ML20154A899
| ML20154A899 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Palisades, Perry, Prairie Island, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1988 |
| From: | Lanning W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| OREM-88-018, OREM-88-18, NUDOCS 8805160228 | |
| Download: ML20154A899 (19) | |
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, a l gpy 0 4 W MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING May 3, 1988 - MEETIliG 88 18 On May 3, 1988 an Operating Reactors Events meeting (88 18) was held to brief senior managers from NRR, RES, AE00 and Regional Offices on events which
- occurred since our last meeting on April 26, 1988. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.
The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 presents a report-to-date of long-term followup assignments and a sumary of reactor scrams. Two significant events were identified for input to NRC's performance indicator program. One event was suggested for long-term followup, enie;;.c/,s?;cadby ' n;;. D. etiw j Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
l As stated ! l cc w/Enclo.: ; See Next Page ' DISTRIBUTION W l
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NAME :MLRetrdoh WL&nrfin : : : : : DATE :05/0_3 /88 :05/ 9 /88 : : : : : OFFICIAL RECORD COPY ! 8805160228 880504 PDR ORG NRRB PDR _ - - _ - - - . ~ , _ _ _ _ _ _._
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CC: T. Murley,12G-18 J. Sniezek, 12G-18 F. Miraglia,12G-18 J. Forsyth, INP0 E. Jordan, AEOD M. Harper, EWS-263 E. Beckjord, NL-007 H. Pastis, 14H-25 W. Russell, PI T. Colburn, 13E-21 B. Davis, RIII K. Perkins, 13E-?1 J. Nelson Grace, PII 0. Dilanni, 13H-15 R. D. Martin, RIV M. Virgilio, 13H-15 J. B. Martin, PV T. Wambach, 13H-15 W. Kane, RI L. Reyes, RII E. Greenman, RIII J. Callan, RIV D. Kirsch, RV S. Varga, 14E 4 D. Crutchfield, 13A-P B. Boger, 14A-2 G. Lainas, 14H-3 G. Holahan, 13E-4 L. Shao, 8E-2 J. Partlow, 9A-2 B. Grimes, 9A-2 F. Congel, 10E-4 E. Weiss, AE00 S. Black, 12E-4 T. Martin, 12G-18 J. Stone, 90-4 R. Hernan, 13H-3 H. Bailey, AE00 J. Guttmann, SECY A. Thadani, 7E d S. Pubin, AE00 i a 4 l 4 l l 4 l
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w u ie 4;2 MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclece Reactor Regulation FROM: Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Franch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING May 3, 1988 - MEETING 88-18 On May 3,1988 an Operating Reactors Events meeting (88-18) was held to brief senior managers from NPR, RES, AE00 and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on April 26, 1988. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1. The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 presents a report-to-date of long-term followup assignments and a sunrnary of reactor scrams. Two significant events were identified for input to NRC's performance indicator program. One event was suggested for long-tem followup. l . a e l'anning, Chi E nts Assessment nch Division of Operationa Events Assessment i Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/Encio.: See Next Page j I
ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BPIEFING (88-18) May 3, 1988 NAME ORGANI7ATION NAME ORGANIZATION W. Lanning NRR/00EA P. Baranowsky NRR/DOEA M.L. Reardon NRR/DOEA R. Lobel NRR/DOEA C. Schulten NRR/DOEA C. Miller OCM/FB K. Perkins NPR/PD3-3 E. Jordan AE0D B. Boger NRR/ADRI F. Miraglia NRR/PD2-3 Y. Benaroya AE00/DSP H. Pastis -NRR/PD2-3 G. Klingler NRR/PMAS 0. Muller NRR/PD3-1 J. Clifford EDO D. Dilanni NRR/PD3-1 J. Roe NRR/DLPQ M. Callahan GPA/CA B. Grimes NRR/DRIS T. Wambach NRR/DRSP J. Zwolinski NRR/DLPQ C. Ader OCM/TR F. Rosa NRR/SELB J.P. Gwynn OMC/LZ C. Berlinger NRR/DOEA T.C. Elsasser OCM/MC C.E. Rossi NRR/00EA T. Silko NPR/DOEA i l O I O
ENCLOSURE-2 OPERATING PEACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 88-18 EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH
~
LOCATION:- 12-B-1) WHITE FLINI TUESDAY, MAY 03, 1988, 11:00 A.M. THIS INFORMATION MAY ALSO BE OBTAINED BY DIALING EXTENSION'21449, OCONEE 2 POWER CIRCulT BREAKER PROBLEM PERRY 1 LOSS OF FEEDWATER/HPCS OUT OF SERVICE PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 & 2 ESF BUS DEGRADATION WITH DG OUT PAllSADES 1 FAILURE OF UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP BREAKER
.' AND OTHER UNRELATED EVENTS 9
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- 88-18 l OCONEE UNIT ? )
POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER PROBLEMS l APP!L 26, 1988 ' PROBLEM l NEW SWITCHYARD POWER CIRCUIT-FREAKERS ENABLED THE EMERGENCY POWER SWITCHING LOGIC TO BE DEFEATED GAEEE OVERSIZED CIRCUIT BREAKER (COGENEL) CAPACITORS SET UP INDUCTIVE AND CAPACITIVE RESONANCE RESULTING IN A HIGH VOLTAGE ON THE SECONDARY SIDE OF THE STARTl!P TRANSFORMER SIGNIFICANCE A FALSE FAULT INDICATION IN THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER COINCIDENT WITH A REACTOR TRIP WILL PREVENT THE EMERGENCY POWER SWITCHING LOGIC (EPSL) FROM PICKING UP ITS EMERGENCY POWER SOURCES, DISCUSSION o OCONEE SYSTEM PLANNING DEPARTMENT CHANGED OUT A NUMBER OF POWER , CIRCulT BREAKERS (PCB) IN FAVOR OF PCB'S WITH HIGHER FAULT INTERRUPTING DUTIES IN ANTICIPATION OF INCREASED GRID GENERATION CAPABILITY, o APR!L 4, 1988 UNIT 2 STARTUP WITH COGENEL PCB'S, llNIT 3 IN SHUTDOWN, ITS" PCB"S ARE ITE PCBs. UNIT 1 IS OPERATING, HALF ITS' PCB'S ARE ' COGENEL'S, o APRIL 26, 1988 WORKERS IN THE SWITCHYARD QUESTION THE LOUD HUMMING NOISE COMING FROM THE UNIT 2 (CT2) STARTilP TRANSFORMER WHEN THEY KNOW IT'S #0kER CIRCulT BREAKERS ARE LOCKED OUT.. , o OCONEE DETERMINES THAT A HIGH VOLTAGE EXIST ON THE SECONDARY SIDE OF ; THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER, o ENGINEERING EVALUATION DETERMINES THAT THE CAPACITOR ACROSS THE COGENEL PCB ARE PASSING EN0 UGH CURRENT TO SET UP A C a L RESONANCE WITH THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER WHICH ESTABLISH A LARGE VOLTAGE ON THE SECONDARY SIDE OF THE TRANSFORMER, CONTACTi R. SCHOLL
