at a time.
RO-12 requires that a test pressure be inserted into the safety-related CHP sensors (pressure switches). Upon reaching the proper set point, CHP is initiated. The CHP signal provides an initiation signal to the SIS circuitry.
However, the containment high-pressure (CHP) input to the SIS is isolated during the performance of RO-12. Therefore, the initiation signal is verified by voltage readings. This minimizes the impact on plant equipment.
The SIS is tested quarterly per Section QO-1, "Safety Injection System," to demonstrate the operability of the SIS circuitry by using the internal testing capability of the system. This test overlaps Tests RI-7 and RO-12 in that, during the QO-1 test, the internal test circuits are used to simulate a safety-injection condition with and without offsite power available which energizes the SIS output relays. Upon initiation, all of the engineered safeguards loads are verified to respond appropriately.
During refueling, Procedures RT-8C+D, "Engineered Safeguards System,"
require that an actual loss of voltage occurs in the emergency buses concurrent with a trip of the PPIA units to effect a full design basis accident.
Proper sequencing and timing of the sequenced loads are verified. Also verified, is the appropriate response of the other engineered safeguards loads. This test overlaps Tests RI-7, RO-12 and QO-1.
7A.2.2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION The containment isolation function is verified in one "system test." As previously mentioned, Procedure RO-12 requires that a test pressure be inserted into the CHP sensors (pressure switches). In addition to verifying SIS initiation, the procedure also requires that Containment Isolation (CI) actuation be verified. The verification is to be made by logging the response of at least one containment isolation valve for each of the CHP relays that energize upon receipt of the CHP condition as sensed by the pressure switches (sensors). The response is checked by valve position indication lights. Although overlap is not a problem with this test, the test does not verify the leak tightness of the containment isolation valves to the CHP condition.
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7A Revision 35 Page 9 of 10 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD TESTING This is verified via the Containment Leak Rate testing program (Procedure RO-32).
In addition, the containment high-radiation input to containment isolation is verified. Procedures RI-86F, RO-11 and MI-6 are used. RI-86F, "Containment Isolation Monitor Calibration," utilizes a known external radiation source to verify the proper safety-related area monitor output. A current source is also used to simulate detector signal input and is adjusted until the high (trip) is reached. Verification of trip is through a RIAX relay contact initiating a control room alarm. During the conduct of RO-11, "Containment High Radiation Test," the radiation monitors are de-energized in each possible 2-out-of-4 combination. This causes the high (trip) circuit to de-energize in the radiation monitors to complete the logic actuation. The response of all the containment isolation valves is verified.
Valid verification of trip action with sufficient testing overlap is provided with the RI-86F and RO-11 procedure combination. The trip circuitry in the radiation monitors is fully functionally checked by increasing a simulated input to above the trip setpoint. The bistable comparison between the input and trip setpoint causes the output relay to de-energize. This in turn causes the RIAX relay in containment isolation 2/4 scheme to de-energize thus alarm.
Removing power to the radiation monitor will also de-energize the output relay and cause RIAX actuation.
Procedure MI-6, "Area Monitor Functional Checks," requires verification of high alarm or trip setpoint on a monthly basis. Verification is by adjusting an internal current to the input of the meter amplifier to check the pre-trip and trip setpoints. An internal circuit prevents actual trip relay actuation in this mode.
The setpoints are only adjusted if acceptance criteria is violated.
7A.2.3 RECIRCULATION ACTUATION Proper overlap exists in the recirculation actuation testing program. Test RI-14 requires simulating actuation of the safety-related SIRW tank level switches which energize the SIRW tank low-level relay as procedurally verified by a control room alarm which is energized by these relays.
Procedure QO-2 utilizes a test switch to energize the SIRW tank low-level relays, to actuate the required loads. Load response is then procedurally verified. These two tests overlap sufficiently to enable them to be combined to provide a valid system verification. Although the tests are performed only during shutdown, they duplicate (as closely as practical) the integrated performance of the RAS which is required in the event of an accident. This is consistent with the intent of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 37; Regulatory Guide 1.22 and Standard Review Plan, Section 7.3, Appendix A.
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7A Revision 35 Page 10 of 10 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD TESTING The RAS is not designed to be tested while the reactor is at power. Shutting the SIRW tank outlet valves would eliminate a source of water to more than one high-pressure or low-pressure safety-injection pump. It should be noted that upon RAS initiation, both of the SIRW tank outlet valves receive an auto closure signal and the containment sump isolation valves receive an auto open signal. Therefore, should an RAS initiation occur during normal conditions, the ECCS (or portions thereof) would be aligned to take suction from an empty sump for some period of time.
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7C Revision 35 Page 1 of 26 REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 REV 3 PALISADES PLANT PARAMETER
SUMMARY
TABLE The attached tables provide a comparison of the instrumentation provided at Palisades against the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97 Revision 3. These tables provide the following information for each parameter: Item, Tag Number, Variable Description, Type and Category, Existing and Required Instrument Ranges, QA Requirements, Environmental and Seismic Qualification, Redundance, Power Supply Display Location and a Comment section which provides a schedule for instrument loop upgrade or justification for acceptability of existing noncomplying instrumentation. The information provided in each column of the table is defined as follows:
ITEM: Consists of the RG 1.97 category followed by a sequential number. Item numbering is consistent with the RG 1.97 ordering of parameters.
TAG NO: This column lists component ID's of the sensors, indicators, power supplies, displays and recorders in each instrument loop selected to compare against the RG 1.97 requirements.
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: Provides a description of the variable as taken from RG 1.97 Revision 3 Table 3.
VARIABLE TYPE: Lists the variable type as defined by RG 1.97.
