Text

Forwards Notice Published in Fr on 990706 Re Proposal to Amend Event Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors
	ML20209E526
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/12/1999
From:	Lohaus P; NRC OFFICE OF STATE PROGRAMS (OSP)
To:	; GENERAL
References
	NUDOCS 9907150060
	Download: ML20209E526 (18)
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t.A2 Kio g* -4 UNITED STATES g

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20065 0001 4

9***** July 12, 1999 STATE LIAISON OFFICERS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend the event reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors. Enclosed for your review is a copy of the notice which was published in the Federal Reaister on July 6,1999.

The objectives of the proposed amendments would be as follows:

(1) To better align the reporting requirements with the NRC's current reporting needs. An example is extending the required initial reporting times for some events, consistent with the need for timely NRC action. Another example is changing tha criteria for reporting system actuations, to obtain reporting that is more consistent with the risk-significance of the systems involved.

(2) To reduce the reporting burden, consistent with the NRC's reporting needs. An example is eliminating the reporting of design and analysis defects and 1

deviations of little or no risk-or safety-significance.

(3) To clarify the reporting requirements where needed. An example is clarifying the criteria for reporting design or analysis defects or deviations.

(4) To maintain consistency with NRC actions to improve integrated plant [

assessments. For example, reports that are needed in the assessment process should not be eliminated. /

Many States have agreements with power reactors to inform the States of plant issues. State reporting requirements are frequently triggered by NRC reporting requirements. Accordingly, the NRC seeks State input on issues related to amending power reactor reporting requirements There will be a public workshop to discuss the proposed rule, beginning at 9:00 a.m. on August 3,1999 in the Auditorium at NRC Headquarters,11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. Written comments may be mailed, delivered, or sent electronically, and are requested by September 20,1999.

If you have any questions, please contact Dennis Allison, teleph (301) 415-1178, e-mail dpa@nrc. gov.

/

hv . , (

aul H. Lohaus, Director Office of State Programs

Enclosure:

Federal Reoister notice b3 9907150060 990712 PDR STERG ESQQEN PDR Th

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STATE LIAISON OFFICERS l ; , July 12, 1999 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is' proposing to amend the event reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors.: Enclosed for your review is a copy of the notice which was published in the FederalEggi 3fg_r on' July 6,1999.

The objectives of the proposed amendments would be as follows:

(1) To better align the reporting requirements with the NRCs current reporting needs. An example is extending the required initial reporting times for some events, consistent with the need for timely .NRC action. Another example is changing the criteria for reporting system actuations, to obtain reporting that is more consistent with the risk-significance of the systems involved.

(2) To reduce the reporting burden, consistent with the NRC's reporting needs. An example is eliminating the reporting of design and analysis defects and deviations of little or no risk-or safety-significance.

(3) To clarify the reporting requirements where needed. An example is clarifying the criteria for reporting design or analysis dei 3 cts or deviations.

(4) To maintain consistency with NRC actions to improve integrated plant assessments _. For example, reports that are needed in the assessment process should not be eliminated.'

Many States have agreements with power reactors to inform the States of plant issues. State -

reporting requirements are frequently triggered by NRC reporting requirements. Accordingly, the NRC seeks State input on issues related to amending power reactor reporting requirements.

There will be a public workshop to discuss the proposed rule, beginning at 9:00 a.m. on August 3,1999 in the Auditorium at NRC Headquarters,11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. Written comments may be mailed, delivered, or sent electronically, and are requested by September 20,1999.

If you have any questions,' please contact Dennis Allison, telephone (301) 415-1178, e-mail dpa@nrc. gov.

OriginalSigned By PAUL H. LOHAUS ,

Paul H. Lohaus, Director Office of State Programs

Enclosure:

Federal Reaister notice Distribution:

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36291 Proposed Rules r+ai nest *r Vol. 64, No.128 Tuesday, July 6.1999 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER be accessed by selecting "Rulemaking Section 50.73 has also been in effect, contains notices to the public of the proposed Forum." This site provides the ability to with minor modification, since 1983. Its issuance of rules and regulations. The upload ' omments as files (any format), essential purpose is to identify "* *

purpose of these notices is to give interested if your web browser supports that persons an opportunity to participate in the the types of reactor events and problems rule making prior to the adoption of the final function. For information about the that are believed to be significant and Mes. interactive rulemaking website, contact useful to the NRC in its effort to identify Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415-5905; e- and resolve threats to public safety. It is mail CAG@nrc. gov. designed to provide the information NUCLEAR REGULATORY Certain documents related to this necessary for engineering studies of COMMISSION rulemaking, including comments operational anomalies and trends and received, the transcripts of public patterns analysis of operational 10 CFR Parts 50 and 72 meetings held, the draft regulatory occurrences. The same information can analysis and the draft report NUREG- be used for other analytic procedures RIN 3150-AF98 1022 Revision 2 may be examined at that will aid in identifying accident the NRC Public Document Room,2120 precursors," (48 FR 33851; July 26.

Reporting Requirements for Nuclear L Street, NW, (Lower Level), 1983),

Power Reactors

% ashington, DC. These same documents AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory also may be viewed and downloaded IL Rulemaking Initiation Commission. electronically via the interactive Experience has shown a need for ACTION: Proposed rule, rulemaking web site established by NRC change in several areas. On July 23, for this rulemaking- 1998 (63 FR 39522) the . published

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: in the Federal Register advance Commission is proposing to amend the Dennis P. Allison, Office of Nuclear notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) event reporting requirements for nuclear Rea; tor Regulation Washington, DC to announce a contemplated rulemaking i power reactors: to update the current 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-1178, that would modify reporting I rules, including reducing or eliminating e-mail dpa@nrc. gov. requirements for nuclear power reactors. l the reporting burden associated with SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Among other things, the ANPR events of little or no safety significance; requested public comments on whether and to better align the rules with the Contents the NRC should proceed with NRC's needs for information to carry out I. Background rulemaking to modify the event 1 Its safety mission, including revising IL Rulemaking Initiation reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.72, reporting requirements based on III. Analysis of Comments IV. Discussion "Immediate notification requirements importance to risk and extending the for operating nuclear power reactors,"

required reporting times consistent with [ gu "lo fProhs m ndments and 50.73, " Licensee event report the time it is needed for prompt NRC 3. Revisions to Reporting Guidelines in system," and several concrete proposals action. Also, a draft report, NUREG~ NUREG-1022 were provided for comment.

1022. Revision 2, is being made 4. Reactor Oversight A public meeting was held to discuss available for public comment S. Reporting of Historical Problems the ANPR at NRC Headquarters on concurrently with the proposed 6. Reporting of Component Problems August 21,1998. The ANPR was also amendments. 7. Enforcement Poning discussed, along with other topics, at a DATES: Submit comments on or before f u public meeting on the role of industry September 20,1999. Comments received 10. State input in nuclear regulation in Rosemont, after this date will be considered if it is V EnvironmentalImpact: Categorical Illinois on September 1,1998. The practical to do so, but the Commission Exclusion public comment period on the ANPR is able to ensure consideration only for VL Backfit Analysis closed on September 21,1998. A comments received on or before this VII. Regulatory Analysis comment from the Nuclear Energy date. Vill. Paperwork ' Reduction Act Statement IX. Regulatory Flexibility Certification Institute (NEI) propo,, sed conducting ADDRESSES: Mail comments to: X. Proposed Amendments ,, table top exercises early in the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory development and review process to test Commission, Washington, DC 20555_ I. Background key parts of the requirements and 0001. ATTN: Rulemakings and Section 50.72 has been in effect, with guidance for clarity and consistency.

Adjudications Staff, minor modifications, since 1983. Its That comment vras accepted and a third Dehver comments to: 11555 Rockville essential purpose is "* *

to provide public meeting was held on November Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 the Commission with immediate 13,1998 to discuss issues of clarity and a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. reporting of * *

significant events consistency in the contemplated Electronic comments may be provided where immediate Commission action to approach. Transcripts of these meetings via the NRC's interactive rulemaking protect the public health and safety may are available for inspection in the NRC website through the NRC home page be required or where the Commission Public Document Room or they may be (http://www.nrc. gov), From the home needs timely and accurate information viewed and downloaded electronically page, select "Rulemaking" from the tool to respond to heightened public via the interactive rulemaking web site bar at the bottom of the page. The concern." (48 FR 39039; August 29, established by NRC for this rulemaking, interactive rulemaking website can then 1983). as discussed above under the heading l

l 36292 Fedcral Register /Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules ADDRESSES. Single copies may be approach would result in substantial comment will be specifically invited on obtained from the contact listed above implementation problems, and several alternatives to the proposed rule.

under the heading FOR FURTHER recommended continuing to rely on the Comment 6: Several comments INFORMATION CONTACT. narrative description which provides opposed changing the criteria in 10 CFR Ilt Analysis of Comments adequate information. One comment 50.72 and 50.73 which require reporting opposed the idea of a check the box any event or condition that alone could The comment period for the ANPR approach on the grounds that it would have prevented the fulfillment of the expired September 21,1998. Twenty- make LERs more difficult for the general safety function of structures or one comment letters were received, public to understand. A few comments systems * * *, The change proposed in representing comments from sixteen supported the check the box approach, the ANPR would have substituted the nuclear power plant licensees (utilities), Response:The intent of the check the phrase "alone or in combination with ,

two organizations of utilities. two States box approach was to reduce the effort other existing conditions" for the word i and one public interest group. A list of required in reporting: however, the "alone" in this criterion. The comments I comment letters is provided below. The majority of comments indicate this indicated that this wauld add comment letters expressed support for would not be the case. Accordingly, the confusion, the rule as currently worded amending the rules along the general proposed rule does not reflect adoption is sufficiently clear, and the need to lines of the objectives discussed in the of a check the box approach. consider other existing phnt conditions ANPR. Most of the letters also provided Comment 4: Several comments in evaluating reportability is undastood specific recommendations for changes opposed codifying the current and uniformly implemented. They to the contemplated amendments guidellnes for reporting human recommended leaving the rule l discussed in the ANPR. In addition to perforraance information in LERs (i.e., unchanged in this regard. J the written comments received, the adding tM detailed guidelines to the Response:The comments are partially 1 ANPR has been the subject of three rule, as was proposed in the ANPR). accepted. The requirement would not be public meetings as discussed above They recommended leaving the rule changed by substituting the phrase under the heading BACKGROUND, and unchanged in this regard, indicating "alone or in combination with other comments made at those meetings have that sufficient information is being existing conditions" for the word also been considered. provided under the current rule and "alone" in this criterion (as proposed in j The resolution of comments is guidelines. the ANPR). l summarized below. This summary Response:The comments are partially However, the proposed amendments addresses the principal comments (i.e., accepted. The proposed rule would not would change the rules by deleting the comments other than those that are: codify the reporting guidelines (as word "alone," so that they would minor or editorial in nature; supportive proposed in the ANPR) for the reasons require reporting "any event or of the approach described in the ANPR; stated above. condition that could have prevented i or applicable to another area or activity However, the proposed rule would fulfillment of the safety function of outside the scope of sections 50.72 and simplify the requirement. It is not structures or systems * * * " This 50.73). necessary to specify the level of detail would simplify the wording, rather than Comment 1: Several comments provided in the current rule. making it more complicated. It is not recommended amending 10 CFR 50.73 Accordingly, the amended paragraph intended to change the meaning of the to allow 60 days (instead of the current would simply require a discussion of requirement, but to make the meaning 30 days) for submittal of Licensee Event the causes and circumstances for any more apparent in the wording of the Reports (LERs). They indicated that this human performance related problems rule. The following points, which are would allow a more reasonable time to that contributed to the event. Details relevant to this question, would determine the root causes of events and would continue to be provided in the continue to be made clear in the lead to fewer amended reports. reporting guidelines, as indicated in reporting guidelines. See section 3.2.7 of Response:The comments are accepted section 5.2.1 of the draft of Revision 2 the draft of Revision 2 to NUREG-1022, for the reason stated above. The to NUREG-1022. This draft report is which is being made available for public proposed rule would change the time being made available for public comment concurrently with the limit to 60 days. comment concurrently with the proposed rule, as discussed below Comment 2:Two comments suggested proposed rule, as discussed below under the heading " Revisions to a need to establish starting points for under the heading " Revisions to Reporting Guidelines in NUREG-1022."

reporting time clocks that are clear and Reporting Guidelines in NUREG-1022." (1) It is not necessary to assume an .

not subject to varied interpretations. Comment 5: Several comments additional random single failure in l Response:The reporting guidelines in opposed codifying a list of specific evaluating reportability. (If such an this area have been reviewed for clarity. systems for which actuation must be. assumption were necessary.

