ML20214U384
| ML20214U384 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1986 |
| From: | Murphy M, Russell J, Touchstone C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214G966 | List:
|
| References | |
| 301.14-SQN, 301.14-SQN-R02, 301.14-SQN-R2, NUDOCS 8612090253 | |
| Download: ML20214U384 (8) | |
Text
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
301.14-SQN l
SPECIAL PROGRAN i
REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Element REVISION NUMBER: 2 l
TITLE: Malfunction of Doors
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REASON FOR REVISION:
L Revised to incorporate SRP comments and Revision 1 SQN Corrective Action Response, j
Revision to clarify corrective action Revision 2 L
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PREPARED BY:
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CONCURRENCES 8612090253 861124
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//-/8-86 N/A ECSP HANAGEK' DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE i
CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
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- SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files, l
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLAhT l
EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP f
OPERATIONS k
CEG Subcategory: Mechanical Equipment Reliability / Design Element: Malfunction of Doors Report Number:
301.14 - SQN (Revision 2)
IN-86-137-005 i
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Revision 2 I.
Malfunction of Doors This report expands on findings of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN)
Generic Concerns Task Force (GCTF) Report--IN-86-137-005 (Reference 1), which. evaluated the issues concerning air lock doors A56 and A57 at SQN.
II.
Specific Evaluation Methodology A review of the K-Forms (Reference 2) was conducted to evaluate the scope of this element. SQN GCTF Report IN-86-137-005 was reviewed to determine adequacy of evaluation.
Historical information such as engineering change notices (ECNs) reviewed are listed in Section VI.
Interviews included personnel in Mechanical Modifications, Industrial Safety, and Design Services. The following concern was evaluated:
IN-86-137-005 Doors A56 and A57 between the control room and Auxiliary Building malfunction every three or four days. CI was told that several individuals at Sequoyah (names not given) had been injured as a result of these same doors malfunctioning. CI questioned actions (or lack thereof) to prevent this from occurring at WBN.
Note: A determination was made based on Reference 3, that the above concern should be read " service building" instead of " control room."
III. Findings Doors A56 and A57 form the air-lock between the auxiliary and service buildings and provide secondary containment isolation, fire barrier, flood protection, and equipment / personnel access.
SQN GCTF Report IN-86-137-005, (Reference 1) evaluated the issues concerning doors A56 and A57. The report's conclusions were:
1.
Injuries associated with doors A56 and A57 have occurred at SQN.
2.
Doore A56 and A57 are high maintenance doors at SQN.
The report also gave the following recommendations:
1.
TVA Design Organization, SQN, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) need to jointly evaluate the access problem (s).
2.
Future modifications to the doors should not be made until the joint evaluation has been performed.
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Revision 2 The report noted that WBN has air-lock doors which are operated using a mechanical operator; however, SQN requires manual operation but has plans to modify their system with a mechanical operator in the future.
ECN-5855 is pending for these modifications. The GCTF also states that a search for Potentially Reportable Occurrences (PRO's) associated with doors A56 and A57 did not reveal any problems that could be associated with violations of the auxiliary building isolation system.
A followup evaluation by this evaluator included a review of ECN-5855 status, and interviews with SQN individuals in Safety, Mechanical Modifications, and Design Services.
1.
ECN-5855 " Modify Doors A56, A57, and A58 as required to withstand High Frequancy Use "
(Reference 3).
There were five (5) workplans (WPs) found against this ECN, two of which are complete:
WP-10628 Complete, October 1983 - Addition of a dp light to warn personnel of high differential pressure between Auxiliary and Service Buildings.
WP-11577 Complete April 1985 - Remove plaster in Auxiliary Building air-lock to allow installation of door operator.
WP-11586 Install door A56 and associated equipment.
WP-11587 Install door A57 and associated equipment.
WP-11654 Install electrical part of doors A56 and A57.
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2.
Interviews a.
Mechanical Modifications i
Discussed the door situation with cognizant engineer j
responsible for modifications and author of WPs 11586 and i
11587. He noted these workplans are in the approval cycle but are basically awaiting scheduling of the work. He agreed with recommendation number one in Section III; however, with respect to recommendation number 2, he noted that some work has already started such as previously mentioned WP-11577.
The engineer noted that an informal coordination effort with WBN is presently underway to assess problems with doors A56 and A57 operation. He mentioned that SQN individuals from Safety, Design Services, and Mechanical i
Modifications (including himself), observed problems with WBN doors during a "walkthrough" in July 1986. He commented that the vendor. OVERLY, has not yet been awarded the contract to fix WBN doors though it is expected. The doors delivered at SQN are also by OVERLY and thus SQN would likely need assistance from vendor with modification.
