ML20246L052
| ML20246L052 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1989 |
| From: | Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0452, RTR-NUREG-452 89-506, NUDOCS 8907180333 | |
| Download: ML20246L052 (200) | |
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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 July 12,'A989 ;
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.89-506
- Attention: Document Control Desk NAPS /DEQ/R2 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dockot Nos. 50-338 ,
50-339 )
License Nos. NPF-4 l NPF-7 Gentlemen:
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POW 5R COMPANY NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 ESF SLAVE RELAY TESTING in response to our letter of June 9,1989 (Serial No.89-433), we are providing a Test Plan for Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Slave Relays (Attachment 1). In accordance with the Test Plan, testing will be conducted on Unit 2 by August 11, 1989 and on Unit 1 within 90 days of entering Mode 4 after completion of the 1989 refueling outage. In addition, the Safeguards Test Cabinet on Unit 1 will be checked and functionally tested to the extent possible prior to startup.
For those relays 6Llineated in the Test Plan as not testable on-line, a basis is provided in Attachment 2. This basis provides the design function, as well as, the operational impact and safety significance if testing was to be conducted on-line. Simplified schematics are also provided in Attachment 2 to facilitate the operational impact and safety significance discussions. A failure analysis of the Safeguards Test Cabinet Blocking circuitry is provided in Attachment 3.
As requested by the NRC in our June 9,1989 telephone conference call and documented in our June 9,1989 letter, we are clarifying Technical Specification 3/4 3.2.1 and the Technical Specification definition of SLAVE RELAY TESTING. These changes are provided in Attachment 4 and are consistent with NUREG 0452, Rev. 4, Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors and Safety Guide 22. The supporting safety analysis is provided in Attachment 5.
We would like to administratively impose these Technical Specification changes until NRC approved Technical Specification changes are received. Therefore, discretionary enforcement for both Units 1 and 2 is requested. The basis for discretionary enforcement is provided in Attachment 6.
The Technical Specification change request has been reviewed and approved by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and the Safety Evaluation and Control Staff. It has been determined that this request does not pose an unreviewed 89071eo333 890712 FDR F
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safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 or a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR S0.92.
Virginia Electric and Power Company requests discretionary enforcement from the requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.3.2.1 to administratively implement the Test Plan on a quarterly basis untilissuance of the license amendment. This request for discretionary enforcement has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Shfety and Operating Committee.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact us immediately.
Very truly yours,
.s M, ht . L. Stewart S nior Vice President - Power Attachments:
- 1. Test Plan for ESF Slave Relays
- 2. Basis for Off-Line Testing
- 3. Safeguards Testing Cabinet Blocking Circuit Failure Analysis
- 4. Changes to Technical Specifications
- 5. Safety Analysis
- 6. Basis for Discretionary Enforcement cc: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11 101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. J. L. Caldwell NRC Senior Resident inspector North Anna Power Station
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i ATTACHMENT 1 Test Plan for ESF Slave Relays l
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l- Test Plan for ESF Slave Relays )
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Plant Criteria for )
Relav Status ** Frequency ** Off-LineTesting
- 601 Off-Line Refueling 1 j
602 On-Line Quarterly / N/A l Refueling l
1 603 Off-Line Refueling 2,3' 604 Off-Line Refueling 2 605 Off-Line Refueling 3 606 Off-Line Refueling 3 607 On-Line Quarterly / N/A I Refueling 608 Off-Line Refueling 2 609 Off-Line Refueling 2 610 Off-Line Refueling 2 611 Off-Line Refueling 2,3 612 On-Line Quarterly / N/A Refuleing 613 Off-Line Reful'.ing 3 614 On-Line Quarterly / N/A l Refuleing 616 Off-Line Refueling 1 I
618 Off-Line Refueling 3 619 Off-Line Refueling 3 62'O Off-Line Refueling 1 .
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Test! Plan for ESF Slave Relays Cont'd.
Plant' Criteria- for l Relay Status ** Frequency ** Off-LineTesting
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- 621' Off-Line Refueling 1-
', 6'23 . Off-Line Refueling ' 3 625 Off-Line Refueling . 3 l
626 Off-Line Refueling 2,3 630 On-Line Quarterly / .N/A Refueling 633 Off-Line Refueling 2,3 636 Off-Line Refueling 3 643 Off-Line Refueling 2' 644 Off-Line Refueling 2 (s45 On-Lbe Quarterly / N/A Refueling
- Criteria for Off-Line Testing: ,
- 1. A singis failure in the Safeguards Test Cabinet circuitry.would cause an inadvertent RPS or ESF actuation.
- 2. The test will adversely affect two or more components in one ESF system or two or more ESF systems.
- Frequency / Plant S atus: i
- 1. Q.iarterly / Modes 1 - 4
- 2. Refueling / Mode 5 every 18 months during a refueling --
l ATTACHMENT 2 Basis for Off-Line Testing i
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' RELAY: K-601 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Safety Injection TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATEDJ.
- 1. Close All Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (BLOCK)
A. FCV-1478; Supply Feedwater Flow to 'A'. Steam Generator B. FCV-1488; Supply Feedwater Flow to 'B' Steam Generator l
l- C. FCV-1498; Supply Feedwater Flow to 'C' Steam Generator i
I DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K601 relay actuates on a safety injection signal to close the feedwater regulating valves in response to a l , main steam line or feedwater line break inside or outside containment. For breaks inside containment isolating feedwater will limit the amount of energy transferred to the containment atmosphere and thus limit the peak containment pressure. For a break in or outside containment isolating feedwater ensures that an excessive RCS cooldown does not occur and prevents the Reactor from exceeding any Thermal-Hydraulic design limits.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF ** STING:
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L Since these valves are block tested, there is no operational impact except upon test circuit failure.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
Provided that the test circuit does not fail there is no safety significance in testing this relay. However, if the circuit does fail, and one or more main feedwater regulating valves isolate feedwater flow, then significant safety concerns exist. If one valve fails closed, a reactor trip would occur as a result of a low steam generator level coincident with a steam flow - feed flow mismatch or steam generator low-low level depending on initial power level. It should be noted that immediate action would be required (< 5 seconds) to prevent a reactor trip. Closure of all the valves would result in a loss of normal feedwater accident, a condition II event.
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RELAY:' K-603 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Safety Injection TEST FREOUENCY: 18 M'anths EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. High Head. Safety Injection (HHSI) System Valve Re-alignment for
' Safety Injection.
A. Open MOV-1115D Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) supply to Charging Pumps Isolation B. Close MOV-1115C Volume Control Tank (VCT) supply to charging pumps isolation valve C. Close MOV-1289A N rmal Charging Isolation Valve D. Open MOV-1867C Boron Injection Tank (BIT) Outlet Valve E. Close TV-1884A, BIT Recirculation Valve
- 2. Open MOV-1865A "A" Accumulator Discharge Valve DESIGN FUNCTION:
The E603 relay actuates on a safety injection signal to align the EHSI system from a normal charging function to a'high head injection function. It also ensures that the accumulator discherge valve is open and capable of performing its passive core injection function. Actuation of this relay ensures high head injection is available and in service during any loss of coolant accidents or cooldown accidents which reduce the RCS water inventory.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
If the HHSI Re-alignment were to actuate, the normal charging valve would begin to close as the RWST supply valve begins to open. When the RWST supply valve is full open the VCT isolation valve would receive a close signal. At this time normal charging would be isolated and seal injection would be supplied from the FWST via the charging pumps. For the duration of this test a boration of the RCS will occur.
The boration rate would be at least 15 gpm assuming seal injection flow only. The significance of this boration increases with core life.
In addition, letdown flow from the RCS is cooled by normal charging in the regenerative heat exchanger. When normal charging is isolated, letdown temperatures will increase which would cause flashing downstream of the letdown flow orifices.
This is an unacceptable condition. The high temperature would 1
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also cause the letdown demineralized ion exchangers to be automatically removed from. service. Therefore, to prevent adverse operation of the letdown system, testing this relay and contacts would require placing the excess letdown system in service, isolating normal letdown, and diluting the RCS to allow rods to compensate for the boration. If any boration is undesirable then MOV-1115C & D would have to be de-energized.
M;<ever, the contacts could not be verified in this condition.
opening the BIT outlet valve will cause some amount of flow past the RCS pressure isolation valves if the BIT hadTesting been previously pressurized by opening the inletTech. valve.
the K604 relay will open the inlet valve. Spec. 3.4.6.2 (Unit 2 only) requires leak testing the RCS pressure isolation valves in the HHSI system whenever there is flow through the valves. This flow may be interpreted as requiring the leak test to be performed. If so, it would cause both trains of safety injection to be inoperable, presents significant ALARA concerns, and is operationally restrictive.
The accumulator discharge valve is normally open and receives an auto open signal when RCS pressure is 1 2000 psig. Therefore, It cannot be closed when RCS pressure is 1 2000 psig.
the contacts can't be verified at power and there is no operational impact.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTINS Flashing across the letdown orifices is unacceptable since it could lead to excessive piping stress and possible failure, Therefore, excess letdown must be used. The maximum excess letdown flow is approximately 15 gpm which is equal to the makeup rate via seal injection. The excess letdown system was provided as a backup system, when the normal letdown system is inoperable. The excess letdown system is only rated for a limited number of thermal cycles and it is not desired to use the system on a routine basis.
Since normal charging is isolated during this test, the ability to provide additional amount of borated water to the RCS is reduced. This may limit the ability of the operator to maintain sufficient inventory in the RCS during condition I and II events without relying on other ESF equipment.
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RELAY: K-604 & K-604XA ACTUATION SIGNAL:' Safety Injection TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Open MOV-1867A Boron Injection Tank (BIT) Inlet Valve
- 2. Open MOV-1865B "B" Accumulator Discharge Valve 3.- Start 1-SI-P-1A Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) Pump
- 4. Input to SI/CDA Load Shed Icgic DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K6J4. relay actuates on a safety injection signal to align the High Head Safety Injection system from a normal charging function to a high head injection function. It also ensures that the accumulator discharge valve is open and capable of performing its. passive core injection function. Actuation of this relay ensures high head injection is available and in service during any loss of coolant accidents or cooldown accidents which reduce the RCS water inventory. In addition, the LHSI pump is started to ensure its availability in case a major loss of coolant accident is in progress. Input into the SI/CDA load shed logic ensures adequate reserve station service power is available to the accident unit by tripping and/or delay starting of non-essential loads on the non-accident unit.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
To test the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) inlet valve the BIT recirculation trip valves would have to be closed to prevent over pressurizing the recirculation piping.
The accumulator discharge valve is normally open and receives an auto open signal when RCS pressure is 2 2000 psig. It cannot be closed when RCS pressure is 2 2000 psig.
Therefore, the contacts can't be verified at power.
1 During normal operation (both units at 100%) part of the SI/CDA load shed sequence would be initiated. Specifically, the shunt reactors would trip and the tap changer for the reserve station service transformers (RSST) would initiate without time delay. Additional large equipment could be affected on the non-accident unit if both units were on reserve station power when the test was conducted.
Allowing the LHSI pump to start is an unnecessary start of an i
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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
If the LHSI pump breaker is racked to the test position every time this relay is tested then a major piece of ESF equipment is rendered inoperable and overall system availability is reduced.
