ML20236P302
| ML20236P302 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1987 |
| From: | Stachew J EG&G IDAHO, INC., IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236P307 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-D-6023 EGG-NTA-7758, TAC-65397, NUDOCS 8708120291 | |
| Download: ML20236P302 (22) | |
Text
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EGG-NTA-7758' -
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-i TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT FOR.r'EVIEW OF RIVER BENO STATION UNIT-1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMEN 0 MENT (RBG-25917)
Docket No. 50-458 i
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J. C. Stachew l
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Published July 1987 Idaho National Engirrering Laboratory l
EG&G Idaho, Inc.
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f Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
'Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-761001570 i
FIN No. 06023 i
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1 ABSTRACT This EG&G Idaho, Inc., report evaluates the submittal (RBG-25917)
I provided by Gulf St.ates Utilities Company (GSU) for River Bend Station (RBS) Unit-1.
The evaluation was to determine the acceptability of I
the proposed Technical Specification (TS) amendment for a one-time extension of surveillance for specific Engineered Safety Feature and Reactor Protection System instrumentation and other miscellaneous systems.
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FOREWORD 3
1 This report is supplied as part of the " Technical Assistance for
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Operating Reactors Licensing Actions" being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear i
Regulatory Commission, Washington D.C., by EG&G Idaho, Inc., NRR and I&E Support.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under authorization 6&R 20-19-10-11-1, FIN No. D6023.
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Docket No 50-458 TAC No. 65397 ii
CONTENTS j
ABSTRACT..............................................................
11 FOREWORD..............................................................
il 1.
INTRODUCTION.....................................................
1 2.
DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION........................................
2 2.1 Penetration Valve Leakage Control System...................
3 2.2 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation..................
4 2.3 Electrical Power Systems /A.C. Sources......................
6 3.
CONCLUSIONS.....................................................
15 4.
REFERENCES.....................................................
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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT FOR' REVIEW 0F RIVER BEND STATION UNIT,
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMEN 0 MENT (RBG-25917) i 1.
INTRODUCTION l
Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) has submitted a proposed amendment i
(RBG-25917) to the Technical Specifications for River Bend Station (RBS)
Unit-1. This report provides an evaluation of the proposed one-time extension of surveillance for specific Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) and Reactor Protection System instrumentation and other miscellaneous systems,
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2.
DISCUSSION AND EVALVATION t
The Licensee provided three Attachments to their Technical Specification Amendment application.1 Each of these attachments is discussed and evaluated in an individual subsection below. Also, the Licensee's letter of May 15, 1987,2 requests changes to the Technical Specifications that affect pages that are common to the Licensee's changed pages that are the subject of this report.
The individual changes proposed by the Licensee's latter of May 15, 1987, and those in the three l
attachments to the subject Licensee's letter of this report have been reviewed for their consistency with all of the individual changes accumulated on the affected comran pages. As the changes which affect common pages only involve adding superscript note designations to specified surveillance for different instrument types, accumulation of the individual changes is acceptable (the different instruments do not have an interaction and the acceptability of the added superscript can be judged 'n an individuai basis).
One recurring carryover is the Licensee's reference to Note (d) on Technical Specification page 3/4 3-11.
This note (d) does not appear in the subject Table 4.3.2.1-1 in the Licensee's May 15, 1987, letter but does appear in the Licensee's letter of May 11, 1987, Attacnment 3, which is the subject letter of this report and is, th refore, t
acceptable.
In each case, the requested extension of the surveillance already has f
accounted for the maximum extension of 25% allowed by Technical Specification 4.0.2 to the existing required 18-month surveillance interval.
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4 2.1 Penetration Valve Leakage Control System The Licensee letter of May 11,-1987,1 Attachment 1 proposed changes to Technical Specification page 3/4 6-16.
This change was for a one-time extension of about 7 days to the functional test for the Penetration Valve Leakage Control System. The purpose of this change is to allow the above listed surveillance to be delayed from it's scheduled due date of September 8, 1987, until the first refueling outage scheduled to begin September 15, 1987.
This Attachment is being reviewed independently by the NRC Staff and, therefore, is not'further addressed in this report.
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2.2 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation The Licensee letter of May 11, 1987,1 Attachment 2 proposed changes to Technical Specification pages.3/4 3-1, 7, 9, 11, 26, and 29.