VARIABLE CATEGORY: Lists the variable category as defined by RG 1.97 QA REQUIREMENT: Describes compliance with the RG 1.97 QA requirement for the specific variable category. Descriptions provided in this in this column are defined as follows:
PRE-QA: Equipment was procured and installed prior to the establishment of a formal QA program. Equipment considered acceptable based on successful operating experience.
COMPLY: Equipment was procured and installed under auspices of Palisades QA program.
N/A: QA requirement not applicable to this category.
ENVIRONMENTAL Describes compliance with the RG 1.97 EEQ requirements for the specific variable category. Descriptions provided QUALIFICATION: in this column are defined as follows:
COMPLY: Equipment located in a harsh environment are included in the Palisades Plant Equipment Qualification List and/or the equipment is located in a mild environment.
N/A: EEQ requirements not applicable to this category.
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7C Revision 35 Page 2 of 26 REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 REV 3 PALISADES PLANT PARAMETER
SUMMARY
TABLE SEISMIC Describes compliance with the RG 1.97 Seismic requirements for the specific variable category. Descriptions provided QUALIFICATION: in this column are defined as follows:
COMPLY: Equipment is seismically qualified to criteria described in FSAR.
N/A: Seismic qualification not applicable to this category.
REDUNDANCE: Indicates the number of instrumentation loops meeting the RG 1.97 requirements provided for this variable. Indicates N/A if redundance not applicable for this category.
POWER SUPPLY: Describes the type power provided to energize the instrument loop. Descriptions provided in this column are defined as follows:
PREFERRED 1E: Instrument loop powered by battery backed 1E ac power.
RELIABLE NON-1E: Instrument loop powered by Non-1E ac which is capable of being energized from the standby power sources and for which procedural guidance is provided for bus restoration.
1E BATTERY: Instrument loop is 1E dc powered.
Non-1E: Instrument loop ac power not backed up by standby power supply.
DISPLAY LOCATION: Indicates control room (CR) panel where variable is indicated. For the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) indicates if the parameter is available via the Plant Process Computer (PPC).
COMMENT: Provides additional information where required. Also provides justification for acceptability of existing instrumentation not in compliance with RG 1.97 requirements.
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7C Revision 35 Page 3 of 26 REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 REV 3 PALISADES PLANT PARAMETER
SUMMARY
TABLE TYPE A VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY A01 Inputs Loop 1 Degrees of A 1 200°F Sub- 200°F Sub- Comply Comply Comply 2 Channels Preferred 1E C12 PPC PPC Indication used to initiate TE-0112CC Subcooling cooling to 35°F cooling to 35°F trip of primary coolant TT-0112CC superheat superheat pumps. Also used to I/I-0112CC allow termination or throttling of SIS flows.
TE-0112CD TT-0112CD I/I-0112CD TE-0112HC TT-0112HC I/I-0112HC TE-0112HD TT-0112HD I/I-0112HD PT-0105A SMM-0114 Inputs Loop 2 TE-0122CC TT-0122CC I/I-0122CC TE-0122CD TT-0122CD I/I-0122CD TE-0122HC TT-0122HC I/I-0122HC TE-0122HD TT-0122HD I/I-0122HD PT-0105B SMM-0124 A02 PT-0105A Pressurizer A 1 0-3000 PSIA 0-4000 PSIA Comply Comply Comply 2 Channels Preferred 1E C12 PPC PPC Indication used to initiate P/S-0751C Pressure C02 trip of primary coolant PI-0105A pump following small PTR-0112 break LOCA. See Note 13.
PT-0105B P/S-0751D PI-0105B PTR-0122
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7C Revision 35 Page 4 of 26 REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 REV 3 PALISADES PLANT PARAMETER
SUMMARY
TABLE TYPE A VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY A03 Stm Gen A Steam Generator A 1 160% to -140% Tube Sheet to Comply Comply Comply 2 Channels Preferred 1E C12 PPC PPC Indication used to LT-0757A Level (Equivalent to Steam /Steam Generator determine steam P/S-0757A tube sheet to Separators generator with ruptured LI-0757A steam tube to be isolated.
separators) Indication also used to LT-0757B initiate once thru cooling P/S-0757B on low/low level.
LI-0757B STM GEN B LT-0758A P/S-0758A LI-0758A LT-0758B P/S-0758B LI-0758B A04 Stm Gen A Steam Generator A 1 0-1200 PSIG From Comply Comply Comply 2 Channels /Steam Preferred 1E C12 PPC PPC Indication used to PT-0751C Pressure Atmospheric to Generator determine ruptured steam P/S-0751C 20% above generator to allow PIC-0751C lowest safety isolation following steam valve setting line break. Lowest relief PT-0751D valve setting 985 psig.
P/S-0751D PIC-0751D Stm Gen B PT-0752C P/S-0751C PIC-0752C PT-0752D P/S-0751D PIC-0752D A05 LT-0103 Pressurizer Level A 3 0-100% Top to Bottom N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C12 PPC PPC P/S-0103 (Equivalent to of Vessel LI-0103A top to bottom of vessel)
LT-0102 P/S-0751A C02 LIA-0102A
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7C Revision 35 Page 5 of 26 REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 REV 3 PALISADES PLANT PARAMETER
SUMMARY
TABLE TYPE A VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY A06 AE-2401L Containment A 3 0-10 Vol% or 0- 0-10 Vol% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C11A PPC PPC AIT-2401L Hydrogen 20 Vol% (capable of AI-2401L Concentration (switch operating from -
selectable) 2 to 60 PSIG)
AE-2401R from -2 to AIT-2401R 60 PSIG AI-2401R
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7C Revision 35 Page 6 of 26 REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 REV 3 PALISADES PLANT PARAMETER
SUMMARY
TABLE TYPE B VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY B01 NE-1/3 Neutron Flux B 1 10-8 to 200% of 10-6 TO 100% Comply Comply Comply 2 Channel Preferred 1E C06 PPC PPC NI-1/3B full power of full power NI-1/3D NI-1/3A EC-175 NE-2/4 NI-2/4B NI-2/4A EC-176 B02 CRD-1 Thru-45 Control Rod Position B 3 Full in or not full Full in or not full N/A N/A N/A N/A Reliable C12 C02 PPC PPC These indications are in, analog in Non-1E shown on the core map position for any display and rod position of 45 Control display.
