ML20236J750
| ML20236J750 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1987 |
| From: | Lesser M, Peebles T, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236J724 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-87-20, 50-414-87-20, NUDOCS 8708060269 | |
| Download: ML20236J750 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1987020
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UNITED STATES '
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Report.Nos.
50-413/87-20 and 50-414/87-20
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Licensee: Duke Power Company
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422. South Church Street
' Charlotte,-N.C.
28242
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Docket'Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.: NPF-35'and NPF-52
Facility Name: Cat uba 1 and '2
Inspection Conducted: Ma 26 - July 8,1987
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Inspectors:
'P. K Ta D ~ rn
' Date Signed
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M . 'S . Re'sser ~
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/Dat,4 Signed
Approved by: [
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T. A. P'eebles, Section Chief ~
Ddte Signed.
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Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site inspecting
in the areas of review- of plant operations; surveillance observation; mainte-
nance observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports; and followup of
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previously identified items.
Results: Of the five (5) areas inspected, one apparent violation was.identi-
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fied in one area.
(Inadequate Measures to Require Investigation of Isolated
Containment Pressure Channel to Oetermine Root Cause paragraph 8.b.).
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8708060269 e70730
ADOCK 05000413
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
lPersonsContacted
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Licensee Employees
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- J. W. 'Hampton, Station Manapr
- H..B. Barron,:0perations Superintendent
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W. F. Beaver, Performance. Engineer
B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
R. N. Casler, Operating Engineer
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R. H. - Charest, . Station Chemistry Supervisor
-*M. A. Cote, Licensing $pecialist
T. E. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent
-W. P. Deal, Health Physics Supervisor
C. S. Gregory, I. & E . Support Engineer
- C. L. Hartzell, Ccmp;iance Engineer
J. Knuti, Operating Engineer
F. N. Mack,-Project Services Engineer
W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer.
F. P. Schiffley., II, Licensing Engineer
- G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent
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J. Stackley, I. & E. Engineer
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D. Tower, Shift Operating Engineer
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- R. F. Wardell, Technical Services Superintendent
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J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations
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Othee licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
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mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
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2.
Exit Interview
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The inspection scope an6 findings were summarized on July 8,1987, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
The
licensee indicated that they are considering denying the violation listec
below. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials
previded to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
The
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foilowing new itens were identified at the exit interview:
Inspector Followup Item 413,
414/87-20-01:
Review of Design
Engineering TOPFORM Program.
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Inspector Followup Item 413, 414/87-20-02: Replacement of Non
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Environmentally Qualified Wire in Annulus Ventilation Filter Heater.
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Violation
413/87-20-03:
Inadequate
Investigation
of
Isolated
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Containment Pressure Channel.
Licensee Identified Violation 413/87-20-04: Failure to Retest
Auxiliary Feedwater Check Valves.
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3.
Licenste Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
a.
(CLOSED)
Deviation 413/85-55-03, 414/85-68-03: Failure to Meet
Commitment in FSAR Section 7.4.7.1 for Auxiliary Shutdown Panels.
The response for this item was provided by the licensee in corre-
spondence dated May 15, 1986. The inspector reviewed the corrective
action taken and considers this item closed.
b.
(CLOSED)
Unresolved Item 414/86-16-03: Evaluation of Apparent
Electrical Cable Overfill in Electray in the Unit 2 Auxiliary
Feedwater Pump Room. The inspector reviewed the licensee evaluation
of this problem which indicates that the problem is not technically
significarit and was isolated.
The situation has been corrected and
thcrefore, this item is closed.
c.
(CLOSED)-
Unresalved
Item 413/86-50-03:
Improper Calibration
Procedure for SNSWP Temperature Instrument.
This item is closed
based on the licensee's corrective action taken and documented under
Proble'n Investigation Report 0-C86-0129. The cause of the incorrect
calibration procedure resulted from a lack of control on the
installation of temperature instrument hardware and failure to
adequately control portions of the Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
List. The inspector reviewed Change 8 to IP/1/B/3112/04, Calibration
of Non-Safety Related (RN) Intake Structure Instrumentation and
discussed changes in the licensee's policies for use of the I&C List
with responsible personnel. The instrument is not safety related and
was correctly calibrated during portions of the year where Technical
Specifications require the instrument to be operable (July, August
and September).
d.
(CLOSED)
Violation 413/86-51-04, Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.3.2.
The response to this item was provided in
correspondence dated March 6,
1987.
The inspector reviewed the
corrective action taken and considers this item closed.
e.
(CLOSED)
Licensee
Identified Violatien 414/86-53-03,
Design
Deficiency Causing Failure of Component to Operate From Standby
Shutdown Facility.
