ML20214U341
| ML20214U341 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1986 |
| From: | Murphy M, Russell J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214G966 | List:
|
| References | |
| 301.01-SQN, 301.01-SQN-R02, 301.01-SQN-R2, NUDOCS 8612090232 | |
| Download: ML20214U341 (13) | |
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. TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 301.01-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER: 2 TITLE: Kerotest Valve Leakage and Corrosion REASON POR REVIEION:
To incorporate Senior Review Panel (SRP) Comunents Revision 1 To incorporate SQN Corrective Action Response Revision 2 PREPA** TION PREPARED B*i:
-f S. T. McComb 11-13-86 SIGNATURE DATE
, REVIEWE J/fl b-)$-S b
/ / SIGNATURE DATE tt Y SIONATURE
/t/nb6 DATE conCuna-M h$ , r .CEG-K:_ ..*s UfN SRP: mans 4 E"i //*E *8S SIONATURE DATE SIGNATURE
- DATE APPROVED BY:
Y ANl lbfD*80 N/A ECSP MANAdtk DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
*SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.
2288T ,
j , o i TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP OPERATIONS CEG P Subcategory: Nechanical Equipment Reliability / Design (301) Element: Eerotest Valve Leakage And Corrosion Report Number: 301.01-SQN Revision 2 RI-85-045-003 IN-85-594-001 IN-86-285-001 II-85-090-001 II-85-090-002 Evaluator: Scott McComb 11-13-86 Date Reviewed by: / / # // //-/f-fd oes CEo er Date Approved by: . - me 1/-/3-36 W. R. Lage(gken Date 1601T
Revision 2 I. Kerotest Valves Leakage and Corrosion This report evaluates the use of Korotest valves in CSSC systems at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The five employee concerns which address this problem have identified Sequoyah (SQN), Watts Bar (WBN), and Bellefonte Nuclear Plants (BLN). The concerns IN-86-285-001, IN-85-594-001, XX-85 990-001, and EX-85-085-003 are considered generically applicable to SQN. The NSRS reported on the " Generic Implications of Watts Bar Kerotest Valve Problems on SQN" (I-85-861-SQN, Revision 1) when they investigated concern XX-85-090-002. In all cases, these valves were reported to have leakage, corrosion, and seating problems. II. Specific Evaluation Methodology A. Concerns / Perceived Problems The five employee concerns evaluated in this report are as follows: IN-86-285-001: " Watts Bar unit 1 & 2. Globe valves (Kerotest) were received from vendor in a corroded condition due to vendor's hydro of valve and inadequate drying. These valves leaked after installation. A generic NCR was written to correct this problem but the full implementation of the NCR disposition is questionable. Raamples of the systems with these valves are: CVCS, Safety Injection RHR & Reactor Coolant. Construction Dept. Concern. CI has no further information." IN-85-594-001: "3/4" Kerotest valve (possibly globe) 30 valves inspected with a 90% reject rate - bearings were missing / busted / frozen. These valves were installed throughout the site (units 1 & 2) and all may net have been identified as evidence of an NCR, hold tags, or further investigations was not known. (Names / details known to QTC)" XX-85-090-002: "Sequoyah: Unit 1 and 2. Per CI TVA used globe valves (Kerotest) extensively in both plants Watts Bar and Bellefonte and had leakage & corrosion problems. CI questions the usage of these valves at Sequoyah - the sister plant - for leakage & corrosion problems. The systems to be checked as examples are CVCS, Safety Injection, RHR & Reactor Collant, etc. CI has no further information. Nuc Power Concern." i Page 1 of 9
, I Revision 2
- v. XX-85-090-001: "Bellefonte all units. The globe valves (kerotest) need to be checked for corrosion & leakage due to vendors hydro and inadequate drying. Examples of these systems are: CVCS, Safety Injection RHR, Reactor Coolant. CI stated this problem has existed for six years. Construction Dept.