These changes were for a one-time extension from September 4, 1987, to no later than September 15, 1987, to the Channel Calibration and Logic System.
l Function Test (LSFT) surveillance of the Main Steam Line Radiation-High (MSLRH) instrument of the Reactor Protection System Main l
Steam Line Isolation actuation instrumentation and for the Isolation System Response Time of the Main. Steam Line Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, j
The purpose of this change is to allow the above listed surveillance to be delayed from their scheduled due date of September 4,1987, until the first l
refueling outage scheduled to begin September 15, 1987.
i Evaluation:
l The Licensee provided the following technical justification for requesting the surveillance extensions.
1.
For the Channel Calibration extension, the Licensee states that isolation actuations from the MSLRH are not used for inputs to the l
10CFR100 calculations; no practical credit is taken for the Main St'eam l
Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure as a result of the detectors; no credit for this instrumentation is taken in any other FSAR analysis, and FSAR
.j Appendix 15A presents the MSLRH isolation actuation only as part of a best estimate analysis.
Channel Checks and Channel Functional Tests are specified and executed for the Main Steam Line Radiation-High instrument per Technical Specification surveillance Table 4.3.1.1-1.
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2.
For the Logic System Functional Test, Licensee calculations performed using probabilistic methodology for the effects on the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) isolation logic Reactor Protection System (RPS) logic indicates no appreciable increase in the probability for failure for extending the surveillance period from 18 to 24 months.
Licensee results of a search of the industry Nuclear Plant Reliability Data 4
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'4 System (NPRDS) indicated a.very low probability for equipment failures with regard to manual switche:, and =xiliary relays for the subject I
surveillance period and requested extension.
Channel Checks and Channel Functional Tests are specified and executed per Technical Specification Table 4.3.2.1-1.
The Licensee also committed to perform a monthly channel functional test on the portion of the instrument loop.that may exhibit instrument related drift, the logarithmic radiation monitors.
3.
GSU has determined, based on past experience, that if testing is performed while at power that there is a high probability of an RPS or ESF actuation due to the system design.
Based on the above justification provided by the Licensee and the i
relatively short extension requested (about 11 days) compared to'the required 18 month + 257. extension and the fact that the subject instrumentation does not exhibit sudden catastrophic failure or out of specification performance in these time frames, it is judged that the requested extensions for the Channel Calibration and LSFT are. acceptable.
1 However, it is noted that although the Licensee has also requested the same time extension for the Main Steam Line Radiation-High instrument for the Isolation System Response Time in Technical Specification 4.3.2.3, no justification for this change was presented. A value is specified for the subject instrument in Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-3, Isolation System Instrumentation Response Time. Although the short time extension requested compared to the required 18 month + 257. extension surveillance interval is such that significant changes to the Isolation System Response Time would not be anticipated, without any Licensee justification, it is recommended that th6 words " Isolation System Response Time and" be deleted from the asterisk footnote at the bottom of proposed Technical Specification page 3/4 3-11.
The Licensee letter of July 15, 1987,3 withdrew this request for Isolation System Response Times.
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2.3 Electrical Power Systems /A.C. Sources The Licensee letter of May 11, 1987,1 Attachment 3 proposed changes to Technical Specificati'un pages 3/4 3-11, 29, 30, 41, 42, 43, 107, and 111, 3/4 5.4, 3/4 6-29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 47, 52, 56, 57, 59, and-60, 3/4 7-2 and 6, and 3/4 8-6, 7, 8, and 9.
These changes were for a one-time extension beginning from August 15, 1987 to completion of the first refueling outage (scheduled to begin on September 15, 1987) to the Channel Calibration, Logic System Functional Test (LSFT), and Isolation System Response Time or ECCS Response Time Surveillance Requirements (SR) of the following instruments:
Channel Calibration, Logic System Functional Tests, Isolation System l
Response Time or ECCS Response Time l
Reactor Vessel Water 1.evel - Low Low Low Level 1 (RHR Isolation System j
i of the Isolation Actuation Instrumentation) i Drywell Pressure - High (RHR Isolation System of the Isolation Actuation Instrumentation) 1 i
ECCS Division I Trip System - RHR-A (LPCI Mode) and LPCS System (all instruments)
ECCS Division II Trip System - RHR B and C (LPCI Mode) (all insi.ruments)
ECCS Loss of Power Division I and II (sustained undervoltage and degraded voltage)
Drywell Pressure High (Primary Containment Ventilation System, Unit j
Cooler A and B)
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 (Primary Containment Ventilation System, Unit Cooler A and B) 6
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- System Functional Test or Operability Requirement:
LPCS and LPCI of. ECCS Division 'I: and II;($Rl4.5.1.c)
Primary Containment Unit Coolers (SR 4.6.3.2.c).
