ML21055A953

Petition of Beyond Nuclear, Michigan Safe Energy Future and Dont Waste Michigan for Leave to Intervene, and Request for an Adjudicatory Hearing

ML21055A953
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	02/24/2021
From:	Lodge T Beyond Nuclear, Don't Waste Michigan, Law Office of Terry Jonathan Lodge, Michigan Safe Energy Future
To:	NRC/OCM
SECY RAS
References
50-255-LT-2, 72-007-LT, License Transfer, NRC-2021-0036, RAS 55989
Download: ML21055A953 (112)

Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Entergy Nuclear Palisades, LLC, Holtec International, and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (Palisades Nuclear Plant)

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Docket No. 50-255 NRC-2021-0036

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February 24, 2021

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PETITION OF BEYOND NUCLEAR, MICHIGAN SAFE ENERGY FUTURE AND DONT WASTE MICHIGAN FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE, AND REQUEST FOR AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING I. INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309, 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.80 and 50.82, and 10 C.F.R. § 72.50; the hearing notice published by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) at 86 Fed. Reg. 8226 (February 4, 2021); and pertinent federal law and regulation, Petitioners Beyond Nuclear, Michigan Safe Energy Future and Dont Waste Michigan, (BN, MSEF and DWM) (collectively, Petitioners) hereby petition and move for leave to intervene and request a hearing before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. They seek a hearing on the application of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENOI), on behalf of itself, Entergy Nuclear Palisades, LLC (ENP), Holtec International (Holtec), and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) (collectively, Applicants) seeking approval of the transfer of control of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-6 and Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-20 for Big Rock Point Plant (Big Rock Point) and Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades), respectively, as well as the general license for the Big Rock Point Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) and the Palisades ISFSI (collectively, the licenses). The application requests that the NRC consent to (1) the transfer of control of the licenses to Holtec and (2) the transfer of ENOIs operating authority to HDI. The NRC is also considering amending the licenses for administrative purposes to reflect the proposed transfer.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEEDING The NRC is considering the issuance of an order pursuant to 10 CFR §§ 50.80 and 72.50 approving the direct and indirect transfers of control of Provisional Operating License No.

DPR-6 and Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-20 for Big Rock Point and Palisades, respectively, as well as the general licenses for the Palisades and Big Rock Point Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs). The application, dated December 23, 2020 (ADAMS No. ML20358A075), requests that the NRC consent to (1) the transfer of control of the licenses to Holtec, and (2) the transfer of ENOIs operating authority (i.e., its authority to conduct licensed activities under the licenses) to HDI. In addition, HDI submitted a Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) including Site-Specific Decommis-sioning Cost Estimate for Palisades Nuclear Plant dated December 23, 2020 (ADAMS No.

ML20358A232), which the NRC is considering as a supplement to the license transfer application.

The NRC is also considering amending the licenses for administrative purposes to reflect the proposed transfer. Following approval of the proposed direct and indirect transfers of control of the licenses, Holtec Palisades, LLC, would be the licensed owner of the licenses and HDI would be the licensed operator for the licenses. HDI will contract with Comprehensive Decommissioning International, LLC to decommission Palisades. CDI is to decommission the Palisades power plant, restore the site, and manage on-site spent nuclear fuel. HDI has a project goal to complete decommissioning and final license termination within approximately 20 years following sale closure and license transfers.1 The NRC must forbid any license or right thereunder to be transferred, directly or indirectly, through transfer of control of the license, unless the Commission consents in writing.

10 CFR § 50.80. The Commission must determine that the proposed transferee is qualified to hold the license, and that the transfer is otherwise consistent with applicable provisions of law, regulations, and orders issued by the Commission. Id. Before it can issue the proposed conforming license amendment, the Commission must make findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and Commission regulations.

Petitioners do not believe the HDI possesses the financial qualifications necessary to complete such a risk-intensive project. HDIs decommissioning cost estimates rely on unreasonable assumptions that, either individually or cumulatively, threaten HDIs ability to complete license termination and site restoration activities and manage spent nuclear fuel on the timeline and within the budget proposed in the PSDAR. HDI ignores the likelihood that on-site contamination will exceed current volume and cost estimates. HDI also assumes DOE will begin taking title to spent nuclear fuel by 2030, which is not rationally established, and fails to account 2

for likely project delays associated not only with Palisades, but with decommissioning and related obligations at the various other sites for which HDI is or plans to be responsible. HDI has PSDAR at 1.

1 HDI incongruously predicts Fuel and GTCC waste shipping will be performed 2

when repositories [sic] for this type of waste are developed by the DOE. PSDAR at 13.

no nuclear decommissioning track record and actively underestimates the license termination, site restoration, and spent fuel management liabilities attached to Palisades and Big Rock Point, and so cannot demonstrate adequate decommissioning financial assurance.

Additionally, the application does not establish that the HDI possesses adequate financial qualifications to cope with the funding shortfalls identified above. There is no showing that HDI is adequately capitalized or otherwise has access to the funding necessary to bankroll its own day-to-day operations, let alone procure additional financial assurance when the Palisades nuclear decommissioning trust runs short, which the NRC requires. It is obvious that HDI has no resources beyond or independent from the Nuclear Decommissioning Trust (NDT).

Indeed, Holtec, acting through HDI and a cast of LLCs, plans to assume decommis-sioning, site restoration, and spent fuel management obligations not only for Palisades, but also for the three reactors at Indian Point, and reactors at two additional sites. Given the dearth of financial information to support the license transfer application, the structure of the proposed transfer and HDIs significant portfolio risk, the Applicants have not provided adequate assurance that Holtec International is now or will become financially qualified to manage the risks associated with Palisades.

For these reasons, the Petitioners seek leave to intervene in the pending license transfer proceedings for Palisades to oppose the transfer, and request that a hearing be held on the questions of whether the proposed licensee has demonstrated adequate financial qualification, adequate decommissioning financial assurance, and adequate funding for spent fuel management as required under the Atomic Energy Act and relevant NRC regulations.

III. LEGAL STANDING TO INTERVENE Petitioners BN, MSEF and DWM below set forth their qualifications to qualify as organizations with representational legal standing through designated members to oppose the application and pursue its dismissal, with prejudice.

A. Petitioning Organizations And Designated Members

1. Beyond Nuclear Beyond Nuclear is a not-for-profit public policy, research, education organization based in Takoma Park, Maryland that advocates the immediate expansion of renewable energy sources to replace commercial nuclear power generation. Beyond Nuclear has over 12,000 members of whom a number reside, work and recreate near the Palisades Nuclear Plant. Beyond Nuclear herewith provides the declarations of three of its members, Maynard Kaufman, Caroline Ferry, and W. Dillon Reed, all of whom have designated Beyond Nuclear to intervene to protect their interests in physical health and safety, the health and safety of their family members, their real property, and the health and stability of the physical environment proximate to Palisades. Beyond Nuclears address is 7304 Carroll Ave., #182, Takoma Park, MD 20912, phone (301) 270-2209, www.beyondnuclear.org.

Maynard Kaufman is an adult citizen of Michigan who lives at 25485 County Road 681, Bangor, MI 49013, which is located 10 miles from the Palisades Nuclear Plant. He opposes the license transfer to Holtec International and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC because of concerns over Holtecs performance as a corporation. He is concerned that there might be groundwater contamination in the plant complex that has traveled into, or will travel into, Lake Michigan during decommissioning. He further worries that if a spent fuel accident were to occur at Palisades Nuclear Plant involving a spent fuel storage pool fire or canister drop accident, or a serious breach of the dozens of spent fuel storage casks maintained at Palisades, that his family and/or he might be killed, injured or sickened by airborne or waterborne radioactive releases, and that he might suffer irreparable damage to real and personal property located at his residence.

Additionally, he is apprehensive about radioactive leaks and contamination from the routine handling and storage, whether in a spent fuel pool or dry storage casks or canisters, of spent nuclear fuel and other irradiated materials at Palisades during decommissioning. He is disquieted that the spent fuel pool will be dismantled and there will be no means at the Palisades site to stabilize, unload or fix defects in a canister or cask used for spent nuclear fuel.

W. Dillon Reed is an adult Michigan citizen who lives at 80015 Ramblewood Drive, Covert, MI 49043, which is located 0.75 straight-line miles from the Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades). His home is near Lake Michigan and in the warm season he walks on the beach and wades in the Lake within a few hundred yards of Palisades and goes boating with friends or relatives. He opposes the license transfer to Holtec International and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC because of concerns over Holtecs performance as a corporation. He is concerned that there might be groundwater contamination in the plant complex that has traveled into, or will travel into, Lake Michigan during decommissioning. He further worries that if a spent fuel accident were to occur at Palisades Nuclear Plant involving a spent fuel storage pool fire or canister drop accident, or a serious breach of the dozens of spent fuel storage casks maintained at Palisades, that his family and/or he might be killed, injured or sickened by airborne or waterborne radioactive releases, and that he might suffer irreparable damage to real and personal property located at his residence. Additionally, he is apprehensive about radioactive leaks and contamination from the routine handling and storage, whether in a spent fuel pool or dry storage casks or canisters, of spent nuclear fuel and other irradiated materials at Palisades during decommissioning. He is disquieted that the spent fuel pool will be dismantled and there will be no means at the Palisades site to stabilize, unload or fix defects in a canister or cask used for spent nuclear fuel Caroline Ferry is an adult citizen of Michigan who lives at 79964 Fernwood Drive, Covert, MI 49043, which is located 0.75 straight-line miles from the Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades). Her home is near Lake Michigan and in the warm season she walks on the beach and wades in the Lake within a few hundred yards of Palisades and goes boating with friends or relatives. She opposes the license transfer to Holtec International and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC because of concerns over Holtecs performance as a corporation. She is concerned that there might be groundwater contamination in the plant complex that has traveled into, or will travel into, Lake Michigan during decommissioning. She further worries that if a spent fuel accident were to occur at Palisades Nuclear Plant involving a spent fuel storage pool fire or canister drop accident, or a serious breach of the dozens of spent fuel storage casks maintained at Palisades, that her family and/or she might be killed, injured or sickened by airborne or waterborne radioactive releases, and that she might suffer irreparable damage to real and personal property located at her residence. Additionally, she is apprehensive about radioactive leaks and contamination from the routine handling and storage, whether in a spent fuel pool or dry storage casks or canisters, of spent nuclear fuel and other irradiated materials at Palisades during decommissioning. She is disquieted that the spent fuel pool will be dismantled and there will be no means at the Palisades site to stabilize, unload or fix defects in a canister or cask used for spent nuclear fuel.

