ML20235S020

Forwards Petitioner Requests for Disallowance of Licensee to Bring Unit 3 & 4 Reactors Critical,Until Both Internal & NRC Safety Investigation Completed

ML20235S020
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	01/12/1989
From:	Chandler L NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:	Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17347A999	List: ML20235S020
References
2.206, NUDOCS 8903060014
Download: ML20235S020 (2)

Text

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I M I, o g UNITED STATES 7 '8 a- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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JAN 121989 MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas E. Hurley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Lawrence J. Chandler Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement Office of the General Counsel

SUBJECT:

THOMAS J. SAPORITO, JR. 2.206 PETITION REGARDING TURKEY POINI NUCLEAR STATION In the enclosed December 21',1988' Petition filed pursuant to 10 CFR i 2.206, Thomas J. Saporito, Jr. has requested that the Executive Director for Operations not allow the licensee to bring the Unit 3 or Unit 4 Reactors critical until both an internal safety investigation conducted by the licensee and an NRC safety investigation are complete. The Petitioner alleges that

. Florida Power & Light Co.'s Turkey Point Nuclear Station has continuously demonstrated poor maintenance, poor leadership, poor quality improvement, unprofessional operator behavior and the inability of management to effectively address and resolve these concerns. In support of this claim, he relies on a report from the Institute of Plant Operators (INPO) which concluded that Turkey Point had significant problems which resulted in poor ratings from the INP0 team. Petitioner also relies on an Enercon Services report which identified personnel', support and leadership problems as contributing to the plant's poor perfomance. Furthermore, he relies on an NRC Safety System functional Inspection Report which reported problems in the feedwater and nitrogen systems. Finally Petitioner refers to NRC SALP

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Report (50-250/88-15; 50-251/88-15) as well as previous SALP reports which suggested various deficiencies in plant operations.

You should also be aware that Mr. Saporito has filed several complaints with l the Department of Labor (DOL) alleging a violation of Section 210 of the

! Energy Reorganization Act, 42 USC 5851. In those actions, Petitioner alleges l that he was harassed and discriminated against by Florida Power & Light Co.

in retaliation for his notifying the NRC of safety concerns. The Petitioner further asserts that this alleged harassment and discrimination may discourage other employees from reporting safety concerns to the NRC. In at least one 1 action DOL found in favor of Florida Power & Light Co. However, other complaints by Mr. Saporito with substantially the same allegations are still pending before DOL. l CONTACT: LaVonne Martin x21694

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I have enclosed drafts of a letter of acknowledgment to the Petitioner for your signature and a Notice of Receipt of the Petition for publication in the Federal Register. If you want the licensee to respond regarding these matters, we will assist your staff in drafting an appropriate letter.

Please inform my staff of the technical staff contact who will be involved in preparing a response to the Petition. Please ensure that I am provided copies of all correspondence related to the Petition and that I am asked to concur on all staff correspondence.

0 L wrence J. Chandler Assistant General Coun el for Enforcement Office of the General Counsel

Enclosures:

1. Copy of Petition

2. Draft Letter of Acknowledgement

3. Draft Federal Register Notice cc: w/encls.

WRussell, RI JGutierrez, RI JLieberman, OE JScinto, OGC b

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Executive Director for Operations

.. United States Nuclear Regulatory Consission Washington, D.C. 20555

' Thomas J. Saporito, Jr.

1292 Sioux Street

' Jupiter, Florida 33458 (407) 747-8873 re: Title (19) Code of Federal Regulations Part (2.296)

Dear' Sir:

' 21DEC88 Please .be advised and officially informed as this letter. represents a formal request to your office in regards to your licensee Florida Power

& Light Company, (Turkey Point Nuclear Station), located in Homestead, Florida for actions by your office as specified below.

Speciffe Request:

The request is hereby made upon your office to insure that your licensee is not permitted to bring the (Unit 3 or Unit 4) Reactors' Critical until such time as your licensee completes it's internal safety investigation and' until- such time as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission completes it's investigation relating to the safety concerns cddressed in the report of 95DEC88 furnished to NRC Region.II on 96DEC88'by Thomas J. Sa'porito, Jr..

Basis and Justification:

Reference is'made to the fact that this nuclear station has previously been rated as one of the ten worst nuclear stations in the country.

Reference is made to the past INPO (Institute of Plant Operators) station inspection reports as these reports revealed significant problems at the station which resulted in the station receiving very j poor evaluation ratings by the INPO team.