Testing this relay with the opposite unit in a start up, with the Station Service transformers beAng fed from the RSST will result in a loss of large station loads. If G bus is cross-tied, then the circulating Water (CW) pumps on the unit being.
tested would trip. Tripping the CW pumps on a unit at 100%
power would cause a turbine trip on low condenser vacuum. This in turn would cause a reactor trip. Since condenser vacuum was lost the steam dumps would not be available and the initial RCS heat load would be. removed via the steam generator safety and atmospheric dump valves. Residual heat would be removed by auxiliary feedwater and the steam generator atmospheric dump valves. Opening the stear generator safety valves is significant because they may stick open and cause an excessive cooldown.
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J RELAY: K-605-ACTUATION S*1.AL: Containment Isolation Phase A I
TEST FTIQUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Close HCV-1200A,B Letdown Isolation Valve
- 2. Close TV-1859 Accumulator Test Line Isolation Valve
- 3. Close TV-110A Main Steam to Steam Generator Blowdown Tanks
- 4. Close TV-LM-100A,C Containment Air to Leakage Monitoring System
- 5. Close TV-DA-103A Containment Sump to High Radiation Sampling System
- 6. TCS Mux Input DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K605 relay is actuated on a Containment Isolation Phase A signal which is generated by a safety injection signal. The
' Phase "A" signal is generated to isolate the containment atmosphere from the outside atmosphere in accident scenarios which may result in an increased containment pressure. This isolation is accomplished by isolating system piping wh4.ch penetrates containment and is not required for accident mitigation, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation, Residual Heat Removal System Operation, or instrument air.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING To test this relay both letdown valves must be placed in service. This would require control manipulations by the operator and could result in lifting the letdown line relief valve. When the relay is tested, letdown would isolate disrupting the charging and letdown flow balance. To restore letdown it would again require control manipulations. This is not considered a controlled or normal evolution. The high probability of inappropriate or ineffective operator action would require testing this relay with excess letdown in service and normal charging isolated. This also requires significant control manipulations. Also, excess letdown is not designed for routine operation and has a limited thermal cycle design life.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
With normal charging isolated the maximum seal injection rate is approximately 15 gpm which can be balanced by using excess letdown. Since normal charging is isolated during thfs test, the ability to' provide additional amounts of borated water to-the RCS is reduced. This may limit the ' ability. of the operator to maintain sufficient inventory in the.RCS during condition I and'II events without relying on other ESF equipment..
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l RELAY: K-GO6 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Containment Isolation Phase A TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months l
EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Close HCV-1200C Letdown Isolation Valve
- 2. Closs TV-BD-100C Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation
- 3. Close TV-DA-100A Containment Sump Pump Discharge Valve
- 4. Close TV-CV-150C Containment Vacuum Pump Suction Valve
- 5. Close TV-DG-100A Primary Drain Transfer Tank Pump Discharge
- 6. Close TV-LM-100G Containment Air to Leakage Monitoring System
- 7. Close TV-LM-101A Sealed Pressure System to Leakage Monitoring System
- 8. Partial logic to Close FCV-AS-100B Air Ejector Aux Steam Supply DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K606 relay is actuated on a Containment Isolation Phase A signal which is generated by a safety injection signal. The Phase "A" signal is generated to isolate the containment atmosphere from the outside atmosphere in accident scenarios which may result in an increased containment pressure. This isolation is accomplished by isolating system piping which penetrated containment and is not required for accident mitigation, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation, Residual Heat Removal System operhtion, or Instrument Air.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING In order to test the letdown isolation valve (HCV-1200C) another orifice valve would have to be placed in service so that letdown would not isolate when HCV-1200C closes.
This requires some control manipulations by the operator and could result in challenging the letdown line relief valve.
If the logic to close the air ejector Aux Steam supply valve is made up it would result in a loss of condenser vacuum and eventually a turbine trip. Therefore, the air 1 ejector may have to be isolated to test this relay. I Isolating steam generator blowdown will affect steam generator chemistry and will require manually isolating the blowdown line l
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prior to testing to ensure a water hammer is avoided when the t- the valve'is re-opened. Failure of the valve to reopen would ;
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EAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING i
If.the. steam generator blowdown valve fails to re-open_ i and steam generator chemistry degrades significantly then.
the life of the generator maybe reduced. This may require more tubes to be replaced _ the next outage and is an ALARA- ]
concern. .
The leakage monitoring containment isolation valves are only opened for Type "A" Testing. Opening these valves is un-necessary and increases the probability of failure or leakage.
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BEL &Il K-608 ACTUATLON SIGNAL; Safety Injection TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
'1. Start 1-CH-P-1C High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump
- 2. Open MOV-SW-121A, 122A, 221A, 222A Ser'. Ice Water Spray array valves
- 3. Close MOV-SW-123A, 223A Service Water Spray Bypass valves DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K608 relay actuates on a safety injection signal to start a HHSI pump to provide injection flow to the reactor coolant system (RCS). Actuation of-this relay ensures high head injection is available and in service during any loss of coolant or cooldown accidents which reduce the RCS water inventory. Fuel integrity is maintained by the Safety Injection system removing heat from the core and by the Recirculation Spray system transferring heat to the service water system. The purpose of closing the bypass valves and opening the spray array valves is to increase the cooling capability of the Service Water system to ensure an adequate heat sink is available during accident conditions.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
The charging pump logic will not allow testing this pump with the breaker racked to the test position. Therefore, the pump must be allowed to start, which is unnecessary, and may require swapping pumps. Depending on pump availability this evolution may be ;
significant or incapable of being performed. In order to test the 1 Service Water MOV's the spray arrays may require realignment and Service Water pump manipulations may be required.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
When testing this relay the HHSI system must be realigned or manipulated and there is some increased probability that a human error or equipment failure could result in component damage or system inoperability. Testing the Service Water MOV's may require i realignment which would affect the loads being supplied by the Service Water system. Starting and stopping Service Water pumps and realigning the spray and bypass valves will cause transients on the Service Water system, l
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i RELAY: K-609 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Safety Injection TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Start 1-SW-P-1A Service Water Pump
- 2. Str.rt 2-CH-P-1A High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) Pump DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K609 relay actuates on a safety injection signal to start a HHSI pump to provide injection flow to the reactor coolant system (RCS). Actuation of this relay ensures high head injection is available and in service during any loss of coolant or cooldown accidents which reduce the RCS water inventory. The start of the service water pump on a safety injection signal is anticipatory and is based on the assumption that a large break I4CA is in progress.
The pump starts to provide additional cooling water flow to ensure adequate heat sink is available if a containment actuation eignal occurs and the recirculation spray system becomes oper:ational.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
In order to test the Service Water pump, significant system manipulations may be required depending upon the present line-up.
For example, if it is the running pump it must be shutdown to allow it to start or rack its breaker to test. This would require aligning the redundant pump to the appropriate header and starting it. If it is desired to rack the pump breaker to the test I position, and another pump is out of service for maintenance, then only two pumps would be operable and this would require entry into the Tech. Spec. action statement.
The charging pump logic will not allow testing this pump with the
, breaker racked to the test position. Therefore, the pump must be allowed to start, which is unnecessary, and may require swapping i
pumps. Depending on pump availability this evolution may be I significant or incapable of being performed.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
When testing this relay the Service Water and HHSI systems must be realigned or manipulated and there is some increased probability that a human error or equipment failure could result in component damage or system inoperability. If the service water pump breaker I is racked to test for testing purposes then a major piece of ESF equipment is rendered inoperable and would not be immediately available if required, l
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TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months {
EQUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Open SOV-HV-1300A, 2300A. Supplies air to the trip valves which open and discharge Control Room bottled air.
- 2. Close AOD-HV-160-1 Normal Control Room Ventilation Supply 3' . Close all High Radiation Sampling System Isolation Trip Valves.
DESIGN. FUNCTION:
Relay K610 actuates on a safety injection signal that may be caused by a mainsteam line break and it isolates the control room from the outside atmosphere, The function of this relay is to ensure the control room remains habitable during a mainsteam line break in the turbine building assuming a 10 gpm primary to secondary leak with one percent failed fuel.
It discharges the high pressure control room air bottles to pressurize the control room in order to prevent in leakage and to provide breathable quality air.
Relay K610 also closes the high radiation sample system isolation trip valves to prevent the loss of reactor coolant and provide containment isolation.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
Testing this relay would result in discharging all the bottled air bar.Xs for both units. This would require both units to enter t. Tech. Spec. Action Statement for approximately 8-12 hours in order to re-pressurize at least two air banks.
Therefore, to reduce the time frame that the Action Staterent would be entered, this test would require isolating the iischarge headers and locally verifying equipment actuation. '
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
I During the duration of this test both trains of bottled air for both units would be rendered inoperable. With the discharge headers isolated the air bottles could be made available if required, but after some time delay. This time delay could result in overexposing the control room operators during certain accident scenarios and would violate the requirements of GDC 19.
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l RELAY: K-611 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Safety Injection I
TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED: j
- 1. Start Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-2 by opening TV-MS-111A, Steam Supply to Terry-Turbine j
- 2. Start 1-FW-P-3A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
- 3. Start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-EE "7-1H: Circuit 2 DESIGN FUNCTION:
Actuation of the K-611 relay by a safety injection signal ensures a heat sink for the RCS is available via the aux-iliary feedwater system since the main feedwater system would be isolated by the same signal. The auxiliary feed-water system ensures there is acequate feedwater flow available to remove residual and decay heat. This relay also ensures that the emergency diesel generator is started in response to what could be a design basis accident (a LOCA with a loss of offsite power).
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
Starting the auxiliary feed pumps is unnecessary and would require lining them up on recirculation or allowing them to flow to the steam generators. It is not desirable to run the . pumps on recirculation except as absolutely necessary since the recirculation path has been determined to be minimally sized and leads to some amount of pump degradation. Flowing the steam generators with water from the emergency condensate tank, which sits stagnet for long periods of time, upsets steam generator chemistry. During very low power operation flowing the generators will result in a reactivity purtibation.
To prevent the above adverse affects, TV-MS-211A would have to be isolated, and the breaker for FW-P-3A racked to test.
This would render 2 of 3 Auxiliary Feedwater pumps inoper-able for the duration of the test and require entry into a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Action Statement.
Without any a operator actions, testing this relay will result in a fast start of the EDG. It has been determined that frequently fast starting the EDG is unnecessary and leads to diesel degradtion. Therefore, to test this relay would require running this test concurrently with the monthly slow start EDG test. Another method would be placing the diesel in manual local, which prevents any
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. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
. Testing this relay more frequently than 18 months would require rendering the EDG and 2 of 3 auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable everytime 1.t's tested. Cince the overall j availability of the syste. ja reduced, there is some in- 1 creased possibility that a accident could occur with both I diesels inoperable (assuming t.he redundant EDG fails).
Although the EDG under test can be started manually there will be an increased time delay which may cause certain plant design conditions to be exceeded. In addition, failure of the redundant EDG would result in a total loss of the l auxiliary feedwater cystem. This is very significant since auxiliary feedwater is the primary means of removing residual and decay heat. It would also place the unit in a condition outside of the design analysis. During certain plant conditions and accident scenarios this test could result in core damage.
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RELAY: K-613 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Containment Isolation Phase A TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months !
EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Close TV-1204A Letdown / Containment Isolation
- 2. Partial logic to close FCV-AS-100A Auxiliary Steam Supply to Condenser Air Eiector
- 3. Close TV-SS-INCA
- 4. Close TV-MS 10%
- 5. Close TV-1519A
- 6. Close TV-VG-100A 1
DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K613 relay is actuated on a Containment Isolation Phase A signal which is generated by a safety injection signal. The Phase "A" signal is generated to isolate the containment atmosr,nere from the outside atmosphere in accident scenarios which result in an increased containment pressure. This.
isolation h. accomplished by isolating system piping which pener.rateo ;ontainment and is not required for accident mitigation. . Letdown isolation also reduces RCS inventory loss and mitigates any release in the event of fuel failure.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING When this relay is tested, letdown would isolate disrunting tue charging and letdown flow balance. Isolating etdown without closing the orifice isolation valves will sub,,ct J the low pressure piping to RCS pressure and result in lifting the relief valve. To restore letdown it would again require control manipulations, This is not considered normal evolution. Therefore, to test this relay would require pithg excess letdown in service and isolating normal charging. This also requires significant control manipulations. The excess letdown system is not designed for routine operation and is I designed for a limited number of thermal cycles.
If the logic to close the air ejector Aux Steam supply valve j (FCV-AS-100A) is made up it would result in a loss of condenser vacuum and eventually a turbine trip. Therefore, the air ejector may have to be isolated to test this relay.
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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
l- With normal charging isolated the maximum seal injection rate-is approximately 15 gpm which can be balanced by using excess letdown. Since normal charging is isolated during this test, the ability to provide additional amounts of borated water to the RCS is reduced. This may limit the ability of the operator to maintain sufficient inventory l in the ECS during condition I and II events without relying l on other ESF equipment, i
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-ACTUATION SIGNAL: Containment Isolation Phase A ;
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l RELAY: K-616-ACTUATION SIGNAL: Steam Line Isolation TEST FREQUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
'1, close all Main Steam Trip Valves (BLOCKED) .
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B. Close TV-MS-101B-1 C. Close TV-MS-101C-1
-DESIGN FUNCTION:
Relay K616 is actuated by a steam line isolation signal in response to a steam line break downstream of the main steae non-return valves. Actuation of this relay closes all of the main steam trip valves and prevents an uncontrolled blowdown of all steam generators.
1 OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
Since this is a block test there is no operational impact unless the test circuit fails.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
If the test circuit fails and allows all of the trip valves to close simultaneously a reactor trip would occur on either a high RCS pressure or a low-low steam generator level. Based on actual ~ events, if one one main steam trip valve closes-a Hi steam line flow SI signal will be generated. The steam generator safeties would open momentarily and then the-Steam Generator Atmospheric dump valves would open. -This is due to the condenser steam dumps'not being available. This is undesirable since one safety may stick open and cause a cooldown event. In addition, a RCS pressurizer PORV may be challenged.
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RELAY: K-618 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Containment Isolation Phase B TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Close TV-BD-100A Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve
- 2. Close TV-CC-104A,B,C Component Cooling (CC) to all Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) (. BLOCK)
DESIGN FUNCTION:
Relay K618 actuates on a Containment Isolation Phase B signal as a result of a containment high-high pressure i signal. The Phase B Isolation Signal ensures that all i penetrations not already closed by a Phase A Isolation Signal are now closed in response to a large break LOCA.
The Phase B Signal ensures the containment atmosphere is isolated from the outside atmosphere.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
Isolating steam generator blowdown will affect steam generator chemistry and will require manually isolating the blowdown line prior to testing to ensure a water hammer is avoided when the valve is re-opened. Failure of the valve to reopen would lead to steam generator chemistry concerns.
Provided the test circuit for the component cooling trip valves does not fail, there is no operational impact of testing these components.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
If the steam generator blowdown valve fails to re-open and steam generator chemistry degrades significantly then the life of the generator maybe reduced. This may require more tubes to be replaced the next outage and is an ALARA Concern.
A test circuit failure for the CC trip valves will result in a loss of cooling to the RCP lube oil, thermal barrier and l stator coolers. This would result in increasing bearing temperatures which may approach the RCP trip setpoint. If this occurs the reactor and the RCP's would be tripped. This would place the plant in a natural circulation condition which is undesirable.
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l RELAY; K-619 i ACTUATION SIGNAL: Containment Isolation Phase B 1
TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Close TV-BD-100C Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve
- 2. Close TV-CC-105A Chilled Water to Containment Air Recirculation Fan Isolation
- 3. Close TV-IA-102A Instrument Air Isolation
- 4. TSC MUX Input DESIGN FUNCTION:
Relay K619 actuates on a Containment Isolation Phase B signal as a result of a containment high-high pressure signal. Mie Phase B Isolation Signal ensures that all penetratim u not already closed by a Phase A Isolation Signal are now closed in response to a large break LOCA.
The Phase B Signal ensures the containment atmosphere is isolated from the outside atmosphere.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING 1 Isolating steam gener:. tor blowdown will affect steam generator chemistry and will require manually isolating the blowdown line prior to testing. Failure of the valve to reopen would lead to steam generator chemistry concerns.
Isolating the instrument air system supply to containment will require starting a containment instrument air compressor.
Closing the chilled water isolation valves causes a very rapid heat up of the containment. A drop in chilled water flow will trip the common unit mechanical chiller water, unless trip is blocked by a jumper prior to testing. A significant transient in the chilled water system will occur that may also affect the other unit.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
If the steam generator blowdown valve fails to re-open and steam generator chemistry degrades significantly then the life of the generator maybe reduced. This may require more tubes to be replaced the next outage and is an ALARA Concern.
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RELAY: K-620 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Feedwater Isolation TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED: !
- 1. Closes All Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (BLOCK)
A. Close FCV-1478; Main Feedwater supply to "A" Steam Generator B. Close FCV-1488; Main Feedwater supply to "B" Steam Generator C. Close FCV-1498; Main Feedwater supply to "C" Steam Generator DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K620 relay actuates on a Feedwater Isolation signal generated by a safety injection signal to close the feedwater regulating valves in response to a main steam line or feedwater line break inside or outside containment. For breaks inside containment isolating feedwater will limit the amount of energy transferred to the containment atmosphere and thus limit the peak containment pressure.
For a break in or outside containment isolating feedwater ensures that an excessive RCS cooldown does not occur and prevents the Reactor from exceeding any Thermal-Hydraulic design limits.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTIJLG:
Since these valves are block tested, there is no operational impact except upon test circuit failure.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
Provided that the test circuit does not fail there is no safety significance in testing this relay. However, if the circuit does fail, and one or more main feedwater regulating valves isolate feedwater flow, then significant safety concerns exist. If one valve fails closed, a reactor trip would occur as a result of a low steam generator level coincident with a steam flow - feed flow mismatch or steam generator low-low level depending on initial power level. It should be noted that immediate action would be required (< 5 seconds) to prevent a reactor trip. Closure of all the valves would result in a loss of normal feedwater accident, a condition II event.
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l' RELAY: K-621 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Steam Generator High Water Level or Safety Injection TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
A. TURBINE TRIP (BLOCK)
B. ALL FEEDWATER PUMPS TRIP (BLOCK)
- 1. 1-FW-P-1A1
- 2. 1-FW-P-1B1
- 3. 1-FW-P-1C1 C. REDUNDANT FEEDWATER I"OLATION (BLOCK)
- 1. MOV-FW-154A .
- 2. MOV-FW-154B
- 3. MOV-FW-154C D. LOW PRESSURE HEATER DRAIN PUMP TRIP
- 1. 1-SD-P-2A
- 2. 1-SD-P-2B DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K-621 relay is actuated by a Safety Injection signal or a steam generator high-high water level. The operation of this relay serves two purposes. If the actuation signal was a safety injection aignal, in response to a main steam or feed line break, then this relay ensures that all feedwater and main steam to the turbine is isolated. For breaks inside containiaent isolating feedwater will limit the amount of energy transferred to the containment atmosphere and thus limit the peak containment pressure.
For a break in or outside containment isolating feedwater ensures that an excessive RCS cooldown does not occur and prevents the Reactor from excceding any Thermal-Hydraulic design limits. The isolaticn of feedwater is accomplished by closing the feedwater isolation valves, which are re-dundant to the main feedwater regulating valves, and tripping the main feedwater pumps. Isolating main steam to the turbine is accomplished by closing the turbine stop and governor valves.
The other purpose of this relay is to actuate on a steam generator high-high level which prevents an excessive reactivity addition from a cooldown, prevents filling the main steam piping with water, and prevents excessive moisture carry over to the turbine. The main steam piping i
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is not designed to support the additional load of water and may fail as a result of an over stressed condition.
Moisture carry over to the turbine is detrimental since it will cause damage to the turbine blading.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
1 There is no operational impact due to feedwater isolation l and turbine trip as long as the test circuitry does not fail.
However, tripping the low pressure-heater drain pumps will cause a major feodwater train oscillation which will require starting an third condensate pump and taking manual control of the feed train.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
i Provided that the test circuits do not fail there is no safety significance in testing this relay. However, if the Feedwater Isolation circuit fails, and one or more feedwater isolation valves isolate feedwater flow, then significant safety concerns exist. If one valve fails closed, a reactor trip would occur as.a result of a low steam generator level-coincident with a steam flow - feed flow mismatch or steam generator low-low level depending on initial power level. It should be noted that immediate action would be required (< 5 seconds) to prevent a reactor trip. Closure of all the valves would result in a loss of normal feedwater accident, a condition II event.
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RELAY:- K-623 ACTUATION' SIGNAL: Steam Line Isolation TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Close Main Steam Trip Valve Bypass Valves A. Close TV-MS-113A-1 Main Steam Trip Valve Bypass B. Close TV-MS-113B-1 Main Steam Trip Valve Bypass C. Close TV-MS-113C-1 Main Steam Trip Valve Bypass DESIGN FUNCTION:
Relay K623 is actuated by a steam line isolation signal in response to a steam line break downstream of the main steam non-return valves. Actuation of thf relay closes all of the main steam trip valves and prevents an uncontrolled blowdown of all steam generators.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
These valves are normally-closed during power operation and will have to be opened to test this relay. These valves are used to equalize pressure across the main trip valve so that it can be opened. During the test, the rapid closure of these bypass valves may cause the main steam trip valve to close and this would result in a reactor trip on a safety injection signal.
j EAFETY ELGNIFICANCE OF. TESTING:
i Since the valves are normally closed it is unnecessary to open them and then verify they close during the relay test. This !
is especially true if there exists some probability that their closure could cause the main steam trip valve to close which j would cause a reactor trip and a safety injection. l l
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RELAY: K-625 ,
ACTUATION SIGNAL, Containment Isolation Phase "B" TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATPQi
- 1. Close TV-BD-100E Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve
- 2. Close TV-CC-102E component cooling return isolation from "A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Lube Oil and Stator Coolers (BLOCK)
- 3. Close TV-SOV-105B chilled water return from containment air recirculation. fan
- 4. Close TV-CC-103A cooling water from Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchanger DESIGN FUNCTION:
Relay K625 actuates on a Containment Isolation Phase B signal as a result of a containment high-high pressure signal. The Phase B Isolation Signal ensures that all penetrations not already closed by a Phase A Isolation Signal are now closed in response to a large break LOCA.
The Phase B Signal ensures the containment atmosphere is isolated from the outside atmosphere.
OPERATIONAL IMPAQ7 OF TESTING:
Isolsting steam generator blowdown will affect steam generator
.: chemistry and will require manually isolating the blowdown line f prior to testing to ensure a water hammer is avoidgd when the the valve.is re-opened. Failure of the valve to reopen would lead to steam generator chemistry concerns.
Closing the chilled water isol ation valves causes a very rapid hoat up of the containment. A irop in chilled water flow will trip the common unit mechanical 7 hiller water, unless the trip is blocked by a jumper prior to testing. A significant transient in the chilled water u ; tem will occur that may also affect the other unit.
Provided the test circuit for the component cooling trip M9ws does not fail, there is no operational impact of testing these components.
HAfETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
If the steam generator blowdown valve fails to re-open and steam generator chemistry degrades significantly then the life of the generator may be reduced. This may require
more tubes to be replaced the next outage and is an ALARA Concern.
A test circuit failure for the CC trip valves will result in a' loss of cooling to the RCP lube oil and stator coolers This would result in increasing bearing temperatures which
> may approach the RCP trip setpoint. If this occurs the reactor and the RCP's would be tripped. This would place the plant in a natural circulation condition which is undesirable. l 1
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RELAY: K-626 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Containment Isolation Phase B TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EQUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Close TV-CC-102A,C Component Cooling (CC) return isolation from B&C Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) Lube Oil and Stator Coolers (BLOCK)
- 2. Start 1-SW-P-5 Service water return from recirculation spray heat exchanger radiation monitor pump
- 3. Start 1-SW-P-8 Service water return from recirculation spray heat exchanger radiation monitor pump
- 4. Close TV-CC-105C Chilled water return from containment air recirculation fan
- 5. Close TV-CC-101A Thermal barrier cooling water return from all RCP's DESIGN FUNCTION:
Relay K626 actuates on a Containment Isolation Phase B signal as a result of a containment high-high pressure signal. The Phase B Isolation Signal ensures that all penetrations not already closed by a Phase A Isolatita Signal are now closed in response to a large break LOCA.
The Phase B Signal ensures the containment atmosphere is isolated from the outside atmosphere.
Po d the e for the RCP component cooling trip valves does not fail, there is no operational impact of testing these components.
Closing the chilled water isolation valves causes a very rapid i heat up of the containment. A drop in chilled water flow will trip the common unit mechanical chiller water, unless trip is !
blocked by a jumper prior to testing. A significant transient in the chilled water system will occur that may also affect the other unit.
SAFETY SIGNIFICA_NCE OF TESTING:
A test circuit failure for the RCP Component Cooling trip valves will result in a loss of cooling to the RCP lube oil and thermal barrier coolers. This would result in increasing bearing temperatures which may approach the RCP trip setpoint.
If this occurs the reactor and the RCP's would be tripped.
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RELAY: K-633 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation on a Steam Generator Low-Low level TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Open TV-MS-111A, Steam Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Terry-Turbine
- 2. Start FW-P-3A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K633 relay actuates on a steam generator low-low level.
This relay starts one of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (FW-P-3A) and opens steam supply to the Terry-Turbine (TV-MS-211A) which is the steam driven auxiliary feed pump.
Thn primary reason for the K633 relay starting the auxiliary ft2dwater pumps to ensure adequate heat sink is available drn the unit trips and safety injection is not required. In this case a time delay start is not required so the pumps start immediately.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTIN3:
Starting the auxiliary feed pumps is unnecessary and would require lining them up on recirculation or allowing them to flow to the steam generators. It is not desirable to run the pumps on recirculation except as absolutely necessary since the recirculation path has been determined to be minimally sized and leads to some amount of pump degradation. Flowing the steam generators with water from the en.ergency condensate tank, which sits stagnet for long periods of time, upsets steam generator chemistry. During very low power operation flowing the generators will result in a reactivity purtibation.
Therefore, TV-MS-211A would have to be isolated, and the breaker for FW-P-3A racked to test. This would render 2 of 3 Auxiliary Feedwater pumps inoperable for the duration of the test and require entry into a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Action Statement.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
, In order to test this relay one pump would have its breaker j placed in racked-to-test and the steam supply to the Terry !
-Turbine would have to be manually isolated. Defeating two j of three auxiliary feedwater pumps which are solely relied upon !
as the primary heat sink during an accident is not prudent. )
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' Failure of the one remaining pump would result in a total loss j of the auxiliary feedwater system. This would, place the unit in a condition which is outcide of the design analysis. During-certain plant conditions or accident scenarios this test could result in core damage. ,
In addition,-this test reduces the overall availability of 4 the Auxiliary Feedwater system and increases the probability that an accident could occur during,the test.
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- 1. Close all Main Feedwater bypass control valves j A. Clote FCV-1479-1 B. Close FCV-1489-1 I C. Close FCV-1499-1 DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K636 relay actuates on a safety injection signal to close the feedwater regulating bypass valves in response to a main steam line or feedwater line break inside or outside containment. For breaks inside containment isolating feedwaterwill limit the amount of energy transferred to the containment atmosphere and thus limit the peak containment pressure.
For a break in or outside containment isolating feedwater ensures that an excessive RCS cooldown does not occur and prevents the' Reactor from exceeding any Thermal-Hydraulic design limits.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
In order to test these valves the steam generator level control system will have to be manipulated. At 100% power the bypass valves will have to be opened slightly while allowing the MFRVs to control in auto. When the bypass valves close, the MFRV's will have to compensate. An oscillation may occur if the MFRV's are slow to respond or incapable of responding if the bypasses were opened too far initially. At 30% power this test would be much harder since the MFRV's will be erratic during low feed flow conditions.
SAFETY SIGH,IFICANCE OF TESTING:
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' ACTUATION SIGNAL: Containment Spray Actuation
' TEST'FREOUEEQli 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Close MOV-SW-108A Service Water (SW) Supply to Component Cooling (CC) Heat Exchangers (BLOCK)
- 2. Open MOV-QS-101A Quench Spray (QS) Pump Discharge Valve
- 3. Open MOV-SW~iolc Service Water Supply to Recirculation Spray (RS) Heat Exchangers (BLOCK)
- 4. Open MOV-SW-105A Service Water Return from Recirculation Spray (RS) Heat Exchangers (BLOCK)
- 5. Start 1-RS-P-2A OutFide Recirculation Spray (RS) Pump
- 6. -Open Stub Bus Breaker 15H12 Supply Breaker to Cor.ponent Cooling and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump
- 7. Close MOV-SW-110A, 114A Service Water Supply and return from Containment Recirculation Air Fans
- 8. Re-align the Safeguards Ventilation System through the Iodine Filters pESIGN FUNCTION:
A Containment spray Actuation signal is generated in response to a containment high-high pressure. Initiation of this signal completes the ESF response to a large break LOCA coincident with a loss of off-site power. This signal actuates the Quench Spray and Recirculation Spray Systems.
These systems are designed to reduce the containment pressure to sub-atmospheric pressure within one hour of the .i accident. The Quench Spray System also reduces gaseous iodine in the containment by spraying the atmosphere with a sodium hydroxide solution. The Recirculation Spray System removes core heat by pumping water, which has spilled out the break after passing over the core, through heat exchangers cooled by service water. In addition, it aligns the service water system to provide cooling flow through the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers and isolates flow to the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers since it is no longer needed.
The purpose of this signal is to ensure 10CFR100 limits are not exceeded by maintaining containment and fuel integrity. I containment integrity is assured by limiting the peak containment pressure and reducing it to sub-atmospheric
conditions within one hour by use of the spray systems.
Fual integrity is maintained by the Safety Injection System t removing heat from the core and by the Recirculation Spray Fystem transferring that heat to the service water system.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
For the test circuits which have block functions there is no operational impact provided the test circuit does not fail. j The Quench Spray pump discharge valve is normally closed.
To prevent gravity flowing to the inside recirculation spray sump the normally open suction valve will have to be closed.
There is an interlock in the test circuit to ensure the suction valve is closed prior to testing the discharge valve. The.
applicable Tech. Spec. Action Statement must be entered. Since the suction valve will be made inoperable during the test.
Allowing the outside recirculation spray pump to start is unnecessary and would require closing its suction and discharge valves, and filling the casing with water.
Therefore, the breaker will be placed in test and the applicable Tech.-Spec. Action Statement entered.
Opening the. stub bus breaker would cause a loss of CC if the CC pump powered from this breaker is running.
Therefore, CC pumps may have to be swapped to test this breaker. If only one pump is operable, this test cannot be performed since it could result in a reactor trip due to a loss of cooling to the RCP coolers.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
A test circuit failure for MOV-SW-108A would allow the valve to close and isolate service water to the cc,mponent cooling heat exchangers. This would result in a loss of cooling capacity for loads cooled by the component cooling system. The most significant loads are the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) lube oil and stator coolers. A loss of service water cooling would therefore result in increased RCP bearing temperatures. If the temperatures approach the limit then the Reactor and the RCP's would be tripped.
This would place the unit in a natural circulation condition which is not desirable.
It should be noted that testing this relay would render one train of the quench spray and recirculation spray systems inoperable for the duration of the test. This would reduce the overall availability of these systems and increase the possibility of an accident occuring while they are inoperable . In addition, single failure of the redundant trains emergency power supply will result in a complete
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l RELAY: K-644, K-644XA1, K-644XA2 ACTUATION SIGNAL:_. Containment Spray Actuation TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATXD.1,
- 1. Start 1-QS-P-1A Quench Spray Pump
- 2. Open MOV-QS-100A Quench Spray Pump Suction Valve j
- 3. Open MOV-RS-155A, 156A Recirculation Spray Pump Suction &
Discharge valves
- 4. Open MOV-SW-101A, 105C Service Water Supply & Return from R.S. ,
heat exchangers (EIOCK)
- 5. Open MOV-RS-100A Casing Cooling Tank discharge valve
- 6. Trip 1-CC-P-1A Component Cooling Pump
- 7. Open MOV-SW-103's,104's Service Water Isolation Valves to RS heat exchangers l
- 8. Input into SI/CDA load shedding logic
- 9. Trip 1-HV-F-37A,B,C Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling Fans
- 10. Trip 1-HV-F-1A,C
- 11. Start 1-RS-P-3A Casing Cooling Pump
- 12. Close TV-SW-101A,B Service Water to Containment Air Recirculation Fans DESIGN FUNCTION: ,
1 A Containment spray Actuation signal is generated in response to a containment high-high pressure. Initiation of this signal completes the ESF response to a large break LOCA coincident with a loss of off-site power. This signal actuates the Quench Spray and Recirculation Spray Systems.
These systems are designed to reduce the containment pressure to sub-atmospheric pressure within one hour of the accident. The Quench Spray System also reduces gaseous iodine in the containment by spraying the atmosphere with a sodium hydroxide solution. The Recirculation Spray System removes core heat by pumping water, which has spilled out the break after passing over the core, through heat exchangers cooled by service water. In addition, it aligns the service water system to provide cooling flow through the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers and
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isolates flew to the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers since it is no longer needed.
The purpose of this signal is to ensure 10CFR100 limits are not exceeded by maintaining containment and fuel integrity.
Containment integrity is assured by limiting the peak containment pressure and reducing it to sub-atmospheric conditions within one hour by use of the spray systems.
Fuel integrity is maintained by the Safety Injection System ,
removing heat from the core and by the Recirculation Spray !
System transferring that heat to the service water system.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
Allowing the Quench Spray (QS) Pump to start, which is unnecessary, would require lining up the pump for recirculation. Since the suction valve must be closed, (it is normally open) to verify it opens, then the QS pump will run dry for some time period until the suction valve opens. This is unacceptable. Therefore, to test these components the QS pump breaker would be racked to its test position. In addition, the Chemical Addition Tank discharge valve must be de-energized because it receives an auto open signal ( 5 min. time delay) when the QS pump starts. The applicable Action Statement for the Quench Spray and system would be entered.
The Recirculation Spray pump suction and discharge valves are normally open and would require closing. As a pre-caution the pump would have is to be placed in pull-to-lock to prevent its starting with the valves closed.
If a test circuit failure allow the service water supply and return valves from the Recirculation Spray (RS) heat exchangers to open then service water will flow to the RS heat exchangers. This condition is unacceptable and would require a containment entry to drain the heat exchangers.
