ML20203J989

Proposed Tech Specs Re Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation

ML20203J989
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	08/05/1986
From:	OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20203J981	List: ML20203J977 ML20203J983 ML20203J989
References
TAC-62069, NUDOCS 8608060095
Download: ML20203J989 (11)

Text

4 ATTACHMENT A PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES 8608060095 DR 860805 ADOCK 05000285 PDR

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ATTACHMENT A PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES

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TABLE 2-5 Instrumentation Operatina Recuirements for Other Safety Feature Functions '

Minimum Minimum Permissible Operable Degree of Bypass No. Functional Unit Channels Redundancy Conditions 1 CEA Position Indication 1 None None Systems 2 Pressurizer Level 1 None Not Applicable

---3 Cubcooling-Margir. 1 None Not Applic=kle

---Monitos-

ac S PORV Acoustic Position l None Not Applicable Indication-Direct ac

] Safety Valve Acoustic l None Not Applicable Position Indication fr PORV/ Safety Valve Tail db i None Net Applicable

()

Pipe Temperature NOTES:

a One channel per valve.

b One RTD g for both PORV's; two RTD's, one for each code safety.

c If ite's A'is-operable, requirements of specification 2.15 are modi-fied for items 3/ and ji to " Restore inoperable channels to operability within 7 days or be in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />."

d If itemsy,V and,[5. are op,erable, requirements of specification 2.15 are modified for item,b,-to " Restore inoperable channels to oper-ability within 7 days or be in hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />."

1 Am:ndmentNo.II)3)I 2,70

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.21 Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Apolicability Applies to post-accident monitoring instrumentation not included as part of the Reactor Protective System or Engineered Safety Features.

This specification is applicable while in modes 1, 2 and 3.

Objective To assure that instrumentation necessary to monitor plant parameters during post-accident conditions is operable or that backup methods of analysis are available.

Specifications Post-accident instrumentation shall be operable as provided in Table 2-10. If the required instrumentation is not operabic, then the appropriate action specified in Table 2-10 shall be taken.

Basis Post-accident monitoring instrumentation provides information, during and following an accident, which is considered helpful to the operator p)

(

in determining the plant condition. It is desirable that this instru-mentation be operable at all times during operation of the plant.

However, none of the post-accident monitors are required for safe shutdown of the plant nor are any control or safety actions initiated by the monitors.

In general, the post-accident monitors provide wide range capabilities for parameters which are beyond the range of normal protective and control instrumentation. They also provide remote sampling and analysis capability to reduce personnel exposure under post-accident conditions. Because the information necessary to assess the effect of an accident (i.e. , core damage) can be obtained from other sources and by manual methods, it is not necessary that the post-accident monitors be operable at all times.

The Subceoled tvla 'n MonRer-(Stvir4), h Heated hdsq Thermocouple 4Harcl and 4be, Com Ed erma.ouple,s(crr) cenyriso lhe Inadt uAle & M "j

_Tndmmenkka(FICI).Sy5km. ryr43 % h"^T F 2 "I t MG -o737. The, Godo'on of As xLC1 is -to e n ha n c e. % e abiMy c[ k @n C* @.n/cr k diagnose, 4he approach to, +he exode-nce of, and +he recotery Fr. sin JCC. AddManally,

+h aJ in Jr.scting res c/n- wo/ ant in wnfoey . UThe indr:n>ents are. Included k s Technical Spc.cmea/ ions d /6C Nf CU T dieneri: Lc//er- 23-37. Thenar-ea rag equs%d by acident QnalySIS,<Or b~ing +he plant h ecM shaMeurn.

~Gt -jhe. event more Jhan pur' fenscrs ina reac/cr wssef {efe( (//JTl')chansw/stre.