2. Michigan Safe Energy Future Michigan Safe Energy Future is a grassroots association of people in western and southwestern Michigan which since 2013 has advocated for the permanent shutdown of Palisades Nuclear Plant and replacement of nuclear and natural gas power generation with safe and renewable nonnuclear energy technologies. MSEF does not have a fixed office address, which is deemed to be the residence of its organizational secretary.

James Scott is an adult citizen of Michigan who lives at 80014 Ramblewood Hill, Covert, MI 49043, which is located 1.2 straight-line miles from the Palisades Nuclear Plant. His home is near Lake Michigan and in the warm season he walks on the beach and wades in the Lake within a few hundred yards of Palisades and goes boating with friends or relatives. He opposes the license transfer to Holtec International and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC because of concerns over Holtecs performance as a corporation. He is concerned that there might be groundwater contamination in the plant complex that has traveled into, or will travel into, Lake Michigan during decommissioning. He further worries that if a spent fuel accident were to occur at Palisades Nuclear Plant involving a spent fuel storage pool fire or canister drop accident, or a serious breach of the dozens of spent fuel storage casks maintained at Palisades, that his family and/or he might be killed, injured or sickened by airborne or waterborne radioactive releases, and that he might suffer irreparable damage to real and personal property located at his residence.

Additionally, he is apprehensive about radioactive leaks and contamination from the routine handling and storage, whether in a spent fuel pool or dry storage casks or canisters, of spent nuclear fuel and other irradiated materials at Palisades during decommissioning. He is disquieted that the spent fuel pool will be dismantled and there will be no means at the Palisades site to stabilize, unload or fix defects in a canister or cask used for spent nuclear fuel.

Ann Scott is an adult citizen of Michigan who lives at 80014 Ramblewood Hill, Covert, MI 49043, which is located 1.2 straight-line miles from the Palisades Nuclear Plant. Her home is near Lake Michigan and in the warm season she walks on the beach and wades in the Lake within a few hundred yards of Palisades and goes boating with friends or relatives. She opposes the license transfer to Holtec International and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC because of concerns over Holtecs performance as a corporation. She is concerned that there might be groundwater contamination in the plant complex that has traveled into, or will travel into, Lake Michigan during decommissioning. She further worries that if a spent fuel accident were to occur at Palisades Nuclear Plant involving a spent fuel storage pool fire or canister drop accident, or a serious breach of the dozens of spent fuel storage casks maintained at Palisades, that her family and/or she might be killed, injured or sickened by airborne or waterborne radioactive releases, and that she might suffer irreparable damage to real and personal property located at his residence. Additionally, she is apprehensive about radioactive leaks and contamination from the routine handling and storage, whether in a spent fuel pool or dry storage casks or canisters, of spent nuclear fuel and other irradiated materials at Palisades during decommissioning. She is disquieted that the spent fuel pool will be dismantled and there will be no means at the Palisades site to stabilize, unload or fix defects in a canister or cask used for spent nuclear fuel.

3. Dont Waste Michigan Dont Waste Michigan is a 30-year-old grassroots association with over 50 members in southern, western and central Michigan. DWM is located at 811 Harrison St., Monroe, MI 48161. DWM works to shut down aging, dangerous nuclear power plants in the Great Lakes Basin; to halt or block the construction of new nuclear power plants; to educate the public about the dangers of nuclear power and nuclear waste, its deadly by-product; and to block the practice of landfilling nuclear waste.

Alice Hirt is an adult citizen of Michigan who lives at 6677 Summit View, Holland, MI 49024, which is located 36.5 straight-line miles from the Palisades Nuclear Plant. Her home is near Lake Michigan and in the warm season she walks on the beach and wades in the Lake and goes boating with friends or relatives. She opposes the license transfer to Holtec International and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC because of concerns over Holtecs performance as a corporation. She is concerned that there might be groundwater contamination in the plant complex that has traveled into, or will travel into, Lake Michigan during decommissioning. She further worries that if a spent fuel accident were to occur at Palisades Nuclear Plant involving a spent fuel storage pool fire or canister drop accident, or a serious breach of the dozens of spent fuel storage casks maintained at Palisades, that her family and/or she might be killed, injured or sickened by airborne or waterborne radioactive releases, and that she might suffer irreparable damage to real and personal property located at her residence. Additionally, she is apprehensive about radioactive leaks and contamination from the routine handling and storage, whether in a spent fuel pool or dry storage casks or canisters, of spent nuclear fuel and other irradiated materials at Palisades during decommissioning. She is disquieted that the spent fuel pool will be dismantled and there will be no means at the Palisades site to stabilize, unload or fix defects in a canister or cask used for spent nuclear fuel.

Joseph C. Kirk is an adult citizen of Michigan who lives at 29794 Lake Bluff, Palisades Park, MI 49043, which is 0.8 straight-line miles from the Palisades Nuclear Plant. His home is near Lake Michigan and in the warm season he walks on the beach and wades in the Lake within a few hundred yards of Palisades and goes boating with friends or relatives. He opposes the license transfer to Holtec International and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC because of concerns over Holtecs performance as a corporation. He is concerned that there might be groundwater contamination in the plant complex that has traveled into, or will travel into, Lake Michigan during decommissioning. He further worries that if a spent fuel accident were to occur at Palisades Nuclear Plant involving a spent fuel storage pool fire or canister drop accident, or a serious breach of the dozens of spent fuel storage casks maintained at Palisades, that his family and/or he might be killed, injured or sickened by airborne or waterborne radioactive releases, and that he might suffer irreparable damage to real and personal property located at his residence.

Additionally, he is apprehensive about radioactive leaks and contamination from the routine handling and storage, whether in a spent fuel pool or dry storage casks or canisters, of spent nuclear fuel and other irradiated materials at Palisades during decommissioning. He is disquieted that the spent fuel pool will be dismantled and there will be no means at the Palisades site to stabilize, unload or fix defects in a canister or cask used for spent nuclear fuel.

B. Legal Basis for Standing Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.309, a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene must address (1) the nature of the petitioners right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceeding, (2) the nature and extent of the petitioners property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding, and (3) the possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioners interest.

In determining whether a petitioner has sufficient interest to intervene in a proceeding, the Commission has traditionally applied judicial concepts of standing. See Metropolitan Edison Co.

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 332 (1983) (citing Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610 (1976)). Contemporaneous judicial standards for standing require a petitioner to demonstrate that (1) she, he or it has suffered or will suffer a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury-in-fact within the zone of interests arguably protected by the governing statutes (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA));

(2) the injury can be fairly traced to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plants), LBP-99-25, 50 NRC 25, 29 (1999).

An organization that wishes to intervene in a proceeding may do so either in its own right by demonstrating harm to its organizational interests, or in a representational capacity by demonstrating harm to its members. See Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Road, Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), LBP-98-9, 47 NRC 261, 271 (1998). An organization seeking representational standing must demonstrate how at least one of its members may be affected by the licensing action (such as by activities on or near the site), must identify that member by name and address, and must show (preferably by affidavit) that the organization is authorized to request a hearing on behalf of that member. See, e.g., Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Georgia), CLI-95-12, 42 NRC 111, 115 (1995); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-549, 9 NRC 644, 646-48 (1979); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),

ALAB-535, 9 NRC 377, 390-97 (1979). Regarding the preference for an affidavit, see Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. (Cambridge, Ohio Facility), CLI-99-12, 49 NRC 347, 354 & n.4 (1999); Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-96-1, 43 NRC 19, 23 (1996).

C. Petitioners Have Demonstrated Standing Standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated by the proximity to Palisades stated in the declarations of the individuals annexed to this Petition. All individual Petitioners, in turn, have authorized the organizational Petitioners to represent their interests in this proceeding.

All but one of the seven individual members has provided evidence of living within 10 miles of Palisades. Five of the six within the 10 mile zone live within 1.2 miles of Palisades. BN, MSEF and DWM all are entitled to the presumption of injury-in-fact for persons residing within that zone. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-10, 9 NRC 439, 443 (1979); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2),

LBP-79-1, 9 NRC 73, 78 (1979); and Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-23, 64 NRC 257, 270 (2006)).

The license transfer application involves a reactor which will be decommissioned during the license period.

Even assuming, arguendo, there is no presumption of standing based upon mere close geographic proximity to Palisades, then standing should be accorded the individual citizens near Palisades based on the proximity-plus test, where a petitioner may show that the activity at issue involves geographical closeness to a significant source of radioactivity producing an obvious potential for offsite consequences. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64, 75 n.22 (1994). The case of Shaw Areva MOX Services, LBP-07-14 (2007) involved a license application for a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility in South Carolina. The petitioners there submitted standing affidavits from members whose residences were within 20 to 32 miles from the facility site. The licensing board noted that the NRC Staff included residents as far away as 50 miles from the facility in its calculation of potential population doses. The Shaw decision suggests that a significant proximity radius is justified in cases involving large amounts of spent nuclear fuel, and cited Carolina Power &

Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-99-25, 50 NRC 25 (1999).

The notion of injury-in-fact encompasses all radiation impacts, including those that do not necessarily amount to a regulatory violation. See Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-01-35, 54 NRC 403, 417 (2001) (citing Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 247-48 (1996)). A minor exposure to radiation-even if it is within regulatory limits-will suffice to state an injury-in-fact. Id.

And not only actual injury, but the threat of injury from radiation exposure, is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of traditional standing. See Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), CLI-03-14, 58 NRC 207, 216 (2003) (A threatened unwanted exposure to radiation, even a minor one, is sufficient to establish an injury.). See also, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.

