Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Protection Sys Intrumentation Setpoints & Surveillance Requirements
	ML20247E150
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	05/10/1989
From:	; DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20247E136	List: ML20247E150; NRC-89-0050, Application for Amend to License NPF-43,changing Tech Specs Re Reactor Protection Sys Instrumentation & Instrumentation Setpoints to Reflect Design Changes Scheduled for First Refueling Outage to Eliminate Backup Manual Scram Function;
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l LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS I

BASES REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS (Continued) 8.

Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-High The scram discharge volume receivas the water displaced by the motion of the control rod drive pistons during a reactor scram.

Should this volume fill up to a point where there is insufficient volume to accept the displaced water The Teac-at pressures below 65 psig, control rod insertion would be hindered.

tor is therefore tripped when the water level has reached a point high enough to indicate that it is indeed filling up, but the volume is still great enough to accommodate the water from the movement of the rods at pressures below 65 psig when they are tripped.

9.

Turbine Stop Valve-Closure The turbine stop valve closure trip anticipates the pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux increases that would result from closure of the stop valves. With a trip setting of 7% of valve closure from full open, the resultant increase in heat flux is such that adequate thermal margins are maintained during the worst case transient.

10.

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure The turbine control valve fast closure trip anticipates the pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux increase that could result from fast closure of the turbine control valves due to load rejection with or without coincident failure of the turbine bypass valves. The turbine control valve (TCV) fast closure signal is generated' independently in each valve control logic and connected directly to the Reactor Protection System. The signal to the Reactor Protection System is generated simultaneously with the deenergir;ng of the solanoid dump valves which produces control valve fast closure. Therefore, when TCV fast closure occurs, a scram trip signal is initiated.

11.

Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position The reactor mode switch Stutdown position is a redundant channel to the automatic protective instrumentation channels and provides additional manual reactor trip capability.

32. Manual Scram The Manual Scram is a redundant channel to the automatic protective i

instrumentation channels and provides manual reactor trip capability.

13.

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REVISED UFSAR SECTION 7.2 l

i 7.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 7.2.1 Description 7.2.1.1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation and control I

System Description

7.2.1.1.1 System Identification 7.2.1.1.1.1 Identification The reactor protection system (RPS) includes the motor-generator power supplies, sensors, relays, bypass circuitry, and switches that cause rapid insertion of control rods (scram) to shut down the reactor.

It also includes outputs to the process computer system (PCS) and annunciators, although these latter two systems are not part of the RPS.

Trip functions are summarized in Figure 7.2-1.

A completely redundant capability, the alternate rod insertion function of the control rod drive (CRD) system is provided to mitigate anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) events (see Subsection 7.6.1.18).

7.2.1.1.1.2 Classification The RPS is classified as Safety Class 2, Category I, and Quality Group B.

7.2.1.1.1.3 Reference Desion The Fermi 2 RPS is similar, except for system size, to the Edwin l#

I. Hatch, Unit 1 RPS.

There are no differences other than those instrument panel locations within the plant and manual scram g

logic arrangement.

7.2.1.1.2 Power Sources The RPS receives power from two high-inertia ac motor generator sets (Figure 7.2-2).

A flywheel provides high inertia sufficient to maintain voltage and frequency within 5 percent of rated values for at least 1 sec following a total loss of power to the drive motor.

Alternate power is available to reach the RPS buses.

The 120-V ac supply bus A is available to RPS bus A, and the 120-V ac alternate supply bus B is available to RPS bus B.

The RPS power supplies have been modified to prevent the inadvertent application of out-of-tolerance voltage or frequency power to the RPS relay trip logic.

The electrical protection assembly consists of a GE type TFJ-175A circuit breaker with an under-voltage release controlled by a protection logic circuit card.

The protection logic disconnects the RPS logic from the 1

7.2-1

RPS power supply whenever voltage or frequency exceeds normal tolerances.

The protection is redundant and includes each alternat~e power supply, as shown in Figure 7.2-2.

The electrical protection assemblies are packaged in enclosures that are mounted sels-mically on the outside wall of each RPS motor-generator set cubi-cle.

Two assemblies are connected in electrical series between each source of RPS power and the respective RPS distribution panel.

Controls for testing and operation are provided on each assembly along with status indication for the particular trip parameters.

Following a trip, the breaker must be reset locally.

The protection assemblies are qualified to meet IEEE 344-1975 and IEEE 323-1974.

The protection trip setpoints are 110 percent of nominal ac volt-age and -5 percent of the nominal frequency of 60 Hz.

Each protection logic has an independent time delay adjustable from 0.1 to 3.0 sec to prevent spurious trips and the resulting scrams.

7.2.1.1.3 Eculpment Desion 7.2.1.1.3.1 Initiatino Circuits Neutron monitoring system (NMS) instrumentation is described in Section 7.6.

Figure 7.2-3 clarifies the relationship between NMS channels, NMJ logics, and the RPS logics.

The NMS channels are part of the NMS.

The NMS logics are part of the RPS.

As shown in Figure 7.2-4, there are four NMS logics associated with each trip system of the RPS.

Each RPS logic receives inputs from two NMS logics.

Each NMS logic receives signals from one intermedi-ate range monitor (IRM) channel and one average power range moni-tor (APRM) channel.

The position of the mode switch determines which input signals effect the output signal from the logic.

The NMS logics are arranged so that failure of any one logic cannot prevent the initiation of a high neutron flux scram.

The RPS logic is a "one-out-of-two-taken-twice" system as discussed in Subsection 7.2.1.1.3.2.

Reactor pressure is measured at two locations.

A pipe from each location is routed through the primary containment and terminates in the reactor building.

Two panel-mounted pressure transmitters monitor the pressure in each pipe.

Cables from these trans-mitters are routed to the main control room.

One pair of the transmitters is physically separated from the other pair.

Each transmitter provides a high-pressure signal to one channel.

The transmitters are arranged so that two transmitters provide an input to trip system A and two transmitters provide an input to trip system B, as shown in Figure 7.2-5.

The physical separation and the signal arrangement ensure that no single physical event can prevent a scram caused by nuclear system high pressure.

