ML20235K631
| ML20235K631 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1987 |
| From: | Gray E, Gray H, Kaplan J, Kaucher J, Kamal Manoly, Paulitz F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235K584 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-353-87-11, NUDOCS 8710050172 | |
| Download: ML20235K631 (46) | |
See also: IR 05000353/1987011
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
87-11
Docket No.
50-353
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License No. CPPR-107
Category
A
Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company
2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101
Facility Name:
Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2
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Inspection At:
Limerick Pennsylvania
Inspection Conducted: June 22 - July 2, 1987
9/03 / 6 7
Inspectors:
eN
E. H. /ra ,Le m Leade
&KA
rkus,
G
T
date
H
K. A. Manoly, Lead 6feactor Engineer
date
(f
9/et/f 7
~
. E. Kaucher, Resident Inspector
date
L . WY
- ]/off7
H.
. Ka lan, Lead Reactor Engineer
/' da/ e
t
fMODY
9kl27
F. Paulitz, fleact'or Engineer
'd a te
Approved by:
/
%
- 9/C3/87
H. Gray, Acting, Chi ffiaterials
date
and Processes Secti81i
Su
R8an 87e nssa
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Inspection Summary: Announced Construction Team Inspection conducted on
June 22 - July 2, 1987 (Inspection Report No. 50-353/87-11)
Areas Inspected:
The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, Core
Spray system and construction practices on other safety related piping and
equipment in the Drywell, Reactor Building, Control Room and Diesel Generator
Buildings were inspected. This construction inspection included piping,
mechanical, electrical, instrumentation and controls, and structural systems,
procedure reviews and observation of construction practices. The purpose of-
this inspection was to verify that the systems and hardware are being con-
structed with acceptable quality and in compliance with NRC regulations,
licensee commitments, and design specifications.
Results: The inspectors concluded, based on the sample of systems and
hardware inspected, that the plant systems and hardware are being constructed
substantially in accordance with NRC requirements and licensee commitments and
that construction is progressing with an acceptable level of quality. .However,
three violations were identified.
The violations include (1) failure to verify certain instrument data sheets,
parts lists, assembly drawings and connection diagrams as updated to the Unit 1
installed condition;-(2) not recording both ambient and motor temperature
during surveillance of a core spray motor requiring continuous heating; and,
(3) the finding of a fillet weld not in conformance with the AWS 01.1 code
after final QC inspection. Also, an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.55e was
identified in that a design deficiency involving an emergency diesel generator
and fire protection system interaction was not reported.
This apparent viola-
tion will be the subject of a scheduled enforcement conference.
In addition, six unresolved items were identified.
These involved procedure
for covering of socket weld joints prior to welding, non safety steam piping
and drains located over diesel generator electrical components, flow switch
failure modes, procedures for review of document changes, errors in instrument
data sheets and a question of 50.55(e) deportability on SDR No. 135.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE NO.
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1.0 Scope and Purpose of the Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2.0 Persons Contacted . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . , . . . . . . .
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3.0 Safety Related Components, Piping Systems and Supports. . . .
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3.1 Scope and Objective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
3.2 Inspection Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3 Inspection Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
3.4 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.5 Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
4.0 Electrical System Supports. . . . . . . .
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4.1 Scope and Objective. . . .
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4.2 Inspection Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4.3 Inspection Activities. .
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4.4 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4.5 Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5.0 Electrical Power System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5.1 Scope and Objective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5.2 Inspection Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5.3 Inspection Activities.
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5.4 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5.5 Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . .
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6.0 Instrumentation and Control s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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6.1 Scope.
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6.2 Inspection Criteria.
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6.3 Inspection Activities. . .
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6.4 Findings . . .
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6.5 Conclusions.
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7.0 Project Organization.
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7.1 Construction Supervision and Management.
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7.2 Project Engineering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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7.3 Construction Engineering . . . .
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8.0 Unresolved Items. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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9.0 Exit Meeting. .
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Attachments
I
Persons Contacted
II
Drawings, Procedures and Documentation Reviewed
II-a Safety Related Components, Piping and Supports Inspected
II-b Electrical Safety Related Supports Inspected
II-c Electrical Power Systems Inspected
II-d Instrumentation and Controls Inspected
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DETAILS
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1.0 Scope and Purpose of the Inspection
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The Limerick Unit 2 plant is estimated to be 64% construction complete
and 90% engineering complete as of June 1987.
The purpose of this
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inspection was to examine aspects of construction activities to establish
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if selected work in progress is being done in accordance with construction
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codes and procedural requirements.
The following inspection activities
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regarding various aspects of construction, engineering, Quality Control and
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Quality Assurance were performed during this team inspection.
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Review of the Limerick Unit 2 construction program and inspection of
installed components to determine if they are in accordance with
engineering drawings and procedures and commitments in the Final
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Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
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Review of procedures applicable to work, materials and construction.
Observation of components in the field.
Interviews with the construction work force at work ar as to deter-
mine if proper training, materials and instructions are provided to
properly handle and install components.
Review of work installation packages.
Independent measurements where possible.
Review of documentation to determine conformance to regulatory and
code requirements.
Evaluation of how QA is involved in construction and how QC checks
work in progress and after completion.
Examination of interfaces between Project Engineering, Construction
Engineering and the construction workforce.
The inspection was directed toward the High Pressure Coolant Injection
(HPCI) and Core Spray Systems followed by a sampling of other safety
related systems and components.
The piping, pipe and electrical supports;
electrical components, instrumentation and controls (I&C); pumps, valves,
welding, documentation work packages and procedures for the HPCI and core
spray systems were examined or reviewed.
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2.0 Persons Contacted
Numerous licensee 'and licensee contractor personnel were contacted during
the inspection. Attachment I is a list of the principal individuals who
were contacted by the NRC inspectors.
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3.0 Safety Related Components, Piping Systems and Supports
3.1 Scope and Objective
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The scope of the piping system inspections included the core spray,
loop B and the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system.
Both
of these systems are part of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems
(ECCS).
In accordance with part 6.3 of the FSAR, the HPCI system is
intended to provide sufficient water to the reactor coolant system
to maintain the water level above the top of the core #:c, breaks in
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lines less than 1 inch nominal diameter. The core spray system is
to provide spray cooling of the core and to provide water inventory
makeup of the reactor coolant system during large pipe breaks.
Following inspection of the HPCI and the core spray systems, other
piping and pipe supports in the drywell and reactor building were
examined during dayshift and second shift plant tours.
During
inspection of installed piping and pipe supports, work packages.
including drawings, redlines, and Field Change Notices / Field Change
Requests (FCN/FCR's) were examined for work in progress.
Discussions
were held with craftsmen to find out if they were being provided with
adequate instructions, drawings, procedures and assistance or
guidance from field engineers.
The specific portions of the HPCI and Core Spray Systems inspected
are tabulated in Attachment II.a of this report.
3.2 Inspection Criteria
The governing criteria for the piping system inspections were:
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
Safety Evaluation Report (SER)
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ASME Section III, Class 1 (NB) and Class 2 (NC) and Section IX
The verification of correct piping system installation was performed
either by visual inspection or by independent measurements on
accessible components and supports.
The detailed criteria used for the inspection of these installations
were those described in the specific installation specification.
The inspection attributes for piping and fittings included selected
verification of the following:
linear and angular measurements related to piping runs and
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support locations;
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branch connection types and locations;
conformance of the piping details to the applicable piping
isometric as modified by redline change, Field Change
Notice (FCN) or Field Change Request (FCR).
welder and weld joint identification.
welder performance qualification
field work packages.
piping bend and elbow radii;
support mark numbers, functions and locations;
a
proper flow direction marks on valves;
piping wall thickness; as measured were compared to the ASME
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code, NC3640 requirements and the Limerick calculation sheet.
correct sequential location of valves on piping runs; and,
proper identification and orientation of valves and Limitorque
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operators.
The inspection attributes for pipe supports included selected
verification of the following:
as-built configurations compared to support detail drawing (BZ
series), including dimensions of members;
support orientation;
connection to the proper structure;
direction of restraint;
sizes and quality of weld on hangers, including welded
attachments to piping;
baseplate dimensions and location of structural attachments to
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baseplate;
baseplate bolt (concrete expansion or Richmond insert)
tightness, edge distance and the bolt mark identification for
Hilti bolts;
restraint bleed holes open and free of foreign material;
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grouting of floor mounted baseplates and gap sizes for wall
mounted plates; and,
pipe routing and support locations such that movements of
piping due to vibration, thermal expansion, etc., would not
likely cause contact with other pipes, supports, equipment or
components.
3.3 Inspection Activities
Inspection of the core spray and high pressure coolant injections
system consisted of the following activities:
Walkdown inspection of as-built piping components (including
fittings and attachments), equipment and system supports;
Independent comparison of selected piping components and
supports to the attributes identified in Section 3.2;
Comparison of valve and pump identifications to those shown on
the P&lDs and isometric drawings.
Review of selected QA Audits, QC inspections, non destructive
examinations, ASME Code Authorized Inspection signoffs, non
conformance reports and dispositions, the involvement of
construction engineering and the specific work packages.
Review of representative shop and field data sheets, associated
NDE reports, and material test repnets for base metai and weld
filler materials as required by ASME III-NC and ASME IX.
Measurements of pipe sizes and wall thickness were made.
Visual inspection of welds and component surfaces.
3.4. Findings
a.
