ML20215L173
| ML20215L173 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1986 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2450, NUDOCS 8610280515 | |
| Download: ML20215L173 (27) | |
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October 11, 1986
SUMMARY
/ MINUTES ACRS REACTOR OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE WASHINGTON, D. C.
AUGUST 4, 1986 A meeting was held by the Reactor Operations Subcommittee on August 4, 1986. Notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on July 22, 1986 (Attachment A). The schedule of items covered in the meeting is in Attachment B. The list of attendees is in Attachment C.
A list of the meeting handouts is in Attachment D. The handouts are filed with the office copy. Herman Alderman was the Designated ACRS Staff Member. The meeting was convened at 1:00 p.m.
Principal Attendees ACRS Members Cognizant ACRS Staff Engineer J. Ebersole, Subcommittee Chairman Herman Aldeman C. Michelson C. Wylie Consumers Powere R. Reed F. Buckman NRC Staff E. Jordan D. Allison J. Rosenthal A. Bourvia M. Wegner H. Bailey E. Weiss K. Jabbour E. Licitra R. Johns D. Mcdonald V. Panciera G. Knighton B. Sharp J. Sheetz 8610280515 861011 h fj O PDR A ,
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Reactor Opsrations Mtg. 2 August 4, 1986 Opening Statement - Subcommittee Chairman J. Ebersole Subcommittee Chairman introduced the ACRS Members who were present. He noted the purpose of the meeting was to review recent operating events at operating plants. He noted that the subcomittee had received a request from Dr. Fred Buckman of Consumers Power for time to make a presentation with Consumers Power's views on the May 19th event.
The Subcommittee was asked if anyone desired to make any coments at this time. Following a negative response, Mr. Ebersole called up Dr.
Buckman of Consumers Power for the first presentation.
F. .Buckman, V.P. , Nuclear Operations, Consumers Power Company Dr. Buckman referred to a presentation by the Augmented Inspection Team on the May 19th, 1986 reactor trip at the Palisades Plant before the Reactor Operations Subcommittee on June 6, 1986.
Dr. Buckman noted that his purpose was to provide an overview of Palisades operating performance and to discuss the current activities dealing with the May 19th trip. By way of background, he presented some of the history of the Palisades Plant.
o Palisades is the first Combustion Engineering unit to be built in the United States.
o Bechtel was the architect engineer.
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. l R: actor Operations Mtg. 3 August 4, 1986 o Construction started in 1967, and commercial generation was in 1971.
o A 100 percent power licensee was granted in October of 1973, and 100 percent power was achieved in March 1973.
Significant tube leaks were experienced in January 1973, and August 1973. The plant was shut down from August 1973 to April 1975, to investigate the extent of corrosion and the types of corrosion taking place in the steam generators. The plant was returned to service in April 1975 with about 3,000 tubes plugged out of a total of 17,000 tubes in the steam generators.
From April of 1975 until November 1977 the plant had a good history of operation. In November 1977, the Palisades Plant was authorized to increase the power level to 2,530 megawatts which is about a 15 percent increase from its original authorized level.
From November 1977 on, the plant continued to operate fairly well until 1979 and 1980, when there were some disturbing errors with regard to the positioning of valves and controls in the power plant.
Dr. Buckman noted that in March 1981, Consumers Power started on a regulatory performance improvement program, the purpose of which was to develop a program and to upgrade the overall performance of the plant staff to a point where the company was pleased with both the economic performance and the performance from a human or operator perfonnance point of view.
Reactor Operations Mtg. 4 August 4, 1986 Mr. Ebersole asked what was the nature of the aberations the valve positioning.
Dr. Buckman replied the first event concerned a containment isolation valve that was mispositioned. It was a valve that was supposed to be locked closed and it was found locked open.
Another one involved the timing of a suction valve from the safety injection refueling water storage tank. The wrong valve was inadver-tently timed. A valve that was supposed to remain open during power operation was closed.
Another operation involved the inadvertent separation of the D.C.
batteries from the plant for about 55 minutes. This happened during the process of doing surveillance on the generators.
Dr. Buckman noted that the program was for about 22 months and lasted until 1982.
Dr. Buckman mentioned two events that took place in 1983 and 1984 which were significant with regard to the overall trend and performance at Palisades.