59, 74 (1978).

Here, the petitioning organizations members live, work and recreate near a site which for decades will experience the storage onsite of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and greater-than-Class-C waste (GTCC) waste. It will be transported around the site, loaded into storage casks, stored, monitored and ultimately, repackaged and transported away via truck, barge and/or rail. SNF and GTCC waste are inherently dangerous radiotoxic materials. Each SNF storage and SNF transport canister will carry considerably more radioactivity (200 times or more) than was dispersed by the Hiroshima nuclear bomb. SNF poses a dangerous, long-term health and environmental risk. It will remain dangerous for time spans seemingly beyond human comprehension. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Cesium-137, a very dangerous radioactive element if allowed to enter air or water, is one of dozens of listed hazardous radioisotopes in SNF.

HDI admits in the PSDAR that there is a possibility, albeit low, of radiological accidents, such as zirconium fire accidents, that could produce offsite doses that exceed the EPA's protective action guides and affect the public health and safety. HDI admits the potential 3

for radioactive contamination of various areas of the site and the likely need for remediation.

4 5

Accidents and spillage have implications for groundwater and lake water quality and air quality for workers and offsite residents such as the individual petitioners living from 1 to 10, or even tens of miles, from the radiation source.

Even the Continued Storage GEIS, cited by HDI, considered an accident scenario in 6

PSDAR at 29-30.

3 PSDAR at 9-10.

4 PSDAR at 12, 22.

5 PSDAR at 38.

6 which wind-borne missiles damage the concrete overpack of a dry cask and also considered an accident resulting in a dry cask leaking.... There is sufficient evidence, in short, of the 7

potential for dire public health and safety and environmental consequences to justify the concerns expressed by BNs, MSEFs and DWMs individual members.

Whether and at what distance from the radiation source a person can be presumed to be affected, and thus have legal standing, is judged on a case-by-case basis in NRC licensing cases, taking into account the nature of the proposed action and the significance of the radioactive source. While a petitioner must show that he or she lives, works or recreates proximate to the location of dangerously radioactive materials, importantly, the petitioner does not have the burden of articulating a plausible means through which those materials could cause harm. It is the inherent dangers of the radioactive materials that create the obvious potential for offsite consequences. U.S. Army Installation Command (Schofield Barracks, Oahu, Hawaii, and Pohakuloa Training Area, Island of Hawaii, Hawaii), CLI-10-20, 71 NRC 216, 218 (2010), citing USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-05-11, 61 NRC 309, 311 (2005).

As noted, spent nuclear fuel is high-level nuclear waste and is inherently dangerous with obvious potential for offsite consequences. The reasonableness of a petitioners apprehension of injury must be left for consideration when the merits of the controversy are reached. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (Cobalt-60 Storage Facility), ALAB-682, 16 NRC 150, 152, 154 (1982) (petitioners lived three to five miles from water-shielded irradiation facility at National Naval Medical Center holding 320,000 curies of radioactive cobalt-60 that allegedly Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 7

(NUREG-2157) (2014) (Continued Storage GEIS or GEIS) at Executive Summary, p. lviii.

were emitting gamma radiation; proximity to cobalt inventories sufficed to establish petitioner's interest). In Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Georgia),

CLI-95-12, 42 NRC 111 (1995), the Commission left undisturbed the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards finding that it was neither extravagant nor a stretch of the imagination to presume that some injury, which wouldnt have to be very great, could occur within one half mile of the research reactor. Id. at 117. See also CFC Logistics, Inc., LBP-03-20, 58 NRC 311, 320 (2003) (petitioners residing from between one-third of a mile to three miles from a facility licensed to possess up to 1 million curies of cobalt-60 could rely on proximity presumption to establish their standing to intervene because of the quantity of radioactive material and its dangerousness). Also, see Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-04-15, 59 NRC 256, 257 (2004) (groups with members living at 2.5-and 4.9-mile distances, respectively, from the proposed facility live in [such] close proximity to the proposed LES facility that they would have an obvious potential to be affected by the facility). And in an earlier LES proceeding involving the proposed Claiborne Enrichment Center, the Licensing Board remarked that the petitioner (which had several members residing within 1 mile, in close proximity to the proposed facility) could rely on a presumption of injury from an accidental release of fission products. See Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center),

Memorandum and Order (July 16, 1991) (unpublished) at 6.

Prior agency rulings regarding spent fuel pool expansion proceedings also supply some guidance. Shearon Harris, LBP-99-25, 50 NRC at 29-31 (petitioner seventeen miles from the facility at issue accorded standing); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-7, 25 NRC 116, 118-19 (1987); id., LBP-87-17, 25 NRC 838, 842, aff'd in part and reversed in part on other grounds, ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13 (1987)

(residence within ten miles of ISFSI sufficient for standing); Florida Power & Light Co. (St.

Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-10A, 27 NRC 452, 454-55 (1988), aff'd, ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627 (1988) (standing of individual living within 10 miles of ISFSI conceded by parties); Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-00-02, 51 NRC 25, 28 (2000) (standing granted individual with part-time residence located ten miles from ISFSI).

The proposed license transfer raises significant health, safety, environmental, and financial concerns for BN, MSEF, DWM and their members. BN, MSEF and DWM and their members will be at risk if there is a shortfall in the Decommissioning Trust Fund (DTF) that prevents the Palisades site from being fully decontaminated and restored. The radiological risk to members health and safety and to the environment, if land and water intended for release for public use is not decontaminated completely before license termination, will comprise a continuing threat. A financial threat also looms if the DTF is unjustly or improvidently depleted, because the members of BN, MSEF and DWM, as taxpayers and/or ratepayers, may become the last resort source of indemnification and financing of Palisades decommissioning.

In sum, Petitioner organizations have demonstrated, via declarations of their members, that the members face present or prospective injury, and that they reside close by inherently dangerous radioactive materials that could cause or contribute to extremely serious accidents and/or contamination accidents. Beyond Nuclear, Michigan Safe Energy Future and Dont Waste Michigan all should be granted legal standing to pursue contentions denominated below on behalf of their members.

IV. CONTENTIONS The NRCs contention regulation, 10 CFR § 2.309 requires that this Petition:

(I) Provide a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted, provided further, that the issue of law or fact to be raised in a request for hearing under 10 CFR 52.103(b) must be directed at demonstrating that one or more of the acceptance criteria in the combined license have not been, or will not be met, and that the specific operational consequences of nonconformance would be contrary to providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety; (ii) Provide a brief explanation of the basis for the contention; (iii) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the contention is within the scope of the proceeding; (iv) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the contention is material to the findings the NRC must make to support the action that is involved in the proceeding; (v) Provide a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinions which support the requestors/petitioners position on the issue and on which the petitioner intends to rely at hearing, together with references to the specific sources and documents on which the requestor/petitioner intends to rely to support its position on the issue; (vi) In a proceeding other than one under 10 CFR 52.103, provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant/licensee on a material issue of law or fact. This information must include references to specific portions of the application (including the applicants environmental report and safety report) that the petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute, or, if the petitioner believes that the application fails to contain information on a relevant matter as required by law, the identification of each failure and the supporting reasons for the petitioners belief;....

CONTENTION NO. 1 Changes in land use, effects of historical site events, and inadequacies of the 2006 Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement all comprise new information which necessitates additional NEPA supplementation.

A number of changes in land use, the historical consequences of activities at the Palisades site, and insufficiencies in the 2006 Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) 8 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 8

27, NUREG-1437 (2006 SEIS).

warrant additional supplementation of the NEPA document for Palisades.

A. Rationale for contention Generally, the changes which require investigation and analysis under NEPA include:

accounting for the current historically high Lake Michigan water levels and their effects on hydrological flow onsite and offsite, as well as contributions to erosion of the bluff at the foot of the dune on which dry storage casks containing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) repose on concrete pads; the interim and final disposition of four bus-sized steam generators at the site, which are radioactively contaminated condition and pose unaddressed concerns for transport and disposal; the lingering effects of multiple water spillages from the Palisades cooling tower array that implicated the Radwaste Building; the characterization of historical tritium spillage and leakage sitewide; the continued use and disposition of two seismically-unqualified concrete storage pads holding SNF in dry storage casks; the unexplained reduction of greater-than-class-C (GTCC) radioactive waste storage needs from 5 casks for storage to 2 casks; identification of environmental effects of repackaging of SNF from present DSCs into transport containers; the prospects for unloading and repackaging the SNF in defective Cask No. 4, loaded in 1994; and environmental impacts from the need for extended storage of high burnup SNF.

B. Contention is within scope of proceedings Supplementation is within the scope of this proceeding as admitted by Applicants, who point out that 10 CFR § 50.82(a)(4)(I) requires that the PSDAR include,... a discussion that provides the reasons for concluding that the environmental impacts associated with site-specific decommissioning activities will be bounded by appropriate previously issued environmental impact statements.9 C. Legal standards under NEPA Under NEPA, NRC is obligated to undertake a supplemental EIS when presented with substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns or new and significant circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts after the EIS is assembled. 10 C.F.R. § 51.92(a)(1)-(2); see also id. § 51.72(a)(1)-(2). New and significant information presents a seriously different picture of the environmental impact of the proposed project from what was previously envisioned. Hydro Res., Inc., 50 N.R.C. 3, 14 (1999). Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League v. Nuclear Regulatory Com'n, 716 F.3d 183, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

D. Pertinent facts and evidence Petitioners address the substantial changes and new and significant circumstances and information below.

1. Lake Michigan Water Levels In 2006, the level of Lake Michigan was at about 577 ft. MSL (Mean Sea Level). As of 10 February 2021, the level of Lake Michigan is about 580.5 ft. MSL, and the projection is that by the end of 2021 it will rise several more inches. According to the 2006 SEIS, groundwater 11 Palisades Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) at 18.