Visual Examination
The walkcown inspection did not reveal any significant
deficiencies or discrepancies.
The piping components including
valves and connections were found to conform to the drawing and
work package requirements including redline revisions, FCN's and
FCR's.
Valve 2F007 shown on drawing DCA-419-1, a gate valve
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with full functional flow from either end was found to be
installed in the inverted position in accordance with the Field
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Changes' Notice (FCN) dated MarchI16, 1987'.
The piping drawing.
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will be revised by project engineering to include this. change,
b.
Measurements of Pipe Wall Thickn'ss
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The inspector determined' wall thickness measurements at 132-
locations in.the HPCI and CS systems using an ultrasonic "D"
meter. ~All readings exceeded speci.fied minimum wall require--
ments' of the P-300 piping specification, the Limerick piping :
minimum wall calculation sheets and the ASME Code Section III,
NC 3641.
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c.
Documentation Review
ihe inspector randomly selected various: items in the CS
and HPCI systems-for documentation review.
These. items were
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identified during a walk-down and are discussed below.
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Field Welds FW-4, FW-6 and FW-12 (150-GBB-212-1)
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A review of weld data' sheets indicated that the subject'
joints.were welded in,accordance with qualified Section IX
Welding Procedure PI-AT-LH/5 using the Tunsten Inert Gas-
(TIG) process for an open butt root pass'and the manual
metal arc-(MMA) process for the remaining. layers.
Review of. typical. filler metal reports for bare wire ~and
electrodes used in the fabrication of these welds revealed
no deficiencies. A check of four welders (P78, PTF, P3M'&
PSE) involved in welding these joints disclosed proper
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qualification at the 1.ime of. production welding. Documen-
tation showed that these-welds'were examined by radiography
and magnetic' particle inspection.
Qualification and certi-
fication for three NDE inspectors noted on the inspection
records was reviewed and found to-be satisfactory.
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Spool Pieces HBB-208-1-2 and HBB-209-1-4. A review of
document packages furnished by Texas Pipe Bending' revealed
material test reports conforming to designated SA carbon
steel material specifications (SA 105, SA 106 Gr.B and SA
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234 WPB). These data packages contained acceptable liquid
p
penetrant and radiographic reports.
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Core Spray Pump - S/N - 0771131
The document package contained certified test reports that
conformed to SA 516 Gr 70 and SA 333, carbon steel-material
specifications. The material reports showed satisfactory
tensile properties and acceptable impact test results at
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+10 F.
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Valves
The inspector reviewed several valve packages in the HPCI
and Core Spray Class 2 systems and noted a variance in
impact testing.
Some valves such as the Anchor Darling 12"
150# gate valve (HV-F072) were furnished with impact test
results whereas other valves such as the Atwood & Morrel
12"-150 valve (2F021) were not impact tested.
In response
to the inspector's question concerning this difference,
Bechtel's principal engineer stated that only the contain-
ment isolation valves greater than 6" 0.D. nominal pipe
size, in the Class 2 system required impact testing. The
inspector sampled documentation for valves over 6" and
confirmed that the containment isolation valves requiring
impact testing exhibited acceptable impact test results.
The lowest service temperature for the HPCI and CS piping
systems are 40 F and 42 F, the lowest water temperature
anticipated in the suppression pool and condensate tank,
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respectively.
These temperatures should be well above the
nil ductility transition (NDT) temperature for heat treated
(normalized) carbon steel castings of the sizes encountered
For example the Limerick data
showed that normalized SA-352 Gr LCB castings used for
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pressure boundary parts, such as body and bonnet, exhibited
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acceptable impact properties at 0 F or lower.
The inspector reviewed several Class 2 containment isola-
tion valves packages in the HPCI and CS systems and one
Class 1 valve package in the CS system and verified that
the pressure boundary parts of valves with nominal pipe
size greater than 6" were impact tested and had acceptable
impact properties.
The sampling showed that for those
valves which did not require impact testing, castings were
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normalized, a heat treatment which should provide accept-
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able impact properties.
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Bolts and Nuts
The inspector randomly selected two purchase order
packages covering bolts and nuts, P.O. 8031-F - 60251 and
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P.O. 18240 - F203929.
The packages contained mill test
reports indicating conformance to SA 193-B7 (bolts) and
SA-194 Gr 7 (nuts) along with magnetic particle inspection
reports.
d.
Audit Reports
The inspector reviewed audit reports generated by Bechtel and
PECo QA organizations.
The Bechtel audits as tabulated below
covered the installation of valves and small bore and large bore
piping.
Small Bore
Large Bore
Valve
Pipinj
Piping
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Audit:
PFA 797-
PFA 820 -
PFA -
2/20/87
6/2/87
12/23/86
Next Scheduled
Audit:
7/24/87
1st Qtr. 88
9/14/88
The Bechtel audit reports for construction of piping included
material traceability, welding, NDE and hydrostatic testing and
were written in great detail. The valve audits included wall
thickness measurements, hydrostatic testing, orientation, flow
direction and weld quality.
The inspector reviewed eleven (11) PECo Audit reports and two
surveillance reports covering a period between December 1986
and June 1987.
No significant problems or deficiencies were
reported.
PECo performs surveillance checks of safety related
construction including electrical, instrumentation and controls,
mechanical, piping, welding and nondestructive examination. The
surveillance activities result in PECo QA being fully involved
in ongoing construction activities.
Review of the audics indi-
cated that problems are identified at early stages to provide
for timely corrective actions.
e.
Non Conformance Reports
The inspector reviewed five NCR's (#1170, #1160, #11453,
- 10975 and #10439) and concluded that no gross deficiencies
or discrepancies were encountered. All conditions described in
the NCRs were eliminated by refurbishment or other suitable
actions as approved by engineering.
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Bechtel Weld Laboratory and Weld Shops
The inspector witnessed bend testing of root and face specimens
prepared from two performance qualification test assemblies
fabricated by Welder P26.
The welder was being tested on 2"
Sch. 80 carbon steel pipe using an open butt TIG procedure
PI-T in the 2G and SG positions. The bend specimens were
successfully bent to ASME IX requirements. The inspector toured
the weld shop and examined several spool pieces currently being
welded.
Review of associated work packages and interviews with
the welders indicated that welding was being performed by
qualified welders in accordance with prescribed weld procedures
and work package requirements.
g.
Cleanliness of Material During Installation
Construction Procedure CP-P-7, paragraph 5.3.1 requires
that open ends of mechanical equipment and piping be sealed
except when being worked.
PECO QA had previously identified a
problem.with construction maintaining proper pipe spool end
cove' rage as noted in the QA site monthly report dated 5/5/87.
The NRC inspection team observed a large number pipe and
equipment openings and determined that almost all pipe and
equipment open ends were properly covered with the following
exceptions.
HCD-211-E19
No cover on the end of a short pipe extending
from a closed valve at elevation 283', AZ
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DBD-203-1-1 and DBD-204-1 *, The feedwater piping closure weld
preparation',, although nearly in alignment were
not covered.
Three CRD lines were not in sockets and
were uncovered.
Dirt or debris was not observed
on the surface of the closed valve below the
socket.
Each of the above isolated cases were corrected by the
licensee.
Numerous CRD pipe to socket weld joints at about the
265' elevation had the CRD pipe resting in the socket directly
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above the closed CRD system valve for each pipe section.
The
socket weld joints were not covered.
The inspector verified
that the pipe to socket fitup tack and weld sequence for these
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welds did require removal of the pipe from the socket, removal
of any dust or particles from the socket and examination of the
valve which is located directly below the sockets prior to tack
welding the pipe in the socket.
This operation is monitored by
QC inspection and construction engineering.
The procedure
CP-P-7, part 5.3 does not address the requirement for control of
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socket weld cleanliness where a pipe is positioned in the socket
without welding or covering of the weld joint. This is an
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unresolved item pending PECo review of CP-P-7.and possible re-
vision to define the cleanliness requirements for pipe to socket
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weld joints including the maximum time between tack welding and
root pass welding of pipe to socket welds.
(50-353/87-11-01)
3.51 Conclusions
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Based.on NRC inspection of installed piping, pipe supports and
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safety related components and review of applicable documentation and
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procedures it was concluded that installation is proceeding per
drawings traceable to the FSAR and in accordance with applicable
procedures
The work packages were found to be readily available
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.for use and up to date for the work status.
Quality control,
quality assurance, project- engineering and construction engineers
were found to be involved in the construction activities.
No
significant problems were identified.
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4.0 Electrical System Supports
4.1 Scope and Objective
The scope of the electrical system supports inspection included
review of the activities performed by project engineering, construc-
tion and quality assurance. The inspection included interview of
cognizant personnel, review of pertinent procedures and examination
of electrical raceways, wireways (gutters) and conduit support
installations.
The primary objective of the inspection was to
determine whether electrical system supports were installed in
accordance with regulatory requirements, FSAR commitments and
approved construction specification and drawings.
Additional
objectives were to determine whether the procedures, instructions
and drawings used to accomplish construction activities were
adequate and whether quality related records accurately reflected
the completed work.
4.2 Inspection Criteria
The governing criteria for the inspection of electrical system
installations were:
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
AISC Steel Construction Manual
AWS Structural Welding Code (Steel) 01.1
AWS Structural Welding Code (Sheet Steel) 01.3
4.3 Inspection Activities
The inspection of electrical system supports included the following:
Review of the approach and process used by Project and
Construction Engineering in selection of the various types of
electrical system supports.