The plant was shut down from August 1983 to November 1984 due to signif-icant cracking of steam generator tubes. During this outage, in August 1984, Consumers Power decided to stop construction of the Midland Plants. Dr. Buckman noted that he believed the decision to stop
Reactor Operations Mtg. 5 August 4, 1986 construction had a strong negative effect on the morale of the people in nuclear operations throughout the company. He noted the combination of these two events led to a period of low morale and high employee turn-over.
Dr. Buckman noted that a new management team was installed at Palisades-in November 1984. This new management team consisted of a new plant' manager and a whole line of supervisors below plant managers.
Dr. Buckman went on to list some indication of performance between 1984 and now.
'k He noted that there was about a 10 percent turnover in personnel'in 1984 and about 17 percent in 1985. He correlated much of the poor perfor-J mance with a loss of morale and the need to replace a lot of skilled people with relatively inexperienced replacements.
He noted that the availability factor has been showing a slight generh1
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increasing trend.
He noted that unplanned challenges to safety systems was eight in 1984, 15 in 1985, and 13 in 1986. He stated that these numbers are higher than the industry average and causes Consumer Power to look at the condition of the plant, plant maintenance and be concerned about what they should be doing about it.
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Reactor Operations Mtg. 6 August 4, 1986 Dr. Buckman noted that the biggest problem he has is in the work order and maintenance backlog. In December of 1984 the backlog was about 2500 work orders. During an INP0 assistance visit, the management was infomed that there was a lot of maintenance to be performed that was
, not documented. Consumers set up a team to inspect the plant and list all the maintenance to be performed. The number of outstanding work orders increased to about 4000. Right now it is down to about 1400.
Dr. Buckman noted that they were making progress on control room defi-ciencies. In 1985 there were about 160 control room deficiencies. At the end of 1985 there were about 80. The present total is about 30.
It is expected that the number will be about 10 at the end of the current outage.
Dr. Buckman indicated that considerable progress had been made in terms of corrective actions.
In summary, Dr. Buckman noted some positive aspects of improvements at Palisades, o There is a substantive reduction in the number of contaminated areas in the plant o Employee turnover has been stabilized o There are improvements in plant production i.e., capacity factor, generating capacity and heat rate
R actor Operations Mtg. 7 August 4, 1986 He concluded with -- Palisades has been through a lull in performance.
Its performance is improving and continues to improve and I (Dr.
Buckman) am committed to make it one of the best plants in the United States.
LaSalle 2 Feedwater Transient without a Reactor Scram - A. Bournia Prior to the LaSalle 2 presentation, Mr. Jordan introduced Jack Rosenthal as the new Branch Chief for the Events Analysis Branch. He noted the appointment was effective on September 30th.
Mr. Bournia noted that this event occurred at 4.21 a.m. on June 21st.
The LaSalle 2 experienced a reactor low-level transient which went below the scram setpoints with no scram occurring.
New level switches had been installed in this plant to meet the Environ-mental Qualification rule. During this event the water level fell. The operators initiated the motor driven main feed pump to ameliorate the excursion. Indications were that the water level had reached near the trip point. The on coming shift realized that the reactor water level fell below the normal reactor trip set point without scram.
The initiator for this event was a turbine load at 90 percent and a governor valve that opened for no apparent reason.
R: actor Optrations Mtg. 8 August 4, 1986 The trip setpoint is nomally at 12 and the water level dropped below the setpoint for about a minute and a quarter and approached about six inches.
Mr. Ebersole asked what would happen if the water level continued to decrease. Mr. Bournia responded then it would reach a lower trip level.
This would be on other switches.
An augmented inspection team was set up to investigate this incident, and a confirmation letter was sent to the licensee prohibiting startup -
of !! nits 1 and 2 until this problem can be resolved.
The licensee tested these switches and found at ambient conditions that there was a variation in the setpoint.
The problem has turned out that these differential pressure switches stick and sometimes it is hard to get them to operate. There is appar-ent friction of-the cross-shaft due to the bearings as the seals, or a combination of both.
The licensee has proposed to recalibrate all these switches so that this will ensure that the switches will trip within the technical specifica-tions. This is the short term remedy. The long term remedy is to replace them with switches that won't be subject to similar problems.
