ML20235N475
| ML20235N475 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1987 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2508, NUDOCS 8707200084 | |
| Download: ML20235N475 (59) | |
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DATE ISSUED: 7/7/87
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. s n.m SUNMARY/ MINUTES OF THE 7/MF7 ACRS SUBCCPMITTEE MEETING ON
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THE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS JUNE 11, 1987 WASHINGTON, D.C.
INTRODUCTION The ACRS Subcommittee on the Auxiliary Systems held a meeting on Thurs-day, June 11, 1987 at 1717 H Street,-N.W., Washington, D.C..to discuss-matters associated with fire protection systems and systems interaction effects resulting from the December 9 1986 feedwater pipe failure event at Surry, Unit 2.
The entire meeting was open to public attendance.
Mr. Sam Duraiswamy was the cognizant ACRS' Staff for this meeting. A list of documents submitted to the Subcommittee is included in Attach-ment A, and the presentation schedule for the meeting.is included in
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Attachment B.
1 ATTENDEES
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ACRS:
C. Michelson (Subcommittee Chairman), J. C. Ebersole, G. A. Reed, and C. J. Wylie.
!'l Sam Duraiswamy (Cognizant ACRS Staff).
Principal NRC Speakers:
D. Notley, M. Chiramal, R. Hernan, J. Craig, J. Wermiel, B. Holland, and J. Flack.
EXECUTIVE SESSION J
Mr. Michelson, the Subcommittee Chairman, convened the meeting at 8:30 a.m., and stated that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the following:
- Regulatory requirements and recent operating events associated with inadvertent actuation of fire protection systems.
- Systems interaction effects resulting from the December 9,1986 feedwater pipe rupture event at Surry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2.
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Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1987
' Manual fire mitigation and associated issues.
- Propagation of heat and smoke and associated issues.
I He said that the Subcommittee had received neither written comments nor requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public.
Prior to holding discussions on scheduled items, the Subcommittee expressed views on several issues such as requirements for fire protection system design for future plants, systems interaction effects, etc.
Some of those views and associated discussions are given below.
Mr. Reed commented that different people designing different systems do not seem to have adequate communication with each other.
Fire protec-tion experts designing fire protection systems do not seem to give serious consideration about the ramifications and systems interaction effects that would result in the event of inadvertent actuation of these systems.
Similarly, security system designers do not seem to think about how to cope with an emergency situation in the e' vent of the failure of the security systems.
If experts pursue their interest individually without communicating with each other, he believes that it will compromise safety.
Mr. Michelson agreed with the comment made by Mr. Reed. He stated that lack of proper communication among various system designers sometimes result in a very_ conservative design.
In his opinion,_too much conser_ _ _
vatism does not necessarily improve plant safety.
Mr. Ebersole commented that during his visit of the Surry plant on May 28, 1987, he got the impression that changing the operation of a system from " automatic" to " manual" might preclude the possibility of spurious actuation.
He does not believe that such action will always solve the spurious actuation problem.
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Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1987 Mr. Michelson commented that during Surry Plant tour, he'was disturbed to find out that the licensee does not have detailed drawings of the internal circuitry of the Cardox system to find out how that system j
1 works. :It seems that.since representatives from the Cardox company take care of the maintenance work,'the licensee does not care to understand-l how the system works. He believes that irrespective of.who does the -
maintenance work, the licensee should have a clear knowledge of the operation of the system.
Stating that Appendix R requirements apply cnly to those plants operst-ing prior to January 1, 1979, Mr. Michelson. commented that these re-quirements are intended to patch up the deficiency in the fire pro-tection system design at the operating plants. He does not believe the same approach should be used in developing requirements for future plants. He does not believe that explicit criteria exist for use by the applicants in designing fire protection system for future plants.
He believes that that the Commission should start thinking about providing specific guidance on this issue for future plants before it is too late.
Mr. Hernan stated that the Staff does not have a program at this time to revise Appendix R so as to make it applicable to future plants. The guidance included in the Standard Review Plan (SRP) will be used in.
reviewing the fire protection system design for future plants.
Mr. Michelson comented that some of the things allowed in Appendix R need not be allowed for future plants.
For example, Appendix R allows train A and train B of cable trays.to be routed in the same room as long as they are separated by a fire barrier. There is no need to allow this sort of things in future plants because it is not that difficult to keep these trains out of the same room.
Mr. Hernan responded that be believes that pecple involved in new plant designs may have a better knowledge of what scrt of fire protection s
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j Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1987 system design will be acceptable to the NRC Staff than those who de-signed plants 10 or 15 years ago.
1 Mr. Notley stated that the Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 devel-oped in 1976 was intended to provide guidance for designing fire pro-tection systems for new plants.
Mr. Michelson comented that the 1976 version of the Branch Technical Position does not seem to be in use anymore. Also, he has'not seen any specific guidance for fire protection system design for future plants in the current SRP Section 9.5-1.
Mr. Wermiel responded that there is nothing in the current licensing criteria that refers back to the 1976 version of the Branch Technical Position for fire protection system design for future plants. The existing SRP Section 9.5-1 is the only document that provides guidance for future plants. Appendix R does not apply to future plants at all.
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Mr. Ebersole comented that certain things, such as comon duct work intertied all over the place, that are allowed in tppendix R should not be allowed for future plants.
Mr. Michelson reiterated that the existing requirements in the SRP Section 9.5-1 are intended to patch up the deficiencies in the existing
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plant designs.
He strongly believes such requirements should not be used for future plant designs. The Comission ought to rethink what l
should be the fire protection system requirements for future plants.
Mr. Hernan stated that he believes that the General Electric (GE)
Company has interacted with severai foreign countries to obtain informa-tion for use in the design of various systems, including fire protection systems, for its Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) design. He believes that GE will ccme up with a reliable fire protecticn system design for its ABWR.
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4 Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1987 Mr. Michalson suggested that the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) look to see to what extent U.S. communicates with other countries in the fire protection area, what are the design criteria being used by other countries for fire protection systems, and hcw do they address fire threats, etc.
INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
- Regulatory Requirements for Fire Protection System Design to Prevent Inadvertent Actuation - Mr. D. Notley Mr. Notley reviewed the regulatory requirements / guidance associated with the faadvertent actuation of fire protection systems (Attachment C, pages 1-6). He said that such requirements / guidance are contained in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard, General Design Criterion 3, and SRP Sections 3.6-1-and 9.5-1.
l Mr. Ebersole asked whether there are any criteria / guidance to prevent moisture intrusion from various sources into closed control panels so as to avoid malfunctions of equipment and possible inadvertent actuation.
Mr. Madden responded that NFPA 72-D includes some requirements on this matter.
It is up to the designer to design the system so as to prevent I
this problem.
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Mr. Michelson commented that the SRP does not seem to provide specific I
guidance on the environmental hazards problem.
Mr. Notley stated that sometime ago he did a study for the Savdnnah River Plant on the effects of moisture on computer installations and l
electrical installations. Based on the study, he recommended that there be no water scurces near the computer installation. Mr. Michelson said that he would like to have a copy of the study done by Mr. Notley.
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1 Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1987
.1 Mr. Michelson asked whether the Staff has any idea about how much vibration on a typical fire. protection system control panel would cause inadvertent actuation. He asked also whether the manufacturers had done any testing on this matter. Mr. Notely responded that he does not have i
any idea on this issua. However, after the fire at the Browns Ferry plant, several manufacturers had qualified their equipment to withstand earthquakes.
I Mr. fiichelson co,mmented that his conversation with certain TVA people i
indicates that the control panels for the Cardox system at TVA plants have been seismically qualified. He is not sure whether it is done in other plants because there seems to be no specific Staff requirement that these panels should be seismically qualified.
Further, there are no explicit requirements included either in Appendix R or in the SRP 1
with regard to preventing inadvertent actuation of fire protection systems.
The existing requirements / guidance on this matter are very vague and may not be that much useful to the licensees.
Mr. Notley responded that Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 issued in 1976 provided some guidance on the inadvertent actuation of fire protection systems.
As far as he can tell, current criteria do not address what needs to be done to prevent inadvertent actuation.
However, there are guidance on how to deal with the consequences or prevent unacceptable consequences resulting from inadvertent actuation.
Stating that if all the available C0 is discharged instantaneously into 2
a room, it may result in overpressure and cause severe damage to the room, Mr. Ebersole asked whether there are any specific requirements to preclude this from happening.
The Staff responded that there are no specific requirements on hcw to design for accidental discharge of all CO in a rccm.
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Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1987 Mr. Michelson commented that most of the analyses done indicate that 1
when an essential equipment gets wet as a result of inadvertent actua-l tion of fire protection systems, it looses its function. The analyses l
do not indicate what exactly happens to that equipment and what-we have to cope with in the plant.
If we need to understand the risk j
consequences, the analyses should go farther to indicate the effects on plant safety resulting from loosing the function of an essential equipment.
Mr. Michelson asked about the need for curbs in certain parts of the plant. Mr. Notley responded that those sections of the plant that have flammable liquids should have curbs to contain the liquid to minimize the fire hazard. Also, curbs are installed to direct water from fire mitigation systems to drains.
Mr. Michelson asked whether the Staff requires installation of alarms to signal fuel oil leakage. Mr. Wermiel responded that usually there will be some indication of fuel oil leakage.
Mr. Michelson commented that if there is no alarm, the operator.may or may not know the leakage of the fuel oil.
He believes that this sort of things will create a significant fire hazard situation.
- Recent Incidents Associated With Inadvertent Actuation of Fire Protection Systems and Their Interaction on Safety Systems -
Mr., M. Chiramal 1
i Mr. Chiramal from the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational l
Data (AE00) discussed briefly some of the events associated with the inadvertent actuation of fire protection systems (Attachment C, pages 7-22). He said that these events could be put into two different
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categories:
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Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1987
- Inadvertent actuation resulting from the problems associated with fire protection systems.
- Inadvertent actuation resulting from moisture intrusion into-the control panel of the fire protection systems due to feedwater line break or steam line break.
He said that AE0D has not yet completed the study and they do not have a specific schedule for the completion of the study.
Indicating that in one of the events water from the fire protection system got to various locations of the plant through conduits, ducts, etc., Mr. Michelson asked what are the requirements to seal the conduits to preclude the recurrence of such incident. Mr. Chiramal responded that conduits are sealed to prevent gas leakage, but somehow water gets I
through those seals.
Mr. Michelson asked why the incident that occurred at Browns Ferry plant on April 30, 1986 is not included in the list of events being studied by AE0D. Mr. Chiramal responded that it should have been included in the i
list.
With reference to one of the events where the fire protection system was actuated by steam, Mr. Michelson asked whether it is true that since the steam looks like smoke'and is also hot the smoke detectors sense the l
steam as smoke from fire and actuate the fire protection system. The Staff said yes.
i Mr. Michelson stated that it seems even a sophisticated smoke detector cannot differentiate between actual smoke form a fire and steam. He asked whether there are other kinds of detectors that would be able to differentiate between smo'Ke ar.d steam. Mr. Madden said no such detec-tors are available at this time.
