ML20210S645
| ML20210S645 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07200022 |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1999 |
| From: | Gaukler P AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#399-20735 ISFSI, NUDOCS 9908180153 | |
| Download: ML20210S645 (12) | |
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DOCKETED USNRC August 6,1999 i
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 E 16 P3 :06 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFh Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board au5 In the Matter of
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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
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Docket No. 72-22-ISFSI
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(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
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APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO STATE OF UTAH'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSION OF LATE-FILED AMENDED UTAH CONTENTION O j
Applicant Private Fuel Storage L.L.C. (" Applicant" os "PFS") hereby responds to l
the " State of Utah's Request for Admission of Late-Filed Amended Utah Contention Q,"
filed July 22,1999. (" State's Request"). The State's Request should be denied, first, for l
failing to meet the requirements for late filed contentions, and second, for failing to meet the Commission's contentions requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R. 2.714.
l I.
BACKGROUND i
As part ofits June 1997 License Application, PFS included the results ofits cask vendors' analyses of vertical drops and tipover events. Sg Safety Analysis Report
("SAR") at 8.2.6 (rev. 0). Based on the license application, the State filed a contention j
(Contention Q) which alleged, in part, that PFS did not adequately identify the "most I
vulnerable fuel" analyzed in a cask drop, c.nd that PFS did not address lifting accidents.
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In its April 22,1998 decision, the Board rejected the contention in its entirety, stating that the contention and its bases I
fail to establish with specificity any genuine material dispute; impermissi-bly challenge the Commission's regulations or rulemaking-associated ge-i 9908180153 990006 I
PDR ADOCK 07200022 C
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neric determinations; lack materiality; lack adequate factual or expert opinion support, and/or fail properly to challenge the PFS application.
Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) LBP-98-7,47 NRC 142,195 (1998).
Starting in February 1998, the State's expert, Dr. Marvin Resnikoff, whose decla-ration supports the State's Request, began an exchange ofletters with the Spent Fuel Project Office' concerning the methodology developed by the Lawrence Livermore Na-tional Laboratory ("LLNL")2 for analyzing the impacts of a cask drop on fuel integrity.
As discussed in more detail below, the topic of Dr. Resnikoff's letters to the NRC Staff was how the LLNL report addressed the fuel pellet weight and the effects ofirradiated fuel cladding, the precise issues that underlie the State's Amended Contention Q.
On May 21,1999, the Spent Fuel Project Office issued Interim Staff Guidance 12
- Buckling ofIrradiated Fuel Under Drop Conditions ("lSG-12"), which recommended i
that the analysis of cask drop accidents include consideration of the effects ofirradiated
' fuel cladding and pellet weight, ISG-12. On July 22,1999, the State filed its Request, seeking admission of a contention based on the Staff's recommendations in ISG-12.
Specifically, the contention alleges that PFS is required to perform a revised analysis of fuel integrity for a vertical drop event that incorporates pellet weight and irradiated fuel i
cladding, and has failed to do so.
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' See Letter from M. Resnikoff to C. Haughney, dated February 27,1998 (attached as Exhibit 1).
2 In October 1987, LLNL released the report " Dynamic Impact Effects on Spent Fuel Assemblies", UCID-21246, that developed methodologies for analyzing the impacts of cask drops on spent fuel.
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II.
ARGUMENT The State's late-filed Amended Contention Q should not be admitted first, be-cause it does not satisfy the NRC's requirements for late-filed contentions, and second, because it seeks to require PFS to perform an analysis that is properly within the scope of the rulemaking for Holtec's certificate of compliance which, moreover, has already been 1
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I performed by Holtec.
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4 A.
The State's Request to File Amended Contention Q Is Unjustifiably Late The State must demonstrate that a balancing of the five factors set forth in 10 I
C.F.R. Q 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) supports admission ofits late-filed contention. LBP-98-7,47 NRC at 167. Since the State has failed to do so, its request for the admission of Amended Contention Q must be denied.
l The State Lacks Good Cause The first and most important factor in determining the admissibility of a late-filed claim is a showing of good cause. The State lacks good cause here because, through its expert Dr. Resnikoff, the State was aware of the LLNL methodology of analyzing cask drops, and the fact that the methodology did not address pellet weight and cladding em-i brittlement, almost 17 months before this contention was filed.3 i
The State nonetheless claims it has good cause for its late-filed contention be-1 cause of the Staffs recent issuance ofISG 12. However, the State has provided no ex-planation why its contention is dependent on information contained within ISG-12 or
' Dr. Resnikoff copied his February 27,1998 letter to Denise Chancellor, the State's Assistant Attorney General and Connie Nakahara of the Utah Division of Environmental Quality. S_ee Exhibit 1.
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t why its concerns about the LLNL methodology _ could not have been raised prior to the is-suance of1S0-12.
The State's familiarity with the concerns that ISG-12 addresses is evidenced by Dr. ResnikofT's dialogue with the Staff and the State's comments on the Holtec HI-STAR 100 ' storage casid. In Dr. Resnikoff's February 27,' 1998 letter to the NRC, he specifically questions the LLNL methodology's use of."non-irradiated fuel assemblies" and its failure L to "take into account the weight of the fuel itself." Exh. I at 2. When the Staff re-sponded that it had evaluated his concerns for a horizontal drop accident,d Dr. Resnikoff again wrote the Staff, stating they "did not fully address [his] concems" and requested
- that they further evaluate the effects ofirradiation and pellet weight on the fuel integrity during a drop event.' The State's prior knowledge of the LLNL report and the concems addressed by the Staffin ISG-12 is further illustrated by the State's March 26,1999 i
comments on the rulemaking for Holtec's HI-STAR 100 certificate of compliance.' In its
. comments, the State, with the assistance of Dr. Resnikoff, specifically questions Holtec's
- reliance on the LLNL methodology, and the methodology's failure to address the impacts ofirradiated cladding and pellet weight. Exh. 4 (State's Comments) at 2-6.
As the Commission has clearly determined, intervenors cannot simply wait for a new NRC Staff issuance in order to justify a contention when the information supporting the contention has previously been publicly available. See Duke Power Co. (Catawba Letter from M. Delligatti to M. Resnikoff, dated November 19,1998 (attached as Exhibit 2).
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s Letter from M. Resnikoff to M. Delligatti, dated December 31,1998 (attached as Exhibit 3).
- Letter from D. Chancellor to Secretary, NRC, dated March 26,1999 (" State's Comments")(attached as Exhibit 4).
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Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19,17 NRC 1041,1048 (1983). Here, the in-formation supporting the contention was not only publicly available, but directly attribut-able to the State and its expert witness.
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The State lacks good cause because it has offered no explanation whichjustifies,-
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or even explains, its 17 month delay in filing this contention. Where good cause is' lack-j ing, a compelling showing must be made with respect to the other four factors, which, as
' ' discussed below, the State has not done.
2.
The Other Factors Do Not Justify Admission of the Late-Filed Contention Of the remaining four factors, the third and fifth factors are to be accorded mee weight than the second and fourth factors, which concern the protection of the peti-
- tioner's asserted interest by other means or parties. LBP-98-7,47 NRC at 207-209.
While the State interests may not be represented by another party in the PFS proceeding,
. it certainly has other means available to protect its interests, namely, the rulemaking as-sociated with the certificate of compliance for the Holtec Hi-STORM 100 storage cask.7 As evidenced by its filing of copious comments for the rulemaking for the Hi-STAR 100 storage canister, the State is well aware of the certificate of compliance rulemaking proc-
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ess and can represent its interests in those proceedings. See Exh. 4 (State's Comments).
The State has offered no explanation for why its interests cannot be fully insured through this process.
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'The comment period for the HI-STORM cask has not yet opened but the Staff has issued a Preliminary Draft Safety Evaluation Report to Holtec and is expected to publish the Draft Safety Evaluation Report and a notice of opportunity for comment in the Federal Register this fall. g Proposed Schedule provided by NRC Staff at December 11,1998 Pre-hearing Conference.
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The State's position on the third factor, the development of a sound record, is in-
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consistent with its argument that it has good cause for its late-filed contention. If Dr.
Resnikoff"has [the) considerable expertise in technical issues regarding the storage and degradation of spent nuclear power plant fuel" to contribute to the development of a sound record (State's Request at 8), then he surely could have formulated this contention without waiting for the Staff to issue ISG-12. Otherwise, the State's ability to contribute is questionable and suggests that it was merely waiting for the Staff to develop new is-sues that could be used to prolong and delay these proceedings. In any event, the State has not provided a summary of Dr. Resnikoff's expected testimony, which weighs against the admission of the contention. Private Fuel Storage, LBP-98-7,47 NRC at 208-209.
Finally, contrary to the State's assertion, admission of the contention will cer-tainly broaden and inevitably delay this proceeding by expanding its scope to include a contention that has already been dismissed by the Board and thus is not the subject of any existing contention.
In sum, the remaining four factors weighed together militate against granting the State's late-filed motion, and therefore clearly do not make the compelling showing re-quired to overcome the State's lack of good cause.
B.
The State's Amended Contention is Inadmissible in its basis for Amended Contention Q contention, the State refers to the section of the PFSF SAR in which PFS discusses Holtec's analysis of spent fuel integrity under the design basis vertical and horizontal accelerations for the HI-STORM storage cask system, State's Request at 4, and then contends that PFS must perform a revised analysis 6
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consistent with ISG-12, despite the fact that PFS never performed the fuel integrity analysis for the III-STORM design basis accelerations, but simply described in the SAR the Holtec analysis and results. The State's contention that PFS must perform the ISG-12 analysis must be rejected because (1) the proper forum for raising concerns regarding the adequacy of Holtec's analysis of fuel integrity under design basis accelerations is the rulemaking for the cask's certificate of compliance, and (2) Holtec has already performed a revised analysis per the recommendations ofISG-12 which show that the fuel will maintain its integrity under the design basis accelerations for the HI-STORM cask.8 The State's contention is inadmissible in that it "impermissibly challenge [s] the Commission's regulatory scheme provisions, or rulemaking-associated generic determi-nations, which establish a separate cask design approval process...." LBP-98-7,47 NRC at 186. As the Board has previously recognized, generic issues concerning the ade-quacy of the vendors' designs are to be addressed in the separate rulemaking proceedings for the certification of the casks, not the licensing of the PFSF. Id.' The issue of the in-tegrity of the fuel assemblies under cask design drop conditions is a generic one, and the State has not claimed, or even offered an example, of how the conditions at PFS are unique. Thus, if the State does have concerns with Holtec's analysis of fuel integrity un-der design bases accelerations for its casks, the proper forum for raising them is the rule-
- PFS will be amending its SAR to reflect the new, revised Holtec analysis as part of an amendment to its license application which is currently planned to be filed during the latter part of Augus?.
' See also Private Fuel Storage, LLC. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-10,47 NRC 288,295 (1998).
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A making for the HI-STORM 100 certificate of compliance.'8 The State's attempt to raise this generic design issue as part of this proceeding is unwarranted and the Contention should be dismissed.