Concern. CI has no further information." EX-85-085-003: "Kerotest valves are extremely poor. They seldom seat properly. Construction Dept. Concern. CI has no additional information. B. Methodology The evaluation of these concerns, the associated NSRS evaluation, and line response concentrate on five aspects.
- 1. The validity of the concern.
- 2. The adequacy of the NSRS evaluation report and the roccamendations contained therein.
- 3. Verification of the line response and corrective action taken by line management.
- 4. The adequacy of corrective action to resolve the concern and prevent recurrence.
Appropriate regulatory requirements and SQN specific procedures were reviewed to ensure programmatic compliance for safety valve availability and operability. Interviews were conducted to verify any actions required to close this issue at SQN. Revision 1 to this report to incorporate Senior Review Panel l comments was performed by an evaluator who was not part of the lR1 7 original evaluation. l
- III. Findings i A review of the referenced documents and interviews with cognizant i personnel revealed the following:
- 1. NSRS Evaluation Findings IRL The NSRS report has generated the following findings as a (R1 result of its investigation into this problem. l i
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Revision 2
)
u- - - III. Findings (continued)
- s. A problem with Kerotest valves at WBN was identified and I documented in a Division of Construction Nonconformance l !
, Report (NCR) - 2501R (Reference 2). l l l
- b. In the final report on this problem (Reference 5) the
! IRL .!
" Description of the Deficiency" identified several hundred 3/4 , l !
1 , and 2-inch valves with leakage and corrosion problems. The I i
" Safety Implications" section of the report states: l "While some of the subject Kerotest valves are installed in essential safety-related systems: CVCS, SIS, RHR, UNI, RCS. and i
CSS, operation of the valves is not required for the safe shutdown of the plant during a loss of coolant accident. As a result. TVA i could identify no valves that perform a safety function. However, ' to document this, a failure effect analysis was performed. The analysis identified no detrimental effect on plant safety as a result of the failure of any of these valves." i i The report also stated in the " Corrective Action" Section:
"TVA does not consider the valves to perform a safety function;
[ however, we do believe that the corrosion identified with the valves could result in a maintenance problem during the life of the plant. Therefore, TVA has instituted a maintenance program to dismantle, inspect, and replace parts as required for those valves installed at WBN." j In addition, the report noted the " generic applicability of the c'orrosion problem" and stated: l " Verbal discussions with personnel at SQN ladicated that during j normal disassembly for maintenance, they have identified no Kerotest valves with what they' consider escessive corrosion."
- c. The response to NCR 2501R does not address the safety l consideration of a one percent fuel failure as stated in the i safety analysis. If the valve stems leaked, and the valves l are in areas where they might inhibit personnel entry, this l In turn might impair safety functions. l lR1
- d. The letter (Reference 6) which transmitted the above report to l NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10/CFR 21 did not l mention whether the WBN procurement specification was deficient l by not requiring valve packing removal and bonnet drying after l hydrostatic testing. l Page 3 of 9
Revision 2
- e. A memorandum entitled. "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units l 1 and 2 - Deficient Kerotest Y-Type Globe Valves - Report l No. 4 (Reference 7)." responded to the commitments made l In NCR-2501 to follow up on generic implications of the l Kerotest valve failures. This memorandum stated: l l
"We have reviewed the Kerotest valve insta11stion at l Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and find that these valves' safety l function would not be compromised by problems developing l from a water saturated stem packing. Westinghouse i specified packing replacement'after hydrostatic testing l on their procurements."
l 1 f. The memorandum also stated that most of the valves at l SQN were procured by Westinghouse and implied that there I was no problem at SQN. The Westinghouse specification l applicable to these valves at SQN is G-678824 Revision 1. l Westinghouse also had an applicable cleaning and I cleanliness specification which did not specify packing l removal. The Westinghouse procured valves were dedicated l to the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS). l lR1
- s. Most of the remaining small valves not initially l purchased for SQN by Westinghouse were procured by NAVC0 l as part of the principal piping contract 71C37-92615. TVA l specification 9923 (no revision) was used on this contract. l This specification did not require that valve bonnets be l dried out or packing removed after hydrostatic tests. The l remainder was purchased directly from Kerotest on TVA l contract 79K3-824147. TVA General Specification 3640 was I made applicable to this contract. Paragraph 7.10 of this l specification requires removal of the packing after l hydrotest and that valves shall be shipped without the l packing installed.
