ML20210B220
| ML20210B220 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/1986 |
| From: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Ward D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137P218 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8602040397 | |
| Download: ML20210B220 (5) | |
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~g i UNITED STATES 4 8 n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j ,i WASHINGTON, D. C.'20555 Y*****JY January 23, 1986 CHAIRMAN Mr. David A. Ward, Chairman Advisory. Committee on Reactor Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Mr. Ward:
This is in response to your letter dated November 14, 1985 containing comments on the NRC Incident Investigation Program.
Your letter discussed several aspects of the staff's program including: the degree of coher~ence in the followup actions from the Davis-Besse investigation; and the relative weights that should be placed on independence and expertise in the makeup of future incident investigation teams. The Commission would like to respond on both of these' subjects.
With regard to the degree of coherence on followup actions-from the Davis-Besse event, it is important to note that the direct ~
focus of the Davis-Besse Team was on the causes and circumstances of the June 9 event. In addition, implications of this event on other plants were noted, as appropriate, in the Team's report, NUREG-1154. Thus, the followup actions defined by the ED0 identified actions concerning Davis-Besse separately from items warranting review because of their generic implications.
All Davis-Besse related follow-on actions will be resolved in an integrated manner and will be documented in a single report, i.e., the staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER). Thus, a high degree of " coherence" should result in our resolution of these action items. For example, the SER will specifically address the root cause of each component failure, provide updated information, identify corrective actions taken, and assess the acceptability of the licensee's actions. The SER will serve to update the information on the event contained in the Team's report.
As noted above, the generic concerns identified as part of the investigation of the Davis-Besse event have been highlighted by the EDO. These generic concerns and the responsible office are identified in the ED0's memorandum of August 5, 1985. The resolution of'these concerns will be coordinated and integrated Qg%olo4o377'
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through (a) periodic ED0 meetings with the responsible Office Directors, including written status reports on each item, and (b) internal coordination and concurrence procedures to assure that the actions are complementary and that the resolution of one issue will not adversely affect the solution to another.
For example, one generic item (8f) calls for AE00 review of past operating experience and. determination of causes for overspeed trips.- AE00 will issue a specific report on this subject which will be reviewed and acted upon, as appropriate, by NRR and IE.
Another example is generic item (8j) where resolution has been initiated through the issuance of an IE Bulletin identifying the specific action necessary to assure the operability of selected safety-related valves. Coherence on this item was achieved by means of wide coordination within the staff and by a CRGR review.
With regard to the relative weights of independence and expertise, it is important to recall that various reviews of the NRC's investigation of significant events, including the report by the Brookhaven National Laboratory, found no indication of bias or. lack of independence on the part of the NRC. The Commission recognizes, however, that technical expertise and the perception of independence may indeed be competing. Both virtues are needed given'available staff resources and a specific incident to be investigated. The objective is to assure that al-1 IIT's are well qualified technically to thoroughly determine what happened and why. Further, we agree that each team must be sufficiently independent to assure that the real causes of the event are sought, including any NRC contributions or lapses, and discussed in the. team's report.
Thus, it is expected that the team members will be from several NRC offices and will not have direct, significant involvement with the plant or the regulatory activities that may be associated with the event.
We greatly appreciate the interest in and contributions made by the ACRS to the formation of the staff's program for incident investigation. The ACRS will be kept fully informed by the i
staff as the program is further defined.
Commissioner Asselstine adds the following:
- I would have formed an independent office to investigate significant incidents at operating nuclear power plants, as recommended in the Brookhaven report and endorsed by the
- ACRS. The Commission rejects the notion of receiving
! candid, independent advice on root causes, including those that may have origins within the Agency, of significant events. As the Committee observes, given the Commission
. decision to have its staff investigate significant events,
O the Commission must now face the issue of the relative weights to be assigned to the competing virtues of independence and expertise for members of an IIT. The Commission responds to this concern by saying that we will select team members from several NRC offices and from among individuals who have not had direct, significant involvement with the plant or the regulatory activities that may be associated with the event. In my view, it is simply asking too much of what most likely will turn out to be mid-level people to advise the Commission candidly on whether the Commission's policies, procedures and practices, and perhaps even the individual regulatory decisions of their own offices and management, have contributed to or are a root cause of a significant event.
The Commission repeatedly states that its major decisions on policies, procedures and practices have been carefully thought through and that the regulatory program has been and is successful., even with respect to the Tennessee Valley Authority nuclear program. The approach to investigating significant events chosen by the Commission helps assure that all of the root causes of an event will not be identified.
Commissioner Bernthal adds the following comments:
For the better part of a year, I have in vain urged the Commission to reconsider its ill-advised decision not to form a' separate, Commission-level group to investigate events like Davis-Besse (cf. copies of pertinent memoranda enclosed). While I believe the initial Commission policy decision was a mistake, the Commission's subsequent belated decision last fall to convene an ad hoc group to carry _out just such functions as I would have assigned to a permanent Commission-level entity compounds the mistake with confusion.
