ML20245D862
| ML20245D862 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1988 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245D861 | List: |
| References | |
| 4515K, NUDOCS 8810070246 | |
| Download: ML20245D862 (17) | |
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i ATIACIBEMI._1 PROPOSED CHANCES TO APPENDIX A' IECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR
.i QUAD CITIES STATION UNITS 1 AND 2-ZACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-29 ANQ_DPR-30 Revised Pages:
3.1/4.1-3 (DPR 29 & 30) 3.1/4.1-8 (DPR 29 & 30) 3.1/4.1-9. (DPR 29 & 30) 3.1/4.1-10 (DPR 29 & 30) 3.2/4.2-6 (DPR 29 & 30) 3.2/4.2-11-(DPR 29 & 30) 4515K#""
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00AO-CITIES OPR-29 toss of condensate vacuum occurs when the condenser can no longer handla heat input. toss of condenser vacuum initiates a closure of the turbine stop valves and turbine bypass valves, which eliminates the heat input to the condenser. Closure of the turbine stop and bypass valves causes a pressure transient, neutron flux rise, and an increase in surface heat flux. To prevent the cladding safety limit from being exceeded if this occurs, a reactor scram occurs on turbine stop valve closure. The turbine stop valve closure scram function alone is adequate to prevent the cladding safety limit from being exceeded in the l
event of a turbine trip transient with bypass closure.
The condenser low-vacuum scram is a backup to the stop valve closure scram and causes a scram before the.
stop valves are closed, thus the resulting transient is less severe. Scram occurs at 21 inches Hg vacuum, stop valve closure occurs at 20 inches Hg vacuur,. and bypass closure at 7 inches Hg vacuum, High radiation levels in the main steamline tunnel above that due to the normal nitrogen and oxygen l
radioactivity are an indication of leaking fuel. A scram is initiated whenever such radiation level exceeds fifteen times normal background (without hydrogen addition). The purpose of this scram is to l
reduce the source of such radiation to the extent necessary to prevent excessive turbine contamination.
Discharge of excessive amounts of radioactivity to the site environs is prevented by the air ejector off-gas monitors.- which cause an isolation of the main condenser off-gas line provided the limit specified f
in Specification 3.8 is exceeded.
The main steamline isolation valve closure scram is set to scram when the isolation valves are 10% closed from full open. This scram antletpates the pressure and flux transient which would occur when the valves close. By scramutng at this setting, the resultant transient is insignificant.
A reactor mode switch is provided which actuates or bypasses the various scram functions appropriate to the particular plant operating status (reference SAR Section 7.7.1.2).
64)enever the reactor mode switch is in the Refuel or $tartup/ Hot Standby position, the turbine condenser low-vacuum scram and main steamline isolation valve closure scram are bypassed. This bypass has been provided for flexibility during startup and to allow repairs to be made to the turbine candenser. While this bypass is in effect, protection is provided against pressure or flux increases by the high-pressure scram and APRM 15% scram, respectively, which are effective in this mode.
i i
If the reactor were brought to a hot standby condition for repairs to the turbine condenser the main steam 1tue isolation valves would be closed. No hypothesized fingle failure or single operator action in this mode of operation can result in an unreviewed radiological release.
The manual scram function is active in all modes, thus providing for a manual means of rapidly inserting control rods during all modes of reactor operation.
The IRM system provides protection against excessive power levels and short reactor periods in the startup and intermediate power ranges (reference SAR Section 7.4.4.2 and 7.4.4.3).
A source range monitor (SRM) system is also provided to supply additional neutron level information during startup but has no scram functions (reference SAR Section 7.4.3.2).
Thus the IRM is required in the Refuel and Startup/ Hot Standby modes. In addition, protection is provided in this range by the APRM 151 scram as discussed in the bases ll for Specification 2.1.
In the power range the APRM system provides required protection (reference SAR Section 7.4.5.2).
Thus, the IRM system is not required in the Run mode, the APRM's cover only the intermediate and power range, the IRM's provide adequate coverage in the stattup and intermediate range.
The high-reactor pressure, high-drywell pressure, reactor low water level, and scram discharge volume high level scrams are required for the Startup/ Hot Standby and Run modes of plant operation. They are therefore required to be operational for these mooes of reactor operation.
The turbine condenser low-vacuum scram is required only dur4D power operation and must be bypassed to start up the unit.
