ML20236D741

State of VT Brief & Argument in Responding & in Opposition to Memorandum of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp on Existence of Any Genuine & Substantial Question of Fact Re Contention 1.* Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20236D741
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	03/17/1989
From:	Press S VERMONT, STATE OF
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#189-8302 OLA, NUDOCS 8903230247
Download: ML20236D741 (14)

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DOCKETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA- USNFC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAR @9 MAR 20 P3 :20 Before Administrative Judges

,mc a Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.

James H. Carpenter In the. Matter of )

)

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR ) Docket No. 50-271-OLA POWER CORPORATION ) (Spent Fuel Pool

) Amendment,)

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear )

Power Station) )

)

STATE OF VERMONT'S BRIEF AND ARGUMENT IN RESPONDING AND IN OPPOSITION TO MEMORANDUM OF VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION ON.THE EXISTENCE OF ANY GENUINE AND SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF FACT REGARDING CONTENTION 1 I. INTRODUCTION The State of Vermont (" Vermont"), an interested state (10 CFR 2.715(c)), hereby submits arguments responding and in opposition to Memorandum of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation on the Existence of any Genuine and Substantial Question of Fact regarding Contention 1

(" Memorandum"). This brief, and the Testimony of William K. Sherman, are responsive arguments and testimony, filed in accordance with 10 CFR 2.1113 and the Board's Memorandum and Order dated January 10, 1989.  !

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-C Vermont Yankee' Nuclear Power' Corporation (" Vermont .

Yankee") in the Memorandum and the accompanying Sworn ,

Written Testimony.of. Donald A. Reid, et. al., Submitted by. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, dated February 28, 1989, (" Applicant's Testimony"), has chosen- -I 1

to litigate Contention 1 both on the basis that the existing spent fuel pool cooling system (SFPCS) meets the 2

single failure criterion , and that the enhanced SFPCS further meets the single failure criterion 4.

The State;of Vermont argues that the SFPCS is not proven to meet the single failure criterion on either basis. In consideration of the existing system, it is apparent'that the existing SFPCS does not meet the single failure criterion, neither for storage of 2870 fuel assemblies 1

Contention 1: The spent fuel pool expansion amendment should be denied because, through the necessity to use one train of the reactor's residual heat removal system (RHR) in addition to the spent fuel cooling system l in order to maintain the pool water within the design .

a limits of 150 F, the Single-failure criterion as set forth in the General Design Criteria, and particularly Criterion 44, will be violated. The Applicant has not established that its proposed method of spent fuel pool cooling ensures that both the fuel pool cooling system and the reactor cooling system are single failure proof.

2 Applicant's Testimony, item A. at 17.

An enhanced SFPCS was proposed in Vermont Yankee j letter to NRC, dated June 7, 1988, and was evaluated in the NRC staff Safety Evaluation Report issued October 14, l 1988. ]

4 Applicant's Testimony, item B at 17.

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, requested in this proceeding, nor for the present configuration allowing storage of 2000 fuel assemblies.

It is,'however, futile to litigate based on the existing SFPCS since the Applicant committed as of June 7, 1988, to install the enhanced SFPCS, and all review by the-parties and NRC'were performed with that commitment arisumed.

{ As of the time of that commitment, the adequacy of the existing SFPCS became irrelevant. <

In consideration of the enhanced SFPCS, as demonstrated in'the Responsive Testimony of William K. Sherman

(" Vermont Responsive Testimony"), there is not yet availabla sufficient information to allow the Board to decide the issue. Lacking design information, it'is impossible to decide the issue. The Board should hold the proceeding open pending the necessary and required information to prove the single failure adequacy of the enhanced SFPCS. Absent this information, the Board must deny the application.

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II.

SUMMARY

OF THE PROCEEDING In April, 1986, Vermont Yankee applied for an amendment to it's operating license to increase the maximum ,

authorized spent fuel storage capacity from 2000. spent' fuel assemblies to 2870 assemblies. In May, 1987,

' Contention'1 was admitted by this board' challenging the adequacy of the SFPCS. Vermont Yankee's application intended'to.use the residual heat removal (RHR) system to-augment, during reactor operation, the SFPCS until-sufficient fuel decay had taken place 5. The NRC staff reviewed this application and summarized its conclusions 6

on January 21,'1988 . The NRC staff concluded, in part Based upon the staff's calculated decay heat load, under the normal maximum heat load and a' single failure, one SFPCS train cannot maintain the SFP water temperature below 150 F foy the first'68 days

.following shutdown for refueling 5

Vermont Yankee Response to Request for Additional Informaton - Proposed Change 133, Spent: Fuel Expansion, dated November 24, 1986, R. W. Capstick to Vernon L.

Rooney, Questions 13 and 17.

6 NRC letter, Forthcoming Meeting with Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, dated January 21, 1988 (Stephen A.

Varga to Warren P. Murphy), with Enclosure, Status Report on Review of Explanation of the Spent Fuel Storage capacity.

7 141, at 5.