7.2-2

t e

~

Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) low-water-level signals are ini-tiated from differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant reference column of water and the pressure due to the actual water level in the vessel.

The transmitters are arranged on two sets of taps in the same way as the nuclear system high pressure transmitters (Figure 7.2-5).

Two instrument lines attached to taps on the RPV, one above and i

one below the water level, are required for the differential pressure measurement for each transmitter.

The two pairs of lines terminate outside the primary containment and inside the reactor building.

They are physically separated from each other and tap off the RPV at widely separated points.

Other systems I

sense pressure and level from these same pipes.

The physical separation and signal arrangement ensure that no single physical event can prevent a scram due to RPV low water level.

Turbine stop valve closure inputs to the RPS come from valve stem position switches mounted on the four turbine stop valves.

To provide the earliest positive indication of closure, each of the double-pole, single-throw switches opens before the valve is more than 10 percent closed.

Either of the two channels associated with one stop valve can signal valve closure, as shown in Figure 7.2-6.

The logic is arranged so that closure of three or more stop valves initiates a scram, when the reactor is operating above 30 percent of rated power.

Turbine control valve fast closure inputs to the RPS come directly from contacts of the relays that effect control valve fast closure.

Operation of any two of these relays will initiate control valve fast closure.

Fast closure of one control valve in each RPS logic will initiate a scram whenever the reactor is operating above 30 percent of rated power.

Position switches mounted on the eight main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) signal MSIV closure to the RPS.

To provide the earliest positive indication of closure, each of the double-pole, single-throw switches is arranged to open before the valve is more than 10 percent closed.

Either of the two channels asso-ciated with one isolation valve can signal valve closure.

To facilitate the description of the logic arrangement, the position-sensing channels for each valve are identified and assigned to RPS logics as follows:

Trip Position-Sensing Channel Valve Identification Channels Relays Assionment Main steam line A, FO22A (1) and (2)

A, B Al, B1 inboard valve Main steam line A, FO28A (1) and (2)

A, B Al, B1 outboard valve i

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Trip Position-Sensing Channel

-Valve Identification Channels Relays Assignment

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' Main steam line B, F022B (1) and (2)

E, D Al, B2 inboard valve Main steam line B, FO28B (1) and (2)

E, D A1, B2 outboard valve Main steam line C, F022C (1) and (2)

C, F A2, B1 inboard valve Main steam line C, F028C (1) and (2)

C, F A2, B1 outboard valve Main steam line D, F022D (1) and (2)

G, H A2, B2 inboard valve Main steam line D, F028D (1) and (2)

G, H A2, B2 outboard valve Thus, each logic receives signals from the valves associated with i

two steam lines as shown in Figure 7.2-7.

The arrangement of signals within each logic requires closing of at least one valve in each of the steam lines associated with that logic to cause a trip of that logic.

For example, closure of the inboard valve of steam line A and the outboard valve of steam line C causes a trip of logic Bl.

This in turn causes trip system B to trip.

No scram occurs because no trips occur in trip system A.

In no case does closure of two valves or isolation of two steam lines cause a scram due to valve closure.

Closure of one valve in any three steam lines causes a scram.

I Wiring for the position-sensing channels from one position switch is physically separated in the same way that wiring to duplicate sensors on a common process tap is separated.

The wiring for position-sensing channels feeding the different trip logics of one trip system is also separated.

The MSIV closure scram function is effective only if the reactor mode switch is in RUN.

The effects of the logic arrangement and separation provided for the MSIV closure scram are as follows:

a.

Closure of one valve for test purposes with one steam line already isolated will not cause a scram resulting from valve closure b.

Automatic scram will occur on isolation of any three steam lines l

7.2-4

c.

]

l No single failure can prevent an automatic scram c.

required for fuel protection due to MSIV clos.ure.

Four nonindicating level switches (one for each channel) provide scram discharge volume (SDV) high-water-level inputs to the four RPS channels.

An additional level-indicating switch (trip unit),

with transmitter, in each channel is redundant to the level switch in that channel.

This arrangement provides diversity to ensure that no single event could prevent a scram caused by SDV high water level.

With the scram setting listed in Table 7.2-1 and in the Technical Specifications, a scram is initiated when sufficient capacity remains in the tank to accommodate a scram.

Both the amount of water discharged and the volume of air trapped above the free surface during a scram have been considered in the selection of the trip setting.

Drywell pressure is monitored by four pressure transmitters as described in Subsection 7.6.1.12.

The transmitters are physi-cally separated and electrically connected to the RPS so that no single failure can prevent a scram caused by primary containment high pressure.

Main steam line radiation is monitored by four radiation moni-tors, which are discussed and evalucted in Section 11.4.

Each monitor provides a trip signal to one channel when high gamma radiation is detected in the vicinity of the main steam lines (Figure 7.2-5).

Ma ondenser low vacuum trip will be effected indirectly throu,h main steam line isolation.

A main condenser vacuum of approximately 7 in. Hg will cause steam line isolation valve closure, which in turn causes reactor trip.

Four turbine first-stage pressure transmitters are provided to initiate the automatic bypass of the turbine control valve fast closure and turbine stop valve closure scrams when the first-stage pressure is below some preset fraction of rated pressure corresponding to 30 percent of rated power.

The transmitters are arranged so that no single failure can prevent a turbine stop valve closure scram or turbine control valve fast closure scram.

Channel and logic relays are fast-response, high-reliability relays.

Power relays for interrupting the scram pilot valve solenoids are type CR105 magnetic contactors, made by GE.

The system response time, from the opening of a sensor contact up to and including the opening of the trip actuator contacts, is less than 50 msec.

The time requirements for control rod movement are discussed in Subsection 4.5.2.

Sensing elements have enclosures to withstand conditions re-sulting from a steam or water line break long enough to perform satisfactorily.

Environmental specifications for the instruments of the RPS are given in Table 3.11-1.

7.2-5

To gain access to those calibration and trip setting controls located outside the main control room, operations personnel must remove a cover plate, access plug, or sealing device before any trip setting can be adjusted.