Rods B03 Deleted B04 - PCS Cold Leg Water B 3 50°F to 400°F Covered by Item B06.
Temperature B05 Loop 1 PCS Hot Leg Water B 1 50°F to 700°F 50°F to 700°F Comply Comply Comply 2 Channels Preferred 1E C12 PPC PPC TE-0112HC Temperature TT-0112HC PTR-0112 Loop 2 TE-0122HD TE-0122HD PTR-0122 B06 Loop 1 PCS Cold Leg Water B 1 50°F to 700°F 50°F to 700°F Comply Comply Comply 2 Channels Preferred 1E C12 PPC PPC TE-0112CC Temperature TT-0122CC PTR-0112 Loop 2 TE-0122CD TT-0122CD PTR-0122 B07 PCS Pressure B 1 0-400 PSIG Covered by A02.
(Pressurizer Pressure)
FSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS APPENDIX 7C Revision 35 Page 7 of 26 REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 REV 3 PALISADES PLANT PARAMETER
SUMMARY
TABLE TYPE B VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY B08 Core Exit B 3 0°F to 2300°F Covered by Item C01.
Temperature B09 LE-0101A Coolant Inventory B 1 Top of Core to Bottom of Hot Comply Comply Comply 2 Channels Preferred 1E C11A PPC PPC LTRI-0101A Top of Vessel Let to Top of Vessel LE-0101B LTRI-0101B B10 Degrees of B 2 200°F Covered by A01.
Subcooling subcooling 35°F superheat B11 PCS Pressure B 1 0-4000 psig Covered by Item A02.
(Pressurizer Pressure)
B12 LT-0383 Containment Sump B 2 0-100% Narrow Range Comply Comply N/A 2 Channels Preferred 1E C13 PPC PPC P/S-1812A Water Level (Narrow (Bottom to Top (Sump)
LPIR-0383 Range) of Sump)
LT-0382 P/S-1805A LPIR-0382 B13 LE-0446A Containment Water B 1 0-100% Wide Range Comply Comply Comply 2 Channels Preferred 1E C13 PPC PPC LIT-0446A Level (Wide Range) (Exceeds (Plant Specific)
LPIR-0383 Maximum Expected Water LE-0446B Level by 1.5 ft)
LIT-0446B LPIR-0382 B14 - Containment Pressure B 1 0 - Design Covered by C12.
Pressure B15 POS-0155 POS-0738 Containment Isolation B 1 Closed - Not Closed - Not Comply Comply Comply Redundant Isolation 1E Battery Various PPC PPC See Note 14.
POS-0739 Valve Position Closed Closed Method for each flow POS-0767 path. Redundant POS-0768 Position Indication POS-0911 for each valve not POS-0939 provided.
POS-1001 POS-1002 POS-0910 POS-0940
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TABLE TYPE B VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY POS-1004 POS-1007 POS-1036 POS-1037 POS-1038 POS-1044 POS-1045 POS-1064 POS-1065 POS-1101 POS-1102 POS-1103 POS-1104 POS-1358 POS-1805 POS-1806 POS-1807 POS-1808 POS-1813 POS-1814 POS-1910 POS-1911 POS-2009 POS-2083 POS-2099 POS-2412A POS-2412B POS-2413A POS-2413B POS-2414A POS-2414B POS-2415A POS-2415B B16 Containment Pressure B 1 -5 PSIG to Covered by Item C12 Design Pressure
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TABLE TYPE C VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY C01 INCE-14H02 Core Exit C 1 0°F to 2300°F 200°F to Comply Comply Comply 2 Channels Preferred 1E C11A PPC PPC See Note 15.
INCE-16G07 Temperature 2300°F (8 Thermo-couples INCE-21N11 per Channel)
INCE-26N08 INCE-32Q04 INCE-46V13 INCE-43X14 INCE-52M13 INCE-66J16 INCE-71H13 INCE-73B13 INCE-76G17 INCE-86J10 INCE-81J07 INCE-36R07 INCE-41Q16 LTRI-0101A LTRI-0101B C02 None Radioactivity C 1 - 1/2 Tech Spec Online Analysis Concentration or Limit 50 to 100 capability isolated during Radiation Level in times Tech accident.
Circulating Primary Spec Limit Grab sample to be used Coolant to evaluate variable.
C03 None Analysis of Primary C 3 - 10µCi/ml to No online system for Coolant (Gamma 10Ci/ml or analysis available. Grab Spectrum) TIDI4844 sample to be used to source term in evaluate variable.
coolant volume C04 PCS Pressure C 1 - 0-4000 Covered by Item A02.
(Pressurizer Pressure)
C05 Containment Pressure C 1 - -5 PSIG to Covered by Item C12.
design pressure C06 Containment Sump C 2 - Narrow Range Covered by Item B12.
Water Level (Narrow (Sump)
Range)
C07 Containment Water C 1 - Wide Range Covered by Item B13.