Review of the procedures governing the selection and spacing of
required supports. Attachment II-b provides a listing of
documents reviewed.
Performance of a walkdown verification of the electrical system
supports in the control (switchgear and cable spreading rooms)
and the diesel buildings (D-room). Attachment II-b provides a
listing of inspected electrical installations.
Review of quality control inspection records of electrical
supports systems verified in the walkdown.
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Overview of construction activities
The size and routing of raceways was determined by the
electrical discipline.
Designation and location of required
supports was shown on the electrical. raceway layout drawings by
the project civil / structural engineering discipline.
Supports
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designated on the raceway drawings were selected from speciff-
cation E-1406-2.
Deviations from the generic or specific con-
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figurations identified in the specification, required the
origination of Field Change Requests (FCR's) by construction.
The majority of Unit 2 cable' tray and conduit installations
were erected during the Unit I construction phase.
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installations (designated as Unit 1 and common area) were
selected from specification E-1406-1.
Unit #2 installations
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erected after the restart of construction in January 1935 were
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mainly located in the reactor and diesel buildings.
Bechtel
has the responsibility for the design, selection and construction
of all cable tray, conduit and gutter support installations.
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The responsibility for inspection of all Category I electrical
installations is Bechtel's and of Category IIA installations is
PEC0's.
Selection of conduit supports was performed by field engineering
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based on requirements in specification E-1406 which included
size of conduit and span (maximum 10'-0").
Drawings showing
layout of supports and connection details were prepared by field
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personnel, and included as a construction aid occument in the
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work packages, for use by the construction craft for erection.
Field personnel performed inspection of completed conduit
installations and transmitted the work packages to QC for final
inspection. As-built drawings were made for conduit supports
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installed in the common areas of units 1&2.
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Gutter supports in the common areas of Units 1&2 were selected,
detailed, and inspected in a similar process to that utilized
for the conduit supports in these areas. Work packages for
gutters installed after the restart of Unit 2 construction has
typically contained the list of gutters to be installed, esti-
mated length, reference to support configurations and details in
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specification E-1406-2 and the location of the supports along
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the length of gutters.
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The inspection of electrical system support installations was
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performed to the attributes in the quality control instruction
QCI-E-2.0.
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4.4 Findings
The following findings'were noted during the review and inspection
of activities related to electrical system support installations.
Some discrepancies were noted during the inspection of Category
a.
IIA electrical support installations in the cable spreading room
at elevation 254'-0".
These included:
(1) A drawing error.
resulting in lack of identification of support P7 for tray Nos.
20TBV, 20TCW, 20TDX, 20TEY & 20KFZ in proximity of building
column line No. 23, (2) A lack of documentation of configuration
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for support No. CSR8A(SIM), and (3) An improper connection of
support S6 (brace type) to an adjacent C30 support rather than
to designated tray (20TGT) rail.
The inspector.found that the category IIA installations in the
room were erected during the construction of Unit 1.
These in-
stallations were not yet inspected by PECO (QC inspection of IIA
installations is the responsibility of PECO).
The inspector was
informed that' field change requests were issued to document and
resolve the above noted discrepancies during this inspection.
b.
The approach adopted for selection and documentation of generic
or specific support configurations and details for cable tray,
gutter and conduit installations was found to be cumbersome,
difficult to follow and open to interpretations.
Specification
No. E-1406-1 & 2 for conduit and cable tray notes and details
consists of four large volumes containing immense selections for
generic and specific support configurations and details.
The
inspector did not identify safety problems resulting from the
!
practice described above,
However, some of the discrepancies
i
noted in category IIA installation (item 1 above) could have
resulted from the complexity of this approach.
It is note-
worthy that the electrical system supports examined were found
to provide adequate structural restraint to the installations
involved.
c.
Inspection of multiple conduit and gutter support No. CBL-G-474
in the cable spreading room at elevation 254'-0" resulted in the
identification of two deficiencies in the fillet weld connecting
the top end of the diagonal brace to the vertical member in the
frame.
The fit-up gap between the connecting tube steel sec-
i
tions exceeded the 1/16" limit of AWS DI.1 welding code, and
,
the weld size was smaller than the minimum required 3/16".
In
l
some portions along the length of the weld, the size of the
j
weld was less than 1/8".
Upon inspection of the similar frame
j
(No. CBL-G475) in the cable spreading area in Unit 1, the same
i
weld was found to be undersized (i.e. less than 3/16").
Review
I
of QC inspection records (QCIR no. E1175-W-124) indicated that
]
- - _ -__ __-__ -_ ___
. _ _ _ _ _ _ .
i
,
17
the welds on both supports in Units 1&2 were accepted by QC in
)982. The deficiency identified in the electrical supports'
welds is a violation of the master quality control instruction
QCI-W-1.00, the project instruction 8031/W2.00 for welding and
non-destructive examination and Criterion X of Appendix B to
10 CFR 50 for inspection.
(50-353/87-11-09)
4.5 iConclusi_on
Based on results of the review and inspection of electrical system
supports, the team concluded that the systems were adequately
supported for anticipated design loads.
Though the approach for
.
selection and documentation of support configurations was rather
i
cumbersome and involved, and in several cases was difficult to
follow, the inspection of Category I installations did not result in
the identification of any non conformances other than the case of
undersized fillet welds on the multiple conduit and gutter supports
'
noted in Section 4.4 above.
Several discrepancies were also noted
l
during the inspection of seismic category IIA support installations
'
in the cable spreading room, however, they were not yet inspected by
4
_ - . _ . _ _ _ . . - _ . - _ . - . . - - - -
t
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.
18
5.0- Electrical Power Systems
l
5.1 Scope and Objective
Objective
This inspection was conducted to determine if construction activities
related to safety related electrical systems and components were in
conformance to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B and the
licensee's commitment in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR).
The objective of the inspection activities was to determine the
conformance of safety related electrical systems and components to
applicable requirements.
The following inspection activities were
performed:
Review of procedures for the electrical systems and components to
determine if the above requirements and commitments have been
adequately translated into applicable construction specifica-
tions, drawings, work procedures, and instructions, and whether
these procedures are of sufficient detail and clarity for
adequate work performance and control.
Review of quality assurance plan and activities to determine
that changes to these procedures were controlled and that the
quality control inspection plan of installed safety related
electrical components has attributes which reflect the
requirements of the procedures.
Review of records to determine if the licensee and contractor
systems for preparing, reviewing, and maintaining records are
functioning properly; that the records reflect work accomplish-
ment consistent with the above requirements and commitments;
and, to determine if the records indicate any generic problems,
management control inadequacies, or other weaknesses of safety
significance.
Direct observation and independent evaluation of selected work
performance, work in progress and completed work to determine
whether activities related to safety related electrical systems
and components were being controlled and accomplished in ac-
cordance with the above requirements, commitments and licensee's
procedures.
Determine if inadequacies, in these work activi-
ties, concerning electrical systems and components indicate a
management control problem or generic weakness.
i
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1
I
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_
_
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.
19
, .
,
t
Independent evriuation to determine if the correct electrical
requirisents were incorporated into the purchase specification
of se Hcted safety related electrical components; that the
purchased eciuipment received has the correct electrical require-
ment's (through verification of vendor test data and/or name
. plate dsta); and, that the equipment received was stored, in
accordance with procedures, as determined by direct observation
or recrds.
?
Direr. observation,)cdependentevaluationandinterviewsof
'
16 ensee and contractor' personnel to determine if the on-site
and off site engineg ing activities are being performed in
'accordacce vith the above requirements, commitments and licensee
procedorrr.
-
,
?
i
Direct obse/ vat' ion, lnersonnei interviews, and record reviews to
5i
determine if the QuaDty Assurance Program is being conducted
- ",
!
in accordance with procedures and (1) that electrical personnel
.
inchw"og quality control personnel are following these pro-
l
cedures, (Q that the attributes for inspection are understood
>
,
l
l
through trainirg and verified by audits, (3) that nonconformance
'
of electried system u d components are identified and evaluated
for corrective 4ction in a timely manner, (4) that non-conform-
,
l
ing items are revi+;wed and accepted, rejected, repaired or
'
,
reworked in acco @ nce with documented procedures, and (5) that
"
those items accepted "as-is" have as a basis proper engineering
basis and justification.
,
,
Direct observation and procedure review to determine (1) if the
a
safety reisted electrical system and components are subject to
,
substantial degrada' tion due to interactions of non-safety
related systea,s, and (2) if non-safety interactions could result
in common cause failure.
,
.fcope
.
lhe selecteitportions of the safety related electrical system and
comporets inspected associated with the Division 2 ECCS, High
<
Presst re,Ccient Injection System (HPCI) and the B Loop Core Spray
-
+
Systed-a~re e "follows:
1
'
,
'
Code Spray Pump 2BP206, 4KV breater, Safeguard Bus D22.
i
a
dmergency Diesel Generator 22, lead cable & raceway.
=
Care Spray Pump 2BP206, motor, cable and raceway.
125 VDC System Division 2, Channel B, battery, charger, UPS,
/
cable and raceway.
/,tI,o
Core Spray Pump 2DP206, 4KV breaker, Safeguard Bus D24.
,
Emergency Dir el Generator 24, leac' cable and raceway.
J
~ a 1
,
y
!