REFERENCE:
50.72 # 12124
. ' BRIEFING: OCONEE 0 It'MEDI ATE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN BY LICENSEE TO LINE UP THE UNIT 3 STARTUP TRANSFORMER TO UNIT 2. o LICENSEE STATED THAT UNIT 3 WILL NOT BE RESTARTED IINTIL THE l' NIT 2 PCE ARE AVAILABLE TO BE RETllRNED TO SERVICE, o POST-INSTALLATION SYSTEM TESTING DID NOT IDENTIFY THE DESIGN PROBLEM, FOLI.0WUP SELB HAS THE LEAD FOR FOLLOWUP. l j l l l
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88 .18 PERRY 1 LOSS OF FEEDWATER/HPCS OUT OF' SERVICE , APRIL 27, 1988 PROBLEM LOSS OF FEEDWATER WITH HPCS OllT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE, MLSE HUMAN ERROR WHILE RESTORING NORMAL ELECTRICAL SUPPLY TO BUS. SIGNIFICANCE PRECURSOR TO SERIOUS EVENT, LOSS OF FEEDWATER AND SCRAM WITH REDUCED MITIGATING CAPABILITY, DISCUSSION ; o PLANT OPERATING AT 100% POWER, o HPCS OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE, o OPERATOR MADE SEQUENCING ERROR WHEN TRYING TO RESTORE NORMAL ELECTRICAL SUPPLY TO BUS, i o HOT SURGE TANK LEVEL CONTROLLER OUTPUT DROPPED TO ZER0 AND TANK ! LEVEL CONTROL VALVE WENT FULLY CLOSED, o FEEDWATER B0OSTER PUMPS TRIPPED ON LOW HOT SURGE TANK LEVEL, o MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS TRIPPED BECAUSE INTERLOCLED WITH FEEDWATER , B00 STER PUPPS, ; o IN ABOUT 20 SECONDS WATER LEVEL DECREASED TO 88 INCH, SCRAM INITI ATED AT LEVEL 3. RCIC INITIATED AT LEVEL 2. HPCS WOULD HAVE ' BEEN INITIAE D AT LEVEL 2 BUT WAS OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE, i e RCIC SYSTEM RESTORED REACTOR WATER LEVEL TO NORMAL LEVEL IN l ) APPR0XIMATELY 25 MINilTES, RCIC SYSTEM FLOW RATE ABOUT 700 GPM, ! FOLLOWUP REGION WILL REVIEW THE LICENSEE'S POST SCRAM EVALUATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION, CONTACTi T. GREENE
REFERENCE:
50,72 # 12136 l i
- 88-18 PRAIPIE ISLAND 1 8 2 ESF BUS DEGRADATION WITH DG OUT APRIL 26, 1988 PROBLEM SINGLE FAILURE (FUSE) RENDERS ONE ESF. BUS IN0PERABLE, M!1E '
, IMPROPER MAINTENANCF ACTION BLOWS D.C. CONTROL POWER FUSE. SIGNIFICANCE THE AFFECTED BUS COULD NOT BE ENERGIZED BY EITHER THE EMERGENCY DIESEL OR OFFSITE POWER, DISCUSSION
! o ON APRIL 26, 1988 PRAIRIE ISLAND UNITS 1 8 2 AT 100% POWER, ,
I o SITE HAS TWO EMERGENCY DIESELS WHICH ARE SHARED BETWEEN BOTH UNITS. o NUMBER 2 DIESEL OFF LINE FOR ANNUAL PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE, o TECHNICIAN BLEW A D.C. CONTROL CIRCUIT FUSE RENDERING AUT0 SEQUENCING i 0F DIESEL #2'S LOADS TO THE ESF BUS OR AN ALTERNATE BUS INOPERABLE, i o THIS FAILURE COULD ALSO DISABLE FAST TRANSFER OF THE ESF BUS TO 0FFSITE POWER. MANUAL CONTROL WAS STILL AVAILABLE. ! c D.C. CONTROL POWER RESTORED IN 20 MINUTES, o SIMILAR EVENT OCCURRED LAST OCTOBER DURING P.M. ON #1 DIESEL. o THIS PLANT IS SIMILAR IN EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION TO OTHERS OF ITS VINTAGE, E'.'G' , TURKEY POINT AND POINT BEACH, o CONDUCT OF DIESEL PM WITH BOTH UNITS AT POWER IS LEAST RISK SCENARIO, i n