Level (Wide Range) (Plant Specific)
C08 Containment Area C 3 - 1 R/HR to Covered by Item E01.
Radiation 10-4 R/HR
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TABLE TYPE C VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY C09 RE-0631 Effluent Radioactivity C 3 100 to 105 CPM 10-6 µc/cc to 10- N/A N/A N/A N/A Preferred 1E C11 PPC PPC 2
RIA-0631 Noble Gas Effluent (Equivalent to µc/cc from Condenser air 1x10-5 to 2x10-2 Removal System µci/cc Exhaust C10 PCS Pressure C 1 - 0-4000 PSIG Covered by Item A02.
(Pressurizer Pressure)
C11 Containment C 3 0-10 Vol-%
Hydrogen (Capable of Concentration Operating from
-2psig to 60psig)
C12 PT-1812A Containment Pressure C 1 -14.7 to -5 PSIG to 3 Comply Comply Comply 2 Channels Preferred 1E C13 PPC PPC Design Pressure 55 P/S-1812A 185.34 PSIG times Design PSIG LPIR-0383 Pressure for Concrete PT-1805A P/S-1805A LPIR-0382 C13 Containment Effluent C 2 - 10-6 µCi/cc Covered by item E03 Radioactivity Noble to Gases from Identified 10-2 µCi/cc Release Points C14 Effluent Radioactivity C 2 - 10-6 µCi/cc Covered by Item E03 Noble Gases (From to building or areas 103 µCi/cc where penetrations and hatches are located)
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TABLE TYPE D VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY D01 FT-0306 RHR System Flow D 2 O-8000 GPM 0-110% Design Pre-QA Comply N/A N/A Reliable C02 PPC PPC All components located FIC-0306 GPM (6000 Flow Non-1E in mild environment GPM design Flow)
D02 TT-0351B RHR Heat Exchanger D 2 0°F to 400F 40°F to 350°F Pre-QA Comply N/A N/A Reliable C02 PPC PPC TR-0351 outlet Temperature Non-1E TE-0351B D03 LT-0365 Accumulator Tank D 3 0-100% 10% to 90% N/A N/A N/A N/A Preferred 1E C13 PPC PPC Note 1 P/S-0365 Level (Equivalent to Volume LIA-0365 5% to 95%
LM-0365 Tank Volume)
LT-0368 P/S-0368 LIA-0368 LM-0368 LT-0372 P/S-0372 LIA-0372 LM-0372 LT-0374 P/S-0374 LIA-0374 LM-0374 D04 PT-0363 Accumulator Tank D 3 0 to 300 PSIG 0 to 750 PSIG N/A N/A N/A N/A Preferred 1E C13 PPC PPC SI Tank Designed for P/S-0363 Pressure 300 PSIG.
PIA-0363 Note 1 PT-0367 P/S-0367 PIA-0367 PT-0371 P/S-0371 PIA-0371 PT-0369 P/S-0369 PIA-0369 D05 VOP-3041 Accumulator Isolation D 2 Closed or Open Closed or Open Pre-QA None N/A N/A 1E Battery C03 PPC PPC Note 2 VOP-3045 Valve Position VOP-3049 VOP-3052
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TABLE TYPE D VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY D06 FT-0212 Boric Acid Charging D 2 0-140 GPM 0-110% Design Pre-QA Comply N/A N/A Reliable C02 PPC PPC Design Flow is 132 FY-0212 Flow Flow Non-1E GPM. All components FIA-0212 located in mild P/S-0212 environment.
D07 FT-0308 Flow in HPI System D 2 0-250 GPM per 0-110% Comply Comply N/A N/A Preferred 1E C13 PPC PPC Design flow is 225 GPM P/S-0751A (Flow to Cold Legs) injection line Design Flow per injection line.
FI-0308A FM-0308 FT-0310 P/S-0751B FI-0310A FM-0310 FT-0312 P/S-0751C FI-0312A FM-0312 FT-0313 P/S-0751D FI-0313A FM-0313 D07A FT-0316 Flow in HPI System D 2 0-350 GPM per 0-110% Design Comply Comply N/A N/A Preferred 1E C13 Design flow is 300 GPM P/S-0316 (Flow to Hot Legs) injection line Flow per injection line.
FI-0316A FT-0317 P/S-0377 FI-0317A
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TABLE D08 FT-0307 Flow in LPSI System D 2 0-2000 GPM o-110% Design Comply Comply N/A N/A Preferred 1E C13 PPC PPC Design flow is 1500 P/S-0751A per injection Flow GPM per injection line.
FI-0307A line FM-0307 FT-0309 P/S-0751B FI-0309A FM-0309 FT-0311 P/S-0751C FI-0311A FM-0311 FT-0314 P/S-0751D FI-0314A FM-0314 D09 LT-0331 Refueling Water D 2 0-100% Top to Bottom Pre-QA Comply N/A N/A Preferred 1E C13 PPC PPC All components located P/S-0331 Storage Tank Level Equivalent to in mild environment LIA-0331 Top to Bottom LT-0332A P/S-0332A LIA-0332A D10 EAI-2103 Reactor Coolant D 3 0-800 Amps Electric Current N/A N/A N/A N/A Same Bus as C12 PPC PPC EAI-2104 Pump Status Powers Pump EAI-2203 EAI-2204 D11 FE-1039 Primary System D 2 Closed - Not Closed - Not Comply Comply N/A N/A Preferred 1E C11A PPC PPC FM-1039 Safety Valve Positions Closed Closed FI-1039 (including PORV and Code Valves)
FE-1040 FM-1040 FI-1040 FE-1041 FM-1041 FI-1041 FE-1042B FM-1042B FI-1042B FE-1043B FM-1043B FI-1043B D12 Pressurizer Level D 1 Top to Bottom Covered By Item A05 D13 EAI-1211 Pressurizer Heater D 2 0-200 Amps Electric Pre-QA Comply N/A N/A Same bus as C02 PPC PPC All components in mild EAI-1305 Status Current heaters environment
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TABLE D14 LT-0116 Quench Tank Level D 3 0-100% Top to Bottom N/A N/A N/A N/A Reliable C02 PPC PPC LIA-0116 Non-1E D15 TE-0116 Quench Tank D 3 0°F to 350°F 50°F to 750°F N/A N/A N/A N/A Reliable C02 PPC PPC Note 3 TIA-0116 Temperature Non-1E D16 PT-0116 Quench Tank D 3 0 to 25/100 0 to Design N/A N/A N/A N/A Reliable C02 PPC PPC Rupture Disk at 100 PIA-0116 Pressure PSIG Dual Pressure Non-1E PSIG.