9 Corps of Engineers graph, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&

10 source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjW9sz3uIHvAhXMZc0KHVocBscQFjAAegQIARAD&url=https%3 A%2F%2Fwww.lre.usace.army.mil%2FPortals%2F69%2Fdocs%2FGreatLakesInfo%2Fdocs%2FWater Levels%2FLTA-GLWL-Graph_2016.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0m2ma2LSw4pHdLA-2_NqoE https://www.lre.usace.army.mil/Missions/Great-Lakes-Information/Great-Lakes-Water-Levels/

11 beneath the Palisades site ranged from 604 ft. MSL down to 580 ft. MSL, and [t]he calculated groundwater flow velocity at this site is westward [i.e., toward Lake Michigan] at approximately 23 ft/yr.

12 The change in Lake Michigan levels thus is in opposition to the groundwater flow from the Palisades site. This raises questions of whether groundwater has slowed its westward travel or even reversed it in some locations on the Palisades site. Higher lake levels may have implications for the rehydration or concentration of groundwater, or change in flow direction of radioactive and nonradioactive contaminants in the soil, discussed below. The rise in lake levels has implications for the security and stability of the two concrete pads on which DSCs repose, including erosion and groundwater as an exacerbation in the event of earthquakes, detailed below.

2. Steam Generators There are four steam generators at Palisades; two were replaced in the early 1990s and have been stored at Palisades for nearly 30 years in a utility building. Steam generators are bus-13 sized heat exchangers used to convert water into steam from heat produced in a nuclear reactor core. They are used in pressurized water reactors (PWR) between the primary and secondary coolant loops. Through use, the piping and associated structures becomes radioactive. The disposal of steam generators makes up an especially challenging task because of their measures, Water-Level-Forecast/Monthly-Bulletin-of-Great-Lakes-Water-Levels/

2006 SEIS at 4-40.

12 2006 SEIS at 2-1.

13 their weight and compared to other heat exchangers high radioactive inventory.14 There is zero mention or discussion in the 2006 SEIS of steam generator radioactivity or ultimate disposition. In the PSDAR, the Applicants state that it is likely that the generators will be transported offsite by barge, and that a boat slip may have to be constructed at Palisades for this purpose. Applicants conclude that this aspect of decommissioning would be bounded by 15 the 2006 SEIS, as there would be no impacts on water quality associated with Palisades decommissioning beyond those discussed in the GEIS. The implications of loading and 16 hauling steam generators on the Great Lakes are not mentioned in the 2006 SEIS or the PSDAR.

By contrast, in 2010 the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative analyzed a proposal to ship steam generators via water from the Bruce nuclear power plant complex on Lake Huron, and predicted that [i]f all the total radioactive inventory of one steam generator is released, this would exceed the Health Canada Action Level for intervention in the event of a nuclear emergency by two times (2.52 mSv vs. 1mSv action level).

17 The Palisades steam generators and associated irradiated piping and other components Walberg and others, Disposal of Steam Generators from Decommissioning of 14 PWR Nuclear Power Plants, IYNC 2008, Interlaken, Switzerland, 20 - 26 September 2008 Paper No. 158, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwin0pmI7YHvA hVUHM0KHZyNDXAQFjALegQIIBAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Finis.iaea.org%2Fcollection%2FNCLC ollectionStore%2F_Public%2F40%2F048%2F40048101.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2WwrEiAf2QUGO_LrkU44 gG PSDAR at 11, 19.

15 PSDAR at 21.

16 Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative,Submission to the Canadian Nuclear Safety 17 Commission On the matter of: Application from Bruce Power to Transport Radioactive Steam Generators under Special Arrangement and Exclusive Use on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River, http://www.ccnr.org/GLCI_CNSC_Supplementary.pdf (p. 5/58 of.pdf) proposed to be shipped away via barge must be addressed in a supplemental EIS.

3. Cooling Towers Overflow There were 3 overflows of water from the Palisades cooling towers in 8 years during the 1980s. According to Consumers Power, radioactive contamination came from the South Radwaste building, after the overflows mixed with heavy rains and flooded the South radwaste building. The principal contaminants listed by the NRC were Cobalt-60 and Cesium-137. Six 18 19 thousand cubic feet of onsite contaminated soil containing a total radionuclide inventory of 5.1 mCi was removed and disposed elsewhere onsite. About 1,600 cubic feet was packaged as 20 radwaste to be subsequently shipped offsite, but it is not known whether that occurred. The 21 6,000 cubic feet that was excavated was estimated to contain 15% of the total radiation, and remained in the fenced area described as South Radwaste Area (Area B). The utility concluded 22 that the problem was resolved by excavation and replacement of topsoil with gravel, to inhibit wind erosion and reduces inhalability. There was no consideration given to whether the 23 groundwater was polluted because there are no domestic wells in the area down-gradient from REQUEST UNDER 10 CFR 20.302 TO RETAIN CONTAMINATED SOIL ONSITE AT 18 PALISADES PLANT (TAC NO. 67408)

References:

(1) CPCo's letter, T. C. Bordine to NRC, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0608/ML060870601.pdf Id.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 the plant. That ignores the fact that Lake Michigan is down-gradient drinking water.

24 It is not clear whether it remains true that there are no domestic water wells down-gradient from Palisades, more than 30 years later, nor, apparently, has any groundwater sampling been done to track any further effects from this incident.

This circumstance supports conducting a new, final sitewide contamination characterization.

4. Characterization Of Historical Tritium Spillage And Leakage Cancer, birth defects, genetic damage and potentially other maladies occur in humans ingesting tritium. When tritium decays, it emits a low-energy electron (roughly 18,000 electron volts) that escapes and slams into the DNA in the cells next door, a ribosome or some other biologically important molecule.

Palisades has an increasingly disturbing tritium problem. Tritium is mentioned in the 2006 SEIS only as a contaminant released to the water and air in planned and controlled circumstances. But it is the increasingly unplanned, recurring leaks of tritium that Palisades 25 26 has not been able to anticipate or satisfactorily control that pose ongoing risks to public health.

And there is no admission or discussion of the tritium problem in the 2018 Entergy ISFSI letter and report, nor in the PSDAR.

In December 2007, Palisades, as with a growing number of operating reactors in the U.S.,

Id.

24 2006 SEIS at 2-11.

25 Id.

26 disclosed that it was leaking tritium into groundwater on the site. Entergy could not identify 27 when the leak began so it was assumed to have occurred throughout 2007. Palisades determined that the leaks were coming from a failed storage tank and connected underground pipes.28 Tritium was reported in an onsite groundwater test well at 34,000 picocuries per liter. Entergy 29 estimated that a total of 8.33 curies of tritium was leaked into groundwater with about 1% of the failed tank and pipings tritium contents leaking out. For this same period, the Palisades nuclear 30 power station deliberately released 839 curies of radioactive tritium as liquid effluent into Lake Michigan and 341 curies of radioactive fission and activation gases at ground level.31 Palisades and NRC officials downplayed the health and safety significance of these ongoing radioactive releases and concentrated contamination. Entergy emphasized that the discovery of tritium leaks in groundwater was made at a test well on the company's property that is not used for drinking water. This was a misleading assertion; samples taken from onsite test 32 wells are only indicators that highly mobile tritium has escaped into the movement of groundwater tables. At Palisades, groundwater can transport tritium offsite into Lake Michigan and potentially other drinking water sources, such as deeper groundwater tables and aquifers.

Tritium found in well near Palisades, Kalamazoo Gazette, Dec. 17, 2007 27 2007 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, Palisades, April 29, 2008, Abnormal 28 Releases, p. 1 of 4 http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/tritium/plant-info.html Id. at 1.

29 Id.

30 Id., Attachments 2 and 3.

31 Nuclear plant to dig up pipes in search of leak, Kalamazoo Gazette, May 19, 2008 and 32 Palisades repairs second tritium leak, Kalamazoo Gazette, August 12, 2009 While the leaking damaged pipe was supposedly excavated, drained, and repaired in 2008, tritium levels continued to spike in Palisades groundwater, raising concerns that leaks 33 34 of unknown origin continued. Entergy announced that the leak was caused by a failed weld at a turn in a stainless steel pipe installed during original construction, and claimed that this flaw had also been repaired.35 To the immediate north of Palisades is the Van Buren State Park. To the immediate south of Palisades nuclear power plant is Palisades Park, a private, more than century-old resort community with 200 cabins. Portions of the Palisades Park resort community, inhabited mostly during warm weather months, also use well water. The shoreline beaches and waters are popular for boating, swimming and fishing.

In February 2010, Entergy claimed to have replaced all underground pipes but at a 36 public meeting on February 24, 2010, the NRC staff could not verify if Entergy was claiming to have replaced all buried pipes that carry radioactive water or just those pipes that carry water related to safety-related functions of the reactor. Entergy later maintained that its 37 spokespersons statement was taken out of context and that Palisades had not replaced all of its Id.

33 Palisades reports 'uptick' in tritium, Kalamazoo Gazette, June 11, 2009 34 Palisades repairs second tritium leak, Kalamazoo Gazette, August 12, 2009 35 Palisades nuclear plant keeping ahead of the leaks, Herald-Palladium, February 20, 2010, 36 http://www.beyondnuclear.org/storage/tritium_buriedpipe_pali_02222010_notreplaced.pdf http://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/idmws/doccontent.dll?

37 library=PU_ADAMS^PBNTAD01&ID=100840075 buried pipes to head off the corrosion problem.38 On June 11, 2014, Entergy announced that there were no active leaks from buried pipes currently on the site. But in 2012 and 2013, workers tried unsuccessfully to repair repeated tritium leaks occurring from an above-ground safety injection refueling water tank. Some of the leakage traveled into the plants control room. On May 5, 2013, Palisades was manually shut down due to exceeding the allowable leak rate from the storage tank. The tank contains up to 300,000 gallons of borated water with low levels of tritium contamination that is used during refueling outages or in case of emergency. During that time, workers found numerous cracks and tried again to stop the tank from leaking. When Entergy eventually did replace the entire bottom 39 of the tank, it was discovered that a protective sand bed barrier had not been installed as credited in the plants original blueprints.40 Entergy discovered radioactive tritium on February 26, 2015 in two temporary onsite test wells, but could not identify the exact location of the pipe leak or the leak volume rate. Entergy suspected the radioactive leak originated from the reactors steam generator inside containment which leaked out into the turbine building and through failing buried piping systems for the Palisades nuclear plant keeping ahead of the leaks, Herald-Palladium, February 20, 2010 and 38 Correction, February 22, 2010, http://www.beyondnuclear.org/storage/tritium_buriedpipe_pali_02222010_notreplaced.pdf Palisades nuclear plant leak released low dose of radioactive water into Lake Michigan, 39 Kalamazoo Gazette, May 10, 2013, http://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2013/05/leak_at_palisades_nuclear_plan.html Palisades: Constant repairs, extra inspections, have kept nuclear plant running, Kalamazoo 40 Gazette, August 25, 2014, http://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2014/08/palisades_nuclear_plant_repair.html turbine sump oil separator to the turbine building drain tank. Tritium is an indicator of other 41 radioisotopes that might be present in water used in the nuclear cycle.