MSIV Sprino Failures at Femi 2 - M. Wegner IAE
Reactor Operations Mtg. 9 August 4, 1986 In May 1986, during local leak rate testing, Fermi 2 reported finding 3 inner springs from one valve and one inner spring from another MSIV cracked. It was later determined to be a generic problem applicable to several BWRs and PWR.
The significance is that, in BWR's, slower closing speed could occur and the valves may not remain seated following closure. In PWR's closure of the reverse flow valve (which is spring - closed) could be affected.
Mr. Michelson asked what would happen in a BWR if all four springs were broken? Mr. Wegner replied that it wouldn't affect it.
Mr. Ebersole asked about the production of these springs whether or not there was some deviation in the production to cause the cracking.
Mr. Johns replied for the hundreds of springs produced, these four failed springs are the only four that have been recorded as failed.
Turkey Point 3 and 4, Potential Failure of All Emergency Diesel Genera-tors, June 13, 1986 - H. Bailey, I&E The problem as stated by Mr. Bailey is that multiple design deficiencies in the Turkey Point Electrical Distribution System have the potential for failure of both diesels. These deficiencies could result in a loss of all onsite AC power in the event of a loss of offsite power.
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Reactor Operations Mtg. 10 August 4, 1986 4
The motor control center "D" swing bus has a non-safety related stub bus with single breaker isolation. This could result in overloading of both emergency diesel generators.
Five deficiencies have been identified that could contribute to over-loading of both EDG's.
o Post TMI Emergency operating procedures require an additional charging pump and a high head safety injection pump in a 30 minute and 30 to 60 min. loading interval respectively.
o Actual cooling water pump (CCW and ICW) loads are higher than '
expected. Scrre increase is due to only one train in opera-tion.
o Equipment qualification evaluation have assumed containment coolers operate longer than before.
o Transformer losses were not adequately accounted for in previous evaluation.
Followup for this event include:
o The swing buses,were disabled and a dedicated operator used to manipulate breakers for the short term with unit 4 in cold shutdown.
o The EDG loads were reduced, the loading sequences were changed and plant procedures were revised, o NRC has reviewed qualification for continued operation of unit 3.
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Reactor Operations Mtg. 11 August 4, 1986 o Unit 4 is shutdown until the above items have been completed.
Mr. Ebersole asked how long has this wiring configuration existed. Mr.
Bailey replied since the plant was originally built.
Inadequate Design of PWR Safety Injection Pump Minimum Flow Paths July 24 and 25, 1986, Point Beach - H. Bailey, I&E This event concerned a potential loss of safety injection pump minimum flow path due to signal failure vulnerability. The significance is that it is a potential loss of all high head safety injection pumps during a small-break LOCA.
Mr. Ebersole asked how many plants were involved. Mr. Bailey replied that so far they had identified four.
The first was on July 24th last year. The Point Beach Plant submitted a part 21 report describing this design deficiency.
The system has two safety injection pumps that take suction from the basic acid tanks and the refuelling water storage tank. They discharge to the reactor coolant system. They have a recirculation line with an orfice. The recirculation lines are tied together. The path back to the refueling water storage tank has two air operated valves in series.
l The concern is that if you have a small break LOCA and the reactor coolant system pressure is above the shut off head or above the head of l
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Reactor Op; rations Mtg.
12 August 4, 1986 these pumps when it is getting minimum flow, and one of these valves were to fail, then you could damage or destroy both pumps.
Mr. Ebersole asked if the bypass flow was left on, would you get ade-ouate flow even though the bypass flow is still occurring. Mr. Bailey replied in the affirmative.
Mr. Bailey noted the reason for the valves was that when recirculating from the sump the valves close to prevent contaminated water being sent to the refueling water storage tank. The inadvertent closure of these valves was not considered in the design reviews.
Mr. Bailey also pointed out that these air operated valves are supplied air through solenoid valves, and if you lost either the power to the solenoid, or the air itself, the valve would fail closed. In addition
, if you lost power to the solenoid, the same power loss would cause you to lose indication in the control room.
The fix for this problem is disable these valves and block them open.
In the event they need to be closed for sump recirculation, an operator will be sent to manually close the valve, Perry Nuclear Plant, Fire in the Condenser Off Gas Beds, June 20 -E.
Weiss, I&E i
l This event began with a test of the room chillers for the off gas system. A number of portable electric heaters were installed in the
Reactor Op rations Mtg. 13 August 4, 1986 vault room that contained the charcoal beds. Mr. Weiss pointed out that there is no water deluge system available to stop fires in these beds.
