ML20235W859
| ML20235W859 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1987 |
| From: | Kane W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8710190066 | |
| Download: ML20235W859 (11) | |
Text
, ?
USHRC-DS 19810C1 n A D O F 00T 081987 Docket No.
50-412 License No. NPF-64 Duquesne Light Company ATTN: Mr. J. J. Carey Senior Vice President Nuclear Group Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2, Special Assessment Report Per agreement reached in a meeting on May 18, 1987 and your commitment in a letter dated June 29, 1987, Duquesne Light Company performed an Operational Assessment of Beaver Valley Unit No. 2 performance for the 1nterval between initial criticality 'and completion of 50's po'wer plateau testing. This assess-ment was transmitted in your letter of September 16 and discussed, together with our preliminary assessment, in a meeting onsite on September 18, 1987. At that time, based upon your experience to date with the initial startup and testing program, NRC agreed that continuation of the startup test program was appropriate.
Since that meeting, we finalized our assessment of your performance during this limited time period; this interim special assessment report is enclosed for' your information. This report does not supersede our normal Systematic Assess-ment of Licensee Performance (SALP) process. Our next SALP report will include this period; this special assessment will be a part of the overall input to i
that SALP.
Please contact us if you have any questions on this report.
Sincerely, Original Sic:. led By William F. Kane, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
Special Assessment Report, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 8710190066 071008 PDR ADOCK 05000412 O
PDR OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 14 TRIPP 10/6/87 - 0001.0.0 10/07/87
\\
Duquesne Light Company 2
00T 081987 cc w/ enc 1:
J. D. Sieber, Vice President, Nuclear J. Crockett, Senior Manager, Nuclear Operations E. Ewing, Quality Assurance Manager R. J. Swiderski, Manager, Startup Group J. P. Thomas, Manager, Engineering R. E. Martin, Manager, Regulatory Affairs C. O. Richardson, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector Commonwealth of Pennsylvania bec w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
DRP Section Chief J. Beall, SRI, BV-1 P. Tam, LPM, NRR T. Martin, DRSS S. Ebneter, DRS A. Lodewyk, DRS Robert J. Bores, DRSS l
1 RhDjP RI:DRP i:
P
/mjd iggins a e" 10/h/87 10/h/87 10/1/87 l
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 14 TRIPP 10/6/87 - 0002.0.0 10/06/87
]
l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I SPECIAL ASSESSMENT REPORT I
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY BEAVER VALLEY, UNIT 2 ASSESSMENT PERIOD: AUGUST 4, 1987 - SEPTEMBER 11, 1987 l
l 1
1
l l
j j
l
.1.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE The Systematic Assessment of. Licensee Performance (SALP) Report No.
(50-412/86-99) on Beaver Valley, Unit 2, assessed performance during the period from April 1,1986 to February 28, 1987. At the end of the period, i
the licensee had recently completed construction activities and was in the f
midst of finishing preoperational testing.
The Regional Administrator recuested the licensee to conduct a self-assessment of their performance during the initial phases of tbMr power ascension test program. At the i
same time, the Region I staff w, directed to conduct a parallel assess-ment of licensee performance.
Because the reactor shut down on September 11, 1987 after reaching 50?;
{
power, that date was chosen as the end date for the assessment. Accord-ingly, this Special Assessment Report covers the period from August 4 (initial criticality) to September 11, 1987 (50?;
power plateau completion).
Although the assessment utilizes a SALP-type methodology, it is in addition to the SALP process, and the assessment period of the i
next BV-2 SALP will not be adjusted for it.
This assessment reviews Operations, Surveillance, Startup Testing, and Assurance of Quality and j
includes an Overall Evaluation.
I The licensee's assessment was received on September 16, 1987, and the
{
Regional staf f's assessment included a review of the licensee's report.
Both assessments were discussed at a site meeting with the licensee on September 18, 1987.
2.
OVERALL EVALUATION Performance in the functional area of Operations was very good. Licensee preplanning was evident.