The Contention must also be dismissed because it fails to present a genuine dis-pute of material. fact in that Holtec has already performed a revised analysis per ISG-12.
In ISG-12, the Staff recommends that any analysis using the LLNL methodology should be redone using "the irradiated material properties" of the fuel cladding and "the weight of the fuel pellets," or alternatively, a more sophisticated " analysis of fuel integrity which considers the dynamic nature of the drop accident and any restraints on fuel movement resulting from cask design." ISG-12.' The sole basis of the State's contention is that neither of the alternative analyses recommended by ISG-12 has been done. State's Re-quest at 5. In fact, however, in Revision 7.0 to the Topical Safety Analysis Report
- (" TSAR") for HI-STORM 100 (filed under letter dated June 8,1999), Holtec includes a revised analysis of fuel integrity under drop conditions that incorporates these recom-mendations.- See HI-STORM TSAR, Section 3.5 (Rev. 7.0)(attached as Exhibit 5).
Specifically, the revised analysis is based on irradiated fuel cladding materials and in-cludes the weight of the fuel pellets. e at 3.5-2-3. In this analysis, Holtec concludes that the integrity of the fuel cladding will not be compromised by the design basis decel-
- eration loading of 45g (which assures that the fuel cladding can withstand the design ba-sis cask drop). E at 3.5-19. Thus, Holtec has performed an analysis per ISG-12,
Indeed, as noted above, both Dr. Resnikoff and the State have raised similar issues in context of the rulemaking proceeding for the HI-STAR 100 cask storage system.
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2 3.
claimed to be lacking by Amended Contention Q," and therefore the Contention must be dismissed for lack of factual basis and for failing to present a genuine dispute of material fact.12 The State also contends, incorrectly, that the revised analysis must be performed for the Intermodal Transfer Point ("ITP") and "during transport on either rail or high-way." State's Request at 7. As in its original Contention Q, the State's attempt to extend the contention to transportation related issues clearly exceeds the scope of this proceed-ing. The Notice of Opportunity for a Hearing in this case delineated the scope of the pro-ceeding to include only the consideration of"an application... for a materials license, under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 72,... to possess spent fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage in an [ISFSI) located on the Skull Valley Goshute Indian Reservation...." 62 Fed. Reg. 41,099 (1997). Because transportation of spent fuel is governed by 10 CFR Part 71, and not Part 72, this part of the State's con-tention must be rejected,just as the Board rejected the identical claim in the original Contention Q.
~ " The State cannot simhly ignore Holtec's analysis or claim that it was unaware of its existence. The State has an " ironclad obligation to examine the publicly available documentary material... " Duke Power Co.
j (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2), LBP-83 8A,17 NRC 282,285 (1983). Its failure to fulfillthis 1
obligation cannot justify the admission of a factually baseless contention.
- The State's discussion of"the concept of multiple confinement," State's Request at 5-6, does not refute the authority cited at pages 209-210 in Applicant's December 24,1997 Answer to Petitioner's Contentions, in particular the quotation from the proposed rule ($1 Fed Reg. 19,106,19,108 (1986) which explicitly pro-
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vides that the " canister could act as a replacement for the cladding." Indeed, the PFS accident dose calet-lation assumes;in accordance with NRC Staff guidance, a 100% fuel cladding failure. M PFSF SAR at {
8.2.7.2. Thus, the argument set forth at pages 209-210 in Applicant's December 24,1997 Answer (that the contention must be dismissed because, even if proven, it would not entitle the State to relief) constitutes another bases as well for the dismissal of Amended Contention Q.
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Moreover, the State's attempt to extend this contention to transportation and the ITP is based on the misconception that the 10 and 18 inch cask maximum lift heights for the storage casks apply to the transportation, the same misconception the State made in its original contention. During transportapan and at the ITP the spent fuel will be inside a certified transportation cask - not a storage cask - and configured and handled in ac-cordance with its certificate of compliance under 10 C.F.R. Part 71. As such, the trans-portation cask will be fitted with impact limiters and certified to withstand a drop of 30 feet. 10 C.F.R. Q 71.73(c)(1). Thus, a drop of 10 or 18 inches could have no impact on fuel integrity in a certified transportation cask.
III.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Applicant respectfully requests that the Board deny Utah's request to admit its late-filed, amended Contention Q.
Respectfinly submitted, 0(M(!
OIL Jay P. Silberg Emest L. Blake, Jr.
Paul A.Ostkler SHAW PITTMAN 2300 N Stree'. N.W.
Washington, DC 20037 (202) 663-8000 August 6,1999 Counsel for Private Fuel Storage L.L.C.
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DOCKETED l.lSHRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA W AUG 16 P3 :06 NUCLEAR REGULATGRY COMMISSION Of &
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Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ADJs
.,:p In the Matter of
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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
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Docket No. 72-22
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(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
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ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 hereby certify that copies of the Applicant's Response To State Of Utah's Re-quest For Admission Of Late-Filed Amended Utah Contention Q were served on the per-sons listed below (unless otherwise noted) by e-mail with conforming copies sent by U.S.
mail, first class, postage prepaid, this 6th day of August 1999.
G. Paul Bollwerk III, Esq., Chairman Dr. Jerry R. Kline Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomi. Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 e-mail: GPB@nrc. gov e-mail: JRK2@nrc. gov and kjerry@erols.com Dr. Peter S. Lam
- Susan F. Shankman Administrative Judge Deputy Director, Licensing & Inspection Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Directorate, Spent Fuel Project Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Material Safety &
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Safeguards e-mail: PSL@nrc. gov U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
m Office of the Secretary
- Adjudicatory File U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Washington, D.C 20555-0001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
' Staff' e-mail: hearingdocket@nrc. gov (Original and two copies)'
Catherine L. Marco, Esq.
Denise Chancellor, Esq.
Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
Assistant Attomey General Office of the General Counsel Utah Attorney General's Office Mail Stop O-15 B18 160 East 300 South,5th Floor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 140873 Washington, D.C. 20555 Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0873 e-mail: pfscase@nrc. gov e-mail: dchancel@ state.UT.US John Paul Kennedy, Sr., Esq.
Joro Walker, Esq.
Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Land and Water Fund of the Rockies Reservation and David Pete 2056 East 3300 South, Suite 1 1385 Yale Avenue Salt Lake City, UT 84109 Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 e-mail: joro61@inconnect.com e-mail: john @kennedys.org
- Diane Curran, Esq.
Danny Quintana, Esq.
Harmon, Curran, Spielberg &
Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians Eisenberg, L.L.P.
Danny Quintana & Associates, P.C.
1726 M Street, N.W., Suite 600 68 South Main Street, Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20036 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 e-mail: dcurran@harmoncurran.com e-mail: quintana @xmission.com
- By U.S. mail only r
J Pitul A. Gaukler '
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A_WilR RADIOACTNE WASTE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES I
February 27,1998 Charles HauW wy, Director Spent Puel Prisact Of5ce, Mail Stop 6F18 Nuc6ier Regulatory c=.niamian Washington, D.C. 20555 Re:
Holtec HI-STAR 100 TSA".
NRC Docket No. 72-1008
Dear Charley:
Dis letter concerns the g force that spent fbel cladding can withstand and the use of this peranater in safety analyses by Hohec, Sierra Nuclear and other cask manufacturers. His issue relates to the Hohec and Transtar stergu w-t cask and transportation casksin general. In my opinion the most vulnerable lhet cannot withstand a 63g force in the most adverse orientation (Holtec TSAR, p. 3.5-1) but a force considerably less. At the very least, aMie'aani intbreation should be requested firam Hohec before issuing a Certi6cate of Compliance for the HI-STAR 100 cask. The Commission may also need to fund
Miniaani studies to consider this issue as it generally relates to transportation accidents involving irradiated Ibel ama===hlia
Tbs "63 " force for most vulnerable Ibel is based on an analysis of the more ductile 3
t ir ""=t not irradiated, cladding. Despite the title of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report on which Holtec relies (" Dynamic Impact Effects on Spent Fuel Aasenblies," UCID 21246, October 1987), the LLNL report does not deal with
" spent fbel" assembEes, only with non-irradiated fuel assenblies. As you are aware, irradiation within a reactor makes fbel assemblies more brittle and less resistant to impact
" Cladding ductility decreases and yield st ess increases with
- creasing ncutron fluence."
m
("An======aan of the Use of Futandad Burnup Fuel in Light Water Power Reactors,"
BatteOs Pacinc Northwest Labs, NURFfdCR-5009, p. 2-5, February 1988).
LLNL's e=Indarian for most vulnerable Ibel also does not take into account the weight of j
the Ibel iessif, only the g force without the additional weight of the fuel. His considerable additional weight is an aMirianal internal force. LLNL assumes fhel peuets remain in a rigid array in a high impact accident and wiu not impart a force to the cladding This is CM not correct.
NRC staff should ask Ho tec and Sierra Nuclear to address this issue in their TSAR's. I S
no available studies analyze irradiated fuel cladding in high impact accidents, the NRC should fund additional studies to address this issue.
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C Haughesy, NRC 02 m /9s I wish these comuments to be induded 's Hohec's NRC dock 48 and to be considered in the Staffs safety evaluation report. Please send me a copy of the staffs draA safety evaluation report for the Hokac cask so that we mey provide comments. Ifyou have questions,8ssi ese to cat.
cc-D Curran
, sincerely, C Nakahara l iet$$ g) k
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November 19, 1998 Dr. Marvin Reorukoff, Senior Associate Radoactrve Waste Management Assoaates 526 West 26* Street, Room 517 New York, NY 10001
Dear Dr. Resrukoff:
I am responding to your February 27,1998, letter regar$ng your concems related to the structural integrity of spent fuel claddmg under hypothetical accident conditions in spent fuel casks. In his March 11,1998, letter, Charles J. Haughney, at the time, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office, wecated the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff was reviewing your concems and would report their findings to him to report drectly to you. I apologize for the delay in respondmg to you; however, Mr. Haughney is currently serving in another office and several hcenomg actions took precedence in allocation of limited staff resources for completing the review. The staff has now completed its review of your concems regarding the Lawrence Uvermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Report UCID 21246," Dynamic impact Effects on Spent Fuel Assembhos," dated October 20,1987, and determined that the LLNL report appeared to use sufficiently conservative data in the characterization of spent fuel claddmg properties. The staff also found that the LLNL report conclusions appeared to be based on acceptable arialysis and assumptions.
In particular, you stated that the LLNL report does not address irradiated fuel claddeg, only ururrodsted fuel claddmg. In actuaisty Table 3 of the report dehneates irradiated cladding longitudmal tensile strength values. This table irdcates that irradiated cladding has a greater strength value than unitradiated cladding. The LLNL report analysis used the va!ues of unitradiated claddmg strength, which is acceptable.
In your letter, you also stated that the LLNL report did not take into account the weight of the fuel assembly in the side drop orientation evaluation. In actuality, the fuel weight was delineated in Table 4 of the report and used appropriately in the analysis in Appendix A of the report. Thus, the LLNL report used the proper weight value in the analysis of the side drop orientation.