Reference is made to the Enercon Servives report which in fact was an Independent Management Appraisal as this agency was contracted by the Florida Power & Light Company in an effort to address the concerns of continuous poor performance at it's Turkey Point Nuclear Station. This report identified (5) root causes attributing to Turkey Point's performance deficiencies as defined herein.

01 Inadequate leadership is reflected in the failure to establish and communicate effective goals for plant improvement.

1 02 An inadequate sense of personal accountability persists within the Turkey Point work force as management is not adequately using information provided by tho' Quality Assurance and Quality Control creanizations.

03 The IMA team identified a lack of sufficient technical sap, art as a root cause of several performance deficiencies at Turkn Point as various engineering organizations, both onsite and offsite, are not properly structured to support the station.

Page 2/4

1. 4 The IMA. team identified inadequacies in several key support systems at Turkey Point which included inadequate plant information systems, an inefficient system for producing and controlling Plant Work Orders, and' inadequate Instrument and Control support for plant operations.

Additionally, excessive use of overtime is a further indication of inadequate support systems.

1. 5 The IMA team identified a lack of a strong sense of plant ownership

- cnd leadership in the Operations Department as the Operations Department has a tradition of accepting and overcoming plant equipment end support deficiencies, rather than demanding excellence from the supporting departments such as maintenance, technical support and training.

Reference is made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Safety System Functional Inspection Report (50-250/85-32: 50-251/85-32) as the report identified the following concerns.

1. 1 Uparade of the Auxiliary Feedwater System: NRC recognizes the effort by FPL and the team reviewed details of the upgrade program, however, the team believes a number of the inspection issues should have been identified by FPL and incorporated into it's upgrade program.

1. 2 Non-Safety Grade Standby Feedwater System: The NRC team determined at the time of the inspection, that there were no administrative controls or Technical Specification requirements in place to assure the availability .on demand of this standby system. Consequently, the team concluded that it would be inappropriate to take into consideration the capabilities of this system during the team's analysis of the inspection findings.

1. 3 Safety Related Nitronen System: The NRC team determined ~that -it cannot be assumed that control roca operators would shift the flow control valves from automatic to manual mode within (6-7 minutes) j following an accident because (1) some operators were trained to assume they had (15-20 minutes) available to take action, and (2) applicable  !

energency procedures did not include requirements for the operators to ,

shift the flow control valves to manual, j Reference is made to the fact that the Turkey Point Station has demonstrated past weaknesses in the areas of plant operations, maintenance, and quality assurance programs as these functional ar(as were rated Category (3) on the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) dated 01JUL83 .310CT84 Additionally, plant 1 cperations was rated Category (3) in the previous SALP as well.

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Page 3/4 Reference is made to SALP (Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance) Inspection Report Number (50-250/88-15: 50-251/88-15) as dated 01JUN87 through 30JUN88 and which identified the following l concerns at the Turkey Point Station:

I

1. 1 The security -progran continues to show a weakness as indicated by the continued number of violations which are repetitive in nature.

1. 2 During the first half of this SALP period, licensee performance in the area of Operations was marginal as demonstrated by equipment problems, plant availability, number of escalated enforcement actions, and the number of special NRC inspections.

1. 3 For the last six months of 1987, Unit 3 had an availability factor of. less than let. Following the repairs to the conoseal leak, Unit 4 returned to service in July and had an up and down operational history for the remainder of 1987

1. 4 An event occurred at the end of the SALP period, which resulted in loss of the required boric acid flow paths.

1. 5 A special NRC. inspection conducted in June 1987 resulted in

, escalated enforcement action and a civil penalty.

1. 6 In July 1987, another event occurred resulting in a Severity Level III violation as this event identified that a turbine operator closed the backup nitrogen supply valves to the Auxiliary Feedwnter System.

1. 7 In september 1987, an unauthorized, unlicensed individual was allowed to manipulate the dilution controls of Unit 3 with the reactor at power as (4) licensed operators observed the event without intervening.

1. 8 In October 1987, voids were detected in the Unit 4 reactor head region with the plant at cold shutdown as and evaluation determined that nitrogen from an accumulator had entered the primary systen through a leaking accumulator isolation valve.

1. 9 Fifty-one LERs (Licensed Event Reports), were submitted in the last seven months of 1987 and 14 were submitted in 1988.

1. 10 Four reactor trips occurred during this evaluation period for Unit 3 as two of the trips were due to personnel error and one due to equipment malfunction.