Some editorial clarifications are reported (by naming the systems in 10 inoperability of a single train would proposed in section 2.5 of the draft of CFR 50.72 and 50.73, as was proposed generally be reportable under this Revision 2 to NUREG-1022, which is in the ANPR).They indicated that a criterion.)

being made available for public system's contribution to risk can vary (2) It is necessary to consider other comment concurrently with the widely from plant to plant, which existing conditions in determining proposed rule, as discussed below precludes construction of a salid reportability. (For example, if Train A under the heading " Revisions to universal list. They recommended that, fails at a time when Train B is out of Reporting Guidelines in NUREG-1022." instead, actuation be reported only for service for maintenance, the event is Comment 3: Many comments opposed those systems that are specified to be reportable.)

adopting a check the box approach for engineered safety features (ESFs) in the (3) The event is reportable regardless human performance and other final safety analysis report (FSAR). of whether or not a system was called information in LERs (as was proposed in Response:The proposed rule would upon to perform its safety function. (For the ANPR, with the objective of include a list of systems for which example, if an emergency core cooling reducing reporting burden). They actuation would be reported. However, system [ECCS) was incapable of indicated that adopting a check the box the concern is recognized and public performing its specified safety

Federal Register /Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36293 functions, the event is reportable even if encompasses at least one operating discussed below under the heading there was no call for the ECCS function.) cycle. Considerable resources are "Significantly degraded components."

(4) The event is reportable regardless expended when it is necessary to search Comment 10: Several comments of whether or not a different system was historical records older than this to recommended changing 10 CFR 50.72 capable of performing the safety make past operability determinations, and 50.73 to exclude reporting of an function. (For example, if the onsite and this is not warranted by the lesser unanalyzed condition that significantly power system failed, the event is significance of historical events older compromised plant safety on the basis reportable even if the offsite power than two years. that it is redundant to other reporting system was available and capable of Response:The comments are partially criteria.

performing its safety functions.) accepted, for the reasons stated above. Response:The comment is not Comment 7:Several comments That is, under the proposed rules, an accepted. Several types of worthwhile recommended changing 10 CFR 50.72 event or condition that could have reports have been Identified that could and 50.73 to exclude reporting an prevented the fulfillment of the safety not readily be captured by other criteria invalid actuation of an ESF (An invalid function of structures or as discussed further below under the actuation is one that does not result systems * *

would be reported by heading " Condition that is outside the from a plant condition that warrants telephone under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(lli) design basis of the plant."

ESF initiation.) only if it exists at the time of discovery, Comment 11:Several comments Response:The comments are partially An event or condition that could have recommended amending 10 CFR 50.72 accepted. The proposed amendments prevented the fulfillment of the safety and 50.73 to exclude reporting of a would eliminate the requirement for function of structures er seriously degraded principal safety telephone notification of an invalid systems * *

would be reported by barrier on the basis that it is redundant actuation under 10 CFR 50.72. Invalid written LER under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) to other reporting criteria.

actuations are generally less significant only if it existed within the previous Response The comments are not than valid actuations because they do three years. accepted. This criterion captures some not involve plant conditions (e.g., low In addition, although not worthwhile repor+s that would not be reactor coolant system pressure) recommended in the comments, under captured by other criteria, such as conditions that would warrant system the proposed rule an operation or significant welding or material defects l actuation. Instead, they result from condition prohibited by the plant's in the primary coolant system. However, i other causes such as a dropped Technical Specifications would be some clarifications are proposed in electricallead during testing). reported under 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) only if it Section 3.2.4 of the draft reporting However, the proposed amendments existed within the previous three years. guidelines, to better indicate which would not eliminate the requirement for For this criterion as well, considerable events are serious enough to qualify for a written report of an invalid actuation resources are expended when it is reporting under this criterlon.

under 10 CFR 50.73. There is still a necessary to search historical records Comment 12: One comment need for reporting of invalid actuations older than three years to make past recommended that, with regard to a because they are needed to make operability determinations, and this is condition or operation prohibited by the estimates of equipment reliability not warranted by the lesser significance Pl ant's Technical Specifications, parameters, which in turn are needed to of historical events older than three reporting should be eliminated for support the Commission's move years. violation of all administstive Technical towards risk. informed regulation. This Three years is proposed, rather than Specifications.

is discussed further in a May 7,1997 two years as suggested in the comments, Response 'Ihe comment is partially Commission paper, SECY-97-101, because the NRC staff trends plant accepted. The proposed rule would

" Proposed Rule,10 CFR 50.76, performance indicators over a period of elimin;:e reporting for Technical Reporting Reliability and Availability three years to ensure inclusion of Specifications that are administrative in Information for Risk.significant Systems periods of both shut down and nature. The reporting guidelines would and Equipment " Attachment 3. Operation. not chan8e. As stated in the current Comment 8: Several comments Comment 9:Several comments reporting guidelines in NUREG-1022, recommended changing 10 CFR 50.72 Opposed using the term !sk-significant Revision 1, failure to meet and 50.73 to limit certain reports to (or significant) in the absence of a clear administrative Technical Specifications current events and conditions. That is, definition. requirements is reportable only if it they recommended that an event or Response: The term "significant" results in violations of equipment condition that could have prevented the would be used in two criteria in the operability requirements, or had a fulfillment of the safety function of Proposed rules. In the first criterion, similar detrimental effect on a licensee's structures or systems * *

be sections 50.72 and 50.73 would require ability to safely operate the plant. For reported: reporting an unanalyzed condition that example, operation with less than the (1) By telephone under 10 CFR significantly affects plant safety. In this required number of people on shift 50.72(b)(2)(lii) only if it currently exists, context the term "significant" would be would constitute operation prohibited and defined by examples, five of which are by the Technical Specifications.

(2) By written LER under 10 CFR discussed below under the heading However, a change in the plant's 50.73(a)(2)(v) only if it existed within " Condition that is outside the design organizational structure that has not yet the previous two years. basis of the plant." In the second been approved as a Technical For a " historical" event or condition criterion, section 50.73 would require Specification change would not. An of this type (i.e., one wnich might have reporting when a component's ability to administrative procedure violation or been significant at one time but has perform ita safety function is failure to implement a procedure, such since been corrected) there is less significantly degraded and the condition as failure to lock a high radiation area significance than there is for a current could reasonably be expected to affect door, that does not have a direct impact event and, thus, immediate notification other similar components in the plant. on the safe operation of the plant, is under 50.72(b)(2)(iii) is not warranted. Again, the term "significant" would be generally not reportable under this With regard to 50.73(a)(2)(v), two years defined by examples, six of which are criterion.

36294 Fed:r:1 Regist:r/Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules Comment 13:One comment promptly reviewed. This includes prir.cipal safety barriers, being seriously recommended changing 10 CFR 50.73 to notification of the NRC Headquarters degraded."

require that LERs identify: (1) How Emergency Officers and the Regional Comment 19: Some cominents many opportunities to detect the Duty Officer and consideration of recommended that the NRC use problem were missed and (2) corrective whether to activate NRC incident enforcement discretion during the actions to prevent future misses. response procedures. Written LERs. rulemaking process to provide early Response: No changes are proposed. If when required, are needed to ensure relief with regard to reporting a missed opportunities are identified and that events can be systematically condition outside the design basis of the are significant to the event, they should reviewed for safety significance. plant and/or a late surveillance test be captured by the current requirements Comment 17:Some comments (condition or operation prohibited by to provide a comprehensive description opposed amending 10 CFR 50.73 to Technical Specifications).

of the event and to describe corrective require additional information regarding Response:The current rules will actions if they are significant to the equipment availability for shutdown continue to apply until final revised event. events (as proposed in the ANPR) to rules are issued and become effective.

Comment 14:With regard to design support staff probabilistic risk However in dispositioning any issues, one comment recommended assessments (PRAs). They indicated that vlotation, the risk-and safety-including language in the rules or their it is rare that sufficient information is significance of the violation will be an statements of considerations not available in an LER. Important consideration. Establishing an encouraging a voluntary report under 10 Response:The proposed rule would interim enforcement discretion policy CFR 50.9 for a newly discovered design require such information. Frequently, would involve the same critical issue which is not otherwise reportable when shutdown events are subjected to elements as developing the revised rule at the plant where first discovered a probabilistic risk analysis, it is and guidance including a provision for (because the affected systems can still necessary to call the plant to determine public comment. This would complicate perform their specified safety functions) the status of systems and equiprnent. the rulemaking process, and essentially but which might have a significant The proposed rule would eliminate constitute a prediction of its final impact on generic design issues at other much of that need. outcome, which may or may not turn plants. Comment 18:Several comments out to be correct.

Response: A statement encouraging recommended deleting 10 CFR Comment 20: Several comment letters <

submittal of voluntary LERs is included 50.72(b)(2)(1), "Any event found while opposed the idea of tying enforcement !

in the reporting guidelines. In addition, the reactor is shut down, that, had it criteria (i.e., violation severity levels) to the guidelines would indicate that any been found while the reactor was in reporting criteria. They indicated this significant degradation that could operation, would have resulted in the could have an unintended adverse effect reasonably be expected to affect nuclear power plant, including its on reporting and the resources multiple similar components in the principal safety barriers, being seriously consumed because in matching an event plant should be reported. degraded or being in an unanalyzed with a reporting criterion. a licensee Comment 15: Several comments condition that significantly would essentially be forced to make a opposed placing a condition, related to compromises plant safety." The preliminary determination of severity systematic non-compliance, on the comments indicated that because the level.

elimination of reporting of late plant would be shutdown, there is no Response:The comments are not surveillance tests (as proposed in the need for immediate NRC action. accepted. The proposed changes to the ANPR) under 10 CFR 50.73. The Response:The requirement for enforcement criteria, are discussed condition would be burdensome telephone reporting would not be below under the heading because licensees would need to track entirely eliminated because, if a " Enforcement."

instances of missed surveillance tests in Principal safety barrier is significantly Comment 21 As requested by the given time periods. degraded or a condition that ANPR, a number of comments identified Response:The proposed rule does not significantly affects plant safety exists; reactor reporting requirements other contain this condition. Reporting for the the event may be significant enough that than sections 50.72 and 50.73 where purpose of identifying systematic non. the NRC would need to initiate actions changes are warranted.

compliance is not needed because NRC [such as contacting the plant to better Response: Comments regarding resident inspectors ruutinely review understand the event and/or initiating a changes to reactor reporting plant problem lists, and thus would be special inspection or investigation) requirements other than sections 50.72 aware of any systematic non-compliance within about a day even if the plant is and 50.73 will be addressed in a in this area if it occurs. shutdown. separate action. A Commission paper on Comment 16: One comment However, in the proposed rule this that subject was submitted on January recommended changing the rules to specific criterion would be combined 20,1999, SECY-99-022, "Rulemaking allow licensees to rely on notifications with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ll), "Any event to Modify Reporting Requiremerits for made to resident inspectors, which or condition during plant operation that Power Reactors" and the Commission could eliminate the need to make a results in the cordition of the nuclear issued a Staff Requirements telephone notification via the power plant, including its principal Memorandum on March 19,1999 emergency nottilcation system (ENS) safety barriers, being seriously degraded directing the staff to proceed with and/or submit a written LER, at least for or * * * " Also, the term "unanalyzed planning and scheduling.

some events or conditions.They condition that significantly Comment 22: One comment indicated, for example, this should be compromises plant safety" would be recommended changing the required adequate where the event is a decision deleted. In combination with other initial reporting time for some events to to issue a news release. changes, this would result in the " * *

within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or by the Response: No changes are proposed. following criterion for telephone beginning of the next business day,"

Telephone notifications to the NRC notification "Any event or condition instead of simply specifying " * *

Operations Center, when required, are that results in the condition nf the within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ." The comment needed to ensure that the event can be nuclear power plant, including its indicated it does not appear that the

Federal Reglater/Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36295 NRC takes action on these events during site * * *.This will cause reporting radiation releases from a site regardless non-business hours. confusion during an event at a time of the source or quantity.