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Mr. Michelson asked whether it is also true that the smoke detectors I
cannot differentiate between smoke and dust. The Staff said that it is j
true.
Mr. Michelson asked how do they plan to analyze the propagation of i
steam. Mr. Chiramal responded that they have to select certain plants and look at their physical arrangements and decide how to confront this issue.
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Mr. Ebefsole asked whether the consequence analyses for inadvertent.
actuation look at the possibility of steam getting into open terminal boxes and causing short circuit. Mr. Madden responded that the conse-quences of steam line break or feedwater line break would not normally be looked at under the fire protection system.
Stating that when restoring power after a prolonged loss of AC power there may be a possibility that the fire protection systems might get actuated inadvertently, Mr. Michelson suggested that AE0D look into this issue and make sure that the fire protection systems do not get actuated when the power is restored.
SYSTEMS INTERACTION EFFECTS RESULTING FROM THE DECEMBER 9, 1986 SURRY INCIDENT - MR. B. HOLLAND Mr. Holland from NRC Region II Office discussed briefly the systems interaction effects resulting from the December 9,1986 feedwater pipe break event at Surry, Unit 2 (Attachment C, pages 23-27). Some of the systems affected during this event are as follows:
- Security System Failures At the time the pipe ruptured, water and steam saturated a security card reader located approximately fifty feet from the break point and shorted cut the entire plant card reader system. As a result, key-cards would not open plant doors.
Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1987 The security radio repeater (in the cable tray room in the turbine building) that is located approximately five feet from the dis-charge nozzle of the Cardox system failed.and was later found to be covered with a thick layer of ice resulting from the inadvertent actuation of the Cardox system.
As a result, security communica-tions were limited to the "non-repeater" or " simplex" mode.
- Fire Protection System Actuations Within mirutes of the pipe rupture event, portions of the Unit 2 turbine building sprinkler system actuated.
Sixty-two sprinkler heads immediately began discharging water to cool the turbine building atmosphere.
As a result of the sprinkler water and feedwater discharge, the CO and the Halon fire suppression system control panels were i
2 affected. The CO fire suppression system control panels for both 2
Units 1 and 2 cable tray rooms are located near the Unit 2 cable tray room access door. The sprinkler water discharged directly l
over and adjacent to these panels intruded into the CO III' 2
i suppression system control panels through multiple open conduit ends which extend from the panels to cable tray raceway above.
The water intrusion caused the time limit switches to short-circuit in the closed position. As a result, the discharge timers did not function as designed. Consequently, a total of 17 tons of CO was 2
discharged into the cable tray rooms.
l The Halon fire suppression system protecting Units 1 and 2 emergen-cy switchgear rooms also actuated. The Halon system actuation was caused by sprinkler water discharge and feedwater run off which flowed under the fire door. The water cascaded down the wall, entered the Halon system conduit through a conduit fitting which did not have its cover in place at the time of the incident.
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e Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1987 water flowed through the conduit and into the Halen system control panel short-circuiting the time limit, battery charger and the dual zone modules. As a result, the Halon system actuated discharging 7-10 percent Halon concentration into the emergency switchgear rooms.
j Mr. Michelson asked whether the motor control centers were actually affected by the event. Mr. Holland responded that they were affected.
They were actually shorting out and had to be deenergized.
Mr. Ebersole asked whether the motor control centers were affected by surface condensation of steam or by water intrusion. Mr. Holland responded that they were affected as a result of steam condensation as well as water intrusion.
Indicating that Surry, Units 1 and 2 have a common control room, Mr.
Michelson asked whether adequate provisions have been made to prevent smoke and gas getting into the control room if there is a fire in an
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area below the control room. Mr. Holland responded that he is not knowledgeable enough to answer that question.
Mr. Michelson commented that the licensee and the Staff should make sure that smoke and other gases do not get into the control room in the event I
of a fire in an area below that room.
l Mr. Ebersole asked whether the emergency switchgear room is designed to cope with a large release of steam into that room. Mr. Holland responded he does not know. He said that during the Surry incident steam did not get into that room.
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a Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1937 Mr..Michelson asked if steam gets into the switchgear room and actuated the Halon system will there be any detrimental effect on. personnel in that room. Mr. Madden responded that the design concentration of Halon which ranges from 7-10 percent will not have any detrimental effects on i
humans.
s Mr. Ebersole asked whether they have considered the effects of discharg-ing large amount of CO into a small room, such as the battery room,
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2 which contains some essential equipment. Mr. Holland responded that he i
is not certain whether it is taken into account in the design.
l Mr. Ebersole suggested that it should be ensured that a large amount of CO does not get released into the diesel generator rooms as a result of 2
inadvertent actuation due to a seismic event.
Mr. Michelson commented that since the emergency diesel generators at the Surry Plant are cooled by air, discharging a large amount of C02 i
into that room inadvertently may impair the air supply to that room I
which-in turn will affect the cooling of the diesel engines.
It should be made sure that such things won't happen. Mr. Holland responded that there are three emergency diesel generator rooms.
He does not believe that CO will be released into all three rooms simultaneously due to 2
inadvertent actuation.
Mr. Michelson suggested that they look at the possibility of dust, resulting from a tornado, inadvertently actuating the C0 system in the _._
2 diesel generator rooms and the resulting consequences.
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Mr. Reed wondered whether too much automation in the design of essential systems plays a significant role in causing certain events in nuclear.
plants.
Mr. Michelson asked whether the licensee has performed any analysis to determine the effects of pipe breaks in the turbine building on safety-related equipment. Mr. Holland said he does not know.
Mr. Holland discussed briefly the corrective actions and modifications recommended by the Staff and adopted by the licensee (Attachment C, pages 28 and 29).
Mr. Michelsor, asked whether licensees of other plants had been made aware of the Surry incident so cs to help them look at possible vul-nerabilities in their plants that need corrective actions. Mr. Holland
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responded that all resident inspectors in Region II had been made aware j
of this event.
Further, the licensee has publicized this event exten-sively throughout the country.
Some of the foreign representatives had also been briefed on this event by the licensee.
Mr. Michelson asked whether INP0 plans to do any study on this event.
Mr. Holland responded that he understands that a group has been estab-lished by INP0 to look into this event.
However, he does not know what that group plans to do.
MANUAL FIRE MITIGATION - MR. D. NOTLEY i
Mr. Notley discussed the following items associated with the manual fire fighting:
- Nature of lighting provided during manual fire fighting (Attachment C, page 30).
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- Training of personnel involved in manual fire fighting, and equip-l ment used for this function-(Attachment C, pages 31-34).
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- Current instructions concerning use of water on electrical fires l
(Attachments,pages35and36).
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- Effects of inadvertent manual fire mitigation on safety-related equipment in adjacent areas.
Mr. Michelson asked whether there are any requirements to use high-intensity lighting when fighting a f're in a smoke-filled room. Mr.
Notley responded that there are no specific requirements on this issue.
Mr. Hernan stated that lighting requirements are based on station blackout considerations rather than fire protection considerations.
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Mr. Michelson comented that he is concerned about the visibility in a i
l smoke-filled room.
Poor visibility due to smoke may result in spraying i
1 water or CO n essential equipment which'in turn may have some adverse 2
effects.
l Mr. Michelson asked whether the NRC Staff, including resident inspec-I l
tors, and other local officials monitor the adequacy of the fire brigade drills. Mr. Craig responded that the fire brigade drills and practices are periodically monitored by the NRC and other appropriate personnel.
Mr. Michelson asked whether the hoses in the local standpipe stations
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are shock proof so as to prevent electrical shocks. Mr. Notley respond-ed he does not know.
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5 Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1987 Mr. Michelson asked whether there are written procedures made available to provide guidance on how to fight fire in different locations of the plant. Mr. Notely responded that written procedures are made available for each zone.
i4r. Michelson asked to what extent equipment is qualified to withstand-l the spray of water and/or CO from the fire protection systems. Mr.
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Wermiel responded that equipment in harsh environments are qualified in accordance with the requirements included in 10 CFR Part 50.49.
1 Mr. Michelson commented that his understanding is that the environmental qualification program does not necessarily deal with equipment that will be sprayed with water or CO resulting from the inadvertent actuation.
2 Mr. Hernan responded that it was not considered by the Equipment Quali-fication Rule,10 CFR Part 50.49.
PROPAGATION OF HEAT AND SM0KE - MR. D. NOTLEY
[ NOTE:
The items on computer codes and research programs associated with propagation of heat and smoke have been postponed to tl'e July 23rd Subcommittee meeting.]
Mr. Notley discussed briefly the regulatory requirements for controlling propagation of heat and smoke (Attachment C, pages 37 and 38), and the l
adequacy of fir barriers to prevent heat and smoke propagation, Mr. Michelson asked whether the fire protection systems will be operable in the event of a station blackout.
Mr. Notley said yes.
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Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 11, 1987 With regard to the adequacy of fire barriers, Mr. Micnelson commented that it is his understanding that these barriers are not intended to prevent heat or smoke from going through.
Mr. Michelson said that RES may want to address the following at the July 23rd meeting:
- How fast heat and smoke might propagate from a fire?
- What are the effects of heat and smoke, that pass through fire barriers, on equipment on the other side of the barriers?
SUBCOMMITTEE REMARKS Mr. Michelson proposed that after discussing the status of the Scoping Study on fire protection being performed by the Sandia National Laboratories at the July 23, 1987 Subcommittee meeting, the Subcommittee may want to develop comments on the adequacy of that study as well as on the topics discussed at the June 11, 1987 meeting.
He said that one of the items we should comment on is the adequacy of fire protection requirements for future plants. He solicited comments from the Subcommittee members.
l The Subcommittee members agreed with the proposal by Mr. Michelson.
I Mr. Reed stated that he agrees that the requirements for future plants should be clarified.
Further, he believes that we should explore the pros and cons of the automated systems vs manual systems.
He suspects j
that too much automation in design might have contributed to the severity of the event at Surry.
He suggested that RES may want to look l
1 into the extent to which Navy uses automation, redundancy, etc.
Mr. Michelson stated that one of the things we may want to consider is l
how to design a system that would discharge water or C only when 2
needed.
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Mr. Wylie stated that if an independent, dedicated decay heat removal system is used in nuclear plants, he believes that they can depend on manual fire mitigation which in turn will preclude the possibility of inadvertent actuation.
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Mr. Hernan stated that the Electric Power Research Institute (EfRI) program is expected to delineate requirements for future plant design,.
including fire protection system design. He committed to provide a copy of the portion of the EPRI report that deals with fire protection system i
for future plants.
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Mr. !iichelson thanked all participants and adjourned the meeting at.2:45 p.m.
l NOTE:
Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or it can be purchased j
from ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 North Capitol Street, Wash-ington, DC 20001, (202) 347-3700.
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO' THE SUBCOMMITTEE-AUXILIARY SYSTEMS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING J
JUNE 11, 1987.
.1 1.
Tentative Presentation Schedule.-
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Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50' 3.
Standard Review Plan Section 6.4, " Control Room Habitability System."