Wiring for the RPS, outside of the enclosures in the main control room, is run in rigid metallic conduits used for no other wiring.

The wires from duplicate sensors on a common process tap are run in separate conduits.

Wires from sensors of different variables in the same RPS logic can be run in the same conduit.

The scram pilot valve solenoids are powered from eight actuator logic circuits, four circuits from trip system A and four from trip system B.

The four circuits associated with any one trip system are run in separate conduits.

Electrical panels, junction boxes, and components of the RPS are prominently identified by nameplates.

Circuits entering junction boxes or pull boxes are conspicuously marked inside the boxes.

Wiring and cabling outside cabinets and panels are identified by color, tag, or other conspicuous means.

7.2.1.1.3.2 Logic The basic arrangement of the RPS actuators and actuator logic is illustrated in Figure 7.2-8.

The system is arranged as two g

separately powered trip systems.

Each trip system has two automatic trip logics, as shown in Figure 7.2-9.

Each logic used for automatic trip receives input signals from at least one channel for each monitored variable.

At least fcur channels for g

each monitored variable are required, one for each of its four automatic trip logics.

Each automatic trip logic provides two inputs into each of the actuator logica of one trip system, as shown in Figure 7.2-8.

'Thus, either of the two automatic trip logics associated with one g

1 trip system can produce a trip-system trip.

The logic is a "one-j out-of-two" arrangement.

To produce a scram, the actuator logics j

of both trip systems must be tripped.

The overall logic of the RPS is termed "one-out-of-two taken twice."

7.2.1.1.3.3 Scram Bypasses A number of manual and automatic scram bypasses are provided.

These account for the varying protection requirements that depend on reactor conditions.

They also allow for instrument service during reactor operations.

All manual bypass switches are in the main control room under the direct control of the main control room operator.

The bypass status of trip system components is continuously indicated in the main control room.

To properly reset the RPS at plant shutdown and during initial plant startup, a bypass is required for the MSIV closure scram 7.2-6

trip.

This bypass has been designed to be in effect when the mode switch is in the SHUTDOWN, REFUEL, or STARTUP position.

Hence, the bypass is necessary to provide for proper RPS reset action whenever the MSIVs are closed during very low power operation.

In the terms of the power generation design bases, the actual pressure scram setpoint is established from considerations of reducing reactor overpressure in the event of isolation at high power levels.

Since the high-pressure scram and reactor relief valves provide protection against overpressure, there would be no safety problem if the reactor were held at normal operating pressure and at a low power level with the MSIVs closed.

The scram initiated by placing the mode switch in SHUTDOWN is 1

automatically bypassed after a short time delay.

The bypass allows the CRD hydraulic system valve lineup to be restored to normal.

An annunciator in the main control room indicates the bypassed condition.

The turbine control valve fast closure scram and turbine stop valve closure scram are automatically bypassed if the turbine first-stage pressure is less then 30 percent of its rated value.

Closure of these valves from a low initial power level does not threaten the integrity of any radioactive material release barrier.

Turbine and generator trip bypass is effected by four pressure switches associated with the turbine first stage.

Any one chan-nel in a bypass state produces a main control room annunciation.

Bypasses for the NMS channels are described in Subsection 7.6.1.13, i

The scram discharge high water level trip bypass is controlled by the manual operation of two keylocked switches, a bypass switch,

)

i and the mode switch.

The mode switch must be in either the SHUT-f DONN or the REFUEL position.

Four bypass channels emanate from the four banks of the RPS mode switch and are each connected into j

the RPS logic.

This bypass allows the operator to reset the RPS scram relays so that the system is restored to operation while the operator drains the scram discharge volume.

In addition, i

actuating the bypass initiates a control rod block.

Resetting l

the trip actuators opens the scram discharge volume vent and drain valves.

An annunciator in the main control room indicates the bypass condition.

The RPS reset switch is used to momentarily bypass the seal-in l

contacts of the final actuators of the reactor shutdown systems.

These seal-in contactp are located downstream from the protection channel outputs.

The reset is effected in conjunction with I

auxiliary relays.

If a single channel is tripped, the reset is i

l accomplished immediately upon operation of the reset switch.

On 7.2-7

2 y

r 1

I'

}

l

[

the other' hand, if a reactor ~ scram situation is present, manual I

-reset is prohibited for a 10-sec period to permit the' control rods to achieve'their fully inserted position.

j 1

7.2.1.1.3.4 Interlocks

)

The scram discharge volume high-water-level trip bypass: signal j

interlocks with the reactor manual control system (RMCS)-to ini-

-tiate'a' rod block.

The interlock is performed using isolating relay contacts-so that no failtre in the control system can pre-l

. vent a scram.

The RPV' low water level, primary containment high pressure, and turbine stop valve position signals are shared with the primary containment and reactor vessel isolation-control system (CRVICS).

Thel sensors feed sensor relays in the RPS.

Contacts from these relays interlock to the primary containment and reac-tor vessel isolation system.

7.2.1.1.3.5 Redundancy and Diversity i

The RPS is divided'into two divisions.

Each division duplicates the function of the other to the extent that either may perform the required function'regardless of the state of operation or.

failure of the other.

Functional diversity is provided by monitoring dependent RPV-variables.

Pressure, water level, and neutron flux are all

. interdependent and are' separate inputs to the system.

Also, MSIV closure, turbine stop valve closure, and turbine control valve fast. closure are anticipatory of an RPV high pressure and are separate inputs to the system.

7.2.1.1.3.6 Actuated Devices The actuator logic opens when a trip signal is received, and then deenergizes the scram valve pi]ot solenoids.

There are two pilot solenoids per control rod.

Both solenoids must deenergize to open the inlet and outlet scram valves to allow' drive water to

~

scram a control rod.

One solenoid receives its signal from trip system A and the other from trip system B.

The failure of one control rod to scram will not prevent a complete shutdown.

The individual control rods and their controls are not part of the RPS.

'Further information on the scram valves and control rods is contained in Subsection 4.5.2.

7.2.1.1.3.7 Seoaration Fc Ir sensor channels monitor these various process variables listed in-Subsection 7.2.1.3.3.1.

Separation criteria for the sensors are given in Section 3.12.