He also noted that if the plant had operated for some time there would have been a release of radioactivity from these beds.
There are two trains and each train has four beds. The plant noticed that there was an elevated temperature in bed number 14, which is the third bed in the train. Temperatures of the order of 1300 degrees F.
were noted.
The licensee decided to use nitrogen to purge the system and extinguish the fire. The purging went on for about 14 days, and then on July 6th they noted high temperatures again and had to extinguish a fire once more.
Charcoal has low thermal conductivity, so that with a reading of 1300 degrees in the center, two feet out you can have a reading of 150 degrees. It is possible to have local hot spots.
i The minimum ignition temperature is lowered by the initial ignition l
l process. The lower flow rates used for this test also lower the ig-l nition temperature.
Perry has issued a detailed report regarding this event, i
Scram Solenoid Valves, Vermont Yankee - Eric Weiss i
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Reactor Operations Mtg. 14 August 4, 1986
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Mr. Weiss discussed a problem with the scram solenoid valves at Vermont Yankee. On June 14th they discovered that one rod failed to move and five rods hesitated for a period of about five seconds before moving because of problems with the scram solenoids.
The primary cause for this event is attributed to manufacturing defects of rebuilt kits to refurbish the scram solenoid valves. It also indicates a certain inadequacy in the post-maintenance testing of these scram solenoid valves and it is at least theoretically possible that if one had enough rods stuck in ad,iacent positions that you might con-ceivably or hypothetically induce core damage.
The plant had performed scram time tests following a system hydro and in these tests they discovered one stuck rod and others that were delayed.
All of the scram solenoids had been rebuilt for normal preventive maintenance. At this plant, they do them all once every five years.
One rod failed to scram due to a spring on a plunger assembly being out of place. Another one hesitated because it had its diaphragm installed backwards and four others hesitated due to diaphragm on the core
- assembly being incorrect.
Mr. Wiess noted that one of the rubber diaphragms was installed back-wards. He noted that there was an obvious right way to install them.
This raises questions about the post maintenance testing.
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Reactor Operations Mtg. 15 August 4, 1986 During the rebuild all of the "0" rings as well as the rubber diaphragms were replaced. The build kits came with a plunger assembly and on the end of the plunger assembly is a nylon needle. In this particular case the needle was an incorrect size.
Since the problem was with the rebuilding of the scram solenods with bad kits, the question arose could anyone else have received a bad set of kits. About 300 kits were shipped by ASCO as coninercial grade items to General Electric and then General Electric shipped them to customers as nuclear grade. G.E. had only about 200 of the kits left, so the remain-ing kits are out in the industry.
Mr. Weiss stated that NRC is preparing an information notice. General Electric has issued a rapid information communication service informa-tion letter.
Catawba Unit 1, Degradation of Auxiliary Feedwater System, June 22 - K.
Jabbour This event concerned fuse failures that resulted in degradation of both trains of electric motor driven auxiliary feedwater systems. The significance of this event is the potential for common mode failure in protection systems logic circuits. It has generic implication for other plants using the same fuses.
On June 22, 1986, the plant was in hot shutdown. The loss of main feed pumps and main feedwater isolation provided a demand signal for the
Reactor Operations Mtg. 16 August 4, 1986 auxiliary feedwater system. In "A" auxiliary feedwater pump did not start. Some of the "A" valves failed to reposition. This was due to a mechanical failure of a fuse on the "A" train. A Train "B" pump started but the runout protection valve failed to close. That failure was traced to a fuse failure but that failure was caused by overcurrent.
One of the significant things about this event is that when they looked at fuses that had never been placed in service, in the warehouse, they exhibited the same kind of mechanical failures that these fuses did.
The mechanical failures were that the solder connection that held the wire in place was not a good connection. They were not good mechanical connections.
As a followup Region 2 and NRR are following up on this event and any generic implication.
, The licensee is doing a weekly surveillance of these fuses and will l
check if they need replacement or not. This will continue until they have a program in place to ensure the reliability of the fuses.
l Catawba Unit 2, Multiple Deficiencies in Remote Shutdown Capability That Caused Depressurization and a Severe Cooldown Transient, June 27, 1986 -
K. Jabbour l
This event concerned inadequate procedures, training and mislabeled controls which resulted in a severe transient during a test of the remote shutdown panel.
