ML20234D203
| ML20234D203 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1987 |
| From: | Andrews R OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| LIC-87-480, TAC-62069, NUDOCS 8707070132 | |
| Download: ML20234D203 (13) | |
Text
,
1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 402/536-4000 July 1, 1387 LIC-87-480 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
References:
1.
Docket No. 50-285 2.
Application for Amendment of Operating License dated August 5, 1986 3.
Letter from OPPD (R. L. Andrews) to NRC (W. A. Paulson) dated March 31, 1987 (LIC-87-196) 4.
Letter from OPPD (R. L. Andrews) to NRC (Document Control Desk) dated June 22, 1987 (LIC-87-445)
Gentlemen
SUBJECT:
Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation Technical Specifications Reference 4 was missing one page of Attachment B.
Please supercede Reference 4 in its entirety by this transmittal.
On Tuesday, June 9,1987, members of my staf f and the NRC's staff discussed the subject item.
It was agreed that OPPD would compile applicable pages and forward them for final approval. As noted in Attachment A, all pages have been previously submitted. Applicable pages are contained in Attachment B.
Attachment C provides a discussion and justification for the changes and a "No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis." OPPD respectfully requests 60 days-from'date of issuance to implement the revised specifications.
Sincerely, R. L. Andrews Division Manager Nuclear Production i
RLA/me cc: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
4 Washington, DC 20036 y
N
\\
R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator A. Bournia, NRC Project Manager P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Harold Borchert, Director - Division of Radiological Health
~
8707070132 870701 PDR ADOCK 05000285 P
PDR 4ssv4 Empioumengngopponunau I
ATTACHMENT A Summary of Chances Pace Docketed 2-70 Application of 8/5/86 2-97 Application of 8/5/86 and letter of 3/31/87 (LIC-87-196) 2-98 Letter of 3/31/87 (LIC-87-196) 3-16a Application of 8/5/86 3-16c Application of 8/5/86 No changes in this_ package are new - that is, all pages have been previously docketed.
- 41x I
ATTACHMENT 8 1
4 4
1 i
l i
TABLE 2-5 A
Instrumentation Operatine Requirements for Other Safety Feature Functions 1
Minimum Minimum Permissible Operable Degree of Bypass
!!o.
Functienci Unit Channels Redundancy Conditions i
1 1
CEA Positicn Indication 1
None None Systems
\\
2 Pressur;:er Level 1
None Not Applicable i
3 Rbcocln g-Mergin 1
- enc I'ot-AppMeaMe-
" nitor 80 43 PORV Acoustic Position 1
None Not Applicable Indication-Direct ac
$4 Safety Valve Acoustic l
hone Not Applicable Positien Indication db 8.5 PORV/ Safety Valve Tail i
None Not Applicable Pipe Temperature J
NOTES:
-3 i
a One chan el per 'alve.
b One RTD or bot. POR7't ; two RTD's, one for each code safety.
c If item is op rsble,j requirements of specification 2.15 are codi-fied for items and / to " Restore inoperable channels to operability within 7 days or be in het shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />."
d If items 4 and are operable, requirements of specification 2.15 are modified for
. tem to " Restore inoperable channels to oper-ability vi;hin 7 ; lays o be in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />."
3 4
5 51, h A=endrent :lc.
2-70
I 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.21 Post-Accident Monitorine Instrumentation
_ Applicability Applies to post-accident monitoring instrumentation not included as part of the Reactor Protective System or Engineered Safety Features.
This specification is applicable while in modes 1, 2 and 3.
Objective To assure that instrumentation necessary to monitor plant parame te rs during post-accident conditions is operable or that backup methods of analysis are available.
Specifications Post-accident instrumentation shall be operable as provided in Table 2-10.
If the required instrumentation is not operable, then the appropriate action specified in Table 2-10 shall be taken.
Basis Pos t-accident monitoring instrumentation provides information, during and following an accident, which is considered helpful to the operator in determining the plant condition.
It is desirable that this instru-(
mentation be operable at all times during operation of the plant.
however, none of the post-accident monitors are required for safe shutdown of the plant nor are any control or safety actions initiated by the monitors.
{
In general, the post-accident monitors provide wide range capabilities for parameters which are beyond the range of normal protective and control ins trumentation.
They also provide remote sampling and analysis capability to reduce personnel exposure under post-accident conditions. Because the information necessary to assess the effect of an accident (i.e., core damage) can be obtained from other sources and by manual methods, it is not necessary that the post-accident monitors be operable at all times.
The svAcoo le A marp morsker, he AdeA J 6 3-~~<rk.