q Primary Containment Drywell; Isolation Valves (SR 4.6.4.2 as specified i
by "#" note in Table 3.6.4-1)'
, Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers (4.6.5.3.b) 1 1
Standby Gas Treatrrent System (SR 4.6.5.'4.d.1.a) and 4.6.5.4.d.3.b))
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Shield Guilding Annulus Mixing System (SR 4.6.5.5 b.1.a) and 4.6.5.5.b.3.b))
l Fuel Building Ventilation (SR 4 6.5.6.e.l.a) and 4.6.5.6.e.3.b))
Standby Service Water System (SR 4.7.1.1.b) i Main Control Room Air Conditioning System (SR 4.7.2.e.2.a))
A. C. Sources - Operating (Division I and II) (SR 4.8.1.1.2.f 2,3,4,5, 6.7,9,10,11, and 12)
The purpose of this change is to allow the above stated surveillance to be delayed from their scheduled due date beginning August 15, 1987 until the completion of the.first refueling outage (scheduled to begin September 15,1987).
l Evaluation:
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.The Licensee-provided the following technical justification for l
reque' sting the surveillance extensions, i-l ~.
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b.
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'ECCS.0ivision I and Division II surveillance involved tasting the ability of the plant's safety related systems to respond to a-Loss' of Offsite-Power (LOP), to a simulated Loss of Coolant
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Accident (LOCA) and to a combined LOP /LOCA:
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i)
Prior to commercial operation the station underwent' a period of extensive testing for the responses of the ECCS systems f
included in the surveillance for which an extension has
.been requested.
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ii) After individual preoperational ECCS system testing was completed in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Gaide 1.68, a major integrated preoperational ECCS test was conducted that involved actual simulation of a series of design bases accidents including a complete sto.cion LOP, a simulated LOCA and;a concurrent LOP /LOCA to all three safety related ECCS divisiens.
iii) Tests were performed of the diesel generators' response to a LOCA condition when in a surveillance mode as well as a test that demonstrated the plant's response to load shedding and load sequencing under LOP /LOCA conditions.
iv) This station experienced an unexpected complete LOP.
Ali plant systems responded as designed including all three Emergency Diesels which started and carried the vital buses for the duration of the LOP.
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v)
There is a considerable amount of testing conducted tc meet the Technical Specification System / Component requirements f
for operability.
Some of this tenting includes performance f
of channel checks, channel calibrations, and response time I
measurements for all ECCS and Plant Isolation / Initiation Instrumentation.
In addition, partial Logic System i
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- Functional. Tests;are performed simulating ' LOP /LOCAsconditions to Lverify response of relaying required for initiatio'ns 'and isolations for many of these same in'struments.
2.
. Although. not always addressed individua11y, justification for the other system. surveillance extensions was that:
Quarterly Inservice Inspection' Pump and Valve' tests:are performed
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in accordance with Section 4.0.5 of the Techcical Specification.s-
'j and ASME Code Section XI, including all of the.ECCS injection and J
i spray systems.
Further, similar testing is done for HVAC equipment required for safe shutdown including monthly operability checks on' the. Standby' Gas Treatment, Annulus. Mixing,.
Containment Unit. Coolers, Fuel Building Ventilatica, and Control Building Ventilation.
l Maintenance of control room pressure at >1/8. inch water with ventilation flow less than 4000 CFM,' is not expected.to change oue to the passive nature of the building structure.
l The Licensee provided further justification for. the surveillance i
extensions requested for the Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers (SR 4,6.5.3.b) and the Standby. Service Water System (SR 4.7.1.1.b).
The Licensee's. letter of July.15, 1987,3 indicates.that ASME' Code Section XI testing for Technical Specification 4,0.5 for valve stroke time and' pump l
start is done as appropriate for these systems, on a quarterly interval. All such testing performed to date for these systems has been acceptable.