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I'i The licensee should provide-additional information which-addresses removal:on normal-fuel pool decay.

heat in the event of a single failure ~or propose an acceptaglealternativemethod-fordecayheat removal While the licensee noted thatfSFP cooling with the SFP heat exchangers :in parallel was possible, sufficient information has not been provided to thoroughly describe the SFPCS cooling capacity in this mode Based'upon the information reviewed to date, cycling the RHR system between'the torus and the spent fuel

. pool is ngg an acceptable method to cool the. spent-fuel pool As remedy for.this design deficiency, the Applicant committed to' design and install an enhanced SFPCS .

The direct result'of this commitment was the issuance by NRC of a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on May 20, 1988, for'the installation only of new fuel racks at vermont Yankee. This SER authorized installation of new fuel racks, but did not authorize an increase in allowed spent fuel storage. The Applicant subsequently installed a portion of the new fuel racks at risk, pending the outcome of this proceeding.

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'Idx, at 8.

IdA 11 Transcript of Meeting between NRC staff and Vermont

' Yankee, February 9, 1988; Vermont Yankee letter dated March 2, 1988, Vermont Yankee Proposed Change 133 - Spent l Fuel Pool Expansion (Warren P. Murphy to NRC Document Control Desk); Vermont Yankee letter dated June 7, 1988, Vermont Yankee Proposed Technical Specification Change for New and Spent Fuel Storage (Warren P. Murphy to NRC Page 5

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On October.14, 1988, the NRC staff issued a document, Safety Evaluation Report Supporting the Spent Fuel Pool Expansion with the following conclusion:  !

Based on these findings the staff concludes that the Vermont Yankee high density racks and fuel pool, including the enhanced system for spent fuel pool cooling is acceptable for the proposed expansion to  ;

2870 assemblies, provided that the number of spent fuel assemblies does not exceed 2000 until the enhanced system as described in the licensee's June 7, 1988 submittal has bggn installed and tested to demonstate operability III. RESPONSIVE ARGUMENTS I

A. The Existing SFPCS Does Not Meet the Single Failure Criterion Applicant's Testimony, at 17, concludes that the SFPCS meets the single failure criterion after 10 days of fuel decay considering the most critical single active failure. This is refuted by Vermont Responsive Testimony, at 4-7, which identifies a single failure l

which leads to the calculation of 69 days of fuel decay i required before the single failure criterion is met.

This is beyond the aveage refueling duration of 44 days.

This defect could be remedied by technical specification limitation prohibiting the facility from entering Startup Document Control Desk).

I SER, October 14, 1988, at 38.

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' mode until after 69 days (Vermont Responsive. Testimony lat

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Nevertheless, any argument of"the existing SFPCS'is moot, since the Applicant has made a firm commitment to provide

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enhanced SFPCS (Applicant's Testimony, at 15-17).

Argument must therefore concentrate on the details of the enhanced SFPCS. "

B. Insufficient Detail is Providad regarding the-Enhanced SFPCS In the June 7,-1988 submittal, the Applicant provided a

" construction permit stage" safety analysis report (SAR) presentation of the conceptual design of an enhanced SFPCS. This submittal failed to include material relating to the single failure adequacy 13, of a detail 13 Vermont has.taken into consideration the Board's Memoradum and Order ("The Order"), LBP-88-25, dated September 27, 1988, regarding Interrogatories 11-17.

While Vermont Responsive Testimony, at 7-18, considers issues included in the Order (environmental qualification, seismic qualification, missile and fire protection requirements), Vermont neither intends a

, fishing expedition to uncover possible problems (Order at 4), nor intends to exceed the literal bounds of the contention (Order at 4-5). Rather, Vermont holds that each of the areas described in Vermont Responsive Testimony, at 7-18, is directly related to the single failure criterion, and this relation is provided in the testimony. Further, Vermont holds that, due to the failure to provide " operating license stage" material in Page 7

that the staff, by its practices, uses to review operating license applications (Vermont Responsive Testimony, at 7-18). Lacking this detailed information, it cannot be determined if the single failure criterion is met.

C. Genuine and Legitimate Single Failure Concerns Exist The procedures encompassed by 10 CFR 50.91 and 92 recognize the legitimate concern of the public for the safety of nuclear facilities. The exercise of this concern in the present proceeding involves the single failure adequacy to remove decay heat from spent fuel.

The progress of the proceeding has shown that the existing SFPCS fails to meet the single failure criterion for the present spent fuel storage configuration (Vermont Responsive Testimony at 5-6).14 The enhanced SFPCS was meant to moot single failure concerns, and in a broad sense, the specific concern

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i these areas which could potentially affect single failure, 10 CFR 2.732 is not met, i.e., the case is not proven.

14 The nonconformance with the single failure cciterion of the existing SFPCS for the present spent fuel storage l l

allowance indicates a breakdown in the past review and l l

approval process.

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regarding interaction with the RHR system is removed (although, as shown by Vermont Responsive Testimony at 14-16, the informational uncertainties regarding the enhanced SFPCS,' leave open possible, and unacceptable, reliance on the RHR system).

Notwithstanding, legitmate and genuine concerns exist over the adequacy of single failure design and review.