</ Mc Core Leif Thermoccwp e (CET,) comgrise l
(43TC) a f,c.
,].
i;ef5 X
ll e
e 4fachcvs of he ICCb h lo enAanee S ah N d 0'-
f 4,d apam to, 4, dis acap "ach h hiskee & anel &gmserecove q,ho m ICC. AdNavn Np if ai;)s by fraek; rae/or pw/u/ DwewA
%s.9"###
' e/a d'eel N7 lA N Ak'n
S/C y,g frg,,, epf /.c ai e
&y a cigric LeN 85-5Q g'g' af ffe ielre< +be. sen u
trb a nal sis, o r
,wg i e a y
geger-P ad & u l
,,,,gme,,
y,,
in 1he event more finn four N) oensors in a
reaefor vesse/
teveI (HJTC) channel are inoperable,
repairs may only be possible i
du ring n e nat refueliny outage.
This is on/
becanse ne sensor.s are acceisible re?ada-after Me missi/c shie/ds and the vessel head cable trays are-removed.
If is not feasib/c to re,sair a.
channel exce out lf onl< p+during a refuelin rahle,yc.if should' one channel is in be res+ored +o OPERABL daks in a.
refueling cutage as som as reasonably possible.
1T both channeis are inoperable, at least one Unnnel shall be resfored to gerable status daring 1he next refuely outage.
exil hemoccuples were insfalled Tlie core pursuant
+o /MRE4-0737.
There are seven G) installed per core gby iheAURE6.
uadran+
four of which were regaired This is e/arfied via. the fxtnofe +o Table
.2 -/O.
TABLE 2-10 Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Operating Limits Minimum Operable Instrument Ch annels Action 1.
Containment Wide Range Radiation
!bnitors (RM-091A & B) 2 (a) 2.
Wide Range Noble Gas Stack Monitor RM-063L (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)
FLM-003M (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)
RM-063H (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a) 3.
Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor (RM-064) 1 (a) 4.
Containment Hydrogen Monitor (VA-81A & B) 2 (b)(c) 5.
Containment Water Level Narrow Range (LT-599 & LT-600) 1 (d)
Wide Range (LT-387 & LT-388) 2 (b)(c) 6.
Containment Wide Range ?ressure 2
(b)(c) bkb-A%chet' (a) With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the mi channels operable requirements, initiate the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter (s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and 1.
either restore the inoperable channel (s) to.0PERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or 2.
prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to specification 5.9.3 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedules for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
(b) With one channel inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next i
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
(c) With both channels inoperable, restore at leas t one channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
(d) With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, operation may continue until the next cold shutdown, at which time the required channel (s) shall be made operable.
he O.C kc 2-98 Amendment No. SI, 77, S7, Jd
i Add The Followino To Table 2-10:
7.
Reactor Coolant System Subcooled Margin Monitor 2
(E) (F)
'8.
Core Exit Thermocouple (1) 2/ Core Quadrant (G) (H) 9.
Reactor vessel level (HJTC) (J) 2 (K)(L) l Add The Followino Footnotes To The Table:
E.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the minimum channels operable requirement, either 1.
restore the inoperable channel (s).to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or 2.
initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or 3.
be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
F.
With both channels inoperable, 1.
restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, or 2.
initiate an alternate means of monitoring the subcooled margin, or 3.
be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
G.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the minimum channels operable requirement, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
)
H.
With both channels inoperable, either restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE ststus within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
l.
With the number of OPERABLE Core Exit Thermocouple less than the four required by NUREG-0737, either restore to at least four OPERABLE channels within seven days of discovery of loss of operability, or prepare _ and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 5.9.3 within 30 days, out-lining the actions taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans for -
restoring the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status.
J.
A channel is eight sensors in a probe.
A channel is OPERABLE if four or i
more sensors, two or more in the upper four and two or more in the lower four, are OPERABLE.
j
4 K.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less_than the minimum channels-operable requirement,
- 1. ' either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days of discovery of loss of operability if repairs are feasible during poweroperation(MODE 1),or 2.
prepare and submit a special report to the Commiss' ion pursuant to Specification 5.9.3 within 30 days of discovery of loss of operability, outlining the action taken, the cause of the ineperability, and the plans for restoring the channel'to operable status.
L.