The Coring Cooling tank discharge valve is normally closed.
If allowed to open it will drain the tank to the containment sump.
To prevent this from happening the in series supply valve MOV-RS-201A would have to be closed.
To test the Component cooling (CC) pump the other pump would have to start and flow adjustments would have to be made to the system. When the "A" pumps trips the system flow adjustments would be required again. If the other prp is inoperable this relay can't be tested since it will result in a loss of the CC system.
During the normal operation (both units at 100%) part of the SI/CDA load shed sequence would be initiated.
p Specifically, the shunt reactors would trip and the. tap changer for the'RSSTs would initiate without time delay. j If the SS transformers'are being fed from RSST then the auto start of various secondary pumps would be delayed.
If'the G-Bus cross-tie breaker is closed, then tha units circulating water would trip. These last tWo conditions are common when one unit is in an outage.
Therefore, testing this relay could lead to a Rx, trip.
. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
-It should be noted that testing this relay would render one train of the quench spray and recirculation spray
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systems inoperable for the duration of the test. This would reduce theoverall availability of these systems and increase'the possibility of an accident occuring while they are inoperable. In addition, single' failure ;
of.the redundant trains emergency power supply will j result in a complete loss of these systems for an ex-tended period. This would result in exceeding 10CFR100 limits during a design basis accident.
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Safeguards Testing Cabinet Blocking Circuit Failure Analysis l'
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Safeguards Tasting Cabinet Blocking Circuit Failure Analysis The Safeguards Test Cabinet (STC) is designed to test the integrity of the ESF Protection Safeguards System output slave relays. This is accomplished by energizing various slave relays and utilizing the test circuitry of the STC to verify that certain protection relays have been energized and their contacts are opening or closing properly.
Two basic types of testing are performed, "Go" testing, in which the protection slave relay is actuated and its operation verified by observation of the equipment, and " BLOCK" testing, in which actuation of the ESF equipment is blocked, and circuit integrity is verified by continuity testing.
Each of the Blocking schemes and their functions are explained in the STC technical manual. Description sheets explaining how the STO circuits function have been attached to this report for the reader's information. This report will only address the possible failures that have been analyzed for each of the blocking schemes.
North Anna's STC employs basically four types of blocking schemes and they will be refer to as detail A,B,C, or D (see attached drawings). The selection of what type of blocking scheme is required, depends upon two factorsy the individual contact (normally open or normally close) of the slave relay and the power supply (AC or DC) which the final actuator requires. With two types of contacts and two possible power supplies there are four possible combinations, thus the four details. The analysis will describe the failure mechanisms that could happen to the circuit. It should be noted that a failure of any blocking circuit to block actuation of the ESF equipment would either cause a significant plant transient or unit trip.
DETAIL A:
A detail "A" blocking scheme is used for slave relays that are powered from a 120 volt AC source and have a contacts which are normally open. An example of a piece of equipment that requires this type of blocking scheme is a MOV. Most MOV's require a contact to close to give the controlling circuitry the logic to stroke the valve.
The failure mechanisms are as follows:
- 1) During the test, the K600 (K*) slave relay is energized by the circuitry in the STC. The continuity path of this circuit is through the light bulb patti 2-1 down through the close contact of the slave relay through the coil of the actuated equipment to the AC return. The voltage is 1
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a level' such . that there is insufficient voltage to actuate the equipment (X1). If for any reason the K8*
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equipment that' slave ' relay controls will actuate. In addition, if for any . reason .the light socket has a y
undetectable short in it, the equipment on that contact .l
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- 2) _If a. contact resistance on the'STC K8* relay 1 increases due.to' oxidation products.or' dirt / dust build up, there exists a possibility that there will not be sufficient voltage available to energize the actuated equipment when a valid ESF signal is requiring actuation because of the voltage drop across the contacts. This as left condition after STC testing would not be.readily detectable. This' scenario.was discussed in a SER'33-88 dealing with MDR' relays m'nufactured a by Potter-Brumfield. The blocking relays installed in North Anna's STC are of this type.
As 'it has been pointed out in the, discussion so far,' a' failure of one component will cause a blocked piece of equipment to actuate R when not desired or not be available-to actuate when a valid ESF signal is present.
DETAIL B:
A detail "B" blocking scheme is used for a slave relay that is . powered . - from 125 volt DC source and has a contact which is normally ' open. The continuity path. for this blocking circuit is .
similar to the one described in detail "A". .Therefore it will not be discussed again. The failure consequences for this circuit are also similar to the ones mentioned in detail "A" except for the failure modes added due to the use of a varistor. As we can see in detail "B" there is an additional component.in parallel with the push to test lamp socket.-The component is a varistor.'A varistor is a two-electrode semiconductor device with a voltage dependent nonlinear resistance that drops as the applied voltage is increased. These devices were incorporated into the test circuit design to protect the lamps from burning up due to voltage surges.
> The failure mode of-a. varistor is a short c'ircuit.
The additional failure modes due to the varistor are the following:
- 1) If the varistor fails the 125 volt DC source will be coupled directly to ground causing the circuit protection fuses to blow. This action will render all components / equipments on '; hat circuit inoperable.
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- 2) If the varistor fails during a test of the K* relay, it could give the tester a false indication of the K* relay contact position. This could lead to an inadvertent actuation of the equipment controlled by that K* relay contact.
DETAIL C:
A detail "C" blocking scheme is used for slave relays that are powered from 120 volt AC source and have contacts which are normally ' closed.. An examp.e of a piece of equipment which deenergizes to actuate is a SOV. Many SOV's are used as controllers to containment isolation air operated valves. When power is remove from the SOV it deenergizes. This action causes air to be removed from the trip valve and the valve shuts. The detail "C" circuit has the following current path. When no ESF signal is present the current path is as follows: The path starts at the AC power supply it continues down through the closed contacts of the slave relay through a zener diode down through the actuating equipments coil to the AC return. The zener diode is there to provide a voltage drop of approximately .7 volts to a status indicating LED wired in parallel to the zener diode. During a test of the K* relay, the current is maintained to the coil of the actuated equipment (Y1) through the closed contacts of the test relay. When the test switch on the front of the STC is turned to the PUSH TO TEST position the contacts of the test K8* relay close. The current path is similar to the one mentioned above.
The failure mechanisms are the following:
- 1) The zener diode is in the circuit regardless of whether the circuit is in test mode or on-line. If at any time the zener opens up, the actuated equipment will cycle.
Cycling the zener diode during STC testing increases the probability of zener diode failure. Zener diode failure will result in either a significant plant transient or a unit trip.
- 2) Since the contacts of the test relay are normally open, the contacts are susceptible to oxidation and dirt / dust build up. Again this is the failure mechanism that was described in the SER detailing failure mechanisms of the MDR type relays.
As mentioned above the zener diodes are in both the test circuit and the normal circuit. The other failure that is possible is that the coil of K8* relay opens while testing; this will'have the same impact on plant equipment as the failures mentioned above.
3
DETAIL D:
A' detail "D" blocking scheme is used for slave relays that are powered from a 125 voit DC source and have contacts which are normally closed. The detail D circuit operates very similar to the detail C circuit..The d*fferences are that lights and diodes are used in lieu of LED's and zener diodes. Like in detail C one of the
. diodes stay in the circuit regardless of testing.
The failure modes are the following:
- 1) If for any reason the diodes would fail open the actuated equipment will actuate.
- 2) The K8* test relay's contact is also normally open. A I normally open contact is more susceptible to oxidation i and or dirt build up. If for any reason the contact resistance increases, there may not be sufficient voltage to keep the actuated equipment's coil energized during the test and the coil may drop out.
- 3) Detail "D" has an additional failure mode due the use of varistors as surge protection for the lamps. The failure mode and description of a varistor is contained in detail "B" and won't be restated. If the varistor in parallel with the white light fails the 125 volt DC source will be shorted to ground. This action will cause the (Y2) coil to deenergize. Failure of the varistor in this detail will lead to a significant plant transient or unit trip.
A basic design problem in the blocking schemes is the fact that the test circuitry is designed to be an integral part of the actual ESi' circuit flow path. With this design a single device failure results in either,
- 1) a piece of ESF equipment not automatically actuating when called upon or
- 2) actuate when the unit is on-line causing a significant plant transient or a unit trip.
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SECTION E TEST CIRCUlT OPERATION The circuits described below are the basic test circuits of the Safeguards Test Cabinet.
There are three basic types of circuits with variations within each type. The first type, shown in figure 4-1, is a circuit designed to check that a protective relay in the Pro-tection Systems Cabinet, which requires contact closure for actuation, is working pro-perly and that its associated field wiring is intact. Th'e second type (figures 4-2 or 4-3) checks a protection system relay which requires a contact opening for actuation.'-
The third type (figure 4-4) provides a check on protection system relay actuation which can be observed on.some external device. Within each type of circuit there are variations .
depending on whether the circuits are operating on an AC or DC line voltage.
Throughout the following discussions and figures, symbology is used to represent the various system equipments involved. These are as follows:
SPS - PSC - Solid State Protection System STC - Safeguards Test Cabinet ASC - Auxiliary Safeguards Cabinet AR - Auxiliary Relay Rack X,- Field Connections; i.e. , SWGR, MCC, etc.
K* - PSC Relay; i.e. , K601, K602, etc.
K8* - STC Belay; i.e. , K801, K811, etc.
S* - STC Test Switch; i.e. , S801, S811, etc.
DS* - STC Test Indicator Lamp; DS8001, DS8011, etc. ,
SD - Steam Dump Contact; SD1, SDX, etc.
PRCYTECTION RELAY WITH CONTACT CLOSURE, DC OR AC The circuit of figure 4-1 (contact closure for actuation) with de or ac line voltage applied is used to check the continuity of the closed contacts of relay K* in the Protection .
Systems Cabinet (PSC) as well as continuity within load X2 The circuit functions in the following manner: Referring to figure 4-1, part b, the white test lamp DS* on the i Safeguards Test Cabinet (STC) is normally on through the closed contacts of relay K8*
and through normally closed contacts,1 to 3 of test lamp DS* to ground. This provides a check on lamp condition and the closed contacts of relay K8*. To check the condition 4-1
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in addition to the control functions described in Section III, results in closure of contacts or relay K8* (part a) and opening the contacts of relay K8* (part b). At this point, the white test lamp DS* will extinguish, indicating that the blocking contacts of test relay K8* have opened. The switch button on the test switch is then depressed, closing )
contacts L21 to L22 of S*. This completes a circuit for the 120 VAC control voltage through the closed contacts of K8* to the operate coil of relay K*, closing the contacts j of K* shown in figure 4-1 (part b). With the circuit configured in this manner, a pot- )
ential exists through white test lamp DS*, the closed contacts of relay K*, and the load X2 to ground. Upon depressing the pushbutton lamp DS* and closing its contacts 1 to 2, the lamp will light, verifying the integrity of the circuit through the load without actually operating it. After the test, the reset switch S821 on the Cabinet is operated (figure 4-1, part a) to reset protection relay K* to its normal state. The test switch S* is then re-turned to its NORMAL Insition, resetting the test relay K8* which, in addition to fun-ctions described in Section HI, results in white test lamp DS* illuminating to indicate that the test circuit has returned to its normal condition. The varistor shown across test lamp DS* prevents current surges from burning out the lamps.