l l
- h. A follow-on purchase of small Kerotest valves for SQN was l mede under TVA contract 84P73-836406. The specification l applicable to this contract was MEB-SS-10.19. Revision 0. l This speelfication also requires removal of the packing l sfter hydrotest and that valves shall be shipped without l the packing installed.
l Pago 4 of 9
Revision 2
- 1. Most of the Kerotest valves used at WBN were also i procured through the Westinghouse NSSS contract. Many I WBN valves were also purchased through Dravo on the l l principal piping contrhet. Dravo. In turn. Issued l purchase order (PO) E2897/98-KN-1 which included TVA i Design Specification WBNP-DS-19835-1521-CX, Revision 2 I as a technical requirement. This specification does not l require removal of the packing after hydrotest. TVA also l made a direct purchase of Kerotest valves for WBN by l contract 79EA2-824589-4. TVA General Specification 3640 l was also applicable to this contract with requirements as l l noted previously. I l
- j. A search of TVA's Equipment Identification System for l Kerotest valves installed at SQN found 1.528. two inches l 1
or less, Westinghouse purchased valves. A second search l for non-Westinghouse valves found over 500 Kerotest globe I valves installed in SQN CSSC systems. These valves are l used estensively in the ERCW system and as instrument l 1 solation valves, root valves, sample connections, vent i valves, and drain valves for other systems. l 1R1
- k. A spare Kerotest Y-type 1-inch globe valve was found in I the ECW warehouse at SQN and disassembled by Nechanical l l' Naintenance UNI). A clear 11guld that looked like water l was in the bonnet area. The bearing on the stem was l correded. Rust was visible on parts inside the bonnet. l The bearing would rotate, but it was not smooth, i Photographs were taken of the valve parts and will be l
} retained in the NSRS flies. l L l I 1. Three former TVA field inspectors agreed that packings I { were generally removed at the various suppliers because l it was good practice and not because it was stated in the l [ specifications. The asbestos / graphite packing generally l used during the time period when these valves were shipped I ' would retain water; and, hence, could cause corrosion l and/or sensure of the valve stem. Source inspection of l ' smaller valves was sometimes walved making their condition l uncertain. l
- 2. NSRS Recommendations l
- a. I-85-861-SQN-01. Rerotest Valve Inspection Perform an inspection of representative Kerotest valves at
( SQN. If corrosion is found in the stem area, or sten leakage la found, an engineering evaluation should be performed to determine the reportability and proper resolution of this I problem. It corrosion and leakage are not found, an evaluation should be performed to determine why the difference exists between WBN and SQN valves. Page 5 of 9 i
Revision 2 QR should evaluate the methods used to determine generic applicability and not rely solely on verbal information such as that received from SQN. Justification The condition of the Kerotest valves is uncertain at SQN. I steller to WBN, and potentially reportable. NCR-2501R 1 documented stellar problems at WBN. 1,523 Kerotest valves l were purchased by Westinghouse for NSSS. 500 Kerotest i valves were purchated by others for CSSC systems. lR1 1 The Westinghouse and TVA specifications are inconsistent l regarding packing removal and valve drying after i hydrotesting. l
- b. I-85-861-SQN-02, NRC Resortability SqN should provide objective evidence that the statements regarding the Westinghouse testing procedure contained requirements for drying out bonnets and/or replacement of bonnet packing after hydrotesting were actually in the applicable Westinghouse specification.
WBN should notify the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Part 21, of the root cause of the WNN valve failures. This is evidently a lack of unifore enforcement of specification requirements to be taken after hydrostatic testing, either by contract or by inspection. Just!fication A spare Kerotest Y-Type Globe Valve from Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I was disassembled and correston and rust were found inside the lR1 bonnet. l c., I-85-861-SQN-02, Analyse One Percent Fuel Failure Accident The impact of Kerotest valve stem leakage coupled with the one percent fuel failure accident atsted in the safety analysis should be investigated. Justification The response to NCR-2501R does not address the safety consideration of a one percent fuel failure as stated in the safety analysis. raie 6 of 9 I i
.i Revision 2 3.