? ADDITIONAL SAFETY GRADE DIESELS WILL BE INSTALLED TO COMPLY U!TH THE BLACK 0UT RULE, 2 NON-SAFETY GRADE DIESELS ARE BEING INSTALLED NOW,
. FOLLOWUP NONE
. CONTACT: R. KARSCH
REFERENCE:
50,72 # 12123, MORNING REPORT 04/28/88 4
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- 88-18 PALISADES 1 FAILURE OF REACTOR TRIP BREAKER APRIL 28, 1988 PROBLEM o All Uf;PECOVERABLE DROPPED ROD FORCED A PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM 100% POWER, o Dl: RING PLANT SHUTDOWfi, EQUIPMENT FAILURE ERROR RESilLTED Ifl THE CPENIfiG OF THE #6 HP FEEDWATER HEATER SAFETY RELIEF AND GPERATOR ERROR RESULTED IN THE OVER FLOWING 0F COnLING TOWER BASIN, o IN PREPARATION FOR STARTUP, A TEST OF ONE OF THE MANUAL RX TRIP PUSH BUTTCNS FAILED TO OPEN THE UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP BREAKER, fSLEE o CAUSE OF THE DROPPED R0D HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED, o ROOT CAUSE FAILURE OF THE UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP ATTACHMENT IS STILL UNDER INVESTIGATION, SIGNIFICANCE o DROPPED ROD IS AN ANALYZED EVENT WITH MIN! MAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE, c THE OPERATOR ERRORS, ALTHOUGH DISCONCERTING, DID NOT RESULT IN ANY PERSONAL INJURIES OR CONTAMINATION, o THE FAILURE OF THE UNDERVOL TAGE RELAY IS A FAILURE OF THE BACKUP REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM, DISCllSS10N o ON APRIL 27, 1988 THE #6 CONTROL R0D DROPPED DUE TO AN UNDETERMINED CAUSE; PLANT RESPONSE NORMAL ' DROPPED R0D AND FLUX TILT ALARMS RECEIVED)'Atb OPERATOR ACTION WAC PROMPT AND CORRECT, o WHILE SHUTTING DOWfl (TURBINE OFF-LI1E) THE MSR DRAIN LINE VALVES FAILED TO PROPERLY CLOSE RESULTING IN THE OVERPRESSURIZAT!0fl 0F THE
#6 HP FEEDilATER HEATER. THIS FAILURE WAS DUE TO AN IMPROPERLY CAllBRATED E-P CONVERTER, o OVERFILLING OF THE COOLING TOWER BASIN DUE TO OPERATOR ACTION RESULTED IN WATER BEING INTRODUCED TO THE RADWASTE BLDG (THIS IS A RECURRING PROBLEM),
CONTACT: T. SILK 0
REFERENCE:
50,72s # 12133, 12137, AND MORNING REPORT 04/28/88
. ' BRIEFING : PALISADES -0 LICENSEE REPLACED BOTH UV BREAKERS, o UV BREAKER FAILED DllE T0 THE UV C0ll BEING If1 PROPERLY M0llNTED ALLOUiNG C0IL TO ROTATE RATHER THAN TO GENERATE A TRIP.- ROOT CAUSE UNDETERMINED, o SECOND UV BREAKER ANALYZED AND NO DEFICIENCIES WERE IDENTIFIED.
o LICENSEE REPLACED THE CRD PACKAGE AND ALL CRD CABLING / CONNECTIONS WITHIN CONTAINMENT. o LICENSEE INITIATED CLEANUP OF RADWASTE BLDG AND FW HEATER AREA, FOLLOWUP EAB DISCUSSING EVENT WITH FORT CALHOUN TO SEE IF SIMILAR PROBLEM EXISTS, ; I i I 1 . e 4 l i
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'liClis,B FERFCMANCC !NTf!CATO:5 515NIFICANT EVChis FLA%T NA"E E',E N T E'iENTCESCA!PTICN GTR SIGNIFICANCE
! ATE DCC%EE C 04/26/53 SWITCHYAID M DIFICATICN EESULTED IN THE FOTENTIAL FCR A 1 FOTENTIAL FCR CR ACTUAL CESPACATICN SIN 5LE FAILUCE TO FRE'viNT AUTC?ATIC !U3 TRAh!FER TO CF SAFETf-FELATEC EGulF?ENT E"EESENCY FCsER 5'AECES.