1303H/
3.1/4.1-3
QUAD-CITIES OPR-29 TABLE 3.1-1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS R Minimum Number of Operable or
' Tripped Instrument Channels.per h ip level Setting Action (2)
Trio Syste dI).
Trip Function-A I
k.. a switch in shutdown A
1 Manual scram IRM 3
High Flux
< 120/125 of full scale A
3 Inoperative APRM(3)
~A 2-High Flux (157. scram)
Sp, edification 2.1.A.2 A
2 Inoperative 40 gallons per bank.
-A 2-(per bank)
High water level in scram
(
~
discharge volume (4) 2 High reactor pressure
_1 1060 psig A
2 High drywell pressure (5) 1 2.5 psig A
2 Reactor low water level 2, 8 inches (8)
A 2
Turbine condenser low
> 21 inches Hg vacuum A
~
vacuum (7) 2 Main steamline high
< 7 X' normal full pener Al radiation (12) 6ackground 4
Main steamline isolation
< 107. valve closure A
~
valve closure (7) l Amendment No. f 5, 90' l
3.1/4.1-8 Y
4 QUAD-CITIES DPR-29 i
. TABLE 3.1-2 REACTOR. PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS STARTUP/ HOT STANDBY MODE Minimum Number of Operable or-Tripped Instrument Channels per Trip System (I)
- Trip Fur.ction Trip Level Setting Action (2) 1 Mode switr.h in shutdown A'
1 Manual scram A.
1..
'3 High Flux i 120/125 of full scale A
3 Inoperative A
APRM(3) 2 High Flux (157, scram)
Specification 2.1. A.2 A'
2
. Inoperative A.
2 High-reactor pressure i 1060 psig A
2 High drywell pressure (5) 1 2.5 psig A
2' Reactor low water level 1 8 inches (B).
A 2 (per bank)
High water level in scram 1 40 gallons per bank A
discharge volume (4)
-> 21 inches Hg vacuum A
2 Turbine condenser low vacuum U) 2 Main steamline high
< 7 X normal full power
.A j
radiation (12) background 4
Main steamline isolation
~< 107. valve closure A
valve closure (7)
I I
Amendment No. N ' N '
3.1/4.1-9 Y
1 1
QUAD-CITIES OPR-29 TABLE 3.1-3 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS RUN MODE Minieman Number of Operable or Tripped Instrument Channels per Tr_in s'estamO1
.Trin Function Trin Level settina Action (II A
1 Mode switch in shutdown A
1 Manual scram APRM(3) 2 High Flux (flow biased)
Specification 2.1.A.1 A or 5 A or 8 l
2 Inoperative Downscale (II) 1 3/125 of full scale A or 8 2
2 High-reactor pressure i 1060 psig A
2 High drywell pressere 1 2 psig A
2 Reactor low water level 1 8 inchesIE)
A 2 (per bank)
High-water level in scram discharge volume 1 ~40 gallons per bank A
2 Turbine condenser low 1 21 inches Hg vaccan A or C vacuum 2
Main Steam 11ne high i 15 X normal full A or C radiation (12) power background (without hydrogen addition) 4 Main steamline isolation i 10% valve closure A or C valve closur, (6) 2 Turbine control valve fast 1 40% turbine / generator A or C closure (9) load mismatch (10) 2 Turbine stop valve i 10% valve closure A or C closure (9) 2 Turbine EHC control fluid 1 900 psig A or C low pressure (9) 3.1/4.1-10 Amendment No.
1303H f.
l
DPR-29 genturi tubes are providId in the main steamlines as a means of measuring steam flow and also 11:1 ting the loss f.f mass inventgry from the vessel ehering a steamline break accident. In addition to monitoring steam flow, instrumentation is provided which causes a trip of Group 1 isolation v alves. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steamline, thus only Group 1 valves are closed. For the worst-case accident, main steamline break outside the drywell. this trip setting of 140% of rated steam flow, in conjunction with the flow limiters and main steamline valve closure, limits the mass inventory los such that fuel is notuncovered,fueltemperaturesremain.lessthan1500gF.andreleaseof radioactivity to the environs is well below 10 CFR 100 guidelines (reference SAR Sections 14.2.3.9 and 14.2.3.10).
Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steamline tunnel to detect leaks in this area. Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded cause closure of Group 1 isolation valves. Its setting of 2000 F is low enough to detect leaks of the order of 5 to 10 gps; thus it is capable of covering the entire spectrum of Inreaks. For large breaks, it is a backup to high-steam flow instrumentation i
discussed above, and for small breaks with the resulting small release of i
radioactivity, gives isolation before the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 are exceeded.
Migh radiation monitors in the main steamline tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure. This instrumentation causes c16sure of Group 1 valves, the only valves required to close for this accident. With the established setting of 15 times normal background (without hydrogen addition) and main steamline isolation valve closure, fission product.
release is limited so that 10 CFR 100 guidelines are not exceeded for this accident (reference SAR Section 14.2.1.7).
l Pressure instrumentation is provided which trips when main steamitne pressure drops below 825 psig. A trip of this instrumentation results in closure of Group 1 isolation valves. In the Refuel and Startup/ Hot Standby modes this trip function is bypassed. This function is provided primarily to provide protection against a pressure rei;ulator malfunction which would cause the contro1'and/or bypass valve to open. With the trip set at 825 psig, inventory loss is limited so that fuel is not uncovered and peak 0 F: thus, there are no cladding tanq>eratures are much less than 1500 fission products available for release other than those in the reactor water (reference SAR Section 11.2.3).
The RC1C and the HPC1 high flow and temperature instrumentation are provided to detect a break in thcir respective piping. Tripping of this instrumentation results iti actuation of the RC1C or of HPCl isolation valves. Tripping logic for this function is the same as that for the main steamline isolation valves, titus all sensors are required to be operable or in a tripped condition to meet single-failure criteria. The trip settings of 200*F and 300% of design flow and valve closure time are such that core uncovery is prevented and fission product release is within limits.
The instrumentation which initiates ECCS action is arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic circuit. Unlike the reactor scram circuits, however, there is one trip system associated with each function rather than the two trip systems in the reactor protection system. The single-failure criteria are met by virtue of the fact that redundant core cooling functions are provided, e.g., sprays and automatic blowdown and high-pressure coolant injection. The specification requires that if a trip system becomes inoperable, the system which it activates is declared inoperable. For example, if the trip system for core spray A becomes inoperable, core spray A is declared inoperable and the out-of-service specifications of Specification 3.5 govern. This specification preserves the effectiveness cf the system with respect to the single-failure criteria even during periods when maintenance or testing is being performed.
The control rod block functions are provided to prevent excessive control rod withdrawal so that MCPR does not go below the MCPR Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit. The trip logic for this function is one out of n; e.g., any trip on one of the six APRM's, eight 1RM's, four SRM's will result in a rod block. The minimum instrument channel requirements assure sufficient instrumentation to assure that the single-failure criteria are met. The minimum instrument channel requirements for the RBM may be reduced by one for a short period of time to allow for maintenance. testing, or calibration. This time period is only - 3% of the operating time in a month and does not significantly increase the risk of preventing an inadvertent control rod withdrawal.
1303st 3.2/4.2-6 Amendnent No.
OUAD-CITIES DPR,
TABLE 3.2-1 INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 150LAT!bei FUNCTIONS Minisaan Number of Operable or Tripped
'Instrumsp{,
Trin Level Settina Action d Channalg w Instruments Reactor low water [5]
>144 inches above top of A
4 active fuel
- 4 Reactor low low water 184 inches above top of A
active fuel' High drywell pressure [5]
12.5 psig I33 A
4 High flow main steamline(5) 1140% of rated steam flow 3 16 16 High temperature main 1200* F 5
steamline tunnel 4
High radiation 115 x normal rated power 8
steamline tunnel background (without hydrogen addition)
Low main steam pressureE43 1825 psig 5
4 C
1300))ofratedsteam 2
High flow RCIC steamline flowI 16-RCIC turbine area high 1200* F C
temperature 0
2 High flow HPCI steamline gfratedsteam 16 -
HPCI area high temperature 1200* F D
Malas be:enever primary containment integrity is required, there shall be two operable or 1.
tripped systems for each function. except for low pressure main steamline which only need be available in the Run position.
Action, if the first column cannot be met for one of the trip systems, that trip.
2.
system shall be tripped.
If the first colisen cannot be met for both trip systems, the appropriate actions listed below shall be taken.
Initiate an orderly shutdown and have the reactor in Cold Shutdown condition in A.
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Initiate an orderly load reduction and have reactor in Hot Standby within 8 B.
hours.
C.