1.ine Response to NSRS Recomunendations (Reference 9) SON Response to I-85-861-SON-01 L Based on the search of the maintenance requests (MR) flied at SQN since the plant went into operation. only one Kerotest Y-type globe valve has esperienced failure due to leakage or ! corrosion problems. Approximately 1,500 Kerotest globe valves (two-inch and under) are listed as installed at SQN. In addition, the search conducted by the NPRDS (a nationwide data-base for operating nuclear plants) reveals that only four i Kerotest valves out of over 1.600 in their data base esperienced failure due to corrosion over the past 10 years. In view of the above information, an inspection of Kerotest i valves at SQN is not warranted, and this review satisfies the IR1 requirement for an evaluation of generic applicability at SQN. l SON Ressonse to I 85-861-80N-02 i j As referenced in the N8RS report (section B.3), a memorandua j from R. W. Centre 11 to J. A. Raulston dated September 10, 1981, ! stated that " Westinghouse provided the majority of the valves ! installed in safety systems of SQN. Westinghouse specified t
- packing replacement after hydrostatic testing on their i
procurements." In additten, section B.6 of the NSES report states, " . . . purchased directly from Kerotest on TVA contract 79K3-824147. TVA General Specification 3640 was made t i applicable to this contract. paragraph 7.10 of this i specification requires removal of the packing after hydrotest i } and that valves shall be shipped without packing installed." } Section B.7 of the NSRS report aise states that a follow-up . I purchase of eas11 valves from Kerotest required removal of the l packing after hydrotest, and that valves shall be shipped without the packing installed. Based upon the above information and the information contained in the response to r i Recommendation I-85-861-SQN-01 on the essentially non-existent
- failure rate of Kerotest valves at SQN, a search to provide l
! objective evidence concerning the Westinghouse testing : j procedure is unwarranted and would provide no useful l ) information. : i s ! l } I
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- i / I' Revision 2
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SQN Response to I-85-861-SON-03
,e Thesafetyanalysisreportindicatesevidenceofseat'leakagQ,'
not stem leakage. In order to have stem leakage, both the , - - packless metal diaphragm and the stem' backup packing would have to fall. The failure analysis which was previously performed and documented identified no detrimental effect on plant' refety. as a result of the failure of any of these valves. i
/
Based on the documented results from the failure lanalytis j and the backup packing arrangement of the Kerotest valves, I lt would be both repetitious and unwarranted to further investigate this issue. ~
.1 l
- 4. Conclusions ' (
l l Based on the findings, the NSRS has substantiated,that there I is a problem with Kerotest Y-type globe valves corroding if the i packing is not removed and valve body dried after hydrotesttrg. l The findings also indicate that due to the inconsistencies of .l the purchase contracts for the Eerotest valves at Sequoyah l Nuclear Plant Lt. cannot be assured that the packing was removed I and valve body dried prior to shipping. However, only;one out' I of 1500 Kerotest globe valves installed at Sequoyak has, . / l esperienced failure due to corrosion indicates that the problem l that Watts Bar has had with Kerotest valves is not generic to IR1 Sequoyah. Therefore, this evaluation is in agreement with the ' i NSRS report I-85-861-SQN with the following addition. Dv2 to, I the inconsistencies of Kerotest purchase specifications and I purchase orders, a review of the current spectrications should I be initiated to ensure they are consistent and the requiremer.t l-is included for ensuring the valves are dey and packing is I removed after hydrotesting for future purchases. The i recommendations from these concerns do not affect the safety - t of plant and therefore should not have an impact on plant I startup. l IV. Root cause 1 l l i The root cat.se of TVA's problem with Y-type Kerotest root valves is I ' that Kerotest did not routinely change out the back-vp packing after l hydrotesting and TVA had inconsistent purchase spectrication for l ensuring the that the valves were dried out properly upon receipt. . l l V. Generic Appilcability l ! I 1 Kerotest Y-type valves were used at Watts Bar, Sequoyah, and i Bellefonte Nuclear Plants. The problem of the packing not being l removed after hydrotesting was found to esist at Watts Bee but not l i Sequoyah. Bellefonte and Browns Ferry have not as yet been evaluated I i for potential Kerotest valve problems. l 1 l 1 Page 3 of 9 l l t-
.- .__-=_- . _ . _ - _ _ - - - - - - - _ - - . - - -- > *' VI. R:fer:ncOs
- 1. NI-15.3, Revision 0. December 1984, " Maintenance Inspection and !