Reactor Operations Mtg. 17 August 4, 1986 The PORV's at Catawba Unit 2 were upgraded to safety grades. As part of that upgrade, the procedures, training and controls should have been implemented as part of that upgrade.
The safety significance of the event is it showed that the capability of the remote shutdown capability at Catawba was degraded and also it caused a rapid cooldown and depressurization of the primary system.
In the upgrade from Unit I to Unit 2 the mode of the controller of the PORV's was slightly different. At Unit I the controller controlled the pressure setpoint of the PORV. When the PORV's were changed to safety grade, the controllers were changed from a pressure setpoint to a valve position. The face of the controller was changed in the control room but not at the remote shutdown station.
The procedures were not changed. One of the steps in the procedure called setting the PORV for 1125 psig. Under a pressure setpoint controller, this would assure the valve didn't open. With the modifica-tions, 1125 psig opened the valve.75 percent of its travel.
So when they started the test, the PORV's went to 75 percent open, whereas they should have remained shut.
The operator, not realizing the change in the mode of operation but realizing the PORV's were open, tried to raise the setpoint. By raising the setpoint he opened the valves even further.
R: actor Op; rations Mtg. 18 August 4, 1986 When the operators saw that things were getting out of hand, then they transferred control back to the control room, and automatic initiation of the safety injection system occurred.
This transient lasted for about six minutes.
An augmented inspection team is scheduled for this event.
BWR's - Residual Heat Removal Pump / Wear Ring Failures - Followup - R.
Herrmann, NRR Mr. Herrmann discussed wearing failures on the lower and upper impellers and at the pump casing. Cracking has been observed on the lower wear rings but not the upper wear rings.
The wear rings are made out of a hardened 410 Martensitic stainless steel and they seem to have a cracking problem in a boiling water environment which is slightly acidic and elevated temperature.
The problem is that pump testing doesn't show if the problem exists, the only way to determine its existence is to visually inspect the wear rings.
Possible solutions are to use a lower hardness wear ring, change the inpeller or don't use a wear ring.
Reactor Trip with Complications, Palo Verde, July 12 - M. Licitra, NRR I
Reactor Operations Mtg. 19 August 4, 1986 )
l The event concerned complications following a reactor trip. The signif-icance involves recurrence of previous problems encountered during power ascension testing; and challenges to safety systems.
The reactor was at 100 percent power when they had a trip due to reactor coolant system low flow indications on two of four channels. A turbine trip followed the reactor trip. Due to the turbine trip, they had a slight dip in grid voltage and because of the dip in grid voltage they lost all the non-essential loaks except for the reactor coolant system pumps.
The reason they didn't lose the pumps is they were in a slightly differ-ent circuit so that there was a time delay and before the signal reached the pumps the voltage went back up.
Because of the loss of non-essential loads, certain things happened that made the trip more complicated.
The charging pump tripped due to low suction pressure. This occurred i
because the level indicator failed low because of loss of electric power. Failure of the level indicator caused a signal to close the valve to the volume control tank and opening a valve to the refueling water tank. The signal never got to the valve to the refuelling water tank so both valves closed.
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Reactor Operations Mtg. 20 ;
August 4, 1986 The control room recognized the problem and were able to open the valves and start all the pumps. They determined one pump was running but not flowing. That pump was turned off.
The next thing that occurred is they got a safety injection and contain-ment isolation. This was caused by the drain tank valve being open due to these events. This led to a direct path for the steam into the condensor and overcooling.
Next they got a main steam isolation actuation due to the pressure going down in the steam generator. The diagnosis took about seven minutes and the recovery was complete with an hour and one half.
Follow up actions included:
o Order voltage trip was reduced from about 4 percent decay to about 7 percent decay, o The charging pump that failed was disassembled and the air space vented. The pump has performed and functioned properly.
o The open valve that caused overcooling has been isolated until a permanent fix is detemined.
o Region 5, NRR, I&E and the licensee are still trying to evaluate this event.
The following events were selected for full Comittee discussion.
. Reactor Operations Mtg. 21 August 4, 1986
. 2. Inadequate design of ECCS minimum flow paths.
The meeting was adjourned at 5:40 p.m.