4.
Standard Review Plan Section 9.5.1, " Fire Protection Program."
5.
Surry Unit 2 Reacter Trip and Feedwater Pipe Failure Report, Rev. 1, dated March 27, 1987..
6.
NRC Augmented. Inspection Team. Report Related to the December 9,.
I 1986 Surry event.
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Presentation Material associated with the Surry event provided 'to the full Committee during the February 5-7, 1987 ACRS meeting.
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Presentation material submitted to the Subcommittee during the l
meeting.
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ATTACHMENT A
TENTATIVE PRESENTATION SCHEDULE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON THE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS JUNE 11, 1987 ROOM 1046, 1717 H ST., N.W.
l WASHINGTON, D.C.
ACRS CONTACT: Sam Duraiswamy 202-634-3267 i
l NOTE: ' Presentation Time should not exceed 50% of the Total Time' allocated for a specific item. The remaining 50% of the time
-is reserved for the Subcornittee questions and answers by the Staff.
" Number of Copies of the Presentation Materials to be submitted to the Subcommittee:
25 copies.
TOTAL PRESENTATION ITEM PRESENTER TIME ACTUAL TIME i
15 min 8:30 - 8:45am 1.
EXECUTIVE SESSION 2.
INADVERTENT ACTUATION 90 min 8:45 - 10:15am 0F FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS a.
Regulatory Require-David Notley ments and/or (NRR)
Guidance for Fire Protection System l
Design to Prevent Inadvertent Actua-l tion b.
Recent Incidents Matthew Chiramal Associated with (AE00) the Inadvertent Actuation of Fire Protection Systems l
and Their Inter-action on Safety Systems
- BREAK ***
15 min 10:15 - 10:30am
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Auxiliary Systems Schedule June 11, 1987 l
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- Tentative Presentation Schedule -
i TOTAL PRESENTATION ITEM PRESENTER TIME ACTUAL TIME l
3.
SYSTEMS INTERACTION 90 min 10:30 - 12:00pm j
EFFECTS RESULTING TROM
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DECEMBER 9, 1986 5URRY INCIDENT Fire Protection Bill Holland Systems-Related (RegionII)
Aspects of 1
December 9, 1986 Surry Incident, and the Associated Systems Interaction Effects
- LUNCH ***
60 min 12:00 - 1:00pm 4.
MANUAL FIRE MITIGATION 60 min 1:00 - 2:00pm a.
Nature of Lighting David Notley Provided During (NRR)
Manual Fire Fighting b.
Training of Person-nel Involved in Manual Fire Fighting, and Equipment Used for this Function c.
Current Instruc-tions Concerning the Use of Water on Electrical Fires
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d.
Effects of Inadver-Uldis Potapovs tent Manual Fire (NRR)
Mitigation on Safety-Related Equipment in Adjacent Areas e
4 Auxiliary Systems Schedule June 11, 1987 i
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- Tentative Presentation Schedule -
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TOTAL PRESENTATION ITEM PRESENTER TIME ACTUAL TIME 5.
PROPAGATION OF HEAT 60 min 2:00 - 3:00pm AND SMOKE
'T (RES)
\\.RelatedComputer Codes b.
History of Research Work Done Relating to Propagation of Heat and Smoke and j
the Resulting Systems j
Interaction Effects c.
Regulatory Require-David Notley ments for Controlling (NRR) the Propagation of
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l Heat and Smoke d.
Adequacy of Fire Barriers to Prevent Heat and Smoke Propagation
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e.
Qualification of Uldis Potopovs
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Equipment for (NRR)
Fire-Induced Environment 6.
SUBCOMMITTEE REMARKS 15 min 3:00 - 3:15pm
- ADJ0 URN ***
3:15pm
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INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS THERE ARE DO SEPARATE PAPTS OF THE BROADER ISSUF OF INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS ~^
A.
REQUIREMENTS OR GUIDANCE CRITERIA TO PREVENT !NADVERTENT ACTUATION l
OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS B.
REQUIREMENTS OR GUIDANCE CRITERIA TO PREVENT UNACCEPTABLE DEGRADATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN AND SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS DUE TO RUPTURE OR INADVERTENT OPERATION OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS l
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I ITEM 2 - C0ffTINUED I
A.
REQUIREMENTS OR GUIDANCE CRITERIA TO PREVENT. INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS NFPA 72-D PROPRIETARY PPOTECTIVE SIGNALING SYSTEMS 2-2.2.1 VOLTAGE, TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY VARIATION.
j EQUIPMEfR SHALL BE SO DESIGNED THAT IT SHALL BE CAPABLE OF 1
PERFORMING ITS INTENDED FUNCTION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
I (A) AT 85 PERCENT AND AT 110 PERCENT OF THE NAMEPLATE PRIMARY (MAIN) AND SECONDARY (STANDBY) INPUT VOLTAGE (S).
(B) AT AMBIENT TEW ERATURES OF 32' 4*F (0*
2*C) AND-120' 4*F (49' 2*C) FOR A MINIM W DURATION AT EACH EXTRE E OF T R EE HOURS.
(C) AT A RELATIVE HWIDITY OF 85 5 PERCEfC AND AN AMBIENT
^
TEMPERATURE OF 90*
4*F (32*
2*C) FOR A DURATION OF AT LEAST 24 HOURS.
2-5 INSTALLATION (ALL SYSTEMS).
2-5.1 ALL SYSTEMS SHALL BE INSTALLED IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER AND IN ACCORDANCE WI'lH APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND WITH SPECIFICATIONS APPROVED BY THE AlfiHORITY HAVING JUP,ISDICTION.
2-5.2 DEVICES SHALL BE LOCATED AND INSTALLED SO THAT ACCIDENTAL OPEPATION WILL NOT BE CAUSED BY VIBRATION OR JARRING.
c2
1 i
i ITEM 2 - CONTINUED NFPA FIRE PROTECTION Hu eB00K - RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRE RISK F# LAGER THE SCOPE OF WE FIRE RISK MANAGER'S RESPONSIBILITY CAN BE SAID TO INCLUDE THE ENTIRE RANGE OF SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS HANDBOOK. SOME OF HIS MAJOR RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:
1.
EVALUATION OF LOSS' POSSIBILITIES.
)
2, PROVISION OF SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES FOR FIRE RISK CONTROL, 3.
COUNSEL WITH WE FACILITY ENGINEERING, MAINTENANCE, AND PLANNING DEPARTMENTS, 14 COUNSEL WITH OPERATING AND SERVICE DEPARTMENTS, 5.
ESTABLISH STAf0ARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR ALL ITEMS OF EOUIPMENT WHICH ARE A PART OF W E FIRE RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM.
6.
Ii:,IRPRETATION OF LAWS, CODES, AND NFPA AND RELATED STAf0ARDS APPLICABLE TO FIRE RISK MANAGFMENT,
- wu i
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ITEM 2 - CrtrrINUED B.
PEOUIREMENTS OR GUIDANCE CRITERIA TO PREVENT UtlACCEPTABLE l
DEGRADATION OF SAFE SHUTI)OWN AND SAFEY-RELATED SYSTEMS AND 1
COMPONENTS DUE TO RUPTURE OR INADVERTENT OPEPATION OF. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS.
1 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERION 3 FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS SHALL BE DESIGNED TO ASSURE THAT THEIR RUPnJRE OR INADVERTENT OPEPATION DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPAIR THE SAFETY CAPABILITY
^
1 STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY.
)
BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION CEB 9.5-1 SECTION C.1,C.(5)
THE CONSEQUENCES OF INADVERTEfff OPERATION OF, OR A CRACK IN, A lODERATE-ENERGY LINE IN THE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM SHOULD MEET l
THE GUIDELINES Si.CIFIED FOR MODERATE-ENERGY SYSTEMS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT IN SRP SECTION 3,6,1.
i 1
1 1
i l
ITEM 2 - CONTINUED STANDARD REVIEW PLANT SECTION 3.6.1 IT IS THE ItGENT OF THIS DESIGN APPROACH THAT POSTULATED PIPING FAILURES IN FLUID SYSTEMS SHO' LD NOT CAUSE A LOSS OF FUtCTION OF J
ESSENTIAL SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS (P. 3.6.1-9).
PLANT ARRANGEME!GS SHOULD' SEPARATE FLUID SYSTEM PIPING FROM i
ESSEtGIAL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS. ENVIRONMENTAL COBOITIONS RESULTING FROM THE ESCAPE OF C0tfTAING FLUIDS FROM MODERATE-ENERGY FLUID SYSTEM PIPING SHALL NOT IMPAIR THE ItGEGRITY OR OPERABILIT(
OF ESSENTIAL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS (P. 3.6.1-10).
FIRE PPOTECTION SYSTEMS ARE AMONG THOSE PRESSURIZED SYSTEMS IDENTIFIED AS MODERATE-ENERGY FLUID SYSTEMS.
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ITEP 2 - CONTINUED.
BTP CEB 9.5-1 1
SECTION C.5.A 1
FIPE BARRIERS SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO (A) ISOLATE SAFETY RELAH D SYSE MS i
FPOM POTENTIAL FIRES THAT COULD AFFECT PERFORMANCE OF THEIR SAFETY FUNCTION, AfD (B) SEPAPATE REDUNDANT DIVISIONS OR TRAINS OF SAFETY RELATED SYSEMS' FROM EACH OTHER SO THAT BOTH ARE NOT SUBJECT TO DAPAGE FROM A SINGLE FIRE.
1 (P. 9.5.1-28).
J FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN FEATURES PREACTION AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER SYSTEMS CROSS-ZONE AUTOMATIC FIRE DETECTION INSTALLATIONS PANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY FIRE SUPPRESSION AGENT OF CHOICE - 1%TCHING AREAhiAZARD TO BE PROTECTED WITH FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM / AGENT TO BE INSTALL G.
j j
i PLANT DESIGN FEATURES l
CURBS / PEDESTALS / DIKES j
DRAINS i
LOW SMOKE PRODUCING INTERIOR FINISH PARRIALS OIL FILLED TRANSFOPJdERS PERM!iit.u ONLY OUTDOORS i
c-6 a
L'33184042.
FORM 1
LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 ooooo***************************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 331 1984 042 0
8501020143 192695 11/23/84
- oooo*****+*********************************************************
DOCKET 331 ARNOLD TYPE:BWR REGION:
3 NSSS:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER CO.
SYMBOL: IEL COMMENTS STEP 2: ISYS SW - UNKNOWN AREA STEPS 8 AND 9: ONLY NON-VITAL BUSSES WERE LOST. WATCH LIST 990 - REACTOR TRANSIENT EVENT CAUSED BY SINGLE FAILURE.
WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
990 COMPLEX EVENT DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
j 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 331/34-040 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 081%. WHILE IN NORMAL POWER OPERATION AT 81% POWER AT 0640 HRS ON 11-23-84, A REACTOR SCRAM OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF LOSS OF NON-VITAL BUSSES.