The NRC is commstted to ensuring the safe operation of dry spent fuel storage and transport casks. The NRC staff will continue to evaluate industry data and analysis on spent fuel claddmg i>,--;+t: in hypothetical accident conditions for these casks.
Please note that your letter has been placed in all applicable dockets (i.e.,721008,72-1014, 71 9261,721023, and 71 9268) and your questions and concems will certainly be considered in the staff's safety evaluations of the pertinent cask designs. You will also have an opportunity to comment on the draft safety evaluation report for each cask design during the public comment period of federal rulemaking to incorporate that cask into Part 72 to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
sett25 elm #M49 PDR ADOCK 07109261 C
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M. Resnikoff.
l trust this responds to your concerns. If you have additional questions or wtsh to discuss this matter further, please contact me at (301) 415-8518.
Sinceroty.
ORIGINAL SI'WED ll( /s/
Mark S. Delligatts, Senior Project M6 nager Spent Fuel Ucensing Section Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nucissr Material b&fcN i
and Safeguards
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Docket Nos.: 72 1008,72 1014,71 9261 72 1023,71 9268
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Q RADIOACEVE WASTE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES Deceaser 31,1998 Mark 5 Udigstei, Senior Project Manager SpcasFuelGesaming Section NMS5 US Nuciser Regulatory Comunisa Washington,DC 20555 Dear unrk-Thank you br your Noveanbar 19 response to my Fetwuary 27
. Your letter did not Aally answer any concerns, so rit try once more.
Bettmessoas From several NRC contrador reports, it is my understanding that irradiated fhel cladding is more briede than unirradiated Anal cladding. This should akar the eaaaa?- of a transponseios or 15F51 anddent involving impact. You stated that irradiated fuel cladding has "a poster strength value" than unirradiated Anel cladding, but this does not ad&uss any conceras about brittisanes. R does not appear that NRC staff are querying Hahac and SNC about this important dimiac*iaa between irradiated and unirradiated fuel cladding. Simply using unirradiated cladding strength in the Haitac and SNC SAR's may not be acceptable.
Dynesmes Lameng I am aware that abs Anel anaernhly weight is taken into account in the LLNL report and j
the Holtec SAR, but the loading is static, that is, the fuel weight is assumed to be evenly 4
distributed along tbs cladding. The model is an=ntially a beam between two ;pports.
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But this model may not bound abs physical situation. In a side impact, the cladding and j'y the Anel are estinct benans. Under impact the bel pellets wouki be WM to break their Gaed cos8pration and strike the cladding with force. This dynamic loading is not ffb considamd in the LLNL report and may be important. It does not appear that NRC staff are M Helene and SNC about this important dimiaeniaa betwen static and dynamic loading.
Thank you for ;--: ~ ii these issues And best wishes for the year.
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re: Comroents on Pseposed Rule to add Hekse H> Star 1000 Ceak Systare ta timeI.ist of Approved Speat Fes15tormy has.
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Im resporue to 64 Fed. Reg.1542,Jaruary i1.1999, she 5cate of Utah rubaums cornrnenti on the Pretirminary Safety Evalumnos Report and Proposed Certificase af Compliar.cc for the ilohec HI-STAR 100 Storap Cask. Thee commems haw been prepared with assistare frorn Marvie Kesnikodi, Ph.D., Radioactiw Waste Management AW= E I
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Comments from the Sete of Utah Prelinsinary Safety Evaluation Report and Proposed Certificate of Compliance Hi-STAR 100 Storage Cask March 29,1998 The Snee ofUtA. midt assimace Aom Marvin Rem &ctr, Ph.D. of Rachosedue Wasee Manasement Associsers, sananim shame camaments em the prelianinary Safety Evahadion Iteport (SER) sad proposed Certificaneof Coagpliance (CoC) for the Hollec 20-STAR 100 immlisard fud simsuge caal,h'RC Duches No.72-1008. 64 Fed.Iles.1542(1999).
The 1D4 TAR 300 is an all masal casic wish an ousee metal overpack the endoses a scaled heliuss filled canister (MPCI containing irradised Ascl. Ahhough the SER and CoC saader resiew hese a5 dress morate only. dhe H5-STAR 100 is desigand for both storage and transpostarson ef spent nucleer paaer plant fuel.
The Snaec has miluee-fold ineeremin the adapacy of the SER and CoC for die HI STAR 500 sierage casfL First. ita design isi*winney idernicd to es design ofshe JD STAR 100 transportsdeo cask. which Pdmar Fest Saosige LLC. (PFS) proposes no use se esanport spent fuel lo hs psoposed % spens fuel marnge installasion (ISFSI)
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cah difTerrrce between de storage cae and eranspostatsan ensk is the tract 1 hat the traruportmics cask uses 'mupest limisers and nessi satisfy
- ypenhencal acddentcondissoas a
tander le CTR Pat 71. Second.PFS plans to use ibe10 STAR 100 enarage ask's irnernal sekled ranister (midti purpose ceaisser oc MFC)to wansport and mere fuc5. The MPC wilt hold ibe irradiaard fuel during menspoemdan te ibe Privase Fuel Ssarage facality. After arival at die PFS facility.the MPCs will be sented *m the Mt. STORM 100 concrete overpack si the peeposed PTS facillsy.1hird. alshanghPFS imends m use ilms Hi STORM 100 cod for naarage under senant consitarr,iv aec(JL m. ident ehe a5 metal cssk Hi-STAR 100 cae will be used as a sensage besup.
These onmeesna address de <=rh= ions of she SER, as 3=5 as she asserdoes rende by the cask manufacimer. Hellec Internsoond. in die Technien1 Safisy Analysiis Repoem (T5ARs) for the 154 TAR med HI STORM casts, %e H8-STAR 100 storage TSARis Holtec Report HI 941184 (NRC Doches No. 72-1005). *Ihe Ht STAR 100 trampantation TSARis Hohec Report HD 953251 (NRC Doder No. 719361). The Hf-STORM 1D0 storagc 13 AR is Hahec Repers 15-951312 (NRC Dosbet No. 72-1914).
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The 9tsee is in the peocres of finalir.ing e 6"'" N agreemem wie IMisc lbst mill f
allow she.stme access as the Hohee peoprisesry sermon of HI-STAR 100 KAR. Revision 9 and HM10RM 100 T5AR. Stevisian 5. The Sense mill subautaddisiaal comments. as a pnyrictary and confidsmial subental. aAur is has recrissd am$ aviewed Hokas twpneesty documents.
Genern!Ceanients The Hl4 TAR 100 design abould not be oppreed, becanne Helene has not psovided M assurance shot die stedding and cask will asemia their integrity under nannat, t
oftWasnual and accidentconditiens. Meerover. Hohee does aos eerseedy esiculate beatih
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arW moder bounding accidents. Norhas Hohne evaluated abe baguet ofa sdotage event. Tiaally, she TSAR and SER do notjumide assurampe the cask and claddlag w9t re: sin tfwir integrity inular thannal condkions ibar exist as an ISFSI. Raaber than j
addressing these deficieneses. lbe NRC's SER bas glossed them sur. These issues are crecimity importam to remessing the put6c health and afety. ami therefore nast be addressed before she Habac Coc can be isused.
Specific Conimients Cladding Estegrity Under lanpset According to she10 5 TAR 300 saerape 13AR(Sec.3.5).the til-STAR 500 synssen is designed Io mishstand a meniriuna decelerssion of 60. v. tile a lawnece I.ivermoec 5
National Labannoties report shows that the mass vulnerable fiari can withstand a deeclarados of63 i
3 n the most alwrse eri=asaalan (side drop).' Hollac sherefore asseres ihm fuel mi integrity will be maininined under all socident candicions. la ihe pretiminary 5Dt{as II-6}. the NRC Staffcercurs ear "ihere is reasonable essmance thattime cladding will snamtain confinsenest inergrity dudng a designbesis drop?
In our view. shis analysis is 'wcorrect. Hahac and the NRC !iaaff have mn deniansarsted a wasonable assurance thas the clademg wiB maintain hs inneyisy.
Holeec's analysis dues nos prmide wasonable answance for the following sensant (1)it does nas aske into accouns the possible incrasse in rate of cularma af cladding ofhigle burnup fuel;(2) Holoce weien for ins ondysis on a Imnence Lw National Laborasesias (LLNL) tuyout that faius to distirigmsb the eWeets afinacear inadiasiari en
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merettA6 fuel meemMies: ad (3) Hatese etso relles on the LLNE. Report's becorrecs meumpeipet ihst fuel assemedies act as a unsaic rigid sad. The first factor (increased sme of enodmion) increases &c likelDemd that fuel cladding snay rupeere. and. shen the stree fackus use taham soge6er.they =%. - ' the likelihood of a release of ra6oactiw: maserials daring a foremsable drop accident at the peopased ISFSt.
3.
Escreased Raer ofOsidentise.
The N]tC"s horariassion Nasice IN 98-29, ensided " Pre Ected incenar im Fuel Rod I
Cladding Onidsdsm' {Angust 3,1995), panidesnew infammeden, nou
" ---- _1 la 6e Hohec TSAR, sher calls loin questice Holtee's necidknt anshsis. IN 9g.29 dina== the exidstlas rate of fust eledding for high Insamy fut ei===aon reported experiences 34th Wastingbosse's fueJ=====Mies. NItc adwisse redpants is " review ile Jaformation for j
oppocamuiey to their fluslinies and canaider acties as approprmer. so Jneid vi=ilar problemaa
- NucJest Reguletory Cosamnission. IN 95 29, hedcarecreme in Emet And
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CAnidigt aridensur(Aseinst 3. IME) at L The Noiice reparr.: ths in October of I997, Wesdnshouse aolified NRC that enodiremion I
of its fuel ciading ccuresica snodel in ins red design code no wilees new dsm on Zirealoy4 exidetion at high buenop *nsay r.seate consqpliance issues fbr its Inselpal Furt Burnsbac Absorher(IFBA) fuel with Zirratoy4 efadding." Id. m 1. As actedis sLe Intkmassan Nesioe.
4 The imeditled code rumy predics highes feet semiperstures and interna 1 peesennes at high burnup conditsuns. This. in lase., may lead to cede mesults that de om meet she Wes1iadouse cruenon prohibiting gap scopening and shar ska not ascet the loss of.coolarn accident iLO(*A) evieerian in 10 CFR SIM6(l>X2K At Ahhough ite peoblem uns initialty decovered by Wesiinghmse wiib reistion so Zirc &ry 4 feet, the Infoemation Notice acats Gian '%c burmsp =1med phenococan,4ich comal resuh in noncompliance wie she osidatice wouisemems of 90 CFR $0.46, may not be limised to Westinghanne IFRA find les might affecs any Zucaliry flael used in high tr.nnup appbriaa.' IN 98 29 as 2. Thua.the experience as Westingbooseis also 7,: mane to any b*gh burnup fuel that immy be stored in flollec casks..nm just to Westingbosee rhel.