A
P
$
r
,
t
1
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_2__
_ _ -
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--_ - - --__- - - - - -- - - - -
_
o
20
Core Spray Pump 2DP206, motor, cable and raceway.
125 VDC System Division 4, Channel D, battery, charger, UPS,
cable and raceway.
l
5.2 Inspection Criteria
5.2.1
Electrical Systems and Components
The following attributes were inspected to ensure that the Class
IE electrical systems and components receipt inspection, storage
and installation were in compliance with NRC requirements,
licensee's FSAR and procedural commitments:
Electrical components received and inspected as specified
in QC instructions.
Installed components are protected from construction
activities to prcelude physical damage and dirt.
Installed components that require protection from moisture
have their space heaters energized.
Alpha numeric and color identification as specified in the
FSAR and installation specification.
Components are installed in accordance with the drawings.
i
Emergency diesel generators and motors are meggered as
-
required.
Procedures for the receipt inspection, storage and instal-
lation have been translated from the NRC requirements and
licensee's FSAR into the licensee's purchase specifications.
QC personnel monitor the above activities with records
which are audited by QA.
Identify and determine any adverse non safety-related
i
systems or components which may interact to prevent the
Class 1E electric system from conforming to the criteria
and bases stated in the FSAR.
l
Verify by reviewing procedures, drawings and visual inspec-
tion that the licensee's commitments in the FSAR are met,
h
_ _ - _ - _ _
_
.
i
21
5.2.2
Cables & Raceways
1
The fol'owing attributes were inspected to ensure that cable
and raceway receipt inspection, storage and installation were in
compliance with NRC requirements, FSAR and procedural
commitments:
Cables received and inspected as specified in QC
instructions.
Cables reels stored to protect cables, cable ends protected
from moisture.
Alpha-numeric and color identification of electrical
cables, raceways as specified in the FSAR and int
llation
specification.
Location and configuration of the electrical raceways as
shown on the drawings.
Electrical raceway routing as shown on the cable pull
ticket.
Cable manufacture, insulation type, jacket type and
conductor type and size as listed on the purchase specifi-
cation and cable pull ticket.
No physical damage to cables and raceways.
During cable installation pull tension and bend radius not
exceeded.
Procedures for the receipt inspection, storage and instal-
lation for cables and raceways adequately translate from
the FSAR commitment and purchase specifications.
QC personnel monitor the above activities with records
which are audited by QA.
l
Installed cables not terminated have ends capped, temporary
cable markers and exposed cables protected by flame proof
material.
Power cables 480 volt or higher are meggered.
- _ _ _ _ - _
- _ _ _
_
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22
>
l
5.3 Inspection Activities
l
Cables & Raceways
The' inspector reviewed the documents listed in Attachment II-c
with respect to cables and raceways, in general, and specifically
j
those listed in paragraph 5.1, scope.
The inspector visually in-
'
spected the cable storage area, cable cutting from the master reels
and intermediate storage in the plant prior to installation.
The-
cables and raceways installed or being installed were visuelly
inspected to the criteria listed in paragraph 5.2.
Interviews were
held with personnel associated with the above activities including
Electrical Systems & Components
The inspector reviewed the documents listed in Attachment II-c
with respect to the Class IE electrical systems and components.and
to those listed in paragraph 5.1, Scope. The inspector visually
inspected the 500KV and 230KV switchyards, 4KV switchgear and 125
and 250 volt direct current systems in the control building, 480
volt load centers and motor control centers in the reactor building
and the emergency diesel generators.
The inspector interviewed
personnel including QC and QA, who were conducting inspections,
installation, and storage surveillance activities.
Engineering
'
personnel were also interviewed at the Pottstown BCI office and at
the site,
5.4 Findings
a.
Cables and Raceways
The inspector found no deficiencies associated with procedures,
records, receipt inspection or storage of cables.
,
During a plant walkdown the inspector observed a QC hold tag on
an installed but not terminated cable.
The referenced NCR
11958 indicated that for cables in the A-B segment of the
ine.ta11ation the maximum allowable pull tension had been ex-
ceded by 54% and in one pull box cable 2BB20233A minimum bend
radius of 6 inches was reduced to 5 inches.
The resolution of
the NCR is unresolved and has been identified as item
(50-353/87-07-02) by the inspector.
No other deficiencies were identified concerning cable
installation.
(-
r
LL ___ _ -
_
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. _ _ _
-
._ _.
- ..
.
. _ _
.
.
.
.g3
ll'
With regard to QA oversight, the licensee completed a QA cable
pulling audit 2E-258 on June 16, 1987.
The audit is being.
currently reviewed by the licensee. A cable storage QA audit
2E-264 was initiated on June 19, 1987 and is currently in
progress.
b.
Electrical System and Components
Long Term Storage
1
The inspector reviewed licensee documentation related to storage
and maintenance of installed electrical equipment such as
electric motors and the emergency diesel generators.
He also
observed the conditions of these items in the field.
The
following deficiencies were identified.
Core Spray Pump Motors
Procedure PSP-G-5.1, revision 6, requires that licensee main-
tenance activities be performed in accordance with construction
procedure CP-G-3.
Procedure CP-G-3 instruction requires that
the special instructions of the equipment manufacturer be shown
on the Maintenance Action Cards (MAC) and be conducted at the
recommended-frequency.
The inspector reviewed MAC 370273, 370395, 356530 and 356531 for
the period of May 29, 1976 and June 16, 1987 associated with the
core spray pump motors.
The MAC card requires that both the
motor and room temperature be recorded.
The acceptance criteria
was that the motor temperature be 5 F above the room temperature,
to preclude moisture in the motor winding. The requirement was
per GE document 22A2724.
Contrary to the above, only one tem-
perature measurement was recorded on the MAC cards.
Failure
to follow Procedure CP-G-3 is considered a violation (50-353/87-
11/03).
Also, during the facility walkdown on June 23, 1987 the in-
.
2
spector observed that the core spray pump 2BP206 motor space
heaters were not energized.
The licensee issued a Long Term
Maintenance Action Item (MAI) No. 3512 on June 25, 1987 to re-
energize the motor space heater. The licensee had determined
that the space heater electrical circuit breaker had tripped.
The heaters were wired to a different circuit breaker and will
be monitored for operability.
_ - _ - _ _ - _
.
24
\\
The licensee issued finding Report No. 2N-568 on June 26, 1987
that identified that BCI LTM QC failed to properly complete
special instructions outlined in the above MAC cards.
Non-conformance Report NCR No.12114 was issued on June 30, 1987
to provide for field disposition.
The licensee reviewed
sixty-four (64) MAC cards and determined that three additional
MAC cards were not filled out properly with both the motor and
room temperature.
However, this review did indicate that storage
maintenance of the motors was properly performed while they were
retained at the Adwin facility.
The following MAC cards for the emergency diesel generators
(EDG), concerning the megger requirements of the armature and
field, were reviewed by the inspector:
354983 through 354990,
357360 through 357367 and 364991 through 364998.
These MAC
cards were for the time period from January through May 1987.
The megger tests were not taken during April 1987 and were
rescheduled for May 1987.
The tests were again not taken during
May 1987. The licensee issued a NCR 11930 dated May 11, 1987 to
provide corrective action.
This corrective action was to per-
form the megger test as required by procedure CP-G-3 in accor-
,
dance with procedure CP-E-7.
If the megger test was found
l_
acceptable this would meet the project design requirement for
the intended use.
The megger tests were performed on June 16,
1987.
The megger tests were found acceptable for EDG 2BG501 and
2DG501. However, for EDG 2AG501 they were found to be unaccept-
able in that three windings were found to have 56%, 58% and 70%
of the accepted values respectively.
EDG 2CG501 also had one
unacceptable winding that measured 75% of the accepted value.
The inspector observed that the emergency diesel generators
2AG501 and 2C501 electrical space heaters were not energized on
June 22, 1987.
The licensee stated the heaters were deenergized
to perform the megger test.
However, EDG 2AG501 space heaters
were not energized as determined by the inspector on June 23 and
24, 1987.
The licensee determined that the EDG 2AG501 space
heaters were inoperable due to heater failure.
The licensee
issued a Maintenance Action Item No. 3507 on June 25, 1987 to
provide temporary supplemental heat to the EDG.
This heat will
be applied until the permanent beaters have been replaced and
reenergized.
The licensee remeggered EDG 2AG501 and 2CG501 on
June 30, 1987.
The inspector reviewed the results of these
megger tests and found they were acceptable.
Prior to the conclusion of the inspection, the LTM QC group,
were reinstructed to CP-G-3 and PSP-G-5.1 requirements for
proper documentation of inspections using the Maintenance Action
Cards.
The field disposition to NCR No. 12114 was to megger
test the pump motors.
This megger test was made on July 2, 1987.
The results of these megger readings were reviewed by the in-
spector and found acceptable.
- _ _ - _
s
e
25
c.
FSAR Commitments
Diesel Generator Exhaust System
The emergency diesel generators exhaust system had been chtngad
from the original design to preclude a potential exhaust leak
into the engine air intake.
The current design of the exhaust
system has the exhaust pipe turned up vertically and exhausting
about 5 feet above the building roof.
The FSAR documented that the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)
exhaust had been designed to the following conditions:
Protect the exhaust pipe above the roof line to prevent
blockage due to a postulated tornado missile.
Prevent the exhaust pipe from ice and snow blockage.