The sensor devices are separated in such a way that no single failure can prevent a scram.

All protection system wiring outside the control system 7.2-8

,._ i,-

cabinets is run in rigid metal conduit.

Six physically separated cabinet bays are provided for the four scram logics.

Where two g

RPS channels of the same trip system enter the same bay they are separated by barriers.

The mode switch, scram discharge volume high-water-level trip bypass switch, scram reset switch, and manual scram switch are all mounted on one control panel.

Each device is mounted in a can and has a sufficient number of barrier devices to maintain adequate separation.

Conduit is provided from the cans to the logic cabinets.

The outputs from the logic cabinets to the scram valves are run I

in four conduits for trip system A and four conduits for trip system B.

The four conduits match the four scram groups shown in Figure 7.2-2.

The groups are selected so that the failure of one group to scram will not prevent a reactor shutdown.

7.2.1.1.3.8 Testability The RPS can be tested during reactor operation by five separate i

tests.

The first of these is the raanual actuator test.

By depressing the manual scram button for one trip channel, the manual actuators are deenergized, opening contacts in the actua-ter logics.

After the first trip channel is reset, the remaining g

three manual trip channels are tested sequentially in a similar manner.

The total test verifies the ability to deenergize all eight groups of scram pilot valve solenoids by using the manual scram pushbutton switches.

In addition to main control room and sequence recorder printout indications, scram group indicator lights verify that the actuator contacts have opened.

The second test is the automatic actuator test.

It is accom-I' plished by operating the keylocked test switches one at a time for each automatic logic.

The switch deenergizes the actuators for that logic and causes the associated actuator contacts to open.

The test verifies the ability of each logic to deenergize the actuator logics associated with the parent trip system.

In

{

addition to annunciator and computer printout indications, the actuator and contact action can be verified by observing the physical position of these devices, j

The third test includes calibration of the NMS by means or sim-

)

ulated inputs from calibration signal units.

Subsection 7.6.1.13 describes the calibration procedure.

The fourth test is the single rod scram test, which verifies u

capability of each rod to scram.

It is accomplished by operating a toggle switch on the RPS test cabinet in the control center j

particular CRD.

Timing traces can be made for each rod scrammed.

Prior to the test, a physics review must be conducted to ensure that the rod pattern during scram testing will not create a rod of excessive reactivity worth.

7.2-9

4 4

The fifth test involves applying a test signal to each RPS chan-nel in turn and observing that a logic trip results.

The test signals can be applied to the process type sensing instruments (pressure and differential pressure) through calibration taps.

RPS response times are verified on a channel basis during pre-operational testing and can be verified thereafter by similar tests.

In all cases, except neutron flux and radiation sensors, the primary sensor response time is included in the measurement of overall channel response time.

This measured response time is added to an allowance for instrument line delay, as appropriate, for each application.

This approach is consistent with the definition of response time, which is the maximum allowable time from when the variable being measured just exceeds the trip set-point to the deenergizing of the control rod scram solenoids.

The applicable test criterion is that the adjusted test-based value must not exceed the value used for the safety analysis.

During preoperational testing, and subsequently on a surveillance basis, the sensor response time is measured using a hydraulic ramp-test method similar to that described in Electric Power Research Institute Report No. NP-267, Sensor Response Time Verification.

To the results of this measurement is added the delay for instrument line length as appropriate for erch application.

The response time of the trip comparators and trip delays is determined using the transient current source test method described in NEDO 21617-A, Analog Transmitters / Trip Unit System for Engineered Safeguard Sensor Trip Inputs.

This test is per-formed as part of the preoperational test and during subsequent surveillance testing.

The balance of the RPS channel logic response time is tested using accepted methods that are documented in existing preop-erational test procedures.

7.2.1.1.4 Environmental Considerations Electrical modules for the RPS are located in the primary con-tainment, in the reactor building, and in the turbine building.

The environmental conditicas for these areas are shown in Tables 3.11-1 and 3.11-4.

Cabling for the RPS will be run in conduit or in an enclosed ferromagnetic cable tray.

Separation will be in accordance with Section 3.12 and Subsection 8.3.1.

7.2.1.1.5 Operational Considerations 7.2.1.1.5.1 Normal During normal operation, all sensor and trip contacts essential to safety are closed; channels, logics, and actuators are 7.2-10

energized.

In contrast, however, trip contact bypass channels consist of normally open contact networks that close to bypass.

7.2.1.1.5.2 Scram Functions The following paragraphs discuss the functional considerations for the variables or conditions monitored by the RPS.

Table 7.2-1 lists the preliminary specifications for instruments that provide signals for the system.

Figure 7.2-1 summarizes the locations from which the RPS may receive a signal that causes a scram.

There are two pilot scram valves and two scram valves for each control rod, arranged as shown in Figure 7.2-2.

Each pilot scram valve in solenoid operated, with the solenoids normally ener-g12s2.

The pilot scram valves control the air supply to the scrar.vc1ves for each control rod.

When either pilot scram valve is Laergized, air pressure holds the scram valves closed.

The scram valves control the supply and discharge paths for CRD water.

As shown in Figure 7.2-2, one of the scram pilot valves for each control rod is controlled by actuator logics A, and the other valve is controlled by actuator logics B.

There are two de solenoid-operated backup scram valves that provide a second means of controlling the air supply to the scram valves for all control rods.

The de solenoid for each backup scram valve is normally deenergized.

The backup scram valves are energized (initiate scram) when trip systems A and B are both tripped.

The functional arrangement of sensors and channels that con-stitute a single logic is shown in Figure 7.2-2.

A sinplified logic schematic is included in Figure 7.2-9.

When a channel sensor contact opens, its sensor relay deenergizes, caasing contacts in the logic to open.

The opening of contacts in the logic deenergizes its actuators.

When deenergized, the actuators open contacts in all of the actuator logics for that trip system.

This action results in deenergizing the scram pilot valve solenoids associated with that trip system (one scram pilot valve solenoid for each control rod).

However, the other scram pilot valve solenoid for each rod must also be deenergized before the rods can be scrammed.