'nepmth/c, mpairy 9 ordy bepc.::sih/c during lhe ned refae/aig eafage . 7his la Arava the sensors a.os accessiNe ends af/ce Yhe misSth Mic/.fS and 4ha reader-tesset Aesd cU/e frays a% rernored. If is net feasiNa lo etpzie en channe 2W Amendment No. BI, gf

L'M/I/O CC^/D/n'04's /og opggg, c2c?/ _i%st- Occi d ent /7]cni/ei-ihn ,'i7dtan>nkdik (mnf Basis ( conttnued.)

y on ,ne o ,,,,,, f "CdPl during a guegny cafys. omeggte d .shculd be mstered 4 is biopemble, oa kfe- a a scan as aaunag y pg,

.Sfafas in a refue/iny channet gsay g, am incperab/s, af /eas/ ese fp boff channe/s G slada:s during :/4e ner/ ivi enn; ca/ age.

i.utomd to operable G- 9'7a.,

TABLE 2-10 g .

.m 7 Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Operating Limits Minimum Operable Instrument Channels Action

1. Containment Wide Range Radiation Monitors (RM-091A & B) 2 (a)

2. Wide Range Noble Gas Stack Monitor RM-063L (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

RM-063M (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

RM-063H (Noble Gas Portion Only) 1 (a)

3. Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor (RM-064) 1 (a)

4. Containment Hydrogen Monitor (VA-81A & B) 2 (b)(c)

5. Containment Water Level Narrow Range (LT-599 & LT-600) 1 (d)

Wide Range (LT-387 & LT-388) 2 (b)(c)

6. Containment Wide Range Pressure 2 (b)(c)

7. RCS Sub'coled 01a.eyn mon o +oe- a is)cc'

,; 8. Gif Therrnoca ,e,s 'Z/$*, h d t.e)(c))

uw Yrcsei Levet [H /TC) zcc) cfX 9) 9.

(a ) ich the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, initiate the pre-planned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter (s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and

1. either restore the inoperable channel (s) to .0PERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or

2. prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to specification 5.9.3 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedules for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

4,,lerofcGR%f E eMnoels Isse Odo equi'el 6,y Hic **'" ] CMan2/5 #,###ye "b";remrah (b) With ene . channel inoperat>1e, restore the inoperableynonitoo) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

(c) With both channels inoperable, restore at least one channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

(d) With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels operable requirements, operation may continue until the next cold shutdown, at which time the required channel (s) shall be made operable.

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2-98 Amendment No. BI,57,(G,((

~T*ABLE :)-to ( continueg) f (1)ilh 4he nurnber of OPERRBLE channels less -lhan required by %e minimum channels operable. reQairemenis ,

inopera6le channells) lo cptrable I. eHhe.r' reshre -the Sfajas wi/hin 7 days of discoveey cf /oss of operabl/Oy' operdon i m ode 1.),or-if repairs are. le'ssible- during power a special YePort do fhe Cor>,m;gik g _ p,,,

and submii wUkin 30 dqs of discswry pur:suanf -lo SpeaGcahk 5.9.-!]2e S ac((m laken, 4hecausef cf loss cf operabili , culfinin t he.

%e plahs md schehles Q< < ester; JJte incycntbilih,amL cP4RA6LE~ s+adus.

yg4 eor fo ai#er restore he inprahit dmnnetcs)

(3) (j)i{h both cita.nnels i.noftntblL,sMus [IMede t), ov >

wiihin la CP&RA8LC.

if repaies are. Qasible durin3 powe< cparakn ,,

allen 1ak me%d of moato,.7, p,g ,,g I. .Tnisiale, an ~

hweeluy, nd d % -!se Gmmissan pursuad s&al af g_

pe smd. suwit a whtjuh Bo Q' ksc.eneoff/re -tAtf duew f specif;:esRen 59.3 the actsn la 4p p , aufand ;q lano pand sekdala k ra'fsring #>e

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ineparal2ih&o,ffLd8C fu s , a n a-q,je,,,

to d Me ned Scbdukd j

3, G 7,.,e /),e sy ens % CP&O98 d 4 M afacCay su@e.

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. TABLE 3-3 (Continued) .

G MINTMLE! FRFQlfENCIES FOR CllECKS. CAI.IBRATIONS AND TESTING

% 0F MISCELLANE0tlS INSTHIRIENTATION AND CONTROLS d

P, u

P Surveillance to Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method

?

Check M Channel check.

,g 19 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Calibrate R Known pressure inputs.

ed Mender

20. Subcooling Margin Meter Check M Channel check.

Calibrate R Known pressure inputs and known resistance substituted for RTD inputs.