Clearly, Palisades has not been able to stay ahead of its tritium leakage. Such leakage is commonplace at aging nuclear reactors. It is possible that tritium contamination is present in the soil at different depths and over conceivably large areas. As noted, neither the PSDAR nor Entergys 2018 ISFSI decommissioning funding plan even mention the word tritium. It has a half-life of 12.3 years, continues to be produced at Palisades, and to leak from known and unknown areas of the power plant. It will take more than a century for tritium to degrade to harmless levels. It will continue to be carcinogenic to workers and later, the public once people are allowed back on the site. The tritium problem must be characterized sitewide and analyzed within a new, supplemental EIS.

5. The Seismically-Noncompliant DSC Storage Pads Michigan has had a lengthy history of earthquake activity, dating back to the first several historically recorded quakes, in 1811 and 1812, originating from the New Madrid fault, centered in New Madrid, Missouri. These quakes registered at 8.0 or higher on the Richter scale and were felt in Michigan. Additional quakes were felt in a variety of locations throughout Michigan in the later 1800s.

The largest earthquake experienced in Michigan was in 1947. With a magnitude of 4.6, it was felt throughout southern Michigan, affecting an area of 50,000 square miles. A quake originating in south central Illinois in 1968 extended approximately 580,000 square miles and US NRC Daily Event Report for March 19, 2015 Event Number 5097 41 http://www.beyondnuclear.org/storage/leak-first-fix-later/pali_leak_03192015_der.doc was felt throughout southern Michigan.

The New Madrid zone has produced the countrys largest earthquake and is considered the countrys most seismically active region east of the Rocky Mountains. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimates the chance of having an earthquake similar to one of the 1811-12 sequence in the next 50 years is about 7 to 10 percent, and the chance of having a magnitude 6.0 or larger earthquake in 50 years is 25 to 40 percent. Movement of the New 42 Madrid fault was noted in a June 2005 Nature article describing the results of a University of Memphis study that detected a half-inch shift in the fault from 2000 to 2005.

There are two concrete pads next to the Palisades nuclear plant, located somewhat above the Lake Michigan waters. One was constructed in 1993, the other in 2005. In 1994, Dr. Ross Landsman, NRC Nuclear Safety Engineer and Palisades Dry Cask Storage Inspector, questioned the adequacy of requirements associated with earthquake activity for Palisades dry cask storage facility in a letter to the chairman of the NRC. In his letter, Dr. Landsman voiced his concerns, Actually, its the consequences that might occur from an earthquake that Im concerned about.

The casks can either fall into Lake Michigan or be buried in the loose sand because of liquefaction [soil taking on liquid characteristics]. This event might be in the publics mind in view of what just happened in Southern California. It is apparent to me that NMSS [NRCs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards] doesnt realize the catastrophic consequences USGS Fact Sheet 2009-3071 (August 2009),

42 https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUK Ewi--rTilILvAhUbac0KHdypCtkQFjABegQIBhAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fpubs.usgs.gov%2Ffs%2F20 09%2F3071%2Fpdf%2FFS09-3071.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1RM23VhjPZyoZ16ZseQzMF of their continued reliance on their current ideology.43 Dr. Landsman determined that both pads were built on compacted sand and other subsurface materials, dozens of feet above bedrock and well above the ground elevation of the nearby Palisades Nuclear Power Plant. Dr.Landsman had filled a direct oversight role in the inspection of dry cask storage at Palisades when he worked at NRC Region III during the period of dry cask storage installation and operation from 1993 to 2005. He concluded from his personal knowledge of the subsoil conditions that the older, 1993, pad nearer Lake Michigan is in violation of NRC liquefaction standards under 10 CFR § 72.212(b)(2)(i)(B), while the newer, 2005, pad further inland violates NRC amplification requirements contained within the same regulations.

Neither the older nor newer dry cask storage pads at the Palisades plant were designed in consideration of the factors contained in the cited regulation, consequently each continues to violate 10 CFR § 72.212(b)(3). Hence the cask storage pads have violated NRC regulations since they were constructed, and they will continue to violate NRC regulations throughout any period of contemplated usage.

The pads are aging, are constantly exposed to the elements, and the odds of a severe seismic event are increasing with the passage of time. The eastern pad must function flawlessly for perhaps 80 years until all high burnup fuel can be removed. The probabilities of pad failure 44

- in the face of proof that the pad does not comply with NRC specifications - must be ADAMS No. ML20080A666.

43 Petitioners expert, Robert Alvarez, points out in his report, discussed further below, that 44 because of safety and logistical considerations, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board predicts that high burnup SNF may have to be stored at reactor sites until 2100.

investigated and analyzed, along with a serious assessment of risks of damage to DSCs in the event of an earthquake. There is no mention or discussion of earthquakes except in a general way in the 2006 SEIS. There is zero mention of the word earthquake in the PSDAR or the 2018 ISFSI decommissioning letter and report. This matter must be addressed in a supplemental EIS and an updated safety analysis.

6. The GTCC Cask Discrepancy Entergy estimates in its 2018 ISFSI letter and report that there will be a need for 6 storage overpacks for GTCC canisters. In the PSDAR, however, Entergy and the other Applicant 45 parties state It is anticipated that no more than 2 GTCC canisters will be required for the storage of GTCC waste from Palisades decommissioning activities.

Neither document reveals the rationale for the estimate. The discrepancy-one estimate is three times the volume of the other - suggests that Holtec and HDI might be characterizing GTCC waste far differently from Entergy. The implications include major cost differences in the means by which GTCC as opposed to other radioactive wastes are transported and the manner in which they are disposed. There may be large differences, depending on transport arrangements, in the amount of radiation exposure for GTCC versus another classification. GTCC is as difficult to dispose of as SNF. These contradictions must be investigated and disclosed within a supplemental EIS.

7. Repackaging dilemmas Applicants comprehension of the prudent management of SNF at the plant site, and the subsequent packaging, transport and disposal arrangements is sorely lacking. The economics set Entergy 2018 letter, ADAMS No. ML18351A478 (p. 39/70 of.pdf).

45 forth in the PSDAR are highly suspect, and Applicants inconsistently maintain that all repackaging will take place by the late 2020s, and that transports of SNF will commence in 2041, or perhaps 2030, and end by 2066. Entergy foresees a 2030 start date for DOE initiating 46 transfer of commercial spent fuel to a federal facility (not necessarily a final repository)... and that the spent fuel is projected to be fully removed from the Palisades site in 2066.47 Current U.S. Department of Energy policy requires packaging of SNF and GTCC waste into smaller uniformly-sized, multipurpose transport, aging and disposal (TAD) canisters for purposes of geological repository disposal. This poses a number of unconsidered management, waste generation and cost issues which are poorly addressed, if at all, in the PSDAR.

There are at present zero approved transport canister types to haul the SNF from reactor sites to anticipated geological repository disposal. DOEs underlying objective for requiring uniformly-constructed transportation, aging and disposal canisters (TADs) is efficiency and safety: the SNF must fit into limited space within the repository in order to control the thermal load that will emanate for centuries from the disposed canisters into the surrounding geological layers of the Earth. The fuel bundles from different reactor types vary greatly in thermal content and as to whether or not they are now considered high burnup fuel (HBF). Presently there is no agreement on the size nor other features of the TAD canisters to achieve the DOEs efficient disposal requirements.

In 2006, DOE gave notice of intent to supplement the Yucca Mountain Final Environmental Impact Statement in the Federal Register, indicating that the proposed surface PSDAR at 3.

46 From Entergy 2018 letter, p. 15/70 of.pdf.

47 and subsurface facilities [at Yuccca] would allow DOE to operate the repository following a primarily canistered approach in which most commercial spent nuclear fuel would be packaged at the commercial sites in multipurpose transport, aging and disposal canisters (TADs), and all DOE materials would be packaged in disposable canisters at the DOE sites. Waste packages would be arrayed in the repository underground to achieve what is referred to as a higher-thermal operating mode, and most spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste would arrive at the repository by rail.48 In the resulting Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, Vol. I (2008) (Yucca SEIS), the DOE stated that DOE would use a TAD canister to transport, age, and dispose of commercial spent nuclear fuel without ever reopening the canister, thereby simplifying and reducing the number of handling operations involved in the packaging of spent nuclear fuel for disposal... [and] consistent with the analysis in the Yucca Mountain FEIS, this Repository SEIS assumes that it would transport and receive all DOE spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in disposable canisters.49 The DOEs present approach is described as follows:

As now proposed, DOE would use a primarily canistered approach to operate the repository; under this approach, most commercial spent nuclear fuel would be packaged at the reactor sites in TAD canisters. DOE would repackage commercial spent nuclear fuel that arrived in packages other than TAD canisters into these canisters in newly designed surface facilities at the repository. The Department would package essentially all DOE material in disposable canisters at the DOE sites. Most spent nuclear fuel and 71 Federal Register 60490 (October 13, 2006),

48 https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0927/ML092710174.pdf https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/EIS-0250-S1-FEIS-01-2008.pdf 49 high-level radioactive waste would arrive at the repository by rail. Some shipments would arrive by truck. At the repository, DOE would place the TAD and other disposable canisters in waste packages that were manufactured from corrosion resistant materials.