PRIOR TO THE EVENT. NONVITAL BUSSES WERE BEING SUPPLIED FROM OFFSITE POWER VIA THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER AND VITAL BUSSES WERE BEING SUPPLIED FROM OFFSITE POWER VIA THE STANDBY TRANSFORMER.
A SPURIOUS STARTUP TRANSFORMER FIRE PROTECTION DELUGE SYSTEM ACTUATION OCCURRED DUE TO A SLOW LEAK IN THE PRESSURIZED SENSING HEADER SURROUNDING THE TRANSFORMER COUPLED WITH FOREIGN MATERIAL WITHIN A PRESSURE REGULATOR THAT IS DESIGNED TO MAKE UP FOR MINOR HEADER LEAKAGE.
APPROX 1 MIN FOLLOWING THE DELUGE SYSTEM ACTUATION. THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER TRIPPED ON PHASE DIFFERENTIAL WHEN l
THE DELUGE WATER SPRAY ABOVE THE TRANSFORMER CAUSED ARCING BETWEEN THE PHASE 2 BUSHING AND THE TOP OF THE TRANSFORMER TANK. THE LOSS OF NONVITAL BUSSES CAUSED A TURBINE TRIP AND TURBINE CONTROL AND STOP l
VALVE CLOSURE. WHICH IN TURN INITIATED A REACTOR SCRAM AS DESIGNED.
l REACTOR PRESSURE PEAKED AT 1070 PSIG AND VESSEL WATER LEVEL DECREASED FROM 193" TO 106" ABOVE TOP OF ACTIVE FUEL DUE TO VOID COLLAPSE.
J AUTOMATIC CONTAINMENT ISOLATION GROUPS II-V ACTUATED AS DESIGNED AT REACTOR LOW LEVEL AND HPCI/RCIC INITIATED AT LOW / LOW LEVEL. HPCI INJECTION PROMPTLY RECOVERED LEVEL WHILE TURBINE BYPASS VALVES CONTROLLED PRESSURE AT 920 PSIG AND THE MSIV'S WERE CLOSED 15 MINS LATER.
THE SUBSEQUENT COOLDOWN WAS UNEVENTFUL.
e 4
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L $9784026-FORM 1
LER SCSS DATA 06-08-67 ao******************************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 397 1984 026 1
8405230188 190751 03/21/84
- +************************
DOCKET 397 WPPSS 2 TYPE BWR REGION:
. ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER BNRO l
FACILITY OPERATOR: WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM SYMBOL: WPP COMMENTS STEPS 2,3,13,14,24k25: ISYS CODE SW - CABLE SPREADING ROOM. STEP 5.16 & 27:
ISYS SW-HPCS DIESEL ROOM.
DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR *iHIS LER ARE 15 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii): Sinele failure criteria.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 001%. THE FIRST ACTIVATION OF THE PRE-ACTION AND DELUGE SYSTEMS OCCURRED ON 3-21-84 AND WAS REPORTED AS A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT BECAUSE WATER WAS FOUND IN THE' STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEN (SGTS) TRAIN B.
THE WATER ENTERED THE SGTS VIA THE DELUGE SYSTEM, MOMENTARILY LIFTED THE DELUGE VALVE OFF ITS SEAT AND ALLOWED WATER TO LEAK AND RUN OUT THE NOZZLES ONTO THE FLOOR ADJACENT TO THE SGTS CHARCOAL BED.
ON 4-19-84 AND 4-27-84 WATER WAS FOUND IN THE B TRAIN OF THE SGTS AGAIN.
THE A TRAIN OF THE SGTS WAS INSPECTED TO INSURE NO WATER WAS PRESENT AND A B TRAIN TEST CANISTER PULLED.
AFTER EACH OF THE EVENTS B TRAIN OF THE SGTS WAS CONSIDERED INOPERABLE UNTIL THE TEST CANISTER ANALYSIS WAS COMPLETE INDICATING NO CHARCOAL DAMAGE.
A
. DESIGN CHANGE IS IN PROGRESS TO PREVENT FUTURE OCCURRENCES.
e 1
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.L 3618'4033 FORM 1
LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 cono**************3*************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER sUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 361 1984 033 1
8409280359 195777 06/16/84 oooo******************************************+++*******************
DOCKET:361 SAN ONOFRE 2 TYPE:PWR AEGION:
5 NSSS:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
SYMBOL: SCE COMMENTS STEP 13: CAUSE XX - INSTALLATION NOT YET COMPLETE: STEP 14: PSYS SW - UNIT 1 4KV SWITCHGEAR ROOM.
WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
401 VULNERABILITY OF BURIED COMPONENTS DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
9 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2): Limitins conditions for operation.
10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 6-16-84, AT 1142, WITH UNIT 2 IN MODE 1 AND UNITS 1 AND 3 IN MODE 5. HYDROSTATIC TESTING WAS BEING PERFORMED ON A NEW'5ECTION OF THE UNIT 2/3 FIRE MAIN PIPING.
LEAKAGE OCCURRED THROUGH THE HYDROSTATIC TEST BOUNDARY VALVES, PRESSURIZING THE ENTIRE FIRE MAIN ABOVE THE OPERATING PRESSURE.
A BREAK OCCURRED IN THE FIRE MAIN PIPING OUTSIDE OF THE HYDROSTATIC TEST BOUNDARY.
FLOODING OCCURRED IN THE AREA OF THE BREAK AND WATER FLOWED THROUGH NEWLY l
INSTALLED TELECOMMUNICATION DUCTS INTO THE UNIT 1 4KV SWITCHGEAR ROOM.
THE THREE UNIT 2/3 FIRE PUMPS, WHICH HAD STARTED ON LOW PRESSURE, WERE SHUT OFF.
THE ENTIRE UNIT 2/3 FIRE MAIN WAS ISOLATED.
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LCO'S 3.7.8.2 AND 3.7.8.3, FIRE WATCHES WERE ESTABLISHED WITH PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS, HOWEVER, THE REQUIREMENTS FOR BACKUP FIRE SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT COULD NOT BE SATISFIED.
AT 1515.
THE LEAK WAS ISOLATED AND THE FIRE MAIN REPRESSURIZED.
THE FAILURE WAS ATTRIBUTED TO CRACKING IN THE PIPE CAUSED BY RECENT HEAVY CONSTRUCTION TRAFFIC CONCENTRATED IMMEDIATELY ABOVE THE FIRE MAIN BREAK.
THE PIPING WAS REPLACED AND THE SYSTEM RETURNED TO THE NORMAL LINEUP.
O I
c_9
1
,L 32186007 FORM 1
LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 oooo****************************************************************
1 DOCKET. YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE j
321 1986 007 0
8604170412 199242 03/11/86 1
...o********+*******************************************************
DOCKET 1321 HATCH 1 TYPE BWR REGION:
2 NSSStGE j
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS l
1 FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO.
SYMBOLt GPC 4
COMMENTS STEP 2 MODEL Bf STEP 5: COMP PFLT - CHARCOAL FILTER.
)
l DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR ThIS LER ARE 10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 000%. AT APPROXIMATELY 1500 CST ON 3/11/86, UNIT 1 WAS SHUTDOWN FOR REFUELING (REACTOR VESSEL COMPLETELY LOADED WITH FUEL AND HEAD NOT INSTALLED), AND UNIT 2 WAS OPERATING AT 2063 MWT i
(APPROXIMATELY 85% POWER).
AT THAT TIME, PERSONNEL WERE PERFORMING l
ONCE PER OPERATING CYCLE PROCEDURE 42SV-T46-OO3-1 ON THE "1A" STANDBY GAS TREATMENT (SBGT) FILTER TRAIN WHEN THEY NOTED THAT THE FILTER TRAIN'S DOWNSTREAM CHARCOAL ADSORBER BED WAS WET.
THE "1A" SBGT FILTER TRAIN'S CHARCOAL FILTER BED APPARENTLY BECAME WET (FROM A l
LEAKING FIRE PROTECTION DELUGE VALVE) ON OR BEFORE 11/24/85.
THE i
DELUGE VALVE WAS ISOLATED FROM ITS WATER SUPPLY ON 11/24/85 AND REPLACED ON 1/13/86.
THE WETTING OF THE CHARCOAL CAUSED DEGRADATION OF THE TRAIN, AND OPERATION IN A CONDITION CONTRARY TO THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 TECH SPECS, A MATERIAL FAILURE IN THE DELUGE VALVE SEAT APPARENTLY ALLOWED ENOUGH LEAKAGE TO WET THE DOWNSTREAM FILTER BED.
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TECH SPECS WAS DUE TO PERSONNEL FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THAT A LEAKING DELUGE VALVE DROP CHECK VALVE MAY INDICATE THAT THE DELUGE VALVE IS LEAKING.
THE CHARCOAL BED WAS REPLACED ON 3/14/96 AND THE TRAIN WAS FUNCTIONALLY TESTED ANJ RETURNED TO SERVICE ON 3/17/86. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL WILL BE INSTRUCTED ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEAKING DELUGE VALVE DRIP CHECK VALVES.
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L 32185018 1
FORM 1
LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 oooo****************************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 321 1985 018 0
8506260447 196115 05/15/85 o*******************************************************************
DOCNET 321 HATCH 1 TYPE BWR REGION:
2 NSSSIGE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO.
SYMBOL -GPC COMMENTS 1
STEP 2: COMPONENT MEI - NIPPLE STEP 7: EFFECT BX - WATER DRIPPED OUT OF 1
VENT ONTO INSTRUMENT PANEL.
DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuatiores.
14 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v): Event that could have Prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
REFERENCE LERS:
1 321/85-002 j
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 5-15-85 AT 2030 CDT, PLANT PERSONNEL' OBSERVED WATER FALLING FROM A CONTROL ROOM HVAC VENT ONTO AN ANALOG TRANSMITTER TRIP SYSTEM (ATTS) DIV II PANEL.
THIS INTRODUCED MOISTURE TO THE ATTS PANEL WHICH, IN TURN, RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING
- 1) THE LIFTINO OF THE
'A' LOW-LOW SET SAFETY RELIEF VALVE THE FAILURE OF AN ATTS POWER SUPPLY.
THE
'A' LLS SRV CYCLED OPEN AND WAS RESET 3 TIMES BEFORE IT OPENED AND REMAINED OPEN AT 2110 CDT.-
THE
'A' LLS SRV REMAINED OPEN AFTER ITS FOURTH ACTIVATION, THUS, OPERATIONS PERSONNEL l
l COMPLIED WITH PROCEDURES AND MANUALLY SCRAMMED THE REACTOR AT 2122 CDT.
ON 5-15-85 AT 2110 CDT, THE HPCI TRIP SOLENOID ENERGIZED FOR 15 MINS THUS, MAKING HPCI INOPERABLE DURING PART OF THIS EVENT.
THE MOISTURE IN THE ATTS PANEL WAS DUE TO ACTIVATION OF THE FIRE PROTECTION DELUGE SYSTEM FOR THE 'A' CONTROL ROOM HVAC FILTER TRAIN.