Prevent rain, melting ice or snow from entering the engine
via the exhaust system.
The inspector reviewed a design change package to install heat
tracing to the exhaust pipe and establish procedure for
surveillance and corrective action in the event of snowfall
greater than 10 inches.
The inspector identified no
deficiencies in the design change package.
d.
Potential System Interaction
>
Diesel Generator Building Floor Drain System
The FSAR stated that the diesel generator cell is provided with
trapped and vented floor drains and an adequate drainage capa-
city to cope with the maximum sprinkler water flow in each room.
The drainage system is arranged to prevent flow from one diesel
generator cell from backflooding into another cell.
The in-
spector reviewed the drain system configuration and the
l
licensee's evaluation in response to Information Notice No. 83-44
" Potential Damage to Redundant Safety Equipment as a Result of
Backflow through the Equipment and Floor Drain System." No
deficient conditions were identified in the diesel generator
drain system.
Diesel Generator Buildino Heating System
The inspector observed that the building heating steam and
condensate return lines passed over three of four motor control
centers (MCC) and piping including a heat exchanger was located
over each of the diesel control panels (DCP).
All of the above
piping and heat exchangers were seismic supported such that the
_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-_
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_-
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_.
4
9
26
piping and heat exchangers would not cause failure of safety-related
electrical components during a postulated seismic event.
However,
leaking of the steam or condensate on the MCC or DCP is not precluded
from occurring prior to or during a seismic event.
The licensee recognized this potential adverse interaction
between the building heating system, as designed, and the as-
sociated emergency diesel generator. A modification was pro-
posed to relocate the heaters on Unit I during the past refue-
ling cutage.
No mention was made concerning the piping located
over the motor control centers.
Furthermore, the modification
was considered by the licensee to be a low priority item and was
not made on Unit 1 during the past refueling outage. This is an
unresolved item pending licensee review of this issue.
(50-353/87-11-02)
Restoration of Offsite Electrical Power after a System Blackout
The SF6 type Power Circuit Breaker (PCB) will trip if below
40 F during a blackout if gas storage heaters are not
energized. The inspector reviewed the procedure " System
Restoration Following Complete Shutdown," noting that system
power restoration is initiated by closing of a breaker not
sensitive to ambient temperature.
The inspector reviewed the
power breaker closure sequence following a system blackout and
had no further questions.
e.
Inspector Followup of Previously Identified Items
During this inspection, Significant Deficiency Reports (SDR)
were reviewed to establish reporting consistency with 50.55(e).
Most of the SDRs were concerned with construction issues and
proper determinations were found to have been made with respect
to deportability.
However, two exceptions were identified as
discussed below.
SDR No. 135
The SDR No.135 involved identification of improper wiring of
the standby liquid control system and did not clearly indicate
if the wiring discrepancy was the result of a construction
problem or design error.
SDR No. 135 was found by the licensee
to not be reportable, however, it could be reportable if a design
deficiency is the cause of the problem. This is an unresolved
item pending determination of the problem cause of SDR No. 135.
(50-353/87-11-10)
SDR No. 159
As noted in report 50-352/85-09, during June 1984 as a part of
Unit I start up testing, the licensee identified a design
- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
l
l
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27
1
deficiency that could cause all four Emergency Diesel Generators
(EDG) to shut down in the event of a loss of offsite power.
l
In the event of a loss of offsite power coincident with a LOCA,
'
this design deficiency would not cause the EDGs to shut down.
The deficiency is that the non-safety fire detection system
would initiate a false fire indication after retur,iing to
service from a loss of power condition.
This would occur due to
an imbalance, during the time period required for the flow
sensors to reach equilibrium following restoration of power, in
the control system wiring bridge that senses flow in the fire
system water lines.
This fire indication would then shut down
those diesel generators that were running under certain circum-
stances.
Prior to the completion of inspection 352/85-09, the
licensee had established the cause of this problem and corrected
it by changing a system timer from I second to 60 seconds. The
i
issue remaining in 1987 is the conformance of the licensee to
the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The Significant Deficiency Report (SDR) No. 159 which was
questioned for adequacy by the NRC inspector during inspection
352/85-09 was reviewed later by the licensee.
The open item
352/85-09-01 and technical issues of report 352/85-09 for the
EDG fire protection interaction including potential shutdown of
the four diesels were evaluated and closed in report 352/85-37.
During this inspection, 353/87-11, the inspector reviewed the
deportability aspect of SDR No. 159.
The original design of
the fire water flow detection system and interaction with the
emergency diesel generators did result in conditions where those
diesels in operation (a maximum of four) could be inadvertently
shutdown.
This is a significant design deficiency.
The failure
to report this deficiency to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) is an apparent violation (50-353/87-11-04).
Licensee Corrective Action for EDG Trips on June 20 & 21, 1984
To prevent further trips of the EDG such as those that occurred
during Unit 1 start up testing the design change package No. 0474
and modification 1-1131-13A,24A were issued correcting the
situation by August 2, 1984.
The corrective action was to
change a time delay relay and was documented in inspection
report 50-352/85-09.
Unit 2 was originally constructed using
the longer time delay relay.
During this inspection, 353/87-11, the interaction between the
Fing Protection Actuation Detection System (FPADS) and the Emer-
gency Diesel Generators (EDG) was reviewed for comparison to the
requirements of IEEE Standard 323. The FPADS is not safety
related while the EDG is safety related presenting a condition
where a non-safety related system failure could shut down a
safety related system.
One of the determinations of IEEE
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_
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28
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l
St'andard 323 is to have the supplier of safety related compo-
L
nents determine the. end of life to preclude common. cause
i
failure. Although not classified as safety related, the
j
interaction of the flow switches with the safety related
emergency diesel generators indicates that a high degree of.
reliability for these switches is appropriate.
The inspector
discussed the need for performing a. failure modes and effects
analysis for these switches as part of the corrective action
,
evaluation.
The licensee had not performed such an analysis.
j
i
This concern of insufficient reliability data on a non-safety
j
system that could affect a safety system as discussed above is
considered an unresolved item.
(50-353/87-11-05)
{
Electrical System and Component Identification
.]
The inspector observed that the battery rooms for Unit 2 had not
!
been identified. This lack of identification relative to unit,
channel, division or bus had been previously identified as item
50-353/86-09-01 and was closed on the basis of proposed licensee
action in inspection report 50-353/86-20. The inspector con-
firmed that Unit 14KV switchgear and battery room were properly
identified including Unit 2 4KV switchgear. This identification
was done by PECo. Since the Unit 2 battery rooms had not been
turned over from the AE this identification.was not completed.
,
The licensee'has directed the AE to identify these room
'
similarly to those done on Unit 1. The inspector has no further
concerns about this item.
5.5 Conclusion
.
The electrical system in general has been properly designed,
purchased, installed and maintained in accordance to the NRC require-
ments and the licensee commitments.
The inspector has not identified any deficiencies in the cable
receipt inspection, storage, cutting from master reels, installation,
QA/QC records, or procedures including the raceway systems. At the
time of the inspection an estimate of 30% of the cables had been
installed.
A violation was identified with regard to proper completion of
Maintenance Action Cards.
In addition, there oppeared to be some
weakness in the area of electrical equipment long term maintenance
storage. This is in regard to motors and emergency diesel generators,
space heaters energization, megger test and temperature surveillance
of motors. Greater attention to the implementation of the MAC
systems could possibly preclude some of these problems.
The inspector did not identify any deficiencies in receipt inspec-
tion, installation, or procedures associated with electrical systems
or components.
'
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,
29
Unresolved items were identified with regard to EDG building heating
system piping located over EDG motor control centers, reliability of
flow switches in the fire protection system and their interaction
with the EDG and deportability of a design deficiency under
requirements of 10 CFR 50.5S(e).
6.0 Instrumentation and Control
6.1 Scope
An inspection of the Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) for the High
Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, Core Spray (CS) System and
parts of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System was conducted to
determine the adequacy of:
installed hardware, construction proce-
dures, design change process, conformance to design documents and
requirements, design drawings, construction work packages, quality
programs, engineering interface, and documentation of completed
design and construction.
Completed work activities and in process work were inspected.
Additionally, current design activities associated with the
candidate systens were reviewed.
I
6.2 Inspection Criteria
l
The fundamental criteria for the inspection consists of the FSAR,
SER, and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B.
In order to verify compliance with the above documents, the
installed I&C commodities and design activities were examined with
respect to the following attributes:
Instrument installations
tubing bend radii
tubing ovality
torquing of support bolts
instrument location
clearance requirements
proper supports
tubing slope
a
instrument line valving
installation of fittings
instrument identification
sensing line routing
control of instrument line penetrations
control and use of flex hose
=
_ - _ - _ _ _
,
30
I&C Cables and Terminations
cables properly identified
a
cable integrity
conductors properly located and terminated
a
redundant cables properly separated
cable routing in accordance with design criteria
a
Control Circuit Design
proper review and approval of design drawings
FSAR logic requirements incorporated in drawings
drawing standards complied with
a
system functional requirements (i.e. pumps & valve controls)
a
reflected in final design
consistency between levels of design drawings
a
6.3 Inspection Activities
Instrument Installation
The instrument installations listed below were visually examined for
conformance with the attributes listed in section 6.2.
Additionally, the completed work packages were compared with the
requirements of the Instrumentation Installation Details, M-830, to
verify incorporation of design requirements.