Range D17 Steam Generator D 1 From tube Covered by Item A03 Level sheet to separators D18 Steam Generator D 2 From Covered by Item A04 Pressure atmospheric to 20% above lowest safety valve setting D19 Stm Gen A Safety/Relief Valve D 2 Main Steam Closed - Not Pre-QA Comply Note 6 N/A N/A Reliable C11 PPC PPC Design Flow 5.6 x 106 FT-0702 Positions or Main Flow 0-6 x 106 Closed Non-1E C12 lbs/hr per Steam PT-0702 Steam Flow lbs/hr per Generator LIC-0701 Steam FLIR-0701 Generator Stm Gen B FT-0704 PT-0704 LIC-0703 FLIR-0702 D20 Stm Gen A Main Feedwater Flow D 3 0-6 x 106 lbs/hr 0-110% Design N/A N/A N/A N/A Reliable C11 PPC PPC Design Flow 5.6 x 106 FT-0701 per Steam Flow Non-1E D20 lbs/hr per Steam PT-0701 Generator Generator FLIR-0701 LIC-0701 Stm Gen B FT-0703 PT-0703 FLIR-0702 LIC-0703
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TABLE D21 Stm Gen A Auxiliary Feedwater D 2 0-650 GPM 0-110% Design Comply Comply N/A 2 Channels per Preferred 1E C11 PPC PPC Design Flow 415 GPM FT-0737 Flow Flow Steam Generator FM-0737 FI-0737 P/S-0737A FT-0749A FM-0749A FI-0749A P/S-0727 Stm Gen B FT-0727A FM-0727A FI-0727A P/S-0727 FT-0736 FM-0736 FI-0736 P/S-0737A D22 LT-2021 Condensate Storage D 1 0-100% Plant Specific Comply Comply Note 17 2 Channels Preferred 1E C13 PPC PPC All components located P/S-2021 Tank Level (Essentially Top in a mild environment LIA-2021 to Bottom of vessel)
LT-2022 P/S-2022 LIA-2022 D23 FT-0301 Containment Spray D 2 0-3000 GPM 0-110% Design Pre-QA Comply N/A 2 Channels Preferred 1E C13 PPC PPC Design Flow 2700 GPM FI-0301A Flow Flow C33 FI-0301B All components located in a mild environment.
FI-0302 FI-0301B and FI-0302B FI-0302A part of same current FI-0302B loop as other components.
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TABLE D24 Cooler Valve Heat removal by D 2 Indicating lights Plant Specific Comply Comply N/A N/A 1E Battery C08 PPC PPC Status determined by Position Containment fan heat confirming cooler valves POS-0824 removal system aligned, fans running POS-0847 and service water POS-0861 available.
POS-0862 POS-0864 POS-0865 POS-0873 POS-0870 Cooler Fan Status 52-1208 52-1209 52-1210 Only cooler inlet and outlet valves located in a Service Water harsh environment.
Pump Status 152-103 152-204 152-205 D25 TE-1812 Containment D 2 0°F to 400°F 40°F to 400°F Pre-QA Note 7 N/A 4 Channels Preferred 1E C13 PPC PPC Maximum Containment TI-1812 Atmospheric Temperature 283F.
Temperature TE-1813 TI-1813 TE-1814 TI-1814 TE-1815 TI-1815 TT-1815 D26 - Containment Sump D 2 50°F to 250°F Not provided. Note 8 Water Temperature D27 Makeup Flow-in D 2 0-110% Design Same as Charging Flow.
Flow See Item D06.
D28 FT-0202 Letdown Flow-out D 2 0 to 160 GPM 0 to 100% Pre-QA Comply N/A N/A Reliable C02 PPC PPC Design flow 132 GPM.
FIC-0202 Design Flow Non-1E All components in mild environment.
D29 LT-0205 Volume Control Tank D 2 0 to 100% Top to Bottom Pre-QA Comply N/A N/A Reliable C02 PPC PPC All components in mild LA-0205 Level (Equivalent to Non-1E environment.
LIC-0205 top to bottom of tank)
D30 TE-0914 Component Cooling D 2 0°F to 200°F 40°F to 200°F Pre-QA Comply N/A N/A Preferred 1E C08 - - Max temp 114F.