According no IN 9592. the increased esidanon of ese chidding is a funcuem of the find burmup. Oxfaradan may cause ibe cladding so become eifectiveh 1hiseser, decreasing km struesural integrity. This drinner cladding due so oxidiantion also lowers shs 's' irnpets force si which fuel cladding will shener Hohes's TSAR relics se the premise that fuel chuldieg will not shamer for any festseeable drop. This preadse is tuned om die assurnption that itwould ade a side drop of snater tissa 63g to damage the dadding.
Our speesdairet ralradanions. presented below. show that the g loading for high bursup
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e temmerce Smel wis caiWiiand clad 5na approaches 45g. The NRC SaafTshould mal apprcne the Hohac appliaminrri unless and urnd Hohne has faciored the i'tfonmanon in IN 98 29 isso its calc.a=% The clear implicadon of!N %29 is that the liA beigk of the 10 STAR 1RI ceak must be admeed so fosser abr g-neces em ahe daddagg.
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AssemWy etWe [an) 1450A0 54 2 00 645000 " 3430M 1456 40 54300t 1450 40 s rveds se4se as4Ao Js4.co
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Be4As 1444D 144.60 14498 B4480 144.00 644A0 adusesser; 7m Tae tas 74o 7as 7an 7.op L *(hseledlemalh05 344e 2tas Mas J4 e0 34 2 2400 34.00 E(pui) 1.04E*@f 1.06E+07 IAe*07 i.30E*07 1A4E+97 LME47 1.A4E+47
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- (best 444 044 ese 4 04 044 Rod 0 84 r(la) 0.18 0 14 etIT nis 0.IB 0 18 9.69 pressert(ib) 229tLDO 195720 22$000 2230.11D 225080 114729 2136A0 ea lpai)
B787.38 4639A2 1047114 B7t?Je 8751.50
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.7.12 2.32 2.12 2.17 232 332 J.33 ob ipni) 613830 813E70 1378.57 1828.19 1838J0 1125.70
$19.50 Filb) 68.54 e6M
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$1.9J 3906 102 41 II.93 Bl.93 93.71 sy 63.58 6721
$4 BI 4334 32.tB 1576 145 M l
A VAss Goes Wasainginnne tyrsioen(Dyannie husmus Erfocis. Tatar 41 B: hessart thergled to a lemur ghe ( valur in As Assesentatd sie Ritk 1 CNWes af furi cleedseg decueenad ase to andries tg t1% caban Ns1kicksom is reduced by 17's.
D-E Meestes sAsserdee&igber mbe twahse in An Assements of er Alek_)
E: held sress loweve4 enhalfTheoriginal 64&se F: Ywed sereus louered andparuuse krwere d (E arit 31 (k Deobling the decissu Mt DEE = Dpurns Inspuss EMecu..
AAR = At Amenemsatof the hisL.
AAsti E anoqWas um especsed as he leser.as dury neck basEmad abcaloy iries -=* iteereur. it was mot mart tim==rs=
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Irramsted and Ueleradiante Feel Assessbiles.
I Hohec's DIAR hr the Hl.5 TAR 100 anarage cask selies der its estianase afg force est will datenge fuel dadens upon a 1947 report Ipy LLNL: The LLNL Report finits no take into account she increased tuinliness of irradiated fiset asacrthlies? Brueuse the I
irindused fuel assenhlies may hour been amtmaled. 6ey mould also be has reasstant to impact _ During te course of a fuel assenhly's life.sutunomse particle boh,traa.
inclusEng neutron Guer, sigui6 candy decreases she samenWy's ductiEty and increases the assemWy's yield amens, sereby embritding ibe fuel assembly. " Cladding doscility despenses omd yield seress incresses with increasing iseutroa fluence "
Twitzernare Itw proposed Hi-ETAR 100 wiB store only inndiased fuel asasabliss; thus, I
ek Apphcant saamos rety se I1WL's amarysis becsune the LLNL does not scoount for arrh and eministlemeat, wtuch tomer te impecs resistance of the fuel assemblies.
These sects are signTacant w6en raagdad meh 6e ineressedevidarian inteaported e* IN 91R9 tiecause increened addstion ocruid enngemisDy cause an increase in cladang emteic11emern? Thes. IN 9529 comr===Ar the LLNL*s erwrr in daregarding the trirde chssnesmstacs afirradessed fuel daddsog.
3.
Feet AsseenWins Do Not Act as a Right Red.
Hohec's calculations rely upee LLNL*s e:roneous assumption timmt 6e fue3 within the cladding behows as a rigid rod. Thea. Hohee merely used a ststic catrida6on insiend er taking into account the dynamic leading upon impact. The LLNL Report speci6ca0y states, *1t is important to tunphasiae &as the g loadings shown la Figs. d and 7 me static loadings.** 11 mis assurnpron is incorrecs lastead of a F y- =. rigid rod the fuel rod cens'ums effuel pellets stacked like coins wnhin thin subuas. la any impact scenario,its fuel assemtdy does mor met as a rigid cod: raser, it acts as a dynamic nasem win the fisei impacalog the imide of the eledeling sad etestinga grestar libldsood of claddisig repuare.
Hohne has acc shown 6st the assempdan of a rigid sod is conservanise. The thiamer cradding due to the increased oddation smes to cosapound thie efTect beesuse a smaller g fosse would te required to ruptuse the anotably. Tlw NRC shdfshould not appeme the
- LLE Repars 8 See e 5. UCID 212en, Ta%t 4.manch outes se dimirense httwass Yemstieneaks and siew unmangsh de rugedtest asasehnse.
- *Ametumsatdahe Uneof Dnersted Bamup Fusik Lisin Waer limoer Ramesmes* Beadle Pacine Neptune Lab.DfUItEGC3t.Sa0NFriruny B000) 5 nia essesse maybes trarle eherersmuses a e aster rase ihmiweinicladdles omring neel sei. sen tw 98 29 at 2 ("Irfeis knel emidaien Breitinereto be sureded Asrkgro scridses.she cimahacould baserne entsialed.-).
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w:3.mu enear.aw, am.n. a..m.* ms.--a seseetuman Hohec applicatine withoint a sboming try the apphemnt stas rts caktassions are consenstin.
In sure, the newly discomed 6ndiass at Westinsicase. as neoogrd2nd in the NRC's Nasice. and the other concerns dscussed abow. raise significani e;oestions akus thz adequacy of Hohec's accidesrt ansipis.
Healtit impmet of'Aeeldents
~Ihe calculmed beahh hopects under hyposhetical accidern condiliens, discussed in Cbspoor 7 of Hohec's HI-STAR 100 TSAR, are not consesvatin Three issues need to be nonre fuDy erandned by NRC Staft: the design basis re.a ar,,abe rediriica pedrasys, and ine dase so Md---
1.
Design basis seeldset.
Holtec's hypotheient design basis accideem conditkoi assumes 100% ef the fact rods ese non mechanically rwmued and the gases and particulates in ibe fuel red gap breween the cladding and fuel pella are refamacd so the MPC cavity and them so the extensal environnsent. Ilm&rian doses are calculated 100 ro frorn tbr cask. le the time imarsal betunes production af Rev.4 and Ra. 6 of the TSAR. the NRC Samff rapseered Hohee to condua the dose calculmiums in conferrumace shh the final tcmon o(NUREG-1536.'
He accideas aestpis in the final versine ofNUREG.1536 ineseased the amoues ef radcastinty to abe MPC cavity by 5 anders of tmagnhude and snaki hsw placed doses at tDD re, caer the EPNs limit ef 5 rem. In Rev. 6. Natire responded to the NRC's rapuess by changing ihe inethod af +" g dosesto bwceporise an extranely small cask tratage rate, rather than assusring 100% ef the cask cemity was released so the execenal emironmem. TSAR,itev. 6 at II.2-15. Thus Holoec's new analysinincscased the ramwtisity refensed to ibe cask entity h 5 anlers of magnitude. but the leakage une reduced the amamma teleased frors the cask cavisy to the envisonment try ince than 5 orders of magnisode. He tiri effecs ef shis sleight o(hand. was to change the design basis accident, so as no reduce.he desaa to the shield and whole body at 100 rn. In essence, the NRC mE bas alknwd ibe applicant so change the defiedtice of a bonding accidean so one shas inwcDws 300% fuel red cleddieg agriure, miah the cask lid imaca. im.
en1 slight leakage frwm the ensk. The derian tasis accidesrt no longer represents a loes.
3 of. confinement-bamer accidem.
Hohec's asiempt to charge the design basis are&4 nt for snarop enska is not only inapproprime. but is cc M We strangDy disagree that the slight ensk leakage. I.$ x
' helcar Regdagary Cersminice?5tansard Resisw Pisa farDry Cat Sturnee 5vsiens NiNLEC l$14, smeary 1997 l
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... #..... u sameeruns 10'ceYs. coastadesabouruEag accidern. A seemario tiert could bed to a greater release rue is a wel Erg errar shas aBows be!inen to leak from the MPC if a cask is dropped.
Lestage of betamt wig allow the maxismm c.ladding lar ;.-. to riseand the feet rod cladding to rupnee. Ja this caer, the percentage of Auf sods that rupame may beless, inst die hakage este from 1be sask cavity would be grisser sham assisned by Holtsc.
2.
Rastation pashnup enstuded In Chapsee 7, Hohne has caksGased the rudimios dose lo an aduk 100 m fress abe assident, duc motely to inholmios a(Ibe passing cload. Other relevant pathmays, such as drect rudimion free ceshan und tebat.de sleposiisd en ibe gsound, sesospension of deposised radicar,ad=a ingestion ofcanaamanneed food and weise and incidemal soil incession, are not consideced,in violation of 30 CFR 72.24(ank 3.
DaneIn ekildren ses eenandered Contrary to 1he standasde in 10 CJ.R. Paris 72 and 20. Hotwc has not calcnistad 1he slanc se cimildrea 71sene samdards guancribe dose timits for *an indindual ousalde ihe cantrolled ares 710 CJ.R. { 72.34m)). and "indhidual rnembers ef the public"(le C.F.R. {f 20.130l.2tLI302). For purposes oftbe Part 20 door sismoords, she reguladoes ddine "indi@ust* as *any human being.* and "sneunber of the pddic" as muy indisidual neept wiiarithm individual is receiving an accupationaldose.* IEmphasis added] The cancept of "any individual
- clearly includes people odier than a$ nit men. ic.. children.
Nor does abe Atosnic Energy Act Emis its prosection s einst undne risk so adult males. tai fac1. NRC regulations dieady mske special excepnose forthe doet to a namor (10 ETR f 20.12D7) mad the &se ao an etahr301rsus (10 CFR f 20.I208) wishin res1ricied areas.
Ferther, Regulmory Guie 3.51. 'tsiculmiens! Models forEstianaring Radmasion heen no Man firam Airborne Radiasciier Mstensk Resuming from Urunium Milling Operasions-aho calculates the done to chiMren and infants try mQasting the organ siae, buemhing rue and &se conversion factess.