PRCrrECTION RELAY WITH CONTACT OPENING, DC The circuit of figure 4-2 (contact open for actuation) with DC line voltage applied is used to check the continuity of the c.osed contacts of relay K* in the Protection Systems Cabinet and to verify that these contacts are opened when the relay is operated to the set condition. Since this check must be accomplished without removing power from the load Y2, a method has been devised to bypass the open contacts of K* during the test. Re-ferring to figure 4-2, DC line voltage is normally applied through the closed contac'.s of protection system relay K* and the load Y2 to ground. At this time the white push-button lamp DS* is on with current through normally closed contacts 1 to 3 and the closed contacts of K*. If at this point white pushbutton lamp DS* is not illuminated, its condition may be checked by depressing the pusbutton and observing that the lamp lights through closed contacts 1 to 2. To initiate the test of the circuit, the Test switch S* on the safe-guards panel is turned to the position PUSH TO TEbT. 1 his causes the contacts on corresponding test relay K8* to close. This is verified by observing that green lamp DS* is lighted through contacts 1 to 3 of the lamp and the dosed contacts of K8*.
Since at this point it has been verified that there is a path through the closed contacts 4-2 i
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I of K8* to maintain power on the load Y2, the test may continue. The test switch S*
is now depressed, closing contacts L21 to L22 as shown in figure 4-2 part a, and pro- i i
viding the 120 VAC control voltage through test switch S* and the closed contacts of 1 K8* to the operate coil of protection relay K*. The white lamp should extinguish at this time, indicating that the contacts of K* have properly opened. At this point a ;
check may also be made on white lamp DS* by depressing the pushbutton, closing contacts 1 to 2 and observing that the lamp lights. After the test, the reset switch S821 on the cabinet panel is operated (figure 4-2, part a) to reset the protection relay K* to its normal state, causing its contacts (figure 4-2, part b) to return to the closed I condition. This is indicated by the white lamp DS* lighting. The test switch S* is I then returned to its NORMAL positM, resetting the test relay K8* which results in j the green lamp DS* extinguishing to it.dicate that the test circuit has returned to its normal condition.
PR(7I'ECTION RELAY WITH CONTACT OPENING, AC The circuit of figure 4-3 (contact open for actuation) with AC line voltage applied is used to check the continuity of the closed contacts of relay K* in the Protection Systems Cabinet (PSC), as well as continuity with load Y1, and to verify that these contacts are opened when the relay is operated to the set condition. Since this check must be accomp-lished without removing the power from load Y1, a method has been devised to bypass the open contacts of K* during the test. As shown, a current monitoring device con-sisting of a Zener diode and LED type indicator is used in place of the regular test lamp of the other test circuits. The Zener diode functions to conduct the full load current while applying a set low voltage to light the LED indicator. Referring to figure 4-2, AC line voltsge is normal'y applied through the closed contacts of protection system relay K*, the Zener diode, and the load Y1 to grouni. At this time the red LED indicator DS*
(*1) will be ON, indicating that the circuit is operating properly in the normal mode.
To initiate the test of the circuit, the test switch S* on the Safeguards panelis turned to the PUSH TO TEST position. This causes the blocking contacts of a corresponding test relay K8* 10 close. This condition is verified by observing that both LED indicators are out. If this is true, there is a circuit through the closed contacts of relay K8* to maintain power on the load Y1 and the test may continue. The test switch S* is now depressed, closing contacts L21 to L22 and providing the 120 VAC control voltage through the closed contacts of K8* to the operate coil of protection system relay K*.
This energizes relay K* and opens the contacts shown in figure 4-3, part b. At this 4-3
time the red LED indicator DS* (#2) will come ON, indicating that protection system relay K* has operated properly. After the test, the reset switch S821 on the cabinet panel is operated (figure 4-3, part a) to reset protection system relay K* to its normal state, causing its contacts (figure 4-3, part b) to return to the closed condition. This is verified by observing that both LED indicators are off. The test switch S* is then returned to its NORMAL position, resetting the teet relay K8* which results in the red LED indicator DS* (#1) coming back on to indicate that the test circuit has re-turned to its normal condition.
CIRCUITS WITH NO BLOCKING SCllEMES REQUIRED, AC OR DC The test circuit of figure 4-4 is used to check the operation of, protection system relay K* and its associated load 21 by simply observing some feature of the operation of load Z1 when the circuit is actuated. These circuits are actuated by turning the test switch S* to PUSH TO TEST position and depressing the switch, with resulting functioning as described fully in the last paragraph of Section 3. In particular, referring to figure 4-4, part a, this closes the contacts L21 to L22 of switch S* and allows the 120 VAC control voltage to be applied across the operate coil of the protection systems relay K*. This closes the contacts of K* (figure 4-4, part b) and allows bus voltage to be applied to load Z1. If load 21 is functioning properly, some indicator (such as a lamp on ,another panel) will operate, indicating that the circuit is functioning properly. After the test, the test switch S* is returned to its NORMAL position and the reset switch S821 is operated (figure 4-4, part a) to reset the protection system relay K* to its normal state, causing its contacts (figure 4-4, part b) to return to the oren condition. This is verified by the disappearance of the indication mentioned previously, i
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A'ITACIIMENT 4 Changes to Technical Specifications i
INDEX (Cont'd)
SECTION~ PAGE
. 1.0 DEFINITIONS (Continued)
- Rated Thermal Power.............................................. 1-5
- Rea ctor l Tri p System Response Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 Reportable Event................................................. 1-5 Shutdown Margin.................................................. 1-5 Site Boundary.................................................... 1-5 Slave Relay Test................................................. 1-5 S o l i d i fi ca t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 Source Check..................................................... 1-5 Staggered' Test Basis............................................. 1-6 Thermal Power.................................................... 1-6 Unidentified Leakage............................................. 1-6 Unrestricted Area................................................ 1-6 Ventila tion Ex haust Treatment System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 Venting...................... ................................... 1-6 NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 la Amendment No.
e l
1.0 : DEFINITIONS (Continued)
- QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO.
1.23 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be the ratio of the maximum upper excore detector calibrated output to the average of the upper excore detector calibrated outputc, or the ratio of the maximum lower excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower excore detector calibrated outputs, whichever is greater. With one excore detector inoperable, the remaining three detectors shall be used for computing the average.
RATED THERMAL POWER 1.24 RATED THERMAL POWER shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 2893 MWt.
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.2S The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor until loss of stationary gripper coil voltage.
REPORTABLE EVENT 1.26 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN 1.27 SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical from its present condition assuming all full length rod cluster assemblies (shutdown and control) are fully inserted except for the single rod cluster assembly of highest reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdrawn.
SITE B0UNDARY 1.28 The SITE B0UNDARY shall be that line beyond which the land is not owned, leased or otherwise controlled by the licensee.
SLAVE RELAY TEST 1.29 A SLAVE RELAY TEST shall be the energization of each slave relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The SLAVE RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check, as a minimum, of associated testable actuation devices.
SOLIDIFICATION 1.30 SOLIDIFICATION shall be the conversion of wet wastes into a solid form that meets shipping and burial ground requirements.
SOURCE CHECK 1.31 A SOURCE CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel response l when the channel sensor is exposed to radiation. This applies to installed radiation monitoring systems.
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?1.0 DEFINITIONS-(Continued) y STAGGERED TEST BASIS' 1,32 A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of:
- a. A' test schedule for n systems, subsystems, trains or other .
designated' components obtained by dividing the specified test-
- y interva_1 into n equal subintervals.
- b. The testing of one system, subsystem,. train or other designat'ed component at the beginning of.each subinterval.
- THERMAL POWER 1.33 THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the l'I reactor coolant.
. 1.34 UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be all leakage which is not IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE l or CONTROLLED LEAKAGE.
UNRESTRICTED AREA-1.35'An UNRESTRICTED AREA shall be any area at or beyond the SITE B0UNDARY -- l where access is not controlled by the licensee for purposes of protection of
- individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials or any area within the SITE BOUNDARY used' for residential quarters or for industrial, commercial, institutional, and/or recreational purposes.
VENTILATION EXHAUST. TREATMENT SYSTEM 1.36 A VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM is the system designed and l installed to reduce gaseous radioiodine or radioactive material in particulate form in effluents by passing ventilation or vent exhaust gases through charcoal absorbers and/or HEPA filters for the purpose of removing iodines or particulate from the gaseous exhaust stream prior to the release to the environment (such a system is not considered to have any effect on noble gas effluents). Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) atmospheric cleanup systems are l-not considered to be a VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM components.
VENTING l
1.37 VENTING is the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a l E confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration or l; other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is not l provided or required during VENTING. Vent, used in system nanes , does not I
imply a VENTING process.
NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 1-6 Amendment No.
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INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 and with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table
, 3.3-5.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.
ACTION:
- a. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION !
requirement of Table S.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.1.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and SLAVE RELAY TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.
4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuation logic test. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION l testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.
4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS functk n { '
shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 nonths.
Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic. trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3.
NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 3/4 3-15 !
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l TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION (1) Manual actuation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown.
l (2) Each train or logic channel shall be functionally tested at least every other 31 days up to and including input coil continuity testing to the ESF slave relays.
(3) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include exercising the transmitter by applying either a vacuum or pressure to the appropriate side of the transmitter.
(4) Only slave relays that do not satisfy any of the following criteria will be functionally tested: -
- 1. A single failure in the Safeguards Test Cabinet circuitry would cause an inadvertent RPS or ESF actuation.
- 2. The test will adversely affect two or more components in one ESF system or two cr more ESF systems.
NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 3/4 3-34 I
1 1
)
INDEX (Cont'd) l SECTION PAGE I
1.0 DEFINITIONS (Continued)
Ra te d The rma l Powe r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 Reactor Trip System Response Time................................ 1-5 Reportable Event................................................. 1-5 Shutdown Margin.................................................. 1-5 Site Boundary.................................................... 1-5 Slave Relay Test.................................................... 1-5 S o l i d i fi c a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
- Source Check..................................................... 1-5 Staggered Test Basis.............................................. 1-6 Thermal Power.................................................... 1-6
' Uni de nti fi e d L e a ka ge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 Unrestricted Area................................................ 1-6 Ventilation Exhaust Treatment System..... ....................... 1-6 Venting.... ..................................................... 1-6 NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 la Amendment No.
-1.0 DEFINITIONS (Continued)
QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO 1.23 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be the ratio of the maximum' upper excore L detector calik ated output to the average of the upper excore detector-calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the. maximum , lower excore detector calibrated rutput to the average . of the lower excore, detector calibrated outputs, w1ichever is. greater. With one excore detector -inoperable, the remaining-three detectors shall be used for computing the average. .
- RATED THERMAL POWER 1.24 RATED THERMAL' POWER shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 2893 MWt.
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.25 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval . from L when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor i until loss of stationary gripper coil voltage.
REPORTABLE EVENT l
l 1.26 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section l 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN 1.27 SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which I
the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical from its present condition I assuming all full length rod cluster assemblies (shutdown and control) are l fully inserted except for the single rod cluster assembly of highest '
~ reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdrawn.
SITE BOUNDARY 1.28 The SITE B0UNDARY shall be that line beyond which the land is not owned, leased or otherwise controlled by the licensee. !
SLAVE RELAY TEST 1 1.29 A SLAVE RELAY TEST shall be the energization of each slave relay and l verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The SLAVE RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check, as a minimum, of associated testable actuation devices.
SOLIDIFICATION l i
1.30 SOLIDIFICATION shall be ' the conversion of wet wastes into a solid form l that meets shipping and burial ground requirements. ,
SOURCE CHECK l 1.31 A SOURCE CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel response l when the channel sensor is exposed to radiation. This applies to installed radiation monitoring systems.