TIA-0914 Water Temperature to ESF System TE-0916 TIA-0916
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TABLE D31 CCW Pump Component Cooling D 2 0-100 amp 0-110% Design Comply Comply N/A N/A From device C08 - - Note 9 Current Water Flow to ESF Flow being EAI-1116 System monitored EAI-1208 Preferred 1E EAI-1109 Reliable Non-CCW Pump 0-150 psig 1E Pressure PT-0918 PIA-0918 CCW Surge Tk 0-100%
Level LT-0920 LIA-0920 SDC Hx Out 20-200F Temp TE-0912 TI-0912 TE-0913 TI-0913 D32 LT-1012 High Level D 3 0-100% Top to Bottom N/A N/A N/A N/A Reliable PPC PPC PPC LIA-1012 Radioactive Liquid (Equivalent to Non-1E Tank Level Top to Bottom)
LT-1014 LIA-1014 LT-1016 LIA-1016 LT-1018 LIA-1018 D33 PT-1160 Radioactive Gas D 3 0 to 120 PSIG 0 to 150% N/A N/A N/A N/A Reliable PPC PPC PPC Design Pressure 120 PIA-1160 Holdup Tank Pressure Design Non-1E PSIG Pressure PT-1161 Note 10 PIA-1161 PT-1162 PIA-1162 PT-1119 PIA-1119 PT-1120 PIA-1120 PT-1121 PIA-1121
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TABLE D34 POS-1657 Emergency D 2 Open - Closed Open - Closed Comply Comply N/A N/A 1E Battery C11A - - Only Emergency POS-1659 Ventilation Damper Status Status dampers are in control POS-1663 Position room HVAC system POS-1679 POS-1713 All components in mild POS-1743 environment PO-1745 POS-1711 Note 18 POS-1658 POS-1660 POS-1664 POS-1680 POS-1714 POS-1744 PO-1746 Note 18 POS-1712 POS-1757 POS-1758 POS-1768 POS-1769
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TABLE D35A Power supplies status D 2 Plant Specific Pre-QA Comply N/A N/A From Bus Various - - All components located of standby power being Location in mild environment monitored Safeguards Xfmr Status Power to Volts alarm from 1E EVI-0015 Amps 0-3 KV Battery bus EAI-0015 0-3 KAMP Startup Xfmr Status 1-2 Volts EVI-0003 1-2 Amps-X 0-3 KV Note 19 EAI-0001X 1-2 Amps-Y 0-3 KAMP EAI-0001Y 1-2 Amps-Z 0-3 KAMP EAI-0001Z 0-3 KAMP Safeguards Bus Status Volts EVI-0008 0-3 KV Note 19 2400 Volt 1E Bus Status 1-C Volts EVI-0001 1-D Volts 0-3 KV Note 19 EVI-0002 1-C Amps 0-3 KV EAI-0003 1-D Amps 0-2 KAMP Note 19 EAI-0004 1-C Power 0-2 KAMP EWI-0007 1-D Power 0-5 MW EWI-0009 0-5 MW Diesel Gen Status 1-1 Volt EVI-1107 1-1 Volt 0-3 KV EVI-1107L 1-2 Volt 0-3 KV EVI-1213 1-2 Volt 0-3 KV EVI-1213L 1-1 Power 0-3 KV EWI-1107 1-1 Power 0-3 MW EWI-1107L 1-2 Power 0-3 MW EWI-1213 1-2 Power 0-3 MW EWI-1213L 1-1 Frequency 0-3 MW SPI-1107 1-1 Frequency 55-65 Hz SPI-1107L 1-2 Frequency 55-65 Hz SPI-1213 1-2 Frequency 55-65 Hz SPI-1213L 55-65 Hz
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TABLE D35A 480 Volt 1E Bus D 2 Plant Specific Pre-QA Comply N/A N/A From Bus Various - - All components located Cont Status being Locations in mild environment 27-11 Bus 11 Undervoltage monitored 27-12 Bus 12 Alarm/ No 27-19 Bus 19 alarm Power to 27-20 Bus 20 alarm from 1E battery bus 480 Volt 1E MCC D 2 Status Supply Bkr.
52-1906 MCC 1 Alarm/No Alarm 52-2006 MCC 2 52-1112 MCC 21+23 52-1214 MCC 22+24 52-1901 MCC 25 52-2001 MCC 26 Undervoltage Preferred 1E 120 Volt Alarm/No Alarm Status 27-1 Y 10 27-2 Y 20 27-3 Y 30 27-4 Y 40 Undervoltage Alarm/No Alarm 1E DC Bus Status 74-D1 DC Bus 1 74-D2 DC Bus 2 D35B Power Supplies Other D 2 Plant Specific Pre-QA None N/A N/A 1E Battery Various - - See Note 12 Sources Important to Safety PS-0441 High Pressure Air Low Pressure PS-0439 Alarm/No Alarm Low Pressure PS-2273 AFW Backup N2 Alarm/No Alarm PS-2274
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TABLE TYPE E VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY E01 RE-2321 Containment Area E 1 1 Rem/hr to 107 1 Rem/hr to 107 Comply Comply Comply 2 Channels Preferred 1E C11A PPC PPC RIA-2321 Radiation High Range Rem/hr Rem/hr RE-2322 RIA-2322 E02 RE-2300 Radiation Exposure E 3 10-4 Rem/hr to 10-1 Rem/hr to N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C11 - - Radiation Monitors thru rate (inside buildings 104 Rem/hr 104 Rem/hr inside Auxiliary/Turbine RE-2317 or area where access buildings. Portable is required to service instrumentation will be RIA-2300 equipment important used to determine thru to safety). radiation levels a long RIA-2317 access routes and in areas where emergency maintenance is required.
E03A RE-2326 Noble gases and vent E 2 10-7µc/cc 10-6µc/cc Comply Comply N/A N/A Non-1E C11A PPC PPC All releases except RIA-2326 flow rate (common to to steam gen relief valves plant vent) 105µc/cc 104µc/cc or atmospheric dump RE-2327 valves through common RIA-2327 stack.
FE-1818 FT-1818 FT-1818 display on PPC FM-1818 only.