Close isolation valves in RCIC system.
D.
Close isolation valves in HPCI subsystem.
Reed not be operable when primary containment integrity is not required.
3.
The isolation trip signal is bypassed when the mode switch is in Refuel or Startup/
4.
Hot Shutdown.
5.
The instrumentation also isolates the control room ventilation system.
This signal also automatically closes the mechanical vaca m pump discharge line iso-6.
1ation valves.
7.
Includes a time delay of 31 t i 9 seconds.
' Top of active fuel is defined as 360* above vessel zero for all water levels used in the 1.0CA analysis (see Bases 3.2).
Amenenent No.
3.2/4.2-11 1303M
OUAD-CITIES DPR-30 Loss of condenser Loss of condensate vacuum occurs when the condenser can no longer handle heat input.
vacuum initiates a closure of the turbine stop valves and turbine bypass valves, which eliminates the heat Closure of the turbine stop and bypass valves causes a pressure transient, input to the condenser.
neutron flux rise, and an increase in surf ace heat flux. To prevent the cladding safety limit from being exceeded if this occurs, a reactor scram occurs on turbine stop valve closure. The turbine stop valve closure scram function alone is adequate to prevent the c14doing safety limit from being exceeded in the event of a turbine trip transient with bypass closure.
The condenser low-vacuum scram is a backup to the stop valve ciosure scram and causes a scram before the Scram occurs at 21 inches Hg vacuum, stop valves are closed, thus the resulting transient is less severe.
stop valve closure occurs at 20 inches Hg vacuum, and bypass closure at 7 inches Hg vacuum.
High radiation levels in the main steamline tunnel above that due to the normal nitrogen and oxygen radioactivity are an indication of leaking fuel. A scram is initiated whenever such radiation level exceeds fifteen times normal background (without hydrogen addition). The purpose of this scram is to l
reduce the source of such radiation to the extent necessary to prevent excessive turbine contamination.
Discharge of excessive amounts of radioactivity to the site environs is prevented by the air ejector of f-gas monitors, which cause an isolation of the main condenser off-gas line grovided the limit specified in specification 3.8 is exceeded.
The main steamline isolation valve closure scram is set to scram when the isolation valves are 10% c This scram anticipates the p essure and flux transtant which would occur when the valves from full open.
By scranning at this setting, the resultant transient is insignificant.
close.
M reactor mode switch is provided which actuates or bypasses the various scram functions appropriate to balenever the reactor mode switch the particular plant operating status (reference SAR Section 7.7.1.2).
is in the Refuel or Startup/ Hot Standby position, the turbine condenser low-vacuum scram and main steamline isolation valve closure scram are bypassed. This bypass has been provided for flexibility While this bypass is in effect, during startup and to allow repairs to be made to the turbine condenser.
protection is provided against pressure or flux increases by the high-pressure scram and APRM IST, scram, respectively, which are effective in this mode.
If the reactor were brought to a hot standby condition for repairs to the turbine condenser, the main steamline isolation valves would be closed. No hypothesized single fallcre or single operator action in this mode of operation can result in an unreviewed radiological release.
The manual scram function is active in all modes, thus providing for a manual means of rapidly inserting control rods during all modes of reactor operation.
The IRM system provides protection against excessive power levels and short reactor periods in the startup A source range monitor (SRM) and intermediate power ranges (refernnce SAR Section 7.4.4.2 and 7.4.4.3).
system is also provided to supply additional neutron level information during startup but has no scram Thus the IRM is required in the Refuel and Startup/ Hot Standby functions (reference SAR Section 7.4.3.2).
In addition, protection is provided in this range by the APRM 15% scram as discussed in the bases modes.
In the power range the APRM system provides required protection (reference SAR for specification 2.1.
Thus, the IRM system is not required in the Run mode, the APRM's cover only the Section 7.4.5.2).
intermediate and power range, the IRM's provide adequate coverage in the startup and intermediate range.
The high-reactor pressure, high-drywell pressure, reactor low water level, and scram discharge volume They are level scrams are required for the Startup/ Hot Standby and Run modes of plant operation.
therefore required to be operational for these modes of reactor ope. ration.
The turbine condenser low-vacuum scram is required only during power operation and must be bypassed to start up the unit.