DOE would array the waste packages in the subsurface facility in tunnels (emplacement drifts).

Yucca SEIS at § 1.4.2, p. 1-14 (Emphasis added).

But the Applicants do not acknowledge the existence of this policy, which applies to all SNF to be shipped from reactor sites. While packaging is mentioned in the PSDAR, it is a general term referring to all irradiated materials and wastes that will be encountered in the decommissioning. The only sign that Entergy or Holtec recognize that there must be repackaging is in a limited sense, where the SNF in 18 Sierra Nuclear VSC-24 DSCs possibly will have to be repackaged before it can be shipped offsite. Entergy said in 2018 that [r]epackaging is 50 currently assumed to occur immediately after the cessation of plant operations, while the spent fuel pool is still available and the associated fuel handling systems are operable.

51 Robert Alvarez also points out a significant incongruity in Entergys understanding:

The DOE has taken the position that under the Standard Contract, it does not have an obligation to accept canistered fuel from licensees. This position, coupled with the DOEs failure to perform, has increased the difficulty of estimating future requirements under 10 CFR 72.30. The estimates presented in this report are for budgeting purposes only, and do not represent any conclusion by the licensee about how the DOE will actually perform in the future. This report should not be taken as any indication that the licensee knows how the DOE will eventually perform its obligations, or has any specific expectation concerning that performance. If DOEs failure to perform results in specific additional costs beyond those reflected in this report, it is expected that the DOE will compensate the licensee for those costs.52 Entergy 2018 letter at 16/70 of.pdf.

50 Id.

51 Declaration of Robert Alvarez accompanying this Petition, Exh. B, p. 4.

52 Alvarez points out that this projection for removal of the SNF has strong elements of speculation. Since DOE has yet to design a standardized TAD and there is no permanent 53 repository selected which would dictate the dimensions of the TADs, Applicants clearly are unprepared to undertake repackaging in a way that will be economical, efficient and protective of workers, the public health and the environment. Applicants speculation reveals that the exemption they seek to plunder the NDT fund for $166,000,000 for spent fuel management is 54 unreliable and reflects that decommissioning plans are neither well-conceived nor complete.

Petitioners expert, Robert Alvarez, conclusively establishes in his report that the 18 VSC-24 casks at the site may not be used for transporting SNF, so it is not merely possible 55 that repackaging will be required, it is obligatory.

NRC regulations at 10 CFR § 50.82(a)(4)(i) require that the PSDAR include,... a discussion that provides the reasons for concluding that the environmental impacts associated with site-specific decommissioning activities will be bounded by appropriate previously issued environmental impact statements. There is no factual discussion of the environmental effects from the unrealistic SNF transport dates, nor confrontation of the harsh realities that high burnup fuel, discussed further below, may not be movable until near the end of the century. There is no discussion of repackaging of all SNF at Palisades, not just that in VSC-24 casks, for purposes of transport to a permanent repository. Indeed, DOE has stated and it is commonly accepted, that there will be no repository before 2048 and that date is suspect. Current federal law does not Id.

53 PSDAR Cover Letter; also PSDAR at 1 and Table 4-1 at 17.

54 Declaration of Robert Alvarez accompanying this Petition, Exh. B, pp. 2-3.

55 allow for the existence of consolidated interim storage facilities such as Holtec International proposes to construct in New Mexico unless there is an open and operating repository. NRC regulations require licensees to submit written notification to the Commission for its review and preliminary approval of the program by which the licensee intends to manage and provide funding for the management of all irradiated fuel at the reactor following permanent cessation of operation of the reactor until title to the irradiated fuel and possession of the fuel is transferred to the Secretary of Energy for its ultimate disposal in a repository. There is no mention of 56 DOE taking title to SNF for consolidated interim storage facilities because they cannot legally exist.

Applicants citing of 2030 or 2041 as the dates that SNF will begin to depart Palisades are fantastical, based on laws that dont exist and facilities that dont exist or will not be brought online within the timeline they postulate despite knowing better.

8. The Problematic Cask No. 4 Cask No. 4 - the fourth DSC to be loaded with SNF, in 1994 at Palisades - poses an additional dimension to the repackaging woes at Palisades.

Weld defects were detected in the fourth VSC-24 cask in 1994 after it was loaded. In 1993, the Michigan Attorney-General sued to halt the construction and loading of about a dozen VSC-24s on the ground that there were irregularities in technical specification documents the manufacturer, Sierra Nuclear, had filed with the NRC. Each VSC-24 stores 24 spent fuel assemblies, and when loaded weighs approximately 130 tons. It was a requirement that the Consumers Power have written, workable procedures for the unloading of any casks, including 10 CFR § 50.54(bb).

56 those with defects or problematic SNF. In the Michigan lawsuit, the utility had provided sworn assurances that any defective VSC-24 could be safely unloaded. The utility engineers analyzed the circumstances and determined that the procedures could not guarantee safe or effective unloading, fearing that using 100 degrees F. water could cause steam flashes since the SNF was at 400 degrees C., which would cause radiation releases. They also determined there was only a 50 hour5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> window of time during which the welding cuts through the lid had to be achieved and the SNF installed in the spent fuel pool, and the worksite could not be cooled during that time.

Further, there was no procedure for removing steel shims that were pressure-fit inside the fuel basket inside the cask, below its extremely heavy lid.

On the basis of its review, the NRC Staff concluded that, had Consumers attempted to unload a cask using the original unloading procedure, deficiencies associated with the original procedure would have prevented completion of the unloading process. The original unloading procedure's administrative limit for maximum cask pressure would have prevented the Licensee from establishing a continuous cooling cycle because the internal cask pressure would not have been sufficient to force steam to the outlet of the discharge piping at the bottom of the spent fuel pool. Other weaknesses in the original unloading procedure that would have hampered cask unloading included a restrictive venting capacity due to reliance upon a small vent line with an installed Swagelok fitting, scant guidance for personnel performing tasks such as drawing a gas sample from the multi-assembly sealed basked (MSB) to check for damaged fuel, and several examples of references to the wrong step within the procedure. Because the original unloading procedure would have required revision in order to complete the unloading process, the NRC found that Consumers had committed a violation of requirements that all activities affecting quality be prescribed by procedures appropriate for the circumstances and that procedures are reviewed for adequacy.57 Petitioners have monitored the ADAMS library for years, seeking information as to whether Cask No. 4 has been unloaded, and have found no evidence that it has been. There was no mention of VSC-24s or other casks in the 2006 SEIS, and none in the 2018 Entergy letter or the PSDAR. As even Entergy admits, all the VSC-24s are facing required repackaging before the SNF they contain can be removed from the site. The procedures to achieve this dangerous site-specific reversal of SNF storage must be identified and the risks assessed in a safety evaluation and disclosed within a supplemental EIS. There certainly is a risk of harm to personnel and perhaps even to the public (such as Petitioners members, a mile from Palisades) and the environment, given the considerable radiation contained within the spent fuel assemblies inside the cask. That this matter is not mentioned whatsoever in the 2006 SEIS and subsequent decommissioning plans suggests an intention to conceal expensive and dangerous but necessary activities from public notice.

9. Unconsidered high burnup fuel implications In the past 20 years, increases in the percentage of uranium-235, the key fissionable material that generates energy in high burnup fuel has allowed reactor operators to effectively double the amount of time fuel is irradiated while reducing the frequency of costly refueling outages. This has been a major contributor to higher capacity factors in the US over the past couple of decades. There are concerns about high burnup SNF, however, including:

Directors Decision DD-97-1, Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Plant), 45 NRC 57 33, 37-38 (1997).

• fuel cladding thickness is reduced to form a hydrogen-based rust of the zirconium metal which can cause the cladding to become brittle and fail;

• increased pressure between the pellets and the inner wall of the cladding causes the cladding to thin and elongate;

• high burnup fuel temperatures make it more vulnerable to damage from handling and transport.

58 The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board has criticized the NRC and DOE for lacking a technical basis for the transport of high burnup spent nuclear fuel.59 Petitioners expert, Robert Alvarez, observed in his expert report that Holtec assumes that cooling times prior to loading high burnup SNF can occur after 5 years in wet storage...

According to research by DOEs Sandia National Laboratory, minimal cooling times prior to emplacement of high burnup SNF into a dry cask range from 25 to 30 years.

60 Furthering his critique of the 5-year cooling time for high burnup fuel postulated by Applicants, Alvarez states:

According to the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board : DOE has examined the trend Robert Alvarez, Memorandum, High Burnup Spent Power Reactor Fuel, December 13, 2013.

58 http://www.environmental-defense-institute.org/publications/Alvarez%20Memo%20re-

%20High%20Burnup%20Nuclear%20Fuel.%2012-17-2013%20rev.%202docx.pdf Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Letter to Mr. John Kotek, Acting Assistant Secretary 59 for Nuclear Energy, May 23, 2016.

https://www.nwtrb.gov/docs/default-source/correspondence/rce0516.pdf?sfvrsn=15 Declaration of Robert Alvarez, Exh. B p. 4, citing U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review 60 Board, Preparing for Nuclear Waste Transportation Technical Issues That Need to Be Addressed in Preparing for a Nationwide Effort to Transport Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, September 2019, p. 74.

https://www.nwtrb.gov/docs/default-source/reports/nwtrb_nuclearwastetransport_508.pdf?sfvrsn=6 in SNF dry storage at nuclear power plant sites (Williams 2013). On average, during 2004-2013, the nuclear utilities discharged SNF that has higher burnups (approximately 45 GWd/MTU) than previously discharged SNF and, therefore, is thermally hotter and more radioactive. In addition, the nuclear utilities are loading SNF into larger dry-storage casks and canisters to improve operational efficiency and reduce cost. As a result, these larger casks and canisters are hotter than earlier dry-storage casks and canisters; therefore, they will take longer to cool sufficiently to meet transportation requirements.