The instrument line from the discharge line of the safeguard
pirdng fill pump to pressure switch PSL-52-231A, work package
JTL-52-01-09Q-A.
The instrument support, instrument, and isolation and drain
valves, work package JML-52-01-09Q-A for PSL-52-231A.
The instrument line from the discharge line of RHR pump 2CP202
te instrument rack 20-C077, work package JTR-51-05-22A-A.
i
in process work activities on Instrument rack 20-C010 (reactor
vessel level), including tubing and instrument cables.
In process work activities on instrument rack 20-C005 (Drywell
pressure), including tubing and instrument cables.
Suppression Pool temperature element installations for
TE-41-2018, D, F and H and TE-41-202 B, D, F and H.
A complete walkdown of the CS and HPCI pump rooms was performed
to verify proper separation of instrument tubing and conduit,
instrument locations compared to that required by P&ID and
general work practices.
..
_ _ - _
-_
.
31
Instrumentation Design Activities
A review of both the field engineering and resident engineering
activities was performed during the process of the inspection.
Additionally, some General Electric and PECo engineering activities
were reviewed.
The following is a list of the activities reviewed.
The relocation of core bores for instrument lines (RHR pump
discharge pressure transmitters) including the preparation and
resolution of Field Change Notices, preparation of Drilling
Excavation Checksheets and resolution of a Field Change Request
for cutting rebar.
Preparation and disposition of a Field Change Request for
addition of weep holes to instrument support tube steel.
Preparation and disposition of Field Deviation Disposition
Request (FDDR) for modification of Unit 2 local instrument
racks to conform to Unit 1 as-built design.
Preparation and disposition of FDDR for replacement of
transmitter E41-ND578 by Bechtel, which was removed from Unit 2
instrument rack for use on Unit I and was originally supplied
by General Electric.
Preparation by PECo of the procedure for Calculation of Nuclear
Safety - Related Instrument Setpoints.
Preparation, revision and issuance of General Electric
Instrument Data Sheets and Design Specification Data Sheets.
Storage of Instrument Components
Activities for protection and storage of instrument components were
reviewed during the course of the inspection and are listed below.
Warehouse storage of instrument components including climate
control, cleanliness,' issuance, storage and receipt.
Procedures and practices for protection of installed
instruments and racks from construction dirt and physical
damage.
Temporary field storage of instruments after removal from the
warehouse and prior to installation in the field,
I
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'I
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ . - _ - -
e
32
In order to verify that the requirements for initiation and control
of HPCI and CS systems meet the design requirements specified in the
FSAR the following control schemes were reviewed.
,
HPCI initiation circuits for isolation valves and the HPCI pump
turbine were reviewed to verify the logic and consistency of
control circuits with functional design requirements.
6.4 Findings
Based on the review of documer,ts and examination of instrument
I
installations, the following findings were identified.
a.
Although very few instrument installations have been completed
at this point in the construction, the quality of workmanship
and conformance to design requirements for those installations
inspected was found to be adequate.
Quality Control, field
engineering and craft personnel appear to be knowledgeable,
conscientious and well managed.
Innovative ideas, such as
tightness gauges for compression fittings, have been
incorporated in the project to provide for consistency and
time saving,
The use of the '" work package" concept seems to
provide a well defined scope of work which is controllable and
auditable, Overall, work on instrument installations is
proceeding smoothly; however, it is early in the process,
b.
Interface between Bechtel Field Engineering and Resident
Engineering appears to be procedurally well defined and adhered
to, and evidenced by the disposition of field change requests
reviewed during the conduct of the inspection,
c.
Field storage of installed instrument racks consists of both
fabric coverings and plywood structures and no evidence of
damage was found by the inspector.
I
I
d.
Warehouse storage facilities for instrument components were
found to be clean, well organized, properly labeled and have
adequate climate controls.
The procedures for receipt and
j
issuance of components are structured to maintain positive
j
control, and include a controlled entry data base of all
'
components which lists ID number, location, receipt date,
issuance date and status codes.
The inspector found no areas
{
of concern.
l
w _- _
_
_
l.
4
...
33
e.
PEco has assumed responsibility for performing setpoint
calculations for nuclear safety-related instruments.
In
preparation for this activity they have prepared a draft
procedure which was reviewed by the inspector and found to be
in compliance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.105
as well as the latest ISA standard for preparation of
setpoints for' nuclear safey-related instruments.
f.
At the time of the stop work on Unit 2, in 1985, General
Electric unitized the-design drawings for both Unit I and
Unit 2.
However, not all of the drawings for Unit 2 were
design verified.
Examples of this problem are Construction
Drawing No. 16908370TR for HPCI leak detection and Instrument
Data Sheet No. 234A9312TR for the reactor water cleanup system.
General Electric issued a letter stating that all Unit 2 unique
drawings should be considered unverified until Unit 2 construc-
tion restart and subsequent review of the drawings.
The subject
drawings were released to Bechtel under separate transmittal
letters which contained no warning that the drawings were not
i
design verified.
Subsequently, the drawings were issued to the
project. As of the completion of this inspection there were
still unverified instrumentation drawings which have been issued
to the project for construction, including, instrument data
sheets, parts lists, assembly drawings and connection diagrams.
The-issuance of unverified design documents is a violation of
both 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI and Appendix D to the
Limerick PSAR as stated in the notice of violation in Appendix A
of this report.
(50-353/87-11-06)
g.
The elementary diagrams, logic diagrams and schematic diagrams
reviewed as part of this inspection were found to be accurate
and in conformance with the design basis committed to in the
FSAR.
No areas of concern were noted.
h.
As part of its design process General Electric will perform a
design review of all Unit 2 design documents, for which it is
responsible, to ensure that all changes have been incorporated
and that the final design meets the licensing bases.
The
,
inspector questioned if procedures were in place to ensure that
'
the impact of the modified drawings is evaluated for existing
l
hardware for which construction is complete.
Bechtel
Construction has procedures in place to perform the required
evaluation; however, PECO testing and Laboratories Division, who
is responsible for loop and instrument calibrations and some
l.
post construction testing, has no written procedure for perform-
ing review of document changes for effect on completed work.
This item will remain unresolved pending additional clarifica-
tios +.o be provided by the licensee.
(50-353/87-11-07)
1.
The inspector reviewed the instrument data sheets and design
specification data sheets for the CS and HPCI. Although these
items had been design verified the inspector found a number of
errors such as instrument element ranges incorrectly listed,
- _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .
._
-__
_
-_.
'
- .
h
34
l!,
rated instrument accuracy incorrectly stated, and incorrect
instrument scales in the instrument data sheets for HPCI. Ad-
ditionally, a significant number of errors have been detected by
GE subsequent to the original verification.
This item will
remain unresolved pending further investigation to explain the
source and significance of the errors.
(50-353/87-11-08)
i
6.5 Conclusions
i
The installed instrumentation inspected was found to be of good
quality and to satisfy the criteria established in section 6.2.
Quality records were found to be acceptable.
Design documents appear
to reflect the requirements of the FSAR and are reflected in the
as-built configuration in the plant.
An item of non conformance with
the document control requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B was
identified in that unverified design documents were issued for
construction.
7.0 Project Organization
7.1 Construction Management and Supervision
The Limerick Unit 2 construction is a major task involving a work
-force of approximately 4200 personnel of diverse skills.
The
interactions between the main contractor, sub contractors and PECo
are numerous, complex and controlled by people, documentation
quality controls, quality assurance, procedures and NRC regulations.
Management of construction has been delegated to Bechtel Construction
by PECo. Oversite of Bechtel activities is provided by the PECo
construction division for the mechanical, electrical and cost and
schedule areas; and by the PECo Quality Assurance Division for audit
and surveillance of activities for the purposes of monitoring and
controlling quality.
Bechtel activities in Limerick Unit 2 construc-
tion include construction management, project supervision, craft
supervision, construction engineering, project engineering, cost and
scheduling, quality control, inspection, procurement, subcontract
administration and safety. The reactor vessel internals are instal-
led by the General Electric Company and the heating and ventilation
(HVAC) by the Schneider Power Corporation.
'The inspectors. interviewed PECo and Bechtel construction managers,
engineering managers, supervisors and workmen to establish how manage-
mont of construction is supposed to be accomplished and to determine
if management has been successful in providing the construction work
l
force with the necessary tools, training, procedures, hardware, super-
vision and controls necessary to properly install piant components.
This aspect of inspection and observation of specific plant systems
and related documentation as described in this report has resulted in
the conclusion of the NRC team that construction is proceeding with
'
adequate management planning and controls.
l
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4
- - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ .
_.
___
. _ _ _ _
_ _ - _ . ___-_ __-__-_ -
.-
- _ _
_ -- _
.c
35
7.2 . Project Engineering
Bechtel Corporation is responsible for all design activities related
to Unit 2 of the Limerick Station.
The Project Resident Engineering
(PE) staff represents the majority of the project engineering organi-
zation.
The bulk of staff is located in'Pottstown within a few miles
of the plant site. The PE staff has a small representation on site
(approximately 40 engineers) for coordination of project activities
with construction engineering.
The balance of the project engineer-
ing staff is located in Bechtel's home office in San Francisco
(SFHO) with an overall responsibility for coordination of mechanical,
. electrical and civil / structural systems activities and performance of
generic and special analyses.