- ama onw e ae %%o m
1_.0 ' DEFINITIONS (Continued)
L STAGGERED TEST BASIS 1,32 A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of:
- a. A test schedule for n' systems, subsystems, trains or other designated components obtained by dividing the specified test interval into n equal subintervals.
- b. The testing of one system, subsystem, train or other designated component at the beginning of each subinterval.
THERMAL POWER 1.33 THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the ]
UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 1.34 UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be all leakage ithich is not IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE l or CONTROLLED LEAKAGE.
UNRESTRICTED AREA 1.35 An UNRESTRICTED AREA shall be any area at or beyond the SITE B0UNDARY l where access is not controlled by the licensee for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials or any area within the SITE BOUNDARY used for residential quarters or for industrial, commercial, institutional, and/or recreational purposes.
VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM 1.36 A VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM is the system designed and installed to reduce gaseous radioiodine or radioactive material in particulate form in effluents by passing ventilation or vent exhaust gases through charcoal absorbers and/or HEPA filters for the purpose of removing iodines or particulate from the gaseous exhaust stream prior to the release to the envi ronment (such a system is not considered to have any effect on noble gas effluents). Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) atmospheric cleanup systems are not considered to be a VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM components.
VENTING 1.37 VENTING is the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a l confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is not provided or required during VENTING. Vent, used in system names, does not ;
imply a VENTING process.
NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 1-6 Amendment No.
2 1
INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION '
3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be .0PERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 and with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-5.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.
ACTION:
- a. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Val;es column of Table 3.3-4, declere the channel inoperabl? and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE l status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint '
value.
- b. With an "5FAS instrumentation char.nei inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.
I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
l 4.3.2.1.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and SLAVE RELAY TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2. l 4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuation logic test. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.
4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.
Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both 13gic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the " Total Na, of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3.
NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 3/4 3-15
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TABLE NOTATION (1) k nual actuation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown.
(2) Each train or logic channel shall be functionally tested at least.every other 31 days up to and including input coil continuity testing .to the ESF slave relays.
(3) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include exercising the transmitter by applying either a vacuum or pressure to the appropriate side of the transmitter.
(4) Only slave relays that do not satisfy any of the following criteria will be functionally tested: -
- 1. A single failure in the Safeguards Test Cabinet circuitry would cause an inadvertent RPS or ESF actuation.
- 2. The test will adversely affect two or more componer.ts in one ESF system or two or more ESF systems.
l NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 3/4 3-34
ATTACHMENT S Safety Analysis for Proposed Changes to Technical Specifications i
l l
l
' EAFETY EVATHATION FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REQUEST CONCERNING ESF STAVE REIAY TESTING INTRODUCTION The proposed Technical Specification change request clarifies the testing requirements for Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) slave relays. . The proposed change adds a requirement to test the selected ESF protection system slave relays on a quarterly test frequency. .This change is consistent with the latest revision of-Standard Technical Specifications. The proposed change also
~
includes an exemption from the quarterly testing requirements for relays which satisfy the following criteria:
- 1. A single failure in the Safeguards Test cabinet circuitry would cause an inadvertent RPS or ESF actuation.
- 2. The test will adversely affect two or more components in one ESF system or two or more ESF systems.
These criteria were established following an extensive i evaluation of North Anna's capability to perform online testing of these relays. The evaluation referenced the material submitted to i
i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i
l 1 the NRC dated 5/8/89, and also includes a technical assessment and failure analysis of the installed hardware that would be used for l= testing the relays. In addition, the system effects, operational impact, 'and safety significance of testing these relays were !
evaluated. Based on ,1:e results of this evaluation ( included as Attachments 1, 2, and 3 ) it was determined that the additional assurance of equipment operability provided by testing all the l
relays online would be negated by the adverse consequences such
.that the overall margin of safety would be reduced.
]} ASIS FOR THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REOUEST 4
The Solid State Protection System (SSPS) output slave relays were designed for contact multiplication from the master relays to actuate various ESF components directly or through auxiliary relays. The system was provided with a test cabinet for testing the slave relays. The test circuitry will actuate the slave relays and either allow equipment to operate, or block its operation if it will result in an adverse impact on the unit.
Elocking equipment operation which would cause abnormal configurations or require significant plant manipulations was not a consideration in the design and ' selection of the blocking circuitry in the test cabinet. Block tests do verify continuity through the contacts of the slave relay. The SSPS also has the capability to perform slave relay coil continuity tests without actuating the relay. The SSPS was not designed to test any of the auxiliary relays downstream of the slave relays. Since construction there have been modifications which added equipment
that would be actuated by. the auxiliary relays and would cause undesirable results. Therefore, an adequate design for testing 1
all of the slave relays online does not exist.
i A high level of confidence that the relay will perform its safety function will be maintained by the system design and testing. The' slave relays are designed to be normally de-energized thereby reducing their susceptibility to failure modes j 1
common to energized components. Testing will include a coil j l
continuity test at least once every 62 days, and a total ESF {
functional test every refueling cycle to verify proper relay and contact operation. The testing will be extensive and will include verification of all slave and auxiliary contacts. In addition, the slave relays that will be tested online will provide statistics for determining slave relay failure rates and reliability. Presently the overall failure rate for slave and auxiliary relays at North Anna is 1.3%. This includes relay actuation and contact failures as well as the relays which failed to reset. The relay actuation failure rate alone is 0.58%, and the failure rate for the contacts themselves is even lower. It should be noted that none of the SSPS slave relays have failed to latch (perform their safety function) . Also, the failure rate was conservatively calculated by dividing the number of all relay failures by the number of ESF slave relay actuations instead of the number of all relay actuations. Considering these failure rates, coupled with the fact that there are two safety trains, the l probability of a slave relay failing to actuate is extremely low and the probability for its redundant relay failing concurrently is even lower.
l If any ESF equipment fails to actuate due to a malfunction or failure of a slave relay or its contacts, adequate testing, design, and administrative controls exist to ensure that the equipment can operate when required. The majority. of all ESF equipment (pumps, valves, etc.) are tested at' least quarterly by Tech. Specs. and .the In Service Inspection Program. Those components that can't be tested at power are tested during shut-down. These tests verify equipment operability as well as the operability of the manual actuation circuitry. The manual actuation circuitry was designed such that a failure of the slave or auxiliary relay contacts will not prevent the equipment from being manually actuated. Therefore, if a relay or contact fails, manual' operation is still available. The Emergency Operating Procedure immediate actions ensure that all equipment actuates by requiring a manual actuation for equipment which may not automatically Sperate. Major equipment is verified immediately while verification of all equipment takes approximately 5 minutes to perform. Therefore, the reliability of ESF equipment to i perform its safety function is extremely high, and any additional assurance provided by testing all of the relays online does not -
outweigh the possible consequences incurred as a result of testing.
The design of the test circuitry is not consistent with the design of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) or the ESF circuitry. The RPS and ESF circuits were designed such that a single failure would not prevent a safety function actuation, and I concurrently, a single failure would not cause a safety function
actuation. Contrary to this design standard, the ESF test circuitry can have a single failure which would prevent or cauce a safety function actuation. Attachment 3 provides a detailed analysis of test circuit failure' modes. The test circuitry itself; therefore, induces a certain degree of unreliability which may lead to equipment inoperability or to a plant transient.
As described in Unit 2 LER 88-03, the spurious actuation of a Containment Depressurization Actuation System relay occurred as a result of a short in the SSPS test circuitry. The short occurred during maintenance on a valve limit switch which interlocks with the SSPS test circuitry. There are a total of eight valves with interlocking circuits which also decreases the overall. system reliability. In addition, there have been'a number of industry i
events which occurred as a result of online'ESF relay testing.
Testing some slave relays online will require significant plant manipulations, abnormal configurations and removing from service various equipment for the duration of the relay test. By ,
imposing off normal plant manipulations and configurations, there exists some increased probability of human error or component malfunction which may lead to more significant events. In addition, the time to comfelete this type of testing is expected to take several eight hour sr.i f ts , if not more. For example, the K643 relay will take over eight hours to perform. If an actual demand was requicxd during this time,some equipment will not be available to perform its intended safety function. The safety i implications of this are significant when considering a single failure on the opposite train could result in a total loss of an j
ESF. safety function. 'This could also lead to a.more significant event 'and could cause the plants design . basis and accident
. analysis to. be exceedeed. A detailed analysis of the operational ' impact and safety significance for 'each relay is provided in Attachment 2.
In conclusion, the additional risk in testing all the slave relays online is not justified by the failure analysis, operational impact, and safety significance when there presently exists adequate design features, sufficient, safe, and proven testing methods, and administrative controls to assure proper equipment operation.
EVATllATION UNDER 10CFRSO.59: POTENTIAL UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report has not increased. Since the design and safety function of the ESF system and associated equipment have not changed, and the integrity of the relays and contacts will be maintained at a high level of reliability, then the probability of an accident or malfunction did not increase. The very low failure rate of the relays coupled with the proposed testing requirements will increase component l
availability and will not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction. In addition, by not testing all of the slave relays online and placing the plant and equipment in off normal configurations, the consequences of an accident or the probability !
of a malfunction would be reduced.
l
)
- The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different ,
4 type than any evaluated in the safety analysis report has not been-L created. The ~ design and' safety function of a component or ,
system has not been changed. By not testing some of the relays overall system availability is increased and the probability of '
challenging single failure accident analysis is reduced. Thus, system design basis an'd accident analysis described in the safety ;
1 analysis report remain unaffected, 'and the possibility of a -
different accident or malfunction has not been created.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is not reduced. The surveillance requirements specified in the Technical Specification change request ensure that the ESF protection system maintains an overall system functional capability comparable to the original design standards.
As ' indicated by the slave and auxiliary relay failure rates, the reliability. of the slave and auxiliary relays are comparable to the original standards. By testing some of the relays, but not all, additional assurance of equipment operability and relay reliability is obtained without subjecting the unit to adverse conditions such that the overall margin of safety is increased.
EyAIUATION UNDER 10RFR50.92 FOR SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration as described in 10CFR50.92. As discussed above, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or i
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create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; nor does it involve a l
significant reduction in the margin of safety. For those_ relays that meet the exemption criteria testing will be on ' an 18 month test frequency by the performing ESF functional tests. . For the other relays a quarterly test frequency will be. implemented and performed using the installed testing cabinet. We conclude that by not testing all of the relays adverse unit conditions will be avoided such that an increase in the margin of safety will be achieved by implementing the proposed change.
Written By:
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~ uM, Date: 7//d/87 t i Shift Technical Advisor Approved By: Date: 0 J
SNSOC Chairman 4
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ATTACHMENT 6 Basis for Discretionary Enforcement i.
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Attachment 6 BASIS FOR DISCRETIOl e ' ENFORCEMENT Technical Specification 3/4.3.2.1 currently requires that on-line testing of ESF slave relays be conducted on a monthly basis. Virginia Electric and Power Company requests that NRC exercise discretion from enforcing the requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.3.2.1 for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 to the extent that:
the test frequency requirement for conducting on-line testing of certain ESF relays be revised from monthly to quarterly the scope of the requirement be revised to only include those '
ESF slave relays that meet the criteria delineated in Attachment 1 and Attachment 4 (Proposed Technical Specification Change).
. the discretionary enforcement remain in effect until a license amendment addressing this request is issued by the NRC.
Each issue is further addressed below.
The current interval in the Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG 0452, Revision 4) for conducting ESF slave relay testing is quarterly.