Children are aseee s idnerable io radiasion sham adutis because of theirlugber surface-erse-to.valume of organs estio.' Other enetriinning factors include ihr fact dust childrerthave higher soilingestion rates sham adusts.' Chs%es also base reduced ingeslam and ire-larian rates earnpased en aduism;'* nevertheless the dose to chadren under a design besis acendens is likely1o be signi6cantly Idgher shari the dose ts an adult. Thus. in ender to mariety the sagsumiums and the Atoamic Emerly Act.is is mecessary so determine weiesher 8 tremummens tweisiime ma nssielssieel %d==, *19ee Itaosamundmises et she heemsdanni cannaistaa en Ramologisot rvesen6sn, scitP4a.19pp.twynese riass.
- EPA," Risk Anammensen Guiemse forSuperfhd Ydme 1 - Hunum Heahh Eveisasian Muuual CPart 56 Dewleynem ernien.e e rresinhery menedimien :.=ala* EPu40ritsees. Decenter L991.
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Ecleanan,iLF s a470mlei Rins ftse Lensl.twed Enwne unessd Enyoner senadienedidts? Federet G=ha-Rayseth II Part 1-Imerien Vernien. ovepued dis the EPA. 8908.
c' Gemson as iPrnama) tier. Wi+1 Ak i=. an. map a vi tens ofUma its dese lismits ese sedefied fiar elaldsen. la addision. children are as a Inghar riA than aduhs es dewtoping cancer becauw childeno be longer than adshs and their cef}s pow neste epidly sham aduals'ceDs, hhat h is mot time repnisasse of 25 sas4r or 100 arty er the EP A acinderrt dose ihnias OM385 Et h Raame. *it is ibeNRC Sean's Wlogy in eniculating caposures en childama.
Seboange Eveet IMr desyse ihet an accionen urvatwing 100% fuel red daddas ruptwe wish adsht tid t-skage is a bewuling accident. See amm disemasies em design basis ma-+=r We unge WitC assif to censider the eSect era anhosage ewus selft an and-tank a=4=aa The Nfic aletady considers lhe impact o(a tomaika missile and r= par =3a= but a tomado missile.
like am 5" diameter snest iediarikms ths cad at I"b6 agdL ' does met hsw the impo:s of j
8 an anti-tank imissile Sissilarly, an explosme uhh an casernal pressure o(300 psig doe 5 not how ihe impact of an anti tank raisode. De lack of a ootg
' e ammeesment of i
the isks of sabmage and tesorism against moeteer mute facilisim aut shapesens is well estabisshed. Tenorists Imre ahonie ther they are capable ef explaidsig the weak innssiscus
- - damage to saade earnetwes associnasd with asansposauian as uvtl as causing t.=
such as de Wecid Tsade Censeeand the OklahomaChy powrtunem Imaildang. As NRC Suffis sante, Gennen regulases) swherkies how hupased an addisonal condition en casks, mensly. aber shey be able to withstood the invest of a 1-oon taissile innpoeting a cask si ibe speed of sound. By 1 bis enedislon. Griman easks are able to widhsisnd de meact osajet easiw inriking a cask. NRC saiKeculd isopose adeliosat condrdous en dry storage casks and ISF51a.es..the CoC eculd reipare Int sa 15f3l be desipsed shh an esseen heem to eranove she line.af-assht.
Since she em5y 1980s, the 10tC las relied as and has poorly irm,,..a J. ma r=a4==ai ses of espernnems carsied eaa by Sandis and Basicile Cel=mh== Laborsmaries ibat rneemsed the releens of radioactive masasials as a result of con sabotage. In one ohhe Sandia experirmenes, a GE 3F-300 truck cask consarams one useradimed thus assembly was silected with am M3A1. a inaienry ' shaped chasgr." Aldisugh the modes "demonstrand that casks could indeed be breached by milisany empleshes and star a canaderabic fractean of span foci could be rearmand by such an snare **' the NItc e4 9 na Smulia's findaags by concluding that since nely.?/l A00 A00 of the basal fuel weighs was teleased in inhainbis Amn, she "aSesage radialeycal camsesysteces of a selease irta heavily pops 6ased stina atem mach as New YdChy would be no early fatalisies andless
- MeineitL41 ram sessnesise11 Lait.TalAe321
" Jfelased, ashenJ. andannum Deele Baland. Seustaararane7tengerianseSasuretr saetafssy issues its1hink of fevreams ared sehsenge Agneuse Espadsery Singnessm* pegerud for siehbeda Agency As lesdses rougeus, temen Oqr.30e, gam esistaa. 99er.y as.
Canumms an Pretissuw) SER. AtMi AR Jou usupe L ana
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Sime of unh est nec (tL4) Intent casser fatality."" But diis andysis is higkh deficient. andirts a Israe awatererspestionable assaanpdom reganfmg esacuation and faiEng to indude severd significant radiatine padrways, mach as direct gamma expomeres frern deposised radiomsclides A more wcent analysis" of a transportation accidem in a rurd arts for a cask holang 14 Deca 24) PWR fhel anscenblies shoms a cast of $629 mill 5an ad a recovery time of 460 days for the clasaur opriasion. This elemmqp is only to a lew) that would reduce d oses to 500 snreadar. Based an this acadent scenario in a swal mening a properly conduceed, seatstic acodes sceanno in an urbem ares can be apected to show biDions oldoEars in elesaap eases and lost reveuset An urban accidaat wmld also canne a large number of newrse health eIFetss. Deficient as the amatpis of a snecnage ewes during ainaspanation is,ihr NRC 5saff has newr asabamed the esenornic and anfety l
implicadona of a sabotsen evens er a fixed storage thesity.
".; '"'.C L.s arust esplainal why it coriab=A de Santia experimem indicanive af what toned eccur in any type of termr st ritack, no matter the circumistamoes Following abc publicasion of tbene Sandta ireuks, the NRC proposed elimdmanan of meny af the safety requirements for shipenenes efspesa fuel aged more ahm 150 days, such as, no annad guards for the shigments in highly AJ areas,na advare notice to the NRC cr local law enforcement of$ casts. and no peruxbe consmunicasion between escorts and a comasunications cratee " "At least 32 parties adanitaed saare desa t00 pages a(
comraens in respesse so the noticef to utsich the NRC mever pub]Icly surpanded. See
.sapm. Halsecad and Baltard. note I.
In the interwnise pars since the Sandia exprnamnes, anni-tank weapons with aruch strater securacy and penetradeg power han been Tnanufactmed and sidely distributed These devices codd release uruch enore radioaccht material. Tine NRC suspended assion en the mic-nsskiss, but it inapproprimely cessinues to use abe sapevised concliasions in the propaard rule as a basis for its policies on terrenam and sabotage of asetear shipmenes T1sc smancema acercrist attacks of the last several years haw ymphicdly demonstrased that the NRC ccnnirmnes ao ignese the risks of sabotage as si nificant petil so the public.
6 The NRC should adopt she specinc recorunman s of Halstead and Ballard far cremeng on
>s rediuic. up-to-este terrorism risk assessenset. Same ef the refe.cnce penunceses Halstead and Ballard suggest me as follen:
The reference seapon should be portahle anti-tank missiles for Gudr ability to
+
permeate Ibe stroms cask anseertals, their range and availainlisy.
" ar.aras.
" Sandgdet.CNas A *Ei,emmes smal thshh EITem sinespus Fsel Tremeperusins." assas& A-w sME-StW12.t. Ne* 2a. l405.
" flakenedares OsHand at 27.
l
i CapupfEE se helknatary SEA. Wi STAR Joe fearase Lad:
er age..,
Smaserthsh A 101aw-cooled. nedum hum-up. W@Pe PWR amnesMy sisandd be lhe reference spent flael A Hainc Hi-5 TAR 100mesq3e cask loaded with 24 PMt assemblies ofdue refrience feet would represeus a natal radicactisy of abeas 5.5 nail 5an Casies. A terrorist incidset resuldngia e ere1wscent release would love radselegical ceasequenas far greater them shone assuned in the Hi-STAR TSAR.
The follombs two scenarios. al a aminiouse simlei be cansdeed. "an aam:k la
=
weich the c.uk is capasred, peneusied ley one er snare empleshe services, and seJesses a siisnifiennt mena=a (st teest noe procent) ofits radioerdw contents; med an anack ht which the cask is perforened try see or moet suunor-piercingvecierts orinisodse and sneeuws a messasunt am ount (as has ear pan est) efias sa4asetite coeuets."*
Note ther Halseead and BaBard escommend a 196 selease became shse is the percantage of anmediased fuel ruissend in the Sandia==Bmaarr tarts" We snaistain Amt a design tesis ecedest aheadd ret be the release ot2 3108or less of 9w cesiusa inventory, but 194, based as the Sandia suboenge insts. Fursher,it is set simply inheside-shmed p_' ' _
that are irepcstans. Larser.siard passiculsess mill be released and deposind dowumied, giving rise to a direct gemsna done.
Tliernsal Requirements The pmposed Coc temperarse auditions for the Holwc Nf-STAR 100 sorage cask are not snificiese to esastaneer that cladding and neanroe ahield degradstion mill be rearsmir.ed. Toreduceleightcm,~ -es NRC statTmustlacorporateanashrniemmi condnice inie ele CoC. a sniennues pih;h or centes-to oceser thseance besueen emake.
While Hohee has suggemed a piwh of I T or a.1' spacing hetseen essks, this anahsis is thehr act hamed on noorous es1culaticas. Usnit the State receews the proprietary calculsilons Anm Holtec. it cannot comunens with specificityon thens. Howewr,bened on reses afsimilar proprietary esiculations for the Hf-STORM 800 ensks se hsw rotewed, we are skeptical thea lhe propnetarv eniculssions for the HI. STAR 100 cask are rigorois and sufEcient.
1.Inder the presens segulatory fiamemosk.ERC semitand eenernesars muss show that indhidual casks will not owrhear if subjected so normal (avesageT = B0 'F) ami cir.
Twmal (awrage T = 100 T) misperanues. It the normal or efr. normal tempressure conditions are smisSed, than the ensk sney be used in that lacerloa. This is siraDe so the approach for the CaC carthipsake and nomasks candisiana. but with one hnpostsat dMerence: indhidual cads may inecract with each osber, csush,g tempersase conditions above aanbient -,-_- >= candiitions. As avesastotine Holhs nomarce abeesbingsmaascid
u a en, Surtisent kParalh AsurasmessurgrGr sofreygIpana Fasd Temausurenaeuse DeseE.eehana EANDe&at6s.
=rsares Ar doe tr> EssuikLMs. haw Spek r
uinneuen armene aut. ets u Ast.* mage +
w..
fem erussi
\\
and te cladding may dayade due no excessive best. In the }E.5 TAR 100 TSAR. the presence of aquent enski sad die eescrete pad sna) not be corret1!y takes imo are===
as far as one can dessrinime frose }iohne's skrich nonpreprietasy assipis. This seuld 3
be property addieaud in the SER and CoC.