The Resident Engineering staff has the overall responsibility for
plant physical design in the mechanical, civil / structural and
electrical disciplines in addition to the planning and control and
quality assurance activities.
The resident engineering staff assigned to the plant site reports to
the Pottstown organization.
In the mechanical and civil areas, the
staff provides support to construction in problems associated with
rebar cutting, custom fit supports and penetration seal program.
The interface between Project Engineering and construction engineer-
ing staffs was evident from observation of the frequency of meetings
(weekly) between department heads and counterparts, in both organiza-
'
tions.
The licensee (PECo) maintains oversight over the PE staff
activities by stationing an engineer from their corporate organiza-
tion in the Pottstown office.
l
Specific details relating to activities performed by the PE organi-
zation in the mechanical area were addressed in NRC inspection
report No. 353/86-20,
7.3 Construction Engineering
The Construction Engineering Department is responsible for material
availability / procurement, walkdown for installation / interference
check, installation, inspection and providing as-built information.
In addition, CE is responsible for obtaining prior Project
Engineering (PE) approval of any design changes necessary for
construction.
As of June 1987, the Construction Engineering (CE) staffing level
was at 580. CE is divided into the pipe support, walding,
electrical, civil, instrumentation, mechanical, HVAC, piping, quality
engineering, material control and systems / change departments.
_ _ - _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - = _ _
_.
, _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _
,
e.
(
!
!
"
36
i
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l
Construction Engineering is the interface group between project
engineering, who'is responsible for all design activities, and the'
plant construction work force.
Construction engineering prepares
the work instruction packages and. works with the construction crafts
to have components installed in accordance with the work package,
drawin'gs and procedures.
Construction engineering performs the first
line inspection of completed work af ter completion by construction.
Bechtel QC performs inspections of completed work after construction
engineering to meet code and procedural requirements and to provide
control over the construction activities.
8.0 Unresolved Items
i
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
ascertain if it is acceptable, a violation, or a deviation.
Unresolved
items are discussed in sectio.ns 3.4(g), 5.4(d), 5.4(e), 6.4(h) and 6.4(i).
9.0 ' Exit Meetin_g
..
The Inspectors met with licensee representatives on-July 2,1987 and
presented the findings of the inspection. The licensee did not identify
any proprietary information contained within the scope of the. inspection.
Written information other than requests for information was not provided
to the licensee during this inspection.
a=_-__________
- _ _ _ .
_. _ - _ _ - _ .
.
O
Attachment I - List of Persons Contacted
Philadelphia Electric Co. (PECo)
x W. Boyer, Supervising Engineer
- J. Clarey, Supt. Limerick 2
x J. Conway, Fire Protection Assistant
- R. Crofton, QAE
- T.
Dey, QAE
- L. Dyer, QAE
- D. Fetters, Project Mgr.
- T. Gotzis, Asst. General Supt. Construction
x A. Jones, Electrical Engineer
- J. Kemper, Sr. V.P. Eng/ Prod
x*G. Lauderback, QA Branch Head
.
- D. Marascio, QAE
- K. Meck, QA Engineer
x 0. Neff, Compliance Engineer
- P. Pavlides, Director, QA
x D. Poliero, Performance Engineer
- L. Pyrih, Chief Mechanical Engineer
- J. Rubert, Site Supervisor, QA
x W. Shuff, Electrical Branch Head (UZ)
- T. Szonntagh, QAE
x*T, Tucker, QA Engineer
Bechtel
- G. Bell, PQAE
x R. Dantuluri, Elect. Dyp. Supt.
D. Davis, Lead Instrumentation Engineer
- M. Fisher, Subcontracts Sr. Field Engineer
H. Greenwalt, QA Engineer
- C,
Headrick, APC QCE
R. Holt, Reactor Lead Instrumentation Engineer
- A. Kumau, Asst. Lead Civil Engineer
- G. Kelly, CS QAE
- H. Linsinbigler, Asst. Project Field Engineer
- S. Loofbourrow, Lead Const. Engineer
- T. Molenaro, Project Supt.
W. Mourer, Construction Manager
x 3. Mukherjee, Mech. Grp. Supt.
x*R. Palaniswany, Resident Project Engineer
l
- N. Powell, Project Engineer
l
- K. Powers, Project Field Engineer
[
G. Sims, Reactor Instrumentation Engineer
l
l
1
-
_ _ _ _ _ _
- _
_-_
_
l
.
Attachment I
2
l
l
- C. Brinson, QA Rep
- D. DiFilippo, QC Supervisor
l
- A. Lileck, Construction Manager
- M. Quirin, Project Manager
N_R_C_
- J. Durr, Engineering Branch Chief, DRS
x*H. Gray, Lead Reactor Engineer
- H. Kaplan, Lead Reactor Engineer
x*J. Kaucher, Reactor Engineer
- J. Linville, Section Chief, DRP 2A
- K. Manoly, Lead. Reactor Engineer
x*F. Paulitz,. Reactor Engineer
- Indicates those present at the exit meeting.
xIndicates those present at the June 30, 1987 meeting
on Electrical 50.55(e) issue.
I
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____-__
fu.
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.
I
i
. Attachment II-a - Drawings used during piping inspections
High Pressure Coolant Injection
P&ID Drawings M55 and M56
l
l
Description
14" EBB-229
Pump Discharge
12" EBB-231
To Cont. Isolation Valve HV208
16" HBB-210
To Pump Suction
16" & 34" - HCB205
Pump Suction Line
'
20" HCB-202
Pump Suction Line
20" HCD-219
From Condensate Storage Tank
12" EBB-208
HPCI Pump Steam Inlet
20" HBB-208
HPCI Pump Turbine Exhaust
16" HBB-209
HPCI Pump Suction from Wetwell
l
14" EBB-229
HPCI Pump to Core Spray
1
..
Core Spray (Loop B - Pumps B & D)
l
P&ID Drawing M52 and M41
16" HBB-220
Pump Suction from Wetwell
'
14" HBB-220
CS Pump B&D tie in
12" GBB-212
CS Pump Discharge
14" GBB-212
Pump B&D Common Discharge Line
to HPCI Tie in (12" EBB-231)
12" DCA-210
Inside Containment
12" DCA-419
To Reactor Vessel Nozzle
Core Spray Sparger
In Reactor Vessel (GE)
l
.
___ _ - -
_
_.
.
i
.
Attachment II-b - Electrical System Supports
1.
Documents Reviewed
E-1406-1 & 2: Conduit and Cable Tray Notes, Symbols and Details
E-49: Specification for Cable Trays for LGS Unit 1 & 2
QCI-W-1.00: Quality Control Instruction for Welding and
Non-Destructive Exam ~ination for Structural and Electrical Component
Installation
QCI-E-2.0: Quality Assurance Instruction for Installation of Exposed
Raceway & Seismic Bracing - Welding Acceptance for Electrical
Raceway / Support Installations
2.
Electrical System Supports Inspected and Related QC Inspection Records
Switchgear Area (#8): Elevation 239'-0" (DWG No. E-1117)
- CBJ-122 for Conduit No. 2BC004-5" RS
- CBJG-72 for Box No. 2DG015
- CBJ-225 for Conduit No. 20D081-6" RS
- CBJ-39 for Conduit No. 2BD007-4" RS
Cable Spreading Room (Area #8): Elevation 254'-0" (DWG No. E-1226)
W4, P7 & C3 for Trays Nos. 20TBV, 20TCW, 20 TDX, 20TEY & 20KFZ
-
-
CSR8A(SIM) for Trays Nos. 20RBB, 20KAD & 20RBA99
F6 for Tray Nos. 2CTSA, 2CTTA, 20TBR, 20TAA, 20TUA & 20KSA
-
CSR 22 for Trays Nos. 20 RAS, 20 RAT & 20RA
-
S6 for Trays Nos. 20TFS & 20TGT
-
-
CBL-G474 for Conduits and Gatters Nos. IAH039-2" RS,
IBH036-2" RS, 1AGI46, IDGI17, 1CGIl0, IDG034 & 1CG033
i
Diesel Generator (D) Building, Elevation 217'-0"
l
!
-
004 for Tray No. 2DCDB05
005 for Tray No. 2DCDB05
-
-
011 for Tray No. 20CDB03
-
012 for Tray No. 2DCDB02
1
19 for Tray No. 2DCDB01
-
i
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-
101 & 102 for Gutter No. 20G803
-
1389 for conduit No. 2DS100 - 1h" RS
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ _ - _
-
,
.
.. .
Attachment II-c - Electrical Power Systems - Documents Reviewed
Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 8
Safety Evaluation Report NUREG-0991, August 1983
Supplement No. 1, December 1983
Supplement No. 2, October 1984
Supplement No. 3, October 1984
Supplement No. 4, May 1985
Supplement No, 5, July 1985
Supplement No. 6, August 1985
Specification for Medium Voltage Metal Clad Switchgear and Associated Bus
Duct, 8031-E-7, revision 2.
Specification for 5000 volt and 15000 volt power cables, 8031-E-29,
revision 2.
Specification for 5000 volt and 15000 volt power cables, 8031-E-29,
revision 12.
Procedures
Quality Assurance Plan Volume I Design and Construction Phase, April 1, 1987.
Processing of Nonconformance Reports, CP-D-1, revision 4.
Permanent Plant Cable Installation and Termination, CP-E-2, revision 4.
Electrical Raceways, CP-E-3, revision 3.