If a trip also occurs in any of the logics of the other trip sys-tem, the remaining scram pilot valve solenoid for each rod is deenergized.

This permits the air to vent from the scram valves and allows CRD drive water to act on the CRD piston.

Thus, all control rods are scrammed.

The water displaced by the movement of each rod piston is vented into a scram discharge volume.

When the solenoid for each backup scram valve is energized, the backup scram valves vent the air supply for the scram valve.

This action initiates insertion of any errant control rods regardless of the action of the scram pilot valves (Figure 7.2-2).

A scram can be initiated manually.

There are two sets of manual i

I scram pushbuttons located on the surface of the main operating i

i 7.2-11

)

s panel.

The first set associated with logics Al and B1 is located directly above the control rod pushbutton matrix on the "A"

surface of the reactor control panel as shown on Figure 7.5-1.

A second set of pushbuttons associated with logics A2 and B2.is located on the "B" surface of the reactor control panel as shown in Figure 7.5-1.

These pushbuttons are approximately 21 in.

apart and 12 in. from the first set of the manual scram i

pushbuttons.

Each of the four manual scram pushbuttons is l

individually canned and tw ct. trol wiring is run in conduit within the control panel, effect a manual scram, at least one f(

a button in each trip system must be depressed.

The manual scram pushbuttons in the first set are close enough to permit one hand motion to initiate the scram.

By operating the manual scram button for one logic at a time and then resetting that logic, each actuator logic can be tested for manual scram capability.

The reactor operator also can scram the reactor by interrupting power to the reactor protection system or by placing the mode switch in its shutdown position.

To restore the RPS to normal operation following any single trip system trip or scram, the actuators must be reset manually.

The actuators can be reset only after a 10-sec delay, and only if the conditions that caused the scram have been cleared.

The actu-ators are reset by operating switches in the main control room.

Figure 7.2-2 shows the functional arrangement of reset contacts for trip system A.

When an RPS sensor trips, it lights a printed red annunciator window, common to all the channels for that variable, which indi-cates the out-of-limit variable.

This window is located on the reactor control panel in the main control room.

Each trip systen lights a red annunciator window which indicates which trip system has tripped.

An RPS channel trip also sounds a buzzer or horn that can be. silenced by the operator.

The annunciator window lights latch in until the initiating contact is reset.

Reset is not possible until the condition causing the trip has been i

cleared.

A sequence-of-events printout identifies each tripped l

7.2-12 1

f l

L 1

4 a

channel;-however,-the physical position of the RPS relays may.

also be used to identify the individual sensor that tripped-in'a group of. sensors monitoring the same variable.

The location-of

. alarm-windows permits the operator to quickly identify the cause of RPS. trips and to: evaluate the threat to the fuel or nuclear system process barrier.

All RPS trip events are : recorded on a sequence-of-events recorder that includes only these nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) inputs.

This record permits analysis of operational transir>'-

events that occur.too rapidly for. operator recognition.

The sequence-of-events recorders print the time and alarm type of each event and can resolve the order of occurrence down to F

1 msec.

Arlesser time difference causes the events to be treated as simultaneous, as discussed in Subsection 7.6.1.11.

Use of the events recorder is not required for plant safety'.

The printout of trips is particularly useful in routinely verifying.

m the correct operation of pressure, level, and valve position switches as. trip points are passed during startup, shutdown, and maintenance operations.

Reactor protection system inputs to annunciators, recorders, and the computer are arranged so that no malfunction of the annun-ciating, recording, or computing equipment can functionally dis-able the RPS.. Direct signals from RPS sensors are not used as inputs to annunciating or data-logging equipment.

Relay contact isolatioh is provided between the primary signal and the informa-tion output.

7.2.1.3.5.3 Operation Information

-Indicators Indicators are installed in the manual scrum switches to-indicate a trip system manual trip.

Scram group indicators extinguish when an actuator logic opens.

Process indicators for all RPS trip variables are available in the main control room.

Annunciators Each RPS input is provided to the annunciator system through isolated relay contacts.

Manual and automatic trip system trips also signal the annunciator system.

7.2.1.1.5.4 Setooints Nominal values for trip system Petpoints are summarized in Table 7.2-1.

In response to the NRC letter from J. F.

Stolz to W. H. Jens j

dated April 12, 1977, that defined specific requirements for instrument trip setpoint values, Edison has instituted a formal l

7.2-13 L_____ __

~

.C program'with the cooperation of.GE to develop.the required tech-nical data._ The referenced setpoint data are presently included

'in'the Technical Specifications.

Neutron Monitorina System Trio To protect the fuel against high heat' generation rates, neutron flux is monitored and used to initiate a reactor scram..The NMS setpoints and their. bases are discussed in Subsection 7.6.1.13.

Nuclear System Hiah Pressure-High pressure within the nuclear system threatens.to. rupture the nuclear system process barrier.

A nuclear system pressure increase during reactor operation compresses the steam voids and results in a positive reactivity insertion.

This causes increased core. heat generation that could lead to fuel failure and system overpressurization.

A scram counteracts a pressure increase by quickly reducing core fission heat generation.

The nuclear system high-pressure scram setting is chosen slightly above the RPV maximum normal operating pressure to permit normal operation'without spurious scram, yet provides a wide margin to the maximum allowable nuclear system pressure.

The location of the pressure measurement, as compared to the location of highest

~

nuclear system pressure during transients, has also been con-sidered in the selection of the high-pressure scram setting..The nuclear. system high-pressure scram setting also protects the core l

from exceeding thermal-hydraulic limits due to pressure increases during events that occur when the reactor is operating below rated power and flow.

Reactor Vessel Low Water Level Low water level in the RPV indicates that the fuel is in danger.

of being inadequately cooled.

Decreasing the water level while the reactor is operating at power decreases the reactor coolant inlet subcooling.

The effect is the same as raising feedwater temperature.

Should water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result.

A reactor scram prebects the fuel by reducing the fission heat generation within the core.

The RPV low-water-level scram setting has been selected to prevent fuel damage following abnormal operational transients.