Y M Channel check.

g

's 21. PORV Operation sud Acoustic Check

Position Indication Calibrate R Apply acoustic input.

Verify R Operation on emergency power supply.

22. PORV Block Valve Operation Check Q Cycle valve.

and Position Indication Calibrate R Check valve stroke against limit switch position.

Verify R Operability on emergency power supply.

23 Safety Valve Acoustic Check M Circuit check.

Position Indication Calibrate H Apply acoustic input.

214 PORV/ Safety Valve Tail Check M Circuit check.

Pipe Temperature Calibrate R Apply known input.

s s> C' .

t TABLE 3-3 (Continued) .

Mittit10M FREQUEllCIES FOR CilECKS, Call 8 RAT 10flS AND TESTlilG OF T115CELLAflEOUS IllSTRf1ENTATI0fl Atl0 Cor4TROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Syyveillance Method YIT-6287A&B (N 243I ' NII3 ) a. Check S a. Comparison of readings from redun-dant channels.

b. Calibrate Q b. Gas calibration.

a . c/w=/c. ^4 a. Gmpa<rson of ceas.*n3= Am.

30. Core EL t+ rherirwegk:, redundant channels Y b. Calibwb R b. Calibec% of AfD cono.L ees en o Q - Quarterly win known vollage 3 " * * * -

S - Each Shift D - Daily M - llonthly A - Annually

> R - 18 months l P - Prior to each startup if not performed within previous week.

g- PM - Prior to scheduled cold leg cooldown below 3000F; monthly whenever temperature remains below 300of and

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g reactor vessel head is installed.

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a. checa. M a- C'"P"** A ""#"3 %

7[31. kealed Junchm 7hermoco+ redundad channels (YE -IlGA and YE-Ilb6)

b. CaI,%6m of A/O conwJers w'h I s. Cat,% Is R I

known oolge sources.

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Attachment B Justification and No Significant Hazards Consideration Discussion Omaha Public Power District (0 PPD) proposes to change the Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specifications as follows. The request is to revise Section 2.15, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Section 2.21, Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, and Section 3.1, Instrumentation and Control Systems Surveillance Requirements The proposed changes add Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation (ICCI) to Technical Specification 2.21, Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Added are the Heated Junction Thermocouples (HJTC) and Core Exit Thermocouples, (CET). The Subcooled Margin Monitor (SMM) is moved from Section 2.15, Instrumentation and Control to Section 2.21. Additionally, the surveillance requirements for these components are added to Table 3-3. This implements Item II.F.2 " Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling," as required by NRC Generic Letter No. 83-37, NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications, dated November 1, 1983.

Following the March 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2, many features were added to nuclear power plants to enhance the ability of the operator to manage accidents and transients. The ICCI System is one of these enhancements and serves to provide information to the plant operators relative to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory. The proposed change adds the ICCI System to the Technical Specifications to reflect its incorporation into the plant.

The following Significant Hazards Considerations discussion is prcvided in conjunction with this application.

1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability of consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No. ,

The Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation (ICCI) system is neither credited nor required in the mitigation of any previously evaluated accident and is not relied upon for reactor trip or initiation of any plant safety systems. Therefore, the proposed change does not affect the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

Although the HJTC is utilized in the Emergency Operating Procedures for corroboration of selected indications, no change to normal operating procedures is involved; thus no new path is created which may lead to a new or different kind of accident. The proposed change is intended solely to

Attachment B (continued) enhance the ability of the operator to manage accidents and transients by providing the operator with additional corroborative information. i

3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The specific purpose of the purposed amendment is to enhance accident and transient monitoring capability and therefore to increase the margin of safety.

The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the stand-ards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (51 FR 7751) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations. Example (ii) relates to a change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications, e.g., a more stringent surveillance requirement. The proposed change is representative of Example (ii) in that it is an addition to the post-accident monitoring instrumentation required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Post TMI Action Plan.

Based on the above discussion, the proposed change does not involve a signifi-cant hazards consideration in that it does not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evalua-ted; (2) create the possibility of an new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. In addition, it is concluded that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and that (2) these proposed technical specifications will not result in a condition which alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.

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