The approach to initial criticality was delib-erate and well controlled.
The number of unplanned trips and reportable events was low for the initial period of power operations. There were no Technical Specification violations or missed surveillance tests.
Licensee management involvement v.'es strong and frequent meetings were effective in addressing problems.
The ;,,terf ace between operations and testing per-sonnel was a notable strength.
Performance in the area of Startup Testing was excellent.
Pretest briefings were generally thorough and test deficiencies were aggressively pursued and resolved.
Management involvement in the test program was evident and allowed schedule changes to enhance the practical value of the time at power.
For example, ascending to 50?s power for a limited time prior to the plant-challenging 30?; power tests assured that the balance of plant systems would be exercised prior to any shutdown that might be required.
]
1 a
y,.
Beaver Valley Unit;2 Special 2
l 1-Assessment-i E
l 1
' Performance in;the areaf of-' Assurance of Quality was good with substantial:
i involvement byfalllon-site groups as. evidenced in the -NRC-requested l
li ce'n see. ' sel f-a s se s sment.
The extensive and consistent involvement ~ by
(
senior management in' daily ' site ' activities continued.
Effective problem identification and resolution were demonstrated.
Overall, 'the licensee ' achieved a ve ry' good level of performance with notable strengths ; and. no ' major weaknesses. 'The licensee 'should be encouragedc to use self-assessment.'and anticipatory programs rather than overly relying upon a reactive approach.
3.
OPERATIONS In ' the ' la' st SALP-Report, the area of Operational Readiness was rated Category 2 (Improving).
This functional area included consideration - of ~
~
procedures and. ' staffing; training and qualification; security; radiolog--
ical' controls and chemistry; and emergency preparedness.
The overall assessment of this functional area was that the licensee had made good-progress in finishing' construction and testing and achieving a good -. level of operational readiness.
Strengths were noted in the quality of proced-ures, the experience of. the staff, ~ and the conservatism of the radiation protection philosophy.
Some. deficiencies were noted in the progress of security program development and system installation.
During this assessment, the inspectors noted a continued. strong perform-ance in - the SALP-identified strength areas; these strengths enabled the licensee to achieve very good performance.
The quality of the procedures and the' experience of -the operators were instrumental in avoiuing any Technical Specification violations, missed surveillance tests,. or feed-water induced reactor trips during the period.
There were only two unexpected ESF actuations.
An AFW motor driven pump was inadvertently started in a surveillance test due to procedural deficiencies.
In the second event, the motor driven AFW pumps received a signal to autostart due to operator difficulty in restarting a main feedwater pump during recovery.from the loss of offsite power test.
In this latter event, one of the AFW pumps failed to start due to an overcurrent condition, but ope'rators failed to. provide appropriate-follosup until the problem reoccurred later in the same day during a previously scheduled surveil-lance test.
This inadequate followup by operations personnel was atypical.
The overall experience in this area was good as compared to other recently licensed plants as listed in NUREG-1275 and reflects good knowledge / performance by the operations and maintenance staffs. Further-more, none of the startup tests (with the exception of MSIV closure) resulted in unplanned reactor trips.
l
o
)N m
p"(
' Beaver V'alleyfunit 2.Special-3 J-Assessment The licensee's approach to. initial'. criticality and ' low power physics ll testing was very deliberate and :well controlled.
A ; few deficiencies. in -
I
. configuration control were identified. -The most significant was ' an AFW pump pressure valve switch found to be valved out which created some NRC -
l and licensee concern. The'. licensee was responsive and worked closely with l*
NRC to examine other systems to determine if more significant 'or wide-spread problems had ' occurred.
Although a few additional minor problems were -- i denti fi ed, none were ' judged by NRC or the licensee to be safety.
However, Re' ional. management interacting with the licensee r
significant.
g regarding-this problem concluded that more initial licensee initiative 1
. ould have been appropriate.
w A total of five unplanned automatic reactor trips occurred during this'-
assessment. The root 'cause of two trips was ' unexpectedly-high rod worth coupled with low MTC such that multi-step rod withdrawal at low power resulted in plant transients.