Response: The comment is r.ot when clarity is necessary. These six Timellness is also important for items accepted.The NRC needs these reports events should all be reported as of obvious public interest. News of in time to call the plant to find out more emergency events, not non emergency nemingly small events spreads quickly, about the event and/or initiate a special events. EAL thresholds in licensee Particubtly in local communities inspection or an Investigation, if emergency plans should be required to around the power plants. Delayed warranted, within a day Sometimes reflect them cleanly. All of these events reporting of such events means that we these actions are taken during non- would affect the State of I!!!nois- will be unprepared to respond to business hours. response and our emergency plans. NRC queries from local officials, or the Comment 23: One comment must reconsider the categories of non. media, with a resultant loss of public recommended that an event or emergency events in the context of the confidence. Therefore, we also oppose condition that could have prevented current guidance to licensees for any reduction in notification fulfillment of the safety function of classifying EALs to ensure there is a re utrements for newsworthy events."

structures or systems. * *

should be clear distinction between emergency e5Ponse:In the interest of simplicity, reportable only when the time limits of and non emergency reportable events." the proposed amendments would the TS are exceeded. It indicated that if Response: Section 50.72 has been maintainjust three basic levels of the time limits are not exceeded the reviewed and appears to be clear in this required reporting times in 10 CFR event is not significant enough to regara. It indicates the following: 50.72 and 50.73 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , and warrant reporting. (1) Any declaration oian Emergency 60 days). However, the concern is Response:The comment is not Class is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR recognized and public comment is accepted. Generally standard TS 50.72(a)(1)(1) and (a)(3). sPecifically invited on the question of require commencement of shutdown (2) The conditions listed in paragraph whether additionallevels should be within one hour if an important system. (b)(1). "One-hour reports." are introduced to better correspond to such as emergency ac power, is reportable pursuant to paragraph (b)(1) Particular types of events. as discussed inoperable. However, the stated reason ifnot reported as a declaration of an below under the heading " Required i for allowing one hour before Emergency Class under paragraph (a). Initial Reporting Times." Also, if in a commencing the shutdown is to provide and l final rule the NRC should relax the time time to prepare for an orderly (3) The conditions listed in paragraph limit to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . a State would not be shutdown. Also, the condition might (b)(2). "Eight hour reports are precluded from obtaining reports earlier have lasted much longer than one hour reportable pursuant to paragraph (b)(2), than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

before it was discovered. Finally, an if not reported underparagraphs (a) or Comment 27:Two comment letters event that results in a safety system (b)(1). addressed coordination with States. The failure (or inability to perform its Comment 26: One comment letter, comment letter from Florida Power &

function) is generally significant enough from the State ofIllinois, opposed Light Company stated "The NRC's to warrant NRC review. relaxing the required initial reporting Public workshop on August 21,1998, Comment 24: One comment from the time from 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for the touched on a number of examples where State of Ohio recommended that, following types of events: Opportunities exist to reduce reporting although rule changes are not necessary, (i) Airborne radioactive release that burdens. An industry representative emphasis should be placed on positive results in concentrations over 20 times commented that licensees sometimes notification of State and local agencies allowable levels in an unrestricted area; have to report the same event to state of emergency conditions before calling (11) Liquid effluent in excess of 20 agencies end the NRC provided one the NRC. times allowable concentrations released such example. FPL concurs with the Response:The comment is accepted. to an unrestricted area: recommendation that the time It arose from a weakness in the NRC's (111) Radioactively contaminated requirement for reporting an event to response to an event at the Davis-Besse person transported to an offsite medical the NRC and to the state should be plant. Because there were considerable facility for treatment; consistent wherever practical and difficulties in establishing telephone (iv) News release or other government possibly in some cases eliminated."

communications with the plant at the agency notification related to the health The comment letter from Northeast time of the event NRC Operations and safety of the public or onsite Nuclear Energy Company stated Center personnel requested that the personnel, or protection of the " Northeast Nuclear Energy Company licensee remain on the line and said that environment, agrees with extending the non-the NRC would notify the Sute. The comment further indicated: "It is emergency prompt notifications to eight However, the NRC did not do so in a of paramount importance that those hours. This would help to eliminate timely manner. Training and procedure charged with regulating and monitoring unnecessary reports and retractions.

changes have been implemented to the public impact of radiolegical However, it is necessary to have the ensure this type of problem will not releases are being kept informed of individual states closely involved with reoccur. unplanned releases in a timely manner. the rule change since they may have Comment 25: One comment letter, Illinois law requires that we perform requirements that are more restrictive or from the State of Illinois, stated the independent assessments, decide what conflict with the proposed rulemaking.

following:"In section 50.72 of the actions may be necessary to protect the For example, in Connecticut all 10 CFR advance notice of proposed rulemaking, public, and assist in informing the 50.72 reports require notification of the seven non-emergency events listed as public regarding any radiological rish state within one hour."

(f), are proposed to be reported in eight Slould follow-up action to a release be Response:The ANPR specifically hours instead of one hour. Of those necessary, then the less time that has requested State input. In addition, a seven events, six (specifically. (il), (iii), elapsed, the better the state is able to letter requesting input was sent to each (iv), (v), (vi), and (vii)) would probably respond in a timely and appropriate State. Written comments were received be classified as emergency events under manner. We oppose any reduction in from the State of Ohio and the State of existing emergency plans at an Illinois notification requirements for unplanned lilinois. In addition, representatives

36296 Fed:ral Register /Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules from several States attended one of the Response: No changes are proposed operating history for similar events and pubtle meetings on the ANPR. The NRC for sections 50.72 and 50.73, which initiates a generic study, as appropriate, will continue to solicit State input as identify generic reporting requirements. to focus upon the nature. cause, the rulemaking process proceeds. It is not feasible or appropriate to consequences and possible corrective Comment 28:One comment address the specific reporting actions for the particular situation or recommended eliminating two of the requirements contained in individual concein.

requirements for immediate followup operating licenses in this format. The NRC stah uses the information notification during the course of an The idea of issuing a generic reported in LERs in confirming event, section 50.72(c)(2)(1), the results ammunication to specific requests for licensing bases, studying potentially of ensuing evaluations or assessments of liense amendments will be addressed gemic sa'ety problems, assessing plant conditions, and section (ah'ng with cther comments on trew.s and patterns of operational 50.72(c)(2)(li). he effectiveness of reprting requirements beyond the exper ence monitoring performance, response or protective measures taken. sec pe of sections 50.72 and 50.73) in a identifying precursors of more The comment indicated that the ser 3 rate action. significant events, and providing requirements continue to apply after the ( omment 32:One comment operational experience to the industr3 event and that they require reporting reo mmended that in section

50. 2(b)(1)(v), the word offsite.. be The NRC determines whether events even if. for example, the result of a meet the criteria for reporting as an further analysis does not change the add 3d before communications Abnormal Occurrence Report to initial report, capability , to make it clear that what Congress or for reporting to the Response:The comment is not must be reported is a loss of European Nuclear Energy Agency accepted. The requirements for communications with outside agencies

n t internal plant communications (NEA).

followup reporting apply only during The information from LERs is widely the course of the event Followup sys ResIonse:The comment is accepted. used within the nuclear industry both reports are needed while the event is nationally and internationally. The ongoing. For example, if an analysis is in the proposed rule the word "offsite" would be added. industry's Institute of Nuclear Power completed during an ongoing event, and Comment 33:Several comments Operation (INPO) uses LERs as a ba9s it confirms an earlier estimate of how suggested that the NRC should define its for providing operational safety long it will take to uncover the reactor experience feedback data to indiv! dual needs relative to the information core if electric power is not restored, provided in LERs. utilities through such documents as that information may very well be Response:The essential purpose of significant operating experience reports, useful for the purpose of evaluating the the LER rule is to identify the types of significant event reports, significant need for protective measures reactor events and problems that are events notifications, and operations and l (evacuation). believed to be significant and useful to maintenance reminders. U.S. vendors !

Comment 29: One comment the NRC in its effort to identify and and nuclear steam system suppliers, as recommended clarifying the reporting resolve threats to public safety. The rule well as other countries and international requirements for problems identified by is designed to provide the information organizations, use LER data as a source NRC Inspectors. necessary for engineering studies of of Operational experience data.

Response: No changes are proposed. operational anomalies and trends, and Comment 34:Some comments The current reporting guidelines patterns analysis of operational indicated that the licensing basis should include a paragraph making it clear that occurrences. To this end, the be defined.

an event must be reported via telephone information required in LERs is Response: No changes are proposed.

notification and/or written LER, as generally needed to understand the The term "llcensing basis" is not required, regardless of whether it had event, its significance, and its causes in explicitly used in the event reporting been discussed with NRC staff order to determine whether generic or rules or the draft reporting guidelines. L personnel or was identified by NRC plant specific action is needed to can come into play, via Generic Letter personnel. preclude recurrence. Some further (GL) 91-18. "Information to Licensees Comment 30: Several comments specific functions are d!scussed belos Regarding two NRC Inspection Manual recommended changing the it is necessary to identify and analyze Sections on Resolution of Degraded and requirements in 50.46(a)(ili)(2) for events and conditions that are Nonconforming Conditions and on reporting errors in or corrections to precursors to potential severe core Operability," in determining what the ECCS analyses. damage, to discover emerging trends or "specified safety function" of a system Response:These comments will be patterns of potential safety significance, is. This relates to whether an event is addressed in a separate action (along to identify events that are important to reportable as an event or condition that with other comments on reporting safety and their associated safety could have prevented the fulfillment of requirements other than sections 50.72 concerns and root causes, to determine the safety function of structures or and 50.73). *be adequacy of corrective actions taken systems * *

and/or an operation or Comment 31:Some comments rGed to aadess the safety concerrs, and to condition prohibited by the plant's issues regarding plant specific :eporting assess the generic applicability of technical specification (TS). However.

requirements contained in Technical events. any unsettled details regarding exactly Specifications (or other parts of the The NRC staff reviews each LER to which commitments are included in the operating license). One suggestion was identify those individual events or licensing basis (for example because of that 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 should be generic situations that warrant differences between the definitions in changed to address these issues. additional analysis and evaluation. The GL 91-18 and 10 CFR 54.3} are not of Another suggestion was that a Generic staff identifies repetitive events and a nature that would change the Letter be issued indicating that the NRC failures and situations where the determination of whether or not a would be receptive to requests for frequency or the combined significance system is capable of perfotming its license amendments to eliminate of reported events may be cause for specified safety functions (i.e.,

specific reporting iequirements. concern. The NRC staff reviews past operable).

i

Fedtral Registtr/Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36297 Comment 35: Several comments are needed in the assessment process supplyinj these prog ams would result recommended conducting tabletop should not be eliminated. In the red 2ction in the currency and exercises (public meetings) early in the value f tt ese indicators to senior drafting process, involving licensees, 2. Section by Section Discussion of ProposedAmendments man gers. Nith respect to the Accident inspectors, and headquarters personnel Sequence l'ecursor program the to discuss the draft amendments and Genera 1 requirements (section additional M days will add a associated and guidance. 50.72(a)(5Y. The requirement to inform commensurtte amount of time to each Response:The Commission agrees. the NRC of (he type of report being individual es ent assessment since The recommended public meeting was made (t.e., emergency class declared. L!censee Ever t Repoes (LERs) are the held on November 13,1998. non emergency 1-hour report, or non- main source of data for these analyses.