PLANT PERSONNEL DRIED THE MOISTURE IN PANEL 1H11-P926. RECHECKED THE i
CALIBRATION OF ALL TRIP UNITS IN PANEL 1H11-P926 TO ENSURE THEIR OPERABILITY, AND REPLACED THE FAILED POWER SUPPLY.
PLANT PERSONNEL REPLACED THE CHARCOAL IN AND CLEANED THE DRAINS FOR THE
'A' CONTROL ROOM HVAC FILTER TRAIN.
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.L 32a85026 FORM 1
LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 oce*****************************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 321 1985 026 0
8508090654 196394 06/27/85 ocoo****************************************************************
DOCKET 321 HATCH 1 TYPE:BWR REGION:
j ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BESS i
FACILITY OPERATOR: GEORGIA POWER CO.
SYMBOL: GPC COMMENTS STEP 3: ISYS SW - UNKNOWN AREA.
l DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 064%. ON 06/27/85 AT APPROXIMATELY 1320 CDT, WHILE PLANT i
PERSONNEL WERE PREPARING TO INCREASE LOAD ON THE UNIT, THE "1C" f
START-UP TRANSFORMER (SUT) SHORTED TO GROUND CAUSING LOSS OF POWER TO f
THE "A"
AND "B" 4160 VOLT BUSSES.
THIS RESULTED IN LOSS OF POWER TO THE "A"
AND "B" REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMPS.
WHILE PLANT PERSONNEL WERE ATTEMPTING TO MANUALLY SCRAM THE UNIT (REQUIRED BY TECH SPECS SECTION 3.6.J.1), AN AUTOMATIC SCRAM FROM THE NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM (I.E.,
LOSS OF RECIRCULATION PUMPS RESULTED IN AN APRM FLOW BIAS-SCRAM SIGNAL) WAS RECEIVED.
THE EVENT RESULTED FROM NON-LICENSED PLANT PERSONNEL CLOSING THE INCORRECT FIRE PROTECTION DELUGE VALVE
- DIAPHRAGM CHAMBER WATER SUPPLY VALVE.
THIS CAUSED THE FIRE PROTECTION WATER SYSTEM TO ACTUATE AND SPRAY THE "1C" SUT, RESULTING IN A PHASE-TO-GROUND FAULT TRIP ON THE "1C" SUT. TEE FIRE PROTECTION DELUGE VALVE DIAPHRAGM CHAMBER WATER SUPPLY VALVES WthE LABELED CORRECTLY AND THE MISALIGNED DELUGE SPRAY NOZZLE WAS REALIGNED.
POWER WAS RESTORED TO THE "1C" SUT AND THE "A" AND "B" 4160 VOLT BUSSES.
BOTH RECIRCULATION PUMPS WERE RETURNED TO SERVICE ON 06/29/85 AT l
APPROXIMATELY 1320 CDT.
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L 33386021.
FORM i
LER CCSS DATA 06-06-87 l
DOCKET
' YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE I
333 1936 021 0
8701280386 202516 12/23/86 ce******************************************************************
I DOCKET 333 FITZPATRICK TYPE:BWR REGION:
1 NSSStGE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SWXX FACILITY OPERATOR: POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NY SYMBOL: PNY COMMENTS STEPS 1,28 ISYS SW - BATTERY MOTOR CONTROL CENTER ROOM.
DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
14 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v): Event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
3 1
REFERENCE LERS:
1 333/86-012 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 082%. ON 12/23/86. WITH THE PLANT AT 82% POWER, A FLOW CONTROL VALVE TEST LINE COUPLING CRACKED ON FIRE CURTAIN 11 MANIFOLD.
THERE WERE NO SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS OUT OF SERVICE WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT.
WATER SPRAY FROM THE CRACK FLOWED THROUGH A DECK GRATING AND ONTO BATTERY MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (BMCC) 2.
'TWO ROWS OF BREAKER CUBICLES WERE WET AND A RESISTOR IN THE BREAKER TO MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVE (29-MOV-77) LOSS OF POWER MONITOR FAILED.
ALL COMPONENTS SUPPLIED BY BMCC-2 REMAINED OPERABLE. THE BMCC WAS DE-ENERGIZED TO DRY AND INSPECT INTERNALS AND REPAIR THE LOSS OF POWER
' CIRCUIT.
THIS MADE HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) AND 3
]
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM-(PCIS) VALVES INOPERABLE: 29-l MOV-77. REACTOR HEAD SPRAY ISOLATION 0-MOV-33) AND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL TO RADWASTE ISOLATION (10-MOV-67).
THE PCIS VALVES WERE DE-ENERGIZED IN THE SHUT POSITION.
THERE WERE NO. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM THEIR INOPERABILITY.
A 7 DAY LIMITING' CONDITION OF i
OPERATION (LCO) WAS ENTERED AND SURVEILLANCE WAS COMMENCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE ACTION STATEMENT.
THE BMCC WAS DRIED, TESTED, ENERGIZED AND DECLARED OPERABLE.
HPCI WAS TESTED SATISFACTORY AND DECLARED OPERABLE.
A DESIGN CHANGE WILL BE INITIATED TO INCREASE
~
WATER TIGHT INTEGRITY OF THE'BMCC-2.
LER-86-012 IS RELATED.
o 4
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l L "4485002.
d
.s FORM 1-LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 oc*o****************************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 344 1985 002 0
8504180034 193902 03/09/85 co*o****************************************************************
DOCKET:344 TROJAN TYPE:PWR REGION:
5 NSSS2WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
i SYMBOL: PGC l
COMMENTS l
STEP 98 EFFECT DX - DAMAGED, UNSPECIFIED EQUIPMENT.
l l
DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 3-9-85 AT 2150 PST. THE REACTOR TRIPPED FOLLOWING A TURBINE TRIP DUE TO SPURIOUS HIGH VIBRATION INDICATION ON A MAIN TURBINE BEARING.
THE RESULTING MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION
]
PRODUCED, AS EXPECTED, A PRESSURE PULSE IN THE HEATER DRAIN AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS, WHICH CAUSED A RUPTURE AT AN ERODED LOCATION IN THE HEATER DRAIN PUMP DISCHARGE PIPING ON THE 45 FT ELEVATION OF THE TURBINE BUILDING.
THE RPS AND PLANT SAFETY SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED.
AS A RESULT OF THE PIPING RUPTURE, A STEAM-WATER MIXTURE OF APPROX 350 F WAS DEPRESSURIZED INTO THE TURBINE BLDG, WHICH ACTUATED FIRE SUPPRESSION (DELUGE) SYSTEMS, DAMAGED SECONDARY PLANT EQUIPMENT IN THE VICINITY, AND INJURED ONE MEMBER OF THE PLANT OPERATING STAFF.
THE REACTOR WAS SAFELY COOLED DOWN USING STEAM LINE POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES AND THE RHR SYSTEM.
o' 9
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A c-4
L 29R84007 l
FORM i
LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87
(
aaaaa.....**.............................................*........
DOCKET YEAR-LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE' 298 1984 007 0
8405230181 190109 04/19/84 oooo*****++*********************************************************
DOCKET:298 COOPER TYPE:BWR REGION:
4 NSS$8GE j
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BNRO i
FACILITY OPERATOR: NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT l
SYMBOL: NPP
)
1 COMMENTS STEP Os COMPONENT CODE XVZ - DELUGE VALVE. STEP 98 EFFECT HX - LOW FILTER EFFICIENCY.
j i
WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
404 CONSTRUCTION INTERACTIONS DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
14 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v): Event that could have Prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
15 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii): Sinsle failure criteria.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 070%. WHILE SCHEDULED CONSTRUCTION WORK WAS IN PROGRESS, A BULLDOZER INADVERTENTLY SHEARED A HYDRANT FROM THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM WITHIN THE COOPER NUCLEAR STATION RESTRICTED SECURITY AREA.
THE STATION FIRE PUMPS AUTOMATICALLY STARTED, BUT WERE LATER T.EMPORARILY SECURED WHILE THE HYDRANT WAS BEING ISOLATED FROM THE SYSTEM.
AT THIS POINT, THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM HEADER PRESSURE HAD DROPPED FROM 140 PSIG TO APPROX. 10 PSIG.
AFTER THE HYDRANT WAS ISOLATED, THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM WAS REPRESSURIZED BY USING THE ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP.
STARTING OF THE ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP CAUSED A PRESSURE SUROE WHICH RESULTED IN A SYSTEM WATER HAMMER.
THIS WATER HAMMER FORCED OPEN THE CLAPPERS GN THE SBGTS AUTOMATIC DELUGE VALVES WHICH FLOODED THE CHARCOAL FILTERS ON THE SBOTS TRAINS, RENDERING BOTH TRAINS INOPERABLE.
THIS PLACED THE PLANT IN A TECH SPEC LCO REQUIRING COLD SHUTDOWN.
THE REACTOR WAS PLACED IN A COLD SHUTDOWN l
CONDITION UNTIL THE INOPERABLE SBGT TRAINS WERE MADE OPERABLE. LACK OF ATTENTION PAID BY THE BULLDOZER OPERATOR TO HIS WORKING ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FAILURE OF THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS TO RESTORE SYSTEM PRESSURE GRADUALLY, WERE PERSONNEL ERRORS WHICH WERE_ IDENTIFIED.,
I l
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L 38285047,
)
j FORM 1-LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 oooo****************************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 382-1985 047 0
8512060003 197652 10/28/85 ocoo************************************************************-****
DOCKETr382 WATERCORD 3 TYPE:PWR 4
REGION!
4 N5SS8CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER EBAS FACILITY OPERATOR: LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL LPL 1
COMMENTS STEP 2: COMP MSC - MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP SUCTION FLANGE.
DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.
l ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 100%. AT 1920 HRS ON 10-28-85 A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED l
DUE TO AN AUX TRIP FROM THE CORE PROTECTION CALCULATCR ON HIGH PRESSURIZER PRESSURE.
PLANT CONDITIONS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY STABILIZED IN MODE 3.
THE TRIP OCCURRED WHEN A STEAM LEAK FROM THE SUCTION q
j FLANGE ON THE B MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP ACTUATED THE DELUGE SYSTEM LOCATED I
DIRECTLY ABOVE THE FEEDWATER PUMP. THE WATER FROM THE DELUGE SYSTEM SPRAYED THE FEEDWATER PUMP CONTROL CABINET CAUSING A TRIP OF THE B MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP.
OPERATIONS PERSONNEL COULD NOT REDUCE REACTOR l
POWER FAST ENOUGH, THEREFORE. PRESSURIZER PRES $URE INCREASED ABOVE THE l
RANGE OF THE CORE PROTECTION CALCULATOR.
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL
)
REPAIRED THE FLANGE LEAK AND DRIED THE COMPONENTS WITHIN THE FEEDWATER PUMP CONTROL CABINET.
e I
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---.-__-__1
L $O0*We95'
[
-L C Ci 0:0
)
.o L-36883025__35 l
FORM i
1,ER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 c...*********************a******************************************.