These transients are caused by.

either single equipment malfunctions or single operator errors, 4

and result in a decreasing RPV water level.

The scram setting is far enough below normal operational levels to avoid spurious The setting is high enough above the top of the active fuel to ensure that enough water is available to account for scrams.

evaporation loss and displacement of coolant following the most i

severe abnormal operational transient involving a level j

decrease.

The selected scram setting was used in developing thermal-hydraulic limits.

The limits set operational limits on the thermal power level for various coolant flow rates.

7.2-14

j Turbine Stop Valve Closure Closure of the turbine stop valve with the reactor at power can result in a significant addition of positive reactivity to the core as the nuclear system pressure rise causes steam voids to collapse.

The turbine stop valve closure scram initiates a scram earlier than does either the NMS or nuclear system high pres-It provides a satisfactory margin below core thermal-sure.

hydraulic limits for this category of abnormal operational tran-

{

sients.

The scram counteracts the addition of positive reactiv-

)

ity resulting from increasing pressure by inserting negative i

i reactivity with control rods.

Although the nuclear system high-pressure scram, in conjunction with the pressure relief system, is adequate to preclude overpressurizing the nuclear system, the turbine stop valve closure scram provides additional margin to the nuclear system pressure limit.

The turbine stop valve clo-sure scram setting provides the earliest positive indication of valve closure.

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure With the reactor and turbine generator at power, fast closure of the turbine control valves can result in a significant addition of positive reactivity to the core as nuclear system pressure rises.

The turbine control valve fast closure scram initiates a scram earlier than either the NMS or nuclear system high pres-It provides a satisfactory margin to core thermal-sure.

hydraulic limits for this category of abnormal operational tran-sients.

The scram counteracts the addition of positive reactiv-ity resulting from increasing pressure by inserting negative reactivity with control rods.

Although the nuclear system high-pressure scram, in conjunction with the pressure relief system, is adequate to preclude overpressurizing the nuclear system, the turbine control valve fast closure scram provides additional margin to the nuclear system pressure limit.

The turbine control valve fast closure scram setting is selected to provide timely indication of control valve fast closure.

Main Steam Line Isolation The MSIV closure scram protects the reactor on loss of the heat sink.

The MSIV closure initiates scram earlier than the NMS or nuclear system high pressure.

Automatic closure of the MSIVs is initiated when conditions indicate a steam line break.

The main steam line isolation scram setting is selected to give the earliest positive indication of isolation valve closure.

The logic allows functional testing of main steam line trip channels with one steam line isolated.

Scram Discharce Volume Hich Water Level Water displaced by the CRD pistons during a scram goes to the scram discharge volume.

If the scram discharge volume fills with the water so that insufficient capacity remains for the water 7.2-15

(

displaced during a scram, control' rod movement.would be hindered during'a scram. -To prevent this situation, the reactor is scrammed when the water'1evel in the discharge volume is filling

'typ, yet is low enough to ensure that the remaining capacity in the volume can accommodate a' scram.

Primary Containment Hiah Pressure High pressure inside the primary containment may indicate a-break

-in the nuclear. system process barrier.

It is prudent to scram the reactor in such a situation, to minimize the possibility of fuel damage and to' reduce energy transfer from the core to the coolant.

The drywell high-pressure 3 cram setting is selected to be as low as possible without inducing spurious scrams.

Main Steam Line Hiah Radiation High radiation in the vicinity of the main steam lines may indi-cate a gross fuel failure in the core.

When high radiation is~

detected near the' steam line, a scram is initiated to limit the release of. fission products from the fuel.

This condition also signals the primary CRVICS to initiate containment of the released fission products.

The high radiation trip setting is selected high enough above background radiation levels to avoid spurious scrams, yet low enough to promptly detect a gross release of fission products from the fuel.

More information cut the trip setting is available in Subsection 11.4.3.8.2.3.

Manual' Scram Pushbuttons are located in the main control room to enable the operator to shut ~down the reactor by initiating a scram.

Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN When the modo switch is in SHUTDOWN, the reactor is to be' shut down with all control rods inserted.

This scram is'not con-

-sidered'a protective function because it is not required to pro-tect the fuel or nuclear system process barrier, and-it bears no-relationship'to minimizing the release of radioactive material from any barrier.

The scram signal is removed after a short delay, permitting a scram reset that restores the normal valve lineup in'the CRD hydraulic system.

7.2.1.1.5.5 Mode Switch A conveniently located, multiposition, keylock mode switch is provided to select the necessary scram functions for various plant conditions.

The mode switch selects the appropriate sensors for scram functions and provides appropriate bypasses.

The switch also interlocks such functions as control rod blocks and refueling equipment restrictions, which are not considered here as part of the RPS.

The switch is designed to provide separation between the two trip systems.

The mode switch 7.2-16

positions and their related scram functions are shown in Figure 7.2-9.

They are a.

SHUTDOWN - Initiates a reactor scram; bypasses main steam line isolation scram b.

REFUEL - Selects NMS scram for low neutron flux level operation; bypasses main steam line isolation scram c.

STARTUP - Selects NMS scram for low neutron flux level operation; bypasses main steam line isolation scram d.

RUN - Selects NMS scram for power range operation.

7.2.1.2 Desian-Basis Information The design-basis information required by Section 3 of IEEE 279-1971 is provided in Subsection 7.1.2.1.1.

7.2.2 Analysis 7.2.2.1 General Presented below are analyses to demonstrate how the various general functional requirements and the specific regulatory requirements listed under the RPS design bases described in Subsection 7.1.2.1.1.1 are satisfied.

Considerations of loss of instrument air and loss of cooling water to vital equipment are discussed in Chapter 15.

7.2.2.2 Reactor Protection System 7.2.2.2.1 Conformance With General Functional Requirements The RPS is designed to provide timely protection against the onset and consequences of conditions that threaten the integrity of the fuel barrier and the nuclear system process barrier.

Chapter 15 identifies and evaluates events that jeopardize the fuel barrier and nuclear system process barrier.

The methods of l

assessing barrier damage and radioactive material releases, along with the methods by which abnormal events are sought and iden-tified, are presented in that chapter.