DOE estimated that if SNF was repackaged from large casks and canisters into smaller standardized canisters (and using standard assumptions about the operating lifetime of the U.S. fleet of nuclear reactors), DOE could remove SNF from all nuclear power plant sites by approximately 2070. However, if no repackaging occurs, some of the largest SNF canisters storing the hottest SNF would not be cool enough to meet the transportation requirements until approximately 2100.61 A significantly longer storage phase is likely to be required for high burnup fuel, something that is not acknowledged in the 2006 SEIS, the 2018 Entergy letter, or the PSDAR.

Indeed, high burnup are not even mentioned at all in the two decommissioning plans. This is significant new information warranting investigation and analysis in a supplemental EIS.

CONTENTION NO. 2 Holtec International and SNC-Lavalin, as well as their subsidiary corporations, Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) and Comprehensive Decommissioning International, LLC (CDI) individually and collectively lack the requisite corporate character, corporate culture and corporate ethics to be licensed, or allowed by contractual privity, to undertake any aspect of the decommissioning of Palisades Nuclear Plant and the management, transportation and disposal of spent nuclear fuel from Palisades and Big Declaration of Robert Alvarez, Exh. B p. 5, citing U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review 61 Board, Preparing for Nuclear Waste Transportation Technical Issues That Need to Be Addressed in Preparing for a Nationwide Effort to Transport Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, September 2019, p. 77.

https://www.nwtrb.gov/docs/default-source/reports/nwtrb_nuclearwastetransport_508.pdf?sfvrsn=6 Rock Point.

Petitioners incorporate by reference and reallege as though written herein the foregoing contents of their Petition for Leave to Intervene.

A. Rationale For Contention Public domain evidence reveals that between them, Holtec International and SNC-Lavalin, a Canadian company, have been debarred, seen their officers and employees convicted of bribery for contracts in multiple countries, generated illegal campaign contributions, and other civil and criminal wrongdoing, such as suspected money laundering, financial manipulation and human trafficking, for nearly two decades.62 CDI markets itself as A Holtec International and SNC-Lavalin Company, stating at its website that CDI is a joint venture of Holtec International and SNC-Lavalin (TSX: SNC) headquartered in Camden, New Jersey. CDIs focus is performing accelerated decommissioning of retired nuclear power plants using innovative technologies to cut the total time elapsed to release plant sites for unrestricted use to six to eight years, pending regulatory approvals (with the exception of the temporary dry storage installation).63 HDI will contract with Comprehensive Decommissioning International, LLC to decommission Palisades. CDIs role and responsibilities in the Palisades decommissioning are 64 mentioned multiple places in the PSDAR.65 See Contention 2, Exhibit A attached to this petition, Holtec & SNC-Lavalin Company 62 Profiles, which is incorporated fully herein by reference as though herein rewritten.

https://cdi-decom.com/decommissioning/

63 PSDAR at 5.

64 For example, see pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 13 of the PSDAR.

65 B. The Contention Is Within The Scope Of These Proceedings Information concerning a licensees or applicants intent to deceive may call into question its character, a matter the Commission is authorized to consider under Section 182.a. of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2232a, or its ability and willingness to comply with Agency 66 regulations, as Section 103.b., 42 U.S.C. § 2133b, requires. Consumers Power Co. (Midland 67 Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 915 n.25 (1982).

C. Legal Standards The Commission is authorized to consider a licensees character and integrity in deciding whether to continue or revoke a license. Piping Specialists, Inc., et al. (Kansas City, MO), LBP-92-25, 36 NRC 156, 153 (1992), citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1207 (1984), revd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

False statements, if proved, could signify lack of management character sufficient to preclude an award of an operating license, at least as long as responsible individuals retained any (a) Contents and form. Each application for a license hereunder shall be in writing and shall 66 specifically state such information as the Commission, by rule or regulation, may determine to be necessary to decide such of the technical and financial qualifications of the applicant, the character of the applicant, the citizenship of the applicant, or any other qualifications of the applicant as the Commission may deem appropriate for the license. (Emphasis added).

(b) Nonexclusive basis. The Commission shall issue such licenses on a nonexclusive basis to 67 persons applying therefor (1) whose proposed activities will serve a useful purpose proportionate to the quantities of special nuclear material or source material to be utilized; (2) who are equipped to observe and who agree to observe such safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property as the Commission may by rule establish; and (3) who agree to make available to the Commission such technical information and data concerning activities under such licenses as the Commission may determine necessary to promote the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public. All such information may be used by the Commission only for the purposes of the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public.

responsibilities for the project. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-20, 19 NRC 1285, 1297 (1984), citing Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1

& 2), LBP-84-13, 19 NRC 659, 674-75 (1984), and Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-83-2, 17 NRC 69, 70 (1983).

The untimely provision of significant information is an important measure of a licensees character, particularly if it is found to constitute a material false statement. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-738, 18 NRC 177, 198 (1983), revd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

An applicants failure to notify a Board of significant information may reflect a deficiency in character or competence if such failure is a deliberate breach of a clearly defined duty, a pattern of conduct to that effect, or an indication of bad faith. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 625-626 (1986).

D. Pertinent Facts And Evidence Petitioners incorporate fully by reference as though herein rewritten the facts evidenced by the citations summarized in Contention 2, Exhibit A, which is attached to this Petition and entitled Holtec & SNC-Lavalin Company Profiles. Petitioners urge the Commission to bear in mind the numerous civil and criminal wrongs contained in Exhibit A as it evaluates Petitioners opposition to Applicants receipt of the license transfer on grounds that they have little economic risk or capitalization and are unqualified to take on the enormous expense and management of decommissioning a commercial nuclear power plant.

CONTENTION NO. 3 Applicants request for the NRC to grant an exemption to use NDT funds for spent fuel management and site restoration activities is contrary to law and regulation, would present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is not consistent with the common defense and security.

Petitioners incorporate by reference and reallege as though written herein the foregoing contents of their Petition for Leave to Intervene.

A. Rationale For Contention In parallel with the submittal of the PSDAR, Applicants on December 23, 2020 requested NRC approval of an exemption to allow them access to Palisades Nuclear Decommissioning Trust (NDT) funds for Palisades spent fuel and site restoration activities. Applicants 68 maintain that their Decommissioning Cost Estimate (DCE) demonstrates that adequate funding is available in the Nuclear Decommissioning Trust (NDT) fund to complete license termination.

69 The parties agree that Applicants may not expend NDT funds totaling $166,122,000 for 70 spent fuel activities, and $34,679,000 for site restoration in the absence of being granted an 71 explicit exemption from the decommissioning regulations by the NRC.

Petitioners maintain, however, that the two claimed expenses are ineligible for reasons of sound public policy and that owing to defective projections of decommissioning workload which carry price tags far higher than Applicants believe, the NDT assets will be depleted and the PSDAR at 1.

68 Id. at 7.

69 PSDAR Table 4-2 at 17.

70 Id.

71 principal objectives of decommissioning will be undermined.

B. The Contention Is Within The Scope Of These Proceedings This portion of the license transfer decision focuses on the reasonableness of various aspects of the planned decommissioning of Palisades and is covered by 10 CFR Part 50.

Pertinent regulations governing this decision, including the criteria governing the Commissions decision to grant the exemption, are contained within Part 50.

C. Legal Standards In NRC parlance, Decommission means to remove a facility or site safely from service and reduce residual radioactivity to a level that permits (1) Release of the property for unrestricted use and termination of the license; or (2) Release of the property under restricted conditions and termination of the license.72 The NRC glossary defines decommissioning as:

The process of safely closing a nuclear power plant (or other facility where nuclear materials are handled) to retire it from service after its useful life has ended. This process primarily involves decontaminating the facility to reduce residual radioactivity and then releasing the property for unrestricted or (under certain conditions) restricted use. This often includes dismantling the facility or dedicating it to other purposes. Decommission-ing begins after the nuclear fuel, coolant, and radioactive waste are removed.73 (Emphasis added).

Residual radioactivity is radioactivity in structures, materials, soils, groundwater, and other media at a site resulting from activities under the licensee's control. This includes radioactivity from all licensed and unlicensed sources used by the licensee, but excludes 10 C.F.R. § 50.2.

72 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/decommissioning.html 73 background radiation. It also includes radioactive materials remaining at the site as a result of routine or accidental releases of radioactive material at the site and previous burials at the site, even if those burials were made in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR part 20.74 The NRC glossary defines decontamination as:

A process used to reduce, remove, or neutralize radiological, chemical, or biological contamination to reduce the risk of exposure. Decontamination may be accomplished by cleaning or treating surfaces to reduce or remove the contamination; filtering contaminated air or water; subjecting contamination to evaporation and precipitation; or covering the contamination to shield or absorb the radiation. The process can also simply allow adequate time for natural radioactive decay to decrease the radioactivity.75 Given this framework, activities that go beyond the scope of radiological decommis-sioning (as defined in 10 C.F.R. § 50.2) -- such as site restoration and the storage, management, and disposal of spent fuel - are not considered legitimate decommissioning activities for the purposes of 10 C.F.R. § 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A). All withdrawals must be for legitimate decom-76 missioning activities consistent with the definition of decommissioning in [10 C.F.R.] § 50.2.77 Thus, absent an exemption from the NRC, funds accumulated for the purpose of radiological decommissioning may not be used to pay for these activities. Disbursements from 78 10 CFR § 20.1003.

74 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/decontamination.html 75 Decommissioning trust funds may be used by licensees if (A) The withdrawals are for 76 expenses for legitimate decommissioning activities consistent with the definition of decommissioning in

§ 50.2....

10 C.F.R. § 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A).

77 NEI 15-06 [Revision 0], Use of the Nuclear Decommissioning Trust Fund, pp. 6-7 (ADAMS 78 No. ML16348A366).

the NDT are restricted to decommissioning expenses. The NRCs definition of 79 Decommission is limited to activities that reduce residual radioactivity. As the NRC has 80 made clear, Decommissioning activities do not include the removal and disposal of spent fuel which is considered to be an operational activity or the removal and disposal of nonradioactive structures and materials beyond that necessary to terminate the NRC license. Because 81 decommissioning only includes activities that reduce radiological contamination, it do[es] not include the cost of demolition and removal of noncontaminated structures, storage and shipment of spent fuel, or restoration of the site.82 The NRCs regulations on the creation and use of NDT assets explicitly state that these funds are intended to cover only radiological decontamination necessary for site closure:

Amounts [required to be set aside in the NDTs] are based on activities related to the definition of Decommission in § 50.2 of this part and do not include the cost of removal and disposal of spent fuel or of nonradioactive structures and materials beyond that necessary to terminate the license. The NRCs regulations on financial qualifications for nuclear decommissioning 83 similarly note that NDT assets address only those decommissioning costs incurred by licensees to remove a facility or site safely from service and reduce residual radioactivity, which does not include, for example, the costs of dismantling or demolishing non-radiological systems and 10 C.F.R. § 50.75(h)(1)(iv).