Comment 36: Several comments emergency 8. hour report) would be The delivery dete for the annual recommended conducting a workshop revised to refer to paragraph (a)(1) Accident Sequence Precursor report (public meeting) early during the public instead of referring to paragraph (a)(3) to would also slip .iccordingly. The NRC i comment period to discuss the proposed correct a typographical error, staff would have to make more rule and draft guidance. Required initial reporting times extensive use of I nmediate Response:The Commission agrees. (sections 5012(a)(5), (b)(1), (b)(2), ar>d Notifications (10 CFR 50.72) and event The recommended workshop has been secti ns 5013(a)(1) and (d)/. In the followup to compensate in part for the added to the schedule. Proposed amendments, declaration of Licensee Event Report (LER) reporting Comment 37:Several comments n emergency class would continue to extension.

recommended that the reporting be reported immediately after in the interest of s mplicity, the Suldelines be revised concurrently with n tification of appropriate State or local proposed amendmen's would maintain the rules. agencies not later than 1. hour after just three basic levels of reqaired Response:The Commission agrees. declaration. This includes declaration of reporting times in 10 CFR 50.72 and Draft guidelines are being made n Unusual Event, the lowest emergency 50.73 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ,8 hours, and 60 days). i available for comment concurrent with class. However public comme nt is specifically the proposed rules. Deviations from technical invited on the question of whether Comment 38: Several comment letters specific tions authorized pursuant to 10 additional levels should be introduced recommended reviewing enforcement CFR 50.54(x) would continue to be to better correspond or paticular types i criteria at the same time the ule is reported as soon as practical and in all of events. For example,10 CFR 50.72

.being developed to ensure consistent cases within I hour of occurrence. currently requires reportina within 4 application of enforcement to reporting. These two criteria capture those events hours for events that involse low levels Response:The comment is accepted. where there may be a need for of radioactive releases, and events The Enforcement Policy is being imm diate action by the NRC. related to safety or environmental Non. emergency events that are protection that involve a press release or reviewed concurrently with development of the rule. rePortabl cy telephone under 10 CFR notification of another govern nent 50.72 would be reportable as soon as agency. These types of events could be IV. Discussion practical and in all cases within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months maintained at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months se that

1. Objectives ofProposed Amendments (instead of within I hour or 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months as information is available on a mc re is currently required). This would timely basis tc respond to heightened The purpose of sections 50.72 and reduce the burden of rapid reporting. public concern about such events. In 50.73 would remain the same because while still capturing those events where another e xample, events re' lated to the basic needs remain the same. The there may be a r.eed for the NRC to environniental protection are sometimes objectives of the proposed amendments contact the plant to find out more about reportable to another agency, which is would be as follows: the event and/or initiate a special the lead egency for the matter, with a (1) To better align the reporting inspection or investigation within about different time limit, such as 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

requirements with the NRC's current a day. These types of events could be reported reporting needs. An example is Written LERs would be due within 60 to the NRC at approximately the same extending tne required trittial reporting days after discovery of a reportable time as they are reported to the other times for some events, consistent with event or condition (instead of within 30 agency.

the need for timely NRC action. Another days as is currently required). Changing Operation or condition prohibited by example is changing the criteria for the time limit from 30 days to 60 days TS (section 5013(a)(2)(1)(B)/. The term reporting system actuations, to obtain does not imply that licensees should "during the previot.s three years" would reporting that is more consistent with take longer than they previously did to be added to eliminate wr!tten LERs for the risk-significance of the systems develop and implement corrective conditions that have not existed during involved. actions. They should continue to do so the previous three years. Such a (2J To reduce the reporting burden. on a time scale commensurate with the historical event would now have less consistent with the NRC's reporting safety significance of the issue, significance, and assessing reportability needs. An example is eliminating the However, for those cases where it does for earlier times can consume reporting of design and analysis defects take longer than thirty days to complete considerable resources. For example, and deviations of little or no risk or a root cause analysis, this change would assume that a procedure is found to be safety-signif:cance, result in fewer LERs that require uncimr and, as a result, a question is (3) To clar;fy the reporting amandment (by submittal of an raised as to whether the plant was ever requirements where needed. An odd,tional report), operated in a prohibited condition. If example is clarifying the criteria for The Performance Indicator (PI) operation in the prohibited condition is reporting design or analysis defects or program and the future risk-based likely, the answer should be reasonably deviations. performance indicator program provide apparent based on the knowledge and (4) To maintain consistency with NRC valued input to regulatory decisions experience of the plant's operators and/

actions to improve integrated plant (e.g. Senior Management Meetings). or a review of operating records for the assessments. For example, reports that Adding 30 days to the delivery of data past three years. The very considerable

36298 Fed:ral Register /Vol. 64 No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules effort required to review all records would refer to a condition ' hat Earthquake (SSE) the event would be older than three years, in order to rule significantly affects plant safety rather reportable.

out the possibility, would not be than a condition that significantly Or, for example, if it is found that a warranted. compromises plant safety. This is an loss of offsite power could cause a loss In addition, this criterion would be editorial change intended to better of instrument air and, as a result, there modified to eliminate reporting if the reflect the nature of the criterion. is reasonable doubt about the ability of technical specification is administrative Condition taat is outside the design one train of the auxiliary feedwater in nature. Violation of administrative basis of the plant (current Section system to perform its specified safety technical specifications have generally 50.72(b)(2)(ll)(B) and section functions for a certain postulated steam not been considered to warrant 50. 73(a)(2)(ll)(B)/. This criterion would line breaks, the event would be

! submittal of an LER, and since 1983 be deleted. However, a condition i

when the rule was issued the staff's outside the design basis of the plant RPonah reporting guidance has excluded almost would still be reported if it is significant if a condition outside the design basis all cases of such reperting. This change enough to qualify under one or more of of the plant (or any other unanalyzed would make the plain wording of the the following criteria. condition) is significant enough that, as rule consistent with that guidance. If a design or analysis defect or a result, plant safety is significantly Finally, this criterion would be deviation (or any other event or affected, the condition would be modified to eliminate reporting if the condition) is significant enough that, as reportable under sections event consisted solely of a case of a late a result, a structure or system would not 50.72(b)(2)(ll)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) surveillance test where the oversight is be capable of performing its specified [i.e., an unanalyzed condition that corrected, the test is performed, and the safety functions, the condition would be significantly affects plant safety).

equipment is found to be functional. reportable under sections 50.72(b)(2)(v) As was previously indicated in the This type of event has not proven to be and 50.73(a)(2)(v) (i.e., an event or 1983 Statements of Considerations for significant because the equipment condition that could have prevented the 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, with regard to remained functional. fulfillment of the safety function of an unanalyzed condition that Condition of the nuclearpower plant, structures or systems that are needed to: significantly compromises plant safety, including its principal safety barriers, (A) Shut down * * *l. "The Commission recognizes that the being seriously degraded / current For example, during testing of 480 licensee may use engineeringjudgment sections 50.72(b)(1)(ll) and (b)(2)(l), volt safety-related breakers, one breaker and experience to determine whether an replaced by new section 50. 72(b)(2)(li), would not trip electrically. The cause unanalyzed condition existed. It is not and section 50. 73(a)(2)(li)/. Currently, was a loose connection, due to a lug that intended that this paragraph apply to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2)(1) was too large for a connecting wire. minor variations in individual provide the following distinction: a Other safety related breakers did not parameters, or to problems concerning qualifying event or condition during malfunction, but they had the same single pieces of equipment, For operation is initially reportable in one mismatch. The event would be example, at any time, one or more hour; a condition discovered while reportable because the incompatible safety-related components may be out of shutdown that would have qualified if lugs and wires could have caused one service due to testing, maintenance, or it had it been discovered during or more safety systems to fail to perform a fault that has not yet been repaired.

operation is initially reportable in four their specified safety function (s). Any trivial single failure or minor error hours. The new 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ll) Another example is as follows. An in performing surveillance tests could would eliminate the distinction because annual inspection indicated that some produce a situation in which two or there would no longer be separate 1 bearings were wiped or cracked on both more often unrelated, safety-grade l hour and 4-hour categories of non- emergency diesel generators (EDGs).

components are out-of. service.

emergency reports for this criterion. Although the EDGs were running prior Technically, this is an unanalyzed There would only be 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months non- to the inspection, the event would be condition. However, these events emergenc reports for this criterion. reportable because there was reasonable shou!d be reported only if they involve Unana yzed condition that doubt about the ability of the EDGs t significantly comprormses plant safety functionally related components or if operate for an extended period of time'

[ sections 50. 72(b)(1)(II)(A) and (b)(2)(1), they significantly compromise plant as required.

,,7,,Y' ,

and section 50. 73(a)(2)(ll)(A): replaced If a design or analysis defect or by new section 50.72(b)(2)(11)(B), and deviation (or any other event or "When applying engineering section 50. 73(a)(2)(ll)(B)/. Currently,10 condition) is significant enough that, as judgment, and there is a doubt regarding i CFR 50.72(b)(1)(il)(A) and (b)i2)(i) a result, one train of a multiple train whether to report or not, the i provide the following distinction: a system controlled by the plant's TS is Commission's policy is that licensees '

qualifying event or condition during not capable of performing its specified should make the report."2 operation is initially reportabic in one safety functions, and thus the train is "For example, small volds in systems hour; a condition d:scovered while inoperable longer than allowed by the designed to remove heat from the shutdown that would have qualified if TS, the condition would be reportable reactor core which have been previously it had it been discovered during under section 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) (i.e., an shown through analysis not to be safety operation is initially reportable h four operation or condition prohibited by significant need not be reported.

hours. The new 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii)(B) TSI. However, the accumulation of volds that would eliminate the distinction because For example,if it is found that an could inhibit the ability to adequately there would no longer be separate 1 exciter panel for one EDG lacks remove heat from the reactor core, hour and 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months categories of non- appropriate seismic restraints because of particularly under natural circulation emergency reports for this reporting a design, analysis or construction conditions, would constitute an criterion. There would only be 8. hour inadequacy and, as a result, there is non emergency reports for this criterion. reasonable doubt about the EDC's ability i 48 FR 39042. August 29,1983 and 48 FR 33856.

In addition, the new 10 CFR to perform its specified safety functions July 26.1983.

50.72(b)(2)(li)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) during and after a Safe Shutdown 2 48 FR 39042. August 29.1983.

Federal Rrgister/Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36299

.L unanalyzed condition and would be include a margin of 3.0 against gross of conditions outside the design basis of reportable." 3 failure or burst under normal plant the plant to the safety significant issues "In addith n. voiding in instrument operating conditions, including startup. while reducing the number eSeports lines that restJts in an erroneous operation in the power range, hot under the current rules in order to indication causing the operator to standby, and cooldown, and all minimize the reporting of less misunderstand the true condition of the anticipated transients that are included significant issues. In particular, the plant is also an uranalyzed condition in the plant design specification. proposed amendments will help ensure and should be repcrted." 4 (2) The calculated potential primary- that significant safety problems that Furthermore, beyend the examples to-secondary leak rate is not consistent could reasonably be expected to be given in 1983, examp'es of reportable with the plant licensing basis. The applicable to similar components at the events would include discovery that a licensing basis accident analyses specific plant or at other plants will be system required to meet the single typically assume (for accidents other identified and addressed although the failure criterion does not do so, than a steam generator tube rupture specific licensee might determine that In another example, if ftce barriers are (SGTR)) a i gpm primary-to-secondary the system or structure remained found to be missing, such tuat the leak rate concurrent with the accident to operable, or that technical specification required degree of separatico 'nr demonstrate that the radiological requirements were met. The proposed redundant safe shutdown trales is consequences satisfy 10 CFR Part 100 rules will provide that, consistent with lacking, the event would be rep,rtable. and CDC-19. In these instances, the NRC's effort to obtain information On the other hand, if a fire wrap, to degradation which may lead to leakage for engineering studies of operational which the licensee has committed is above I gpm under accident conditions, anomalies and trends and patterrs missing from a safe shutdown train but other than a SGTR, would exceed the analysis of operational occurrences, the another safe shutdown train is avaih,ble tlueshold. For some units, the staff has NRC would be at.le to monitor the in a different fire area, protected such approved accident leakages above I gpm capability of safety related components that the required separation for safe subject to updating the licensing basis to perform their design basis functions.

shutdewn trains is still provided, the accident analyses to reflect this amount Significantly degraded component (s) event would not be reportable. of leakage and subject to risk /section 50.73(a)(2)(ll)(C)/. This new if a condition outside the design basis !mplications being acceptable.s reporting criterion would require of the plant (or any other event or (iv) Low temperature over pressure reporting if a component is in a condition) is significant enough that, as transients where the pressure- degraded or non-conforming condition a result, a principal safety barrier is temperature relationship violates such that the ability of the component seriously degraded, it would be preswre temperature limits derived to perform its specified safety function reportable under sections from A ppendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 is significantly degraded and the 50.72(b)(2)(ii)(A) and 50.73(a)(2)(il)(A) (e.g., TS pressure-temperature curves). condition could reasonably be expected

[i.e., any event or condition that results (v) Loss of containment function or to apply to other similar components in in the condition of the nuclear power integrity, including containment leak the plant. It would be added to ensure plant, including its principal safety rate tests where the total containment that design basis or other discrepancies barriers, being seriously degraded). This as found, mmimum-pathway leak rate would continue to be reported if the reporting criterion applies to material exceeds the limiting condition for capability to perform a specified safety (e.g., metallurgical or chemical) operation (LCO) in the facil:ty's TS.s function is significantly degraded and problems that cause abnormal Finally, a condition outsitie the the condition has generic implications.

degradation of or stress upon the design basis of the plant (or any other On the other hand, if the degradations principal safety barriers (i.e.. the fuel event or conditioni would be reportable are not significant or the condition does cladding, reactor coolant system if a component is in a degrad xi or non. not have generic implications, reporting pressure boundary, or the containment) conforming condition such that the would not be required under this such as: ability of a component to perfarm its criterion.