One trip was due to an isolated I&C tech-nician error in which a power supply 'was shorted. The MSIV closure test i
at 30% power resulted in a sudden steam generator level shrink and low-low l
steam generator level trip which, while not planned,. was not entirely unexpected due to the severity of the transient. The last trip was due to
- a defective turbine overspeed trip circuit. Overall, this experience also reflected good performance by the plant staff.
The spurious turbine overspeed trip-occurred at 30% power and resulted in a fairly complex sequence of events. Steam generator level shrink combined with a tripped (while out of service for repairs). steam flow / feed flow mismatch bistable caused a reactor trip.
Af ter a time delay, the gener-ator output breaker tripped, as designed, and the 4KV buses supplying the reactor coolant pumps (RCP) made a fast transfer to the live buses powered from offsite.
Despite the fast transfer, the RCPs tripped on underfre--
quency.. The thoroughness of the licensee's investigation was evident in identifying the initiating event, the reactor trip cause,.and the RCP underfre'quency cause.
The number of lighted annunciators in the control room was considered to be high, but other information available to operators was judged suffic-ient for determination of plant status.
The licensee has an active on-going program for evaluating, resolving and trending such annunciators; a followup reoort to describe this program and its progress has been requested by NRC by December 15, 1987.
The effective interf ace between the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) and test supervision' was a notable strength.
Prior to the MSIV closure test, the NSS discussed that he would wish to reopen the MSIVs as soon as feas-ible to restore the normal path of decay heat removal.
The reactor tripped within ten seconds of MSIV closure; the NSS oversaw the accurate completion of immediate actions, asked the test supervisor about the MSIVs, and was able to quickly reopen them such that no steam generator
]
l l
i
Beaver. Valley Unit 2 Special 4
/
Assessment relief valves were actuated.
Excellent control of the loss of offsite power (LOOP) test was also demonstrated. After the plant was stabilized, i
the NSS asked the test supervisor about reopening the MSIVs.
In this case, the test supervisor requested 30 minutes of data under-the existing conditions to assure all data trends were captured.
This request was accommodated by the Operations crew and the desired data was acquired.
1 These examples were indicative of the excellent control and cognizance of plant activities that the on-shif t operations staff exhibited throughout this period of numerous parallel on going activities. Control room access and noise levels were well controlled; operator plant knowledge and pre-vious experience at Unit I were instrumental in achieving high performance levels and control.
In summary, the licensee demonstrated very good performance in the area of Operations during this period.
A slow and deliberate approach to initial criticality was observed and initial low power physics testing was con-ducted in an almost error-free manner.
A strong and effective interface was maintained between the licensed operators and the test cres.
Both groups showed flexibility in cooperating with each other to acquire good test data while enhancing plant safety.
First hand observations by various inspectors of Control Room performance following two trips from 30*, power (MSIV closure and LOOP) showed excellent operator initial response and subsequent licensee problem solving efforts.
4.
STARTUP AND SURVEILLANCE TESTING Management Control Management oversight and control of testing activities continued to be effective.
Consistent management monitoring of plant activities was observed during major plant evaluations and tests.
Strong management attention to the safety implications of problems identified by startup testing was evident.
The daily plant meetings conducted at 8:00 a.m.
and 4:00 p.m. provided good interf aces among the various groups.
Information and work status i
were presented clearly and concisely during these meetings.
Management presence at these meeting helped in resolving schedule conflicts and assigning priorities among many activities.
Equipment problems identified during startup testing were properly evalu-ated and followed.
Management attention to these problems was consis-tently evident, and was properly factored into later testing.
For i
example, the problem with the Reactor Coolant Pump underfrequency relays was identified, but not resolved until several days after the reactor trip on August 25, 1987 by replacing the relays.
In the interim pe ri od,
further testing was conducted using of fsite power supplies so the fast transfer capability, which was the problem with these relays, would not be required.
i
i.