79 10 C.F.R. § 50.2.

80 General Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities, 53 Fed. Reg. 24018-01, 81 24018 (1988).

Id. at 24028.

82 10 C.F.R. § 50.75 n.1.

83 structures.

84 The NRC has made abundantly clear that, absent a waiver, only costs that reduce residual radioactivity can be withdrawn from the Palisades NDT.85 D. Pertinent Facts And Evidence Notably, when Consumers Energy sold Palisades to Entergy in 2006, Consumers and Entergy pilfered $316,000,000 - 56% - of the then-accrued $566,000,000 Palisades NDT.86 What might the NDT be worth now, had it not been looted? That corporate conversion took place shortly before the Great Recession of 2008, which has cursed the NDT and many other conservatively-invested funds for half a generation. Applicants omitted to mention this act of corporate self-help as they rationalized their own exemption request.

The Petitioners expert Robert Alvarez has articulated facts and calculations that reveal Applicants serious underestimation of the costs of storing SNF in DSCs at Palisades and Big Rock Point. Alvarez calculates that it will cost 30% more for repackaging of the VSC-24 casks than the $17.3 to $37.6 million price tag sussed by Applicants. As to the 20 Holtec casks 87 needed to contain the high burnup SNF once removed from the spent fuel pool at Palisades, Alvarez predicts much more expense than do the Applicants:

Standard Review Plan on Power Reactor Licensee Financial Qualifications and 84 Decommissioning Funding Assurance, NUREG-1577, Rev. 1, at 16, § 2(A)(3) (1999).

Standard Review Plan for Decommissioning Cost Estimates for Nuclear Power Reactors, 85 NUREG-1713, Final Report, at 4, § (B)(3) (2004).

The $316 Million Question, The Herald-Palladium, July 24, 2006, 86 https://www.heraldpalladium.com/localnews/the-million-question/article_d847e49a-9fb5-5412-a920-dcc 29ac596b6.html Declaration of Robert Alvarez accompanying this Petition, Exh. B, p. 3.

87 The GAOs capital cost estimate for a single canister can be as high as $1.5 million (2014 dollars) - suggesting that the Holtec casks at Palisades would cost as much as $30 million. This does not include the costs outlined in GAOs table for activities and equipment necessary to transfer SNF from wet to dry storage, which can run as high as

$42.8 million. This does not include a storage pad, which GAO estimates at $6.5 million, or annual Maintenance and Operation costs as high as $6.5 million/yr. Added together, these costs total $176.8 million ( assuming 15 years of M&O expenses.) Taken together, potential costs for repackaging the VSC-24 and Holtec cask emplacement and storage for 40% of the total number of SNF assemblies at Palisades and Big Rock Point come to as much as $206.8 million - nearly 25% more than the total SNF management costs for all SNF at Big Rock and Palisades.88 In addition to these escalated costs, repackaging will likely not take place at the accelerated pace estimated by the Applicants. Mr. Alvarez pointed out that high burnup fuel also poses much longer onsite storage (and related expense), possibly through the year 2100, as opposed to 2030 or 2041 or 2066, discussed supra at pp. 31, 41. Also, there is the troubling conundrum of unloading and repackaging the SNF in defective Cask No. 4 without causing a serious radiological accident, outlined supra at pp. 37-39. The proposed onsite loading for barge transport of the radioactive steam generators has not been publicly mentioned nor analyzed to minimize obstacles and harms, discussed supra at pp. 22-24. What about the two DSC storage pads, neither of which comports with seismic requirements, as Petitioners pointed out, supra at P. 29-32? Will they hold up for 80 more years?

E. Legally And Factually, The Exemption Is Unsupportable The NRC may grant the exemption sought by the Applicants only if it is [a]uthorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and [is] consistent with the Id. at p. 4.

88 common defense and security. No special circumstances as set forth in § 50.12(a)(2), exist.

89 90 Handing some $200,000,000 of the Palisades NDT over to Applicants would not merely be unjust, it would leave fewer resources to accomplish a possibly dangerous decommissioning campaign. Public health and safety could be jeopardized by decommissioning companies hellbent on gaining partial site closure within a decade, at any price. Rewarding the Applicants by going off the NRC regulatory rails would not be beneficial to the public or the environment. Their exemption request should be denied any consideration.

IV. CONCLUSION The Commission should accord Petitioners with standing to proceed, and by construing the proffered contentions favorably to Petitioners, admit them for adjudication.

The contention rule may not be used as a fortress to deny intervention. Matter of Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Power Plant), 49 NRC at 335 (quoting Philadelphia Elec. Co.

(Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), 8 AEC 13, 20-21 (1974), rev'd in part, CLI-74-32, 8 AEC 217 (1974), rev'd in part, York Committee for a Safe Environment v. N.R.C.

10 CFR § 50.12(a)(1).

89 (2) The Commission will not consider granting an exemption unless special circumstances are 90 present. Special circumstances are present whenever--

(i) Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances conflicts with other rules or requirements of the Commission; or (ii) Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule; or (iii) Compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated; or (iv) The exemption would result in benefit to the public health and safety that compensates for any decrease in safety that may result from the grant of the exemption; or (v) The exemption would provide only temporary relief from the applicable regulation and the licensee or applicant has made good faith efforts to comply with the regulation....

527 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). There is no requirement that a substantive case be made at the contention stage. Matter of Entergy Nuclear Generation Co., et al. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), 50-293-LR (ASLB Oct. 16, 2006), 2006 WL 4801142 at (NRC) 85 (quoting Oconee, 49 NRC at 152).

WHEREFORE, Petitioners pray the Commission grant them admission as intervenors in this proceeding and that their contentions be admitted for adjudication.

February 24, 2021

/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge, Esq.

316 N. Michigan St., Suite 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 (419) 205-7084 tjlodge50@yahoo.com lodgelaw@yahoo.com Counsel for Petitioners PETITIONERS MOTION TO INCORPORATE BY REFERENCE AND ADOPT CONTENTIONS FILED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY CENTER FOR ADJUDICATION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(3), Petitioners move to adopt all contentions filed by the Environmental Law and Policy Center (ELPC) in this proceeding and to re-allege them as their own as if written herein.

Petitioners and the ELPC share many of the same issues and concerns regarding the proposed Palisades license transfer and decommissioning plans in this proceeding. It would serve the interests of judicial economy and merits litigation of the issues for the parties to adopt each others contentions. Petitioners agree that the ELPC may act as the primary representative with respect to ELPC contentions, and reserve the matter of requesting co-sponsorship or joint designation for a later time. Petitioners further give notice of their intentions of offering evidence and argument in support of the ELPCs contentions, should they be admitted for adjudication..

In a license transfer proceeding involving Indian Point, two intervenors, the Town of Cortland and Citizens Awareness Network sought to adopt each others contentions. See Consol.

Edison Co. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 131-33 (2001). The Commission held that where both petitioners have independently met the requirements to participate in the proceeding, the Board may provisionally allow petitioners to adopt each others issues. Id. at 132. That is Petitioners aim should they be granted standing in this matter, and they so move.

February 24, 2021

/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge, Esq.

Counsel for Petitioners CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on February 24, 2021, I deposited the foregoing Petition for Leave to Intervene in the NRCs electronic docket of this proceeding and that according to the protocols of that system, it was to be automatically transmitted to all parties of record registered to receive electronic service.

/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge, Esq.

Counsel for Petitioners




 
















   





   



    



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Entergy Nuclear Palisades, LLC, Holtec International, and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (Palisades Nuclear Plant)

)

Docket No. 50-255 NRC-2021-0036

)

February 24, 2021

)

)

)

DECLARATIONS OF PETITIONERS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Entergy Nuclear Palisades, LLC, Holtec International, and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (Palisades Nuclear Plant)

)

Docket No. 50-255 NRC-2021-0036

)

February 24, 2021

)

)

)

DECLARATION OF AUTHORIZED OFFICER OF MICHIGAN SAFE ENERGY FUTURE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT LICENSE TRANSFER PROCEEDING Under penalty of perjury, I, Bette Pierman (Declarant), declare as follows:

1. I am the President of Michigan Safe Energy Future (MSEF), a Michigan grassroots organization. I am authorized to sign this Declaration.

2. MSEF opposes the transfer of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-issued Palisades Nuclear Plant license to Holtec International and/or Holtec Decommission International, LLC.

3. MSEF is a ____-year-old grassroots association with over _____ members in southern, central and western Michigan. MSEF is headquartered at 2033 Paw Paw Avenue, Benton Harbor, MI 49022. MSEF is working to end the use of commercial nuclear power generation and engages in public education and legal and administrative advocacy in licensing proceedings. MSEF also advocates for measures to protect the health and safety of its members and the southwestern Michigan public from radiological injury.

4. In order to ensure that the license transfer/amendment decision for Palisades Nuclear Plant protects the interests of MSEFs members in a safe and healthy environment, MSEF seeks to intervene on behalf of its members Ann Scott and James Scott, whose declarations are attached.

5. MSEF intends, on behalf of its members, to take all legal actions necessary to ensure the fairness and integrity of the license amendment proceeding and to have the NRC consider all issues bearing on the safety and health of MSEF members, the broader public, and the physical environment. n 8 30

6. I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing facts are true and correct and that any expressions of opinion are based on my judgment.

7. Further Declarant saith naught.

Michigan Safe Energy Future By Date Bette Pierman, President Bette Pierman, President February 22, 2021