1303H/
3.1/4.1-3
OUAD-C! Tits OPR-30 TABLE 3.1-1 REACTOR PROTECTION $Y$ FEM ($ CRAM) INSTRUMENTAL!DN REQUIREMENT $ REFUEL Moot Minimum Number cf Operable or.-
Tripped Instrument channels per tein tvstem(1)
Trie runction Trin Level fattina Action (2) 1 Mode $ witch in shutdown A
1 Manual scram A
1RM 3
High flux 1 120/125 of full scale A
3 Inoperative APRM(II 2
Hign flux.1151 scram)
Specification 2.1.A.2 A
A 2
Inoperative 2 (per bank)
High water level in scram 1 40 gallons per bank A
discharge volume (8) 2 High-reactor pressure i 1060 psig A
2 High-drywell pressureIII i 2.5 psig A
2 Reactor low water level i B inches (8)
A 2
Turb1ne condenser low 1 21 inches Hg vacuum A
vacuumI7) 2 Main steamline high 1 7 Y normal full power A
radiation (121 background 4
Main steamline isolation i 101 Valve closure A
valve closure (7) l l
3.1/4.1-B Amenceent so, N e Ne
OUaD-CITIES DPR 30 TABLE 3.1-2 RE ACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ($ CRAM) INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS STARTUP/HDT STAND 8Y MODE Mintmum Number of Operable or Tripped Instrument Channels per Trin Svitem(l)
Trio Function Trin Level Settina h (Il
.1 Mode Switch in shutdown A
'I Manual scr&m A
1RM 3
High flux i 120/125 of full scale A
3 Inoperative A
APRMI3) 2 High flux (151 scram)
Speciftestion 2.1.A.2 A
2 Inoperative A
2 High-reactor pressure i 1060 psig A
2 High-drywell pressure ($)
1 2.5 psig A
2 Reactor 10w water level
- 1 B inches (8)
A 2 (per bank)
High water level in scram 1 40 gallons per bank A
discharge volumeI43 2
Turbine condenser low 1 21 inches Ng vacuum A
vacuum (73 2
Main steamline high i 7 X normal full power A
radiation (II) background 4
Main steamline isolation i 10% valve closure A
valve closure (73 l
l 3.1/4.1-9 Amencheri No. W '
l QUAO-CITIES OPR-30 TABLE 3.1-3 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ($ CRAM) INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS RUN MOCE Miniman Number of Operable or Tripped Instrument Channels per Trin tytt_M Trin Function Trin Laval tattina Action (2) 1 Mode switch in shutdown A
1 Manual scram A
APRM(II 2
High Flux (flow tiased)
Specification 2.1.A.1 A or 8 A or B 2
Inoperative 2
Downscale (II) 1 3/12$ of full scale A or B 2
High-reactor pressure i 1060 psig A
2 High drywell pressure i 2 psig A
2 Reactor low water level 1 8 inches (8)
A 2 (per bank)
High-water level in scram discharge volume i 40 gallons per bank A
2 Turbine condenser low 1 21 inches Ng vacuum A or C vacuum 2
Main Steamline high 1 1$ X normal full A or C radiation (12) power background (without hydrogen addition) 4 Main steamline isolation I'10% valve closure A or C valve closure (6) 2 Turbine control valve fast 1 40% turbine / generator A or C closure (9) load mismatch (10) 2 Turbine stop valve i 10% valve closure A or C closure (9) 2 Turbine EHC control fluid 1 900 psig A or C low pressure (9) 1303H 3.1/4.1-10 Amenenent No.
QUAO-CITIES DPR-30 Y
, Venturt tubes are przvided in the main steamitnes as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the 1gss cf mass inventory from the vess31 during a steamline break accident. In addition to monttoring steam flow.
instrumentation is provided which causes a trip of Group 1 isolation-valves. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steamline, thus only Group 1 valves are closed. For the worst-case accident, main steamline break outside the drywell. this trip setting of 140% of rated steam flow, in conjunction with the flow limiters and main steam 1tne valve closure. limits the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel temperatures remain less than 1500*F. and release of radioactivity to the environs is well below 10 CFR 100 guidelir.es (reference SAR 5ections 14.2.3.9 and 14.2.3.10).
Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam 1tne tunnel to detect leaks in this area.. Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded cause closure of-Group 1 isolation valves. Its setting of 200*F is low enough to detect leaks of the order of 5 to 10 ppm; thus it is capable of covering the entire spectrum of breaks.