Ifthe camer.tn<entar distmace between a4 scent M!.57AR 100 easks is too samtl. casks cosy thermally laternet with each other. essetiwty ineirasing the ambient serspeesture.
j According to Holess's TSAR. 6e evapnet sket outside nordare ermperasures me 229 Y and 249 T under nonnad and a5essmal scrapuanse caussiloos " la the most extresse esang (c, jfaqsanat casks are in imunediase camast, matcad of the ambient sesaguemews being Be T under naamat onadleians, ie wesed be 229 T. As see casks are reewd smay frean each oder, a name diessene die assi s hename thanasty indepedent of asch osher.
Haline attempts se calculate this I stance in Fig. d.4.5 by sammung a radiatiw blosidas
'% 3:e to lhe peessnce ofother 1sels Bei the sitashes se an IEFSI h farmass
. A-d is is not a bencians facear so amarb as ses presence of adjacent hans sowsse x
at 2291. The effective aschiesa temperatuse 351 be raised as she caAs intsram whh each other. The distance at which casks s91 act independestily ofeach othermust be calculaned by Hottee and incJuded in time Coc. For itse HI. STAR 100 cask. As esitical tesopezarme is 300 Y for de inner surface of she Hediie neuerem abeesbine materisi that sanounds the nurtalcash. The mazionen tempetansres of the }fellte undar nannal amd oEnournal asaditions are 2M T and 294 T. tespectively. The is, the }D. STAR 100 is already operating with a shirt niety sursia, met accownting forthe inwractiah hasween casks.
To see isso accessa 1he iraecaction ofcasks. de folloeise factors inns he Inc.=f, into Ibe calculation. As a first approxuomstion. Italtec condd assume a$ scent casts athe sanne temperahme. T,= 229 T tasotsison.murage pad senspeusture, exasmal convecerve air essiaans, sad mind speed snust mise he incorporaerd isno the madrL ~Jhe swface eersperarme of the cesner cask.T,. could them becateulstad. En the next iessation, the adjacem casts could be ashen et temperance T, and a new teraperaenre for 1he cenart cask could be calculanal T. Hahme could then drissasine 36sserthe series Ts, Ti,T,is comweing so sasac asympactic ulue. lfshe value fes the inner surface ofthe neueron airld exceeds 300 T. the rasks must be spaced feriherapart.-
As the situasion psumensly seemes,the SER and CoC are deficiset. The maxusruns claddirigtempennee er temperanse eIshe neuena shield inner surface has not be cervectly calculaisd. NRC sassand Hobsc are assurairy there is no interaction between thecasks. This assomsption la met essmervaise.
- sense repicet snarty Anaheimaspen Gree ESTAs lGDOmA S enmhschupet 544 Man.lasC f
thustetNo 73.Italt.7eMriB l.
.8
can.
m=ww3aut.nmanmusw m
, y..
ses erthan RennevaWe Serisce Costanilastion The TSAR includes Techairal , J0rS::: llor armovable surface essnaciamlea " If the snaralde contaminados exceeds 22004snfl00 cm fsons seasna and beta samtma senross. the Tedmical Specifa'cmians require har the acc:ssible surface te flashed or pressure washed. "If he sneerable cessasuinasion limiss sdll causes he reduced to accepenbic lewis.cubaste and perionn afiesnstist actions up to and buclading mem'al of the MPC flem she H14 TAR 500 erwerpack aAersonnevire the spem 6ml frois the MPC.* These anodimens casace he ans at de poposed off-aine Sim5 Vancy ISFSt in
- 1) inh. No prcmsions saist for ' - -
1 ; casks wider PF5's "usert clean, stay etenn*
~
philseophy. PFS's psopeesdpodicy is to eseurs ensks that are cantamissled above nqrulsiory lienits back to rendar sites No pummess would cains at PF5 formuseving &c
'O01:arn die HFSTAR 500 snerpe:L lasecognieismofsheenaAle hermeentheTech Spets Ear Ibe Hl-STAR 100 and design ef 6e PF3 facility {and possitey other ISFSts),
abe NRC should specilY than all users ef the HMTAR 300 have sin tapahdny mo rensove smearable contaminadanensine.
Fletare Res*erssking Procesteres The State ef Cash stranalydisagrees sish any proposal by she NRC no aggsene future 4&Iisions and rnisions to de list of appround spens fud s1urage casks as disect fmal rules. Drider such a mocedure absre uvuld be na psopoed role. Instead, the rule would beimrne f!nal wnhisM5 dap after publication salens NRC seceives "significans a Nerse commems ce the sera,1 Ensi rule within 30 days after puld-=rirm
- H Fed. Reg.
at 1543. On accipt of such de lificantly atherie comments. NRC meeld wididraw1be rule, vistress the rwnmems, she a publish a flaal rule. First, the premise undesl>tng NRC't psopened precedsmi dtage - thes *nd&tions and revisines so the lis: of appioved spern feet s'orage essks are roncennmercist and roudne"- is innceusme. The above cocamesis sham that NV.'s sppsord is mas 'somine." Moreover. shes die past prehleens. such as beti se erneks asexinaed widi dry storage cad,s, h is impeincive that fhnse appnyva! ce revis em to the tat of approved esiks be sutsect so adecysste and rigceoias public scatism). Secced. a direct final rule reduces to 30 dap the pasiod oftime for ef5ectise puhlic crum ment. This is an insuf5ciens tiene period se review and prepare cinvernas that may be tigniscandy adstrac* to cause NRC to withdraw the puhlished final rule. Thini, a d'ress final snie wilt dunimish she public sale in corumesning and u
affacingthe ouscome ofridemaking peacedme. h is omae likr}y that NRC will give due cosideration so counments a the propose rule siege; any commenis at de final rule stage
- u a u.m
- At
Commensw PruEmirery SER.55iAR 400 rnway Cad yn see ofunh M har to te Ngriiticandy ahwtse* for NRC to rewrse comme and withdrawthe direcs find rule.
Safeey cueniderstions are too important for NRC so erpaine the appsuvat proces at abe enpense of diminishing the pubhc's role in commenths on the appsetal o(spent maclear fud casks.
1 9
?
-.... = =.
==
=
7 t
3.5 - - FUEL RODS 1
The cladding of the fuel rods is the initial confinement boundary in the HI-STORM 100 System.
. Analyses have been performed in Chapter 3 to ensure that the maximum temperature of the fuel l
cladding is below the Pacific Northwest Laboratory's threshold values for various cooling times.
L
'These temperature limits ensure that the fuel cladding will not degrade in an inert helium l
environment. Additional details on the fuel rod cladding temperature analyses for the spent fuel to be loaded into the Hi-STORM 100 System are provided in Chapter 3.
(
The dimensions of the storage cell openings in the MPC are equal to or greater than those used in spent fuel racks supplied by Holtec International. Thousands of fuel assemblies have been shuffled i
in and out of these cells over the years without a single instance of cladding failure. The vast body of physical evidence from prior spent fuel handling operations provides confirmation that the fuel handling and loading operations with the HI-STORM 100 MPC will not endanger or compromise the integrity of the cladding or the structural integrity of the assembly.
l The HI-STORM 100 System is designed and evaluated for a maximum deceleration of 45g's. Studies
. of the capability of spent fuel rods to resist impact loads [3.5.1) indicate that the most vulnerable fuel l
can withstand 63 g's in the side impact orientation. Therefore, limiting the HI-STORM 100 System to a maximum deceleration of 45 g's (perpendicular to the longitudinal' axis of the overpack during l
all normal and hypothetical accident conditions) ensures that fuel rod cladding integrity is l
maintained. In [3.5.1], it is assumed that the fuel rod cladding pmvides the only structural resistance l
to bending and buckling of the rod. For accidents where the predominate deceleration is directed along the longitudinal axis of the overpack, [3.5.1) also demonstrates that no elastic instability or yielding of the cladding will occur until the deceleration level is well above the HI-STORM 100 limit of 45g's. The solutions presented in [3.5.1], however, assume that the fuel pellets are not i
intimately attached to the cladding when subjected to an axial deceleration load that may cause an elastic instability of the fuel rod cladding.-
l The limit based on classical Euler buckling analyses performed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in [3.5.1] is 82 g's. In the LLNL report, the limiting axial load to ensure fuel rod stability is obtained by modeling the fuel rod as a simply supported beam with unsupported length equal to the grid strap spacing. The limit load under this condition is:
2 2
F = x EI/L In the preceding formula, E = Young's Modulus of the cladding, I = area moment ofinertia of the cladding, and L = spacing of the grid straps.
HI-STORM TSAR Rev.7
' REPORT Hi-951312 3.5-1 1
(
L
? Assuming that F = WxA/g with W being the weight of a fuel rod, and A = the deceleration, the Euler buckling formula can be expressed as A/g = x ( ER'tn/Wr.L ),3 p 2
2 2
~ In the preceding formula, g = gravity, n = number of fuel rods in the fuel assembly, Wr.= the total weight of the fuel assembly, t = cladding wall thickness, and R = cladding mean radius.
Using the preceding formula, a survey of a large variety of fuel assembly types in [3.5.1) concluded that a 17 x 17 PWR assembly resulted in the minimum value for deceleration and results in the lower bound limit of:
A/g = 82 -
The fuel pellet weight was omitted from the analysis in [3.5.1] by.vinue of the assumption that under axial load, the cladding did not support the fuel pellet mass. Since the results may not be conservative because of the assumption'concerning the behavior of the fuel pellet mass, a new analysis of the structural response of the fuel cladding is presented here. It is demonstrated that the maximum axially oriented deceleration that can be applied to the fuel cladding is in excess of the design basis deceleration specified in this TSAR. Therefore, the initial confinement boundary
. remains intact during a hypothetical accident of transport where large axially directed decelerations are experienced by the HI-STORM 100 package.
The analysis reported in this section of the TSAR considers the most limiting fuel rod in the fuel
. assembly. Most limiting is defined as the fuel rod that may undergo the largest bending (lateral)
' deformations in the event of a loss ofclastic stability. The fuel rod is modeled as a thin-walled elastic tube capable of undergoing large lateral dis. placements in the event that high axial loads cause a loss of stability (i.e., the non-linear interaction of axial and bending behavior of the elastic tube is included in the problem fonnulation). The fuel rod and the fuel pellet mass is included in the analysis with the fuel pellet mass assumed to contribute only its mass to the analysis. In the HI-STORM 100 spent fuel basket, continuous support to limit lateral movement is provided to the fuel assembly along its entire length. The extent oflateral movement of any fuel rod in a fuel assembly is limited to: (1) the' clearance gap between the grid straps and the fuel basket cell wall at the grid strap
- locations; and, (2) the maximum available gap between the fuel basket cell wall and the fuel rod in the region between the grid straps. Note that the grid straps act as fuel rod spacers at the strep locations; away from the grid straps, however, there is no restraint against fuel rod -to-rod contact under a loading giving rise to large lateral motion of the individual rods. Under the incremental application of axial deceleration to the fuel rod, the fuel rod compresses and displaces from the
' axially oriented inertial loads experienced. The non-linear numerical analysis proceeds to track the l
HI-STORM TSAR Rev.7 REPORT HI-951312 3.5-2
o Lbehavior of the fuel bd up to and beyond contact with the rigid confining walls of the HI-STOR l
100 fuel basket.