1. Since enhanced SFPCS boundaries are not provided, concern exists that the complete suction and discharge paths, and interconnecting piping up to and including isolation valves, will be upgraded to seismic cate' gory I requirements (Vermont Responsive Testimony at 8-9, 15).

2. Since physical location is not provided, concern exists that single event earthquake, tornado, flood, fire and internal missile effects will not be prevented (Vermont Responsive Testimony at 9-10,15-16).

3. Since essential equipement to be environmentally qualified are not tabulated, and review of qualification reports is not completed, concern exists that single failure from degraded building environments will not be prevented (Vermont Responsive Testimony at 10-12, 16).

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4 '. Since Class lE electrical supply and separation is not demonstrated, concern exists that failure through single electrical events or faults will not be prevented (Vermont Responsive Testimony at 12-17).

The overall concern is that premature determination of the present proceeding could result in an inadequate and unsatisfactory resolution of the above concerns, coupled with the inability to litigate due to 10 CFR 2.1115.(c),(1).

D. Until Satisfaction of the Contention, an Unresolved Safety Issue Exists -

Vermont Yankee pleads for dismissal of Contention 1 based, in part, on the conceptual design of the enhanced SFPCS. Should this be granted, it is NRC staff's intention to allow plant modification (installation of the enhanced SFPCS) under 10 CFR 50.59 without further NRC review of single failure adequacy and without the .

- opportunity for public review or interaction.15 NRC Staff Response to NECNP's First Set of l Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents l to the NRC Staff on the Spent Fuel Pool Expansion Safety Evaluation, December 27, 1988, Interrogatory 2.

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Further, this proceeding represents the last chance to consider the single failure adequacy of the enhanced SFPCS .

1 Determination of Contention 1 cannot be made since single failure adequacy cannot be determined from conceptual information only 17 . Installation cannot proceed 16 Per 10 CFR 2.1115.(c).(1).

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We are unaware of a rule which permits an operating license amendment to be decided based on conceptual or construction permit level information. This, in fact, is what the Applicant intends, with the NRC staff conclusion in the SER of October 14, 1988, at 38, "[ spent fuel pool storage cannot be increased) until the enhanced system as described in the licensee's June 7, 1988, submittal has been installed and tested to demonstrate operability."

NRC intends to perform the review of single failure adequacy that 1)is established through its own SRP practices, and'2)should be completed prior to determination of this proceeding, at a later time gutsida the oublic venue, in the context of verifying .

}9stallationandoperability.

We are unaware that 10 CFR 50.92 or other rules permit an operating license amendment to be decided based on conceptual or construction permit level informa, tion.

This, in fact, is what the Applicant intends, using the NRC staff conclusion in the SER of October, 14, 1988, at 38, "[ spent fuel storage may not be increased) until the enhanced system as described in the licensee's June 7, 1988, submittal has been installed and tested to demonstrate operability." NRC intends to perform the review of single failure adequacy that 1)is established through its own SRP practices, and 2)should be completed prior to determination of this proceeding, at a later time outside the oublic venue, in the context of verifying installation and operability.

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.. e O' because the existence of Contention 1 proves there is an unresolved safety. issue. In order to allow proof of the single failure adequacy of the enhanced SFPCS, the Board has no recourse but to defer decision until " operating license stage" detail information is provided.

IV. CONCLUSION -

Considering the foregoing, the Board is compelled to defer determination on Contention 1 pending production of operating license stage detail information. Absent the proof required by 10 CFR 2.732, the Board should deny the application.

Respectfully / submitted,

,/ ' CU~k.) -

Samuel H. Press Special Assistant Attorney General Director for Public Advocacy George Young -

l Special Counsel Vermont Department of Public Service 120 State Street Montpelier, Vermont 05602 (802) 828-2811 Counsel for State of Vermonn j DATED: March 17, 1989 l

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$ rh UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 'gg gp 20 p3:19 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

(

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARDi'E. UUL t . a #'

Before Administrative Judges

~

Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.

James H. Carpenter In the Matter of )

)

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR ) Docket No. 50-271-OLA POWER CORPORATION ) (Spent Fuel Pool

) Amendment)

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear )

Power Station) )

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Samuel H. Press, hereby certify that on March 17, 1988, I made service of the within Brief and Prefiled Testimony of William K. Sherman in accordance with the rules of the Commission by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to the following:

Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire, Andrea C. Ferster, Esquire Chairman Harmon Curran & Tousley Administrative Judge Suite 430 Atomic Safety and Licensing 2001 S Street, N.W.

Board Panel Washington, DC 20009 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Gustave A. Linenbergqr, Jr. George B. Dean, Esq.

< Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Environmental Protection Board Panel Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Department of the Attorney Commission General Washington, D.C. 20555 One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 Page 1

Mr. Jar.ss H. Carpenter Ann P. Hodgdon, Esquire Administrative Judge Office of the General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Board Panel Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, DC 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing R. K. Gad III Board Panel Ropes & Gray U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 225 Franklin St.

Commission Boston, MA 02110 Washington, DC 20555 Geoffrey M. Huntington, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau State House Annex j 25 Capitol Street j Concord, NH 03301-6397 af M Samuel H'. Press Special Counsel I

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