Design procedure has been to select tentative scram trip setting such that spurious scrams and operating inconvenience are avoided.

It is then verified by analysis that the reactor fuel and nuclear system process barriers are protected.

In all cases, the specific scram trip point selected is a value that prevents damage to the fuel or nuclear system process barriers, taking into consideration previous operating experience.

The scrams initiated by NMS variables, nuclear system high pressure, turbine stop valve closure, turbine control valve fast closure, and RPV low water level, prevent fuel damage following 7.2-17

1 a

1 abnormal operational transients.

Specifically, these scram func-tions initiate a scram in time to prevent the core from exceeding the thermal-hydraulic safety limit during abnormal operational

)

transients.

Chapter 15 identifies and evaluates the threats to fuel integrity posed by abnormal operational events.

In.no case 3

does the core exceed the thermal-hydraulic safety limit.

l t

The scram initiated by nuclear system high pressure, in conjunc-l tion with the pressure relief system, is sufficient to prevent damage to the nuclear system process barrier as a result of internal pressure.

For turbine-generator trips, the stop valve

{

closure scram and turbine control valve fast closure scram pro-vide a greater margin to the nuclear system pressure safety limit than does the high pressure scram.

Chapter 15 identifies and evaluates accidents and abnormal operational events that result in nuclear system pressure increases.

In no case does pressure exceed the nuclear system safety limit.

The scrams initiated by the main steam line MSIV closure, and RPV low water level satisfactorily limit the radiological con-sequences of gross failure of the fuel or nuclear system process barriers.

Chapter 15 evaluates gross failures of the fuel and nuclear system process barriers.

In no case does the release of radioactive materia _ to the environs result in exposures that exceed the guideline values of applicable published regulations.

Neutron flux is the only essential variable of significant spatial dependence that provides inputs to the RPS.

The basis for the number and locations of neutron flux detectors is dis-cussed in Subsection 7.6.1.13.

The other requirements are ful-filled through the combination of logic arrangement, channel redundancy, wiring scheme, physical isolation, power supply redundancy, and component environmental capabilities.

The RPS uses "one-out-of-two-taken-twice" logic.

Theoretically, its reliability is slightly higher than a "two-out-of-three" sys-tem and slightly lower than a "one-out-of-two" system.

The dif-ferences can be neglected in a practical sense, however, because they are slight.

The dual trip system is advantageous because it can be thoroughly tested during reactor operation without causing i

This capability for a thorough testing program sig-a scram.

nificantly increases reliability.

The use of a different channel for each logic input allows the system to sustain any channel failure without preventing other sensors that monitor the same variable from initiating a scram.

Any maintenance operation, calibration operation, or test results in only a single trip system trip.

This leaves at least two channels per monitored variable capable of initiating a scram.

The resistance to spurious scrams contributes to plant safety because reduced cycling of the reactor through its operating modes decreases the probability of error or failure.

7.2-18

c When an essential monitored variable exceeds its scram trip point, it is sensed by at least two independent sensors in each trip system.

Only one channel must trip in each trip system to initiate a scram.

Thus, the arrangement of two channels per trip system ensures that a scram will occur as a monitored variable exceede its scram setting.

Each control rod is controlled as an individual unit.

A failure of the controls for one rod would not affect other rods.

The backup scram valves provide a second method of venting the air pressure from the scram valves, even if either scram pilot valve solenoid for any control rod fails to deenergize when a scram is required.

Sensors, channels, and logics of the RPS are not used for control of process systems.

Therefore, failure in the instrumentation and control of process systems cannot induce failure of any por-tion of the protection system.

Failure of either RPS motor-generator set would result, at worst, in a single trip system trip.

Alternative power is available to the RPS buses.

A complete, sustained loss of electrical power to both buses would result in a scram, delayed by the motor-generator set flywheel inertia.

Alarm trip settings for each local power range monitor (LPRM) channel are revised as necessary by the process computer.

These setpoints are based on computer calculations of the core power distributions and appropriate reactor operating limit criteria.

Upon alarm trip setting revisions by the process computer, an i

J alarm is sounded to alert the operator to the necessary adjustment.

During normal operating conditions, LPRM readings are made once per minute.

During power level changes the scanning frequency is increased to once every 5 sec.

The process computer system (PCS) is described in Subsection 7.6.1.9.

The environment in which the instruments and equipment of the RPS must operate was considered in setting the environmental specifi-cations given in Tables 3.11-1, 3.11-3, and 3.11-4.

The specifi-cations for the instruments located in the reactor or turbine buildings are based on the worst expected ambient conditions.

Design of the system to comply with safety class requirements and the fail-safe characteristics of the system ensure safe shutdown of the reactor during earthquake ground motion.

The system fails in a direction that causes a reactor scram only when subjected to extremes of vibration and shock.

To ensure that the RPS remains functional, the number of operable channels for the essential monitored variables is maintained at or above the minimum given in Tables 7.2-2 and 7.2-3.

The mini-mum applies to any untripped trip system; a tripped trip system 7.2-19

may have any number of inoperative channels.

Because reactor protection requir'ements vary with the mode in which the reactor operates, the tables show different functional requirements for WP the RUN and STARTUP modes.

These are the only modes in which more than one control rod can be withdrawn from the fully -

inserted position.

In case of a LOCA, reactor shutdown occurs immediately following the accident, as one or more process variables exceed their specified setpoint.

Operation verification that shutdown has occurred may be made by observing one or more of the following indications:

Control rod status lamps indicating each rod fully a.

inserted b.

Control rod scram pilot valve status lamps indicating open valves Neutron monitoring power range channels and recorders c.

downscale d.

Annunciators for RPS variables and trip logic in the tripped state Sequence-of-events recorder log of trips e.

f.

Control rod position log on the process computer.

7.2.2.2.2 Conformance To Specific Reculatory Requirements 7.2.2.2.2.1 Industry Standards IEEE 279-1971 IEEE 279-1971 is satisfied as follows NEDO-10139, " Compliance of Protection Systems to Industry Criteria:

General Electric BWR Nuclear Steam Supply System,"

demonstrates compliance of the RPS with IEEE 279-L968.