With both channels inoperable, either restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of discovery of loss of operability if repairs-are feasible during power operation (MODE 1), or 1.
initiate an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel inventory, and 2.
prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 5.9.3, within 30 days of discovcry of loss of operability,_
outlining the action taken, the cause of the 1. operability and the plans and schedules for restoring the system to OPERABLE status, and 3.
restore the system to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled Refueling Outage.
i
)
~
a t
b g
t im r
i.
e d
r 7
w e
e o
t w
t p
d u o
s nt p
n y
d ai i
c t
y a
n o
c g
e h
s ss t
t tb t
n a
g t
e u
uu u
e r
u M
p ps p
g e
e p
n n
n r
k m
n t
e i
u e
i i e i
e o
m rn p
c c
e ens c
e t o n
c n
n a
k r
k rat k
i si o
k i
k i
t c
t c
l c
u c
ut u c
t n
l e
s e
ssp e
s o
e ei y
e s
e n
i h
s h
sin h
u v
vs t
h u
h w
e c
e c
esi c
o n
l l o i
c c
c o
v r
re c
o a
ap l
c n
r l
p l
prD l
a i.
v v
i.
t a
t k
G u
e e
T e
t y h
by i
i N
S n
n n
nnH n
y al e
k c al u
y u
y I
n w
n ww n
]
rp l
ct rp c
l c
l T
a o
a oor a
p ep c
ei ep r
p r
p S
h n
h nno h
p pu y
h w pu i
p i
p E S C
K C
Kkf C
A O s C
C s Os C
A C
A T
IO F) T R
f A
NO S C N
O D y
I N
c T
A n
)
A e
d R
N u
e B O q
M H
M H
M H
H Q
H H
M H
M H
u I
I e
n L T r
i A
A F
t C T n
N o
. E C
S M
(
K U C R 3
E T S
f 3
Ci N e
I c
E R
re n e
e e
e e
e O S ao t
t t
t t
t IB F
I l i a
a a
a a
a I
A O
l t r
r r
y r
y r
r T
S E ic k
b k
b k
b f
k b
P k
b k
b E
N en c
i c
i e
i i
c i
i c
i c
i I
A.
vu e
l e
l e
l r
e l
r e
l e
l C
T.
rF h
a h
a h
a e
h a
e h
a h
a u
C C
C C
C C
V C
C V
C C
C C
N I
E E
S U C Q S E
T R
1 F
c a
F i
n l
O t
o E
w d
s i
na:
o u
t n F
o ao l
I l
N F
at c
ri e
i A
et l
a I
M "-
M n
r n
pa t n T
o e
d o O c so i,
t n
ni i
ui e
a i
ut ed ot ve tp w
g a
vn ca l r i
d r
nd l I A c au r
e a
oi a
i Vt c
e M
id V n ed a
s F
t n o
vn yr e
m aI ki l I l e D
y r
ct a
ep r
ai en oi V n t
a m
l a
l po l
s o
ae a
i o
O i.
B o y l.
ST m
l o
P t t
/
t i
i c
Vi V
ei V e n
x b
t s
Hd f s H p l
h u
u O o 0 n ao 0i C
A S
PP P a SP PP 9-0 1
2 3
12 s
1 2
2 2
2 pifjH uP,o? 4g A
Y!F i
3 m
ms.
t, e s
o c
^
r n
e f
r k s.
d u
u
,o n
de e
a s
r aS c
n r
$n c
-~
F r
r o uu m
00 is e
o fr s o 0
dl r
,O 5,
ae o a 3
g f
en yc w
fa,f s
r n.
c o
g g$
n l
o e
i v
d b
t oi g A
a C
d e
c s
h o
r f y n
o r
n n
nt
~
i sn,o o
w o
a t
f s i
e ol t
m M
e a
n n
e i a g;, K n
o, m W nn r
r rd e
on b
s
$g i
e c
sa i
jt n
r gb'r n
ih l
h ak u
a rc a
ho,, t l
a c
t r
G l
pt a
gl ap Cc 3i 1
mn s
r i
f i
w I
e oa a
e e
T v
Cd G
p S
r f Cr m
E u
e a
g, T
S S
a b
t a
b.