NOTE: A transcript of the meeting is available in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. or can be purchased from ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 N. Capitol Street, Washington, D. C. 20001(202)347-3700.
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- A'ITAONENT A Fed rst Register / Vol. 51, No.140 / Tuisday July 22, 1988 / Notices 26?l8 Chairman's ruling on requests for the .
s He man Alderman (telephone 202/634-cnd the time allotted therefor can be - opportunity to present oral statements
. cbt Ined by a prepaid telephone call to~ 1414) between 8:15 A.M. and 5:00 P.M.- and the time allotted therefor can be Persons planning to attend this meeting th2 cognizant ACRS staff member, Mr.- obtained by a prepaid telephone call to '
are urged to contact the above named ,
Elpidio Igne (telephone 202/634-1414) the cognizant ACRS staff member. Mr. - '
between 8:15 A.M. and 500 P.M. Personr individual one or two days before theRichard Major (telephone 202/634-1414) -
scheduled meeting to be advised of any between 8:15 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. Persons, plinning to attend this meeting are changes in schedule, etc., which may urBed to contact the above named planning to attend this meeting are individual one or two days before the have occurred. urged to contact the above named scheduled meeting to be advised of any Dated: July 10.1986. individual one or two days before the changes in sched'de, etc., which may Morton W. UbarVin 0 i**0 *I**Y '
' Assistant Executive Directorfor Project *Ch'0*\'O MI"8 '* O'.,*w'hich may changes in schedule.etc Review, have occurred.
Ditid: July 17,198tk Morton W. Ubarkin, . [m Doc 86-16451 Filed 7-21-86: 8:45 em] Dated: July 17,198e,*
A ssillont En ecutive Directorfor Project on.Lmo coca noe.es-ar -- -
Morton W. Uberkin.
Review. .
Assistant. Executive Directorfor Project
[W Doc. 8616447 Filed 7-21-ast 545 am}Advisory . Committee on Reactor g, yj,,,,,
causo coot rse*me Safeguards; Subcommittee on (FR Doc. 86-16449 Fued 7-21-a0: 845 am)
Reliability Assurance; Meeting eme -
Advisory Committee on Reactor The ACRS Subcommittee on ,
Safeguards; Subcommittee on Reactor. Reliability Assurance will hold a [ Docket No. 50-373 and 50-374)
O tion MeetinI meeting on August 5,198f,, Room 1046, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC. Commonwealth Edison Co.; La Sage Tha ACRS Subcommittee on Reactor The entire meeting wili be open to County Station, Unita 1 and 2; Denial of Oper-tions will hold a meeting on- public attendance. Amendments to Facility Operating August 4.1986, Room 104a.1717 H The agenda for the subject meeting Ucense and Opportunity for Heartng Street, NW., Washington. DC.
ne entire meeting will be open to shall be as follows:
%e U.S. Nuclear Regulatory public attendance. Tuesdoy, August 5,1936-&J0 A.E Commission (the Commission) has UnuMe Conclusion ofBusiness denied in part requests by the licensee
' sh be as foi ows. ne Subcommittee will review the i r amendments to Facility Operating August 4.1986--1mP.M until final resolution of USI A-46," Seismic Ucense Nos.NPF-11 and NPF-18, issued Monday,lusion the conc ofbusiness Qualification of Equipment in Operating to the Commonwealth Edison Company (licensee), for operation of the La Salle ne Subcommittee will review recent- . Plants."
hear a briefing The Program by the Vendor Subcommittee will also County Station, Units 1 and 2 located in events at operating plants. Branch NRC's Office of Inspection and Oral statements may be presented by La Salle County, Illinois.The Notice of Enforcement on the status of a generic Cons,deration i ofIssuance of members of the public with the check valve program. Amendments was published in the concurrence of the Subcommittee Oral statements may be presented by Federal Registee on April 9,1986 (51 FR Chairman: written statements will be members of the public with the cceepted and made available to the 12247).