(i) Fuel cladding failures in the specifled safety functior. is significantly For example, at one plant several reactor, or in the storage pool, that degraded and the condition could normally open valves in the low exceed expected values, or that are reasonably be expected to vpply to other Pressure safety injection system were unique or widespread, or that are similar components in the p! ant. This routinely closed to support quarterly new criterion is contained in section surveillance testing of the system. In caused by unexpected factors.

(11) Welding or material defects in the 50.73(a)(2)(li)(C) as discussed t elow. reviewing the design basis and As a result, these proposed associated calculations, it was l primary coolant system which cannot be amendments would focus the reprting determined that the capability of the found acceptable under ASME Section valves to open in the event of a large XI, IWB-3600. " Analytical Evaluation of E Section XI Table 8 !n addition, if the extent of degradation is great break loss of coolJnt actident (LOCA)

Flaws" or ASM,, Acceptance Standards (i e.. if rnany. tubes are degraded or oefective). a combined with degraded grid voltage IWB-3410-1. telephone nouncation and a written LER should be during a surveillance test was degraded.

(ill) Steam generator tube degradation provided The plant's TS typically provide spelfte The licensee concluded that the valves in the following circumstances: requirements indicating when reporting is re iuired 1 (based on the number of tubes degraded or derective would still be able to reopen under the )

(1) The severity of degradation

'""n5 I" Percent inspected") and those postulated Conditions and considered corresponds to failure to maintain used t deternune 6em operable. Ilowever, that structural safety factors. The structural "Nnts p s conclusion could not be supported safety factors implicit in the licensing *The LC typically employs La. which is deined using the conservative standards basis are those described in Reguh tory in Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 as the maximu n

11 wable containment leak rate at pressure Pa.1 he estat.lished by Generic Letter 89-10.

Guide 1.121. These safety factors calculated peak containment internal pressure Pendog determination of final related to the design basis accident. Minimum

correctc/e action, administrative 2 48 FR 39042. August 29.1983 arkt 48 FR 33856. pathway leak rate means the minimum leak rate July 26.1983. that can be attributed to a penetradon leakage pati Procedures were impl emented to 4 48 FR 39042, August 29.1983 and 48 FR 33856. for example, the smaller of either the inboard or Preclude closing the valves. The event ;

July 26.1983. outboard valve's individual leak rates. would be rtportable because the l

)

36300 Fedtral R:gister/Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules capability of a component to perform its At one plant the switch on the radio There would only be 8. hour non-specified safety functions was transmitter for the auxiliary building emergency reports for this criterion.

significantly dearaded and the same crane was used to handle a spent fuel The new section 50.72(b)(2)(iv) would condition could reasonably be expected cask while two protective features had eliminate telephone reporting for to apply to othei similar components. been defeated by wiring errors. A new invalid automatic actuation or in another exa nple, during a routine radio control transmitter had been unintentional manual actuation. These periodic inspection. Jumper wires in the procured and placed in service. Because events are not significant and thus valve operators for three valves were the new cor oller was wired differently telephone reporting is not needed.

found contaminated with grease which than the old ue, the drum overspeed However, the p.oposed amendments was leaking from rhe limit switch gear protection and sper.J fuel pool resof slot would not eliminate the requirement for box. The cause was overfilling of the limit switch were inadvertently a written report of an invalid actuation grease box, as a res uit of following a defeated. While the crane was found to urider 10 CFR 50.73. There is still a generic malntenance procedure. The be outside its design basis, this need for reporting of these events leakage resCted in contamination and condition would not be reportable because they are used in making degradation of the electrical because the switch wiring deficiency estimates of equipment reliability components which were not qualified could not reasonably be expected to parameters, which in turn are needed to for exposure to greate. This could result affect any other components at the support the Commission's move in valve malfunctior.(s). The conditions plant. towards risk informed regulation. (See were corrected and the maintenance Condition not covered by theplant's SECY-97-101, May 7,1997 " Proposed procedures were changed. The event operating and emergencyprocedures Rule,10 CFR 50.76. Reporting would be reportable tecause the /section 50.72(b)(2)(li)(C), and section Reliability and Availability information capability of several s'milcr components 50. 73(a)(2)(ll)(C)f. This criterion would for Risk-significant Systems and to perform their specified safety be deleted because it does not result in Equipment," Attachment 3).

functions could be significantly worthwhile reports aside from those The term "any engineered safety degraded. that would be captured by other feature (ESF), including the reactor In a further example, while processing reporting criteria such as: Pmtection system (RPS)." which calculations it was determined that four (1) An unanalyzed condition that currently defines the systems for which motor operated valves within the reactor significantly affects plant safety; actuation must be reported in section building were located below the (2) An event or condition that could 50.72(b)(2)(iv) and section accident flood level and were not have prevented the fulfillment of the 50 73(a)(2)(iv), would be replaced by a quallfled for that condition. Pending safety function of structures or systems specific list of systems. The current replacement with quallfled equipment, that are needed to: shut down the definition has led to confusion and the licensee determined taat three of the reactor and maintain it in a safe variability in reporting because there are valves had sufficiently short opening shutdown condition; remove residual varying definitions of what constitutes time that their safety function would be heat; control the release of radioactive an ESF. For example, at some plants completed before they were submerged. material; or mitigate the consequences systems that are known to have high The fourth valve was normally open and of an accident: risk significance, such as emergency ac could remain open. After flooding, valve (3) An event or condition that results power, auxillary feedwater, and reactor position indication could be lost, but in the condition of the nuclear power core isolation cooling are not considered valve position could be estabilshed plant, including its principal safety ESFs. Furthermore, in many cases indirectly using process parameter barriers, being seriously degraded; systems with much lower levels of risk indications. The event wouhl be U) An ewation or condition significance, such as control room reportable because the capability of , prohibited ay the plant's TS: ventilation syrtems, are considered to be several similar ccmponents to perform (5) An event or condition that results ESFs.

their specified safety functior.s could be in actuation of any of the systems listed in the proposed amendments significantly deFraded. in the rules, as amended; actuation would be reportable for the An example of an event that would (6) An event that poses an actual specific systems named in sections not be reportable is as follows. The threat to the safety of the nuclear power 50.72(b)(2)(iv) and 50.73(a)(2) liv). This motor on a metor-operated vah e (MOV) plant or significantly hampers site would result in consistent reporting of burned out after repeated cycling for personnel in the performance of duths events that result in actuation of these testing. This' event would not tw necessary for the safe operation of the highly risk signl/lcant systems.

reportable because it is a single nuclear power plant. Reasonable consistency in reporting component failure, and while there Manual or automatic actuation of any actuation of highly risk significant might be similar MOVs in the plant, engineered safety feature ESF / current systems is needed to support estimating theie is not a reasonable basis to chink sections 50.72(b)(1)(lv) and (b)(2)(11), equipment reliability parameters, which that other MOVs would be affected by replaced by new . sections 50. 72(b)(2)(lv), is important to several aspects of the this same condition. On the other hand, and section 50. 73(a)(2)(lv)/. Currently. move towards more risk-informed if several MOVs had been repeatetily sections 50.72(b)(1)(iv) and (b)(2)(li) regulation, including more risk-cycled and1 hen after some extended provide the following distinction: an informed monitoring of plant period of time one of the MOVs was event that results or should have performance.

found inopt rable or significantly resulted in ECCS discharge into the The specific list of systems in the degraded be cause of that cycling, then reactor coolant system is initially proposed rule would also eliminate the condition would be reportable, reportable within I hour; other ESF report!ng for events of lesser Minor switch adjustments on MOVs actuations are initially reportable within significance, such as actuation of

- would not be reported where they do 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The new 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv) control room ventilation systems.

not significantly affect the ability of the would eliminate this distinction The specific list of systems in the MOV to carrv out its design-basis because there would no longer be proposed rule is similar to the list of function ancI the cause of the separate 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months categories of systems currently provided in the adjustments is not a generic concern. non emergency report;for this criterion. reporting guidelines in NURCG-1022,

Federal Register /Vol. 64. No.128/ Tuesday July 6.1999/ Proposed Rules 36301 Revision 1. with some minor revisions. ventilation systems, are considered to be years, m orde- to rule out the it is based on systems for which ESFs. possibt'ity, would not be warranted.

actuation is frequently reported and Event or condition that could have A new paragraph. section systems with relatively high risk- prevented fulfillment of the safety 50.72(b)(2)(vi) would be added to clarify significance based on a sampling of function ofstructures or systems that section 10.72. The new paragraph plant specific PRAs (see Draft * * * (current sections 50.72(b)(1)(ll) would explicitly state that telephone Regulatory Guide DG-1046. " Guidelines and (b)(2)(l) replaced by new sections reporting is not required under section for Reporting Reliability and 50. 72(b)(2)(v) and (vi), and sections 50.72(b)(2)(v) foi single fat;ures if Availability Information for Risk- 50.73(a)(2)(v) and (vi)/The phrase redundant equipment in the same Significant Systems and Equipment in " event or condition that alone could system war operable and autlable to Nuclear Power Plants." particularly have prevented the fulfillment of the perform the requbed safety function.

Tables C-1 through C-5). safety function of structures or That is, although vne trainof a system This proposal to list the systems in systems.* * * " would be clarified by may be incapable of performing its the rule is controversial and public deleting the wo d "alone". This clarifles safety function, reporting is not required comment is specifically invited in this the requirements by more clearly under this enterion if that system is still area. In particular, three principal reflecting the principle that it is capable of pet forming the safety alternatives to the proposed rule have necessary to consider other existing function. This is the same principle that been identifled for comment: plant conditions in determining the is currently stated explicitly in section (1) Maintain the status quo. Under reportability of an event or condition 50.73(a)(2)(vi) with regard to written this alternative the rule would continue under this criterien. For example, if one LERs.

to require reporting for actuation of Majorloss ofemerg =ncy assessment train of a two train system is incapable l

,any ESF. The guidance woutcl of performing its safety function for one capability, offsite response capability, or continue to indicate that reporting reason, and the other train is incapable c mmunicati n tapab/11ty(current should include as a minimum the of performing its safety function for a seed n 50.72(b)(U(v), new section system on the list. 50. 72(b)(2)(xill)/. The new section (2) Require use of a plant specific. different reason, the event is reportable.

would be modifiec by adding the word sisk-informed list. Under this The term ..at the time of discovery..