This item is closed based upon a memo dated
June 9,1987, from L. B. Castles and J. E. Thcmas of Duke Design
Engineering. The design error was determined not to be generic in
nature.
Design Engineering will additionally review the Instru-
mentation and Control (I&E) List and instrument detail drawings to
assure adequacy of design drawings.
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f.
- (CLOSED) Violation 413, 414/87-06-01: Inoperability of Containment
Air . Return Systems Since Initial Required Operation Due to a Design
Deficiency' and Inadequate Design Info for PORV's Leading to Inoper-
ability. The1 11c & a responded to this item in correspondence dated
June 11, 199-
The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken
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and' considers' this item closed.
The licensee indicated that an
- extensive program of enhancements ~ to its Design Engineering station
modification- program known ' as TOPFORM .was being implemented.
In
order to assure.NRC review of this program when fully implemented a'
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followup item is hereby established. This is Inspector Followup Item
413, 414/87-20-01: Review of Design Engineering TOPFORM Program.
g.
(CLOSED) Violation 413, 414/87-06-02: Inadequate Measures to Assure
Proper Evaluation of Containment Spray System Heat Exchanger Fouling.
The licensee responded to this item in' correspondence ~ dated June 11,
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1987.
The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken and
considers this item closed.
h.
(CLOSED)- Violation 413, 414/87-08-01: Failure to Follow Procedure
and Inadequate Procedure for Testing of Pressurizer PORV's. .The
licensee responded to this item in correspondence dated June'11,
1987.
The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken and
considers this item closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items'were not identified in this report.
5.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)
a.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting -
period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical
Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control . room logs,
danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Iter Log, and the
removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers
were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with
approved procedures.
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures
taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current
requirements. Areas inspected included the security o, organization,
the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation
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zones, and access control and badging.
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In addition to thE areas discussed above, the areas toured were
inspected. for_ fire prevention and protection activities.
These
included such things as combustible material control, fire protection
systems and materials, and fire protection associated with mainte-
nance activities.
The. inspectors reviewed Problem Investigation
Reports to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting
problems and implementing appropriate corrective actions.
The inspector reviewed Technical Specification chemistry analyies for
January 1,1987 through May 15, 1987.
b.
Unit 1 Summary:
' Unit 1 began the period at- 100% power.
On June 5 an unidentified
leak of approximately 1.7 gpm was discovered. The leak was isolated
within four (4) hours and the Action Staternent of Technical Specifi-
cation 3.4.6.2 was exited.
The leak was determined to be from a
relief valve on the Reactor Coolant Radiation Monitor line and
possibly from Reactor Coolant Pump Seals (which later improved). On
June 22 Refueling Water Storage Tank boron concentration was
determined to be slightly greater than maximum specification and
power reduction was commenced. The problem identified as stratifica-
tion due to improper recirculation. The power reduction was halted
at 87% when a later sample was satisfactory.
On July 3 a tube
rupture in the letdown heat exchanger occurred causing a Reactor
Coolant to Component Ccoling leak of approximately 50 gpm. The line
was isolated within approximately five minutes of quantifying the
leak rate.
The unit ended the period at 100% power, on excess
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letdown, monitoring primary system chemistry closely and repairing
the letdown heat exchanger.
c.
Unit 2 Summary:
The unit began the period at 100%.
On June 2 they began power
reduction due to low boron concentration in a Cold Leg Accumulator
(CLA). The cause was a dilution effect resulting from primary system
check valve leakage into the Safety Injection pump header.
The
diluted water was charged into the CLA during makeup evolutions. ;'
After two drain and refills of the CLA, boron concentration was
satisfactory ar.d power reduction was halted at 49%. The unit ended
the period at 100% power.
d.
On February 2,1987, Duke Design Engineering identified heater wiring
in the Annulus Ventilation (VE) filter train that was not environ-
mentally qualified for post accident radiation doses.
This was
documented in Problem Invest gation Report (PIR) 0-C87-0024. The VE
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filter trains had bee 1 determined operable, however, the justifica-
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tion was not clearly documented and on June 9,1987, Catawba Nuclear
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Station questioned the operability determination. The justification
for continued operation was forwarded in a memo dated June 11, 1987
from L.R. Weidler, Duke Design Engineering. It concluded that based
on a filter carbon bed ef ficiency of at least 89%, and complete
failuru of the filter heaters, the filters are operable for offsite
doss considerations.
Catawba will replace the wiring as soon as
parts are available and until then will perform a monthly laboratory
analysis of a representative carbon sample to ensure efficiency is at
least 99.7% which provides a margin to the required 89%.