1. 11 The leadership of the operators has also inadvertently been diluted through corrective actions in response to identified problems as several incorrect Technical Specification interpretations have been documented over the past several years. s

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Page 4/4 As evidenced herein, the Turkey Point Station over the past years, has continuously demonstrated a poor conduct of maintenance, poor leadership, poor quality improvement, unprofessional operator , I behaviour, and a lack of ability on the part of the licensee's management to properly and effectively address and resolve these l concerns as this conduct of maintenance continues at the present time. i Please be informed that I have concerns that other employees at the Turkey Point Station may have knowledge of additional safety concerns which may not readily surface as these employees are being intimidated by the licensee and these employees have witnessed my consequences as I have made known my safety concerns to outside agencies and they are therefore reluctant to come forward with their concerns, thereby preventing the address and resolution of any safety concerns they may be aware of. It is therefore imperative that the licensee's Turkey Point Stations Reactors, not be permitted to become critical until such time as the aforementioned safety investigations are concluded as the Hea_1_th an_d Safety of the Public is dependent en your office affording t,he proper and correct guidance to your licensee to this end, j

Sincerely: Certified Mail: (P 982 346 203)

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Thomas J. aporito, Jr.

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Executive Director.for Operations

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Thomas J. Saporito, Jr. ,

1202. Sioux Street' Jupiter, Florida 33458 i (407) 747-8873 9

re: Title (l'0 ) Code of Federal Regulations Part (2.206)

Dear Sir:

21DEC88 Please be advised and officially informed as'this letter represents a formal request to your office in regards to your licensee Florida Power

& Light Company, (Turkey Point Nuclear Station), located in Homestead, Florida for actions by your office as specified below.

. -Specific Request:

.The request is hereby made upon your office to insure that your ,

licensee. is not permitted to bring the (Unit 3 or Unit 4) Reactors '

Critical until such time as your licensee completes it's internal safety. investigation -and 'until such time as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission completes it's. investigation relating to the safety concerns.

addressed in the report of 95DEC88 furnished to NRC Region.II:on 96DEC88 by Thomas J. Sa'porito', Jr..

Basis and Justification:

Reference ' is~made to the fact.that this nuclear station has previously been rated as one of the ten worst nuclear stations in the country..

Reference is made to the past INPO (Institute of Plant Operators) station inspection reports as these reports revealed significant problems at the station which resulted in the. station receiving very poor evaluation ratings by the INPO team.

Reference is made to the Enercon Servives report which in fact was an Independent . Management Appraisal as this agency was contracted by the Florida- Power & Light Company in an effort to. address the concerns of continuous poor performance at it's Turkey Point Nuclear Station. This report identified (5) root causes attributing to Turkey Point's performance deficiencies as defined herein.

1. 1 Inadequate leadership is reflected in the failure to establish and

. communicate effective goals for plant improvement.

1. 2 An inadequate sense of personal accountability persists within the Turkey Point work force as management is not adequately using information provided by the Quality Assurance and Quality Control organizations.

1. 3 The IMA team identified a lack of sufficient technical support as a root cause of several performance deficiencies at Turkey Point as .

various engineering organizations, both onsite and offsite, are not properly structured to support the station.

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Page 2/4

1. 4 .The IMA team identified inadequacies in several key support systems

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at Turkey Point which included inadeque(e plant information systems, an inefficient system for producing and controlling Plant Work Orders, and inadequate Instrument and Control support for plant operations.

Additionally, excessive use of overtime is a further indication of inadequate support systems.

1. 5 The IMA team identified a lack of a strong sense of plant ownership and leadership in the Operations Department as the Operations  !

Department has a tradition of accepting and overcoming plant equipment and support deficiencies, rather than demanding excellence from the-supporting departments such as maintenance, technical support and training.

Reference is made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Safety System Functional Inspection Report (50-250/85-32: 50-251/85-32) as the report identified the following concerns.

1. 1 Uparade of the Auxiliary Feedwater System: NRC recognizes the effort by FPL and the team reviewed details _of the upgrade program, however, the team believes a number of the inspection issues should have been identified by FPL and incorporated into it's upgrade program.

1. 2 Non-Safety- Grade Standby Feedwater System: The NRC team determined at the time of the inspection, that there were no administrative controls or Technical Specification requirements in place to assure the availability ,on demand of this standby system. Consequently, the team-concluded that it would be inappropriate to take into consideration the capabilities of this system during the team's analysis of the inspection findings.