E03B RE-2323 Noble gases and vent E 2 10-1µc/cc 10-1µc/cc Comply See Note 16 N/A N/A Preferred 1E C11A PPC PPC Flow rate not provided RIA-2323 flow rate (vent from to to calculated in procedure steam gen relief 103µc/cc 103µc/cc based on primary RE-2324 valves or atmospheric temperatures RIA-2324 dump valves)
E04 - Particulates and E 3 10-3µCi/cc 10-3µc/cc N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A - - - Capability of sampling Halogens to to stack effluent provided.
102µCi/cc 102µc/cc Onsite analysis capability provided.
E05 - Airborne E 3 10-9µCi/cc 10-9µCi/cc N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A - - - Portable sampling and Radiohalogens and to to analysis equipment Particulates 10-3µCi/cc 10-3µCi/cc provided
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TABLE TYPE E VARIABLES ITEM TAG NO VARIABLE INSTRUMENT RANGE QA ENVIRON- SEISMIC REDUNDANCE POWER DISPLAY LOCATION COMMENTS REQUIRE- MENTAL QUALIFI- SUPPLY DESCRIPTION TYPE CATE- EXISTING REQUIRED MENT QUALIFICATION CATION CR TSC EOF GORY E06 - Plant and Environs E 3 10-3 Rem./hr 10-3 Rem/hr N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A - - - Portable radiation Radiation (Portable to to monitors are provided Instrumentation) 2x104 Rem/hr 104 Rem/hr Beta and Photons Gamma 10-3 rad/hr to 10-4 rad/hr and low energy photons E07 - Plant and Environs E 3 Isotopic Isotopic N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A - - - Samples collected Radioactivity remotely transported to (Portable multi channel analyzer Instrumentation) Analysis E08 - Wind Direction E 3 0-360° 0-360° N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A PPC PPC PPC Measured at 2 elevations
+/-5° +/-5° 10 Meters and 60 Meters.
E09 - Wind Speed E 3 0-100 MPH 0-22 MPS N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A PPC PPC PPC Measured at 2 elevations
+/-5 MPH (50 MPH) 10 Meters
+/- .2 MPS E10 - Estimation of E 3 -5°C to Based on N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A PPC PPC PPC Based on temperatures Atmospheric +10°C vertical at 2 elevations 10 Meters Instability +/-.15°C temperature and 60 Meters difference from primary met system (-5°C to 10°C
+/-0.15C)
NOTES
- 1. Safety Injection Tank (SIT) level and pressure monitoring instrumentation changed to Category 3. Reference NRC Safety Evaluation. Safety Injection Tank Pressure and Volume Instrumentation. dated Nov. 29, 1993.
- 2. Power to the SI tank isolation valves is locked out during normal operations to prevent inadvertent isolation of the SI tank from the primary coolant system (PCS). For postulated events, which result in rapid PCS depressurization to a point at which the SI tanks discharge their contents, there is no need to close the SI tanks isolation valve. For events which result in a slowly decreasing primary system pressure, the containment environment would not be expected to be as severe as that resulting from a rapid PCS depressurization. For these less sever events, it is expected that both the SI tanks isolation valves and vent valves position indication would function properly to indicate isolation and/or venting of the tank. Therefore, based on the above, CPCo considers that qualification of the SI tank isolation valve position indication is not required.
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- 3. Events which heat the quench tank result from the release of steam to the tank through underwater spargers. As the volume of water to be heated is large, the temperature of the tank will remain less than the saturation temperature corresponding to tank pressure. The maximum tank temperature is thus restricted to the saturation temperature corresponding to the tank rupture disk pressure setpoint of 100 psig which is 338°F.
- 4. Deleted.
- 5. Deleted.
- 6. The purpose of this indication is to monitor for potentially stuck open steam generator relief valves. Palisades has main steam flow instrument loops with flow transmitters located inside containment which can be utilized to monitor for excessive steam flows which would result from stuck open steam generator relief valves. The steam generator relief valves are located outside containment, and a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) resulting from a stuck open relief valve would not result in a harsh environment inside of containment. Based on the above, it is concluded that the main steam flow instrument loops are located in a mild environment for events (MSLB outside containment) during which it would be required to function and, thus, are not subject to the provisions of 10CFR50.49.
- 7. Containment atmosphere temperature indicating loops are provided for routine surveillance of containment temperature during normal operations. The temperature elements associated with these loops are located in containment and have not been environmentally qualified. Qualified containment pressure indicating loop are, however, provided which can be utilized to assess containment temperature. During accident conditions, when energy is released to the containment the saturation temperature corresponding to the containment pressure provides a close approximation of the actual containment atmosphere temperature. As there are no post-accident operator actions required based on knowledge of containment temperature, CPCo considers that containment pressure is an acceptable alternative for monitoring post accident containment temperature.
- 8. The Palisades design does not contain provisions for monitoring sump water temperature. Monitoring containment pressure, however, allows an assessment of sump temperature as the sump temperature will be equal to or less (ie, slightly subcooled) than the saturation temperature corresponding to the containment pressure. As there are no operator actions required, based on knowledge of containment sump water temperature, CPCo considers that containment pressure is an acceptable alternative for monitoring sump water temperature.
- 9. CCW parameters monitored in the control room include: CCW pump current, CCW pump discharge pressure, CCW surge tank level and shutdown cooling heat exchanger inlet and outlet temperature (CCW side). These parameters are sufficient to allow determination of events such as flow blockage or pipe rupture. Flow blockage events, resulting in decreased system flow, would be indicated by increased CCW pump discharge pressure, decreased CCW pump current and increased differential temperatures across the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. Pipe rupture events would be indicated by decreasing levels in the CCW surge tanks. Providing these parameters in the control room precludes the need for CCW flow instrumentation.