This is
identified as Inspector Followup Item 413, 414/87-20-02: Replacement
of Non Environmentally Qualified Wire in Annulus Ventilation Filter
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Heater, pending installation of qualified wiring in the heaters.
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On May' 27,1987, ~ during uan early morning inspection the inspector
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noted a Nuclear Eqi:Ipment Operator (NEO) in a break room apparently
asleep.
Although /the NEO was not assigned a specific duty at the
time, licensee rules appropriately do not allow sleeping while on
duty.
The inspector brought the situation to the attention of
management who took appropriate corrective
action
including
disciplinary action. On May 28, 1987, the licensee found another NEO
asleep and has since taken disciplinary action for this individual as
well.
The licensee also issued a letter to all personnel reminding
them of the rules and the importance of staying awake. In addition,
off hour management tours were implemented on June 1,
1987, to
observe personnel on duty. One construction person was found asleep
but no additional operations personnel have been found sleeping to
date.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)
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a.
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations
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wera in compliance with variouc TS requirements. Typical of these
requirements were confirmation of compiiance with the TS for reactor
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coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power sy stem s ,
safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventila-
tion, and direct current electrical power sources. The inspector
verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with
the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated,
limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and
restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results
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met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the
individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified
during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate
management personnel.
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b.
The' inspector observed the following surveillance activities:
PT/2/A/4600/02A-
Mode 1 Periodic Surveillance Items
IP/2/A/3222/00D
Analog Channel Operational Test Channel 4
010027 SWR.
CA Flow Channel Check
PT/2/A/4250/002A'
Diesel Generator 2A Operability Test
c.
The inspector reviewed the following surveillance for acceptance:
PT/1,2/A/4600/03B
Quarterly Surveillance-Items
PT/2/A/4200/06B
ECCS Valve Lineup
d ._
The inspector reviewed the licensee's Cont rinment Penetration Valve
Injection Water System Performance Test, P'/1/A/4200/01T. ' Technical Specification 4.6.6.2 requires the use of a Containment Pressure High
or.High High test signal. The test procedure called for a Manual
Phase A or Phase B Containment Isolation test signal in place of the
containment . pressure test signal.
This appeared to be an incon-
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sistency with respect to the required source of the test signal.
' Discussions with licensee Performance Test Engineers and with Tom
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' Dunning of NRC:NRR indicated that adequate component testing and
required overlap was being accomplished in the overall surveillance
test program. It was additionally determined that manual Phase.A or
Phase B actuation was an adequate substitute for a Containment
Pressure High or High High test signal since the source of the
initial signal was at the . system level instead of the component
level. Although the wording in the Technical Specifications could be
more clear, submission of an amendment request by the licensee would
probably not be warranted.
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e.
On June 24, 1987, the inspector attended a meeting of NRC and
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licensee personnel to discuss the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
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Code,Section XI, IWP and IWV pump and valve test program. Minutes
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of this meeting will be published by NRC:NRR.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Maintenance.0 observations (Units 1& 2) (62703)
a.
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components
were observed / reviewed to an ertain that they were conducted in
accordance with requirements
The inspector verified that licensee
activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional
-testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning
components or systems to service, quality contral records were
maintained, activities performed were accomplished by qualified
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p'ersonnel, and materials 1used were properly certified. Work requests.
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were ' reviewed to determine status of outs,tanding -jobs and to assure -
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that' priority is, assignedito safety-related equipment maintenance-
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which may effect' system performance.
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b.
'The inspector observed belt replacement' an E sheath / adjustment'
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activities being performed'on a Control Room Area Air Handling Unit.
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c.
The inspector. reviewed the following wo i requests:
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.4161 MNT
5486 PRF
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4162 MNT
5513 PRF
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-4114 MNT.
5531 PRF.
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'4147 MNT-
5541 PRF
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4196 MNT
~5561 PRF
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" 4128 MNT
5572 PRF
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4382 MNT-
5589 PRF
Noviolationsordeviationswereidentified/f
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8.
Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports { Units-1 & 2) (92700)
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The below listed Licensee Evenh+eports (LER'r Vere reviewed to; de.termine
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if the . information provided not' NRC _ requirements.
The determination
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. included: adequacy of description, verification of compliance with.
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Technical Specifications- and regulatory' requirements,. corrective action
taken, existence of. potential generic' problems, reporting requirements *
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satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional
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inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were
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conducted for .those reports indicated by an (*).
Thuj following LERs are
closed:
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LER 413/87-11 Rv.3
Unit Shutdown Due to Diesel Generator
Inoperability Because of Manufacturing
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Geficiency.