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Industrial Safety Discussion verified coordination of SQN with WBN.
Individual mentioned the July 1986 "walkthrough" discussed above. Several problems were observed with WBN doors such as: doors woald not close, door-dogs came out, parts of the emergency stops safety-switch failed to stop doors while in travel, and the air cylinders cycled with violent surges until the door had to be stopped for fear of damage to the system. The safety individual commented that when these doors function as designed, they are safe. ' Asked what SQN should do, he said that it would be to SQNs advantage to install the new doors and resolve peckless learned from WBN during the present. outage. The safety individual made a list of recommendations (Reference 4) for SQN based on observation of the WBN doors.
i c.
Design Services This individual was also involved in the July 1966 "walkthrough" at WBN and emphasized that SQN must continue to coordinate with WBN in order to gain from experiences there. He noted that the frame alignment for door A57 was a major problem at WBN as observed by SQN and WBN personnel l
and identified by OVERLY and that SQN should definitely i.
keep this fact in mind. The design individual suggested the door modifications be done for SQN during the.present outage.
Conclusions Concern IN-86-137-005 is valid as summarized in Reference 1 and Section III of this repert due to the safety and maintenance aspects of the air-lock door operation.
1 Presently, SQN Nechanical Modifications, Safety, and Design Services personnel are coordinating with WBN to identify operational problems with the doors. This effort will be of value to SQN as they prepare to install their mechanically operated system. There was no evidence found that the auxiliary building isolation function was cumpromised due to door operation problems.
IV.
Root Cause The A56/A57 air-lock is a complex system that requires consideration of safety and operational aspects. Problems with air-lock operation and safety will be minimized only when the system is fully installed and successfully tested.
V.
Generic Applicability Element 301.14 evaluates problem with door lock operation at WBN.
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Revision 2 VI.
Referenecs 1.
TVA - SQN Generic Concern Task Force (GCTF) Report IN-06-137-005,
" Auxiliary Building Doors A56 and A57," Revision 1, May 19, 1986 2.
K-Form, IN-86-137-005 3.
SQN - Engineering Change Notice (ECN) - 5855, " Modify Doors A56, A57, and A58 as Required to Withstand High Frequency Usage,"
July 25, 1983 l
4.
Meeting Notes - SQN Observation of WBN Door A56/A57 Operation, July 1986 s
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R:visicn 2 VII. Immediate and Long-Term Corrective Action SQN Correction action response is as follows:
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Closure of ECN-5855 should resolve the operational and industrial safety lR2 problems associated with the A56/A57 doors. SQN workplans 11586 and i
11587 laplement construction associated with ECN-5855 and have a l
scheduled early start date of October 9, 1986. Corrective Action l
Tracking Document (CATD) 30114-SQN-01 tracks this issue.
l Furthermore, SQN notes that required surveillances have been performed I
as required by Technical Specifications demonstrating the ability of l
l the existing door to maintain its secondary containment function.
IR2 Appropriate post-modification testing requirements will be incorporated l into all workplans which will assure new door functions as required.
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REFERENCE
- ECPS12OJ-ECPS121C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY PAGE OFFICE OF NMCLEAR PONER RUN TIME - 12:
0" FREQUENCY
- REQUEST EWLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
RUN DATE - 10/
ONP - IS$$ - RHM LIST OF EWLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: OP PLANT OPER. SUPPORT SURCATE00RY: 30114 MALFUNCTION OF D0 ORS KEYWORD A S
DENERIC H
APPL STC/NSRS P
KEYHORD B CONCERN SUB R PLT 53$H INVESTIGATION CONCERN KEYNORD C O
NUMBER CAT CAT D LOC FL43 REPORT R
DESCRIPTION KEYWORD D IN 137-005 OP. 30114 N H3N NNYN NS DOORS AS4 S A57 BETWEEN TME CONTROL SAFETY PROGRAM ROOM AND AUX. BLDG. MALFUNCTION EVER SAFETY CONDITIOL T50249 K-FORM Y 3 OR 4 DAYS. CI HAS TOLD THAT SEV CONSTRUCTION i
O ERAL IN0!VIDUALS AT SEQUOYAH (NAMES EMPLOYEES NOT GIVEN) MAD BEEN INJURED AS A RES ULT OF THESE SAME DOORS MALFUNCTIONI NO.
CI QUESTIONED ACTIONS (OR LACK Q
THEREOF) TO PREVENT THIS FROM OCCURR ING AT H5NP. NUCLEAR P0HER DEPARTME NT CONCERN. NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATI DN AVAILABLE IN FILE. NO FOLLON UP Q
REQUIRED.
1 1 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY OP SUBCATEGORY 30114 O
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