Committee. Recordings will be permitted concurrence of the Subcommittee The amendments proposed by the caly during those portions of the Chairman: written statements will be licensee would change the Technical accepted and made avellable to the meeting when a transcript is being kept. Committee. Recordings will be permitted Specifications:(a)To add cnd questions may be asked only by in fire zones 2C.4C2,3C,4C3 end 6E fire to detectors m1mbers of the Subcommittee,its only during those portions of the Unit 1 to demonstrate compliance with meeting when a transcript is beirg kept, Operating Ucense NPF-11 Ucense consuhants, and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify and questions may be asked only by Condition 2.C.(25)(c): and (b) for Units i the ACRS staff membernamed below as members of the Subcommittee,its and :: to delete the Action Statement consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring f;r in advance as is practicable so that to make oral statements should notify 3.3.7.9b.The licensee's reason for this cppropriate arrangements can be made. proposed item b change is that: a) they During the initial portion of the the ACRS staff member named below as will have the required special fire watch far in advance as is practicable so that patrol at least once per hour in each mieting, the Subcommittee may appropriate arrangements can be made, such area with a deficient number of fire sxchange preliminary views regarding During the initial portion of the mztters to be considered during the detection instruments, and b) this meeting, the Subcommittee, along with change is consistent with the Ceneral b lance of the meeting.ne any of its consultants who may be Subcommittee will then hear Electric (GE) Standard Technical present.may exchange preliminary Specifications (STS). However, the presentations by and hold discussions views regarding matters to be with representatives of the NRC Staff presence of the required special fire considered during the balance of the end other interested persons regarding watch (3.3.7.9a) does not address the meeting. requifement for returning instruments to this review. ne Subcommittee will then hear Further information regardmg top 8cs operable status or submitting a Special to be discussed, whether the meeting presentations by and hold discussions Report to describe the actions taken to with representatives of the NRC Staff, restore the operability, the cause of the has been cancelled oe rescheduled, the its consultants, and other interested Chiirman's ruling on requests for the Inoperability, and plans and schedufe persons regarding this review. for restoring the instruments status if cpportunity to present oral statements Further infonnation regarding topics instruments are not operable after 14 end the time allotted therefor can be to be discussed, whether the meeting ebtained by a prepaid telephone call to has been cancelled or rescheduled, the daye. In addition, the proposed change the cognizant ACRS staff member, Mr.
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. .. ATTAGNENT B AGENDA FOR ACRS Meeting on August 4, 1986 1:00 p.m.
Room 1046, H Street -
SPECIAL PRESENTATION Palisades - Frederick W. Buckman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations Department, Consumers Power RECENT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Presenter / Office Date Plant Event Telephone Page 6/1/86 LaSalle 2 Feedwater Transient without A. Bournia, NRR Reactor Scram 28698 5/86 Fermi 2 MSIV Spring Failures M. Wegner, IE 8 24511 6/10/86 Turkey Pt. 3&4 Potential Failure of All H. Bailey, IE /3 Emergency Diesel Generators 29006 6/25/86 Inadequate Design of PWR H. Bailey, IE /7 Safety Injection Minimum Flow 29006 6/20/86 Perry Fire in Charcoal Offgas Beds E. Weiss, IE /f 29005 6/14/86 Vermont Yankee Problems with Scram Solenoid E. Weiss, IE 23 Valves 29005 l 6/22/86 Catawta 1 Degradation of Aux. Feedwater K. Jabbcur, NRR af System 27367 6/27/86 Catawba 2 Multiple Deficiencies In K. Jabbour, NRR A (p Remote Shutdown Capability 27367 Cause Depressurization &
Cooldown Transient 11/2/85 BWRs-Residual Heat Removal R. Hermann, NRR 37 Pump / Wear Ring Failures - 27798
- l. Followup 7/12/86 Palo Verde 1 Reactor Trip w/ complications E. Licitra, NRR 27 28599 OTHER ITEMS OF INTEREST 5/14/86 Improper Use of Heat Shrink- R. Hernan, NRR 32 able Tubing on Elec. Cables 29519
ATTAONENT C ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON REACTOR OPERATIONS--
10CAkl0:l: ROOM 1046, 1717 H St. NN., Washington, D.C.
AkJGUST 4,1986 DATE:
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AC,RS SU,B, COMMITTEE MEETING ON REACIDR OPERATION 1_ _ _
LOCATIOlh ROOM 1046,1717 H St. NW., Washington, D.C.
DATE: AUGUST 4, 1986 ATTENDANCE LIST PLEASE PRINT:
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HANDOUTS SEE ATTAONENT B FOR LIST OF RECEMr SIGNIFICAVf EVEhTS