It is highly questionable, for example, whether OIA has the expertise to carry out an authoritative assessment of our own Staff's performance in incidents such as Davis-Besse.
Moreover, if there was any doubt as to the need for some element of independence and coherence in such assessments, events since Davis-Besse have only confirmed my belief that an independent Commission-level Office of Nuclear Safety will save the Commission time and grief in the long run.
Will the Commission now also form ad hoc groups to explore the causes and remedies for the recent events at Rancho Seco and at the Sequoyei facility in Gore, Oklahoma?
It is unrealistic to expect that there will not be at least a few such significant events per year, on average, and it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Commission needs
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some entity to deal'with events where the procedures of NRC itself might be in question. Refusing even now to concede the point, after having been clearly and repeatedly counseled by the Brookhaven study, by ACRS, and by events, simply invites Congress to do what I do not believe is necessary or wise -- to' establish an entirely independent outside agency analogous to the NTSB to investigate nuclear events of special safety significance.
Chairman Palladino adds the following:
Commissioner Asselstine states that, "It is simply asking too much... (for) mid-level people to advise the Commission candidly." In contrast to his statement, I believe that some of the very best NRC people have been assigned to
, Incident Investigation Teams and that these people have been selected based on their experience and technical abilities as well as their straightforward manner. I have no doubts about their ability to provide us with candid advice, and I believe that Commission meetings with these people have borne out my belief.
Commissioner Asselstine goes on to state that, "The approach to investigating significant events. chosen by the Commission helps assure that all of the root causes of an event will not be identified" (emphasis added), but he gives no reason for this sweeping conclusion. In response, I note that the Commission gave a great deal of attention to the question of how best to assure that all the facts of a particular event will become known and evaluated. I believe that the choice made provides such an assurance and that this belief has been borne out so far by the Davis-Besse investigation. This investigation, in my-opinion, was one of the most intensive and thorough fact finding efforts since TMI. I further believe that the Task.
Force established by the Commission, that includes experts outside the NRC, will increase the assurance that we do get ~~
the necessary information.
J Regarding Commissioner Bernthal's comment, it is not clear to me that a full time independent body can be justified if based on the assumption that there will be a few such significant events per year. My belief is that the number of such events is random and far from periodic. If there were not enough significant events , the group proposed by Commissioner Bernthal would most likely choose to investigate lesser events, the significance of which would not justify the expenditure of such talented manpower.
Also, just as the frequency of occurrence of significant events is random, so is the unpredictable nature of the area to be investigated in an event. By limiting the number of personnel assigned to a permanent body of people, the ability of the team to be responsive to all technical areas of concern will be significantly less than the
- 4 present team concept which allows team members to be drawn from the broad talents throughout the entire NRC staff.
Finally, given that there is a workable alternative, I do not believe that the NRC can afford the luxury of a new and additional group of people during a time of budget restrictions and consolidation of NRC resources and offices. This is especially true given that the present approach appears so far to have produced outstanding results well beyond original expectations.
Sincerely, J)
/ g .t.yw N',~'g_CL?.es N ~ -
Nunzio J. Palladino
Enclosures:
- 1. COMFB-85-8
- 2. Memorandum of Oct. 9
- 3. Memorandum of Oct. 23 i
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION / '
8 g p e.L W ASHIN GTCN, D.C. 20555 g E
%gg# -- June 18, 1985 OFFICE OF THE , ,,
COMFB-85-8 COMMISSIONER MEMORANDUM FOR: Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary .
FROM: Frederick M. Bernthal
SUBJECT:
6/13/85 OPE MEMO ON PROPOSED OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY OPE's preliminary policy analysis, as far as it goes, exposes no major flaws in the concept of an Office of Nuclear Safety (ONS). But considerably more thought is needed to determine exactly how such an office would be organized and staffed if this idea is to have a considered appraisal by the Comission.
Most importantly, I believe a Comission-level ONS must be more than " full participants" on the "go-team". The Comission-level body should itself have executive and supervisory authority over accident investigations, with. "
ultimate responsibility for the product. That means, of course, that capable executive staff would need to be acquired and segregated at the Comission level, with full " matrix-management" style access to staff (or outside) expertise, as needed to carry out the ad-hoc investigative functions. If the Comission is unwilling (or if available resources make it unfeasible) to vest this kind of authority and responsibility in an ONS, then there is little point in pursuing the concept.
I would not envision such an office containing more than 6-10 permanently identifiable staff, and even some of those staff might have other duties anc responsibilities when they are not engaged in training or in an ongoing investigation on behalf of the Comission. It is worth noting that the recent incident at Davis-Besse could provide an excellent case study of
. just. how such a Comission-level supervisory group might work. While I have no doubt as to staff's ability to come to grips with the technical -
ca,uses of such an incident, it seems clear that a highly-respected, Comission-level director could lend focus, independence, and added credibility to such an investigation.