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All of the surveillance that are being requested for extension were performed to satisfy the Technical Specification requirements to allow fuel loading and initial criticality, 9
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1 In addition to the above justification provided by the Licensee,:
i the following observations are made.
For a large fraction of the surveillance extensions o
requested, the involved system applicabi.lity is to only Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3.
Therefore, the requested extension only amounts to about a 31 day extension from August. 15, 1987 to the beginning of the refueling, September 15, 1987.
Since after that date the plant will be l
in Operational Condition 4 or 5.
The instrumentation / systems in this category are Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 and Drywall Pressure -
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High (of the RHR Isolation system of the Isolation Actuation Instrumentation and' Primary Containment Ventilation System, l
Unit Cooler A and B), LPCS and LPCI of ECCS Division I and II (SR.4.5.1.c), Primary Containment Unit Coolers (SR 4.6.3.2.c), Primary Containment Drywell Isolation Valves (SR f
4.6.4.2), Standby Gas Treatment System (SR 4.6.5.4), and the l
Shield Building Annulus Mixing System (SR 4.6.5.5).
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Fur another large group of the surveillance extensions o
requested, the involved system applicability is to Operational Conditions 4 and 5*.
The asterisk not requiring applicability (TS P.3/4 5-6) provided that the reactor vessel head is removed, the cavity flooded, the upper containment fuel pool gate is opened, and water level is maintained within the limits of Specifications 3.9.8 and 3.9.9.
For the major portion of the refueling outage, these systems will not be required per this asterisk footnote.
Therefore, the requested extension essentially only amounts to an extension to about a counle of weeks beyond the l
beginning of the refueling, September 15, 1987.
The l
instruments / systems in this category are ECCS Division I r ip System [RHR - A (LPCI Mode) and LPCS System], ECCS r
Division II Trip System [RHR B and C (LPCI Mode)], anc ECCS
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.t Lbss of Power. Division:I and II- (sustained 'under ' voltage and,.,
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> degraded voltage).
The Fuel Building-Ventilation-'surve'illance.(SR'4.6.5.6.e'.1.a o
and 4.6.5.6.e.3.b) extensions are:for performance testing'in the emergency mode. Howev'er, during the asterisk applicability (when irradiated fuel'.is being handled in the Fuel. Building) one Fuel Building Ventilation Charcoal a
Filtration subsystem is already required to be operating in the emergency mode.
Therefore, irrespective.of the surveillancetesting,the'systemfaiready'operatingIinthe-emergency' mode is providing the desired-filtration.
o The surveillance (SR 4.7.2.e.2.a)' extension,on.the Main
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Control Room Air Conditioning System,is for performance testing upon a LOCA emergency mode. actuation. Again',-for the major part of the refueling outage,.LOCA response _is not:.
applicable (seeTSP.3/45-6,asteriskfootnotegnECCS non-applicability).
Certain clarifications in interpretations were made.
None;of the j
following' clarifications' require any changes, but are stated here:
for completeness.
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In 4.3.3.3 on TS page P.3/4 3-30 ECCS Response Time.for the I
functions in Table 3.3.3-3 are indicated for extension.
The footnote designated "##" on TS P 3/4 3-30~says "... ECCS Response time testing period may.be extended'as identified by Note C on Table 4.3.3.1-l and covers.many more ' functions than are required in Table 3.3.3.-3.
This was interpreted to mean that only those Division I and II items that are in both Table 3.3.3.-3 and Table 4.3.3.1-1 have ECCS Response-Times whose surveillance periods are to be extended.
The majority of. functions in Table 4.3.3.1-l' designated with-l 11
+
,l Note C do not have a required Response Time _per Table 3.3.3-3 and as such no extension of surveillance is being-sought, ESF in footnote designated "**" on TS P,3/4 3-43 is not o
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anywhere defined.
The double asterisk footnote is, I
therefore, interpreted to mean that the subject Division I and II Loss of Power trips are required when the associated j
4.16 kV buses are required to support those ECCS systems l
I required to be operable per Specification 3.5,2.
The "#" designated footnote on TS P.3/4 3-107 as it is tied
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l to SR 4.3.9.2 implies extension for all the functions in I
Table 4.3.9.1-1.