The A

following paragraphs address the differences between IEEE 279-1968 and IEEE 279-1971 standards:

Paragraph 4.7 - Control and Protection System Inter-a.

action.

The RPS interlocks to control systems only through isolation devices such that no failure or combination of failures in the control system will have any effect on the RPS g

b.

Paragraph 4.22 - Identification of Protection System.

Each system cabinet is marked with the words " Reactor l

Protection System" and the particular redundant portion 7.2-20

a.

-I

)

is listed on a distinctively colored marker plate.

Cabling outside the cabinets is identified by color coding (as discussed in Subsection 8.3.1).

~

Exact design comparisons with the testability requirements.of IEEE 279-1971 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 are given in NEDO-10139:

a.

Scram discharge volume Pages 2-26, 2-27 b.

Main steam line isolation valve Page 2-39 c.

Turbine stop valve Pages 2-56, 2-57 l

d.

Turbine control valve Pages 2-69, 2-70

{

e.

Reactor water level Page 2-99

]

f.

Main steam line radiation Pages 2-112, 2-113 i

g.

Neutron monitoring system Page 2-125 j

h.

Drywell pressure Page 2-138 1.

Reactor pressure Page 2-146 g

i j.

Deleted k.

Mode switch Pages 2-164, 2-165 1.

Discharge volume bypass Pages 2-170, 2-171 m.

Main steam line valve bypass Page 2-178 n.

Turbine trip bypass Page 2-186 The RPS manual scram function satisfies IEEE 279-1971 as follows:

a.

Paragraph 4.2 - Sincle Failure Criterion RPS manual controls comply with the single failure criterion.

Four manual scram pushbuttons are arranged into two groups on one main control room Bench Board and the switches are provided with physical and electrical separation.

b.

Paragraph 4.3 - Quality of Components and Modules The RPS manual switches are selected to be of high quality and reliability.

[

c.

Paracraph 4.4 - Eculement Qualification Manual switches and trip logic components are' certified by the vendor that they perform in accordance with the requirements listed on the purchase specification as well as in the intended application.

This l

certification, in conjunction with the existing field experience with these components in this application, serves to qualify these components.

d.

Paracraph 4.5 - Channel Intearity L

The manual switches and components are specified to operate under normal and abnormal conditions of environment, energy supply, malfunctions, and accidents.

e.

Paracraph 4.6 - Channel Independence The manual scram pushbutton is a channel component.

The trip channels are physically separated and electrically isolated to comply with this design requirement.

l 7.2-21 i

x-t tL 1f.

-Paracraoh'4~.7 - Control'and' Protection System ~

Interaction The manual scram pushbutton has-no= control interaction.

g.

Paraaraoh 4.8 - Derivation of System Inputs Not applicable.

h.

Paracraoh 4.9 - Capability for Sensor Checks Not applicable.

i.

Paracraoh <4.l'O'- Capability for Test and Calibration

'A manual'acram switch permits each individual trip

' logic, trip actuator, and trip actuator. logic to be tested on a periodic basis.

j.

Paragraph 4.11 - Channel Bypass'or Removal from

~

Operation.

Since actuation of one manual scram pushbutton places its'RPS trip' system in a-tripped condition, it-is in compliance with this design requirement.

.k.

-Paraaraoh 4.12 - Operatina Bvoasses

Not applicable.

1.

Paracraoh 4'13 - Indication of Bvoasses Not applicable.-

m.

Paraaraoh-4.14 - Access to Means for-Bycassina Not applicable.

.n.

.Paracraoh 4.15 - Multiple Set Points Not applicable.

o.

Paracraoh 4.16 - Completion of Protective Action Once It

.Is Initiated

-Once-the. manual scram push buttons are depressed, it is only-necessary to! maintain them'in that condition until the scram contactors have de-energized and open their seal-in/ contacts.

At this point, the trip actuator logic' proceeds to initiate reactor scram regardless of the state of the manual scram push buttons.

~

p.

Paraaraoh 4.17 - Manual Actuation Four manual scram pushbutton controls are provided on one main control room Bench Board to permit manual initiation of reactor scram at the system level.

The

~

four manual scram pushbuttons (one in each of the four RPS trip logics) comply with this design requirement.

L D

The logic for the manual scram is one-out-of-two twice.

No single failure in the manual or automatic portions of the RPS can prevent either a manual or automatic scram.

j l

7.2-22 L

L _ x___ __2:_ __ __ _ __ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

j

l l

\\

1 q.

Paraaraph 4.18 - Access to Set Point _ Adjustments, Calibration, and Test Points Not applicable.

r.

Paracraph 4.19 - Identification of Protective Actions i

When any manual scram pushbutton is depressed, a contrci room annunciation is initiated and a process computer j

record is produced to identify the tripped RPS trip

{

logic.

s.

Paragraph 4.20 - Information Readout The manual scram function complies with this i

requirement.

t.

Paracraph 4.21 - System Repair The manual scram function complies with this requirement.

{

The RPS is fail-safe and its power supplies are thus unnecessary for scram.

A total ic;s of power causes a scram.

A loss of one power source causes a trip system trip.

IEEE 308-1971 does not apply to the RPS.

IEEE 323-1971

" General Guide for Qualifying Class I Electric Equipment" is satisfied by complete qualification testing and certification of all essential components.

Records covering all essential com-ponents are maintained.

For a complete summary of how the RPS complies with IEEE 323-1971, refer to NEDO-10698.

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! A TURBINE CONTROL -- A BYPASS-!C

- C VALVE PAST CLOSURE

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HIGH PRESSURE 1-

/g NUCLEAR SYSTEM

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WATER LEVEL gbA MAIN STEAM LINE -

3bC HIGtl RADIATION gb A1 NEUTRON MONITORING g'. C SYSTEM

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[CA2 GA2 1

NOTE: CONTACTS SHOWN IN NORMAL OPERATING STATE UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT i

RGURE 7.2-9 LOGICS IN ONE TRIP SYSTEM 1

- _ _ _ _. - _ _. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _. _ _.. _ _

ML20247E150

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