For large breaks, it is a backup to high-steam flow instrumentation discussed above. 4pd for small breaks with the resulting small release of radioactivity, gives isclation before the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 ars
. exceeded.
High radiation monitors in the main steamline tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure. This instrumentation causes closure of Group 1 valves, the only valves required to close for this accident. With the established setting of 15 times normal background (without hydrogen addition) and main steamline isolation valve closure, fission product release is limited so that 10 CFR 100 guidelines are not exceeded for this accident (reference SAR Section 14.2.1.7).
g Pressure instrumentation is provided which trips when main steamline pressure drops below 825 pstg. A trip of this instrumentation results in
- closure of Group 1 isolation valves. In the Refuel and Startup/ Hot Standby modes this trip function is bypassed. This function is provided primarily to provide protection against a pressure regulator malfunction which would With the trip set at 825 I
cause the control and/or bypass valve to open.
psig, inventory loss is limited so that fuel is not uncovered and peak cladding temperatures are much less than 1500*F; thus, there are no fission products available for release other than those in the reactor water (reference SAR 5ection 11.2.3).
The RC1C and the HPC1 high flow and temperature instrumentation are provided to detect a break in their respective piping. Tripping of this instrumentation results in actuation of the RCIC or of HPC1 tsolation Tripping logic for this function is the same as that for the main valves.
steam 11ne isolation valves, thus all sensors are required to be operable or -
in a tripped condition to meet single-f ailure criterta. The trip settings of 200*F and 3001 of design flow and valve closure time are such that core uncovery is prevented and fission product release is within limits.
The instrumentation which initiates ECCS action is arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic circuit. Unlike the reactor scram circuits. however, there is one trip system associated with each function rather than the two trip systems in the reactor protection system. The j
single-failure criteria are met by virtue of the fact that redundant core cooling functions are provided e.g., sprays and automatic blowdown and high-pressure coolant injection. The specification requires that if a trip system becomes inoperable, the system which it activates is declared For example. if the trip system for core spray A becomes inoperable.
inoperable. core spray A is declared inoperable and the out-of-service specifications of Specification 3.5 govern. This specification preserves the effectiveness of the system with respect to the single-failure criteria even during periods when maintenance or testing is being performed.
The control rod block functions are provided to prevent excessive control rod withdrawal so that MCPR does not go below the MCPR Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit. The trip logic for this function is one out of n; e.g., any trip on one of the six APRM's. eight 1RM's four SRM's will result in a rod block. The minimum instrument channel requirements assure sufficient instrumentation to assure that the single-failure criteria are met. The minimum instrument channel requirements for the RSM may be reduced by one for a short period of time to allow for maintenance, testing, or calibration. This time period is only - 31 of the operating time in a month and does not significantly increase the risk of preventing an inadvertent control rod withdrawal.
1303M 3.2/4.2-6 Amendment No.
QUAD-CITIES DPR-30 TABLE 3.2-1 INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATE 5 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTIONS Mintmum Number of Operable or Tripped Ins t rtamep{,
Q14DD111 w In s t ra==nt s Trio tevel tattina Action d 4
Reactor low waterIII
>144 inches above top of A
active fuel
- 4 Reactor low low water 184 inches above top of A
active fuel
- High drywell pressure (5]
12.5 psig I3}
A 4
16 High flow main steamline[5]
1140T. of rated steam flow B 16 High temperature main 1200* F B
steamline tunnel Highradiationmpgg 115 x normal rated power
-B 4
steam 1tne tunne1L 3 background (without hydrogen addition) tow main steam pressureI4l 1825 psig 8
4 C
2 High flow RCIC steamline 1300(})ofratedsteam flow 16 RCIC turbine area high 1200* F C
teviperature 2
High flow HPCI steamline 13005 gf rated steam 0
flow \\ll 16 HPCI area high temperature 1200* F D
KEL11 Wenever primary containment integrity is required. there shall be two operable or 1.
tripped systems for each function, except for low pressure main steamline which only need be available in the Run position.
2.
Action, if the first column cannot be met for one of the trip systems, that trip system shall be tripped.
If the first column cannot be met for both trip systems, the appropriate actions listed below shall be taken.
A.
Initiate an orderly shutdown and have the reactor in Cold Shutdown condition in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
B.
Initiate an orderly load reduction and have reactor in Hot Standby within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
C.
Close isolation valves in RCIC system.
D.
Close isolation valves in HPCI subsystem.