Repair of Kerotest Manual "Y" Globe Valves"
- 2. NCR 2501 R Revision 1, dated October 22, 1980 (801 02780 425)
- 3. NSRS Investigation Report I-85-861-SQN, Revision 1 Apell 9, 1986, " Generic Implications of Watts Bar Kerotest Valve Problems on Sequoyah"
- 4. Nemorandum from John A. Raulston, to L. M. N111s, "WBN Units 1 and i 2. Deficient Kerotest Y-Type Valves - Repert No. 4 (final) -
NCR-2501 R dated Apell 27, 1981 (810 43060 153)
- 5. Letter from L. N. Mills, to James P. O'deilly, NRC, " Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Defieleat Kerotest Y-Type Globe Valves - NCR 2501R - Final Report," dated April 24, 1981 (A27 810424 014)
- 6. Nemorandum from R. W. Cantrell, to J. A. Raulston, "Sequoyah i Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Deficient Kerotest Y-Type Globe Valves - Report No. 4 (final)," dated September 10, 1981 (810916 F0144) ,
- 7. 10CFR21. " Reporting.of Defects and Noncompliance Dated January 1, 1985
- 8. Nemorandum from N. L. Abercrombie, to R. P. Denise, dated Nay 19, !
, 1946 - Subject - Response To the Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) i Investigation Report No. I-85-861-84N R1 " Generic Impilcations of Wattr Sar Kerotest Valve Problems on SQN" VII. Immediate or Long Range Corrective Action f SQN Corrective Action Plan in response to CATD-30101-SQN-001 lR2 is as follows: l All valve standard specification issued by DNR have been revised to l l include 1) requirements for valves to be dried upon completion of hydro l i static testing, and 2) requirements that valve packing be removed before lR2 shipment. This was initiated as part of the corrective action for l 1 NCR 2501, Revision 1 dated October 22, 1980 (801 02700 425). l o I i I I i l Page 9 of 9 J [
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RE FER EttC E FREQULtJCY
- ECPS120J-ECPS121C
- REQUEST TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR PONER h $
PAGE - RUN TIME - 11n O!!P - 1555 - RHM EWLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) RUN DATE - 10/l
- LIST OF EIW'LOYEE CONCERM INFORMATION CATEGORY: OP PLAtiT OPER. SUPPORT SUBCATEGORY: 50181 KERO TEST VALVE LEAKAGE AND CORROSION
- S GENERIC KEYWORD A
,/ H APPL STC/MSRS P KEYMORD B I
C0flCERii SUB R PLT BBSN INVESTIGATION S CONCERN KEYWORD C CAT CAT D LOC FL0B REPORT R DESCRIPTION KEYNORD D I flUMBER l
# EL 085-003 OP 30101 N HBN YYYY NS KERG-TEST VALVES ARE EXTREMELY POOR. SUPPLIER l
K-FORM THEY SELDOM SEAT PROPERLY. CONSTR NONCONFORMANCE a l T50198 ' UCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI,NAS NO ADD CONSTRUCTION ITIONAL INFORMATION. VALVES
,r , , -
IN 594-001 OP 30101 N H5N YYYY's NS 3/4" KER0 TEST VALVE (POSSIBLY GLOBE) NONCONFORMANCE ! T50055 REPORT / 38 VALVES INSrECTED WITH 4-90% REJE- - CORRECTIVE ACTIO: PIPING l CT RATE- BEARINGS HERE MISSING /BUSTE B/FR0 ZEN. THESE VALVES NERE INSTALL < j VALVES ED THROUGHOUT THE SITE (UNITS 182) A.- '