F0I%i !!?CH 1 04/C9/i3 A'TC=ATIC J liCLATICN CF CCNTAlk'ENT FUC.5E SLFFLY AhD 170 TENT!?L FCR OR ACTL'AL CEBRADATICN EIWAUST VALV!5 INACJERIENTLY v TA53ED CUT CUR.NG GEFLELINS. OF CChTAIA"Ehi CR SAFET H ELATED STRUCTUFE3 i
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l _ gnra rr 3 Pnv 3. 1CW STATts FE7fT<T EN LOGTE7f1 FQ1CMfG f6SICMD E(GLG3 C7AFiVIEW (tXED TIPE IPJ POME) FDJTR.Y fCTIVITIES LOG 1 Eft 1 Fri i rLAJS LOGTEFt1 FCL1.Q4.FS LOGTEFt1 FalCWfS (CTIOG ADDED FCTIO&3 C&FLETED Trif417ATIOJ CFEATER TWeJ 6 PC. 3 TO 6 PC. LESS Twel 3 FO. tiw lo8B TOY 19% f_ ECD 0 0 1 0 0 . Efe 0 0 1 0 0 . i I EEB 0 0 1 0 0 . OfrB C 1 1 0 0 . FIEB C 0 1 0 0 . ICSB 0 2 0 0 0 . OTSB 0 1 0 0 0 . F00-2 1 0 0 0 0 . F02-3 1 0 0 0 0 . t FO*-2 1 ,, 0 0 0 0 . f FO5 0 2 0 0 0 . Riff 0 0 1 0 0 . { RV!B 1 4 1 0 0 . 4 ElB 1 3 2 0 0 . S._{CB 0 0 1 0 0 . EtB 3 0 1 0 n , i EXB 1 2 2 0 0 . , TOTft. 9 15 13 0 0 . POTE: Ni evient assigned for Interm follw my have teen assitpsd to cru1tiple trarctes ed a single TfC my have been assiqped to similar ervants at truttiple plants, i.e. , TfC #6T44 we assigne.4 to Wfe , ad SICS fcr rets at Ee.sver Valley 2 Calvert Clif fs 2, and Fwcto Seco 1. i
7,ge n . t 6310?/88 ' SUGLESTER LLhGTIH TOLLCmdP BAIf CF PLAsi HAT ha 081I 515h1FICANT Int!!AL IDLLLhi,P ASSl&Wilti SUGGESTES $[50 Lull 04 $UGCI57 [li[CIE L T6AmVER 10: CCnPLE!!Cn (ht s! Ev[tf , DATE FOLLOWUP 0F LUBE OIL STRAINER NRR/SPLB 06/29/87 BEAVER VALLEY 2 F. DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE DUE TO LUBE STRAINER F0lf ING AT BEAVER VALLEY 2 & ASSESS THE POTENTIAL GENERIC SAF[TY IMPLICAT10ftS AND DETERMINE THE NEED FOR GENERIC C0ffiUNICATION
, ISSUANCE.
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O REA:70R SCRA9 SLMMARY
- W:EK EN3!h5 05/01/23
- 1. PLANT SPECIFIC CATA
; ATE SITE LNIT FCtER SlihAL CAUSE CCMFL!- YTD YTD YTD CATIChi AB0VE EEL;d TOTAL 151 !!!
04/27/!! CALVERT CLIFFS 2 100 A Uhth;s4 h2 2 0 2 04/23/53FER:( ; 100 A FER30hNEL hD 1 0 1 C4/30/!9 HOFE CFEEE 1 55 M EGV!FREhi h3 1 1 2 04/30/ii HA:DA". HECK 1 60 A Lain:sN hD 1 2 3 04/!0/E! FERRY 1 2A FEA5:hhEL kl 0 2 2
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- 1. PLANT SPECIFIC OATA SASEC Ch INITIAL REVIE!! 0F 5C.71 REPORTS ,
FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD !! MIONIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT: SUNDAY SCRA1:5 ARE DEF:NED AS REACTOR- PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RFC'JLT IN ROD MOTION. AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS A! PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDAhCE WITH A PLANT PROCECURE. THERE ARE 109 REACTORS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE. 1
- 2. -COMPLICATIONS: REC 0VERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UhRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAMi i
- 3. PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES. AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.
- 4. "0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL :
CAUSES (LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE. t i l S l l I - l I, . i}}