Consistent'with the justification j
discussion, only the Division I and II function surveillance of Table 4.3.9.1-1 are to be extended as specifically called out in Table 4.3.9.1-1 on TS P.3/4 3-111.
Although Item 14 in the Licensee's description of changes o
has two entries, 4.8.1.1.2.f.2 and 4.8.1.1.2.f.12, where the parameters discussed are only relevant to Diesel Generator 1A, Diese'l Generator IB is included sin:e the
"###" designated footnote on TS Pages 3/4 8-6 and 3/4 8-9 references extension for both Divisions I and II. Also, on all the Section 3.8 pages included for change, Diesel i
Generator 1C is assumed to be associated with Division III I
and is, therefore, excluded.
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The following changes and/or deletions are recommended:
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As in Attachment 2 to this report, the words, " Isolation System Response Time and" should be deleted on TS P.3/4 3-11
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in the asterisk footnote.
Since no justification was l
provided for Isolation System Response Time surveillance 12 l'
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. extension: and the Licensee withdrew the request;in letter 4
-dated Ju'ly~ 15,.1987.3-
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. All footnotes referencing words' such as "may.be. extended to
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the completion'of th'e first refueling outage" should add at, the end words similar to " scheduled to begin September 15,-
1987." Thiswill'11mit$heopenendedtimelimit'onthe extension as it is presently written.
The.following pages
.are affected:
TS Pages 3/4 3-29, 3/4 3-43,'3/4 3-107, q
3/4 3-111, 3/4 5-4, 3/4 6-29, 3/4 6-31,,3/4'6-47, 3/4 6-52,.
.j 3/4 6-56, 3/4 6-57, 3/4.6-59, 3/4.6-60, 3/4 7-2, 3/4 7-6,-
3/4 8-6, 3/4 8-7. 3/.4 8-8, and 3/4 8-9.
o The changes on TS P.3/4 6-31 are such that all automatic
.j isolation valves in Table 3.6.4-1-are. included in the requested extension.
However, Table 3.6.4-1 TS Pages 3/4 6-32, 3/4 6-33, 3/4 6-34, 3/4 6-35, 3/4 6-36, and 3/4 6-37, which are also included, indicate that o'nly those-values so noted by a "#"
designation are to.have their-surveillance extended.
For consistency, the "#" footnote on TS P. 3/4 6-31 should read:
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"The specified 18 month interval during thel first operating cycle may-be extended to coincide with completion of the first. refueling outage,' scheduled to begin September 15, 1987, for those items noted on Table 3.6.4-1."
The Licensee provided this change in letter dated July 15, 1987.3 l
o Delete the right hand change bar on TS P. 3/4'6-32 for the l
two lines labeled "RHR Shutdown Cooling Supply" as these-13 s.
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l lines do not have "#" designations on them.
The Licensee provided this. change in letter dated July 15, 1987.3 l
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Based on the above evaluation, it is judged that the requested surveillance extensions are acceptable with the recommended changes and deletions noted above (which have been implemented in 3
the Licensee's' letter af July 15, 1987 except for one).
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CONCLUSIONS l
l Based on the evaluations presented, GSU's requested one-time extension I
of surveillance was found acceptable for the Channel Calibration and Logic System Functional Test and other system performance testing, but not for j
any Isolation System Response Time.
Below is a summary of the specific f
conclusions reached in Section 2, Discussion and Evaluation.
Numbering is l
the same as that in the Licensee's letter.1 Details may be found in Section 2 of this report.
I Proposed Changes Judged Acceotable 1
1.
SR 4.3.2.2, Table 4.3.2.1-1, Items 6.d and 6.f, Channel Calibration and Logic System Functional Testing of Isolation Actuation
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Instrumentation.
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2.
SR 4.3.3.2, Channel Calibration and Logic Functional Testing for; j
Table 4.3.3.1-1, Item A.1, Division I Trip System, RHR - A (LPCI mode) l l
1 and LPCS System; Table 4.3.3.1-1, Item B.1, Division II Trip System, a
RHR 8 and C (LPCI Mode), Table 4.3.3.1-1, Item D 1, Loss of Power, l
Division I and II.
3.