"offsite"in front of the term alternative, the list of systems would be w uld be added to section 50.72(b)(2)(v) risk-informed, and plant-specific. to eliminate telephone notification fo a " communications capabatty" to make it clear that the requin ment does not Licensees would develop the list based c ndition that no longer exists, or n apply to interr.al plaat communication on existing PRA analyses, judgment. I nger has an effect on required safety systems.

and specific plant dealgn. No list would functi ns. For example, it might be Airborne radioacthe relaise * *

be provided in the rule. discovered that some time ago both and liquid elTluent release * * *

(3) Return to the pre 1998 situation trains of a two train system were (section 50. 72(b)(2)(vif) an-Isecelons (i.e.. before publication of the reporting incapable of performing their safety function, but the condition was 50. 73(a)(2)(vill) and 50. 73(a)(2)(ix)/. The l guidance in NUREG-1022. Revision 1). statement indicating rep orting under '

Under this alternative, the rule would subsequently corrected and no longer exists. In another example, while the section 50.72(b)(2)(viii) atisfies the continue to require reporting for requirements of section 10 2202 would actuation of "any ESF." The guldance plant is shutdown, it might be be removed becaure it would not be would indicate that reporting should discovered that during a previous correct. For examole, sonn events include those systems identified as Period of operation a system was captured by sectdn 20.22C2 would not ESF's for each particular plant (e.g., in incapable of performing its safety be captured by section 50.72(b (2)(vili).

the FSAR). function, but the system is not currently Also, the statement indicathg that WPh regard to this third alternative, required to be operable. These events reporting under section 50.73(a;(2)(vill) it may be noted that this approach has are considered significant, and an LER satisfies the requirements of secion l the advantage of clarity and simplicity, would be required, but there would be l 20.2203(a)(3) would be deleted tecause There would be no need to develop a no need for telephone notification. It would not be correct. Some events new list, and this is the practice thst The phrase " occurring withln three captured by section 20.2203(a)(3) would was followed from 1984-1997 without years of the date of discovery" would be not be captured by section l creating major problems. However, the added to section 50.73(a)(2)(v) to 50.73(#(2)(viii). '

lists of ESFs are not based on risk- eliminate written LERs for conditions The proposed extension of reporting significance. For example, emergency that have not existed during the deadlines to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months in section 5112 diesel generators (EDGs) are known to previous three years. Such a historical and 60 days in section 50.73 raises be highly risk-significant; however, at event would now have less significance, questions about whether similar six pl.mts. the CDGs are not considered and assessing reportability for earlier changes should be made to Parts 20,30.

to be ESFs. Similarly, auxiliary times can consume considerable 40,70. 72 and 76. The merits of such feedwater (AFW). systems at resources. For example, assurr.* that changes, which may vary for differen:

pressurized water reactors (PWRs) are during a design review a discrepancy is types of licensees, will be addressed h known to be highly risk-significant; found that affects the ability of a system separate actions.

however, at a number of plants these to perform its safety function in a given Contents ofLERS (sections systems are not consldered to be ESFs. specific configuration. If it is likely that 50. 73(b)(2)(ll)(F) and 50. 73(b)(2)(ll)U)/

Also, reactor core isolation coolhg the safety function could have been Paragraph (F) would be revised to (RCIC) systems at bolling water reactors prevented, the answer should be correct the address of the NRC Library.

(BWRs) are known to be highly risk reasonably apparent based on the Paragraph 0) currently requires that significant; however, at a number of knowledge and experience of the plant's the narrative section include the plants these systems are not considered operators and/or a review of operating following specific information as to be ESFs. In contrast, at many plants, records for the past three years. The systems with much lower levels of risk very considerable effort required to app 1)(ropriate Operatorfor the particular actions that affectedevent:

the significance, such as control room review all records older than three course of the event, including operator

36302 Federal Register /Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules errors, procedural deficiencies, or both, consequences and implications of the 5. Reporting of Historical Problems that contributed to the event. event. This assessment must include the (2) For each personnel error, the As discussed above, provisions would availability of other systems or licensee shall discuss. be added to sections 50.73(a)(2)(l)(B)

C Ponents that could have performed and 5033(a)(2)(v) to eliminate reporting (l) Whether the error was a cognitive the same function as the components of a condition or event that did not error (e g., failure plant condition, to recognize failure the actual and systems that failed during the event. occur within three years of the date of to realize which It w uld be modified by adding a discovery. (See the response to systems should be functioning, failure to recognize the true nature of the event) regulrement t is include the staius of Comment 8, the discussion under the rocedural error; C mPonents and systems that are heading " Operation or condition a f)Whether the error was contrary toincluded in emergency or operating or (li prohibited by TS." and the discussion an approved procedure, was a direct procedures and could have been used to under the heading " Event or condition result of an error in an approved recover from the event in case of an that could have prevented fulfillment of procedure, or was associated with an ad'litional failure in the systems the safety function of structures or activity or task that was not covered by actually used for recovery." This systems that * * * ") Public comment is an approved procedure; information is needed to better support invited on whether such historical (ill) Any unusualcharacteristics of the the NRC's assessment of the risk- events and conditions should be work location (e.g., heat, noise) that significance of reported events. reported (rather than being excluded directly contributed to the error; and Exemptions (section 50. 73(/)/. This from reporting, as proposed). Public (tv) The type of personnel involved provision would be deleted because the c mment is also invited on whether the (i.e., contractor personnel, utility- exemption provisions in section 50.12 three year exclusion of such historical licensed operator, utility non licensed provide for grantmg of exemptions as events and conditions should be operator, other utility personrJ). warranted. Thus, including another, extended to all written reports ruuired 3 The proposed amendment would section-specific exemption provision in by section 50.73(a) (rather than being l change section 50.73(b)(2)(ll)l]) t limited to these two specific reporting simply require that the licensee discuss section 50.73 adds unnecessary criteria, as proposed).

complexity to the rules.

the causes and circumstances for each

6. Reporting of Component Problems human performance related problem 3. Revisions to Reporting Guidelines in that contributed to the event. It is not NUREG-1022 As discussed above, a new reporting necessary to specify the level of detall criterion would be added to require provided in the current rule, which is A draft report, NUREG-1022, reporting if a component is in a more appropriate for guidance. Detalls Revision 2. " Event Reporting degraded or non-conforming condition I would continue to be provided in the Guidelines.10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73," is such that the ability of the component reporting guidelines, as indicated in being made available for public to perform its specified saf7 function section 5.2.1 of the draft of Revision 2 comment concurrently with the is significantly degraded and the to NUREG-1022. This draft report is proposed amendments to 10 CFR 50.72 condition could reasonably be expected being made available for public and 50.73. The draft report is available to apply to other similar components in comment concurrently with the for inspection in the NRC Public the plant. (See the response to Comment proposed rule, as discussed below Document Room or it may be viewed 14 and the discussion under the heading under the heading " Revisions to and downloaded electronically via the "Significantly degraded component (s)

Reporting Guidelines in NUREG-1022." interactive rulemaking web site (section 50.73(a)(2)(ll)(C)).") Public Spent fuel storage cask problems established by NRC for this rulemaking, comment is invited on whether this (current sections 50. 72(b)(2)(vil) and as discussed above under the heading proposed new criterion would 72.16(a)(1), (a)(2), (b) and (c)/. Section ADDRESSES. Single copies may be accomplish its stated purpose-to 50.72(b)(2)(vil) would be deleted obtained from the contact listed above ensure that design basis or other because these reporting criteria are under the heading "For Further discrepancies would continue to be redundant to the reporting criteria InformatIon Contact." In the draft reported if the capability to perform a contained in sections 72.216(a)(1), report, guidance that is considered to be sPecifled safety function is significantly (a)(2), and (b). Repetition of the same new or different is a meaningful way, degraded and the condition has generic reporting criteria in different sections of relative to that provided in NUREG_ implications. Public comment is also the rules adds unnecessary complexity 1022, Revision 1, is indicated by invited on whether the proposed new and is inconsistent with the current redlining the appropriate text. criterion would be subject to varying practice in other areas, such as reporting interpre'ations by licensees and of safeguards events as required by 4. Reactor Oversight inspectors.

section Also, a 73.71' con forming amendment would The NRC is developing revisions to 7. Enforcement be made to section 72.216. This is Process for oversight of operating The NRC Intends to modify its necessary because section 72.216(a) reactors, including inspection, existing enforcement policy in currently relles on section assessment and enforcement processes- connection with the proposed 50.72(b)(2)(vil), which would be In connection with this effort, the NRC amendments to sections 50.72 and deleted, to establish the time limit for has considered the kinds of event 50.73. The philosophy of the proposed l initial notification. The amended reports that would be eliminated by the changes is to base the significance of the j Proposed rules and believes that the reporting violation on: (1) The reporting section 72.216 would refer to sections 72.74 and 72.75 for initial notification changes would not have a deleterious requirement, which will require and followup reporting requirements. effect on the oversight process. Public reporting within time frames more Assessment ofSafety Consequences comment is invited on whether or not commensurate with the significance of (section 50.73(b)(3)/. This section this is the case. In particular, it is the underlying issues than the current currently requires that an LER include requested that if any examples to the rule, and (2) the impact that a late report an assessment of the safety contrary are known they be Identified, may have on the ability of the NRC to

Federal Register /Vol 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36303 fulfill its obligations of ful.'y (LER) would not be reduced to a minor requirements are frequently triggered by understanding issues that are requited violation. NRC reporting requirements.

to be reported in order to accomplish its In accordance with Appendix C of the Accordingly, the NRC seeks State pub!!c health and safety mistion which Enforcement Policy. " Interhn comment on issues related to the in many cases involves reactLig to Enforcement Policy for Severity Level proposed amendments to power reactor reportable issues or events. As such, the IV Violationsinvolving Activities of reporting requirements.

NRC intends to revise the Enforcement Power Reactor Licensees." the failure to Policy. NUREG-1600 Rev. I as follows: file a 60-day LER would normally be Main I.anguage (1) Appendix B, Supplement I.C- dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation The President's Memorandum dated Examples of Severity Level 11I (NCV). Repetitive failures to make LER June 1,1998, entitled. " Plain Language violations. repcrts indicative of a licensee's in Government Writing," directed that (a) Example 14 would be revised to dnability to recognize reportable the Federal government's writing be in read as follows-A failure to provide the ronditions. such that it is not likely that plain language. The NRC requests required one hour telephone the NRC will be made aware of comments on this proposed rule notification of an emergency action operational, design and configuration :specifically with respect to the clarity taken pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(x). Issues deemed reportable pursuant to 10 and effectiveness of the langt age used.

(b) An additional example would be CFR 50.73, will be considered for Comments should be sent to the address added that would read as follows-A ca egorization at Severity Level 111. This listed above.

failure to provide a required 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or disposition may be warranted since 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months non. emergency telephone n notification pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.

such licensee performance impacts the f*fi" "r nmentalImPact: Categorical (c) An additional example would be ability of the NRC to fulfillitsiegulatory obligations

The NRC has determined that this added that would read as follows-A proposed regulation is the type of action late 8-hour notification that 8. Electronic Reporting described in categorical exclusion 10 substantially impacts agency response. The NRC is currently planning to CFR 51.22(c)(3)(ill). Therefore neither (2) Appendix B, Supplement I.D- implement an electronic document an ensironmental impact statement nor Examples of Severity LevelIV management and reporting program, an environmental assessment has been j known as the Agency-wide Document prepared for this proposed regulation.

nkple 4, would be revised to Access and Management System VI. Backfit Analysis read as follows-A failure to provide a A required 60-day written LER pursuant to fgr e ect nic st i ta o any ty es of backfit The NRC has determined that the 10 CFR 50.73. rule,10 CFR 50.109, does not These changes in the Enforcement reports, including LERs. Accordingly, Policy would be consistent with the no separate rulemaking effort to provide apply to tr: formation collection and for electronic submittal of LERs is reporting requirements such as those overall objective of the rule change of contained in the proposed rule.

better aligning the reporting contemplated.