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE j
368 1983 035 1
8312280445 188452 03/03/83 1
coe*****************************************************************
i DOCKET 368 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR 2 TYPE PWR l
REGION:
4 NSSS CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH i
FACILITY OPERATOR: ARKANSAS POWER AND LIGHT CO.
]
SYMBOL: APL 1
COMMENTS l
STEP 2 ISYS SW = CABLE SPREADING ROOM. SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO I
FLOODING IF DELUGE SYSTEMS NOT TURNED OFF.IN TIME. STEPS 4,5 ISYS ZY =
ALL AC AND DC ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS.
ABSTRACT PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF IE INFORMATION NOTICE 83-41,-(OCNA068314),
" ACTUATION OF FIRE SUPPRESSION-SYSTEM CAUSING INOPERABILITY OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT." AP&L HAD INITIATED A STUDY OF POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO SAFETY-RELATED EQUILPMENT RESULTING FROM SUPPRESSION SYSTEM OPERATION.
AS A RESULT OF THAT STUDY, THE LICENSEE HAS IDENTIFIED ONE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM TO DATE WHERE SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT MAY BE SUBJECTED TO FLOODING IF THE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WERE OPERATED FOR PROLONGED PERIODS WITHOUT OPERATOR INTERVENTION.
FIRE ZONE 2109-U, WHICH IS THE CORRIDOR OUTSIDE THE CABLE SPREADING ROOM ON ELEVATION 372 FEET OF THE ANO-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING, HAS A SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WHICH IS A DELUGE-ACTUATED, DIRECTIONAL WATER SPRAY SYSTEM ACTUATED BY BOTH SMOKE AND LINE-TYPE.
THE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FOR FIRE ZONE 2109-U WAS INSTALLED PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 1978 FIRE PROTECTION SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT.
THE ORIGINAL DRAINAGE ASSESSMENT PORTION OF THE DESIGN CHANGES WAS DASED ON ENGINEERING JUDGMENT INSTEAD OF l
2 DETAILED HYDRAULIC CALCULATION.
A RECENT PRELIMINARY HYDRAULIC CALCULATION INDICATED THAT FLOODING COULD OCCUR. UPON NOTIFICATION THAT A PROBLEM COULD EXIST, AP&L DECIDED TO ISOLATE THE 2109-U SUPPRESSION SYSTEM AND TO RELY ON MANUAL OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM UNTIL A MORE REFINED CALCULATION COULD BE MADE, o
I:
I
(
l C-/7
1 L 39563042
)
1 FORM 1
LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 ooooo***************************************************************
DOCKET -YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 395 1983 042 0
8306100213 183529 05/19/83 e+******+***********************************************************
DOCKET:395 SUMMER 1 TYPE PWR REGION:
2 NSSS:WE I
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GLBT l
FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
SYMBOL: SCC l
ABSTRACT l
AT 0656 HOURS, WITH THE PLANT IN MODE 3.
THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING PREACTION SPRINKLER SYSTEM DELUOE VALVE WAS TRIPPED OPEN WHEN A STEAM I
LEAK ACTIVATED A SMOKE DETECTOR.
AN OPERATOR MADE THE SYSTEM INOPERABLE AT 0730 HOURS WHEN HE CLOSED THE MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE.
f THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR WAS NOT AWARE UNTIL 0930 HOURS THAT THE SYSTEM WAS ISOLATED. THERE WERE NO ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FROM THIS EVENT.
A FIRE WATCH PATROL IN THE GENERAL AREA AND OPERABLE SMOKE DETECTORS WOULD HAVE DETECTED ANY FIRES.
CAUSE IS ATTRIBUTED TO PERSONNEL ERROR 1
AND LACK OF SYSTEM KNOWLEDGE.
THE DELUGE VALVE WAS RESET, AND THE f
SPRINKLER SYSTEM RETURNED TO OPERABLE STATUS BY 1030 HOURS ON MAY 19.
1983.
IN. ORDER TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THE EVENT, THE OPERATOR HAS BEEN COUNSELLED. TRAINING ON SYSTEM OPERATION HAS BEEN INITIATED, AND A CHANGE TO DISPLAY INFORMATION ON SYSTEM STATUS IS TO BE PERFORMED.
j l
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I J
i c- /g
L 39583096 j
I FORM 1
LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 ooooo************************************************************.**
1 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE I
395 1983 098 0
8309210350 185682 08/16/83 f
1 DOCKETt395 ' SUMMER 1 TYPEtPWR REGION:
2 NSSS: NE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GLBT FACILITY OPERATOR: SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
SYMBOL SCC COMMENTS STEPS 3,48 EFFECT EX - WET CHARCOAL FILTERF, LOW ABSORPTIVITY.
ABSTRACT ON AUGUST 16, 1983 AT 0920 HOURS, WITH THE PLANT IN MODE 1.
THE DELUGE VALVE FOR THE AUXILIARY BUILDING CHARCOAL EXHAUST FILTER PLENUM B (XAA-OO40B) TRIPPED OPEN.
THIS OCCURRED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF A SURVEILLANCE TEST ON THE AUXILIARY BUILDING PREACTION SPRINKLER SYSTEMI THE OCCURRENCE FLOODED THE CHARCOAL FILTER, AND RESULTED IN THE PLENUM BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE.
THERE WERE NO ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT BECAUSE THE PLANT VENT RADIATION MONITORS (RM-A3 AND RM-A13) WERE OPERABLE.
TH6 VALVE OPENED DUE TO A PRESSURE SURGE WHEN THE ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP STARTED AND CAUSED THE VALVE'S DROP-WEIGHT TO BE RELEASED.
ALL AFFECTED CHARCOAL, HEPA, AND ROUGHING FILTERS WERE REFLACED.
THE APPROPRIATE OPERATIONAL TEST WAS SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED AND THE-PLENUM WAS RETURNED TO OPERABLE STATUS ON AUGUST 31, 1983, AT 2200 HOURS.
LICENSEE'S INVESTIGATION WILL DETERMINE FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTION.
i l
c-m
L 45686005 FORM 1
LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 ooooo**********++***************************************************
I DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 458 1986 005 0
8602140289 197993 01/07/86
- o*o***************************************************************
DOCKET:458 RIVERBEND 1 TYPE BWR REGION:
4 NSSStGE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SWXX FACILITY OPERATOR: GULF STATES UTILITIES SYMBOL GSU COMMENTS STEP 48 EFFECT HX - FLOOR DRAINS COULD NOT HANDLE FIREWATER FLOWS STEP 5:
WATER LEVEL ROSE IN ROOM CONTAINING REMOTE DATA ACQUISITION EQUIPMENTI STEP 7: TRANSFORMER WAS IN ROOM BELOW THE ROOM BEING SPRINKLED.
1 DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 003%. ON 1/7/86 AT 0847 WITH THE UNIT IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 (STARTUP), A FIRE PROTECTION WATER CURTAIN WAS INADVERTENTLY ACTUATED BY A CONSTRUCTION EMPLOYEE.
WATER FROM THIS ACTUATION RAN INTO TWO MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS AND THROUGH AN UNSEALED PENETRATION IN THE FLOOR AND EVENTUALLY INTO A LOAD CENTER ON THE NEXT i
LOWER ELEVATION.
THE RESULTING SHORT IN THE LOAD CENTER CAUSED A TRANSFORMER TO BURN UP WHICH CAUSED THE BREAKER FEEDING THAT LDAD CENTER TO TRIP.
THIS BREAKER ALSO FED TWO ADDITIONAL LOAD CENTERS, THE LOSS OF WHICH EVENTUALLY CAUSED A REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITORS.
INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENT DETERMINED T. HAT THE SOLENOID ACTIVATION SWITCH WAS UNMARKED AND MISTAKENLY THOUGHT TO BE A DOOR LATCH.
THE IDENTIFICATION AND' PROPER LABELING OF ALL SIMILAR SWITCHES IS CURRENTLY ONGOING.
o c
I 1
1 C-2,o
.L,443S5011 FORM 1
LER SCSS DATA 06-08-87 ocooo***************************************************************
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE.
483 1985 011 0
8504050060 194795 02/22/85 DOCKET 483 CALLAWAY 1 TYPEtPWR REG!ON:
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEERt BECH l
FACILITY OPERATOR UNION ELECTRIC CO.
1 SYMBOLS UEC j
COMMENTS STEP 21 MODEL NO. AM s3.8-1000-4Hf STEP is EFFECT BX-RAIN LEAKED INTO THE HAND PULL STATION.
l DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.
ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 001%. DURING A REACTOR STARTUP ON 2/22/85. THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED AND EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (D/G)
"B" 1
AUTOMATICALLY STARTED AND LOADED WHEN THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER'WAS 1
LOST.
THE REQUIRED SAFETY-RFLATED EQUIPMENT PERFORMED AS DESIGNED
)
DURING THE INCIDENT.
THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER WAS TRIPPED OFF BY AN INTERLOCK BETWEEN THE TRANSFORMER AND ITS DELUGE SYSTEM DUE TO HATER LEAKAGE INTO THE HAND PULL STATION FOR THE DELUGE SYSTEM.
POWER WAS I
LOST TO THE MOTOR / GENERATOR SETS WHICH SUPPLY POWER TO THE CONTROL RODS THUS PREVENTING ROD MOVEMENT.
WHEN THE OPERATORS ATTEMPTED TO 3
MOVE RODS IN AND NO MOVEMENT OCCURRED, THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED.
THE MAUAL REACTOR TRIP IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE OPERATOR ACTION FOR WHICH NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IS NECESSARY.
THE PULL STATION.
WAS REPLACED AND SEALED AND THE TRANSFORMER / DELUGE SYSTEM INTERLOCK HAS BEEN MODIFIED SUCH THAT THE TRANSFORMER MUST BE TRIPPED BEFORE THE DELUGE SYSTEM WILL ACTUATE.
e 9
6 a&+
C-21
=
i
80RN 1
LER SCSS DATA 06-10-87 DOCKET YEAR.LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE-316 1985 026 0
8310170025 197212 09/08/85
)
DOCKET: 316 COOK 2 TYPE:PWR REGION:
3 NSSS:WE
. ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: AEPS FACILITY OPERATOR: INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC CD.
I SYMBOL: IME l
COMMENTS l
STEPS 3,7,14:.EFFECT EX - LOW IODINE REh0 VAL EFFICIENCY; STEPS 2,6,13:
EFFECT EX - WATER DEGRADED CHARCOAL.
l DEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) : Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
)
REFERENCE LERS:
I 1 315/85-058 ABSTRACT I
POWER LEVEL - 000*/.. DURING VISUAL INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED BETWEEN 9-3-85, AND 9-9-85, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE CHARCOAL ADSORBER BANKS, WITHIN 3 TECH SPEC FILTRATION UNITS, HAD BEEN INADVERTENTLY j
EXPOSED TO FIRE PROTECTION WATER.