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- 10. The radioactive waste gas system consists of a waste gas surge tank, three air compressors and six waste gas decay tanks. The design pressure of the waste gas decay tanks is 120 psig and pressure-monitoring instrumentation is provided to indicate from 0 psig to design pressure (120 psig). This range of the pressure instrumentation is considered acceptable based on the following operating and design features which prevent the design pressure of the tank from being exceeded:
- a. During normal operation the tanks are isolated when reaching 95 psig (80% of design pressure).
- b. An alarm is provided to indicate when tank pressure exceeds 100 psig (83% design pressure).
- c. Two relief valves set at tank design pressure are available to relieve pressure when the tank is being filled. One relief is located on the discharge of the air compressors and the other on the tank. The total relief valve capacity exceed the design capacity of the pumping system.
The relief valves relieve back to the waste gas surge tank.
- d. The tanks are located in an area of the plant where the environment would be unaffected during any design basis event. Thus, isolated tanks could not be overpressured by extreme temperature changes.
- 11. Deleted
- 12. Other standby energy sources include emergency high pressure air systems utilized to operate selected air operated valves in the event that the normal instrument air system is disabled. Status of the various standby pressure sources is provided by local pressure indications and control room alarms actuated on low pressure. The accumulator tanks in the standby high pressure air systems are passive devices which function automatically to provide air to required valves through appropriate check valves in the event normal instrument air is lost. The status indications provided are used for monitoring during normal operations to assure that sufficient air is available in the accumulators to perform their function if required. Some of the components of the status indication system are located in harsh environments, however, as these indications are only required to determine system availability prior to use, CPCo considers that upgrading these components is not required.
- 13. The range of the installed PCS pressure instrument loops deviates from the 0-4000 psig range required by Regulatory Guide. The existing range of 0-3000 psig is considered to be adequate based on the improved readability of the smaller range and the modification installed to limit anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) events. (
Reference:
CPCo letter to NRC, Response to NRC Interim Report, Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, dated April 30, 1986).
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- 14. Cable separation for the containment penetration isolation valve position indication listed below deviates from the guidance on redundancy provided in Regulatory Guide 1.97 and the Palisades design basis. A lack of position indication would not result in misleading the operator and by placing the valve handswitch in the closed position, the operator would assure that power is removed from the solenoid operator thus closing the valve.
(
Reference:
supplemental Safety Evaluation, Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, dated January 11, 1994.)
CONTROL VALVE PENETRATION NO FUNCTION CV-1910, 1911 40 PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM SAMPLE CV-1064, 1065 25 CLEAN WASTE RECEIVER TANK VENT CV-1002, 1007 47 PRIMARY SYSTEM DRAIN TANK PUMP SUCTION CV-1036, 1038 49 CLEAN WASTE RECEIVER TANK RECIRCULATION OUTLET CV-1044, 1046 69 CLEAN WASTE RECEIVER TANK PUMP SUCTION CV-1101, 1102 46 CONTAINMENT VENT HEADER TO WASTE GAS CV-1103, 1104 52 CONTAINMENT SUMP DRAIN CV-2083, 2099 44 PRIMARY COOLANT PUMP SEAL LEAKOFF Redundancy per penetration deviates from the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.97 for the containment isolation valves associated with containment atmosphere hydrogen monitoring. For this system there are two penetrations for each channel of hydrogen monitoring. Each channel has its own power supply, resulting in both valves and both position indications per penetration having the same power source. The isolation valves are solenoid valves which are normally closed and deenergized, and are opened to sample the containment atmosphere following an accident. Lack of position indication would not result in misleading the operator, and the opposite channel system would then be used (opened) if necessary.
ISOLATION VALVE PENETRATION NO CHANNEL SV-2412A, SV-2412B 40B RIGHT SV-2414A, SV-2414B 40A RIGHT SV-2413A, SV-2413B 21A LEFT SV-2415A, SV-2415B 21 LEFT
- 15. Cable separation requirements for the core exit thermocouple cables between the reactor head and control room are not met. Justification for this deviation is provided in CPCo letter to the NRC, Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System, dated May 31, 1984.
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- 16. The main steam line radiation monitors are located in an area defined as a harsh environment for a main steam line break outside of containment. The installed radiation monitors are not qualified to operate in this harsh environment. Justification for this deviation is based on the following:
- a. The main steam radiation monitors are used to quantify radiation releases for a steam generator tube rupture. The steam generator tube rupture does not result in a harsh environment in the area containing the radiation monitors. Thus the main steam radiation monitors do not need to be environmentally qualified.
- b. The function of the main steam line radiation monitors is to calculate the potential offsite dose which could occur following a release through the steam generator safety relief or atmospheric dump valves. An alternate method of performing this calculation is provided by the backup High Range Effluent Monitors located on the auxiliary building roof. Use of this backup method is included in Plant Emergency Implementation Procedure.
(
Reference:
Supplemental Safety Evaluation, Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, dates January 11, 1994)
- 17. Both channels of condensate storage level indication cabling are routed through the non-seismic turbine building. This condition has been reviewed and found acceptable as documented in Reference 16.
- 18. PO-1745 and PO-1746 provide position indication via limit switches in the motor operator. Power supply is from the motor operator's breaker cubicle via a step-down transformer.
- 19. The faceplate range of the voltmeters EVI-0001, EVI-0002, EVI-0003 and EVI-0008 is 0 - 3 KV. The voltmeters are self powered devices and require a minimum bus voltage of 1700 V. Therefore, the effective range of the meters is 1.7 - 3 KV.