The analysis is carried out for the "most limiting" spent fuel assembly. The "most limiting" criteria used herein is based on the simple elastic stability formula assuming buckling occurs only between grid straps. This is identical to the methodology employed in [3.5.1] to identify the fuel assembly that limits design basis axial deceleration loading. Table 3.5.1 presents tabular data for a wide variety of fuel assemblies. Considerable data was obtained using the tables in [3.5.2]. The configuration with the lowest value of" Beta" is the most limiting for simple elastic Euler buckling between grid straps; the Westinghouse 14x14 Vantage,"W14V", PWR configuration is used to obtain results.
The material properties used in the non-linear analysis are those for irradiated Zircalloy and are obtained from [3.5.1). The Young's Modulus and the cladding dynamic yield stress are set as:
q E = 10,400.000 psi c = 80,500 psi y
The fuel cladding material is assumed to have no tensile or compressive stress capacity beyond the.
material yield strength.
Calculations are performed for two limiting assumptions on the magnitude of resisting moment at the grid straps. Figures 3.5.1 through 3.5.9 aid in understanding the calculation. It is shown in the detailed calculations that the maximum stress in the fuel rod cladding occurs subsequent to the cladding deflecting and contacting the fuel basket cell wall. Two limiting analyses are carried out. The initial analysis assumes that the large deflection of the cladding between two grid straps occurs without any resisting moment at the grid strap supports. This maximizes the stress in the free span of the cladding, but eliminates all cladding stress at the grid strap supports. It is shown that this analysis provides a conservative lower bound on the limiting deceleration. The second analysis assumes a reasonable level of moment resistance to develop at the grid straps; the level developed is based on an assumed deflection shape for the cladding spans adjacent to the span subject to detailed analysis. For this second analysis, the limiting decelerations are much larger with the limit stress level occurring in the free span and at the grid strap support locations.
It is concluded that the most conservative set of assumptions on structural response still lead to the conclusion that the fuel rod cladding remains intact under the design basis deceleration levels set for the HI-STORM 100.
4
' HI-STORM TSAR Rev.7 REPORT HI-951312 3.5-3 l
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In the following, a physical description of the structural instability problem is provided with the aid of Figures 3.5.1 to 3.5.9. A stored fuel assembly consists of a square grid of fuel rods. Each fuel rod consists of a thin-walled cylinder surrounding and containing the fuel pellets. The majority of the total weight of a fuel rod is in the fuel pellets; however, the entire structural resistance of the fuel rod to lateral and longitudinal loads is provided by the cladding. Hereinafter, the use of the words
" fuel rod", " fuel rod cladding", or just " cladding" means w structural thin cylinder.
The weight of the fuel pellets is conservatively assumed to be attached to the cladding for all discussions and evaluations.
Figure 3.5.1 shows a typical fuel rod in a fuel assembly. Also shown in Figure 3.5.1 are the grid straps and the surrounding walls of the spent fuel basket cell walls. The grid straps serve to rnaintain the fuel rods in a square array at a certain number of locations along the length of the fuel assembly. When the fuel rod is subject to a loading causing a lateral deformation, the grid strap locations are the first locations I
along the length of the rod where contact with the fuel basket cell walls occurs. The fuel basket cell walls are assumed to be rigid surfaces. The fuel rod is assumed subject to some axial load and most likely has some slight initially deformed shape.
For the purposes of the analysis, it is assumed that displacement under load occurs in a 2-D plane and that the ends of the fuel rod cladding have a specified boundary condition to restrain lateral deflection. The ends of the fuel rod cladding are assumed to be simply supported and the grid straps along the length of the fuel assembly are assumed to have gap "gi" relative to the cell walls of the fuel basket. The figure shows a typical fuel rod in the assembly that is located by gaps "g2" and "g3" with respect to the fuel basket walls. Because the individual fuel rod is long and slender and is not perfectly straight, it will deform under a small axial load into the position
(
shown in Figure 3.5.2. The actual axial load is due to the distributed weight subject to a deceleration from a hypothetical accident of transport. For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that some equivalent axial load is applied to one end of the fuel rod cladding. Because of the distributed weight and the fact that a deceleration i
load is not likely to be exactly axially oriented, the predominately axial load will j
induce a lateral displacement of the fuel rod cladding between the two end supports.
The displacement will not be symmetric but will be larger toward the end of the cladding where support against the axial deceleration is provided. Depending on the number of grid straps, either one or two grid straps will initially make contact with the fuel basket cell wall and the contact will not be exactly centered along the length of the cell. Figure 3.5.3 illustrates the position of the fuel rod after the axial load has increased beyond the value when initial contact occurred and additional grid straps
{
are now in contact with the cell wall. The maximum stress in the fuel rod will occur at the location of maximum curvature and will be a function of the bending moment (F x(82-gi))-
2 l
]
Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-7 Rev. 7 HI-951312 a
)
At some load F > F2, either the limit stress in the fuel rod cladding is achieved or the rod 3
begins to experience large lateral movements between grid plates because of the coupling between axial and lateral load and deformation. Figure 3.5.4 shows the deformation mode experienced by the fuel rod cladding caused by the onset of an instability between two grid straps that are in contact with the fuel basket cell wall.
Once the lateral displacement initiates, the rod displaces until contact with the cell wall occurs at the mid point "A" ( see Figure 3.5.5) or the cladding stress exceeds the cladding material yield strength. Depending on the particular location of the fuel rod in the fuel assembly, the highest stressed portion of the fuel rod will occur in the segment with the larger of the two gaps "g2" and "g3". Fcr the discussion to follow, assume that I
g2 > g3. The boundary condition at the grid strap is conservatively assumed as simply-cupported so that the analysis need not consider what happens in adjacent spans betweer. grid straps. At this point in the loading process, the maximum bending moment occum at the contact point and has the value F x (g2-81). Figure 3.5.5 shows the 4
displaced configuration at the load level where initial contact occurs with the fuel cell wall. If the maximum fuel rod stress (from the bending moment and from the axial load) equals the yield stress of the fuel rod cladding, it is assumed that F3 = F4 is the i
maximum axial load that can be supported. The maximum stress in the fuel rod cladding occurs at point "A" in Figure 3.5.5 since that location has the maximum i
bending moment. If the cladding stress is still below yield, additional load can be supported. As the load is further increased, the bending moment is decreased and replaced by reaction loads, "V", at the grid strap and the contact point. These reaction
~ loads V are shown in Figure 3.5.7 and are normal to the cell wall surface. Figure 3.5.6 shows the configuration after the load has been further increased from the value at initial contact. There are two distinct regions that need to be considered sub.=e.guent to initial contact with the fuel basket cell wall. During the additional loding phase, the point "A" becomes two " traveling" points, A, and A'. Since the bendL g nmment at A' and A is zero, the moment F x (82-81) is balanced by forces V at the edd strap and at 5
point A or A'. This is shown in Figure 3.5.7 where the unsupported lengtit current "a" is shown with the balancing load. At this point in the process, two " failure" modes are possible for the fuel rod cladding.
The axial load that develops in the unsupported region between the grid strap and point A' causes increased deformation and stress in that segment, or, The straight region of the rod, between A and A', begins to experience a lateral deformation away from the cell wall.
Hl-STORM TSAR 3.5-8 Rev.7 Hi-951312
7.
Note that in this latter scenario, the slope at A or A' remains zero so this should never govem unless the flat region becomes large. The final limit load occurs when the maximum stress in either portion of the rod exceeds the yield stress of the tube. In what follows, the most limiting fuel assembly from the array of fuel types considered is subject to detailed analysis and the limit load established. This limit axial load is considered as the product of the fuel rod weight times the deceleration. Therefore, establishing the limit load to reach cladding material yield establishes the limiting
{
axial deceleration that can be imposed.
The preceding discussion has assumed end. conditions of simple support for j
conservatism. The location of the fuel rod determines the actual free gap between grid
{
straps. For example, a fuel rod furthest from the cell wall that resists lateral movement of the assembly moves to close up all of the clearances that exist between it and the resisting cell wall. The clearance between rods is the rod pitch minus the rod diameter.
In a 14 x 14 assembly, there are 13 clearance gaps plus an additional clearance g3 between the nearest rod and the cell wall. Therefore, the gap g2 s given as i
g2 = 13(pitch-diameter) + g3 Figure 3.5.9 provides an illustration of the fuel rod deformation for a case of 5 fuel rods in a column. Clearly for this case, the available lateral movement can be considerable for the " furthest" fuel rod. On the other hand, for this fuel rod, there will be considerable moment resistance at the grid strap from the adjacent section of the fuel rod. The situation is different when the rod being analyzed is assumed to be the closest to the cell wall. In this case, the clearance gap is much smaller, but the moment resistance provided by adjacent sections of the rod is reduced. For calculation purposes, we assume that a moment resistance is provided as M = f x K0 for the fuel rod under analysis where
' K = 3EI/L,
L= span between grid straps, and "f" is an assumed fraction of K The preceding result for the rotational spring constant assumes a simple support at each end of the span with an end moment "M" applied. Classical strength of materials gives the result for the spring constant. The arbitrary assumption of a constant reduction in the spring constant is to account for undetermined interactions between axial force in the rod and the calculated spring constant. As the compressive force in the adjacent members increases, the spring constant will be reduced. On the other hand, as the adjacent span contacts its near cell wall, the spring constant increases. On balance, it should be conservative to assume a considerable reduction in the spring constant available to the span being analyzed in detail. As a further conservatism, we also use the angle 8 defined by the geometry and not include any additional clastic displacement shape. This will further reduce the value of the resisting moment at any stage of the solution. In the detailed calculations, two limiting cases are examined. To limit the analysis to a single rod, it is assumed that after " stack-up" of the rods (see Figure 3.5.9),.
the lateral support provided by the cell wall supports all of the rods. That is, the rods are considered to have non-deforming cross-section.