3.
Need not be operable when primary Containment integrity is not required.
The isolation trip signal is bypassed when the mode switch is in Refuel or startup/
4.
Hot Shutdown.
5.
The instrumentation also isolates the control room venttistion system.
This signal also automatically closes the mechanical vacuum pump discharge line iso-6.
lation valves.
7.
Includes a time delay of 3 1 t i 9 seconds.
- Top of active fuel is defined as 360* above vessel zero for all water levels used in the LCCA analysis (see Bases 3.2).
3.2/4.2-11 Amenenent No.
1303H
ATIACIDif2I_2 J
SUMMARY
Of__ CHANGES A total of thirty (30) changes to the Quad Cities Station Units 1 and i
2 Technical Specifications have been identified (fifteen (15) per unit) and are listed below as follows:
- 1) Page 3.1/4.1-3. Bases -
I (a) Third paragraph, first sentence - Replace the work "nitogen" with the word " nitrogen" so the sentence reads, "High radiation levels...due to the normal nitrogen..."
This change corrects an existing typographical error.
(b) 1.
Third paragraph, second sentence - Replace "seven" with fifteen" so the sentence now reads, "A scram is initiated... exceeds fifteen times..."
Add the words "(without hydrogen addition)" at the end of the 2.
sentence so the sentence now reads, "A scram is initiated... exceeds fifteen times times normal background (without hydrogen addition)."
These changes are required as a result of the IMC program.
(c) Eighth paragraph, third sentencc - For the sentence which reads "Thus the IRM is required...in the bases for Specification 2.1.",
following the words, " Standby modes", insert a period so the sentence ends at that point. Capitalize the word "in" which follows and becomes the beginning of a new sentence.
This change splits the third sentence into two new sentences.
2.
Pace 3.1/4.1-8 (a) For item called " Main steamline high radiation", under column called
" Trip Level Setting",
reads Replace the number "7" with the number "15",
so that it now 1.
"i 15 x normal full power...".
2.
Add "(without hydrogen addition)" to the item so that it now reads, "1 5 x normal full power background (without hydrogen 1
addition)".
These changes are required as a result of the IMC program.
- L I *
}
- 3..Eage 3.1/4 1_2 a)
For item called " Main steamline high radiation", under column called
" Trip Level Setting", -
1.
Replace the nunder "7" with the number "15", so that it now reads "115 x normal full power...".
2.
Add "(withut hydrogen-addition)" to the item so that it now reads, "1 15 x normal full power background (without hydrogen addition".
These changes are required as a result of the HWC program.
4.
.Enge 3.1/4.1-10 a)
For item called " Main Steamline high radiation", under column called
" Trip Level Setting", -
1.
Replace the number "7" with the number "15", so that it now reads "115 x normal full power...".
2.
Add "(withut hydrogen addition)" to the item so that it now reads, "1 15 x normal full power background (without hydrogen addition)".
These changes are required as a result of the HNC program.
5.
Paa_e 3.2/4.2-6. Bases -
a)
Third paragraph, third sentence - Replace the number "7" with the number "15" so that it now reads "With the established setting of 15' times..."
b)
Add "(without hydrogen addition)" at the end of the sentence so that it now reads, "with the established setting of 15 times normal background (without hydrogen addition)..."
~
These changes are required as a result of the NWC program.
c)
Replace the SAR Section Reference "14.2.1.7" with" 14.2.1.7", so that the sentence now reads "with the established setting...for this accident (reference SAR Section 14.2.1.7)".
This change corrects an existing typographical error.
(:.
. 6.
Page 3.2/4.2-11, Table 3.2-1, DPR-29 and 30 a)
For item called "High radiation main steamline tunnel instrumentation", under column called " Trip Level Setting", -
1.
Replace the number "7" with the number "15",
so that it now reads, "115 x normal rated power background".
2.
Add "(without hydrogen addition)" at the end of the, item so it now reads, "115 x normal rated power background (without hydrogen addition)".
These changes are a result of the HWC program.
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1 ATIACIR(ENT 3 1
EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT 11AZARDS CONSIDERATION DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT Thore are two types of changes associated with the proposed license amendment directly resulting f rom the Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) program.
The first type of change involves the increase of the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors (MSLRM) from seven (7) times Normal Full Power Background (NFPB).to fifteen (15) times NFPB.