- ' ND ALL MAY NOT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED 0' <
- AS EVIDENCE OF AN MCR, HOLD TAGS, OR ,
! - FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS HAS NOT KNON . i N. (NAMES / DETAILS KN0000 TO GTC) i Iti 285-000 -OP 30101 N HBN fYYY NS NATTS BAR UNIT 1 & 2. GLOBE VALVES ' N000CONFORMANCE T50200 REPORT '(KERS TEST) MERE RECEIVED FROM VENDO CORRECTIVE ACTIE
't IN A CORRODED C0 EDITION DUE TO VEN - PIPING s
2J 'S NTERO OF WALYi Allt INADEOUATE VALVES
- - '% - . THESE VALVES LEAKED ' AFTER I- - -- - -
# < NSTALLATION. A GENERIC NCR HAS HRIT
' TEN TO CORRECT THIS PROBLEM BUT THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NCR DISPD SITION IS QUESTIONABLE. EXAMPLES OF '
- THE SYSTEMS HITN THESE VALVES ARE:
t CVCS, SAFETY INJECTION, RHR, & REACT OR COOLANT. C0ftSTRUCTION DEPT. CONC
. ERII. CI NAS IIS FURTHER INFORMATION.
] XX 090-001 OP 30101 N BLN YYYY I-85-863-ISH . NS SELLEFONTE ALL UNITS. THE OLOBE VAL Il000C000FORMANCE T50200 REPORT VES(KERO TEST) NEES TO BE CHECKE9 F0 CORRECTIVE ACTIC I.
- R COAROSIGII 8 LEAEASE SUE TO VENSORS PIPIf06 TE BRYIIIG. EXAMP VALVES
'..n Lg 18Y3A0 AND INA LES OF THE SYST ARE: CVCS, SfFETY IRJECTION, RIS, REACTOR COOLANT. C I STATES TNIS PROSLEM NAS EXISTED F0
+ M. ,3,r. '
- R SIX YEARS. CSIISTRUCTI0Il SEPT. COII A QQ
' CERII4 CI NAS 110 FORTNER INFORMATION
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lit b TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY PAGE- - REFEREHCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C RUN TIME - 11: I REQUEHCY - REQUEST OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER EMPLOYEE COMCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS) RUN DATE - 10/ () ONP - 1555 - RHM LIST OF EfrLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: 0? PLANT OPER. SUPPORT SUSCATEGORY: 30181 KERS TEST VALVE LEAKAGE ANS CORROSION S GENERIC KEYWORD A g APPL STC/NSRS P KEYNORD B H BBSN INVESVISATION 5 CONCERN KEYMORD C CONCERN 3UB R PLT KEYNORD D NUMBER CAT CAT D LOC FLeB REPORT R DESCRIPTION 30101 N SQN YYYY I-85-861-59N NS SE90SYAN: UNIT 1 4 2. PER CI TVA US NONCONFORMANCE XX 090-002 OP ES OLOBE VALVES (KERS TEST) EXTENSIV CORRECTIVE ACTIO! T50198 REPORT ELY IN BOTH PLANTSS NATTS BAR AND BE OPERATIONS LLEFONTTE AND NAB LEAKAGE & CORR 0SIO VALVES g N PROBLEMS. CI GUESTIONS THE USAGE OF THESE VALVES AT SEGUOYAH - THE SI STER PLANT- FOR LEAKAGE & CORROSION g PROBLEMS. THE SYSTEMS TO BE CHECKED AS EXAMPLES ARE CVCS, SAFETY INJECT ION, RHR & REACTOR COOLANT ETC. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.- NUC PON ER CONCERN. p 5 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY OP SUBCATEGORY 30141 D D 4 9 9 9
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