SR 4.3.3.3, ECCS Response Time for Low Pressure Core Specy System and pumps A, B, and C of Low Pressure Coolant Injection Mode of RHR System.
1 4.
SR 4.3.9.2, Table 4.3.9.1-1, Items 1.a and 1.c, Channel Calibration and Logic System Functional Tests for Drywell Pressure - High and Reactor Vessel water level - Low Low Low Level 1.
5.
SR 4.5.1, ECCS - Operating, Functional Test on LPCS Pump, LPCI pumps A, B, and C.
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SR 4.6.3.2.c, Primary Containment Unit Coolers, System Functional Test.
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7.
SR 4.6.4.2, Table 3.6.4-2, _ Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Valves, valve actuation test for designated valves.
8.
SR 4.6.5.3.6, Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers, valve position testing.
9.
3R 4.6.5.4, Items d.1.a and d.3.b, Standby Gas Treatment System, performance testing on simulated signals.
10.
SR 4.6.5.5, Items b.1.a and b.3.b, Shield Building Annulus Mixing System, Functional Test on LOCA signal.
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SR 4.6.5.6, Items e.l.a and e.3.b, Fuel Building Ventilation, l
functional testing on simulated. signals.
12.
SR 4.7.1.1.b, Standby Service Water System, valve and pump testing.
13.
SR 4.7.2.e.2.a, Main Control Room Air Conditioning System, emergency i
test on a LOCA signal.
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14.
SR 4.8.1.1.2, Items f.2, f.3, f.4.a.1, f.4.a.2, f.5, f.6a, f.7, f.9,
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1 f.10, f.11, and f 12, Diesel Generator Division I and II testing.
Proposed Changes Judged Not Acceptable 1
1.
SR 4.3.2.2, Table 4.3.2.1-1, Items 6.d and 6.f, Isolation System
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Response Time.
l Technical Specification Pages Judged Needing Changed 1.
TS P.3/4 3-11, Isolation System Response Time deletion.
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TS pages 3/4 3-39, 43, 107, 111, 5-4, 6-29, 31, 47, 52, 56, 57, 59,
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1 and 60, 7-2 and 6, 8-6, 7, 8, and 9; add beginning date for first refueling outage.
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3.
TS P.3/4 6-31, add reference to Table 3.6.4-1 on # footnote, l
4.
_TS P.3/4 6-32, delete right hand change bar on RHR Cooling Supply.
The Licensee in letter dated July 15, 1987,3 withdrew the request for Isolation System Response Time testing and provided the changes recommended for the Technical Specification pages summarized above except for adding the beginning date for the refueling outage.
I The requested Extension of the required 18-month surveillance interval accounted for the max 1 mum 25% extension allowed by Technical i
Specification 4.0.2.
The purpose of the change is to allow the listed instrument surveillance to be delayed from their scheduled due dates (beginning August 15, 1987), until completion of the first refueling outage scheduled to begin September 15, 1987.
As the Licensee did not provide any -
justification for the involved Isolation System Response Times, the request for extension of their surveillance is not acceptable and it is
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recommended that this part of the request be deleted from Technical Specification page 3/4 3-11 in the asterisk in 4.3.2.2 and in the footnote.
l Finally, Attachment 1 of the Licensee's submittal is being independently reviewed by the NRC Staff.
This report, therefore, does not l
provide an evaluation of Attachment 1.
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REFERENCES l
1.
J. C. Deddens letter.to NRC, " River Bend. Station Unit-1, Doc.ket
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No. 50-458," RBG-25917, Gulf States Utilities Company, May 11, 1987.
l 2.
J. C. Deddens letter to NRC, " River Bend Station Unit-1, Docket No. 50-458," RBG-25955, Gulf States Utilities Company, May 15, 1987.
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3.
J. E. Booker letter to NRC, " River Bend Station Unit-1, Docket j
No. 50-458, "RBG-26261, Gulf States Utilities Company, July 15, 1987.
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET EGG-NTA-7758 litiN$r#UcrsON10% rat alvta$t J684vt94ANE J rir st ANo swe rir ts TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT FOR REVIEW 0F RIVER BEND STATION UNIT 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
- " " " " * " o " t " o AMEN 0MENTS (RBG-25917) l uo.., -
,84.
Ju!y 1987
. tu r-c.,,,
J. C. Stachew
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