Therefore, a backfit analysis has not requirements with the NRC's reporting 9. Schedule been prepared. However, as discussed needs. The Enforcement Policy changes The current schedule is as follows: below, the NP.C has prepared a

( would correlate the Severity Level of the regulatory analysis for the proposed infractions with the relative importance 08/99-Ccnduct public workshop to rule, which examines the costs and of the information needed by the NRC. discuss proposed rule and draft (se ra e notlc benefits of the proposed requirements in Section IV.D of the Enforcement re{rting utdel r Policy provides that the Severity Level h& M W h v6h published later this month). regulatory analysis as a disciplined of an untimely report may be reduced Process for assessing information depending on the individual August 5,1999-Public comments due to OMB collection and reporting requirements to circumstances. In deciding whether the determine that the burden imposed is Severity Level should be reduced for an September 7,1999-Receive OMB justified in light of the potential safety approval untimely 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or 8. hour non-September 20.1999-Public comments significance of the information to be emergency report the impact that the collected.

due to NRC failure to report had on any agency 10/01/99-Provide final rule and response would be considered. For VII* Regulato Anal#sis guidelines to NRC staff rulemaking example, if a delayed 8. hour reportable group The Commission has prepared a draft event i.mpacted the timing of a followup 11/05/99-Provide final rule and regulatory analysis on this proposed I

inspection that was deemed necessary, guidelines to the formal concurrence rule. The analysis exa:ntnes the costs then the Severity Level would not chain and benefits of the alternatives normally be reduced. Similarly, a late 01/14/00-Provide final rule and considered by the Commission. The notification that delayed the NRC's guideltr'es to CRGR and ACRS draft analysis is available for inspection ability to perform an engineering 02/11/00-Complete briefings of CRGR in the NRC Public Document Room or analysis of a condition to determine if and ACRS it may be viewed and downloaded additional regulatory action was 03/10/00-Provide final rule a:-d electronically via the interactive necessary would generally not be guidelines to Commission rulemaking web site established by NRC considered for disposition at a reduced 04/07/00-Publish final rule and for this rulemaking, as discussed above Severity Level. Additionally, late guidelines under the heading ADDRESSES. Single reports filed in cases where the NRC copies may be obtained from the contact had to prompt the licensee to report 10. State Input listed above under the heading "For would generally not be subject to Many States (Agreement States and Further Information Contact."

disposition at reduced Severity Level Non Agreement States) have agreements The Commission requests public and the Severity Level for failure to with power reactors to inform the States comment on this draft analysis.

submit a timely Licensee Event Report of plant issues. State reporting Comments on the draft analysis may be

36304 Fed:ral Register /Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules submitted to the NRC as discussed Public Protection Notification (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.13. 50 54(D.D.).

above under the heading ADDRESSES. and 50.103 also issued under sec.108,68 The NRC may not conduct or sponsor- Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138).

VIII. Paperwork Reduction Act and a person is not required to respond Sections 50.23. 50.35,50.55, and 50.56 also Statement to, an information collection unless it issued under sec.185,68 Stat. 955 (42 U S.C.

displays a currently valid OMB control 2235). Sections 50.33a. 50.55a and Appendix This proposed . ..le would amend number. Q also issued under sec.102, Pub. L. 91 -190, information collection requirements that 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 are subject to the Paperwork Reduction IX. Regulatory Flexibility Certification and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204. 88 Stat.

Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). In accordance with the Regulatory 1245 (42 U.S.C. 584 4). Sections 50.58. 50.91.

This rule has been submitted to the Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L.97-415, Office of Management and Budget for Commission certifies that this rule will 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 review and approval of the information als issued under sec.184,68 Stat. 954, as not, if romulgated, P have a significant collection requirements. amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also economic impact on a substantial issued under sec.187,68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C.

The public reporting burden for the number of small entitles. This proposed 2237).

currently existing reporting rule affects only the licensing and requirements in 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 operation of nuclear power plants. The 2. Section 50.72 is amended by is estimated to average about 790 hours0.00914 days 0.219 hours 0.00131 weeks 3.00595e-4 months companies that own these plants do not revising Paragraphs (a) and (b) to read per response (i.e., per commercial fall within the scope of the definition of as follows:

nuclear power reaoor per year) "small entitles" set forth in the including the time for reviewing $ S0.72 Immediate notification Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size requirements for operating nuclear power instructions, searching existing data standards established by the NRC (10 reactors.

sources, gathering and maintaining the CFR 2.810). (a) Genera 1 requirements.7 (1) Each data needed, and completing and nuclear power reactor licensee licensed reviewing the information collection. It X P'OP 5'd A"*"d5'"I8 under S 50.21(b) or S 50.22 of this part is estimated that the proposed List of Subjects shall notify the NRC Operations Center amendments would impose a one time implementation burden of about 200 10 CFR Part 50 via the Emergency Notification System Antitrust, Classified information, of.

hours per reactor, after which there '(1) The declaration of any of the would be a recurring annual burden Criminal penalties, Fire prevention.

Emergency Classes specified in the reduction of about 200 hours0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months per reactor Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear licensee's approved Emergency Plan: 8 per year. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Power plants and reactors, Radiation or Commission is seeking public comment protection, Reactor siting criteria, (11) Of those non-Emergency events on the potential impact of the Reporting and recordkeeping specified in paragraph (b) of this information collection contained in the requirements. section.

proposed rule and on the following 10 CFR Part 72 (2)If the Emergency Notification issues: System is inoperative, the licensee shal]

Is the proposed information collection Criminal penalties, Manpower make the required notifications via necessary for the proper performance of training programs, Nuclear materials, commercial telephone service, other the NRC, including whether the Occupational safety and health, Reporting and recordkeeping dedicated telephone system, or any information will have practical utility? other method which will ensure that a is the estimate of burden accurate? requirements, Security measures, and Spent fuel, report is made as soon as practical to the Is there a way to enhance the quality, NRC Operations Center.9,io utility, and clarity of the information to For the reasons set out in the (3) The licensee shall notify the NRC be collected? Preamble and under the authority of the immediately after notification of the .

How can the burden of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, appropriate State or local agencies and I information collection be minimized, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974- not later than one hour after the time the including the use of automated as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC licensee declares one of the Emergency collection techniques 7 15 Proposing to adopt the following Classes.

Send comments on any aspect of this amendments to 10 CFR part 50 and 10 (4) The licensee shall activate the proposed information collection, CFR part 7m. Emergency Response Data System including suggestions for reducing this (ERDS) " as soon as possible but not burden, to the Information and Records P ART 50-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF later than one hour sfter declaring an PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION Management Branch (T-5 F33), U.S. FACILITIES ** N '"CY C *** I" '5"*

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, emergency, or general emergency. The Washington, DC 20555-0001 or by 1. The authority citation for part 50 ERDS may also be activated by the Internet electronic mail to continues to read as follows: licensee during emergency drills or BJSl@NRC. GOV; and to the Desk Authority: Secs. 102,103,104,105,161, exercises if the licensee's computer Officer Office of Information and 182,183,186,189,68 Stat. 930,937,938.

Regulatory Affairs NEOB-10202, 948,953,954,955,956, as amended. sec. 'Other requirements for immediate notification of ed (3150AF98), Office of Management and 234,83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2132,2133,2134,2135,2201,2232,2233,

[cy,byretc lneE ""'

re i[tIisYp$er. in Budget. Washington, DC 20503. parucular 55 20.1906. 20.2202. 50.36,72.74. 72.75.

Comments to OMB on the information 2236,2239. 2282h secs. 201, as amended- and 73.71.

202,206. 88 Stat.1242 as amended,1244, collections or on the abcve issues .These Emergency Classes are addressed in should be submitted by August 5,1999. 12 t on .7 a is's ed Comments received after this date will ub. L 95-601, sec.10,92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851).

E ec 1 tNefhane number of the NRC operations center is 001) 816-5100.

be considered if it is practical to. do so. Section 50.10 also issued under secs.101. mlReservedl but consideration cannot be ensured for 185,68 Stat. 955 as amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, o Requirements for ERDS are addressed in comments received after this date. 2235), sec.102, Pub. L.91-190. 83 Stat. 853 Appendix E.Section VI.

Federal R:gister/Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36305 system has the capability to transmit the pressure coolant injection system: (B) Any liquid effluent release that, exercise data. feedwater coolant injection system; low when averaged over a time of I hour.

(5) When making a report under pressure injection function of the exceeds 20 times the applicable paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the residual heat removal system; and concentrat'on specified in appendix B licensee shall identify: automatic depressurization system. to part 20 table 2, column 2, at the (1) The Emergency Class declared: or (4) BWR isolation condenser system point of entry into the receiving waters (ii) Either paragraph (b)(1). "One Hour and reactor core isolation cooling (i.e., unrestricted area) for all Report " or paragraph (b)(2) "Eight-Hour system. radionuclides except tritium and Report," as the paragraph of this section (5) PWR auxiliary feedwater system. dissolved noble gases.

requiring notification of the Non. (6) Containment systems including: (ix) Any event that poses an actual Emergency Event. containment and reactor vessel isolation threat to the safety of the nuclear power (b) Non-emergency events-(l) One- systems (general containment isolation plant or significantly hampers site Hour reports. If not reported as a signals affecting numerous valves and personnel in the performance of duties declaration of the Emergency Class main steam isolation valve (MSIV) necessary for the safe operation of the under paragraph (a) of this section, the closure signals in BWRs) and nuclear power plant including fires, licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as containment heat removal and toxic gas releases, or radioactive practical and in all cases within one depressurization systems including releases.

hour of the occurrence of any deviation containment spray and fan cooler (x) Any event requiring the transport from the plant's Technical systems, of a radioactively contaminated person Specifications authorized pursuant to (7) Emergency ac electrical power to an offsite medical facility for S 50.54(x) of this part. systems, including: emergency diesel treatment.

(2) Eight-hour reports. If not reported generators (EDGs) and their associated (xi) Any event or situation, related to J under paragraphs (a) or (b)(1) of this support systems; hydroelectric facilities the health and safety of the public or ;

section, the licensee shall notify the used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee onsite personnel, or protection of the {

NRC as soon as practical and in all cases Station; safety related gas turbine environment, for which a news release within eight hours of the occurrence of (

generators; BWR dedicated Division 3 is planned or notification to other j any of the following: EDGs and their associated support government agencies has been or will be j (t) The initiation of any nuclear plant systems; and station blackout diesel made. Such an event may include an j shutdown required by the plant's generators (and black-start gas turbines onsite fatality or triadvertent release of !

Technical Specifications. that serve a similar purpose) which are radioactively contaminated materials. l (ii) Any event or condition that results started from the control room and (xii) Any event that results in a major in: included in the plant's operating and loss of emergency assessment capability, (A) The condition of the nuclear emergency procedures. offsite response capability, or offsite power plant, including its principal (8) Anticipated translent without communications capability (e.g.,

safety barriers, being seriously scram (ATWS) mitigating systems. significant portion of control room degraded; or (9) Service water (standby emergency indication. Emergency Notification (B) The nuclear power plant being in service water systems that do not System, or offsite notification system).

an unanalyzed condition that normally run). * * * *

significantly affects plant safety. (v) Any event or condition that at the 3. Section 50.73 is amended by (iii) Any natural phenomenon or other time of discovery could have prevented revising sections (a), (b)(2)(ll)(F).

external condition that poses an actual the fulfillment of the safety function of (b)(2)(ll)(J), (b)(3), (d), and (e) and by threat to the safety of the nuclear power structures or systems that are needed to: removing and reserving paragraph (f) to plant or significantly hampers site (A) Shut down the reactor and read as follows:

personnel in the performance of duties maintain it in a safe shutdown necessary for the safe operation of the condition 5 50.73 Licensee event report system. l plant. (B) Remove residual heat; (a) Reportable events. (1) The holder (lv)(A) Any event or condition that (C) Control the release of radioactive of an operating license for a nuclear results in intentional manual actuation material, or power plant (licensee) shall submit a or valid automatic actuation of any of (D) Mitigate the consequences of an Licensee Event Report (LER) for any the systems listed in paragraph accident. event of the type described in this (b)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, except when (vi) Events covered in paragraph paragraph within 60 days after the the actuatMn e esults from and is part of (b)(2)(v) of this section may include one discovery of the event. Unless otherwise a pre-planned sequence during testing or more procedural errors, equipment specified in this section, the licensee or reactor operation. failures, and/or discovery of design. shall report an event regardless of the (B) The systems to which the analysis, fabrication, construction, and/ plant mode or power level, and requirements of paragraph (b)(2)(lv)(A) or procedural inadequacies. However, regardless of the significance of the of thLs section apply are: individual component failures need not structure, system, or component that (1) Reactor protection system (reactor be reported pursuant to this paragraph initiated the event.