1. 3 Safety Related Nitronen System: The NRC team determined that it cannot be assumed that control room operators would shift the flow control valves from automatic to manual mode within (6-7 minutes) following an accident because (1) some operators were trained to assume th'ey had (15-20 minutes) available to take action, and (2) applicable i

onergency procedures did not include requirements for the operators to shift the flow control valves to manual. ]

I Reference .is made to the fact that the Turkey Point Station has demonstrated past weaknesses in the areas of plant cperations, i maintenance, and quality assurance programs as these functional areas were rated Category (3) on the Systematic Assessment of Licensee l

Performance (SALP) dated 01JUL83 - 310CT84. Additionally, plant l operations was rated Category (3) in the previous SALP as well.

l.

Page 3/4

)

Reference is made to SALP (Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance) Inspection Report Number (50-250/88-15: 50-251/88-15) as dated 01JUN87 through 30JUN88 and which identified the following concerns at the Turkey Point Station:

1. 1 The security program continues to show a weakness as indicated by i the continued number of violations which are repetitive in nature. I

1. 2 Du/ing the first half of this SALP period, licensee performance in the area of Operations was marginal as demonstrated by equipment problems, plant availability, number of escalated enforcement actions, and the number of special NRC inspections.

1. 3 For the last six months of 1987, Unit 3 had an availability factor l of less than 10%. Following the repairs to the conoseal leak, Unit 4 {

returned to service in July and had an up and down operational history i for the remainder of 1987.

1. 4 An event occurred at the end of the SALP period, which resulted in j loss of the required boric acid flow paths. 1

1. 5 A special NRC inspection conducted in June 1987 resulted in escalated enforcement action and a civil penalty.

1. 6 In July 1987, another event occurred resulting in a Severity Level III violation as this event identified that a turbine operator closed the backup nitrogen supply valves to the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

1. 7 In september 1987, an unauthorized, unlicensed individual was allowed to manipulate the dilution controls of Unit 3 with the reactor at power as (4) licensed operators observed the event without intervening.

1. 8 In October 1987, voids were detected in the Unit 4 reactor head region with the plant at cold shutdown as and evaluation determined that nitrogen from an accumulator had entered the primary system through a leaking accumulator isolation valve.

1. 9 Fifty-one LERs (Licensed Event Reports), were submitted in the last ceven months of 1987 and 14 were submitted in 1988.

1. 10 Four reactor trips occurred during this evaluation period for Unit 3 as two of the trips were due to personnel error and one due to equipment malfunction.

1. 11 The leadership of the operators has also inadvertently been diluted through corrective actions in response to identified problems as l several incorrect Technical Specification interpretations have been documented over the past several years. \

\. -

I

.'. Page 4/4 As evidenced herein, the Turkey Point Station over the past years, has continuously demonstrated a poor conduct of maintenance. poor leadership, poor quality improvement, unprofessional operator ,

behaviour, and a lack of ability on the part of the licensee's management to properly and effectively address and resolve these concerns as this conduct of maintenance continues at the present time.

Please be informed that I have concerns that other employees at the Turkey Point Station may have knowledge of additional safety concerns which may not readily surface as these employees are being intimidated by the licensee and these employees have witnessed my consequences as I have made known my safety concerns to outside agencies and they are therefore reluctant to come forward with their concerns, thereby preventing the address and resolution of any safety concerns they may be aware of. It is therefore imperative that the licensee's Turkey Point Stations Reactors, not be permitted to become critical until such time as the aforementioned safety investigations are concluded as the Health and Safety of the Public is dependent on your office affording the proper and correct guidance to your licensee to this end.

Sincerely: Certif.ied Mails (P 982 346 203)

Thomas J. aporito, Jr.

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y () s 4/Q Executive DirectorLfor Operations cc: NRC Region II u

• AuS United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Trent Steele # -

Washinston, D.C. 29555 Thomas J. Saporito, Jr. YN $)

1292 Sioux Street s%L7,g 7,-

Jupiter. Florida 33458 (407) 747-8873 January 13, 1989 re: Title (10) Code'of Federal Regulations Part (2.296)

Dear Sir:

Please be advised and officially informed as this 1 tter represents a formal request to your office in rosards to your licensee Florida Power

& Light Company. (Turkey Point Nuclear Station). located in Homestead.

Florida for actions by your office as specified below and pursuant to

~(2.292) of the Federal Code.

