ML20211C773
| ML20211C773 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 10/07/1986 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211C748 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8610220022 | |
| Download: ML20211C773 (6) | |
Text
3 ATTACHMENT I TO JPN-86-44 PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING REMOVAL OF THE RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE BYPASS VALVES NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 DPR-59 8610220022 861008 PDR ADOCK 05000333 P
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4.5 (cont'd) 3.5 (cont'd) l' 5.
All recirculation pump discha*ge valves 5.
All recirculation pump-discharge valves l
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shall be tested for operability any time the (or closed if permitted elsewhere in these reactor is in the cold condition exceeding h
shall be operable prior to reactor startup 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, if operability tests have not been specifications).
performed during the preceding 31 days.
)
6.
If the requirenents of 3.5. A cannot be met, the reactor shall be placed in the cold
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condition within 24 hr.
B.
Containment Cooling Subsystem Mode (of the RHR B.
Containment Cooling Subsystem Mode (of the RHR System)
System) 1.
Both subsystems of the containment cooling 1.
Subsystems of the containment cooling mode are tested in conjunction with the test mode, each including two RHR, one ESW pump and two RHRSW pumps shall be operable when-performed on the LPCI System and given in i
4.5.A.1.a.
b, c,
and d.
Residual heat ever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor
- vessel, prior to startup from a
cold removal service water pumps, each loop condition, and reactor coolant temperature consisting of two pumps operating in
- parallel, will be included in
- testing, 1 212*F except as specified below:
supplying 8,000 spm.
The Emergency Service Water System, each loop of which consists of a single operating emergency service water pump of 3,700 spm will be tested in accordance with Section 4.11D.
During each five-year period, an air test shall be performed on the containment spray headers and nozzles.
2.
Continued reactor operation is permissible 2.
When it is determined that one RHR pump for 30 days with one spray loop inoperable and/or one RHRSW pump of the components and with reactor water temperature greater required in 3.5.B.1 above are inoperable, the remaining redundant active components of l
than 212*F.
the containment cooling mode subsystems shall be demonstrated to be operable itunediately and daily thereafter.
8 AmendmentNo.[,
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ATTACHMENT II TO JPN-86-44 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR THE PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING REMOVAL OF THE RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE BYPASS VALVE NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY JAMES A.
FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 DPR-59
e I.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE The operability requirement for the recirculation pump discharge bypass valves.is removed from Section 3.5 A.5 on page ll5a.
The surveillance requirement for these valves is removed from Section 4.5.A.5 on the same page.
Specifically, the words "and
. bypass valves" and "and bypass" are deleted where they occur in these two sections.
II.
PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE General Electric Corporation hac strongly recommended that certain BWRs, including FitzPatrick, remove the recirculation pump discharge byprTs line.
Experience has shown that these valves are not required for the normal or emergency operation of the recirculation system.
It will be unnecessary to require
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operability and surveillance testing of these valves once they~
are removed.
In addition, intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) has been determined to be a generic problem with bypass lines in BWRs similar in design to FitzPatrick.
Removal of these lines during the January 1987 refueling outage at FitzPatrick will eliminate the possibility of cracking in this line.
III. IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE The design purpose of the recirculation discharge bypass line was to heat up an idle recirculation loop prior to startup of the recirculation pump.
The procedure for restarting an idle loop was to open the pump suction valve, and then partially open the four inch discharge bypass valvo.
This was supposed to slowly reheat the cooled down loop in order to prevent thermal shock to the recirculation pump case o,a to minimize thermal stresses on the reactor vessel nozz?us.
However, the bypass line does not adequately reheat a ecoled down loop.
The Technical Specification limit in Section 3.6.A.3 restricts starting an idle recirculation pump based upon the temperature difference between the idle loop and.the reactor vessel.
This restriction replaces the intended function of the bypass valves.
The FSAR transient and accident analyses assume the discharge j
line is isolated with the bypass valve closed.
Removal of the bypass line will absolutely assure that this assumption is true.
j The "Startup of Idle Recirculation Pump" transient described in Section 14.5.7.2 of the FitzPatrick FSAR has been reanalyzed by General. Electric in their safety evaluation (Reference 1).
It I
reads in part:
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" Analysis of the idle recirculation loop startup transient shows that the resulting response is i
affected primarily by the volume of water injected into the core and only secondarily by the temperature
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of the injected water.
Therefore, the bypass line removal is not expected to change the results of the
}
j analysis."
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Amendment No. 26 to the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications removed the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) loop selection logic (Reference 2).
An essential element of that modification is the automatic closure of the recirculation discharge and discharge bypass valves.
This would "... allow the ECCS model to take credit, in the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis, for one half of the LPCIS flow provided in the event of a single failure."
Removal of the bypass-line will not change the results of the design basis LOCA analysis.
Removal of the bypass line does not affect the other design basis accident analyses.
Operation of the FitzPatrick Plant with the recirculation discharge bypass line removed has been demonstrated by perfor-mance of Operability Test OT-2B (Reference 3).
This test verified:
- 1. The ability to isolate a recirculation pump under most normal operating conditions.
- 2. The ability to de-isolate the recirculation pump.
- 3. The ability to reliably start a recirculation pump against a closed discharge valve.
IV.
EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS Operation of the FitzPatrick' Plant in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration as stated in 10 CFR 50.92 since it would not:
1.
involve significant increase in the probability or conse-quences of an accident previously evaluated.
The'FSAR transient and accident analyses have assumed either the recirculation discharge bypass valves are initially closed, or close upon accident initiation.
Removal of the bypass line ensures that these assumptions are true.
Removal of the bypass lines also decreases the probability of a small break loss of coolant accident by eliminating potential sites for this type of accident.
2.
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The effect of the bypass line removal has been-fully evaluated and tested.
No new modes of failure could be created.
3.
involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Removal of the recirculation discharge bypass lines subject to intergranular stress corrosion cracking provide greater assurance of the reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity.
The removal also ensures bypass line isolation as assumed in the transient and accident analyses.
This change to the FitzPatrick plant increases the margin of safety.
)
. e-V.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE The' proposed change will not adversely impact the ALARA, Security or Fire Protection programs at the FitzPatrick plant, nor will it impact the environment.
VI.
CONCLUSION The change, as proposed, does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59, that is, it (a) will not increase the probability or the consequences of an accident or. malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; (b) will not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in.the safety analysis report; (c) will not reduce the margin of. safety as defined in'the basis for any technical specification; (d) does not constitute an unreviewed safety question; and (e) involves no significant hazards considerations, as defined in 10 CPR 50.92.
VII. REFERENCES
- 1. General Electric Corporation, Safety Evaluation - Recircu-lation Bypass Pipe Removal, April-21, 1977.
- 2. NRC Letter R.W.
Reid to G.T.
Berry, Amendment No. 26 to Facility Operating License - Safety Evaluation, Dated August 8,
1977.
3.
James A. FitzPatrick Operability Test Procedure OT-2B, Recirculation Four-Inch Bypass Line Removal Operational Demonstration Test, September 15, 1978.
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