scram, reactor trip). If redundant equipment in the same (2) The licensee shall report:

(2) Emergency core cooling systems system was operable and available to (l)(A) The completion of any nuclear (ECCS) for pressurized water reactors perform the required safety function. plant shutdown required by the plant's (PWRs) including: high-head. (vii) (Reservedl Technical Specifications.

intermediate-head, and low head (viii)(A) Any airborne radioactive (B) Any operation or condition injection systems and the low pressure release that, when averaged over a time occurring within three years of the date injection function of residual (decay) period of I hour, results in of discovery which was prohibited by heat removal systems. concentrations in an unrestricted area the plant's Technical Specifications, (3) ECCS for boiling water reactors that exceed 20 times the applicable except when:

(BWRs) including: high-pressure and concentration specified in appendix B (1) The technical specification is low-pressure core spray systems; high- to part 20 table 2, column 1. administrative in nature: or

36306 Federal Register /Vol. 64. No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 9

(2) The event consists solely of a case (6) Containment systems including: (vill)(A) Any airborne radioactive of a late surveillance test where the containment and reactor vessel isolation release that, when averaged over a time oversight is corrected, the test is systems (general containment isolation period of I hour, resulted in airborne performed, and the equipment is found signals affecting numerous valves and radionuclide concentrations in an to be capable of performing its specified main steam isolation valve [MSIV) unrestricted area that exceeded 20 times safety functions. closure signals in BWRs) and the applicable concentration limits (C) Any deviation from the plant's containment heat removal and specified in appendix B to part 20. table Technical Specifications authorized depressurization systems, including 2, column 1.

pursuant to S 50.54(x) of this part. containment spray and fan cooler (B) Any liquid effluent release that.

(11) Any event or condition that systemr. when averaged over a time period of I l resulted in: (7) E. ergency ac electrical power hour, exceeds 20 times the applicable l (A) The condition of the nuclear systems. Including: emergency diesel concentrations specified in appendix B l

power plant, including its principal generators (EDCs) and their asset vi to part 20, table 2, column 2, at the safety barriers. being seriously support systems; hydroelectric k 9t of entry into the receiving waters degraded; used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee e., unrestricted area) for all (B) The nuclear power plant being in Station; safety related gas turbine radionuclides except tritium and an unanalyzed condition that generators: BWR dedicated Division 3 dissolved noble gases.

significantly affects plant safety; or EDGs and their associated support (ix) Any event that posed an actual I (C) A component being in a degraded systems: and station blackout diesel or non-conforming condition such that threat to the safety of the nuclear power l generators (and black-start gas turbines plant or significantly hampered site l the ability of the component to perform that serve a similar purpose) which are personnel in the performance of duties l Its specified safety function is started from the control room and necessary for the safe operation of the significantly degraded and the condition included in the plant's operating and nuclear power plant including fires, could reasonably be expected to affect emergency procedures. toxic gas releases, or radioactive other similar components in the plant. (8) Anticipated transient without releases.

(111) Any natural phenomenon or other scram (ATWS) mitigating systems- (b) * *

external condition that posed an actual (9) Service water (standby emergency (2) * *

threat to the safety of the nuclear power service water systems that do not (gg)...

plant or significantly hampered site normally run).

personnel in the performance of duties (O Any event or condition occurring (F)(1) The Ener Indust necessary for the safe operation of the Identification Sys m component within three years of the date of function identifter and system name of (v A nY e ent r condition that discovery that could have prevented the each component or system referred to in I fulfillment of the safety function of the LER' resulted in manual or automatic structures or systems that are needed to:

l I

actuation of any of the systems listed in (1) The Energy Industry Identification i paragraph (a)(2)(lv)(B) of this section, (A) Shut down tite reactor and System is defined in: IEEE Std 803-1983 l

h maint in it in a safe shutdown (May 16,1983) Recommended Practice 1 eg(1) The actuation resulted from and c ndition, (B) Remove residual heat; for Unique Identification in Power was part of a pre-planned sequence Plants and Related Facilities-during testing or reactor operation; or (C) Control the release of radioactive Principles and Definitions.

(2) The actuation was invalid and; material: or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an (h) IEEE Std 803-1983 has been (1) Occurred while the system was approved for incorporation by reference properly removed from service; or accident.

by the Director of the Federal Register.

(h) Occurred after the safety function (vi) Events covered in paragraph (2) A notice of any changes made to had been already completed. (a)(2)(v) of this section may include one or more procedural errors. equipment the material incorporated by reference (B) The systems to which the will be published in the Federal requirements of paragraph (a)(2)(lv)(A) failures, and/or discovery of design' of this section apply are: analysis, fabrication, construction, and/ Register. Copies may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and (1) Reactor protection system (reactor or procedural inadequacies. However.

scram, reactor trip). Individual component failures need not Electronics Engineers,345 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017. IEEE Std (2) Emergency core cooling systems be reported pursuant to this paragraph 803-1983 is available for inspection at (ECCS) for pressurized water reactors if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and available t the NRC's Technical Library, which is (PWRs) including: high-head. located in the Two White Flint North intermediate head, and low-head Perform the required safety function.

building,11545 Rockville Pike, injection systems and the low pressure (vil) Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one Rockville, Maryland; and at the Office of injection function of residual (decay) the Federal Register, i100 L Street, NW, l heat removal systems. Independent train or channel to become Washington, DC.

(3) 2CCS for boiling water reactors inoperable in multiple systems or two , , , , ,

(BWRs) including: high-pressure and independent trains or channels to j low-pressure core spray systems; high. become inoperable in a single system 0) I or each hu an ance i pressure coolant injection system; designed to.

feedwater coolant injection system; low (A) Shut down the reactor and event, the licensee shall discuss the pressure injection function of the maintain it in a safe shutdown cause(s) and circumstances.

residual heat removal system; and condition; automatic depressurization system. (B) Remove residual heat; (3) An assessment of the safety (4) BWR isolation condenser system (C) Control the release of radioactive consequences and implications of the and reactor core isolation cooling material; or event. This assessment must include the l

system. (D) Mitigate the consequences of an availability of systems or components (5) PWR auxiliary feedwater system. accident, that:

I

Fcd:ral Register /Vol. 64, No.128/ Tuesday, July 6,1999/ Proposed Rules 36307 (1) Could have performed the same 5. Section 72.216 is revised to read as flight fire with pilot and/or passenger function as the components and systems follows: injury.

that failed during the event, or

$ 72.216 Reports- DATES: Comments must be received on (ii) Are included in emergency or or before August 9,1999.

operating procedures and could have (a) (Reservedl been used to recover from the event in (b) [Reservedl ADDRESSES: Submit comments in case of an additional failure in the (c) The general licensee shall make triplicate to the Federal Aviation systems actually used for recovery. Initial and written reports in accordance Administration (FAA), Central Region.

. . . . . with S5 72.74 and 72.75. Office of the Regional Counsel, (d) Submission ofreports. Licensee Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 25th day o June,1999. ["R o 8 60 S Event Reports must be prepared on Kansas City, Missouri 64106 Comments Form NRC 366 and submitted within 60 For the Nuclear Regulatoiy Commission.

may be inspected at this location days of discovery of a reportable event Annette L Vietti-Cook, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday or situation to the U.S. Nuclear Secretaryof the Commission. through Friday, holidays excepted.

Re latory Commission, as specified in (FR Doc. 99-16934 Filed 7-2-99; 8:45 aml FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Paul (e) Report legibility. The reports and O. Pendleton, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, copies that licensees are required to submit to the Commission under the 1801 Airport Road. Room 100, Wichita, provisions of this section must be of DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Kansas 67209; telephone: (316) 946-sufficient quality to permit legible Federal Aviation Administration reproduction and micrographic SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

processing. 14 CFR Part 39 Comments Invited (f) [ Reserved)

. . . . . (Docket No. 97-CE-67-AD) Interested persons are invited to i participate in the making of the l RIN 2120-AW proposed rule by submitting such l PART 72-LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE Airworthiness Directives; Cessna written data, views. or arguments as INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT they may desire. Communications Aircraft Company 300 and 400 Series NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH LEVEL Airplanes should identify the Rules Docket RADIOACTIVE WASTE number and be submitted in triplicate to AGENCY: Federal Aviation the address specified above.The FAA

4. The authority citation for part 72 Administration, DOT. believes that the proposed regulation continues to read as follows: may have a significant economic impact ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking Authority: Sees.51,53.57,62,63.65.69, (NPRM). on a substantial number of small 81,161.182,183.184,186.189. 68 Stat. 929, businesses. Due to the urgent nature of 930,932.933,934.935,954,955,as

SUMMARY

This document proposes to the safety issues addressed, the FAA has i amended, sec. 234. 83 Stat. 444, as amended supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD) been unable to complete a preliminary l (42 U.S.C. 2071,2073,2077,2092. 2093. 75-23-08 RS, which currently requires regulatory flexibility analysis prior to i 86-repe e ns gan c ng r h an Me NL A nnal !

, , ) sec 274 P'ub regulatory flexibility analysis will be 373,73 Stat. 688, as amended (42 US.'C. repairing the exhaust system on certain 5841,5842,5846); Pub. L 95-6(a. uc.10,92 Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) 300 completed before, or within 180 days of Stat. 2951 as amended by Pub. L 10? 46, and 400 series airplanes. The proposed issuance of, the final rule. To assist in sec. 7902.106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C Ss51): AD would replace the inspections and this analysis, the FAA is particularly ,

sec.102 Pub. L 91-190. 83 Stat 853 (42 replacements that are required by AD interested in receiving information on l U.S.C. 4332); secs.131,132,133.135,137. 75-23-08 R5 with inspections and the impact of the proposed rule on small 141, Pub. L.97-425,96 Stat. 2229. 2230 replacements containing new simpitfied businesses and suggested alternative 2232, 2241, sec.148. Pub. L 100-203.101 procedures for all 300 and 400 series rnethods of compliance that reduce or Stat.1330-235 (42 U.S.C.10151,10152, eliminate such impacts. All airplanes (models affected by the 10153, 10155.10157,10161,10168).

current AD plus additional models). The communications received on or before Section 72.44(g) also issued under proposed AD would also revise the the closing date for comments, specified secs.142(b) and 148(c) (d). Pub. L 100- inspection intervals and would require above, will be considered before taking 203,101 Stat.1330-232,1330-236 (42 replacing certain unserviceable parts action on the proposed rule. The U.S.C.10162(b),10168(c), (d)). Section and removing the exhaust system for proposals contained in this notice may 72.46 also issued under sec.189,68 detailed inspections at regular intervals. be changed in light of the comments Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec.134. Pub. The proposed AD is the result of received.

L 97-425,96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. numerous incidents and accidents Comments are specifically invited on .

10164). Section 72.96(d) also issued relating to the exhaust systems on the overall regulatory, economic, !

under sec.145(g), Pub. L.100-203,101 Cessna 300 and 400 series airplanes environmental, and energy aspects of )

Stat.1330-235 (42 U.S.C.10165(g)). dating from the middle 1970's to the the proposed rule. All comments Subpart J also issued under secs. 2(2), present, including six incidents since submitted will be available, both before i 2(15),2(19),117(a),141(h). Pub. L 97- issuance of AD 75-23-08 R5 where and after the closing date for comments, 425,96 Stat. 2202, 2203,2204, 2222, exhaust problems were cited. The in the Rules Docket for examination by 2224. (42 U.S.C.10101,10137(a), actions specified by the proposed AD interested persons. A report that l 10161(h)). Subparts K and L are also are intended to detect and correct cracks summarizes each FAA pubile contact j issued under sec.133. 98 Stat. 2230 (42 and corrosion in the exhaust system, concerned with the substance of this !

U.S.C.10153) and sec. 218(a),96 Stat. which could result in exhaust system proposal will be filed in the Rules j 2252 (42 U.S.C.10198). failure and a possible uncontrollable in. Docket. j I

i I

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ML20209E526

Text

Enclosure:

Enclosure:

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

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