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- LER 413/87-19
Tdnnical Specification Violation Because of
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Mssed Valve Retests Due to Personnel Error (LIV
c.j issued - see belcw).
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Technical Specific.ation Violation Because of
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Missed Weekly Fire Door Inspection Due to a
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Personne1' Error.
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- LER 414/87-06
Containment Air Release Terminated Due to
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Installation Deficiency.
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- LER 414/87-17
Containment Air Release Termination - Note: This
LER was assigned a number but was cancelled as
not reportable prior to the final written report.
b.
On April 23, 1987, the licensee identified the Unit 1 Containment
Pressure Channel'IV inoperable and on the next day discovered that
1NSPT5040, the' pressure transmitter isolation valve, was shut causing
the inoperability. This event was documented by Incident Investiga-
tion Report C87-040-1 and Licensee Event Report (LER) 413/87-18. The
reports concluded that 1NSPT5040 was inappropriately closed on
April 22, however, the individual responsible for closing the valve
was not determined. A very similar event occurred in November 1986
in which the licensee was unable to determine how a containment
pressure transmitter became isolated (LER 413/86-59). The inspector
was concerned that a significant problem existed and the cause had
not'been identified, thus the licensee was asked to review the events
in more detail. After a more thorough review of the Channel IV strip
chart recorder it became evident that 1NSPT5040 had been shut on
April 7, while performing an instrument calibration and had failed to
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be reopened until April 24. Closer inspection of the valve revealed
a loose and mispositioned handwheel on the valve stem allowing
handwheel rotation without stem movement. This apparently fooled the
technicians performing the calibration into believing they had opened
the valve when in fact the valve remained closed.
The 'icensee's original investigation was flawed in that a thorough
review and comparison of available information was not performed.
This led to a wrong conclusion that the channel was isolated without
being placed in the tripped condition for approximately 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> when
it was actually isolated for approximately 16 days. This contributed
to a missed opportunity to discover how and why the valve was shut.
Furthermore supervisors responsible for review failed to note the
inadequacy of the investigation.
Although similarities between the
April and the November event were recognized, the supervisors failed
to require a more thorough investigation in to the recurring problem.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation process as
described in Station Directive 2.8.1, " Problem Investigation Process
and Regulatory Reporting" and SRG/2, " Safety Review Group Incident
Investigation and Report Preparation." The intent of these proce-
dures, among others, is to determine root cause, to evaluate for a
recurring event and to provide corrective actions.
The reviewing
supervisors must recognize when the investigation has been ineffec-
tive and should not hesitate to require a second effort. This aspect
was discussed with responsible licensee personnel who agreed to
evaluate the program for improvement in that area.
This is
identified as a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 Violation
413/87-20-03:
Inadequate Investigation of Isolated Containment
Pressure Channel.
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c.
In LER 413/87-19,- listed above, the licensee described a Technical
-Specification ' violation due to. failure to conduct retests .. of .
Auxiliary Feedwater System check valves. This item was identified by.
a special test' review task force and, therefore, the licensee is-
given~ credit for identification and reporting of the violation. .This
-is Licensee Identified Violation 413/87-20-04:
Failure to Retest
Auxiliary- Feedwater Check Valves. This item is considered closed ~ by
this report.
One violation was identifisd as described in paragraph 8.b. above.
9.
Previc,t. sly Identified Inspector Findings-(92701)
a.
(CLOSED).
Inspector Followup
Item 413/86-05-02; 414/86-07-01:
Discrepancies Noted Between Periodic Test Program Data Base and Tech.
Spec.
The discrepancies have been corrected and no Technical
Specification violations have occurred, therefore, . .this item is
closed.
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b.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 413/86-07-01: Revise FSAR Table
12.3.4-1 to Reflect Proper Range and Sensitivity . of Steam Li ne .
Monitors. .The discrepancy is corrected in Revision 15 of- the FSAR
which was reviewed by the inspector.
c.
'(CLOSED)' Inspector- Followup Item 413/86-43-02: Review of Control
. Board Valve Tagout Methods. This item is closed based on revision 17
of Catawba Nuclear Station Directive 3.1.1, Safety Tags and Delinia-
tion Tags, which : requires valve position to be indicated on control'
board. stickers associated with tagouts. Operator training has been
. completed and the inspector. reviewed various tagouts'which adequately
implemented the directive,
d.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 413/87-10-04: Safety Tag Verifica-
tion on Block Tagouts. This item is closed based upon the licensee's
determination that the maintenance technicians should have performed
the additional tagout verification prior to commencement of work.
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This is consistent with Station Directive 3.1.1.
This incident has
been evaluated ' as an isolated case by the licensee. The inspector
spot checked several tagouts associated with ongoing maintenance for
proper verification.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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