Specific Request I hereby . officially and formally request that your office immediately l suspend and revoke- the Operating Licenses's (DPR-31 & DPR-41) of the Turkey Point Nuclear Station owned and operated by the Florida Power &

Lisht Company in Miami Florida.

Basis and Justification:

Reference is made to basis and justification stated in the (2.296) received by your office on 27DEC88. Certified (P 982 346 293)

Reference is made to the basis and justification stated in the letter mailed to United States Senator John Glenn on 19JAN89 and copied to your office. Certified (P 617 259 995)-  ;

R'eference is made to the information recovered by the Nuclear Regulatory Cenaission's deposition taken of myself on 12JAN89 as this record will document the willfull falsification and destruction of Safety Related Plant Documents. the severe Chilling Effect of the

' station personnel, and the overall poor conduct of maintenance inclusive of Safety Related procedure violations at the Turkey Point Station'as this station is overwhelmed with equipment deficiencies.

Conclusion:

The immediate actions by your office in suspendina and revokina the aforementioned operatina licenses of the Turkey Point Nuclear Station will insure the Health and Safety of the Public reflect a very responsible action by your department, and will finally afford your  ;

licensee with the required auidance and time to professionally address and resolve the overwhelming operatina and maintenance problems at the Turk.ev_ Point Station.

dct -no nT n iItf p g v +- v <- o * '-t Sincerely:

np r

Certified Mails (P 982 346 297)

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FRDM .DUE: 02/10/B9 EDO CONTRDLaibOO4219 -

• DOC DTs..-01/19/89 FINAL REPLY:

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V.. ^* ';i-Thomm J. Saporito, Jr. . , ,

Jupit:r, Florida

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l'FDR SI,GNATURE OF ** GRN ** ,, CRC ND:

Exccutive Director DESC: _

-ROUTING:

LETTER OF APPRECIATION TD REGIDN II STAFF RE Stello TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR STATION Taylor

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!DATE: 01/27/89 .

, { Murley

ASSIGNED TDs- ' CONTACT: .

RII Ernst .

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS: '

PREPARE LETTER TD' THOMAS J. SAPORITD, JR.~FOR EDO*S SIGNATURE.

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-Thomas J. Saporito. Jr.

1292 Sioux Street Jupiter. Florida 33458 (P 982 346 208) [- -

January 19, 1989 d (497) 747-8873 i//>

Dear Mr. Victor Ste11o. Jr.:

At this time. I would like to take the opportunity to express my feelings of sincere gratitude and appreciation for the efforts made by one of your employees in the address of safety concerns which I brought to his attention concerning the Turkey Point Nuclear Station.

After realizing that your licensee (Florida Power & Light) was not acknowledging, addressing, or resolving any of the safety concerns I hcd brought to their attention. I contacted Mr. Oscar DeMiranda of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Region II office for assistance. Mr.

D:Miranda immediately put 'ne at ease in that he assured my ocnfidentiality and that he would address my safety concerns. Mr. -

D:Miranda went beyond the call'of duty (so to speak) in assisting me as ho provided as with his home telephone number in an effort to maintain (24) hour contact even on weekends and during off-normal hours. I had placed several calls to Mr. DeMiranda at.his home during the week and

• cn weekends and even summoned him via his wife and children when his was recently sick.

Additionally. I would like to commend this individual for his professionalism as he 'has the unique ability to realize my safety  !

concerns in that his previous work experience and vast knowledge in the Nuclear Power industry permits his understanding of my position which has ultimately rosulted in my conveying the safety concerns at the Turkey Point Nuclear Station to the NRC Region II in all areas of plant operation such as Health Physics (ALARA). Equipment Maintenance. Plant Operatlons. Training, Procedure Compliance, etc.

through the extended efforts of individuals like Mr. Oscar I

It is DeMiranda, that will ultimately provide for the Health and Safety of the Public as all Nuclear workers must share the confiaence that I have in the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in their ability to cddress and resolve the safety issues brought to their attention while feelina secure that no reprisal will be taken amainst them by your licensee because of their protected activities. 7 To this end. I would request that this letter be posted at all Nuclear Stations across the United States to ensure the surface of all safety concerns at all Nuclear Plants and to prevent the severe chilling effect which has occurred at the Turkey Point Nuclear Station.

Sincerely: cc Mr. Malcon Ernst. NRC Regional Administrator MR. Oscar DeMiranda. NRC Region II NRC Commissioners. Washington D.C.

gr !> j . Honorable John Glenn. United States Senator l

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