Installation of Internal Raceway and Equipment Seals and Electrical Raceway
Fireproofing, CP-E-4, revision 3
Non-NSSS Electrical Equipment, CP-E-6, revision 6.
Insulation Resistance Testing, CP-E-7, revision 0.
Long Term Storage / Maintenance / Lubrication of Permanent Plant Equipment and
Materials Prior to Turnover, CP-G-3, revision 3.
[
!
Quality Control Instructions
Receiving Inspection, R-1.00, revision 18
Storage Facilities, S-1.00, revision 3
Installation of Electrical Cables, E-4.0, revision 12.
Storage Instructions for Vertical Induction Motors in indoor unheated
i
environment, 261A3283, May 15, 1987.
,
_ - _ _ _
_
o
-
Attachment II-c
2
Diesel Generator packing, shipping, handling and storage instructions Colt
Industries Dwg. No. 11873300, revision 2.
Diesel Generator Annuicator Response, ARC-B0P-1CC514, page 63, revision 2.
System Restoration following Complete Shut-down, System Operation Division
Philadelphia Electric Company, revised June 1, 1986.
Conduits & Cable Tray Notes, Symbols & Details, E-1406
1.0 General Notes
2.0 Raceway and Dropout Cable Separation
3.0 Raceway Numbering and Marking
4.0 Conduit Notes.
Procedures
Standby Diesel Loading Test Procedure, P100.4, revision 4.
.
Loss of All AC Power (Station Blackout), E-1, revision 5.
Administrative Procedure for Control for In-Plant Storage, A-30.4, revision A.
Snow, SE-14, revision 1.
Records
Maintenance Action Cards
MAC, Core Spray Pump, 2AP206, June 1, 1987, motor & room temperature
MAC, Core Spray Pump, 2BP206, May 29, 1987, motor & room temperature
MAC, Core Spray Pump, 2CP206, June 15, 1987, matar & room temperature
l
MAC, Core Spray Pump, 2DP206, June 16, 1987, motor & room temperature
MAC, 480 volt Load Center 20B201, temperature, March 20, 1987,
June 18, 1987
MAC, Diesel Generator 2AG501, armature megger, December 13, 1986, April 14,
4
1987, May 13, 1987, field megger, January 5,1987, April 14,1987,
May 13, 1987
MAC, Diesel Generator 2BG501, armature megger, January 1,1987, April 14,1987,
May 13, 1987 field megger January 5,1987, April 14,1987, May 13,1987.
MAC, Diesel Generator 2CG501, armature megger, January 12, 1987, April 14,
1987, May 13, 1987, field megger, January 12, 1987, April 14, 1987,
May 13, 1987
MAC Diesel Generator 2DG501, armature megger, January 12,1987, April 14,
1987, May 13, 1987, field megger, January 5,1987, April 14,1987,
May 13, 1987
MAC, Core Spray Pump 2BP206, megger May 6, 1987.
MAC, Core Spray Pump 20P206, megger May 6, 1987.
'
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'
________________ _
- - _ _ _ _
.
..
3
Attachment II-c
3
l
l
'
Maintenance Action Item
l
MAI, 3263, Core Spray Pump Motor energize space heaters, April 4, 1987
MAI, 3417, Core Spray Pump Motor, deenergize space heater to work pump,
June 2, 1987
MAI, 3438, Core Spray Pump Motor, reenergize space heaters, June 9, 1987.
MAI, 3512, Core Spray Pump Motor, reenergize space heater circuit breaker
Triped, June 23, 1987.
Instorage Maintenance System History Inquiry for Load Center 20B201 space
heater operability December 24, 1985 through June 18, 1987.
Nonconformance Report 11930, Diesel Generators not megger as required, April
11, 1987.
'
Field Inspection Report, NCR 11930, Diesel Generator Meggering, June 17, 1987
Nonconformance Report 11958, Overtension and minimum bend radius exceeded.,
Cables 2BB20233A, 2BB202338 and 2BB202330, May 21, 1987.
Shipping Notice Core Spray Pump, 2BP-206.from Eddystone to Limerick April 2,
1987.
Quality Control Inspection Record
Storage Facilities, Log No. SM00036, May 29, 1987
Permanent Plant Cable Reels, Log No. R3531, February 9, 1987
Q List Cables, Log No. R1479, July 6, 1982
Cable Installation for NCR 11958 above, May 4, 1987
Quality Assurance Report
No. 2E-236, Cable Laydown Areas, July 31, 1986
No. 2E-248, Cable Pulling Unit 2 PGCC cables, February 20, 1987
Drawings
PI&D, Fuel & Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer, M-20, sheet 7, revision 2.
PI&D, Plent Heating Steam, M-96, sheet I revision 30, sheet 2 revision 31
sheet 3 revision 18, sheet 4 revision 19, and sheet 5 revision 3.
Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Control and Auxiliaries, E-591, sheet 1
revision 7, sheet 2 revision 4, sheet 3 revision 7, sheet 4 revision 1
i
sheet 5 revision 2, sheet 6 revision 4, and sheet 7 revision 2.
Electrical Schematic Engine Control, Colt Industries, 11870038, sheet 3,
revision 15.
l
1
Location of Drain Funnels and Caps, Diesel Generator Building, plan EL 217,
M-590, revision 0.
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_____ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
- _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _
a
P
i
' Attachment II-c
4
Drawings (Continued)
Normal Waste Drainage System, C-26, Sheet I revision 37, sheet 2 revision 9
Plumbing and Drainage Diesel Generator Building EL 217, M-550, revision 4
Plumbing and Drainage Symbols, Abbreviations and General Notes, M-500,
revision 15.
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- _ _ ___ -_
.
?
7
Attachment II-d - Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) Documents Reviewed
I&C Dccuments reviewed during CTI
Drawings
'
Isometric SP-HBB-270-E3, Reactor Building discharge line from safeguard fill
pump 2AP-256
Isometric FJ-52-01-09A, Safeguard Piping Fill Pump
Isometric SP-GBB-219-1E, Reactor Building RHR Pump 2CP202 Discharge Drain
Isometric FJ-51-05-22A, sheets 1 & 2, RHR Rack 20-0077
P&ID, M51, sheets 5, 6, 7 and 8 - RHR
I
I
M-1542 Instrument Location Reactor Building Unit 2 Plan at EL 177 Area 17
E-369, Schematic Diagram, Safeguard Piping Fill Pump
M1-E41-1010-D.-4.4, P&ID, HPCI
E-104, Schematic Block Diagram, HPCI, sheets 1 and 2
'
M1-E41-1040-E-017.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-018.1, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-019.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-020.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-021.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-022.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-023.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-024.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-025.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-026.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-027.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-028.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-029.2, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1040-E-030.1, Elementary Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1030-F-08.8,
Functional Control Diagram, HPCI
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M1-E41-1030-F-04.19, Functional Control Diagram, HPCI
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M1-E41-1030-F-05.12, Functional Control Diagram, HPCI
M1-E41-1030-F-06.12, Functional Control Diagram, HPCI
M-830, Instrument Installation Details
M-601, Instrument Index
M-1-E41-4010-L-06.9, Design Specification Data Sheets for HPCI
M-1-E41-3050-H-02.1, Instrument Data Sheets for HPCI
M-1-E21-4010-L-04.8, Design Specification Data sheets for CS
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M-1-E21-3050-H-02.1, Instrument Data Sheets for CS
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M-772, Level Setting Diagrams
E-350, sheets 1 and 2, Schematic Diagram Core Spray Pumps
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Attachment II-d
2
Procedures
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General Electric Independent Design Verification Procedure E0P42-6.00
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General Electric Document Distribution Procedure E0P 60-2.00
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PECO Draft procedure - Calculation of Nuclear Safety-Related Instrument
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Setpoints, TL-03-500I3
CP-0-10, Review, Implementation and Control of Design Change Package
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CP-J-1, Fabrication and Installation of Instrumentation
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CP-E-2, Permanent Plant Cable Installation and Termination
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CP-F-2, Receipt Inspection, Storage and Withdrawal of Materials / Equipment
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' Specifications
8031-C-105, Specification for Drilling and Chipping of Structural Concrete
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8031-M-248, Design Specification for Nuclear Instrument Valves
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8031-A-40-2-100, Penetration Seals Schedule Legend
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Design Change Documents
FCN-CC-11
FCR-CC-173
FCN-MI-11
FCN-JS-28
FCN-CC-12
FCN-CC-31
FDDR-HH2-3670
FDDR-HH2-3775
Work Packages
JML-52-01-090-A, Install Instrument Support Instrument with Celebration Tee,
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Isolation Valve and Drain Valve
JTR-52-01-090-A, Install Supports, Tubing and Flexhose
JMR-51-05-22Q-A, Mount and Install Instrument Rack
JTR-51-05-22Q-A, Install Instrument Line
Other Documents
General Electric letter, PE-3247, March 14,1985 - Design Verification of
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Limerick Unit 2 Drawings
General Electric letter, PE-3564, June 18,1987 - Design Verification of
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Limerick Unit 2 Drawings
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Instruction Manual for HPCI Terry Turbine
M-251-59-1, Installation Manual for Metal Bellows Flexible Hose
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M-251-58-1, Instruction Manual for Installation, Inspection and Handling
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for Metal Bellows Flexible Instrument Hose
Limerick Generating Station Units 1&2 Project Q-List
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