Beaver Valley Unit 2 Special 5
j
'l Assessment Organizational Interfaces The interfaces among the various groups involved in testing activities were generally smooth.
Particularly effective interfaces existed between the Operations and the Test Group.
Prior to performing testing, pre-test briefings were conducted by test personnel.
Also, before the transient-type tests, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor reminded the operation crews to monitor key parameters during the test. Test prerequisites, initial test conditions and plant responses were jointly monitored by the Operations and testing personnel.
Problems identified by testing were correctly and promptly fed back to Operations, and corrective actions were properly taken.
While appropriate briefings were generally conducted prior to testing, during the post-core hot functional test phase before the start of this operational assessment period, these pre-test briefings were not always conducted in sufficient detail. As an example, a safety injection that occurred on July 30, 1987, was due to a misunderstanding between test personnel and the operations crew as a result of a pre-test briefing not being properly conducted.
This weakness was brought to management's attention by NRC and, during this assessment period, test briefings significantly improved.
Startup Test Performance Startup tests were generally conducted in accordance with approved test procedures by highly qualified personnel.
Test datt were properly taken, data stations were adequately manned, and data reduction was performed properly.
The startup test administrative program was carried out per test procedure IST 2.01A.10, "Startup Testing Program," which provided a logic and com-prehensive test sequence.
To the extent practical, this procedure was followed through most phases of startup testing. Particularly noteworthy were the tests during the approach to the initial criticality and the low power physics testing.
These tests were performed in a deliberate, con-trolled and well organized manner.
Toward the end of 30*J power plateau testing, management decided to deviate from the established test sequence.
A temporary deferral of major transient tests at 30?J power level such as the MSIV closure test and the Loss of Off site Power test was made. These tests were conducted af ter the completion of the 50?J power non-transient type tests.
This deviation was well thought out and its safety signif-icance was preperly reviewed by the appropriate licensee groups (PORC, OSC, etc.).
NRC concurrence was also obtained in a timely manner.
(
QA s.
7,.
Beaver Valley Unit 2 Special
.6 Assessment-LThe test: results review process functioned smoothly. Technical review of.
the -results was thorough. and the - Joint -Test Group and Onsite Safety.
Committee reviews were good.
Test-identified problems were properly disseminated -to the appropriate groups.
Test deficiencies were pursued l
3aggressively for resolution and carried forward to'later test. conditions _
when necessary.
Notwithstanding the positive aspects of the test program, the following instances were observed in which the test group and/or the vendor repre-sentative-(expert) did ' not appear ' to be adequately-involved in the decision making which' impacted on subsequent testing:
.On August _20, 1987, during a Turbine Overspeed Trip test,- the change of maximum speed acceptance criteria from 1998 rpm (based on IST procedure) to 2028 rpm (based on OST procedure) was made without the vendor representative's full concurrence.
Following a reactor trip on August 18, 1987, I&C personnel adjusted the Nuclear Instrumentation Intermediate Range compensation voltage.
However', the test group's test IST-2.01.01, " Alignment of NIS" was not reperformed in.a timely manner.
Prior to the MSIV closure test, the feedwater regulation valve gain adjustment was altered without being fully assessed by all personnel and groups involved.
Although the above' examples appear to be isolated instances, collectively, these examples indicate that information feedback to the test group needs I
improvement.
In summary, the licensee conducted a well controlled startup testing pro-gram with a good perspective on nuclear safety. Management oversight and J
control of testing continued to be strong and effective.
Strengths noted during this period include professional and conscientious operators, highly _ qualified test personnel, and a well controlled startup test pro-gram.
A weakness occasionally observed was that the test group and/or vendor representatives were not properly involved in the decision making
)
process which impacted subsequent test results.
Overall, however, licen-see performance in the startup test areas, to date, is considered good.
5.
ASSURANCE OF QUALITY For this assessment period, management involvement and control in assess-ing and assuring quality have been evaluated.
This section is a synopsis of the assessments relating to quality of work in all areas. The previous two SALP reports have rated this area as Category 2.