I therefore continue to believe that Option 3 -- an ONS reporting to the Comission -- holds promise. In particular, the recent memorandum and proposal from Judge Cotter deserves careful consideration if OPE, with the assistance of OIA or other management experts in the Agency, is to prepare a more complete proposal for organizing and staffing a Commission-level ONS. I would think that the director of ONS himself (not the Licensing Panel) should have executive authority for investigations. But the Licensing Panel may indeed, as Judge Cotter suggests, provide the institutional structure and at least some of the requisite professional expertise for a credible, independent, Comission-level board of inquiry.
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-2 If my colleagues believe that this concept has merit, then I would propose
- that a study group be appointed by the Chairman to prepare a more serious, specific recommendation for Commission consideration. Judge Cotter and appropriate agedcy management experts might be members of such a panel.
SECY, please track.
cc: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Zech OPE OGC ACRS EDO AEOD Judge Cotter e..
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\f %f, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
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October 9, 1985 OFFICE OF THE A' COMMISSIONER MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Chilk FROM: Frederick M. Bernthal
SUBJECT:
COM JA-85-11, Further NRC Actions on Davis Besse I have reviewed Commissioner Asselstine's August 16 memorandum on the above captioned subject, the response of the Chairman and Commissinner Zech, and Comissioner Asselstine's further comment of September 5.
I concur in the proposal of Commissioner Asselstine, as modified by the Chairman. The Chairman further notes, however, that his special review team approach would not test the concept suggested by Judge Cotter.
Perhaps the Commission should devise a procedure that would test desirable aspects of the Cotter proposal, e.g. whether an ASLB judge should preside.
A qualified board of inquiry should indeed be helpful in evaluating causes ."
of and response. to incidents such as that at Davis-Besse.
Needless to say, I still believe it most worthwhile for the Commission to explore the concept of an independent review team, with an eye to whether the elements of such a team, reporting to the Comrission, should be made a rather more permanent feature for Commission evaluation of the causes of significant powerplant incidents. After this trial case is concluded, it may be worth having OPE prepare an analysis of variants on the theme that might be appropriate to a more permanent, Comission-level incident-response structure. I attach a copy of some thoughts I have had on this subject.
I also note the Chairman's memorandum of October 1 directing an OIA retro-spective audit of staff's long-term handling of Davis-Besse. For the record, contrary to the indication in your October 3 memorandum to me, it would appear from Commissioner Zech's note of October 2 that he too -
supports such an audit. Consistent with my views expressed in the attachment, I have no objection to the principle embodied in this action.
However, in view of.the Commission's earlier votes on SECY-85-2M and COMFB-85-8, it is curious that while there will be no official,' identifiable, permanently responsible Commission-level office to investigate such incidents, it appears that whenever an especially significant incident occurs, the precedent will now have been set for the Commission to establish such an office on an ad-hoc basis. I suspect that this piecemeal approach to the resolution of Davis-Besse class incidents will in the long run wind up being confusing and unsatisfactory from the standpoint of public perception, i_f not with respect to the substance of the Commission's investigation.
cc: Commissioners EDO OPE OGC OIA Judge Cotter
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, ! ~,, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
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% # October 23, 1985 FFICE OF THE M AISSIONER MEMORANDUM FOR: Samuel J. Chilk, Sec FROM: Frederick Be
SUBJECT:
SRM on C MJA-85-11/11A Please add the following comment to the above captioned SRM:
" Commissioner Bernthal set forth the view in June (COMFB-85-8) that the Commission should direct OPE to carry out a comprehensive study of a small Office of Nuclear Safety investigative group which would report directly to the Commission, and be responsible for the investigation of just such incidents as Davis-Besse. He noted then that the Davis-Besse incident could provide an excellent case study of how such a Commission-level investigative group might work. He does not now object, of course, to the Chairman's proposal to establish such a team, but instead of this ad-hoc approach, he continues to prefer a more orderly approach and appraisal that could lead to a permanent, responsible, identifiable structure."
The first sentence of Point 2 should be modified to read as follows:
"The Commission will establish an ad hoc group to review issues concerning the adequacy of the licensee's and staff's evaluations and actions before, during, and after the Davis-Besse incident, with particular attention to decision-making on the auxiliary feedwater system. The accuracy of probabilistic risk analyses performed for reliability of the Davis-Besse plant safety systems should be evaluated. The group is to report...."
I have two additional concerns which Commissioners should consider:
- 1) As the Chairman is aware, if this ad-hoc panel is to evaluate staff's performance, ths EDO should not be proposing candidates for the panel. It is therefore not clear that this portion of the SRM should be directed to the EDO. 2) Is the Chairman's recent directive to 0IA to conduct an evaluation of Staff's performance in connection with Davis-Besse clearly defined, so that the ad-hoc panel and OIA are not duplicating effort?
[ Incidentally, with all respect for the considerable capabilities of OIA, I doubt that DIA possesses the expertise and resources to carry out an independent, authoritative evaluation of Staff's performance in the Davis-Besse matter.]
cc: Chairrian Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Zech OGC OPE OIA EDO p (yt C# W