L DO r
^
t R
e rA T
v 4
e T
S O
y n
l C
c e
t0 n
h I
D e
- w MA d
T u
S Q
l k
t
/ R
)
A A
q ey
+
d R
e el t
e B
r "h
f u
I 0
F t
n L
I 5n A
T i
"m o
t C
A e
n T
i v;
l-o IT C
S E
eF a
(
K M
5 k r C
U e
e N
p0 0
cb 3
I R
c t
E T
nn a
n3 ei c b'O I
i l
3 C
S ao r
k hw h
ir li k
b a
E R
I l t c
i CC t o eN L
O i c e
l il B
F S
en h
a h
we k
e A
U vu C
C m
b ab T
S O
rF C
d E
E u
en 1
I S
a b
mw f
C A
ab ro 4t L
od E
L fld U
E roe Q
C eol E
S pcl e
R I
a F
M t gt nb l
nI e
oes M F l
nl n U
O
)
i e -
p M
3 u
fd h E l
I T Y il s I
c oi l
4 r
I c
pc I
M n
o u
d a
o i
I4 m
tda ree cd I
t 2
r al h i n p
l da e
t u i
i
(
r h
sdlee c
B 7
n hhs Tu A s
ccs e
A f
ase
.b D
7 i
t e
v yf s
o l
8 Ex li yh o t r JI l
2 k-e 6
rh yl tt o
s n
t eS ll n rt m
E n
S t
yh a o r o c r
rhl t umoia mY a
I h
Y O
acinn i
l{ (
re C
uaaon8rPr QEDMA1 P 0
m 3
I M
QSDMARPP 3
yE
$"@E@
O
(
ATTACHMENT C Justification and No Significant Hazards l
Consideration Discussion Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) proposes to change the Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specifications as follows. The request is to revise Section 2.15, Instrumentation and Control System, Section 2.21, Post Accident Monitoring
=!
Instrumentation, and-Section 3.1, Instrumentation and Control Systems Surveillance Requirements.
The proposed changes add Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation (ICCI) to Technical Specification 2.21, Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Added are the Heated Junction Thermocouple (HJTC) and Core Exit Thermocouple, (CET). The Subcooled Margin Monitor (SMM) is moved from Section 2.15, Instrumentation and Control to Section 2.21.
Additionally, the surveillance requirements for these components are added to Table 3-3.
This implements Item II.F.2 " Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling," as required by NRC Generic Letter No. 83-37, NUREG-0737 Technical Specif'ication, dated November 1, 1983.
Following the March 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2, many features were added to nuclear power plants to enhance the ability.of the operator to manage accidents and transients. The ICCI-System is one of these enhancements and serves to provide information to the plant operators relative to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory. The proposed change adds the ICCI System ~to the Technical Specifications to reflect its incorporation into the plant.
A st&tement concerning required number of channels is included as a footnote to Table 2-10, (item (I)).
Item (I) requires a special report to be submitted within 30 days if the number of operable channels falls below the required number of channels for greater than 7 days.
As alternate means exist for the calculation of the subcooled margin, (separate from the calculation done via the " inadequate core cooling system instrumentation"), the Specification for the Reactor Coolant System subcooled margin monitor provides an additional alternative to plant shutdown.
The action statements (as noted in footnotes E and F), allow for restoring ~ the inoperable channel (s) to operable status within 7 days, or initiating an alternate means of determining the subcooled margin, or initiating a plant shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92, the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications were assessed to determine if there was potential for a significant hazards finding.
Will the proposed change increase significantly the probability or consequences -
of any accident of malfunction of equipment previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report?
1 a--
I Attachment C (Continued) r No, the implementation of the proposed changes would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
The inadequate core cooling instrumentation system was installed in order to j
provide for the post accident monitoring of the condition of the reactar core.
The systems themselves only serve in a monitoring capacity, and do not directly control any automatic function associaied with the accident.
Failure of any portion of the system would be, first of all, controlled by the added limiting conditions for operation, assuring that the operations Staff is aware of the
)
requirements of the system. Additionally, the failure of the system would have j
no impact on the course of any accident previously analyzed in the Safety I
Analysis Report.
By adding limiting conditions for operation, the likelihood of any accident occurring with the system unavailable is lessened.
1 Will the proposed change in any way create the possibility for a new or diffarent accident than any previously analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report?
No, since the proposed change is only intended to inpose operability requirements on an existing system. The in; position of these requirements in no way creates any new or different accidents than those previously included in the Safety Analysis Report.
Does the proposed change significantly reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of the Technical Specifications?
No, because this change is intended to impose operability requirements on the Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System.
It does not lessen any requirements of the existing Technical Specifications, and hence does not reduce the margin of safety.
For the above reasons, the Omaha Public Power District does not believe that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications involve any significant l
hazards considerations.
The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the stand-ards for determining whether 3 significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (51 FR 7751) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations.
Example (ii) relates to a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications, e.g., a more stringent surveillance requirement.
The proposed change is representative of Example (ii) in that it is an addition to the post-accident monitoring instrumentation required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Post TMI Action Plan.
Based on the above discussion, the proposed change does not involve a signifi-cant hazards consideration in that it does not:
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evalua-ted; (2) create the possibility of an new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
In addition, it is concluded that:
(1) there is reasonable l
assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and that (2) these proposed Technical Specifications will not result in a condition which alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC's Final Environmental Statement.
i
)