ON 9-8-85, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT,
{
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE WATER EXPOSURE, THE CHARCOAL ADSORBERS COULD HAVE._ INCURRED DAMAGE.
ALL AFFECTED CHARCOAL TRAYS WITHIN THE 3 UNITS WERE REMOVED, EMPTIED, CLEANED AND REFILLED WITH NEW CHARCOAL.
FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE CHARCOAL CHANGEOUT AND REPAIR OF THE
{
MECHANICALLY DAMAGED TRAYS (REPORTED IN LER NO. 50-315/85-38-1)
'IN-PLACE FILTER, TESTS WERE CONDUCTED.
THE FILTRATION UNITS WERE RETURNED TO SERVICE ON THE FOLLOWING DATES:
UNIT 2, HV-AES-2, 10-4-85; UNIT 1, ACRF, 9-24-85: AND UNIT 2 ACRF, 10-3-85.
TO PREVENT THE RECURRENCE OF INADVERTENT SPRAY HEADER PRESSURIZATION,'A DESIGN CHANGE'HAS BEEN INITIATED TO CHANGE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION FROM AUTOMATIC TO MANUAL.
TO PREVENT FUTURE-SPRAY HEADER LEAKAGE, THE LEAKING ISOLATION VALVES AND ASSOCIATED DRAINS WERE REPAIRED AS REQUIRED.
j l
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m q
S EQU E.\\ CE 07 D/Es"S 07 SYS"EN
\\"ERAC" 0 N S
- PIPE RUPTURE
- UNIT 2 TURBINE BUILDING SPRINKLER SYSTEM ACTUATIO
- VITAL BAlltRY ROOM 28 CARD READER SHORT OUT
- OPENING 0F CONTROL ~ ROOM DOORS
- FLOODING 0F UNIT 2 CABLE SPREADING ROOM FLOOR
- WATER LEAKAGE BEHIND MAIN CONTROL BOARD
.1 C-23
\\
t 1
SEQUENCI 07 NEV S Or SYS"EN
.\\"ERAC".ONS
( CONT.)
{
- DISCHARGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM i
- DEGRADATION OF RADIO REPEATERS 1
- DISCHARGE OF HALON FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM j
I
- OPERATOR TRAPPED IN CONTROL ROOM BACK STAIRWAY
- FLOW 0F CARBON DIOXIDE INTO MAIN CONTROL ROOM
- FLOW OF HALON INTO MAIN CONTROL ROOM C-24
' 81.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OF SYSTEM INTERACTIONS j
Pipe Rupture The-pipe rupture occurred approntmately 40 seconds after the reactor tripped due to low steam generator level'in C generator.
Unit 2 Turbine Building Sprinkler Actuations Due to the heat. generated from the water escaping from the break, 62 sprinkler heads in the immediate area opened and discharged water into the turbine building atmosphere.
Tne sprinkler syst ein in the turbine building is.normally an active system and the sprinkler heads have fused links which activate the head at 165 degrees F.
Vital Battery Room 2B Card Reader Short Out When the pipe ruptured. Water and steam saturated a security card reader for the-door to vital battery room OB which is located in the Unit 2 turbine building basement approximately 50 feet from the break point.
This condition shorted out the entire plant card reader system.
Opening of Control Room Doors to Allow Easy Access During Event Security personnel responded to the control room and other vital areas and provided access control ~ to these areas while the door's were open.
Control room doors remained open throughout' the event to provide easy access.
Floeding of Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room Floor Water from the break and turbine building sprinkler system accumulated on the me::anine entrance to the Unit 2 cable spreading room.
Water ran under the cable spreading room door and accumulated in the room around floor penetrations.
l Water Leakage Behind Unit 2 Vertical Control Board in Control R=om Water dripped through at least one penetration into the" main control room behind the Unit 2 vertical control board.. Operators took immediate action to protect electrical instrumentation by placing plastic over the instruments in order to direct the leakage away.
A c - 25
~
4
+
- Discharge of Cardox System into Unit 1 and Unit 2' Cable Spreading Rooms Water.from the break and' turbine building sprinkler system entered the CARDOX fire.supression system control. panels for both the Unit 1 and Unit 2. cable spreading rooms.- These-panels are located at the me::anine entrance to the Unit 2 cable spreading door'in the turbine building.
The water intrusion.was through multiple open conduit ends which extend from the panels toLthe cable tray raceway above.
The water intrusion caused the time.
limit switches to short in the closed position resulting in a carbo dioxide discharge;into both cable spreading rooms.
Also, it was noted that the bulk of the discharge occurred in the Unit 1~ cable spreading room even though the fire protection panel. printer did not indicate a Unit 1 discharge throughout the entire event.
This l
condition was a result of the affect of the water on the CARDOX panels time' limit switches-and also resulted in a total of 16.tonc*
carbon dioxide being discharged into the cable spreading rooms.
Degradation of Radio Repeaters Located in Cable Spreading Room No. 1 Excessive carbon dioxide discharge in the Unit 1 cable spreading room resulted in the Security radio repeaters becoming temporarily degraded.
These repeaters provide for clearer radio communications by broadcasting amplified signals through the plant.
With the degradation of the repeaters, direct communication between portable handsets was degraded: however, eeded-communication was accomplished using radios or.the station gai-tronics system.
Discharge of Halon System into Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency i
Switchgear Rooms Halon system actuation was caused by sprinkler water discharge and feedwater runoff which flowed under the elevation 27'-O" fire door (30) installed in the column 9 wall.
The water runoff cascaded down the column line 9 wall, which separates.the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine buildings, on the Unit
- 1. side, entered;the Halon system through a conduit fitting which had the fitting cover plate removed at the time of the event.
The water flowed through the conduit and entered the Halon control panel located on the l
Unit 1 side of the column line 9 wall and caused the time limit, battery charger, and dual :ene modules to short.
-This short resulted in discharge of the system into the emergency switchgear rooms.
I C-26
1 l
I 1
Operator Trapped in Stairway at Control Room Back Door After discharge of the carbon dioxide and halon systems, an operator who was in the back stairway was unable to gain access to the control room due to the card reader system being cut of service.
He was admitted to the control room by another per son inside the control room who heard him outside the door.
Flow of Carbon Dioxide into Main Control Room Upon verification of the CARDOX discharge, members of thr licensee's loss prevention staff donned SCBAs and conducted a personnel search of the cable spreading rooms.
Also the personnel took measures to vent the carbon dioxide from the rooms. These measures included opening of the doors to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mechanical equipment rooms and the access doors to the Unit 2 cable spreading room at elevation 45'-3".
Opening of these access doors allowed carbon dioxide to flow out of the cable spreading room, down to the 27'-O" elevation. and into the main control room a n n e:- and main control room through the open doors.
This situation was also aggravated due to the normal control room ventilation system supply being out of service due to a design modification being accomplished.
A temporary supply fan was installed in the Unit 1 mechanical equipment room to supply control room ventilation.
The normal control room exhaust fan was in operation creating a negative pressure in the control room.
With the negative pressure in the cor: trol room, the carbon dioxide j
flowed into the control room through the open doors.
Also, the j
temporary control room supply fan was taking suction in a room I
which was being used to vent carbon dioxide from Unit 1 Cable spreading room.
l Control room operators in the main control room annex experienced l
I some discomfort; however, all operators were physically able to l
perform all required duties.
Once the operators recogni:ed that I
l carbon dioxide was present in the control room. normal ventilatten l
was secured and emergency ventilation was initiated.
This action placed the control room at a higher pressure that the turbine j
building and diluted the carbon dioxide level in a short period of time.
Flow of Halon into Main Control Room l
Upon initial discharge of Halon agent into the emergency t
l switchgear room, some in leakage of halon into the main control room through floor penetrations in the Unit 1 computer room and through the control room emergency air bottle discharge piping l
was ncticod.
However. it should be noted that the concentration l
of Halon as a result of the emergency switchgear room discharge did not create a life ha ard to centrol room personnel.
l l
.f G?- ;E7
III SPURIOUS FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Sealed all open ends of conduits leading to the carbon dioxide system control panels throughout the plant.
Replaced all components within the Unit 1 and Unit 2 cable tray rooms carbon dioxide control panels that show visible signs of corrosion.
1 Full'y tested both systems to confirm proper system operation.
Sealed the Unit 1 CARDOX control panel.
A 1-1/2 inch hole and a 1 inch hole existed in the right side wall near the bottom of the panel.
I
\\
Replaced missing 2 inch conduit cover under the elevation 27'-0"
{
turbine building column line 9 wall platform and walked down all l
other conduits to ensure that covers to the conduits, pull boxes, and Junction boxes are in place and prcperly sealed.
Repaired door seal on the Halon control panel and relocated l
identification sign.
l Replaced all existing Halon panel modules which are no longer manufactured and upgraded these modules to current I
sts.te-of-the-art equipment.
Performed functional Test of the Halon svstem f or both Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency switchgear rooms to ensure proper operation.
Replaced Halon system check valves in discharge lines.
Replaced Unit 2 and reworkd reworked Unit i Halon cylinder heads
{
l to ensure that bottle will not leak and that seals are in good condition.
l Refilled Halon bottles and placed in discharge header.
Halon pressure switch covers and solenoid covers were removed and inspected for water damage.
1 QUESTIONS 7 s
C - zg
'3V' NRC RECOMMENDED MODIFICATIONS Installation of a' wintergreen odori=er in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 cable spreading rooms carbon dioxide system.
1 Licensee has completed. scoping study of recommendation and l
station is in process of reviewing proposal. f or funding.
l Installation of a permanent oxygen analy er in control room with-audible alarm.
The. licensee has installed portable oxygen analy:er meters in the main control room and is in the procurement stage of obtaining permanent oxygen analy er instrumentation.
Development of a procedure which will require operators to pressurice the control room in the event of a fire supression i
system actuation in either the cable spreading room (s) or'the
(
emergency switchgear room (s).
The licensee has implemented a standing. order to all operators to take necessary action in the event of CARDOX or HALON system actuation with regards to control room habitability.
This order will be reviewed by the operations superintendent af ter hardware
~
changes have been implemented'and revised as necessary.
Installation of predischarge visual and audible warning devices near Units 1 and 2 cable spreading room doors and inside' cable spreading rooms which will activate to alert personne1' prior to a CARDOX discharge.
Licensee has completed scoping study of recommendation and station is in process of reviewing proposal for funding.
QUESTIONS?
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4.
MANUAL FIRI MITIGATION 4.A NATURE OF LIG WING PROVIDED DURING MAflUAL FIRE FIGHTING BTP OfB 9.5-1, SECTION C.5.G, APPENDIX R,'SECTION III.J.
NORP%L STATION LIGFfilflG l
8-HOUR BATTERY POWERED EERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS - PERfWJENT It!STALLATION PORTABLE HAND LIGHTS l
l l
l I
s C - 3o l
I
)
I4.B TRAINING OF PERSONNEL ItNOLVED IN MANUAL FIRE FIGHTIt:G BTP CEB 9.5-1, SECTION C,3, APPEtOIX R, SECTIONS Ill.H AfD 111.1 THE BRIGADE LEADER AND AT LEAST TWO BRIGADE MEMBERS SHALL HAVE SUFFICIENT TRAINING IN OR KNOWLEDGE OF PLANT SAFETY-RELATED.