The second type of change corrects typographical errors that currently exist in the Quad Cities Technical Specifications. These changes are considered to be administrative.
via In a HWC program, hydrogen is injected into the reactor coolant, the condensate system to suppress the dissolved oxygen concentration. Hydrogen gas will initially be used with plans to eventually change to a 11guld hydrogen system. This suppression of dissolved oxygen concentration, coupled with a high purity reactor. coolant has been showed to aid in the reduction intergranulas etress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in susceptible reactor piping and materials.
During normal operation of a BWR, nitrogen-16 is formed from an oxygen-16 reaction.
Because of the reducing environment with added hydrogen, more of the nitrogen N-16 that is in the core is in a volatile form.
Consequently this is carried off by the steam, increasing the activity of the This requires an increase to the HSLRM setpoint from seven (7) times steam.
NFPB to fifteen (15) times NFPB (without HWC).
The safety function of the MSLRMs is to detect the radiation increase in the event of a Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA) and to close the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and shutdown the reactor on high radiation levels.
The closure of the MSIVs mitigates the release of radioactive fission products to the environment.
For the CRDA, the calculated dose rate at the monitors is Because the calculated dose rate of 8 R/hr is approximately five 8 R/hr.
times the proposed setpoint of 1.5 R/hr, the monitors will maintain the capability to close the MSIVs and scram the reactor on high radiation caused i
by the design basis CRDA.
The difference between the time required for th MSLRM to reach the current trip setpoint (0.7 R/hr) and the new setpoint (1.5 R/hr) is approxi-mately 1/4 second, and the time required to reach the new trip setpoint remains less than 1/2 second. The time period permitted for complete closure of the MSIVs is five (5) seconds (Quad Cities Technical Specification 3.7/4.7.D.1).
The increase in time-to-closure (due to the new setpoint), is only five (5) 1
i
, percent of the current time-to-closure.
This will have a small effect on the total release and resulting dose to the public.
Since the calculated dose from the CRDA is only 12 mrem, the increase will be very small, and therefore does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The capability to monitor for fuel failures is not affected by this change. The MSLRMs operating detection range is not changed. The Steam Jet Air Ejector Off-Gas Radiation Monitor, which is more sensitive to fuel failures than the MSLRM, is not affected by th s change and will be capable of alerting the plant staff to the existence of minor fuel failures which could be present below the proposed trip setpoint.
BASIS FOR SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Commonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed snendment and determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration.
In accord-ance with the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the f acility, in accordance with the proposed amendment, would not:
1)
Involve a_significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because:
(a) The consequences of the design basis CRDA, which takes credit for the operation of the MSLRMs, are not significantly affected by this change as discussed. No other previously analyzed accidents or malfunctions, as addressed in the UFSAR, are involved. Therefore, the probability or consequences of previously evaluated accidents is not significantly increased.
(b) The correction of typographical errors are administrative changes and do not significantly increase the probability or consequences of previously evaluated accidents.
l
- 2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any L
accident previously evaluated becauset (a) This modification only adjusts the trip setpoint on the MSLRM; no other statior, instruments or equipment are involved. The only design basis accident which takes credit for MSLRM is the CRDA, and the increased setpoint does not af fect the ability of the MSLRM to perform its intended safety function.
It has also been shown that the increased setpoint has no effect on the capability of the strtion to detect noble gas releases from the reactor core.
As a result, the proposed snendment does not create the possibility of a new or
+
dif ferent kind of accident f rom any previously evaluated accidents.
i
p
' (b) The correction of typographical changes are administrative and do not create the possibility of new or dif ferent kinds of accidents.
3)
Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:
L (a) The CRDA is the only accident which takes credit for the trip The change in the trip setpoint for the operation of the MSLRM.
7 setpoint for the MSLRM does not reduce the. margin between the calculated dose rate from the accident and the trip setpoint..The change does not significantly affect the consequences of the CRDA as previously discussed. The change offers significant benefits that enhance the margin of safety for operation with Hydrogen Water Chemistry by supporting a water chemistry program which substantially mitigates IGSCC of safety-related piping. Hence, the margin of safety has actually been increased as a result of the proposed amendment.
(b) The correction of typographical errors is an administrative change and does not reduce the margin of safety.
Therefore, since the proposed license unendment satisfies the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.92, Commonwealth Edison has determined that a no signi-ficant hazards consideration exist for these items. We further request their approval in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(4).
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