The proposed license amendment incorporates this guidance as the test frequency for those relays deemed testable on-line. In the interim, adoption of this frequency would result in implementation of an acceptable test frequency rather than implementing the overly l conservative frequency necessitated by the current specification. l The concern that a monthly frequency is overly conservative is l' found in a recent Westinghouse study: " Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System," (WCAP-10271-P-A, Supplement 2,
, Revision 1), which supports quarterly testing of slave relays. The study includes an NRC Safety Evaluation Report which endorses the !
quarterly test frequency for slave relay testing. In fact, the study ;
makes reasonable arguments that support extending the surveillance interval to as long as 18 months with acceptable increase in core ,
melt frequency or system unavailability.
The reduction in the scope of slave relay testing is consistent with the NRC Policy issued October 26,1988 (Secy 88-304) regarding
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" Staff 'Actionsi to Reduce Testing at Power" wherein the stated i ultimate objective is: to eliminate testing at power ' for ' equipment:
where acceptable reliability can be achieved without such testing.
-As' discussed in Attachment 5 of this. request, supplementing 'the on-
' line testing by the - other overlapping test requirements ' delineated in
- the UFSAR and Safety Guide. 22, provides . reasonable assurance. that ,
p the, relays will function as required. Finally, the low failure rate for .j slave relays as described in our May '8,1989 letter (Serial No.89-276) and Attachment 5 (Safety Analysis), provides additional assurance that ' the test requirements are sufficient to assure relay.
reliability'.
The interval .in which discretionary enforcement should be. applied '
was chosen to permit a consistent methodology for the ESF slave
- relay testing during the period in which NRC is reviewing the proposed license amendment request. - This will serve to reduce the-administrative and- enforcement burdens- on both NRC and the licensee until-the technical issues are resolved.
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. RELAY: K-609 I ACTUATION SIGNAL: Safety Injection 1 i
TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months f
EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Start 1-SW-P-1A Service Water Pump
- 2. Start 2-CH-P-1A High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) Pump DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K609 relay actuates on a safety injection signal to start a HHSI pump to provide injection flow to the reactor coolant system (RCS). Actuation of this relay ensures high head injection . is available and in' service during any loss of coolant or cooldown accidents which reduce the RCS water inventory. The start of the service water pump on a safety injection signal is anticipatory and is based on the assumption that a large break LOCA is in progress.
The pump starts to provide additional cooling water flow to ensure adequate heat sink is available if a containment actuation signal occurs and the recirculation spray system becomes operational.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
In order to test the Service Water pump, significant system manipulations may be required depending upon the present line-up.
For example, if it is the running pump it must be shutdown to allow it to start or rack its breaker to test.- This would require aligning the redundant pump to the appropriate header and starting y 1
it. If it is desired to rack the pump breaker to the test position, and another pump is out of service for maintenance, then only two pumps would be operable and this would require entry into the Tech. Spec. action statement.
.The charging pump logic will not allow testing this pump with the breaker racked to the test position. Therefore, the pump must be allowed to start, which is unnecessary, and may require swapping pumps. Depending on pump availability this evolution may be significant or incapable of being performed.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
When testing this relay the Service Water and HHSI systems must be realigned or manipulated and there is some increased probability that a human error or equipment failure could result in component damage or system inoperability. If the service water pump breaker is racked to test for testing purposes then a major piece of ESF equipment is rendered inoperable and would not be immediately available if required.
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RELAY: K-610 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Safety Injection TEST FRFCUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Open SOV-HV-1300A, 2300A. Supplies air to the trip valves which open and discharge Control Room bottled air.
- 2. Close AOD-HV-160-1 Normal Control Room Ventilation Supply
- 3. Close all High Radiation Sampling System Isolation Trip Valves.
DESIGN FUNCTION:
Relay K610 actuates on a safety injection signal that may be caused by a mainsteam line break and it isolates the control room from the outside atmosphere. The function of this relay is to ensure the control room remains habitable during a mainsteam line break in the turbine building assuming a 10 gpm primary to secondary leak with one percent failed fuel.
It discharges the high pressure control room air bottles to pressurize the control room in order to prevent in leakage and to provide breathable quality air.
Relay K610 also closes the high radiation sample system isolation trip valves to prevent the loss of reactor coolant and provide containment isolation.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
Testing this relay would result in discharging all the bottled air banks for both units. This would require both units to enter a Tech. Spec. Action Statement for approximately 8-12 hours in order to re-pressurize at least two air banks.
Therefore, to reduce the time frame that the Action Statement I
would be entered, this test would require isolating the discharge headers and locally verifying equipment actuation.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
During the duration of this test both trains of bottled air for both units would be rendered inoperable. With the discharge headers isolated the air bottles could be made available if required, but after some time delay. This time delay could result in overexposing the control room operators during certain accident scenarios and would violate the requirements of GDC 19.
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l RELAY: K-611 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Safety Injection TEST FREOUENCI: 18 Months EOUIPHENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Start Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-2 by opening TV-MS-111A, Steam Supply to Terry-Turbine
- 2. Start 1-FW-P-3A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
- 3. Start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-EE-EG-1H: Circuit 2 RESIGN FUNCTION:
Actuation of the K-611 relay by a safety injection signal ensures a heat sink for the RCS is available via the aux-iliary feedwater system since the main feedwater system would be isolated by the same signal. The auxiliary feed-water system ensures there is adequate feedwater flow available to remove residual and decay heat. This relay also ensures that the emergency diesel generator is started in response to what could be a design basis accident (a LOCA with a loss of offsite power).
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
Starting the auxiliary feed pumps is unnecessary and would require lining them up on recirculation or allowing them to flow to the steam generators. It is not desirable to run the pumps on recirculation except as absolutely necessary since the recirculation path has been determined to be minimally sized and leads to some amount of pump degradation. Flowing the steam generators with water from the emergency condensate tank, which sits stagnet for long periods of time, upsets steam generator chemistry. During very low power operation flowing the generators will result in a reactivity purtibation.
To prevent the above adverse affects, TV-MS-211A would have to be isolated, and the breaker for FW-P-3A racked to test.
This would render 2 of 3 Auxiliary Feedwater pumps inoper-able for the duration of the test and require entry into a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Action Statement.
Without any a operator actions, testing this relay will result in a fast start of the EDG. It has been determined that frequently fast rnarting the EDG is unnecessary and l leads to diesel degradt2on. Therefore, to test this relay l would require running chis test concurrently with the monthly slow start EDG test. Another method would be ,
placing the diesel in manual local, which prevents any l l
automatic starts, and would require declaring the diesel inoperable for the test duration. This is the preferred method since the coordination required for a slow start is restrictive.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
Testing this relay more frequently than 18 months would require-rendering the EDG and 2 of 3 auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable everytime it's tested. Since the overall availability of the system is reduced, there is some in-creased possibility that a accident could occur with both diesels inoperable (assuming the redundant EDG fails).
Although the EDG under test can be started manually there will be an increased time delay which may cause certain plant design conditions to be exceeded. In addition, failure of the redundant EDG would result in a total loss of the i auxiliary feedwater system. This is very significant since auxiliary feedwater is the primary means of removing residual and decay heat. It would also place the unit in a condition !
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I conditions and accident scenarios this test could result in core damage.
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i RELAY: K-613 ACTUATION SIGNAL: Containment Isolation Phase A TEST FREOUENCX1 '18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Close TV-1204A Letdown / Containment Isolation
- 2. Partial logic to close FCV-AS-100A Auxiliary Steam Supply to Condenser Air Ejector
- 3. Close TV-SS-106A
- 4. Close TV-MS-109A
- 5. Close TV-1519A
- 6. Close TV-VG-100A DESIGN FUNCTION:
The K613 relay is. actuated on a Containment Isolation Phase A signal which is generated by a safety injection signal. The Phase "A" signal is generated to isolate the containment atmosphere from the outside atmosphere in accident scenarios which result in an increased containment pressure. This isolation is accomplished by i.solating system piping which penetrates containment and is not required for accident mitigation. Letdown isolation also reduces RCS inventory loss and mitigates any release in the event of fuel failure.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING When this relay is tested, letdown would isolate disrupting the -charging and letdown flow balance. Isolating letdown without closing the orifice isolation valves will subject the low pressure piping to RCS pressure and result in lifting the relief valve. To restore letdown it would again require control manipulations. This is not considered normal evolution. Therefore, to test this relay would require pithg excess letdown in service and isolating normal charging. This also requires significant control manipulations. The excess letdown system is not designed for routine operation and is designed for a limited number of thermal cycles.
If the logic to close the air ejector Aux _ Steam supply valve (FCV-AS-100A) is made up it would result in a loss of condenser vacuum and eventually a turbine trip. Therefore, the air ejector may have to be isolated to test this relay.
y SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
With normal charging isolated the maximum seal injection rate is . approximately- 15 gpm which can .- be balanced by using excess letdown. Since normal charging is isolated.during this test, . the ability to provide additional amounts of-borated--water to the RCS is reduced. This may limit the ability of 'the operator to maintain sufficient iiw:ntory in the RCS during condition I and II events without relying on other'ESF equipment.
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RELAYi K-616
' ACTUATION SIGNAL: ' Steam Line Isolation
. TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EQUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Close:all Main Steam Trip Valves (BLOCKED)
A. Close TV-MS-101A-1 B. Close TV-MS-101B-1 C. Close TV-MS-101C-1 DESIGN FUNCTION:
Relay-K616 is actuated by a steam line isolation signal in response to a steam line break downstream of the main steam non-return va.ves. Actuation of this relay closes all of the main steam trip valves.and prevents an uncontrolled blowdown of all steam generators.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
Since this is a block test there is no operational. impact unless the test circuit fails.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
If the test circuit fails.and allows all of the trip valves to close simultaneously a reactor trip would occur on either a high RCS pressure or a low-low steam generator level. Based on actual events, if one one main steam trip valve closes a Hi steam line flow SI i
signal will be generated. The steam generat safeties would open momentarily and then the Steam Ge rator Atmospheric dump valves would open. This ue to the condenser steam dumps not being available. This is undesirable since one safety may stick open and cause a cooldown event. In addition, a RCS pressurizer PORV may be challenged.
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RELAY: K-618
, ACTUATION SIGNAL: Containment Isolation Phase B l~ TEST FREOUENCY: 18 Months EOUIPMENT ACTUATED:
- 1. Close TV-BD-100A Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve 1
- 2. Close TV-CC-104 A, B,C Component Cooling (CC) to all Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) (BLOCK)
DESIGN FUNCTION:
Relay K618 actuates on a Containment Isolation Phase B signal as a result of a containment high-high pressure signal. The Phase B Isolation Signal ensures that all penetrations not already closed by a Phase A Isolation Signal are now closed in response to a large break LOCA.
The Phase B Signal ensures the containment atmosphere is isolated from the outside atmosphere.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF TESTING:
Isolating steam generator blowdown will affect steam generator chemistry and will require manually isolating the blowdown line prior to testing to ensure a water hammer is avoided when the valve is.re-opened. Failure of the valve to reopen would lead to steam generator chemistry concerns.
Provided the test circuit for the component cooling trip valves does not fail, there is no operational impact of testing these components.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF TESTING:
If the steam generator blowdown valve fails to re-open and steam generator chemistry degrades significantly then the life of the generator maybe reduced. This may require more tubes to be replaced the next outage and is an ALARA concern.
A test circuit failure for the CC trip valves will result in a loss of cooling to the RCP lube oil, thermal barrier and stator coolers. This would result in increasing bearing temperatures which may approach the RCP trip setpoint. If this occurs the reactor and the RCP's would be tripped. This would ,
place the plant in a natural circulation condition which is I undesirable.
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