RELATED SYSTEMS TO UNDERSTAND THE EFFECTS OF FIRE AND FIRE i
SUPPRESSANTS ON SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY.
THE FIRE BRIGADE TRAINING PROGRAM CONSISTS OF CLASS POOM i
INSTRUCTION, FIRE FIGHTING PRACTICE AND FIRE DRILLS.
{
CLASSROOM INSTRUCTION INCLUDES:
THE PROPER USE OF C0fHUNICATION, LIGHTING, VENTILATION, AND EMERGENCY BREATHING EQUIPMENT.
THE' PROPER METHOD FOR FIGHTING FIRES INSIDE BUILDINGS AfD CONFINED I
SPACES.
1 DETAILED REVIEW OF FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGIES AND PROCEDURES.
REVIEW OF THE LATEST PLArn MODIFICATIONS AND CORRESPONDING CHANGES IN FIRE FIGHTING PLANS.
l l
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C - 3l
.. +
i I
I l
i ITEM 14 B - CotRINUED l
l FIRE FIGHTING PRACTICE l
i FIRE FIGHTING PRACTICE AT PANY PLANTS IS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STATE FIRE MARSHALL CERTIFIED TRAINING INSTRUCTOR, OR IS DONE AT A STATE SPONSORED FIRE FIGHTER TRAINING FACILITY.
PRACTICE SESSIONS ARE HELD FOR EACH FIRE BRIGADE ON THE PROPER METHOD OF FIGHTING THE VARIOUS TYPES OF FIRES THAT COULD OCCUR IN A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT.
THESE SESSIONS PROVIDE BRIGADE MEMBERS WITH EXPERIENCE IN ACTUAL FIRE EXTINGUISHMENT AND THE USE OF EMERGENCY l
l BREATHING APPARATUS UNDER STRENUOUS CONDITIONS ENCOUNTERED IN FIRE l
- FIGHTING, FIRE DRILLS FIRE BRIGADE DRILLS ARE PERFORMED IN THE PLArc SO THAT THE FIRE BRIGADE CAN PRACTICE AS A TEAM, DRILLS ARE PERFORMED AT REGULAR INTERVALS NOT TO EXCEED 3 MotHHS FOR EACH SHIFT FIRE BRIGADE,
~
NOT LESS THAN ONE DRILL FOR EACH SHIFT FIRE BRIGADE PER YEAR IS UNANNOUNCED TO DETERMINE THE FIRE FIGHTING READINESS OF THE Pl.AriT FIRE BRIGADE, BRIGADE LEADER, AfD FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT. THE RESPONDING SHIFT FIRE BRIGADE MEMBERS MUST NOT BE AWARE THAT A DRILL IS BEING PLANNED UtGIL IT IS BEGUN, UNANNOUNCED DPILLS ARE NOT TO BE SCHEDULED CLOSER THAN 4 WEEKS, AT LEAST ONE DRILL PER YEAR SHOULD BE PERFORMED ON A "BACK SHIFT" FOR EACH SHIFT FIRE BRIGADE, C-34
!TFM 4.B - CONTINUED FIRE DRILLS - CONTINUED THE DPILLS APE PREPLANNED TO ESTABLISH THE TRAINING OBJECTIVES OF THE DRILL AND ARE. CRITIQUED TO DETERMINE HOW WELL THE TPAINING OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN N T.
UNANNOUNCED DRILLS ARE PLANNED AND CRITIQUED BY MEMBERS OF THE t%NAGEMENT STAFF RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANT SAFETY AND FIRE PROTECTION.
AT 3-YEAR ItTERVALS, A RANDOMLY SELECTED UNANNOUNCED DRILL IS CRITIQUED BY QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS INDEPENDENT OF THE LICENSEE'S STAFF. A COPY OF THE WRITTEN REPORT FROM SUCH INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR NRC. REVIEW.
AS A MINIttJM, EACH DRILL PROVIDES FOR:
ASSESSMENT OF EACH BRIGADE MEMBER'S I@0WLEDGE OF HIS OR HER ROLE IN THE FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY FOR THE AREA' ASSLNED TO CONTAIN THE FIRE, 1
AND OF CONFORMANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PLANT FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES AND USE OF FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMEfG, INCLUDING SELF-CONTAINED EERGENCY BREATHING APPARATUS, CotNUNICATION EQUIPMENT, AND VENTILATION EQUIPMENT, TO THE EXTENT PP.ACTICABLE.
THE SIMJLATED USE OF FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPENT REQUIRED TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION AND TYPE OF FIRE SELECTED FOR THE DRILL.
ASSESSMENT OF BRIGADE LEADER'S DIRECTION OF 1HE FIRE FIGHTING EFFORT AS TO THOROUGHNESS, ACCURACY, AND EFFECTIVENESS.
I i
C-55
l O
1 4.8 Ecu1PMENT USED BY PEPSONNEL DURING MANUAL FIRE FIGHTING PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS l
FIRE HOSE PERSONAL " TURN-0UT" GEAR
- SCBA ' s c:. c.. -. 4.4
- a. u-ar, c.o i I
c
(
i
- HELMET & FACE SHIELD 4
}
- CCAT i
- PANTS f
- BOOTS
- GLOVES HAfD LIGHTS PortrABLE C0ffiUNICATION EoVIPMENT i
i PORTABLE FANS WITH "ELEPHAKr TRUNK" l
1 l
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l c-39
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I f4. C.
CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF WA~ER ON ELECTRICAL FIRES BTP CFEB 9.5-1, SECTION B.2 EXPERIENCE Wim MAJOR ELECTRICAL CABLE FIRES SHOWS WAT WATER WI l
l PROMPTLY EXTINGUISH SUCH FIRES. SINCE PROMPT EXTINGUISHING OF THE FIRE IS VITAL TO REACTOR SAFETY, FIRE AND WATER DAMAGE TO SAFETY j
SYSTEMS IS REDUCED BY THE MORE EFFICIENT APPLICATION OF WATER FROM FD'ED SYSTEMS SPRAYING DIRECTLY ON THE FIRE RATHER THAN BY MANUAL APPLICATION WITH FIRE HOSES. APPROPRIATE FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES AND FIRE TRAINING SHOULD PROVIDE THE TECHNIQUES, EQUIPMENT, AND SKILLS FOR THE USE OF WATER IN FIGHTING ELECTRICAL CABLE FIRES IN NUCLEAR PLANTS, PARTICULARLY IN AREAS CONTAINING A HIGH CONCENTRATION OF ELECTRIC CABLES WITH PLASTIC INSULATION.
THIS IS TOT TO SAY THAT FIXED WATER SYSTEMS SHOULD BE INSTALLE EVERYWHERE. EQUIPMENT THAT MAY BE DAMAGED BY WATEP SHOULD BE S l
OR RELOCATED AWAY FROM THE FIRE HAZARD Ats THE WATER. DRAINS SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO REMOVE ANY WATER USED FOR FIRE SUPPRESSION At0 EXTIN l
GUISWENT TO ENSURE THAT WATER ACCUMULATION DOES NOT INC/.PACITATE SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMEAT.
APPENDIX R, SECTION 111.1.
FIPE BRIGADE TPAINING l
THE TYPES OF FIRES COVERED SHOULD INCLUDE FIRES IN ENERGIZED E EQUIPMENT Ato CABLES AtO CABLE TRAYS.
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4.C, - CotGIHUED i
NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION - FIRE PROT TEENm EDITION SECTION 13 - CHAPTER 1 WATER AND WATER FIRE FIGHTING WATER ON ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN UdING WATER ON ELECTRICAL AND ELECTPONIC EQUIPMETE, RECOG MUST BE GIVEN TO THE VALUE OF AUT0f9 TIC SPRINKLER PROTEC WATER SPRAY FIXED SYSTEMS AS MEANS OF REDUCING FIRE DAMAGE, EVEN WHERE SUCH ELECTRICAL OR ELECTRONIC EQUIPMETE t%Y BE i
SHOULD BE LITTLE CONCERN RELATIVE TO THE SHOCK HAZARD, OR THAT TH WATER WILL CAUSE EXCESSIVE DAt%GE TO EQUIPMENT IN INS THIS T(PE. EXPERIENCE HAS r.90VED THAT IF A FIRE DEVELO i
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ENOUGH TO OPERATE SPRINKLERS, THE SPRINKLERS, IF PROPERLY INSTALL AND MAltRAINED, PROVIDE FOR EFFECTIVE FIRE CONTROL AND EXTINGUISFfiEN WITH VIRTUALLY NO HAZARD TO PERSONNEL AND WIE NO MEAS IN DAMGE TO THE ELECTRICAL OR ELECTRONIC EQUIPMEf6 (AS TO IAt%GE TRACEABLE TO HEAT, FLAN, SMOKE, AND THE POSSIBLE NEED TO i
USE l%NUAL HOSE STREAMS),
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5.
PROPAGATION OF HEAT AND SMOKE 5.C. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROLLING WE PROPAGATION OF HEAT SMOKE BTC CEB 9.5-1 GENERAL
" DEFENSE-IN-DEPm" SECTION C.5.A.
FIRE BARRIERS TO SEPAPATE REDUNDANT SYSTEMS AND TO ISOLATE FIRE HAZARDS FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS TO BE PROTECTED BY SEALING, OR BY USE OF FIRE DOOR OR DAMPERS l
USE OF NONCOMBUSTIBLE t%TERIALS FOR CONSTRUC-TION AND INTERIOR FINISH SECTIvN C.5.D.
STIPULATES CONTROLS TO MINIMIZE WE USE OF l
COMBUSTIBLES IN THE PLANT AND TO PROVIDE AUTOMATIC DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION WiEN-
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l EVER USE OF COMBUSTIBLES CANNOT BE AVOIDED SECTION C.S.E.
STIPULATES PROTECTION FOR ELECTRICAL CABLES J
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5.C. - CONTINUED SECTION C.5.F' STIPULATES CAPABILITY TO REMOVE Sf0KE AND HEAT FROM PLANT AREAS INVOLVED IN FIRE SECTION C.7 - GUIDELINES FOR SPECIFIC PLANT AREAS SECTION C.7.B STIPULATES SMOKE DAMPERS IN HVAC PENE-TRATIONS IN PARTITIONS SEPAPATING THE i
CONTROL ROOM PROPER FROM THE REST OF l
THE CONTROL ROOM COMPLEX.
l STIPULATES SMOKE DETECTION CAPABILITY IN 1
THE OUTSIDE AIR INTAKES FOR THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE CAPABILIW TO ISOLATE CONTROL j
ROOM VENTILATION TO PREVENT SMOKE INFILTRA-TION 1
SECTION C 7.C STIPULATES tW UALLY OPERABLE SMOKE VENTING CAPABILITY FOR THE CABLE SPREADING ROOM w-.
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