ML20238A149
| ML20238A149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1987 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238A112 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-65397, NUDOCS 8709090151 | |
| Download: ML20238A149 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
E W ASHINGToN. D. C. 20555
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION i
i SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.10 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY a
RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-458
1.0 INTRODUCTION
j By letter dated May 11, 1987 as supplemented July 27, 1987, Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) (the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1.
The pro-posed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TSs) to extend the surveillance interval, on a one-time basis, for the penetration valve leakage control system (PVLCS) until the first refueling outage scheduled to begin September 15, 1987.
This evaluation addresses the proposed changes to the.TSs as specified in Attachment 1 to the May 11, 1987 application as supplemented July 27, 1987.
The staff's evaluation of Attachments.2 and 3 is documented in the safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 9 dated August 12, 1987.
2.0 EVALUATION The PVLCS comprises a compressed air system, including accumulators, providing pressurized air to a particular subset of containment isolation valves on process lines penetrating containment.
The purpose is to obtain zero outleakage from containment by a controlled inleakage of uncontaminated air into containment.
In addition to the PVLCS valves, the PVLCS also supplies compressed air to a parallel system which performs the same function for the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) and i.e known as the Main Steam - Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS).
The proposed TS change is limited to the " Penetration Valve Leakage Control System," under TS 3/4.6.1 and would extend the TS surveillance interval, on a one-time basis, by an additional seven (7) days on the allowable TS limit of 18 months + 4.5 months (25% allowance under TS 4.0.2.a).
The safety function of the PVLCS is to eliminate outleakage of radioactivity through the PVLCS valves, and the main steamline isolation valves (in conjunction with MS-PLCS), after a LOCA, and in doing so contribute to reduction o'f total offsite dose to less than or equal to 10 CFR Part 100 limits.
Therefore, the offsite doses of an accident could be increased if the PVLCS failed to operate.
8709090151 870831 ADDCK 0500g8 DR
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. The reliability of the PVLCS is a function of two sets of circumstances:
a)
The capability of the individual items of equipment which comprise the system, to operate when required.
This capability is maintained by regular surveillance / test requirements of all such equipment at more frequent intervals than refueling, i.e., caily, monthly, quar-terly, cold shutdown, etc.
When failures occur during such surveil-lance, maintenance, replacement, and review of related procedures as necessary, is conducted to ensure continuing acceptable reliability.
The licensee has detailed the results of these tests at River Bend.
From these data, seven (7) items could have resulted in operational problems:
these were, failures in pressure indication (4 times), and failure of a compressor to operate (3 times).
Given these circumstances, the licensee should confirm operability of these two groups of items by showing that the latest TS surveillance test requirements have been met before entering into the seven-day extension.
b)
The capability of the individual items of equipment to function as an integrated system; with specific inputs at sensors to ensure that the system not only operates, but also provides the licensing basis 3
performance to achieve its safety function.
This is the purpose of i
the functional [ performance] test under evaluation.
j Given the results of the surveillance tests described by the licensee, i
and the additional confirmation of operability from (a), above, the effect of an extension of seven (7) days in 680 days (22.5 months) is considered insignificant with respect to impact on the reliability of the functional performance of the PVLCS during the remaining seven (7) aays of operation in Modes 1, 2 and 3.
During refueling:
The safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 7, dated j
August 3, 1987, shows that 25 PVLCS valves must be tested to the requirements of TS 4.6.1.3.f after the granted surveillance time extension has expired.
TS item 1.27 shows that such operability must also be con'irmed for all essential support systems, and since Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50, Part III.C.2.(b) requires that the Type C tests be undertaken with the PVLCS valves pressurized from that same system, then the PVLCS should be func-tionally tested and declared operable for the purpose of a completed regulatory test on these valves.
Therefore, the surveillance test on the PVLCS should be completed prior to and/or parallel with related PVLCS valves over the same period.
Note:
The MS-PLCS is not a part of this requirement.
The licensee's proposal to increase, on a one-time basis, U.: surveillance interval on the functional test of the penetration valve leakage control system. TS Item 4.6.1.10.c, by seven days is acceptable provided the latest TS surveillance tests confirm the operability of the related air compressors and pressure sensing devices prior to entry into the extension period.
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3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation-or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as. defined in 10'CFR Part 20 and/or changes to the surveillance requirements.
The staff has determined that the amendment' involves no
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significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in.the types, of any effluents.that may be released offsite, and that there is no signif-icant increase in individual or cumulative occupational. radiation exposure.
.The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment.on such finding.
Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environ-mental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
4.O CONr'USION The staff has concluded, based'on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of 1
the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and the' security nor to the health and safety of the public.
Principal. Contributors:
R. Licciardo Dated: August 31, 1987 i
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