In the most recent SALP, strengths were noted in management (including senior corporate) involvement, worker attitude, first line supervision effectiveness and QC
a.
~
J
- Beaver Valley unit 2 Special 7
l Assessment aggressiveness. The degree'of management iny'olvement, in particular,' was l credited with resulting in a' smooth and.. integrated organizational response to the. completion of const'ruction, the. conduct of major tests, and toward the making of necessary changes. One weakness, an overemphasis on " paper" by QA, was identified which indicated that QA was not used for assessment or.as'a management tool to enhance performance. Since~ the end of the SALP.
period and prior!t6.this assessment, the licensee' completed construction, preoperational testing,. initial core load.and operating Mode ascension'(to Mode 3),
During ~ this ' assessment ' period, the licensee continued : to demonstrate i
active management involvement in site activities with twice daily meetings-of first' and second level supervisors and weekly on-site meetings involv-4 ing -senior corporate management.
Licensee preplanning was evident, including 'the installation of several trailers near the Control Room for
. test personnel. use, meetings, briefings and trip reviews.
Use of the trailers reduced noise and traffic within the Control Room while avoiding any. time pressure on trip review participants.
The frequent meetings-continued to reduce interface problems while facilitating efficient allo-cation of resources.
Pretest briefings and post-trip reviews were found j
to be thorough. Operations QA provided coverage of numerous operational activities.
In. particular, it was noted that QA put ~ additional emphasis.
on witnessing actual activities in the plant including operability verifi-
- cation, surveillance and actual plant testing.
No indication of schedular pressures was observed as test preparation, conduct and recovery were. deliberate' and controlled.
The absence of Technical Specification violations 'and missed surveillance tests was also indicative of a careful
. approach to Mode changes and system-testing.
I 1
The Security Program received a high level of licensee management atten-tion and resource allocation during this period of time while it was i
heavily ' stressed by.the number of personnel, including construction craf t and testing, accessing the site plus ongoing test activities... Security performance was strong and did not adversely affect the conduct of plant operations.
Similarly, the Radiation Protection Program was smoothly implemented as the plant went into an. operational status.
An emergency planning training drill was conducted with no disruption of on going, plant j
startup.
The successful implementation of these interrelated activities demonstrated good coordination, control and management involvement in i
assuring the quality of integrated site activities.
l The previous two SALP reports also noted that licensee initiatives tended to be reactive rather than anticipatory, although the most recent SALP L
found some improvements had been achieved. Two additional examples of the earlier weakness were identified during this period.
In one case, a test deficiency identified a configuration control error and a limited systems
Beaver Valley Unit 2 Special 8
Assessment verification was conducted.
This verification was made subsequently more extensive but the licensee's decision was made af ter an NRC request. Two additional non-safety significant discrepancies were subsequently iden-tified.
The licensee had - a procedure in draft form which might have allowed.self-identification of the errors, but the procedure had not been fully completed and implemented.
In the second case, at NRC request, the licensee conducted a systematic self-assessment of their performance through the 50% power plateau.
The licensee self-assessment was of excellent quality and reflected a major effort by the licensee.
The report reviewed operating performance, ISEG evaluations, QA activities, surveillance, testing, annunciator trends, OSC assessments, and chemi stry.
The report also documented the licensee's evaluation of the adequacy of engineering support provided.
The report was self-critical and noted areas for improvement. There was good agreement between NRC findings and the conclusions in the licensee's report.
In discussions with Regional management, the licensee stated that it had achieved some value from the self-assessment and would consider continuing some of the assessment activities. At this time, however, the self-assessment is considered to have been an excellent but reactive program initiated at the NRC's request.
In summary, the licensee's performance in this area has shown continued strengths.
The tendency to t'e thorough, but reactive was also observed.
The brevity of the period (about five weeks) makes further assessment difficult, but the lack of Technical Specification violations and the low frequency of operational events, and, in general, good personnel perform-ance by all parts of the licensee organization demonstrated success in the assurance of quality, 1
l l
l
_ _ _ -.