Hl-STORM TSAR 3.5-9 Rev. 7 Hi-051312
Numerical Analysis - Based on the tabular results in Table 3.5.1, the fuel assembly with the smallest value for the deceleration based on the classical Euler buckling formula is analyzed in detail. The following input data is specified for the limiting 14 x 14 assembly
[3.5.2]:
Inside dimension of a HI-STORM 100 fuel basket cell s := 8.75 in Outside envelope dimension of grid plate gp := 7.763 in Outer diameter of fuel rod cladding D :=.4 in l
Wall thickness of cladding t :=.0243 in Weight of fuel assembly (including end fittings)
W := 1177 lbf Number of fuel rods + guide /in'strument n := 14 tubes m a column or row Overall length of fuel rod between assumed end support L := 151 in Length of fuel rod between grid straps L := 25.3 in s
Average clearance to cell wall at a grid strap location assuming a straight and centered fuel assembly 8 I :=.5-(s - gp) g ; - 0.494 +in Rod pitch pitch := 0.556 in Clearance := (n - 1)-(pitch - D)
Clearance -2.028 in Minimum available clearance for lateral movement of a fuel rod between grid straps g 3 " 81 +.5-(gp - (n D + Clearance))
g 3 - 0.561 in Maximum available clearances for lateral movement of a fuel rod between grid straps g 2 " 8 3 + Clearance g 2 - 2.589.in Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-10 Rev.7 HI-951312
4
. Young's Modulus of Zircalloy [3.5.l]
E := 10400000 psi Dynamic Yield Strength of Zircalloy (3.5.1]
y := 80500 psi o
Geometry Calculations:
Compute the metal cross section area A, the metal area moment ofinertia I, and the total weight of a single fuel rod (conservatively assume that end fittings are only supported by fuel rods in the loading scenario ofinterest).
D -(D - 2 t)2' I:=1-D -(D - 2 t)#
'A:=E-2 4
4/
64 2
A - 0.029.in 1 - 5.082 10-4.in4 W := W W - 6.005 lbf r
r
~
n As an initial lower bound calculation, assume no rotational support from adjacent spans and define a multiplying factor j
f:= 0.0 Compute the rotational spring constant available from adjacent sections of the rod.
K := 3 E-f K - 0.l'bf in L s Now compute the limit load, if applied at one end of the fuel rod cladding, that causes an overall clastic instability and contact with the cell wall. Assume buckling in a symmetric mode for a conservatively low result. The purpose of this calculation is solely to demonstrate the flexibility of the single fuel rod. No resisting moment capacity is assumed to be present at the fittings.
i I
~
P 0 := x E P 0 - 2.288.lbf 2
1 l
Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-11 Rev.7 Hi-951312 j
t Note that this is less than the weight of the rod itself. This demonstrates that in the absence of any additional axial support, the fuel rod will bow and be supported by the cell walls under a very small axial load. In reality, however, there is additional axial support that would increase this initial buckling load. The stress induced in the rod by this overall deflected shape is small.
P 0'81 D Stress i :=
Stress ; - 444.32. psi 21-P 0 Stress d := A Stress d - 79.76 psi The conclusion of this initial calculation is that grid straps come in contact and we need only consider what happens between a grid strap. We first calculate the classical Euler buckling load based on a pin-ended rod and assuming conservatively that the entire weight of the rod is providing the axial driving force. This gives a conservatively low estimate of the limiting deceleration that can be resisted before a perfectly straight rod buckles.
I
~
a lim! := n E-a lim! - 13.57 L
W s
r The rigid body angle of rotation at the grid strap under this load that causes contact is:
2-(8 2 - 81f 0 g := atan 0 g -9.406 deg Conservatively assume resisting moment at the gr'id is proportional to this " rigid body" angle:
M := K 8 M -0 in lbf (in this first analysis, no resisting moment is r
g r
assumed)
The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and the resisting moment is W alimi MD r
r
+
o
- 2841.172 psi SS :=
o A
2I 8s The total stress at the contact location is HI-STORM TSAR 3.5-12 Rev.7 HI-951312 -
i Y a i ml'(8 2 - 81)- M D
r r
4 Stress 2
- Stress 2 - 6.721 10. psi g
W aNml r-
. Stress 2d "
Stress 2d - 2841.172. psi g
4 Stress 2t := Stress 2 + Stress 2d Stress 2t - 7.00510 psi This is the maximum value of the stress at this location since, for further increase in axial load, the moment'will decrease with consequent large decrease in the total stress.
The safety factor is o
-1.149 Stress 2t The axial load in the unsupported port:on of the beam at this instant is (W Dliml)
P ax *
- )
cos p
- 82.599.lbf ax At this point in the load process, a certain axial load exists in the unsupported span on either side of the contact point. However, since the unsupported span is approximately 50% of the original span, the allowable deceleration limit is larger. As the axial load is incrementally increased, the moment at the contact point is reduced to zero with consequent increases in the lateral force V at the grid strap and at the contact points A and A'. Figure 3.5.8 provides the necessary information to determine the elastic deformation that occurs in the unsupported span as the axial load increases and the contact points separate (and, therefore, decreasing the free span).
From geometry, coupled with the assumption that the deflected shape is a half" sin" function with peak value "6", the following relations are developed:
Assume "a" is a fraction of 50% of the span (the following calculations show only the fmal iterated assumption for the fraction c :=.9 Il s a - 11.385 in a := c -
(2/
Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5 Rev. 7 HI-951312
Calculate "b" in Figure 3.5.8
]
.5 ~
b := (a) + (g 2 - 81)3
~
b - 11.576 in an equation for 5 can be developed from the geometric relation (8 2 - 81) ~
b
- =
a 2 (R - 6) l
' The inverse of the radius of curvature, R, at the point of peak elastic deflection of the free span, is computed as the second derivative of the assumed sin wave deflection shape. Based on the geometry in Figure 3.5.8, the peak deflection is:
I 5
i
+ 4 b g 2'-
<2 l
b 1
b 6 :=.5-a-
- a-2-(g 2 - 81),
(3/
4'(82-81) 5 -0.426 in i
For the assumed "a", the limiting axial load capacity in the unsupported region is conservatively estimated as:
2 I
a lim 2 := n E-2, a lim 2 - 64.816
)
The corresponding rigid body angle is:
1 -(g 2 - 81)'
0 2 := atan 0 2 - 10.429 deg -
a Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-14 Rev.7 Hi-951312
.I
. The axial load in the unsupported portion of the beam at this instant is (W alim2) r P
t*
ax cs0) 3 p
- 395.763.lbf ax The resisting moment is Ai r := K 0 2 r
M = 0 in lbf The total stress in the middle of the unsupported section of free span "b" is stress 3 " (P 6-hi)D ax r
4 stress 3 - 6.63910. psi 21 P ax 4
stress 3d := A stress 3d - 1.3810.ps.i 4
stress 3t := stress 3 + stress 3d stress 3t - 8.015 10. psi The safety factor is 0 y
-1.004 stress 3t
. The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and any the resisting moment is
{
W a lim 2 MD r
gs :=
r 4
+
o
- 1.35710.pst o
A 21 gs o
The safety factor is Y - 5.932 gs j
For this set of assumptions, the stress capacity of the rod cladding has been achieved, so that the limit deceleration is:
A 1 mit := a 1 m2 A limit - 64.816 This exceeds the design basis for the HI-STORM 100 package.
l HI-STORM TSAR 3.5-15 Rev.7 HI-961312
L If there is any restraining moment from the adjacent span, there is a possibility of exceeding the rod structural limits at that location due to the induced stress. Therefore, the above calculations are repeated for an assumed moment capacity at the grid strap.
f:= 1.
K := 3 E ' f L s The rigid body angle of rotation at the grid strap under this load that causes contact is:
2,(82-81) 0 g := atan 0 g - 9.406 deg L s Conservatively assume resisting moment at the grid a function of this angle,is M r := K 0 i r
M - 102.875 in lbf The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and the resisting moment is W alimi MD-r r
4
+
o
- 4.333 10
- psi 85 :=
o A
21 gs The total stress at the contact location is W a I mi-(8 2 - 8.1) - M -
Stress 2 - 2.67210 psi D
r r
4 Stress 3 :=
21 W a1ml r
Stress 2d :=
Stress 2d - 2841.172. psi A
4 Stress 2t := Stress 2 + Stress 2d Stress 2t - 2.95610
- psi This is the maximum value of the stress at this location since, for further increase in axial load, the moment will decrease with consequent large decrease in the total stress.
The axial load in the unsupported portion of the beam at this instant is i
(W aliml) r P ax :=
P
- 82.599 lbf ax cos(0 ;)
Hi-STORM TSAR -
3.5-16 Rev. 7 Hi-951312
)
.c
- a
- At this point in the load process, a certain axial load exists in the unsupported span on either side of the contact point. However, since the unsupported span is approximately 50% of the original span, the allowable deceleration limit is larger. As the axial load is incrementally increased, the moment at the contact point is reduced to zero with consequent increases in the lateral force V at the grid strap and at the contact points A and A'. Figure 3.5.8 provides the necessary information to determine the elastic deformation that occurs in the unsupported span as the axial load increases and the contact points separate (and, therefore, decreasing the free span).
From geometry, coupled with the assumption that the deflected shape is a half" sin" function with peak value "6", the following relations are developed:
' Assume "a" is a fraction of 50% of the span (the following calculations show only the fina iterated assumption for the fraction e :=.7 L\\
s a := c -
a - 8.855 in 2)
Calculate "b" in Figure 3.5.8 (a)2,(,,))2
- b :=
b - 9.1 *in The inverse of the radius of curvature, R, at the point of peak elastic deflection of the free span, is computed as the second derivative of the assumed sin wave deflection shape. Based on the geometry in Figure 3.5.8, the peak deflection is:
+ 4 y)2'
'5 1
- 2
(
y.
y.
i 6 :=.5 -
a-
- a-2-(g 2 - 81),
(xj 4-(82-81) 3
)
6 - 0.427+in HI-STORM TSAR 3.5-17 Rev. 7 Hi-961312 -
3
F i
r I
i For the assumed "a", the limiting axial load capacity in the unsupported region is conservatively estimated as:
2 I
1 a lim 2 := x E b)2, a 1 m2 - 104.9 The corresponding rigid body angle is:
(82-81) 0 3 := atan 1-0 > - 13.314 deg a
The axial load in the unsupported portion of the beam at this instant is (W a1 m2) r P ax "
E
= 647.331 albf ax cos(0) 2 The resisting moment is M := K 0 ~2
' M - 145.619.in lbf r
r The total stress in the middle of the unsupported section of free span "b" is stress 3 := (P 6-M ) D ax r
4 stress 3 - 5.14510
- psi 2I 4
stress 3d := A stress 3d -2.25710 psi i
4 stress 3t := stress 3 + stress 3d stress 3t - 7.40210 psi The safety factor is a y
-1.088 stress 3t
' The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and any the resisting moment is Hi-STORM TSAR -
3.5-18 Rev. 7 Hi-961312
1 W -a 'im2 MD r l r
4_
gs
- gs " WW W A
21 The safety factor is Y- - 1.015 gs i
For this' set of assumptions, the stress capacity of the rod cladding has been achieved, so that the limit deceleration is:
A limit := a lim 2 A limit - 104.9 i
(
. Conclusions An analysis has demonstrated that for the most limiting PWR fuel assembly stored in the HI-STORM 100 fuel basket, a conservative lower bound limit on acceptable axial decelerations exceeds the 45g design basis of the cask. For a reasonable assumption of moment resisting capacity at the grid straps, the axial' deceleration limit exceeds the design basis by a large margin.
It is concluded that fuel rod integrity is maintained in the event of a hypothetical accident condition leading to a 45g design basis deceleration in the direction normal to the target.
l' I
i j
Hl-STORM TSAR 3.5-19 Rev.7 Hi-961312
l
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